Operation Barbarossa

Operation Barbarossa (German: Unternehmen Bar-barossa) was the code name for Nazi Germany's invasionof the Soviet Union duringWorldWar II, which began on22 June 1941. The operation was driven by Adolf Hitler'sideological desire to conquer the Soviet territories as out-lined in his 1925 manifestoMein Kampf (My Struggle).In the two years leading up to the invasion, the two coun-tries signed political and economic pacts for strategic pur-poses. Still, on 18 December 1940, Hitler authorized aninvasion of the Soviet Union for a start date of 15 May1941, but this was not met; instead, the invasion beganon 22 June 1941. Over the course of the operation, aboutfour million soldiers of the Axis powers invaded the So-viet Union along a 2,900-kilometer (1,800 mi) front, thelargest invasion force in the history of warfare. In addi-tion to troops, the Germans employed some 600,000 mo-tor vehicles and between 600700,000 horses. It markedthe beginning of the rapid escalation of the war, both ge-ographically and in the formation of the Allied coalition.Operationally, the Germans won resounding victories andoccupied some of the most important economic areasof the Soviet Union, mainly in Ukraine, both inict-ing and sustaining heavy casualties. Despite their suc-cesses, the German oensive stalled on the outskirtsof Moscow and was subsequently pushed back by aSoviet counteroensive. The Red Army repelled theWehrmacht's strongest blows and forced Germany intoa war of attrition for which it was unprepared. The Ger-mans would never again mount a simultaneous oensivealong the entire strategic Soviet-Axis front. The failureof the operation drove Hitler to demand for further op-erations inside the USSR, all of which eventually failed,such as Operation Nordlicht, Case Blue, and OperationCitadel.The failure of Operation Barbarossa was a turning pointin the fortunes of the Third Reich. Most importantly, theoperation opened up the Eastern Front, to which moreforces were committed than in any other theater of warin world history. The Eastern Front became the site ofsome of the largest battles, most horric atrocities, andhighest casualties for Soviets and Germans alike, all ofwhich inuenced the course of both World War II andthe subsequent history of the 20th century. The Germanforces captured millions of Soviet prisoners who were notgranted protections stipulated in the Geneva Conventions.Most of them never returned alive; Germany deliberatelystarved the prisoners to death as part of a "Hunger Plan"that aimed to reduce the population of Eastern Europeand then re-populate it with ethnic Germans.

1 Background

1.1 Racial policies of Nazi GermanyMain article: Racial policy of Nazi Germany

As early as 1925, Adolf Hitler vaguely declared in hispolitical manifesto and autobiographyMein Kampf (MyStruggle) that he would invade the Soviet Union, assert-ing that the German people needed to secure Lebensraum(living space) to ensure the survival of Germany forgenerations to come.[19] Nazism viewed the Soviet Union(and all of Eastern Europe) as populated by non-AryanUntermenschen (sub-humans), ruled by "Jewish Bol-shevik conspirators.[19] Mein Kampf said Germanysdestiny was to turn to the East as it did six hundredyears ago.[20] Accordingly, it was stated Nazi policy tokill, deport, or enslave the majority of Russian and otherSlavic populations and repopulate the land with Ger-manic peoples.[19] The Germans belief in their ethnicsuperiority is discernible in ocial German records andby pseudoscientic articles in German periodicals at thetime, which covered topics such as how to deal with alienpopulations.[21]

In their plan to create the Greater Germanic Reich the Nazi lead-ership aimed to conquer Eastern European territories, Germanisethose seen as part of the Aryan race, subjugate and exterminatethe Soviet populations, and colonise the territory with ethnic Ger-man settlers.

Before and during the invasion of the Soviet Union,German troops were heavily indoctrinated with anti-Bolshevik, anti-Semitic and anti-Slavic ideology viamovies, radio, lectures, books and leaets.[22] Following

1

2 1 BACKGROUND

the invasion, Wehrmacht ocers told their soldiers totarget people who were described as Jewish Bolsheviksubhumans, the Mongol hordes, the Asiatic oodand the Red beast.[23] Nazi propaganda portrayed thewar against the Soviet Union as both an ideological warbetween German National Socialism and Jewish Bolshe-vism and a racial war between the Germans and the Jew-ish, Gypsies and SlavicUntermenschen.[24] German armycommanders cast the Jews as the major cause behind thepartisan struggle.[25] Themain guideline policy for Ger-man troops was Where theres a partisan, theres a Jew,andwhere theres a Jew, theres a partisan.[26] ManyGer-man troops did view the war in Nazi terms and regardedtheir Soviet enemies as sub-human.[27]

After the war began, the Nazis issued a ban on sexual re-lations between Germans and foreign slave workers.[28]There were regulations enacted against the Ost-Arbeiter(Eastern Workers) that included the death penaltyfor sexual relations with a German person.[29] HeinrichHimmler, in his secret memorandum, Reections on theTreatment of Peoples of Alien Races in the East, (dated 25May 1940) outlined the future plans for the non-Germanpopulations in the East.[30] Himmler believed the Ger-manization process in Eastern Europe would be completewhen in the East dwell onlymenwith truly German, Ger-manic blood.[31]

The Nazi secret plan Generalplan Ost (General Plan forthe East), which was prepared in 1941 and conrmedin 1942, called for a new order of ethnographical re-lations in the territories occupied by Nazi Germany inEastern Europe. The plan envisaged ethnic cleansing, ex-ecutions and enslavement of the overwhelming majorityof the populations of conquered counties with very smalldiering percentages of the various conquered nationsundergoing Germanisation, expulsion into the depths ofRussia and other fates. The net eect of this plan wouldbe to ensure that the conquered territories would be Ger-manized. It was divided into two parts: the Kleine Pla-nung (Small Plan), which covered actions which wereto be taken during the war, and the Grosse Planung (BigPlan), which covered actions to be undertaken after thewar was won, and to be implemented gradually over a pe-riod of 25 to 30 years.[32]

Evidence from a speech given by General Erich Hoepnerindicates the disposition of Operation Barbarossa and theNazi racial plan, as he informed the 4th Panzer Groupthat the war against Russia was an essential part of theGerman peoples struggle for existence (Daseinkampf),also referring to the imminent battle as the old struggleof Germans against Slavs and even stated, the strug-gle must aim at the annihilation of todays Russia andmust therefore be waged with unparalleled harshness.[33]Racial motivations were central to Nazi ideology andplayed a key role in planning for Operation Barbarossasince both Jews and Communists were considered equiv-alent enemies of the Nazi state. Nazi imperialist ambi-tions were exercised without moral consideration for ei-

ther group in their ultimate struggle for Lebensraum.[34]

1.2 German-Soviet relations of 193940Main article: GermanySoviet Union relations before1941

In August 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed anon-aggression pact in Moscow known as the MolotovRibbentrop Pact shortly before the German invasion ofPoland that triggered the outbreak of World War II inEurope. A secret protocol to the pact outlined an agree-ment between Germany and the Soviet Union on the divi-sion of the eastern European border states between theirrespective "spheres of inuence": the Soviet Union andGermany would partition Poland in the event of an inva-sion by Germany, and Russia would be allowed to over-run the Baltic states and Finland.[35][36] The conclusionof this pact was indeed followed by a Soviet invasion ofPoland that led to the annexation of the eastern part ofthe country.[19] The pact stunned the world because ofthe parties earlier mutual hostility and their conictingideologies.[37] As a result of the pact, Germany and theSoviet Unionmaintained reasonably strong diplomatic re-lations for two years and fostered an important economicrelationship. The countries entered a trade pact in 1940by which the Soviets received German military equip-ment and trade goods in exchange for raw materials, suchas oil and wheat, to help Germany circumvent a Britishblockade of Germany.[38]

Despite the parties ostensibly cordial relations, each sidewas highly suspicious of the others intentions. After Ger-many entered the Axis Pact with Japan and Italy, it be-gan negotiations about a potential Soviet entry into thepact.[39] After two days of negotiations in Berlin from 12to 14 November 1940, Germany presented a written pro-posal for a Soviet entry into the Axis. On 25 Novem-ber 1940, the Soviet Union oered a written counter-proposal to join the Axis if Germany would agree to re-frain from interference in the Soviet Unions sphere of in-uence, but Germany did not respond.[39] As both sidesbegan colliding with each other in Eastern Europe, con-ict appeared more likely, although they did sign a borderand commercial agreement addressing several open is-sues in January 1941. Some historians also believe thatSoviet leader Joseph Stalin, despite providing an amica-ble front to Hitler, did not wish to remain allies with Ger-many. Rather, Stalin might have had intentions to breako from Germany and proceed with his own campaignagainst Germany as well as the rest of Europe.[40]

1.3 German invasion plansSee also: A-A line, The Ural mountains in Nazi planningand Lossberg studyStalins reputation as a brutal dictator contributed both

