ABIGAIL WOODS

WHY SLAUGHTER? THE CULTURAL DIMENSIONS

OF BRITAIN’S FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE

CONTROL POLICY, 1892–2001

(Accepted in revised form February 10, 2004)

ABSTRACT. In 1892, the British agricultural authorities introduced a policy ofslaughtering animals infected with foot and mouth disease (FMD). This measure

endured throughout the 20th century and formed a base line upon which officialssuperimposed the controversial ‘‘contiguous cull’’ policy during the devastating 2001epidemic. Proponents of the slaughter frequently emphasized its capacity to elimi-

nate FMD from Britain, and claimed that it was both cheaper and more effectivethan the alternative policies of isolation and vaccination. However, their discussionsreveal that a less obvious but nonetheless important reason for maintaining the

slaughter policy was the conviction that in its manner of operation and its outcomes,it benefited the state and status of the British nation. To its supporters, slaughter wasfar more than a method of disease control; it acted also as a moralizing and civilizingforce, an indicator of veterinary ability and a ‘‘virility symbol’’ of British interna-

tional leadership. This ‘‘cultural’’ rationale for FMD control by slaughter declinedduring the late 20th century and was wholly undermined by the 2001 epidemic, whenextensive culling failed to convey the intended image of an organized, enlightened

Britain.

KEY WORDS: agriculture, contiguous cull, foot and mouth disease, history,nationalism, policy, slaughter, vaccination, veterinary

1. INTRODUCTION

In 2001, Britain suffered a devastating, seven-and-a-half month epidemic of

foot and mouth disease (FMD), a highly contagious viral disease of cloven-

footed animals. From the outset, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and

Food (MAFF)1 tried to control the disease by directing the slaughter of

diseased animals and their healthy contacts, placing nationwide restrictions

upon the movement and marketing of livestock, and attempting to trace the

origin and spread of disease. These measures had formed the basis for

1 The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, formerly the Board of Agricultureand Fisheries was formed in 1919. In 1955, it merged with the Ministry of Food tobecome MAFF. During the 2001 FMD crisis, this body was reconstituted as DE-

FRA, the Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.

Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 17: 341–362, 2004.

� 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

British FMD control policy for over a century. However, during the first

month of the epidemic, their failure to prevent viral spread caused the

government to open discussions upon the potential use of FMD vaccina-

tion. It eventually rejected this step in favor of a contiguous cull policy,

proposed by epidemiologists, which required the slaughter of all susceptible

animals within a 3 km radius of a confirmed case.2

The contiguous cull proved highly controversial. While its execution

coincided with a diminution in FMD spread, it is debatable whether it was

responsible for the epidemic’s decline. Proponents argued that it represented

the quickest and cheapest method of stamping out the virus and achieving

national ‘‘FMD-freedom,’’ a prerequisite for the resumption of agricultural

exports to other FMD-free countries. They viewed the alternative policy,

vaccination, as an unsafe and untested measure that could only contain and

not stamp out the virus, and referred to the year-long trading penalties

placed upon vaccinating nations by the international animal disease control

body, the Office Internationale Epizooties (OIE).3 Their critics – who in-

cluded the authors of numerous academic tracts upon the 2001 epidemic –

claimed that proponents of the cull had used doubtful scientific arguments

to support their rejection of FMD vaccination, and that the agricultural

economic benefits of culling were far outweighed by the cost to the tourist

industry. In any case, FMD control was not a purely economic issue. It was

morally wrong and indeed illegal to slaughter over 10 million mostly healthy

livestock in a manner that caused serious suffering to both humans and

animals.4

In his paper on the ethics of the government response to FMD, Ben

Mepham adhered to the latter view, asking, ‘‘might it not be concluded then,

that the real motive [for the cull] is an underlying determination to re-

establish the country’s ‘disease-free status,’ perhaps amounting to a need to

‘restore national pride’?’’5 I have discussed elsewhere the perceived impor-

2 For a detailed account of the course of the epidemic, see I. Anderson (2002).3 ‘‘Ministers gamble on mass cull,’’ Guardian, 16 March 2001, p. 1; ‘‘Head to

Head: Vaccination,’’ BBC news, 19 March 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1229910.stm; ‘‘Farmers will not back vaccination proposal,’’ The Times, 18 April, p.6; I. Anderson (2002), chapter 10 and 13.

4 ‘‘Militant farmers plot rural revolt,’’ Observer, 18 March 2001, p. 9; ‘‘NFU‘ignoring’ small farmers,’’ Guardian, 19 April 2001, p. 8; ‘‘Propaganda war overvaccination continues,’’ The Times, 21 April 2001, p. 14; D. Campbell and R. Lee

(2003); P. Sutmoller et al. (2003); M. Mort, C. Bailey, J. Baxter, and I. Convery,‘‘The Health and Social Consequences of the 2001 Foot and Mouth Epidemic inNorth Cumbria: an action research project,’’ evidence presented to European Par-

liament Committee on FMD (2003), www.europarl.eu.int/comparl/tempcom/fiap/contributions/other_evidence/lancaster_study_en.pdf.

5 B. Mepham (2001), p. 343.

ABIGAIL WOODS342

tance of national FMD-freedom, arguing that from the late 19th to the early

21st centuries, it exerted a powerful influence over the British government’s

attitude towards FMD research and control.6 Here, I will examine Mep-

ham’s suggestion that national pride was a motivating factor in the pursuit

of this goal. I draw upon evidence from two important fields of policy

debate, which I examine in turn. The first encompasses 20th century dis-

cussions upon whether slaughter, isolation, or vaccination represented the

most appropriate response to British FMD outbreaks. The second relates to

concurrent attempts by the British government to persuade overseas nations

to mimic its approach to FMD control.

Historians of medicine have long recognized that disease control meth-

ods are not based simply upon scientific evaluations of the biological nature

of disease, but are selected also as a result of broader social, economic,

political, cultural, and geographical concerns. For example, controls may

reflect cultural attitudes towards those sections of society most susceptible

to infection, or the ambitions of medical professionals charged with con-

trolling disease. Responses to epidemics may reflect the style of government

and its attitude towards intervening in trade or in the everyday lives of the

population. The geography of a nation is important in that it affects the

ability of a disease to invade and spread. The scientific framework within

which laboratory experiments are devised and results interpreted can also

influence decisions upon disease control, while nationalistic issues can affect

the willingness of medical authorities to adopt methods discovered by for-

eign scientists.7

Factors such as these, I will argue, had an important influence upon the

British government’s historic response to FMD and continued to shape

policy in 2001. For, while on economic and scientific grounds, MAFF (and

its predecessor, MAF) had a strong case for controlling FMD by means of

slaughter, its policy preferences were also underpinned by less obvious – and

perhaps not even consciously recognized – moral, cultural, and nationalistic

convictions. The very language and expressions employed during discus-

sions upon FMD reveals how MAFF officials and their supporters saw

slaughter not only as a cheap, effective method of disease control, but also

as a moralizing and civilizing force, an indicator of veterinary ability, and a

‘‘virility symbol’’ of Britain’s international superiority. Its replacement by

alternative policies that had no such advantages could not, therefore, be

contemplated.

