why us national intelligence estimates predict that the...

Why US National Intelligence Estimates Predict that the

European Missile Defense System Will Fail Technological Issues Relevant to Policy

Theodore A. Postol

Professor of Science, Technology, and National Security Policy Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Voice: 617 253-8077; FAX: 617 258-5750; e-mail: [email protected]

Plenary Lecture German Physical Society

Berlin, Germany February 29, 2008

MIT Science, Technology, and

National Security Working Group

Major Issue

Major Issue The US Intelligence Community Believes that Any Country with the Technology and Industrial Capacity to Field ICBMs Will Also Have the Technology to Field Certain Countermeasures. These Countermeasures Include:

1. Separating RVs 2. Spin-Stabilized RVs 3. RV Reorientation 4. Radar Absorbing Material (RAM) 5. Booster Fragmentation 6. Low-Power Jammers 7. Chaff 8. Simple (Balloon) Decoys

Major Consequence

If these countermeasures can be fielded, they will totally defeat any and all

current and future exoatmospheric US missile defenses

Findings of MIT/Cornell Studies of Exoatmospheric Missile Defenses(1 of 2)

Major Findings (1 of 2) � The European Midcourse Radar (EMR) cannot do the job (of discrimination).

Simply speaking, it will not have sufficient detection ranges against warheads to function as a useful element of the defense.

� The GLOBUS II radar in Vardo, Norway, will instead be needed to perform the discrimination functions for the European Missile Defense.

� The Forward-Based X-band radar (FBX) will, at best, only be able to perform limited initial tracking and discrimination against warheads launched from Iran.

� All tracking/cuing over Europe will have to be performed by the low-frequency early warning radar at Fylingsdale, England.

� That radar will not even have the resolution to tell the difference between a real warhead and a 0.3 m length of wire.

� One pound of 0.3 m aluminum covered glass wires could produce hundreds of thousands of false radar targets that would be indistinguishable from actual warheads.

Findings of MIT/Cornell Studies of Exoatmospheric Missile Defenses(2 of 2)

Major Findings (2 of 2) � The only available discrimination service for support of the Fylingsdale radar

will have to come from the GLOBUS II radar in Vardo, Norway. It appears that be Norwegian government has not yet informed the Norwegian population about this critical role for the Vardo radar.

� If the Bush administration’s unsupported assertions about the nature of the Iranian ballistic missile threat were to be correct, the interceptor farms that the US wants to deploy in Poland will have to be expanded.

� Even if all the current deficiencies in the US proposed missile defense for Europe are corrected, and the necessary upgrades are made, the US intelligence community predicts that the first Iranian IRBMs and ICBMs will be will be able to defeat the upgraded European Missile Defense.

False Claim That EMR Can Perform Discrimination Services for the Defense

IMPORTANT FACT IGNORED BY THE MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

� The Radar Cross Section (RCS) of warheads at X-Band is roughly 10 times larger than that of a Locust!

� With RV orientation and/or RAM, the RCS of a warhead at X-Band can easily be made comparable to or smaller than the RCS of a Locust.

Discrimination Ranges PREDICTED for EMR and FBX Radars by the Missile Defense Agency

EMR

Fylingsdale

Vardo

Grand Forks

Clear

Thule

Locations of Postulated ICBMs Launched from Iran

to the Continental United States at One Minute Intervals

Range-Fan for S/N=100 and RCS=1.00 m2


Cape Cod

Discrimination Ranges that Could Actually be ACHIEVED by the EMR and FBX Radars

EMR

Fylingsdale

Vardo

Grand Forks

Clear

Thule





Cape Cod

False Claim That EMR Can Perform Discrimination Services for the Defense

IMPORTANT FACT NOT DISCUSSED BY THE MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

� The Only Radar Capable of Providing a Discrimination Service for the US Proposed European Missile Defense is the GLOBUS II X-Band Intelligence Radar at Vardo, Norway.

� GLOBUS II Caused a Scandal in 1999 in Norway When It Was Discovered that the MOD Made False Claims About Its Actual Purpose to the Norwegian Parliament.