1.3 German invasion plans 3

The geopolitical disposition of Europe in 1941, immediately be-fore the start of Operation Barbarossa. The grey area representsNazi Germany, its allies, and countries under its rm control.

to the Nazis justication of their assault and their faithin success; many competent and experienced military of-cers were killed in the Great Purge of the 1930s, leav-ing the Red Army with a relatively inexperienced lead-ership compared to that of their German counterparts.The Nazis often emphasized the Soviet regimes brutalitywhen targeting the Slavs with propaganda.[41] They alsoclaimed that the Red Army was preparing to attack theGermans, and their own invasion was thus presented as apre-emptive strike.[41]

In the summer of 1940, following the rising tension be-tween the Soviet Union and Germany over territories inthe Balkans, an eventual invasion of the Soviet Unionseemed to Hitler to be the only solution.[42] While no con-crete plans were made yet, Hitler told one of his generalsin June that the victories in Western Europe nally freedhis hands for his important real task: the showdown withBolshevism.[43]

Although German generals warned Hitler that occupy-ing Western Russia would create more of a drain thana relief for Germanys economic situation, he antici-pated compensatory benets, such as the demobilizationof entire divisions to relieve the acute labor shortage inGerman industry; the exploitation of Ukraine as a re-liable source of immense agricultural products; the useof forced labor to stimulate Germanys overall economy;and the expansion of territory to improve Germanys ef-forts to isolate Great Britain.[44] Hitler was convinced thatBritain would sue for peace once the Germans triumphedin the Soviet Union.[44]

On 5 December 1940, Hitler received the nal militaryplans for the invasion the German High Command hadbeen working on since July 1940 under the codename

Operation Otto. Hitler, however, was dissatised withthese plans and on 18 December issued Directive No. 21,which called for a new battle plan, now codenamed Op-eration Barbarossa.[44] The operation was named aftermedieval Emperor Frederick Barbarossa of the Holy Ro-man Empire, a leader of the Third Crusade in the 12thcentury.[44] The invasion was set for 15 May 1941, butthis objective would not be met.[45]

According to a 1978 essay by German historian AndreasHillgruber, the invasion plans drawn up by the Germanmilitary elite were coloured by hubris stemming fromthe rapid defeat of France at the hands of the invin-cible Wehrmacht and by ignorance tempered by tradi-tional German stereotypes of Russia as a primitive, back-ward Asiatic country. Red Army soldiers were con-sidered brave and tough, but the ocer corps was heldin contempt. The leadership of the Wehrmacht paid lit-tle attention to politics, culture and the considerable in-dustrial capacity of the Soviet Union, in favour of a verynarrow military view.[46] Hillgruber argued that becausethese assumptions were shared by the entire military elite,Hitler was able to push through with a war of annihila-tion that would be waged in the most inhumane fashionpossible with the complicity of several military leaders,even though it was quite clear that this would be in viola-tion of all accepted norms of warfare.[46]

In autumn 1940, high-ranking German ocials drafteda memorandum on the dangers of an invasion of the So-viet Union. They said Ukraine, Belorussia and the BalticStates would end up as only a further economic burdenfor Germany.[47] It was argued that the Soviets in theircurrent bureaucratic form were harmless and that the oc-cupation would not benet Germany.[47] Hitler disagreedwith economists about the risks and told his right-handman Hermann Gring, the chief of the Luftwae, that hewould no longer listen to misgivings about the economicdangers of a war with Russia.[48] It is speculated that thiswas passed on to General Georg Thomas, who had pro-duced reports that predicted a net economic drain forGermany in the event of an invasion of the Soviet Unionunless its economy was captured intact and the Caucasusoilelds seized in the rst blow, and he consequently re-vised his future report to t Hitlers wishes.[48] The RedArmy's ineptitude in the Winter War against Finland in193940 convinced Hitler of a quick victory within a fewmonths. He did not anticipate a long campaign lastinginto the winter, and therefore adequate preparations, suchas the distribution of warm clothing and winterization ofvehicles and lubricants, were not made.[44]

Beginning in March 1941, Grings Green Folder laidout details for the disposal of the Soviet economy af-ter conquest. The Hunger Plan outlined how the en-tire urban population of conquered territories was to bestarved to death, thus creating an agricultural surplus tofeed Germany and urban space for the German upperclass.[49] Nazi policy aimed to destroy the Soviet Unionas a political entity in accordance with the geopolitical

4 2 GERMAN PREPARATIONS

Lebensraum ideals for the benet of future generationsof the "Nordic master race".[41] In 1941, Nazi ideologueAlfred Rosenberg, later appointed Reich Minister of theOccupied Eastern Territories, suggested that conqueredSoviet territory should be administered in the followingReichskommissariate (Reich Commissionerships):German military planners also researched Napoleonsfailed invasion of Russia. In their calculations, they con-cluded that there was little danger of a large-scale retreatof the Red Army into the Russian interior, as it couldnot aord to give up the Baltic states, Ukraine, or theMoscow and Leningrad regions, all of which were vi-tal to the Red Army for supply reasons and would thushave to be defended.[52] Hitler and his generals disagreedon where Germany should focus its energy.[44] Hitler,in many discussions with his generals, repeated his or-der of Leningrad rst, the Donbass second, Moscowthird";[53] but he consistently emphasized the destructionof the Red Army over the achievement of specic ter-rain objectives.[54] Hitler believed Moscow to be of nogreat importance in the defeat of the Soviet Union andinstead believed victory would come with the destructionof the RedArmywest of the capital, especially west of theWestern Dvina and Dnieper rivers, and this pervaded theplan for Barbarossa.[55][56] This belief later led to disputesbetween Hitler and several German senior ocers, in-cluding Heinz Guderian, Gerhard Engel, Fedor von Bockand Franz Halder, who believed the decisive victory couldonly be delivered at Moscow.[57] Hitler had grown over-condent in his own military judgement from the rapidsuccesses in Western Europe.[44]

2 German preparations

The Germans had begun massing troops near the Sovietborder even before the campaign in the Balkans had n-ished. By the third week of February 1941, 680,000German soldiers were gathered in assembly areas on theRomanian-Soviet border.[58] In preparation for the attack,Hitler moved more than 3.2 million German and about500,000 Axis soldiers to the Soviet border, launchedmany aerial surveillance missions over Soviet territory,and stockpiled war materiel in the East.Although the Soviet High Command was alarmed by this,Stalins belief that the Third Reich was unlikely to at-tack only two years after signing theMolotovRibbentropPact resulted in a slow Soviet preparation.[44] Since April1941, the Germans had begun setting up OperationHaisch to add substance to their claims that Britain wasthe real target. These simulated preparations in Norwayand the English Channel coast included activities such asship concentrations, reconnaissance ights and trainingexercises.[44]

We have only to kick in the door and the whole rottenstructure will come crashing down.[19][59]

German soldiers (Flamethrower team) in the Soviet Union, June1941

Adolf Hitler

The postponement of Barbarossa from the initiallyplanned date of 15 May to the actual invasion date of 22June 1941 (a 38-day delay) occurred for a number of rea-sons. Most importantly, the Balkans Campaign required adiversion of troops and resources that hampered prepara-tions, and an unusually wet winter kept rivers at full ooduntil late spring. The full oods could have discouragedan earlier attack, even if it was unlikely to have happenedbefore the end of the Balkans Campaign.[60]

The importance of the delay is still debated.[60] WilliamShirer argued that Hitlers Balkans Campaign had de-layed the commencement of Barbarossa by several weeksand thereby jeopardized it.[61] He cited the deputy chiefof the German General Sta in 1941 Friedrich Paulus,who claimed the campaign resulted in a delay of aboutve weeks.[62] This gure is corroborated by boththe German Naval War Diary and Gerd von Rundst-edt.[62] Antony Beevor names a variety of factors thatdelayed Barbarossa, including the delay in distributingmotor transport, problems with fuel distribution, andthe diculty in establishing forward airelds for theLuftwae.[63]

The Germans deployed one independent regiment, oneseparate motorized training brigade and 153 divisions for

5Barbarossa, which included 104 infantry, 19 panzer and15 motorized infantry divisions in three army groups,nine security divisions to operate in conquered territo-ries, four divisions in Finland and two divisions as re-serve under the direct control of OKH.[64] These wereequipped with about 3,350 tanks, 7,200 artillery pieces,2,770 aircraft (that amounted to 65 percent of the Luft-wae), about 600,000 motor vehicles and 625,000700,000 horses.[65][66][44] Finland slated 14 divisions forthe invasion,[lower-alpha 1] and Romania oered 13 divi-sions and eight brigades over the course of Barbarossa.[3]The entire Axis forces, 3.8 million personnel,[2] deployedacross a front extending from the Arctic Ocean south-ward to the Black Sea,[54] were all controlled by the OKHand organized into Army Norway, Army Group North,Army Group Center and Army Group South, alongsidethree luftotten (air eets, the air force equivalent ofarmy groups) that supported the army groups: Luftotte1 for North, Luftotte 2 for Center and Luftotte 4 forSouth.[3]