6 A. Woods (2004), (forthcoming).7 For examples, see E. Ackerknecht (1948); M. Durey (1979); C. Rosenberg

(1992); A. Hardy (1993); L. Bryder (1999); P. Baldwin (1999).

WHY SLAUGHTER? 343

2. THE DRIVE FOR BRITISH FMD-FREEDOM

In 1886, legislative restrictions upon the domestic and international live-

stock trade succeeded in eliminating endemic FMD from Britain for the first

time since its 1839 appearance. Thereafter, the government’s response to

FMD was governed by the desire for national freedom from infection. This

policy goal led to the imposition of increasingly stringent controls upon the

importation of livestock and livestock products. It also facilitated the rise of

FMD control by slaughter, a measure that proponents argued could stamp

out new invasions of virus more quickly and cheaply than the traditional

method of isolating infected premises. In 1892, central government gained

the power to slaughter infected animals and their contacts. It applied this

measure increasingly in subsequent years, in an effort to minimize the im-

pact of new trade restrictions, placed by FMD-free countries such as Aus-

tralia, New Zealand, and the USA, upon livestock exported from infected

nations. By the mid-1920s, slaughter had become an established policy,

applied in compulsory, universal fashion to all FMD outbreaks.

During the first two-thirds of the 20th century, Britain was rarely free of

FMD for more than a few months at a time. The virus invaded repeatedly

from abroad, and although most new outbreaks were stamped out quickly,

some spread to cause major epidemics, as in 1922–1923, 1923–1924, 1951–

1952, and 1967–1968. On such occasions, MAFF (and its predecessor,

MAF) struggled to control not only disease but also public opinion, as

numerous farmers, veterinarians, and members of the public revolted

against the slaughter and attacked the official conviction that it was the best,

if not the only route to national FMD-freedom. During the first half of the

century, critics called for a return to the older policy of isolation, whereas

from the 1950s they demanded FMD vaccination. Throughout, officials

worked hard to defend their preferred policy from attack. Meanwhile, in an

attempt to reduce the frequency of FMD importation, they encouraged

European neighbors and trading partners to take more effective precautions

against disease spread. Their efforts seemed vindicated when FMD disap-

peared from Britain in 1968 and did not return until 2001, with the excep-

tion of a minor outbreak on the Isle of Wight in 1981.8

3. CONTROLLING FMD AT HOME

3.1. Defending Slaughter, 1922–1924

The 1922–1924 epidemics saw the first widespread application of the

slaughter policy, and the first intensive pressure for its overturn. In previous

8 See F.N. 6.

ABIGAIL WOODS344

years, slaughter had succeeded in rapidly extinguishing new invasions of

disease. Consequently, FMD incidence remained relatively low. However, in

1922–1924, FMD spread extensively, and for the first time, thousands of

farmers from all over Britain experienced the slaughter policy at first hand.

As the crisis deepened, many demanded a return to the earlier method of

isolating sick animals, and claimed that the human, animal, and financial

costs of slaughter far outweighed its benefits. However, Chief Veterinary

Officer, Stuart Stockman, dismissed such calls. In defense of his preferred

slaughter policy, he devised a powerful set of arguments that advertised the

national economic benefits of FMD-freedom and the merits of FMD con-

trol by slaughter.

Stockman argued that although rarely fatal, FMD caused chronic and

costly reductions in meat and milk production. Its highly contagious nature

meant that if allowed to spread unchecked it would soon become endemic,

and inflict enormous financial losses upon British agriculture. It was not

sufficient to merely control the disease, as its presence within Britain pre-

vented livestock exporters from trading with nations such as America, which

were FMD-free. Rather, it had to be eliminated from Britain. Slaughtering

infected animals and their contacts was the cheapest and most effective

means of achieving this goal, as unlike the older policy of isolation,

slaughter halted the manufacture and spread of virus.9

However, to the British agricultural authorities, FMD control by

slaughter was not merely an economic affair; it was also a moral, disci-

plining, and nationalistic force. A close examination of the nature of and

principles underlying the slaughter policy reveals why this was so. Although

intended to bring about a ‘‘national benefit’’ – that of freedom from FMD –

the costs of slaughter were overwhelmingly borne by individuals living in

regions affected by the disease. Success depended upon their willingness to

subordinate personal and regional interests to those of the nation. For,

while in many ways, slaughter was a dictatorial policy, imposed in com-

pulsory fashion by central government, it relied heavily upon the voluntary

actions of individual farmers. The penalties it laid down for infringing

regulations were relatively minor, and did not act as a major deterrent to

law-breaking. Also, officials were unable to act until stockowners informed

them of the appearance of FMD, and they relied upon farmers to adopt

‘‘strongly suggested’’ but not legislatively enforced modes of behavior, such

as disinfecting vehicles that entered and left the farm, keeping movements to

9 ‘‘Slaughter and Isolation – a comparison,’’ 1923 Report of the Chief Veterinary

Officer (1924), pp. 31–34.

WHY SLAUGHTER? 345

a minimum, and avoiding mixing with farmers whose stock were infected.10

Controlling FMD by means of slaughter, therefore, required livestock

owners to be aware, organized, and patriotic. They had to recognize FMD

as a costly, dangerous plague, monitor closely the health of their animals,

regulate their behavior in accordance with official recommendations, and

tolerate the loss of infected stock.

These features of the slaughter policy were well known to Stockman, his

MAF colleagues, and supportive agriculturalists, whose public and private

commentary upon FMD control frequently adopted a moralizing or

nationalistic tone. They praised the stoicism and self-sacrifice of farmers

who abided by the slaughter policy, sympathized with their losses, but at the

same time reminded them ‘‘of the important part they can, and legally and

morally should, play in checking and eradicating the disease.’’11 Problems

encountered in the control of FMD they attributed to ‘‘the human element,

human frailty.’’12 The chief impediment to success was the refusal of certain

‘‘ignorant’’ and ‘‘selfish’’ farmers to follow official advice and comply with

the requirements of their slaughter policy. Stockman and his supporters

accused such individuals of attempting to save their own livestock at the

expense of the nation, and criticized their failure to comprehend a policy

accepted by all educated and enlightened men. They also claimed that in

opposing the slaughter and holding meetings to call for an alternative pol-

icy, these parties had facilitated the spread of disease.13 In this manner, they

undermined livestock owners’ complaints about the rising death toll from

slaughter, the delayed culling and disposal of infected stock, and the

resulting social, psychological, and financial hardships. Nor would they

countenance critics’ calls for a return to isolation. This policy, they argued,

involved an even greater degree of self-sacrifice than slaughter, as no com-

pensation was paid and lengthier, more arduous trade restrictions were re-

quired to prevent disease spread. Those unable to bear the hardships

10 Verbatim evidence to 1922 Committee, PRO MAF 35/162; Report of the 1922

Departmental Committee on FMD (1923), p. 19; Memo, ‘‘Advice to farmers,’’ PROMAF 35/164; Mr Jones, legal adviser, advice to 1924 Departmental Committee,PRO MAF 35/165.