Radar-Range Fans for Vardo and US Proposed EMR and FBX Missile Defense Radars

Cape Cod

Grand Forks

Clear

Locations of ICBM

EMR Line-of Sight

Fylingsdale Line-of Sight

Thule Line-of Sight

Cape Cod Line-of Sight



Fylingsdale Tracking

Thule Tracking


Thule Tracking

EMR Tracking

Cape Cod Tracking

Vardo Line-of Sight

Vardo Tracking Vardo Tracking

EMR Tracking

Range-Fan for S/N=100 0.10 seconds Integration

and RCS=0.01 m2

Range-Fan for S/N=100 with One Pulse

and RCS=0.01 m2


and RCS=0.01 m2

EMR

Thule

EMR

FBX

Vardo

Fylingsdale

Requirements for Expanded Numbers of Interceptors



Locations of Launch Sites Associated with European and US Missile Defenses

EMR

Fylingsdale

Vardo

Grand Forks

Clear

Thule

Cape Cod

FBX

Interceptor Farm

Interceptor Farm

European Interceptor Launch Site

US Interceptor Launch Site

Area Covered by 100 Missile Expanded Polish Launch Site

United States Capitol

Area Covered by 100 Missile Expanded Polish Launch Site

United States Capitol

Orbital Sciences Ground-Based Interceptor and Raytheon and Boeing Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles

Throw Weights of Potential ICBM’s to 10,000 Kilometers Range

Minuteman IIIWarhead

Minuteman III Launch Weight � 75,000 lbs Throw Weight � 2,500 lbs

European GBI Launch Weight � 49,500 lbs Throw Weight � 1,500 lbs

Midgetman ICBM Launch Weight � 30,000 lbs

Throw Weight � 1000 lbs



Coverage of the Missile Defense Radars



Locations of Radars Associated with European and US Missile Defenses

EMR

Fylingsdale

Vardo

Grand Forks

Clear

Thule

Cape Cod

FBX

Interceptor Farm

Interceptor Farm


Grand Forks

Clear


and RCS=0.01 m2


and RCS=0.01 m2


and RCS=0.01 m2

EMR

Thule

EMR

FBX

Vardo

Fylingsdale


Cape Cod

Grand Forks

Clear

Locations of ICBM

EMR Line-of Sight

Fylingsdale Line-of Sight

Thule Line-of Sight

Cape Cod Line-of Sight




Thule Tracking


Thule Tracking

EMR Tracking

Cape Cod Tracking

Vardo Line-of Sight

Vardo Tracking Vardo Tracking

EMR Tracking


and RCS=0.01 m2


and RCS=0.01 m2


and RCS=0.01 m2

EMR

Thule

EMR

FBX

Vardo

Fylingsdale

Relative Size of the Different Radars



Comparison of the Relative Sizes and Average Power of the Fylingsdale UEWR, the GLOBUS II Radar at Vardo, Norway, and the Forward-Based X-Band (FBX) Radar

UEWR

FBX

Globus II

PAVE PAWS 31 meter Diameter

~ 755 m2 Antenna Area 150 KW

Average Power

GLOBUS II 27 meter Diameter

~ 570 m2 Antenna Area 150 KW

Average Power

FBX 9.2 m2 Antenna Area

30 – 70 KW Average Power

Comparison of the Relative Sizes of the European Midcourse Radar, the GLOBUS II Radar at Vardo, Norway, and the Forward-Based X-Band (FBX) Radar

GLOBUS II ~ 570 m2 Antenna Area

27 meter Diameter 150 KW

Average Power

EMR 105 m2 Antenna Area

~ 20 - 30 KW Average Power

FBX 9.2 m2 Antenna Area

50 – 60 KW Average Power

The Forward-Based X-Band Radar (FMX) Has Limited Acquisition Abilities Against 0.01 m2 Cone-Shaped Warheads at Ranges Greater Than 1000 km

Initial Discrimination Range Capabilities: Radar Cross Section = 0.01 m2, S/N = 100, 390 km Range – Dwell Time =0.1 sec, 1.2 Watts Average Power per T/R Module Ugraded Discrimination Range Capabilities: Radar Cross Section = 0.01 m2, S/N = 100, 490 km Range – Dwell Time =0.1 sec, 3 Watts Average Power per T/R Module Tracking Range With Upgrades: Radar Cross Section = 0.01 m2, S/N = 020, 730 km Range – Dwell Time =0.1 sec, 3 Watts Average Power per T/R Module

US Intelligence Findings on Foreign Ballistic Missile Developments



Intelligence Findings on Foreign Ballistic Missile Developments and Countermeasures

US Intelligence findings predict that even an upgraded US Missile Defense will be defeated by

postulated Iranian/ North Korean ICBMs when they are first deployed!


Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Statement for the Record to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

on Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015

by Robert D. Walpole National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs

September 16, 1999 Penetration Aids and Countermeasures We assess that countries developing ballistic missiles would also develop various responses to US theater and national defenses. Russia and China each have developed numerous countermeasures and probably are willing to sell the requisite technologies. � Many countries, such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq probably would rely initially on readily available technology —including separating

RVs, spin-stabilized RVs, RV reorientation, radar absorbing material (RAM), booster fragmentation, low-power jammers, chaff, and simple (balloon) decoys—to develop penetration aids and countermeasures.

� These countries could develop countermeasures based on these technologies by the time they flight test their missiles.

https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1999/walpole.htm


�� Foreign assistance continues to have demonstrable effects on missile advances around the world, particularly from Russia and North Korea. Moreover, some countries that have traditionally been recipients of foreign missile technology are now sharing more amongst themselves and are pursuing cooperative missile ventures. We assess that countries developing missiles also will respond to US theater and national missile defenses by deploying larger forces, penetration aids, and countermeasures. Russia and China each have developed numerous countermeasures and probably will sell some related technologies. Many of these countries probably have considered ballistic missile defense countermeasures. Historically, the development and deployment of missile defense systems have been accompanied by the development of countermeasures and penetration aids by potential adversaries, either in reaction to the threat or in anticipation of it. The Russians and Chinese have had countermeasure programs for decades and are probably willing to transfer some related technology to others. We expect that during the next 15 years, countries other than Russia and China will develop countermeasures to Theater and National Missile Defenses.

https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/1999/walpole.htm


Speeches & Testimony Iranian Ballistic Missile, WMD

Threat to the US The Iranian Ballistic Missile and WMD Threat to

the United States Through 2015 Statement for the Record to the

International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee

by Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs

(as prepared for delivery) September 21, 2000

2006-2010. Most believe Iran will likely test an IRBM—probably based on Russian assistance— during this period. All assess that Iran could flight test an ICBM that could deliver nuclear weapon-sized payloads to many parts of the United States in the latter half of the next decade, using Russian technology obtained over the years. Ballistic Missile Defense Countermeasures. Many countries, such as Iran, probably will rely initially on readily available technologies to develop penetration aids and countermeasures, including: separating RVs, radar absorbent material, booster fragmentation, jammers, chaff, and decoys. These countries could develop some countermeasures by the time they flight-test their missiles. More advanced technologies could be available over the longer term. Some of the factors that will influence a nation’s countermeasures include: the effectiveness weighed against their cost, complexity, reduction in range-payload capability; foreign assistance; and the ability to conduct realistic tests. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2000/walpole_missile_092200

How the Countermeasures Work



Effects of Countermeasures on Emerging Foreign Ballistic Missile Threats

First Generation Countermeasures Predicted by the US Intelligence Community

Separating RVs Radical reductions in the radar detectivity of warheads against X-Band radars (Cross Sections of 0.01 m2 or less)

Spin-Stabilized RVs Removal of potentially exploitable fluctuations in the size of an otherwise tumbling warhead’s X-Band Radar Cross Section. These can be used to increase detection ranges relative to “tumbling” warheads

RV Reorientation Guarantee that warheads are oriented so as to minimize the X-Band radar’s detection range against the warhead

Radar Absorbing Material (RAM) Guarantee that warheads will be invisible to the X-Band radar. Also confounds discrimination by X-Band Radars

Booster Fragmentation Hides the low-Radar Cross Section warhead among numerous low and high Radar Cross Section fragments

Low-Power Jammers Eliminates the ability of the X-Band radar to detect, track, or discriminate against either warheads or decoys. A “dumb” jammer of roughly 0.1 Watts would be adequate for defeating the proposed European Midcourse Radar to be located in the Czech Republic.