Army Norway was to operate in far northern Scandinaviaand bordering Soviet territories.[3] Army Group Northwas to march through the Baltic states into northern Rus-sia, either take or destroy the city of Leningrad and linkup with Finnish forces.[67][68][53] Army Group Center,the army group equipped with the most armour and airpower,[69] was to strike from Poland into Belorussia andthe west-central regions of Russia proper, and advance toSmolensk and then Moscow.[68][53] Army Group Southwas to strike the heavily populated and agricultural heart-land of Ukraine, taking Kiev before continuing eastwardover the steppes of southern USSR to the Volga withthe aim of controlling the oil-rich Caucasus.[68][53] ArmyGroup South was deployed in two sections separated bya 198-mile (319 km) gap. The northern section, whichcontained the army groups only panzer group, was insouthern Poland right next to Army Group Center, andthe southern section was in Romania.[70]

The German forces in the rear (mostly Waen-SS andEinsatzgruppen units) were to operate in conquered ter-ritories to counter any partisan activity in areas they con-trolled, as well as to execute captured Soviet politicalcommissars.[41] The ocial plan for Barbarossa assumedthat the army groups would be able to advance freely totheir primary objectives simultaneously, without spread-ing thin, once they had won the border battles and de-stroyed the Red Armys forces in the border area.[71]

3 Soviet preparationsIn 1930, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, a prominent mili-tary theorist in tank warfare in the interwar periodand later Marshal of the Soviet Union, forwarded amemo to the Kremlin that lobbied for colossal invest-ment in the resources required for the mass productionof weapons, pressing the case for 40,000 aircraft and

50,000 tanks.[72] In the early 1930s, a very modern op-erational doctrine for the Red Army was developed andpromulgated in the 1936 Field Regulations in the form ofthe Deep Battle Concept. Defense expenditure also grewrapidly from just 12 percent of the gross national productin 1933 to 18 percent by 1940.[73]

But during Stalins Great Purge in the late 1930s, whichwas still lightly ongoing at the start of the war in June1941, the ocer corps of the Red Army was decimatedand their replacements, appointed by Stalin for politi-cal reasons, often lacked military competence.[74][75][76]Of the ve Marshals of the Soviet Union appointed in1935, only two survived Stalins purge. 15 out of 16 armycommanders, 50 out of the 57 corps commanders, 154out of the 186 divisional commanders and 401 out of456 colonels were killed, and many other ocers weredismissed.[74] In total, about 30,000 Red Army person-nel were executed.[77] Stalin further underscored his con-trol by reasserting the role of political commissars at thedivisional level and below to oversee the political loyaltyof the Army to the regime. The commissars held a posi-tion equal to that of the commander of the unit they wereoverseeing.[74] But in spite of eorts to ensure the politi-cal subservience of the armed forces, in the wake of RedArmys poor performance in Poland and in the WinterWar, about 80 percent of the ocers dismissed duringthe Great Purge were reinstated by 1941. Also, betweenJanuary 1939 and May 1941, 161 new divisions wereactivated.[78][79] Although about 75 percent of all the o-cers had been in their position for less than one year at thestart of the German invasion of 1941, many of the shorttenures can be attributed not only to the purge, but alsoto the rapid increase in creation of military units.[79][44]

In the Soviet Union, speaking to his generals in Decem-ber 1940, Stalin mentioned Hitlers references to an at-tack on the Soviet Union in Mein Kampf and that Hitlerbelieved the Red Army would need four years to ready it-self. Stalin declared we must be ready much earlier andwe will try to delay the war for another two years.[80] Asearly as August 1940, British intelligence had receivedhints of German plans to attack the Soviets only a weekafter Hitler informally approved the plans for Barbarossaand warned the Soviet Union accordingly.[81] But Stalinsdistrust of the British led him to ignore their warningsin the belief that they were a trick designed to bring theSoviet Union into the war on their side.[81] He had anill-founded condence in the MolotovRibbentrop Pactand suspected the British of trying to spread false ru-mours in order to trigger a war between Germany andthe USSR.[82] In early 1941, Stalins own intelligenceservices and American intelligence gave regular and re-peated warnings of an impendingGerman attack.[83] Rus-sian spy Richard Sorge also gave Stalin the exact Germanlaunch date, but Sorge and other informers had previouslygiven dierent invasion dates that passed peacefully be-fore the actual invasion.[84] Stalin acknowledged the pos-sibility of an attack in general and therefore made sig-

6 3 SOVIET PREPARATIONS

nicant preparations, but decided not to run the risk ofprovoking Hitler.[85]

Marshal Zhukov speaking at a military conference in Moscow,September 1941

Beginning in July 1940, the Red Army General Stadeveloped war plans that identied the Wehrmacht asthe most dangerous threat to the Soviet Union, and thatin the case of a war with Germany, the Wehrmachtsmain attack would come through the region north of thePripyatMarshes into Belorussia;[86][71] which later provedto be correct.[86] But Stalin disagreed, and in October heauthorized the development of new plans that assumeda German attack would focus on the region south ofPripyat Marshes towards the economically vital regionsin Ukraine. This became the basis for all subsequent So-viet war plans and the deployment of their armed forcesin preparation for the German invasion.[86][87]

In early 1941 Stalin authorized the State Defense Plan1941 (DP-41), which along with the Mobilization Plan1941 (MP-41), called for the deployment of 186 divi-sions, as the rst strategic echelon, in the four militarydistricts[lower-alpha 2] of the western Soviet Union that facedthe Axis territories; and the deployment of another 51divisions along the Dvina and Dnieper rivers as the sec-ond strategic echelon under Stavka control, which in thecase of a German invasion was tasked to spearhead a So-viet counteroensive along with the remaining forces ofthe rst echelon.[87] But on 22 June 1941 the rst ech-elon only contained 171 divisions,[lower-alpha 3] numbering2.62.9 million;[2][88][89] and the second strategic echelon

contained 57 divisions that were still mobilizing, most ofwhich were still seriously understrength.[90] The secondechelon was undetected by German intelligence until daysafter the invasion commenced, in most cases only whenthe German ground forces bumped into them.[90]

At the start of the invasion, the manpower of the So-viet military force that had been mobilized was 5.35.5 million,[2][91] and it was still increasing as the Sovietreserve force of 14 million, with at least basic militarytraining, continued to mobilize.[92][93] The Red Armywas dispersed and still preparing when the invasion com-menced. Their units were often separated and lacked ad-equate transportation.[94]

The Soviet Union had some 23,000 tanks in service,[44]of which about 11,000 were in the western military dis-tricts that faced the German invasion force.[7] Hitler laterdeclared to some of his generals, If I had known aboutthe Russian tank strength in 1941 I would not haveattacked.[95] However, maintenance and readiness stan-dards were very poor; ammunition and radios were inshort supply, and many armoured units lacked the trucksfor supplies.[44] The most advanced Soviet tank models the KV-1 and T-34 which were superior to all cur-rent German tanks, as well as all designs still in devel-opment as of the summer 1941,[96] were not available inlarge numbers at the time the invasion commenced.[84]Furthermore, in the autumn of 1939, the Soviets dis-banded their mechanized corps and partly dispersed theirtanks to infantry divisions;[97] but following their obser-vation of the German campaign in France, in late 1940they began to reorganize most of their armored assetsback into mechanized corps with a target strength of1,031 tanks each.[78] But these large armoured forma-tions were unwieldy, and moreover they were spread outin scattered garrisons, with their subordinate divisions upto 100 kilometres apart.[78] Furthermore, the reorgani-zation was still in progress and incomplete when Bar-barossa commenced.[98][97] Soviet tank units were rarelywell equipped, and they lacked training and logistical sup-port. Units were sent into combat with no arrangementsin place for refueling, ammunition resupply, or person-nel replacement. Often, after a single engagement, unitswere destroyed or rendered ineective.[94] The Soviet nu-merical advantage in heavy equipment was thoroughlyoset by the superior training and organization of theWehrmacht.[77]

The Soviet Air Force (VVS) held the numerical advan-tage with a total of approximately 19,533 aircraft, whichmade it the largest air force in the world in the summerof 1941.[99] About 7,1339,100 of these were deployed inthe ve western military districts,[lower-alpha 2][99][7][8] andan additional 1445 were under Naval control.[100]

Historians have debated whether Stalin was planning aninvasion of German territory in the summer of 1941. Thedebate began in the late 1980s when Viktor Suvorov pub-lished a journal article and later the book Icebreaker in