11 ‘‘The farmers’ duty,’’ The Times, 3 February 1922, p. 12 col e.12 Capt. Pretyman, evidence to 1924 Departmental Committee, PRO 35/166, p.

78.13 ‘‘NFU support,’’ The Times, 6 February 1922, p. 7 col. a; ‘‘The Stock owners’

stoicism,’’ The Times, 24 December 1923, p. 11 col. c; ‘‘NFU resolutions,’’ TheTimes, 10 January 1924, p. 14 col. b; Evidence presented to 1922 and 1924 Com-mittees of Enquiry, PRO MAF 35/162, 35/164, 35/165 and 35/166; CVO address to

the National Veterinary Medical Society, Veterinary Record, 19 January 1924, p. 36.

ABIGAIL WOODS346

associated with slaughter could certainly not be trusted to abide by the

requirements of isolation.14

This discourse reveals that one of the reasons why MAF and its sup-

porters accepted the slaughter policy was that it appeared to benefit the

national condition. They viewed FMD as an invading ‘‘enemy’’ that could

only be defeated by a ‘‘military operation.’’ Like other forms of warfare, the

‘‘fight’’ against FMD could ‘‘only be successfully prosecuted by the nation

and not by private individuals.’’ A ‘‘veterinary army’’ was required, of which

Stockman was ‘‘general in chief.’’ Slaughter was an essential ‘‘weapon’’ in the

‘‘battle’’ against FMD, and instilled in farmers a wartime mentality that

comprised a sense of duty, discipline, and the national good.15

Support for slaughter also rested on the belief that it enhanced Britain’s

international standing. Stockman and his supporters viewed Britain’s FMD-

freedom as a sign of national superiority over countries that still suffered from

endemic disease, and attributed this status to the adoption of a slaughter

policy. In efforts to justify and inspire support for slaughter, they often

contrasted Britain’s infrequent FMD outbreaks and low compensation costs

with the large number of costly outbreaks experienced in nations that did not

employ a slaughter policy. Implicit in this rhetoric was the notion that FMD

elimination by slaughter resulted in a ‘‘pure’’ livestock population, that was

uncontaminated by the germs of FMD and far superior to those ‘‘tainted’’

animals raised within infected nations.16 In fact, international differences in

FMD incidence and control were largely a product of geography, although

British agricultural officials rarely drew attention to this matter. Nations with

land borders found it impossible to prevent virus invasion. Consequently,

they dismissed as futile the pursuit of national FMD freedom and rejected

slaughter on the grounds of cost and public opposition.17

Another way in which slaughtering contributed to Britain’s international

status was by facilitating the livestock export trade to FMD-free nations.

14 ‘‘Slaughter versus Isolation,’’ Stockman evidence to 1924 Departmental Com-

mittee, PRO MAF 35/167; Verbatim report of 1922 Pretyman committee, PROMAF 35/164; Stockman correspondence to J. Sadler and H. Tollemache, CheshireObserver, 19 January 1924, p. 1.

15 Verbatim evidence to 1924 committee, PROMAF 35/164 and 35/165; Report ofthe 1924 Departmental Committee on FMD (1924–1925), p. 78.

16 For European FMD incidence, 1921–1925 see Hansard [HC], 196, col. 1713–1714, 10 June 1926; ‘‘FMD abroad,’’ in official evidence to 1922 committee of en-quiry, PRO MAF 35/160; ‘‘Slaughter versus Isolation,’’ Stockman evidence to 1924

Departmental Committee, PRO MAF 35/167.17 For a discussion of the influence of geography upon disease control policies, see

P. Baldwin (1999).

WHY SLAUGHTER? 347

During the first half of the 20th century, this trade comprised several

thousand valuable pedigree beasts, exported annually for breeding purposes

to the Dominions, Argentina, and Europe. In the years prior to the 1922–

1924 epidemics, exports earned an annual average of just £700,000, whereas

the government’s compensation bill amounted to £1.25 million the 1922–

1923 epidemic and £3.3 million in 1923–1924. However, the export trade

was not merely an economic affair. Breeders – many of whom were wealthy

aristocrats – regarded their animals as the best in the world, and argued that

in breeding with ‘‘inferior’’ stock overseas they raised the worldwide stan-

dard of meat and livestock. Preserving the export trade was, therefore,

essential to the international prestige of the British nation. Their opinions

carried considerable weight, and encouraged the veterinary authorities to

resist calls for policy change.18

FMD control by slaughter had other cultural benefits. Its belated elimi-

nation of the 1922–1924 epidemics marked an important political victory for

MAF officials in their battle with the proponents of isolation. It also con-

firmed their far-sightedness in adhering to slaughter, their ability to imple-

ment it successfully, and their skill in winning government support for this

unpopular measure. To veterinary commentators, the elimination of FMD

was a scientific and a professional achievement in which MAF veterinarians

demonstrated the profession’s indispensable role in advancing the national

and agricultural interest. In addition, it proved the superiority of veterinary

surgeons over medical doctors, who were often critical of the slaughter policy

yet had failed to eliminate a single human ailment from Britain.19

3.2. Battling Against Vaccination, 1951–1968

In the years after the 1922–1924 epidemic, MAF continued to support

slaughter in the belief that it benefited livestock health, the agricultural

industry, and the state and status of the nation as a whole. They dismissed

the only viable alternative, isolation, on the grounds it would not lead to

18 Government Responses to Parliamentary Questions, Hansard [HC], 125, col.1942–1943, 26 February 1920; ibid, 128, col. 637–638, 22 April 1920; 1922, 1923 and

1924 Reports of the Chief Veterinary Officer; CVO evidence to 1924 Committee, PRO35/167; E. Whetham (1979).

19 Sir John McFadyean, evidence to 1912 Departmental Committee on FMD;Editorial, ‘‘Congratulation replaces criticism,’’ Veterinary Record, 2 September 1922,p. 626; Editorial, Veterinary Journal, February 1924, pp. 56–57, Stockman corre-

spondence to Sir W. Leishman, 7 January 191/24, PRO MAF 35/217.