Chaff 100 grams of Chaff could easily hide a warhead or a decoy from the X-Band radar. The countermeasure would deply many clouds of Chaff, some of which contain warheads, decoys, or nothing, to overwhelm the X-band radars

Simple (Balloon) Decoys Could be used to degrade the ability of kill vehicle to hit the warhead (note US anti-satellite attack on an alleged tank of Hydrazine). More importantly, can make it impossible for Kill Vehicle to know which of many balloons might contain a warhead. Can also be filled with radar absorbing foams, to make the balloons and warheads invisible to the X-Band radars

Separating RVs, Spin Stabilized RVs and Re-Oriented RV

Countermeasures to the Defense



Radar Cross Section of Large Round-Nose Warhead

Spin Stabilized Warheads Separated Warheads (Tumbling) Warhead Reorientation

0.003 m2

Radar Cross Section of ICBM Upper Rocket Stages

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Aspect angle, Theta [Degrees]

RCS

- dBs

m

RCS at 0.1 GHz

RCS at 10 GHz

50°Rocket Motor

Behaves Like RadarCorner Reflector

Rocket MotorRadar Cross Section

at X-Band

Cylinderwith No Endplates

Cylinderwith Endplates

Radar Cross Section of Circular Cylinders at Frequencies of 0.10 and 10.0 GHz

Cylinder DimensionsApproximate Titan II

3m Diameter x 30m Length

Cylinderwith Endplates

No Endplates

Spin Stabilized Warheads Separated Warheads (Tumbling) Warhead Reorientation

Radar-Range Fans for 1 m2 Targets for EMR and FBX Missile Defense Radars

EMR

Fylingsdale

Vardo

Grand Forks

Clear

Thule





Cape Cod

Radar-Range Fans for 0.01 m2 Targets for EMR and FBX Missile Defense Radars

EMR

Fylingsdale

Vardo

Grand Forks

Clear

Thule





Cape Cod

Radar-Range Fans for US Proposed EMR and FBX Missile Defense Radars

EMR

Fylingsdale

Vardo

Grand Forks

Clear

Thule







Cape Cod

1 m2 RCS

0.01 m2 RCS

Radar Absorbing Materials (RAM) Countermeasures to the Defense



Properties of Radar Absorbing Materials at Frequencies at or Near X-Band

Graded dielectric reticulated foam radar absorbing material. This material is about 1.9 centimeters thick and weighs about 3 ounces per square foot.

Resonant radar absorbing covering. This absorber is tuned to 8.5 GHz. It is roughly 1.8 centimeters thick and weighs about 1.1 pound per square foot.

Dual-band radar absorber with resonant absorbtion at 9 and 18 GHz. This material is about .45 centimeters thick and weighs about 1.5 pounds per square foot.

Data from: Richard N. Johnson, “Radar Absorbing Material: A Passive Role in An Active Scenario,” The International Countermeasures Handbook, 11th Edition, 1986, EW Communications, Inc.,

Frequency of GBR X-Band

Radar Frequency of GBR X-Band

Radar

Frequency of GBR X-Band

Radar Radar Absorbing Materials

Booster Fragmentation Countermeasures to the Defense



False Targets Cloud Created in Army Ballistic Missile Development Agency Test Using a Titan II ICBM on January 10, 1975,

Signature of Fragmented Tanks (SOFT),

Booster Fragmentation

False Targets Cloud Created in Army Ballistic Missile Development Agency Test Using a Titan II ICBM on January 10, 1975,

Signature of Fragmented Tanks (SOFT),

Figure 8.4. The Signature of Fragmented Tanks experiment cut the Stage II of Titan II ICBM B-27 (62-008) into the numerous pieces shown above. The resulting debris cloud was used to test the ability of the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile radar system to discriminate between debris from the upper stage and the reentry vehicle. From David K. Stumpf , “Titan II, A History of a Cold War Missile Program,” The University of Arkansas Press, Fayetteville, Copyright 2000, pages 200-201

6 Ft Man and Minuteman Warhead

Booster Fragmentation

Low-Power Jammer Countermeasures to the Defense



X-Band Transmit/Receive Module Average power � 2 Watts, Peak Power � 10 Watts

2.66 inches

1.05 in

Low-Power Jammers?

Devices that Can Be Used to Build X-band Jammers

Devices that Can Be Used to Build Low-Power X-band Jammers

Low-Power Jammers

Chaff Countermeasures to the Defense



Defense Exhaustion Strategy Using Chaff

Chaff

Weight and Frequency Dependence of Chaff

Frequency dependence of the Radar Cross Section (RCS) of chaff. The RCS per dipole is inversely proportional to radar frequency. This effect can be offset by reducing the dipole diameter as frequency increases. The data shown above is from R. Layne DuBose, “Chaff Systems for Ships Defense,” The International Countermeasures Handbook, 11th Edition, 1986, EW Communications, Inc., Palo Alto, California, pp.343-349.