7which he stated that Stalin had seen the outbreak of warin western Europe as an opportunity to spread communistrevolutions throughout the continent, and that the Sovietmilitary was being deployed for an imminent attack atthe time of the German invasion.[102] This view had alsobeen advanced by former German generals following thewar.[103] Suvorovs thesis was fully or partially acceptedby some historians, including Valeri Danilov, JoachimHomann, Mikhail Meltyukhov and Vladimir Nevezhin,and attracted public attention in Germany, Israel andRussia.[104][105] However, it has been strongly rejectedby most historians of this period,[106] and Icebreaker isgenerally considered to be an anti-Soviet tract in west-ern countries.[107] David Glantz and Gabriel Gorodetskywrote books to rebut Suvorovs arguments,[108] and mosthistorians believe that Stalin was seeking to avoid war in1941 as he believed that his military was not ready to ghtthe German forces.[109]

4 Order of battleMain article: Order of battle for Operation Barbarossa

5 Invasion

German infantryman in front of a dead Soviet soldier and aburning BT-7 tank in Ukraine, June 1941

At around 1:00 am on 22 June 1941, the Soviet mili-tary districts in the border area[lower-alpha 2] were alertedby NKO Directive No. 1, which was issued late on nightof 21 June.[120] It called on them to bring all forces tocombat readiness, but to avoid provocative actions ofany kind.[121] It took up to 2 hours for several of theunits subordinate to the Fronts to receive the order of thedirective,[121] and the majority did not receive it beforethe invasion commenced.[120]

At around 3:15 am on 22 June 1941, the Axis Powerscommenced the invasion of the Soviet Union with thebombing of major cities in Soviet-occupied Poland[122]and an artillery barrage on Red Army defences on the

entire front.[120] The heavy air-raids stretched as far asKronstadt near Leningrad, Ismail in Bessarabia, to Sev-astopol in the Crimea; meanwhile, troops on the groundcrossed through at numerous places accompanied in somelocales bymembers of Lithuanian andUkrainian fth col-umn.[123] Roughly three million soldiers of the Wehrma-cht went into action and faced slightly fewer Soviet troopsat the border.[122]

At around noon, the news of the invasion was broadcastto the population by Soviet foreign minister VyacheslavMolotov: "... Without a declaration of war, Germanforces fell on our country, attacked our frontiers in manyplaces... The Red Army and the whole nation will wagea victorious Patriotic War for our beloved country, forhonour, for liberty ... Our cause is just. The enemywill be beaten. Victory will be ours!"[124][125] By callingupon the populations devotion to their nation rather thanthe Party, Molotov struck a patriotic chord that helpeda stunned people absorb the shattering news.[124] Withinthe rst few days of the invasion, the Soviet High Com-mand and Red Army were extensively reorganized so asto place them on the necessary war footing.[126] Stalin didnot address the nation about the German invasion until 3July. Just like Molotov, he called for a Patriotic War ...of the entire Soviet people.[127]

In Germany, on themorning of 22 June, Nazi propagandaminister Joseph Goebbels announced the invasion to thewaking nation in a radio broadcast, At this moment amarch is taking place that, for its extent, compares withthe greatest the world has ever seen. I have decided todayto place the fate and future of the Reich and our peoplein the hands of our soldiers. May God aid us, especiallyin this ght!"[128] Later the same morning, Hitler pro-claimed to colleagues, before three months have passed,we shall witness a collapse of Russia, the like of whichhas never been seen in history.[128]

6 Phase one

German advances from June to August, 1941

8 6 PHASE ONE

The initial momentum of the German ground and airattack completely destroyed the Soviet organizationalcommand and control within the rst few hours, par-alyzing every level of command from the infantry pla-toon to the Soviet High Command inMoscow.[129] There-fore, Moscow failed to grasp the magnitude of the catas-trophe that confronted the Soviet forces in the borderarea.[44] At around 7:15 am, Stalin issued NKO Direc-tive No. 2, which announced the invasion to the SovietArmed Forces, and called on them to attack Axis forceswherever they had violated the borders and launch airstrikes into the border regions of German territory.[130]At around 9:15 pm, Stalin issued NKO Directive No.3, signed by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, which nowcalled for a general counteroensive on the entire frontwithout any regards for borders that both men hopedwould sweep the enemy from Soviet territory.[131][121]Timoshenkos order was not based on a realistic appraisalof the military situation at hand, and it resulted in devas-tating casualties.[44]

6.1 Air war

Luftwae reconnaissance units worked frantically to plotSoviet troop concentration, supply dumps, and airelds,and mark them down for destruction.[44] In contrast, So-viet artillery observers based at the border area had beenunder the strictest instructions not to open re on Germanaircraft prior to the invasion.[44] The Luftwae reportedto have destroyed 1,489 aircraft on the rst day of theinvasion[132] and over 3100 over the rst three days.[133]Hermann Gring, Minister of Aviation and Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwae, distrusted the reports and or-dered the gure checked. Luftwae stas surveyed thewreckage on Soviet airelds, and their original gureproved conservative, as over 2,000 Soviet aircraft wereestimated to have been destroyed on the rst day of theinvasion.[132] In reality, Soviet losses were likely higher; aSoviet archival document recorded the loss of 3,922 So-viet aircraft in the rst three days against an estimated lossof 78 German aircraft.[133][134] The Luftwae reportedthe loss of only 35 aircraft on the rst day of combat.[133]A document from the German Federal Archives puts theLuftwaes loss at 63 aircraft for the rst day.[135]

By the end of the rst week, the Luftwae had achievedair supremacy over the battleelds of all the armygroups,[134] but was unable to eect this air domi-nance over the vast expanse of the western SovietUnion.[136][137] According to the war diaries of theGerman High Command, the Luftwae by 5 July had lost491 aircraft with 316 more damaged, leaving it with onlyabout 70 percent of the strength it had at the start of theinvasion.[138]

6.2 Baltic statesMain article: Baltic Operation

On 22 June, Army Group North attacked the So-viet Northwestern Front and broke through its 8th and11th Armies.[139] The Soviets immediately launched apowerful counterattack against the German 4th PanzerGroup with the Soviet 3rd and 12th Mechanized Corps,but the Soviet attack was defeated.[139] On 25 June, the8th and 11th Armies were ordered to withdraw to theWestern Dvina River, where it was planned to meetupwith the 21st Mechanized Corps and the 22nd and 27thArmies. However, on 26 June, Erich von Mansteins LVIPanzer Corps reached the river rst and secured a bridge-head across it.[140] The Northwestern Front was forced toabandon the river defenses, and on 29 June Stavka or-dered the Front to withdraw to the Stalin Line on theapproaches to Leningrad.[140] On 2 July, Army GroupNorth began its attack on the Stalin Line with its 4thPanzer Group, and on 8 July captured Pskov, devastatingthe defenses of the Stalin Line and reaching Leningradoblast.[140] The 4th Panzer Group had advanced about450 kilometres (280 mi) since the start of the invasionand was now only about 250 kilometres (160 mi) fromits primary objective Leningrad. On 9 July it began itsattack towards the Soviet defenses along the Luga Riverin Leningrad oblast.[141]

6.3 Ukraine and MoldaviaSee also: OperationMnchen and Battle of Brody (1941)

The northern section of Army Group South faced theSouthwestern Front, which had the largest concentra-tion of Soviet forces, and the southern section facedthe Southern Front. In addition, the Pripyat Marshesand the Carpathian Mountains posed a serious chal-lenge to the army groups northern and southern sectionsrespectively.[142] On 22 June, only the northern sectionof Army Group South attacked, but the terrain impededtheir assault, giving the Soviet defenders ample time toreact.[142] The German 1st Panzer Group and 6th Armyattacked and broke through the Soviet 5th Army.[143]Starting on the night of 23 June, the Soviet 22nd and 15thMechanized Corps attacked the anks of the 1st PanzerGroup from north and south respectively. Although in-tended to be concerted, Soviet tank units were sent inpiecemeal due to poor coordination. The 22nd Mech-anized Corp ran into the 1st Panzer Armys III Motor-ized Corps and was decimated, and its commander killed.The 1st Panzer Group bypassed much of the 15th Mech-anized Corps, which engaged the German 6th Armys297th Infantry Division, where it was defeated by anti-tank re and Luftwae attacks.[144] On 26 June, the So-viets launched another counterattack on the 1st PanzerGroup from north and south simultaneously with the 9th,

919th and 8th Mechanized Corps, which altogether elded1649 tanks, and supported by the remnants of the 15thMechanized Corps. The battle lasted for four days, end-ing in the defeat of the Soviet tank units.[145] On 30 JuneStavka ordered the remaining forces of the SouthwesternFront to withdraw to the Stalin Line, where it would de-fend the approaches to Kiev.[146]