ABIGAIL WOODS348

national FMD-freedom, and labeled its supporters selfish and ignorant.20

During the mid-20th century, however, the discovery and improvement of

FMD vaccines by continental and British FMD scientists provided a new

policy option and revived British debates over FMD control. As mentioned

earlier, on account of their geography most European nations suffered from

endemic FMD, and for political and economic reasons were unable to adopt

a British-style control policy. Consequently, they regarded vaccination as

the most effective method of containing FMD. France, Belgium, Holland,

Switzerland, Denmark, Holland, and Sweden began to adopt this technol-

ogy during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Vaccines were not then available

in sufficient quantities to permit widespread, systemic use, and so govern-

ments applied diverse strategies such as the immunization of valuable stock,

ring vaccination around outbreaks, or the vaccination of vulnerable animals

along frontiers to prevent disease invasion. In Switzerland and Sweden,

vaccination was applied in combination with slaughter. Some countries al-

lowed farmers to vaccinate at will, while in others it was enforced by the

state.21

MAF viewed as irrelevant these advances in vaccine production and

continued to apply a slaughter policy in pursuit of national freedom from

FMD. Its stance became subject to substantial criticism in 1951–1952, when

a severe FMD epidemic spread across Western Europe and invaded Britain.

As the months passed, the apparent failure of slaughter to contain FMD

caused considerable alarm, and on learning from the press of FMD vacci-

nation overseas, many members of the British public asked why MAF did

not follow suit. In defense of their actions, officials devised a set of economic

and scientific arguments against vaccination, which they used alongside

Stockman’s economic justification for the slaughter policy. Supportive ag-

riculturalists and veterinarians then took up and publicized their case.

Firstly, officials declared vaccination more expensive than slaughter: to

maintain complete national immunity to FMD, veterinarians would have to

inoculate all susceptible animals every four months, at an annual cost of

£13 million. By comparison, over the previous 25 years slaughter had cost

20 For example, ‘‘Responsibility of the Stock Owner,’’ The Times, 9 January 1928,p. 20, col. a; ‘‘Cattle disease and its results – plight of the breeding industry,’’ ibid, 14May 1928, p. 20, col. a; ‘‘FMD slaughter policy – question in Parliament,’’ ibid, 13May 1935, p. 22, col. c; ‘‘Vindication of Britain’s slaughter measures,’’ Daily Mail, 9

November 1937, p. 20, col d; ‘‘More cases of FMD,’’ Daily Telegraph, 16 November1937, p. 16, col. fl ‘‘FMD – slaughter, Council of Agriculture,’’ The Times, 10December 1937, p. 9, col. a; ‘‘Mr T Williams, speech,’’ ibid, 12 March 1941, p. 2, col.

f.21 26th and 27th meeting of Gower Committee of Enquiry, September 1953, PRO

MAF 387/28; Report of Committee of Enquiry on FMD, 1952–1954, pp. 27–35.

WHY SLAUGHTER? 349

the government an average £176,000 a year in compensation. Secondly, they

argued that vaccines were dangerous because animals did not develop FMD

immunity until 14 days after inoculation. During that period and when

vaccines were wearing off, animals could still contract FMD, but were likely

to show only mild clinical signs of disease. This phenomenon of ‘‘masking’’

would probably allow FMD to occur and spread unnoticed. Their third

argument was that vaccines were far less effective than slaughter, as they

were useless in young animals and largely unsuccessful in pigs and sheep.22

As in earlier years, however, science and economics were not the only

factors influencing MAF’s choice of FMD control policy. In explaining why

their view of vaccination differed from that of foreign experts, officials and

their supporters revealed their continuing conviction that Britain’s adher-

ence to slaughter was a sign of national superiority. They pointed out that

vaccinating governments sought only to control FMD, instead of pursuing

the higher goal of national FMD-freedom. Consequently they were satisfied

with vaccination, a scientifically flawed method that could contain the virus

but not eliminate it. Also, continental scientists had released vaccines for use

in the field prior to exhaustive laboratory testing. The results of field trials

were unreliable because where FMD was endemic, many vaccinated animals

already possessed disease immunity, and it was impossible to tell whether

vaccines ‘‘masked’’ infection or assisted its spread. By contrast, British

scientists had carried out accurate, reliable testing, using animals of known

susceptibility to infection within a controlled laboratory environment. On

account of Britain’s FMD-freedom, they had higher standards than their

continental counterparts, because even a single vaccine failure in the field

could result in a widespread epidemic.23

Officials’ claims were not unfounded, given the different contexts of

FMD control in Britain and Europe. What is significant, however, is their

assumption that these differences arose because Britain was far in advance

of the continent, both in scientific development and FMD control. Records

of internal MAF discussions, and the evidence that officials submitted to the

Committee of Enquiry into the 1951–1952 FMD epidemic are similarly

revealing of the nationalistic framework within which officials viewed FMD

control. They took great pride in the fact that, unaided by laboratory-

22 For details, see H. H. Skinner’s collection of press cuttings upon the 1951–52epidemic, held by the Animal Virus Research Institute, Pirbright.

23 ‘‘Forceps,’’,‘‘Foot and mouth disease and its control,’’ Sport and Country, 16April 1952 (AVRI archive); Dr I. Galloway on FMD vaccines, Daily Telegraph, 8

May 1952 (AVRI archive); ‘‘FMD policy – comparisons with the continent,’’ TheTimes, 12 May 1952, p. 3 col. d; Lord Rothschild, ‘‘Foot and Mouth,’’ SundayTimes, 5 October 1952 (AVRI archive); FMD research – Interim report (1952) pp. 1–

2; ‘‘FMD research,’’ The Times, 15 February 1954, p. 3 col. d.

ABIGAIL WOODS350

generated tools, their staff could engage with and gain a resounding victory

over a terrible animal plague that regularly laid waste foreign agriculture.

For them, FMD-freedom still represented the supreme mastery of man over

nature, and its achievement through slaughter was testament to the pro-

fessional abilities of the veterinary department, the administrative and

political skills of the Ministry of Agriculture and the responsible, educated,

patriotic nature of the farming community.