Nose-On RCS of a Round-Back Cone-Shaped Warhead with a Pointy Nosetip at X-Band is About .0001 m2.

NOTE:

Chaff One Kilogram of Chaff Reflects More Than 1 million Times More Radar Signal than a Single Warhead

Roughly 100 grams or less of Chaff will Conceal a Warhead/Decoy for 10 to 20 minutes from an X-Band Radar!

Radar Cross Section of Chaff Dipoles

The peak radar cross section of a tuned dipole is.

� .� �� 2

2

48

The average radar cross section of a randomly oriented tuned dipole is,

� � �� 316

15 2�

.

Chaff

Radar Cross Sections of Various Shapes of Interest in Ballistic Missile Defense Applications

Chaff

Balloon Countermeasures to the Defense



Targets are Identified by Their Brightness in Two Infrared Wavelength Bands Targets As They Might Be Seen at 200 kilometers range

~20 seconds to impact, lateral separation ~3.5 km?, total divert ~.5 km/sec?

Target 1 Observed Brightness







Target 8 Observed Brightness Target 5 Observed Brightness


Balloons

IFT-6 Target Complex as Seen By Distant Approaching EKV

Range of Observed Target Complex ~ 230 – 250 km for FOV 1 – 1.5º

~3.5 km

~3 km

2.2 Meter Diameter Balloon (Roughly Ten Times Brighter than the Mock Warhead)

Mock Warhead

Rocket Stage that Deployed the Mock Warhead and Balloon

Balloons

Some Photos of Objects that Could Appear Like Warheads

Large Balloon 2.2 Meter Diameter Balloon Balloon With White Coating With Reflecting Coating With Black Coating

Light Rigid Replica Decoy Minuteman Inflatable Decoy Minuteman Warhead

Balloons

Statement Indicating that Top Management of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Knew About the Discrimination Problems Identified in the IFT-1A Experiment

"So the decoy is not going to look exactly like what we expected. It presents a problem for the system that we didn't expect,"

Statement of Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, while being filmed by 60 Minutes II after learning that the 2.2 meter balloon misdeployed (did not inflate properly) during the IFT-5 experiment

Balloons

IFT-6 Target Complex as Seen By Distant Approaching EKV

Range of Observed Target Complex ~ 230 – 250 km for FOV 1 – 1.5º

~3.5 km

~3 km

2.2 Meter Diameter Balloon (Roughly Ten Times Brighter than the Mock Warhead)

Mock Warhead

Rocket Stage that Deployed the Mock Warhead and Balloon

Balloon Canister is Now the Least Bright Object: Hence, the Balloon Canister Looks Like the Warhead

Balloons

Further Observations and Conclusions



Observations and Conclusions

Observations and Conclusions

� The Bush administration has been systematically providing inaccurate information to its European allies (and apparently to NATO) about the US proposed missile defense for Europe.

� It is highly implausible that this campaign of providing such basically false technical information was or is an accident.

� The implications of these US actions, and the passive response to it by the European allies and NATO, raises serious questions about the future of US-European security relations.

� These problems will almost certainly be solved by any of the US Presidential candidates when they take the office, but the European allies should not assume that the US was solely to blame for this deplorable historical incident in US-European security relations.

Appendix

False Claims Made by Bush Administration to the European Union, Committee on Foreign Affairs,

Subcommittee on Security and Defense



False Claims Made by Bush Administration to the European Union, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Security and Defense

The European Midcourse Radar (EMR) Cannot Possible Have the Range to Perform Discrimination Services for

the European Defense System

European Interceptors Are Fast Enough to

Overtake and Intercept Russian ICBMs

European Interceptors and Radars Cannot

Possibly Defend Northern Japan

Orbital Sciences Ground-Based Interceptor and Raytheon and Boeing Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles

Estimated Dimensions and Weight of the National Missile Defense Launch Vehicle

Rocket Components

Length (ft)

Diameter (ft)

Component Weight (lbs)

Shroud 11.6 4.17 200

Payload (Kill Vehicle) -- -- 155

Payload Adaptor -- -- --

1st Stage (Orion 50XLG) 33.8 4.17 37,800

2nd Stage (Orion 50XL) 11.7 4.17 9,500

Total 51.4 -- 47,655

Estimated Performance Parameters of the National Missile Defense Launch Vehicle Rocket Components