On 2 July, the southern section of Army Group South the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies, alongside the Ger-man 11th Army invaded Soviet Moldavia, which wasdefended by the Southern Front.[147] Counterattacks bythe Fronts 2nd Mechanized Corps and 9th Army weredefeated, but on 9 July the Axis advance stalled along thedefenses of the Soviet 18th Army between the Prut andDniester Rivers.[148]

6.4 BelorussiaMain article: Battle of BiaystokMinsk

In the opening hours of the invasion, the Luftwae de-stroyed the Western Fronts air force on the ground,and with the aid of Abwehr and their supporting anti-communist fth columns operating in the Soviet rear par-alyzed the Fronts communication lines, which particu-larly cut o the Soviet 4th Army headquarters from head-quarters above and below it.[149] On the same day, the 2ndPanzer Group crossed the Bug River, broke through the4th Army, bypassed Brest Fortress, and pressed on to-wards Minsk, while the 3rd Panzer Group bypassed mostof the 3rd Army and pressed on towards Vilnius.[149] Si-multaneously, the German 4th and 9th Armies engagedthe Western Front forces in the environs of Biaystok.[44]On the order of Dmitry Pavlov, the commander of theWestern Front, the 6th and 11th Mechanized Corps andthe 6th Cavalry Corps launched a strong counterstrike to-wards Grodno on 2425 June in hopes of destroying the3rd Panzer Group. However, the 3rd Panzer Group hadalready moved on, with its forward units reaching Vil-nius on the evening of 23 June, and the Western Frontsarmoured counterattack instead ran into infantry and an-titank re from the V Army Corps of the German 9thArmy, supported by Luftwae air attacks.[149] By thenight of 25 June, the Soviet counterattack was defeated,and the commander of the 6th Cavalry Corps was cap-tured. The same night, Pavlov ordered all the remnantsof the Western Front to withdraw to Slonim towardsMinsk.[149] Subsequent counterattacks to buy time forthe withdrawal were launched against the German forces,but all of them failed.[149] On 27 June, the 2nd and 3rdPanzer Groups met near Minsk and captured the city thenext day, completing the encirclement of almost all of theWestern Front in two pockets: one around Biaystok andanother west of Minsk.[150] The Germans destroyed theSoviet 3rd and 10th Armies while inicting serious losseson the 4th, 11th and 13th Armies, and reported to havecaptured 324,000 Soviet troops, 3,300 tanks, 1,800 ar-

tillery pieces.[151][152] On 30 June, Stalin relieved Pavlovof his command, and on 22 July tried and executed himalong withmanymembers of his sta on charges of cow-ardice and criminal incompetence.[153][154][84]

A Soviet directive was issued on 29 June to combat themass panic rampant among the civilians and the armedforces personnel. The order stipulated swift, severe mea-sures against anyone inciting panic or displaying cow-ardice. TheNKVDworkedwith commissars andmilitarycommanders to scour possible withdrawal routes of sol-diers retreating without military authorization. Field ex-pedient general courts were established to deal with civil-ians spreading rumours and military deserters.[155]

On 29 June, Hitler, through the Commander-in-Chief ofthe German Army Walther von Brauchitsch, instructedthe commander of Army Group Center Fedor von Bockto halt the advance of his panzers until the infantry forma-tions liquidating the pockets catch up.[156] But the com-mander of the 2nd Panzer Group Heinz Guderian, withthe tacit support of Fedor von Bock and the chief of OKHFranz Halder, ignored the instruction and attacked oneastward towards Bobruisk, albeit reporting the advanceas a reconnaissance-in-force. He also personally con-ducted an aerial inspection of theMinsk-Biaystok pocketon 30 June and concluded that his panzer group was notneeded to contain it, since Hermann Hoths 3rd PanzerGroup was already involved in the Minsk pocket.[157] Onthe same day, some of the infantry corps of the 9th and4th Armies, having suciently liquidated the Biaystokpocket, resumed their march eastward to catch up withthe panzer groups.[157] On 1 July, Fedor von Bock orderedthe panzer groups to resume their full oensive eastwardon the morning of 3 July. But Brauchitsch, upholdingHitlers instruction, and Halder, unwillingly going alongwith it, opposed Bocks order. However, Bock insisted onthe order by stating that it would be atly irresponsible toreverse orders already issued. The panzer groups, how-ever, resumed their oensive on 2 July before the infantryformations had suciently caught up.[157]

7 Phase twoFurther information: Battle of Smolensk (1941) andLeningrad Operation (1941)On 2 July and through the next six days, a rainstormtypical of Russian summers slowed the progress of thepanzers of Army Group Center, and Russian defensesstiened.[158][44] The delays gave the Soviets time to or-ganize a massive counterattack against Army Group Cen-ter. The army groups ultimate objective was Smolensk,which commanded the road to Moscow. Facing theGermans was an old Soviet defensive line held by sixarmies. On 6 July, the Soviets attacked the 3rd PanzerGroup with 1000 tanks. The Germans defeated thiscounterattack with overwhelming air superiority.[44] The2nd Panzer Group crossed the Dnieper River and closed

10 8 PHASE THREE

German advances during the opening phases of Operation Bar-barossa, August 1941

in on Smolensk from the south while the 3rd PanzerGroup, after defeating the Soviet counterattack, closedon Smolensk from the north.[44] Trapped between theirpincers were three Soviet armies. On 18 July, the PanzerGroups came to within sixteen kilometres of closing thegap, but the trap did not snap shut until 26 July.[44]When the Panzer Groups nally closed the gap, 300,000Red Army soldiers were captured,[159] but 200,000 RedArmy soldiers escaped to stand between the Germans andMoscow.[44]

Four weeks into the campaign, the Germans realized theyhad grossly underestimated Soviet strength. The Ger-man troops had used their initial supplies without attain-ing the expected strategic freedom of movement.[44] Op-erations were now slowed down to allow for resupply;the delay was to be used to adapt strategy to the newsituation.[44] Hitler by now had lost faith in battles of en-circlement as large numbers of Soviet soldiers had es-caped the pincers.[44] He now believed he could defeatthe Soviets by economic damage, depriving them of theindustrial capacity to continue the war. That meant seiz-ing the industrial center of Kharkov, the Donbass and theoil elds of the Caucasus in the south and the speedy cap-ture of Leningrad, a major center of military production,in the north.[44][159]

Fedor von Bock, the commander of Army Group Center,and almost all the German generals involved in OperationBarbarossa argued vehemently in favor of continuing theall-out drive toward Moscow. Besides the psychologicalimportance of capturing the enemys capital, the generalspointed out that Moscow was a major center of arms pro-duction, the center of the Soviet communications systemand an important transportation hub. More signicantly,intelligence reports indicated that the bulk of the RedArmy was deployed near Moscow under Semyon Timo-shenko for an all-out defense of the capital.[44] But Hitlerwas adamant, and he issued a direct order to the talentedpanzer ace Heinz Guderianbypassing Guderians com-manding ocer, von Bockto send Army Group Cen-

ters tanks to the north and south, temporarily halting thedrive to Moscow.[159]

8 Phase threeFurther information: Battle of Uman, Battle of Kiev(1941) and Siege of Leningrad

By mid-July, the Germans had advanced within a fewkilometers of Kiev below the Pripyat Marshes. The1st Panzer Group then went south while the 17thArmy struck east and trapped three Soviet armies nearUman.[160] As the Germans eliminated the pocket, thetanks turned north and crossed the Dnieper. Meanwhile,the 2nd Panzer Group, diverted from Army Group Cen-ter, had crossed the Desna River with 2nd Army on itsright ank. The two Panzer armies now trapped four So-viet armies and parts of two others.[161]

By August, as the serviceability and the quantity ofthe Luftwaes inventory steadily reduced due to com-bat, while demand for air support only increased asthe VVS stubbornly resurged, the Luftwae found itselfstruggling to maintain local air superiority in the frontlines.[162] Also with the onset of bad weather in Octo-ber, the Luftwae was on several occasions forced to haltnearly all aerial operations. The VVS, although facedwith the same weather diculties, had a clear advantagethanks to the prewar experience with cold-weather yingtechniques.[163] ByDecember, the VVS havematched theLuftwae and was even pressing to achieve air supremacyover the battleelds.[164]

For its nal attack on Leningrad, the 4th Panzer Groupwas reinforced by tanks from Army Group Center. On8 August, the Panzers broke through the Soviet defenses.By the end ofAugust, 4th Panzer Group had penetrated towithin 48 kilometers of Leningrad. The Finns had pushedsoutheast on both sides of Lake Ladoga to reach the oldFinnish-Soviet frontier.[159]