By contrast, MAF officials saw vaccination as a complex process under

which germs were modified and not eliminated. It acted like a smokescreen,

obscuring the transmission and symptoms of FMD from the gaze of the

veterinary authorities, and in failing to stamp out infection, forced livestock

to co-exist with a dangerous virus. Under this ‘‘second best’’ policy there

could be no certain or obvious victory over FMD. Consequently, MAF

officials and their supporters believed it suitable only for nations where

British-style controls were unworkable. According to this logic, if Britain

adopted a policy of vaccination, it would be reduced to the same level as

disorganized, inefficient, ignorant, and immoral nations such as France,

where ignorant farmers did not regard FMD as a dangerous disease, and

‘‘the Latin temperament of the population and the intrusion of politics

militate[s] against the effective imposition of restrictions.’’24 Such a move

could not, therefore, be contemplated.25

Pro-vaccination campaigners argued that the owners of valuable pedi-

gree herds should have the right to vaccinate their own animals at their own

expense without going through MAF veterinary surgeons.26 Officials re-

garded any such move as a dangerous heresay, which would encourage

owners to pursue their personal interests at the expense of the nation. They

argued that in removing farmers’ responsibilities under the slaughter policy,

vaccination would promote complacency, undermine their sense of national

duty, and lessen their awareness of animal welfare. Also, allowing farmers to

vaccinate at will would weaken the centralized nature of Britain’s FMD

control policy, and destabilize an administrative system that was a credit to

the nation.27 As in 1922–1924, MAF officials and their supporters labeled

proponents of policy change ‘‘selfish’’ and ‘‘ignorant,’’ and continued to

refer to FMD as an ‘‘invading enemy,’’ that had to be ‘‘fought’’ and ‘‘de-

24 Gowers committee account of visit to France and Switzerland, PRO MAF 387/23.

25 J. Ritchie and W. Tame, evidence to Gowers committee, PRO MAF 387/2;T. Dalling, evidence to Gowers committee, PRO MAF 387/18; Gowers committeemeetings, PRO MAF 387/28.

26 Lord Iveagh evidence to Gower committee, PRO MAF 387/7; George Villiers,‘‘The case for inoculation,’’ PRO MAF 35/765.

27 Gowers committee account of visit to France and Switzerland, MAF 387/23.

WHY SLAUGHTER? 351

feated’’ by means of animal ‘‘sacrifice.’’28 Eventually, slaughter succeeded in

stamping out FMD, and the pro-vaccination lobby was defeated.

During the next major epidemic of 1967–1968, MAF again insisted upon

controlling FMD by slaughter. In defense of their actions, officials repeated

many earlier arguments about the economic advantages of this policy and

the scientific defects of vaccination. However, in the language and expres-

sions they used, spokesmen and their supporters revealed a continuing faith

in the moral, cultural, and national benefits of slaughter. They argued that

Britain had ‘‘gone to great lengths and expense to remain the healthiest

livestock country in the world. Good breeding and husbandry have made us

the envy of the world.’’ MAFF’s professional staff and British FMD sci-

entists were ‘‘the best in the world,’’ and the administration of the ‘‘cam-

paign’’ against FMD was ‘‘first-rate.’’ In contrast to vaccination, ‘‘Britain’s

standards are higher than most countries.’’ Foreign nations could use vac-

cines to control FMD, but in Britain, where the goal was disease elimina-

tion, their adoption would be ‘‘a national calamity’’ that was ‘‘tantamount

to resigning our proud freedom from disease, with far-reaching conse-

quences on exports for breeding.’’ A move to vaccinate would also mean

that ‘‘all the sacrifice that those 1,600 farmers have given will be in vain.’’29

In the early weeks of the ‘‘battle … waged between virus and vet,’’ virus

appeared to be winning. One commentator attributed the failure of

slaughter to ‘‘farmers [who] seem to have adopted a fatalistic attitude to-

wards the disease and … have not bothered to take precautions. Such an

attitude in 1940 would have lost the war.’’30 However, within MAF’s Vet-

erinary Department, officials were beginning to doubt whether, despite its

merits, slaughter could succeed in containing the epidemic. Consequently,

they drew up contingency plans for ring vaccination. At the critical moment,

FMD incidence dropped and the plans were not put into practice. Never-

theless, on the advice of the Northumberland Committee of Enquiry into

the 1967–1968 epidemic, officials agreed to keep them in constant readiness

in case of future outbreaks.31 MAF’s acknowledgement that vaccines could

help to suppress new FMD outbreaks drew resistance from farming bodies

traditionally supportive of the slaughter policy. They were concerned that

vaccination would not only hinder Britain’s pursuit of FMD-freedom, but

28 FMD reporting in The Times and The Daily Telegraph, March–August 1952,passim.

29 Examples drawn from Hansard [HC], Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, 20November–23 December 1967, passim.

30 ‘‘The nature of the enemy,’’ Chester Chronicle, 1 December 1967, p. 17.31 Report of the committee of enquiry on FMD 1968, Part 1, pp. 89–91; Hughes

group report, 2 April 1969, and Carnochan to Treasury, 23 April 1969, PRO MAF

276/403.

ABIGAIL WOODS352

also ‘‘convey to the world that FMD is endemic in Great Britain,’’ and

‘‘change the standing of this country which, in the past, we have been proud

to call the stud farm of the world.’’ From a nationalistic as well as from a

trading perspective, Britain should not depart from the traditional slaughter

policy.32

4. THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE: INTERPRETING FOREIGN

ATTITUDES TO FMD CONTROL

Analysis of 20th century policy discussions on the international aspects of

FMD provides further evidence for MAF’s conviction that in pursuing

FMD freedom by means of a slaughter policy, Britain was demonstrating its

superiority over nations that failed to follow suit. In considering how best to

reduce FMD importation into Britain, official attention often focused upon

the disease situation abroad. Throughout the century, Canada, New Zea-

land, Australia, and the USA remained virtually FMD-free, and tackled

occasional outbreaks by means of slaughter. However, until the 1970s and

1980s, FMD was endemic in most European and South American countries.

While recognizing the constraints that national geography placed upon the

choice of FMD control policy, MAF officials and leading agriculturalists

felt that all nations should recognize FMD as a terrible animal plague, take

steps to limit its spread, and aspire ultimately to FMD elimination. Those

that failed to do so they regarded with a mixture of emotions. For while

foreign nations’ lack of control over FMD lent support to their belief in

Britain’s political, scientific, moral, and educational superiority, it also laid

Britain open to repeated invasions of virus from abroad.

This ambivalence towards FMD-infected nations was clearly illustrated

by the responses of leading agriculturalists to the 1912 news that FMD had

existed unnoticed in Ireland for over two weeks and had spread across the

Irish Channel, an event that coincided with political debates over whether

Ireland should be granted Home Rule. On the mainland, the agricultural

authorities tackled FMD outbreaks by slaughtering all infected animals and

their contacts and banning Irish livestock imports. However, the Irish

Department for Agriculture and Technical Instruction opted to slaughter

only overtly diseased stock and isolate the remainder. Its President, TW

Russell, spoke for countless Irish farmers in claiming that there was no

direct evidence that Irish animals had exported FMD to England, and that

the trade ban was unjustified.