Burn Time (sec)

Vacuum Specific Impulse (sec)

Vacuum Thrust (lbs)

Component Weight (lbs)

Propellant Weight (lbs)

Empty Weight (lbs)

Empty/Full Mass Fraction

Shroud -- -- -- 200 --

Payload (Kill Vehicle) -- -- -- 155 --

Payload Adaptor -- -- -- -- --

1st Stage (Orion 50XLG) 70 295 149,500 37,800 35,480 2,320 0.0614

2nd Stage (Orion 50XL) 70 289 36,000 9,500 8,680 820 0.0859

Total 140 -- -- 47,655 --

Orion 50XL Rocket Stage

Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle

Orion 50XLG Rocket Stage

Pegasus Launch Vehicle

Ground-Based Interceptor Achieves 6.3 km/sec Carrying a Payload of 1950 lbs

Orbital Sciences GBI

Ground-Based Interceptor Achieves 8.5 to 8.7 km/sec Carrying a Payload of 220 to 155 lbs

Midgetman ICBM

Orbital Sciences GBI

The GBI Has a Higher Lift Capability than the US Midgetman ICBM!

The Ground-Based Interceptor Can Carry a Full Minuteman III BUS and Three Warheads to 6,000+ Kilometers

Orbital Sciences GBI Minuteman Shroud,

Warheads, and BUS

False Claims Made by Bush Administration to the European Union, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Security and Defense

The European Midcourse Radar (EMR) Cannot Possible Have the Range to Perform Discrimination Services for

the European Defense System

European Interceptors Are Fast Enough to

Overtake and Intercept Russian ICBMs

European Interceptors and Radars Cannot

Possibly Defend Northern Japan

False Claim That Japan Can Be Defended from Europe


False Claims Made in Presentations to European (and Japanese?) Allies by Missile Defense Agency

that US Proposed European Missile Defense Can Defend Northern Japan

FBX in Eastern Turkey too Far from Missile Trajectory to Track the Deployed Warhead (RCS ~ 0.01m2)

X-Band Radar in Czech Republic Below Radar Horizon Sea-Based X-Band Radar Off Adak

Below Radar Horizon

Launch from Iran

NO PLAUSIBLE WAY FOR DEFENSE SYSTEM TO OBTAIN PRECISION TRACKING DATA NEEDED TO GUIDE

INTERCEPTORS FROM ALASKA!


False Claim That Interceptors Cannot Engage Russian ICBMs

• Interceptor launched � 250-300 sec after threat

Russian ICBM

Interceptors Cannot Catch Russian Missiles

400 sec

600 sec 800 sec

1,200 sec

Time (sec) after Russian ICBM Launch

Moscow

Interceptor

U.S. European Interceptor Site Cannot Affect Russian Strategic Capability

Approved for Public Release 07-MDA-2623 (13 JUN 07) ms-109673B / 061407

ICBM Burnout

ICBM Apogee 1,000 sec

27


• Interceptor launched � 250-300 sec after threat

Russian ICBM

Interceptors Cannot Catch Russian Missiles

400 sec

600 sec 800 sec

1,200 sec

Time (sec) after Russian ICBM Launch

Moscow

Interceptor

U.S. European Interceptor Site Cannot Affect Russian Strategic Capability

Approved for Public Release 07-MDA-2623 (13 JUN 07) ms-109673B / 061407

ICBM Burnout

ICBM Apogee 1,000 sec

27

Russian ICBM Trajectory



Location of SS-18/19 Russian ICBM at 5 Second Intervals During Powered Flight

0700 600 500 400 300 200 1008000

100

200

300

400

500

Range (km)

Alti

tude

(km

)

SS-18/19 Powered Flight Profile

Locations Every 5 Seconds

Second Stage Ignition

I t t

Burnout (340sec)


Two Stage Pegasus 8.3 km/sec Interceptor Against SS-18/19 ICBM Launched from Vypolzovo Russia

ICBM Burnout (SS-18/19) at 300 seconds

also Launch of Interceptor

from Poland

Interceptor Completes Powered Flight

ICBM Breaks Radar Horizon

3.5 4.5

5.5 6.5

7.5 8.5

2.5 minutes

300 seconds

1 minute

2 3 4 5 7 8 9

6

1 0 minutes

2 3

4

5


Location of SS-25 Russian ICBM at 5 Second Intervals During Powered Flight

0700 600 500 400 300 200 1008000

100

200

300

400

500

Range (km)