General Guderian at a forward command post of a Panzer reg-iment near Kiev, 1941

The Germans attacked Leningrad in August 1941 with

11

6,000 cannons, 4,500 trench mortars, 19,000 machineguns, 1,000 planes, 1,000 tanks, and approximately600,000 men in 40 divisions.[165] In the following threeblack months of 1941, 400,000 residents of the cityworked to build the citys fortications as ghting con-tinued, and 160,000 others joined the ranks of the RedArmy. On September 7, the German 20th MotorizedDivision seized Shlisselburg, cutting o all land routesto Leningrad. The Germans severed the railroads toMoscow and captured the railroad to Murmansk withFinnish assistance to inaugurate the start of a siege thatwould last for over two years.[166][167]

At this stage, Hitler ordered the nal destruction ofLeningrad with no prisoners taken, and on 9 Septem-ber, Army Group North began the nal push. Within tendays it had advanced within 11 kilometers of the city.[159]However, the push over the last 10 km (6.2 mi) provedvery slow and casualties mounted. Hitler, now out of pa-tience, ordered that Leningrad should not be stormed,but rather starved into submission.[159] Deprived of itsPanzer forces, Army Group Center remained static andwas subjected to numerous Soviet counterattacks, in par-ticular the Yelnya Oensive, in which the Germans suf-fered their rst major tactical defeat since their invasionbegan. These attacks prompted Hitler to concentrate hisattention back to Army Group Center and its drive onMoscow. The Germans ordered the 3rd and 4th PanzerArmies to break o their Siege of Leningrad and supportArmy Group Center in its attack on Moscow.[159]

Before it could begin, operations in Kiev needed to benished. Half of Army Group Center had swung to thesouth in the back of the Kiev position, while Army GroupSouth moved to the north from its Dniepr bridgehead.[168]The encirclement of Soviet forces in Kiev was achievedon 16 September. A savage battle ensued in which theSoviets were hammered with tanks, artillery, and aerialbombardment.[168] After ten days of vicious ghting, theGermans claimed over 600,000 Soviet soldiers captured.Actual losses were 452,720 men, 3,867 artillery piecesand mortars from 43 divisions of the 5th, 21st, 26th, and37th Soviet Armies.[168]

9 Phase four

Main article: Battle of MoscowAfter Kiev, the Red Army no longer outnumbered theGermans and there were nomore trained reserves directlyavailable. To defend Moscow, Stalin could eld 800,000men in 83 divisions, but no more than 25 divisions werefully eective. Operation Typhoon, the drive to Moscow,began on 2 October.[161] In front of Army Group Centerwas a series of elaborate defense lines, the rst centeredon Vyazma and the second on Mozhaysk.[161]

The rst blow took the Soviets completely by surprisewhen the 2nd Panzer Group, returning from the south,

Soviet planes ying over German positions near Moscow

took Oryol, just 121 km (75 mi) south of the Sovietrst main defense line.[161] Three days later, the Panzerspushed on to Bryansk, while the 2nd Army attacked fromthe west.[161] The Soviet 3rd and 13th Armies were nowencircled. To the north, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Armiesattacked Vyazma, trapping the 19th, 20th, 24th and 32ndArmies.[161] Moscows rst line of defense had been shat-tered. The pocket eventually yielded 673,000 Soviet pris-oners, bringing the tally since the start of the invasion tothree million. The Soviets had now only 90,000 men and150 tanks left for the defense of Moscow.[169]

The German government now publicly predicted the im-minent capture of Moscow and convinced foreign corre-spondents of a pending Soviet collapse.[170] On 13 Octo-ber, the 3rd Panzer Group penetrated to within 140 km(87 mi) of the capital.[161] Martial law was declared inMoscow. Almost from the beginning of Operation Ty-phoon, however, the weather worsened. Temperaturesfell while there was a continued rainfall. This turned theunpaved road network into mud and steadily slowed theGerman advance on Moscow to as little as 3.2 km (2.0mi) a day.[159] At the same time, the supply situation forthe Germans rapidly deteriorated. On 31 October, theGerman Army High Command ordered a halt to Oper-ation Typhoon while the armies were reorganized. Thepause gave the Soviets, who were in a far better supplysituation, time to consolidate their positions and organizeformations of newly activated reservists.[159] In little overa month, the Soviets organized eleven new armies that in-cluded 30 divisions of Siberian troops. These had beenfreed from the Soviet Far East after Soviet intelligenceassured Stalin that there was no longer a threat from theJapanese.[159] Over 1,000 tanks and 1,000 aircraft arrivedalong with the Siberian forces.[159]

On 15 November, with the ground hardening due to thecold weather, the Germans once again began the attack onMoscow.[159] Although the troops themselves were nowable to advance again, there had been no delay allowed toimprove the supply situation. Facing the Germans werethe 5th, 16th, 30th, 43rd, 49th, and 50th Soviet armies.The Germans intended to let the 3rd and 4th PanzerArmies cross the Moscow Canal and envelop Moscow

12 11 WAR CRIMES

from the northeast. The 2nd Panzer Group would attackTula and then close in on Moscow from the south.[84] Asthe Soviets reacted to the anks, the 4th Army would at-tack the center. In two weeks of desperate ghting, lack-ing sucient fuel and ammunition, the Germans slowlycrept towardsMoscow.[84] However, in the south, the 2ndPanzer Group was being blocked. On 22 November, So-viet Siberian units, augmented with the 49th and 50thSoviet Armies, attacked the 2nd Panzer Group and in-icted a shocking defeat on the Germans. The 4th PanzerGroup pushed the Soviet 16th Army back, however, andsucceeded in crossing the Moscow canal to begin the at-tempted encirclement of Moscow.[84]

The German position of advances before the start of OperationTyphoon, September 1941

On 2 December, part of the 258th Infantry Division ad-vanced to within 24 km (15 mi) of Moscow and could seethe spires of the Kremlin, but by then the rst blizzardsof the Russian Winter had already begun.[171][84] A re-connaissance battalion also managed to reach the town ofKhimki, only about 8 km (5.0 mi) away from the Sovietcapital. It captured the bridge over the Moscow-VolgaCanal as well as the railway station, whichmarked the far-thest eastern advance of German forces.[172] But in spiteof the progress made, the Wehrmacht was not equippedfor winter warfare, and the bitter cold caused severe prob-lems for their guns and equipment. Furthermore, weatherconditions grounded the Luftwae from conducting anylarge-scale operations.[84] Newly created Soviet units nearMoscow now numbered over 500,000 men, and on 5 De-cember, they launched a massive counterattack as partof the Battle of Moscow that pushed the Germans backover 320 km (200 mi). By late December 1941, the Ger-mans had lost the Battle forMoscow, and the invasion hadcost the German army over 830,000 casualties in killed,wounded, captured or missing in action.[84]

10 AftermathWith the failure of the Battle of Moscow, all Germanplans for a quick defeat of the Soviet Union had to be

revised. The Soviet counteroensives in December 1941caused heavy casualties on both sides, but ultimately elim-inated the German threat to Moscow.[84]

In spite of this devastating setback for the Germans, theSoviet Union also suered heavily from the conict. Itlost so much of its army and industry that the Germanswere able to mount another large-scale oensive in July1942. Hitler, having realized that Germanys oil sup-ply was severely depleted,[173] aimed to capture the oilelds of Baku in an oensive, codenamed Case Blue.[174]Once again, the Germans quickly conquered great ex-panses of Soviet territory, but they failed to achieve theirultimate goals in the wake of their decisive defeat at theBattle of Stalingrad.[159]

By 1943, the Soviet war economy was fully operationaland able to outproduce the German war economy, whichhad not been prepared for a long war of attrition.[44] Thewar ended with the total defeat and occupation of NaziGermany in May 1945.[44]

11 War crimesMain articles: German mistreatment of Soviet prisonersof war and The Holocaust in Russia

The Soviet Union had not participated in the GenevaConventions and therefore their troops could not rely onthe protection the Conventions guaranteed soldiers dur-ing times of war.[175] Hitler called for the battle againstthe Soviet Union to be a struggle for existence and ac-cordingly authorized crimes against Soviet prisoners ofwar. A Nazi memorandum from 16 July 1941, recordedbyMartin Bormann, quotes Hitler saying, The giant [oc-cupied] area must naturally be pacied as quickly as pos-sible; this will happen at best if anyone who just looksfunny should be shot.[176][177]

Himmler inspecting a prisoner of war camp

13

Hitler issued the notorious Commissar Order, whichcalled for all Soviet political commissars taken prisonerat the front to be shot immediately without trial.[175] Ger-man soldiers both willingly and unwillingly participatedin these mass killings.[175] An estimated two million So-viet POWs died of starvation during Barbarossa alone;nothing was done for their survival.[175] The famishedPOWs were hardly able to walk by themselves.[178] Bythe end of the war, 58 percent of all Soviet POWs diedin German captivity.[179][180]