To leading British agriculturalists and their supporters in the national

press, the actions of Russell and his supporters proved that Ireland was not

32 Farming correspondence, 1970, PRO MAF 287/479/2.

WHY SLAUGHTER? 353

only incapable of controlling FMD but also intrinsically unsuited to na-

tional self-government. They accused the Irish Department of ‘‘ignorance,

weakness and dilatoriness’’33 and of colluding with ignorant, irresponsible,

greedy Irish farmers to conceal FMD from the British authorities. They

attributed Ireland’s resistance to the trade embargo to a ‘‘self-interested’’

desire for profit, and a failure to consider how FMD impacted upon

mainland agriculture and its livestock export trade. Moreover, the Irish

reaction to FMD revealed ‘‘a lack of experience in matters of the kind – and,

it has been suggested, her dislike of legislative control.’’34 Evidently, the

Irish agricultural authorities could not be trusted to contain FMD; nor

could the Irish population as a whole be trusted to abide by the law. In fact,

Ireland’s response to FMD offered sufficient justification for maintaining

rule from Westminster.35

In their dealings with Argentina, MAF officials revealed a similar con-

viction that the failure to control FMD was indicative of broader national

failings. Veterinary investigations carried out during the period 1926–1968

suggested that South American meat imports were responsible for the

majority of British FMD outbreaks, including the 1967–1968 epidemic.36 As

the largest exporter in the region, suspicions fell naturally upon Argentina,

which suffered from endemic FMD and took relatively few precautions

against its spread. For over 40 years, MAF officials tried to convince

Argentine government officials and farmers to improve the ‘‘purity and

merit’’37 of their meat by taking more effective steps against the disease. This

proved an extremely difficult task: many Argentines viewed FMD not as a

dangerous plague but as a mild and transient ailment, and they thought the

costs of control far outweighed the benefits. They also disputed the evidence

of a link between their meat and British FMD outbreaks.38

The Argentine stance was not unjustified; in nations where FMD was

endemic, animals gained resistance to infection at an early age and suffered

33 Charles Bathurst, letter to The Times, 3 September 1912, p. 6 col. a.34 ‘‘FMD,’’ The Times, 15 July 1912, p. 13 col. e35 Department of Agriculture for Ireland (1914); 1912 Report of the Chief Vet-

erinary Officer (1913); Speeches by Chaplin, Bathurst, and Peel, Hansard [HC], 40,col. 1487–1567, 5 July 1912; ‘‘Special Article,’’ The Times, 15 July 1912, p. 13 col. e;‘‘The Irish Cattle Trade,’’ The Times, 6 September 1912, p. 10 col. a.

36 Report of the Committee of Enquiry on FMD (1953–1954), pp. 11, 15–16, 79;Report of the Committee of Enquiry on FMD (1968–1969), pp. 12–13; Origin of the

1967–1968 FMD Epidemic (1968), pp. 3–4.37 ‘‘Meat – imports, Argentina,’’ The Times, 6 August 1828, p. 16, col. b.38 Correspondence 1926–1928, PRO MAF 35/208; J. Richelet (1929); Clippings

from Farmer and Stockbreeder, 3 October 1957, and Daily Express, 22 April 1968,PRO MAF 276/396; La Fiebre Aftosa en Gran Bretana, anos 1967–68’, Argentine

government white paper, PRO FCO 7/171.

ABIGAIL WOODS354

only mild clinical signs. The huge livestock population of Argentina and its

vast open spaces made attempts at control seem futile – and also unneces-

sary given the British willingness to admit Argentine meat regardless of the

presence of FMD. However, MAF officials became extremely exasperated

by Argentine attitudes, which they attributed to ‘‘national pride,’’ a desire to

‘‘save face,’’ or a ‘‘guilty conscience.’’ Like the French, the ‘‘provocative

Argentines’’ were ‘‘temperamental and not readily amenable to disci-

pline.’’39 They had a weak, unstable, and corrupt political system in which

entrenched interests prevented the passage of disease control regulations

that restricted trade. Further impediments to progress included the small

numbers of poorly educated veterinary surgeons, and ignorant livestock

owners who failed to recognize FMD as a plague and refused to acknowl-

edge the scientific evidence linking their meat to British FMD outbreaks.

Incompetent scientists were also to blame, as they were incapable of

assessing the safety and potency of FMD vaccines.40 Many changes were,

therefore, required before Argentina became like Britain, a nation capable

of pursuing FMD freedom by means of slaughter.

Another international clash over FMD control occurred during the mid-

1950s, when British agricultural and veterinary officials attempted to stim-

ulate interest in the formation of a European Commission on Foot and

Mouth Disease (EUFMD). They argued that only a coordinated attack

could defeat the disease, and, working through the Food and Agriculture

Organisation of the United Nations, helped to draw up a constitution that

institutionalized British preferences for FMD control. Member govern-

ments had to agree to undertake FMD control with a view to eradication.

Vaccination was acceptable in the early stages, but should ultimately give

way to slaughter. In July 1954, after just six nations had joined, the EU-

FMD held its first meeting.41

From the start, the French government expressed opposition to the

EUFMD, on the grounds that it replicated the responsibilities of the existing

international animal disease control body – the Paris-based Office Interna-

tional des Epizooties (OIE). The French also attempted to establish a rival

worldwide FMD-control body, for which it drafted a constitution and

39 C. P. Quick, Memo, 9 December 1957, PRO MAF 35/696; Uffen minute, 27March 1968, PRO FCO 7/168.

40 R. Jackson, correspondence, 1927, PRO MAF 35/208; A. Hurd correspon-

dence, 1958–1960, PRO MAF 35/696 and 255/891; Report of J. Ritchie’s trip toSouth America, 4 June 1959, PRO MAF 255/891; M. Gale, dispatches to FO,March-May 1968, PRO FCO 7/168 and 7/1070; M. Cresswell, ‘‘The Anglo-Argen-

tine meat problem: summary,’’ PRO MAF 287/520/1.41 Detailed correspondence contained within PRO MAF 35/868, 35/869 and 252/

48.

WHY SLAUGHTER? 355

arranged an initial meeting. Governments interested in its proposal refused

to join the EUFMD, making it impossible for the latter to fulfill its goals. As

described earlier, MAF officials had an extremely poor opinion of French

FMD control, and had drawn from it several disparaging deductions about

the state of the French nation. Consequently, they were infuriated by its

attempts to undermine the EUFMD, and argued that only Britain, by virtue

of its superlative FMD status, had the authority to establish an interna-

tional control body.42 One official alleged ulterior motives on the part of the

French government: ‘‘The French have been absolutely vicious about this,

partly because the OIE is stationed in Paris and partly because their desire is

to avoid any real measure of control of their own internal conditions. They

know that these cannot stand up to scrutiny.’’43 The French proposals

eventually fell by the wayside and the EUFMD became the dominant body

in European FMD control. But despite repeated urgings, France refused to

join the organization until 1981.44

5. FMD CONTROL IN THE 21St CENTURY

This paper has shown that while for much of the 20th century, MAFF

officials and their supporters used economic and scientific arguments to

defend their preference for FMD control by slaughter, they were driven also

by faith in moral, cultural, and national benefits. Its successful application

depended upon and advertised the merits of organized, intelligent veterinary

officials, skilled MAF administrators, and educated, disciplined farmers,

and required all of these groups to band together and subordinate their

personal desires to the interests of the nation. The outcome – national FMD

freedom – was the highest possible achievement in animal disease control,

and permitted the worldwide exportation of Britain’s famous, untainted

pedigree stock. Just as FMD control by slaughter enhanced the standing of

the British nation, so the adoption of alternative policies abroad highlighted

the political, educational, and scientific deficiencies of foreign countries.