Alti

tude

(km

)

SS-25 Powered Flight Profile

Locations Every 5 Seconds

Third Stage Ignition

I t t

Second Stage Ignition

I t t

Burnout (170 sec)


Two Stage Pegasus 8.3 km/sec Interceptor Against SS-25/27 ICBM Launched from Vypolzovo Russia

ICBM Burnout (SS-27) at 180 seconds

also Launch of Interceptor

from Poland

Interceptor Completes Powered Flight

ICBM Breaks Radar Horizon

3.5

4.5

2.5 minutes

180 seconds

1 minute

2

3 4

5 7 8 9 6

1

0 minutes

2

3


Intercept Points for Two Stage Pegasus 8.3 km/sec Interceptor Against SS-25/27 and SS-18/19 ICBMs Launched from Vypolzovo Russia

Intercept Point Against SS-25/27 ICBM Intercept Point Against SS-18/19 ICBM

False Claim That Radar in Czech Republic Performs a Critical Role in the Defense

False Claim That Radar in Czech Republic Performs a Critical Role in the Defense


Grand Forks

Clear


and RCS=0.01 m2


and RCS=0.01 m2


and RCS=0.01 m2

EMR

Thule

EMR

FBX

Vardo

Fylingsdale

Appendix

Statements Made by “Responsible” US Officials



Some Notable Quotes

"As you see, if there are Russian launches from interceptor sites we could establish tracks on those, but although we can establish those coverages the interceptors cannot catch them."

LIEUTENANT GENERAL HENRY A. “TREY” OBERING, III Director, Missile Defense Agency

March 1, 2007 Q&A SESSION

http://prague.usembassy.gov/obering-mar1.html

As NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer commented after the April 19 NATO-Russia Council meeting, "The Allies were convinced and are

convinced that there are no implications of the United States system for the strategic balance... Ten interceptors will not, and cannot affect the strategic balance and ten interceptors cannot pose a threat to Russia."

http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/roo050307.htm

"U.S. missile defense plans are neither directed at nor a threat to Russia. Due to the location and capabilities of the European missile

defense assets, the proposed system would have no capability against Russian ICBMs."

Missile Defense Cooperation U.S. Missile Defense Factsheet

http://prague.usembassy.gov/md704-factsheet.html

"Senior Russian officials as well as their experts understand the limited capabilities of the interceptors and the X-band radar, including why the

European-based assets would have no capability against Russian ICBMs launched at the United States, and how it is optimized for engaging

ballistic missile threats launched out of Iran." Brian R. Green Statement for the Record to the HASC Strategic Forces Subcommittee, 3/27/07

http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Strat032707/Green_Testimony032707.pdf

Some Notable Quotes

"First of all, these interceptors, the radars, are not designed against

the Russian threat. You're not going to counter the hundreds of Russian ICBMs and the thousands of warheads that are represented by that fleet with 10 interceptors in a field in Europe. The radar that we were putting

there -- first of all, it is designed against the Middle Eastern threat, not against the Russian threat.

With the radar that we have there that we have proposed, it is a very narrow beam radar. It has to be queued. And so even if we wanted

to try to track Russian missiles with that radar, we could only track a very, very small percentage of those missiles. And even if we could, passing that information off and having an interceptor try to intercept

the Russian missile, we can't do it. The interceptors that we would place in Europe are not fast enough to catch the Russian ICBMs. We're in

a tail chase from a location in Poland and if you'd like, in that -- in response to any questions, I can show you some slides on that as well. "

AIR FORCE LT. GEN. HENRY A. OBERING THE WASHINGTON FOREIGN PRESS CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 2007, 12:00 P.M. EST http://kiev.usembassy.gov/files/070223_missile_defense_eng.html

"MR. HADLEY: Of course the deployment that we're talking about in Europe is not about Russia at all. It's not aimed at

Russia. The systems we would deploy do not have capability of any significant character against Russian ICBMs destined for the -- that are aimed at the United States. Just doesn't have any capability."

Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Steven Hadley on the President's Trip to the G8 Summit and Europe

White House Conference Center Briefing Room June 1, 2007

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070601-11.html

why us national intelligence estimates predict that the...

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