Organized crimes against civilians, including women andchildren, were also carried out on a huge scale by the Ger-mans and local supporters.[175] Under the command ofthe Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Head Of-ce), the Einsatzgruppen killing squads conducted large-scale massacres of Jews and communists in conqueredSoviet territories. Holocaust historian Raul Hilberg putsthe number of Jews murdered by mobile killing opera-tions at 1,400,000.[181] The original instructions to killJews in party and state positions was broadened to in-clude all male Jews of military age and was expandedonce more to all male Jews regardless of age. By theend of July, the Germans were regularly killing womenand children.[178]

Burning houses suspected of being partisan meetingplaces and poisoning water wells became common prac-tice for soldiers of the German 9th Army.[84] At Kharkov,the fourth largest city in the Soviet Union, the Germanswere instructed to only give food to the small number ofpeople who worked for them, with the rest designated toslowly starve.[84] Thousands of Soviets were shipped toGermany to be used as slave labor.[175]

The citizens of Leningrad were subjected to heavy bom-bardment and a siege that would last 872 days and starvemore than a million people to death, of whom approx-imately 400,000 were children below the age of 14.[182]The German-Finnish blockade cut o access to food, fueland raw materials, and rations reached a low, for the non-working population, of four ounces (ve thin slices) ofbread and a little watery soup per day.[165] Starving So-viet civilians began to eat their domestic animals, alongwith hair tonic and Vaseline. An estimated one millionLeningrad residents died during the siege, mostly due tostarvation, the intense cold, and stress.[183][184] Some des-perate citizens resorted to cannibalism; Soviet recordslist 2,000 people arrested for the use of human meatas food during the siege, 886 of them during the rstwinter of 194142.[184] The Germans planned to seal oLeningrad, starve out the population, and then demolishthe city entirely.[167]

12 Historical signicance

Operation Barbarossa was the largest and one of theswiftest military operations in human history; more men,

tanks, guns and aircraft were committed than had everbeen deployed before in a single oensive.[84] A total of75 percent of the entire German military participated.[44]The invasion opened up the Eastern Front of World WarII, the largest theater of war during that conict, and itwitnessed titanic clashes of unprecedented violence anddestruction for four years that resulted in the deaths ofmore than 26 million people.[185] More people died ght-ing on the Eastern Front than in all other ghting acrossthe globe during World War II.[186]

13 See also Operation Silver Fox Timeline of the Eastern Front of World War II Black Sea campaigns

14 Notes[1] Finland was not ocially a member of the Axis, but co-

ordinated its invasion of the Soviet Union with the Axispowers.

[2] The four Soviet military districts facing the Axis, theBaltic Military District, the Western Special Military Dis-trict, the Kiev Special Military District and the OdessaMilitary District, at the outbreak of the war were re-named the Northwestern Front, the Western Front, theSouthwestern Front and the Southern Front, respectively.A fth military district, the Leningrad military district,became the Northern Front.(Glantz 2012, pp. 11, 16,208)

[3] 170 divisions and 2 independent brigades, along with 12airborne brigades.(Glantz 2012, pp. 16, 219)

15 References[1] Clark 2012, p. 73.

[2] Glantz 2001, p. 9.

[3] Glantz 2010a, p. 20.

[4] Glantz 2001, p. 9, 2.68 million.

[5] Glantz 1998, p. 1011, 101,293, 2.9 million.

[6] Taylor 1974, p. 98, 2.6 million.

[7] Mercatante 2012, p. 64.

[8] Clark 2012, p. 76.

[9] Glantz 2010a, p. 28, 7,133 aircraft.

[10] Mercatante 2012, p. 64, 9,100 aircraft.

[11] Clark 2012, p. 76, 9,100 aircraft.

14 15 REFERENCES

[12] Heeresarzt 10-Day Casualty Reports per Theater ofWar,1941.

[13] Red Army and NKVD gures, 19411945.

[14] Bergstrm 2007, p. 117.

[15] Graham Royde-Smith.

[16] Krivosheev 1997, pp. 9598.

[17] AOK POW Reports.

[18] Sharp 2010, p. 89.

[19] The Fatal Attraction of Adolf Hitler, 1989.

[20] Shirer 1990, p. 716.

[21] Fahlbusch 1999, pp. 241264.

[22] Evans 1989, p. 59.

[23] Evans 1989, pp. 5960.

[24] Burleigh 2001, p. 512.

[25] Kershaw 2000, p. 466.

[26] Kershaw 2000, p. 467.

[27] Frster 2005, p. 127.

[28] Majer 2003, p. 180.

[29] Gellately 1990, p. 224.

[30] Himmler 1940, pp. 147150.

[31] Mazower 2009, p. 181.

[32] Rssler & Schleiermacher 1996, pp. 270274.

[33] Ingrao 2013, p. 140.

[34] Ingrao 2013, pp. 138142.

[35] Kirby 1980, p. 120.

[36] Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, 1939.

[37] Roberts 2006, p. 30.

[38] Shirer 1990, pp. 668669.

[39] Roberts 2006, p. 57.

[40] Weeks 2002, p. 98.

[41] Hartmann 2013, pp. 924.

[42] Ericson 1999, p. 127.

[43] Ericson 1999, pp. 129130.

[44] Battle for Russia, 1996.

[45] Brackman 2001, p. 344.

[46] Wette 2007, pp. 2122.

[47] Gorodetsky 2001, pp. 6970.

[48] Ericson 1999, p. 162.

[49] Patterson 2003, p. 562.

[50] Handrack 1981, p. 40.

[51] Klemann & Kudryashov 2013, p. 33.

[52] Rich 1973, p. 212.

[53] Higgins 1966, pp. 1159.

[54] Glantz 2010a, pp. 18.

[55] Glantz 2010b, pp. 19, 60.

[56] Clark 2012, p. 72.

[57] Glantz 2010b, pp. 5560.

[58] Shirer 1990, p. 822.

[59] Hardesty 2012, p. 6.

[60] Bradley & Buell 2002, pp. 3540.

[61] Shirer 1990, p. 829.

[62] Shirer 1990, p. 830.

[63] Beevor 2012, p. 163.

[64] Glantz 2010a, pp. 20, 34.

[65] Glantz 2010a, pp. 20, 25.

[66] Clark 2012, pp. 7374.

[67] Glantz 2012, p. 36.

[68] Baker 2013, pp. 2627.

[69] Glantz 2012, p. 14.

[70] Glantz 2012, p. 40.

[71] Glantz 2010a, p. 21.

[72] Clark 2012, p. 56.

[73] Clark 2012, p. 55.

[74] Clark 2012, p. 57.

[75] Glantz 1998, p. 26.

[76] Glantz 2012, p. 55.

[77] Rayeld 2004, p. 315.

[78] Glantz 2012, p. 22.

[79] Clark 2012, p. 58.

[80] Berthon & Potts 2007, p. 47.

[81] Waller 1996, p. 192.

[82] Roberts 1995, p. 1293.

[83] Waller 1996, pp. 196198.

[84] Soviet Storm: Operation Barbarossa 2011.

[85] Waller 1996, p. 202.

[86] Glantz 2012, p. 15.

15

[87] Glantz 2010a, p. 21-22.

[88] Glantz 1998, p. 1011, 101, 293.

[89] Taylor 1974, p. 98.

[90] Glantz 2010a, pp. 2223, 51.

[91] Glantz 1998, p. 293.

[92] Glantz 1998, p. 107.

[93] Glantz & House 1995, p. 68.

[94] Sakwa 2005, pp. 225227.

[95] Macksey 1989, p. 456.

[96] Glantz 2012, p. 23.

[97] Glantz 1998, p. 109.

[98] Dunnigan 1978, p. 82.

[99] Glantz 2010a, p. 28.

[100] Glantz 1998, p. 13.

[101] Russian Military Library.

[102] Uldricks 1999, pp. 626627.

[103] Smelser & Davies 2008, p. 243.

[104] Uldricks 1999, pp. 631, 633, 636.

[105] Bar-Joseph & Levy 2009, p. 476.

[106] Uldricks 1999, p. 630.

[107] Roberts 1995, p. 1326.

[108] Mawdsley 2003, pp. 819820.

[109] Bar-Joseph & Levy 2009, p. 477.

[110] Kirchubel 2005, p. 26,29.

[111] Kirchubel 2003, p. 31.

[112] Kirchubel 2007, p. 31.

[113] Glantz 2012, pp. 290303.

[114] Kirchubel 2005, p. 26.

[115] Glantz 2012, p. 290-303.

[116] Kirchubel 2005, p. 29.

[117] Kirchubel 2007, p. 30.

[118] Kirchubel 2005, p. 31.

[119] Glantz 2012, pp. 302303.

[120] Clark 2012, p. 81.

[121] Glantz 2012, p. 287.

[122] Kirchubel 2007, pp. 3334.

[123] Seaton 1972, p. 98.

[124] Clark 2012, p. 70.

[125] Braithwaite 2010, p. 74.

[126] Seaton 1972, p. 99.