This view of FMD control by slaughter did not go unopposed. Propo-

nents of first isolation and later vaccination argued that these methods were

more humane and inflicted considerably less hardship upon livestock owners

and rural communities. The gentler methods removed the need for gov-

ernment compensation, preserved animals in order that they could enter the

food chain, and provided psychological security to farmers living in fear of

42 Correspondence, 1954, PRO MAF 252/48.43 Minute, 5 August 1955, PRO MAF 252/49.44 Report of the 22nd session of the ECFMD (1977), Appendix 7; Report of the 23rd

session of the ECFMD (1979).

ABIGAIL WOODS356

losing their stock. Moreover, vaccination was a modern, scientific achieve-

ment adopted by all forward-looking nations. By comparison, the tradi-

tional cull policy was a blunt and outdated instrument, applied by

‘‘backward’’ countries that were unaware of the progress of science.45 But

such views had little impact on official opinion. MAF branded its opponents

‘‘ignorant,’’ ‘‘selfish,’’ and ‘‘unpatriotic’’ and deliberately excluded them

from policy discussions. Consequently, slaughter survived, despite MAF’s

1968 acknowledgement than vaccination might be required in future.

During the years 1968–2000, FMD remained absent from mainland

Britain, and the ‘‘cultural’’ basis for FMD control by slaughter became less

apparent. This was partly because officials no longer had to stamp out

successive outbreaks or to defend their preferred policy from attack. As the

years passed, they gradually lost touch with the moralizing, nationalistic

aspects of FMD control. Meanwhile, structural changes in the British meat

and livestock export trade meant that it ceased to be the preserve of the rich

pedigree breeder. Exports of ‘‘ordinary’’ livestock increased substantially,

adding to the economic value of the trade, but detracting from its nation-

alistic importance.

Another reason for the declining ‘‘cultural’’ value of FMD control by

slaughter was the worldwide improvement in FMD control. During the

second half of the 20th century, endemic FMD was brought under control in

South America and gradually eliminated from Europe by means of vacci-

nation. The 1992 formation of the European Union prompted the stream-

lining of European FMD control policy, and after some debate, all nations

agreed to stop vaccinating and adopt a slaughter policy. For fear that

vaccinated animals might import infection, these countries worked through

the Office Internationale Epizooties to establish new trade barriers against

vaccinating nations. Those that wished to export agricultural produce to the

EU were forced to follow suit and pursue national FMD freedom by means

of slaughter.46 In this manner, MAFF’s long-standing preference for FMD

control became fixed in international law, the basis for a new system of

trade. However, while this shift seemed to vindicate MAFF’s century-old

policy decisions, it also meant that Britain no longer stood apart from most

45 Cheshire farmers’ evidence to 1924 Committee of Enquiry, PRO MAF 35/164;‘‘Foot and mouth,’’ The Economist, London, 24 May 1952, p. 506; ‘‘Foot and Mouth

Policy under Fire,’’ Daily Telegraph, June 1952 (AVRI archive); A. M. Allen,‘‘Immunised Cattle,’’ ibid, October 1952; George Villiers, ‘‘The case for inoculationas an aid to the fight against FMD,’’ PRO MAF 35/866.

46 Rees (unpublished); Report from the Commission on the control of FMD (1989);‘‘OIE official ‘disease-free’ status,’’ http://www.oie.int/eng/info/enstatut.htm; ‘‘Eur-

ope awaits crucial findings,’’ Guardian, 1 March 2001, p. 8.

WHY SLAUGHTER? 357

of Europe, elevated by its ability to achieve FMD freedom by slaughter. The

nationalist implications of this policy were correspondingly weakened.

Britain’s international standing in the field of animal health was

undermined further by the disastrous late 20th century epidemic of BSE and

by the appearance of swine fever in 2000. Farmers could no longer claim

that Britain’s livestock were the best and the healthiest in the world. Indeed,

there was a growing perception of Britain as a ‘‘plague nation’’ that posed a

threat to international human and animal health. Such suspicions were

confirmed in 2001, when FMD spread throughout Britain and into Ireland,

France, and the Netherlands.47 Britain was no longer a victim of the inferior

FMD control policies pursued by ‘‘inferior’’ foreign nations; instead, it was

responsible for the worst European encounter with FMD in over two dec-

ades.

Despite this shifting context, the official response to the 2001 FMD

epidemic was still influenced by cultural and nationalistic issues, which

supplemented the oft-cited economic and scientific rationales for slaughter

and acted as a bar to policy change. Whereas during the first two-thirds of

the 20th century, MAFF saw FMD control by slaughter as an indication of

Britain’s superiority, in 2001 it became a means of dispelling the increasingly

widespread belief that Britain was a sick country, in which greedy, corrupt

farmers employed immoral, unnatural farming methods, under the

encouragement of an incompetent, hide-bound MAFF and a flawed Com-

mon Agricultural Policy.48 Keen to reassert their disease-control credentials

and to restore Britain’s international standing as an FMD-free nation,

officials reached for the simple, decisive policy that had succeeded repeatedly

in the past. When that failed, they opted for ‘‘even more of the same,’’ a

contiguous cull.

Throughout the epidemic, official pronouncements – which were echoed

by selected farmers and veterinarians and disseminated by the national

media – named slaughter as the only policy capable of restoring Britain’s

FMD-freedom. Initially, they neglected to mention vaccination as a policy

option. Later, they highlighted the cost and organizational difficulties of

47 S. Jasnoff, ‘‘Civilisation and madness: the great BSE scare of 1996,’’ PublicUnderstanding of Science 6 (1997), p. 222; ‘Pig ban threatens UK farmers,’ BBCnews, 12 August 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/877326.stm; ‘‘Europe awaitscrucial findings,’’ Guardian, 1 March 2001, p. 8; ‘‘First French case triggers alarm

across Continent,’’ The Times, 14 March 2001, p. 9; ‘‘Go away. This evil has come tous from your whore of an England, once again,’’ Independent, 14 March 2001, p. 3;‘‘Angry French have it in for the English,’’ The Times, 17 March 2001, p. 19.

48 ‘‘The terrible cost of our cheap meat,’’ Sunday Times, 18 March 2001, pp. 12–13; A. Kaletsky, ‘‘What is so special about the farmers?’’ The Times, 19 April 2001, p.

18.

ABIGAIL WOODS358

vaccinating, its impact upon livestock exports and the risk that it would

perpetuate the disease. But their rejection of this technology was not based

solely upon scientific and economic factors. They also believed that vacci-

nation would undermine Britain’s international standing and reduce the

quality of its meat and livestock. They feared to ‘‘leap into the unknown,’’

and were concerned that consumers would perceive vaccinated meat as

‘‘tainted’’ (a somewhat unfounded supposition given the many inoculations

that livestock already received.) As Mepham suggested in his paper on the

ethics of FMD control,49 national pride was clearly at stake, for MAFF had

spent a century trying to ‘‘educate’’ the world on the merits of slaughter and

did not intend to sacrifice its principle of FMD-freedom in favor of a policy

that most civilized nations had now abandoned. Vaccination amounted to

an admission of failure, and would stigmatize the nation on account of the

trading penalties it attracted. These convictions were reflected in the lan-

guage MAFF and its supporters used to describe vaccination: it was ‘‘a

substantial retreat,’’ ‘‘no substitute for slaughter,’’ and a ‘‘last resort.’’50

Dead set against vaccination, MAFF neglected to consider recent tech-

nical advances that had made it a safer and more effective method than ever

before. Supported by farmers’ leaders, who had most to lose economically

by vaccination, it resisted public pressure for a change in policy, even when

the failure of slaughter became apparent. As in previous years, officials

alleged that farmers who demanded vaccination had failed to understand

the issues involved, and wished only to save their own animals at the ex-

pense of the nation. In resisting the destruction of their stock and failing to

abide by ‘‘bio security’’ regulations, these selfish individuals had allowed the

disease to continue spreading, and were therefore responsible for the failure

of the traditional policy.51 War metaphors again played an important role in

its discussions upon FMD control: ‘‘animal sacrifice’’ was the only way ‘‘to

49 Mepham (2001), p. 343.50 For examples see ‘‘Ban on country rambling and trading may be necessary,’’

The Times, 22 February 2001, p. 8; J. Alcock, ‘‘Why animals have to be slaughtered,’’The Times, 27 February 2001, p. 11; ‘‘It’s so quiet here that even the birds are silent,’’

Observer, 4 March 2001, p. 10; ‘‘Foot and mouth: record number of new cases,’’Independent, 15 March 2001, p. 1; ‘‘The testing procedure,’’ Independent, 19 March2001, p. 6; ‘‘Brown sticks by slaughter,’’ Telegraph, 20 March 2001, p. 1; ‘‘Drasticcull is only cure,’’ The Times, 13 April 2001, p. 12; ‘‘Vets fear foot and mouth ‘leper’

status,’’ The Times, 19 April 2001, p. 6.51 ‘‘Police set to enforce mass cull,’’ Observer, 18 March 2001, p. 1; ‘‘Slaughter

spreading disease,’’ Guardian, 20 March 2001, p. 1; ‘‘Farmers deny FMD illegali-ties,’’ BBC News, 10 April 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/world_a-t_one/programme_highlights/1270791.stm; Leader, ‘‘FMD,’’ The Times, London, 12

April 2001, p. 25; I. Anderson (2002), pp. 126–29, 148–51.

WHY SLAUGHTER? 359

control, contain, combat, defeat, eradicate, annihilate, exterminate, wipe out’’

the disease.52

Ultimately, however, the measures used to tackle the 2001 FMD epi-

demic failed to convey the intended image of an rational, educated Britain,

in which organized veterinary officials implemented measures framed by

skilled legislators, to which all disciplined, patriotic farmers adhered. The

premature deaths of millions of stock resulted in authoritative challenges to

the notion that the stamping out of germs was an achievement superior to

vaccination, under which germs were manipulated and modified. Assess-

ments of the cull’s impact upon animal welfare and rural life problematized

the traditional ‘‘solution’’ to FMD and concluded that its costs far out-

weighed its benefits. MAFF found it extremely difficult to convince farmers

that the slaughter of their healthy animals under the contiguous cull policy

was of benefit to the nation, especially in the light of its own failure to

implement the cull efficiently. Instead of joining together in the battle

against a common foe, the nation fragmented into diverse interest groups,

many of whom saw MAFF as the enemy rather than FMD.

Mid-epidemic, MAFF was itself culled and replaced by DEFRA. Public

sympathy for the rural plight had caused its strategy of blaming farmers for

disease spread to backfire. Proponents of the cull, especially those NFU

leaders who had for many years exerted a powerful influence over MAFF’s

policy making, became hate figures. Veterinary surgeons suffered a blow to

their professional reputations, as commentators criticized their acceptance

of the slaughter policy and assistance in its execution. Meanwhile, images of

the slaughter distributed by the world’s media caused international incre-

dulity and outrage, diminishing rather than enhancing the standing of the

British nation. Although FMD was finally stamped out, few expressed pride

in the regaining of national FMD-freedom. In fact, the epidemic threw into

question the feasibility of maintaining Britain’s FMD-free status in an era of

globalized trade and increasingly intensive farming practices.53

The events of 2001, therefore, undermined the century-old ‘‘cultural’’

rationale for FMD control by slaughter, while also raising doubts over its

supposed economic benefits and the alleged risks of vaccination. Indeed,

perceptions of the two policies were reversed; vaccination came to be viewed

as the more ethical, civilized, and nationally beneficial policy, while

slaughter became a backward, immoral method, which brought shame on

the nation, and was supported only by a selfish minority who sought to

advance their own interests (in the livestock export trade) at the country’s

expense. This change of opinion was reflected in the reports of numerous

52 B. Nerlich et al. (2001).53 I. Anderson (2002).

ABIGAIL WOODS360

committees of enquiry into the epidemic, which advised the future use of

vaccination alongside slaughter. DEFRA’s response comprised a new con-

tingency plan that recommended the immediate consideration of vaccina-

tion upon the appearance of FMD. However, the contiguous cull also

remains on its policy agenda. It remains to be seen whether, when FMD

next appears in Britain, DEFRA will make history and vaccinate.54

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank two anonymous referees of this paper for their com-

ments. Professor John Pickstone and colleagues at CHSTM also provided

valuable assistance, and I am indebted to the Wellcome Trust for their

generous funding of my research.

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Centre for the History of Science, Technology and Medicine

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Manchester M13 9PL.

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E-mail: mbjssaw2@man.ac.uk

ABIGAIL WOODS362