[127] Clark 2012, p. 92.

[128] Clark 2012, p. 82.

[129] Glantz 2012, p. 31, 33.

[130] Clark 2012, p. 83.

[131] Glantz 2010a, p. 31.

[132] Bergstrm 2007, p. 20.

[133] Bergstrm 2007, p. 23.

[134] Hardesty 2012, p. 9.

[135] Hardesty 2012, p. 8, 390.

[136] Glantz 2012, p. 19.

[137] Hardesty 2012, p. 54.

[138] Glantz 2010a, p. 54.

[139] Glantz 2012, p. 37.

[140] Glantz 2012, p. 38.

[141] Glantz 2012, p. 93.

[142] Fritz 2011, p. 89, 140.

[143] Glantz 2012, p. 41.

[144] Glantz 2012, p. 42.

[145] Glantz 2012, pp. 4344, 225.

[146] Glantz 2012, pp. 21, 4344.

[147] Glantz 2012, p. 45.

[148] Glantz 2012, p. 45, 112.

[149] Glantz 2010a, pp. 2933.

[150] Glantz 2010a, pp. 2933, 56.

[151] Murray & Millett 2000, pp. 122123.

[152] Fritz 2011, p. 88, 509.

[153] Glantz 2010a, pp. 5657.

[154] Forczyk 2014, pp. 253.

[155] Seaton 1972, p. 111.

[156] Glantz 2010a, pp. 5456.

[157] Glantz 2010a, pp. 6062.

[158] Glantz 2010a, p. 63.

[159] Hitler Strikes East, 2009.

[160] Thomas 2012, p. 13.

[161] Thomas 2012, pp. 1214.

[162] Hardesty 2012, p. 84.

16 16 SOURCES

[163] Hardesty 2012, p. 8385.

[164] Hardesty 2012, p. 103.

[165] Miller & Commager 2001, p. 68.

[166] Miller & Commager 2001, pp. 6869.

[167] Beevor 2012, p. 204.

[168] Glantz & House 1995, p. 77.

[169] Glantz & House 1995, p. 343.

[170] Smith 2000, pp. 8391.

[171] Shirer 1990, p. 1032.

[172] Commager 1991, p. 144.

[173] Hayward 2000, p. 769.

[174] Symonds 2014, p. 70.

[175] General Wilhelm Keitel: The Lackey, 1998.

[176] Holocaust Denial on Trial, by Charles Gray.

[177] Browning 1998, p. 10.

[178] Beevor 2012, p. 213.

[179] Glantz 2012, p. 48.

[180] Nazi Persecution of Soviet Prisoners of War.

[181] Hilberg 1961, p. 767.

[182] Siege of Leningrad 2011.

[183] Miller & Commager 2001, p. 69.

[184] Beevor 2012, p. 289.

[185] Mosko 2002, p. 236.

[186] Weinberg 2005, p. 243.

16 Sources

16.1 Printed Baker, Lee (2013). The Second World War on theEastern Front. Routledge. ISBN 978-1317865049.

Bar-Joseph, Uri; Levy, Jack S. (Fall 2009).Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure.Political Science Quarterly 124 (3): 461488.doi:10.1002/j.1538-165X.2009.tb00656.x.

Bartov, Omer (2001). The Eastern Front, 194145:German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare.London: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-333-94944-3.

Beevor, Antony (2012). The Second World War.New York: Back Bay Books. ISBN 978-0-316-02374-0.

Bellamy, Chris (2007). Absolute War: Soviet Russiain the Second World War. Vintage Books. ISBN978-0-375-72471-8.

Bergstrm, Christer (2007). Barbarossa The AirBattle: JulyDecember 1941. Classic Publications.ISBN 978-1-85780-270-2.

Berthon, Simon; Potts, Joanna (2007). Warlords:An Extraordinary Re-creation of World War IIThrough the Eyes and Minds of Hitler, Churchill,Roosevelt, and Stalin. Da Capo Press. ISBN 0-306-81538-9.

Boog, Horst; Frster, Jrgen; Homann, Joachim;Klink, Ernst; Mller, Rolf-Dieter; Ueberschr,Gerd R. (1998). Attack on the Soviet Union.Germany and the SecondWorldWar IV. Translatedby Dean S. McMurry, Ewald Osers, Louise Will-mot. Clarendon Press. ISBN 0-19-822886-4.

Brackman, Roman (2001). The Secret File of JosephStalin: A Hidden Life. Frank Cass Publishing. ISBN0-7146-5050-1.

Bradley, John; Buell, Thomas (2002). Why WasBarbarossa Delayed? The Second World War: Eu-rope and the Mediterranean. Square One Publish-ing. ISBN 0-7570-0160-2.

Braithwaite, Rodric (2010). Moscow 1941: A Cityand Its People at War. Prole Books. ISBN 978-1-86197774-8.

Browning, Christopher R. (1998). Ordinary Men:Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solutionin Poland (1 ed.). New York: HarperCollins. ISBN0-06-099506-8.

Burleigh, Michael (2001). The Third Reich: A NewHistory. Pan Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-330-47550-1.

Clark, Lloyd (2012). Kursk: The Greatest Battle:Eastern Front 1943. Headline Review. ISBN 978-0755336395.

Commager, Henry (1991). The Story of the Sec-ond World War. Brasseys Publishing. ISBN 978-0080410661.

Dunnigan, James (1978). The Russian Front. Arms& Armour Press. ISBN 0-85368-152-X.

Ericson, Edward (1999). Feeding the German Eagle:Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 19331941.Praeger Publishing. ISBN 978-0275963378.

Evans, Richard J. (1989). In Hitlers Shadow. NewYork, NY: Pantheon.

Evans, Richard J. (2008). The Third Reich at War.London: Allen Lane. ISBN 978-0-7139-9742-2.

16.1 Printed 17

Fahlbusch, Michael (1999). Die SdostdeutscheForschungsgemeinschaft (in German). German His-torical Institute. ISBN 978-0-375-41086-4.

Frster, Jrgen (2005). The GermanMilitarys Im-age of Russia. Russia War, Peace and Diplomacy.London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Forczyk, Robert (2014). Tank Warfare on the East-ern Front 19411942. Pen and Sword. ISBN 978-1781590089.

Fritz, Stephen (2011). Ostkrieg: Hitlers War of Ex-termination in the East. University Press of Ken-tucky. ISBN 978-0813134161.

Gorodetsky, Gabriel (2001). GrandDelusion: Stalinand the German Invasion of Russia. Yale UniversityPress. ISBN 978-0300084597.

Gellately, Robert (1990). The Gestapo and Ger-man Society: Enforcing Racial Policy, 19331945.Clarendon Press. ISBN 978-0-19-820297-4.

Glantz, David (2001). The Soviet-German War19411945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay.A Paper Presented as the 20th Anniversary Distin-guished Lecture at the Strom Thurmond Institute ofGovernment and Public Aairs. Clemson Univer-sity.

Glantz, David (1998). Stumbling Colossus: The RedArmy on the Eve of World War. University Press ofKansas. ISBN 978-0700617890.

Glantz, David (2010a). Barbarossa Derailed: TheBattle for Smolensk, Volume 1. Helion & Company.ISBN 978-1906033729.

Glantz, David (2010b). Barbarossa Derailed: TheBattle for Smolensk, Volume 2. Helion & Company.ISBN 978-1906033903.

Glantz, David; House, Jonathan (1995). When Ti-tans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler.Michigan University. ISBN 978-1906033729.

Glantz, David (2012). Operation Barbarossa:Hitlers invasion of Russia 1941. The History Press.ISBN 978-0752460703.

Handrack, Hans-Dieter (1981). Das Reichskommis-sariat Ostland: Die Kulturpolitik Der Deutschen Ver-waltung Zwischen Autonomie Und Gleichschaltung19411944 (in German). Hann. Mnden: Gauke.ISBN 978-3879980383.

Hartmann, Christian (2013). Operation Barbarossa:Nazi Germanys War in the East, 19411945. Ox-ford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-966078-0.

Hardesty, Von (2012). Red Phoenix Rising: The So-viet Air Force in World War II. University Press ofKansas. ISBN 978-0700618286.

Hayward, Joel (July 2000). "Too Little, TooLate: An Analysis of Hitlers Failure in August1942 to Damage Soviet Oil Production". TheJournal of Military History 64 (3): 769794.doi:10.2307/120868.

Higgins, Trumbull (1966). Hitler and Russia:The Third Reich in a Two-Front War, 19371943.Macmillan Publishing. ASIN B0000CNOQU.

Hilberg, Raul (1961). The Destruction of the Euro-pean Jews. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.

Himmler, Heinrich (1940). Reections on theTreatment of Peoples of Alien Races in the East.Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Mil-itary Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 1013. District of Columbia: US Government PrintingOce. pp. 147150. ISBN 978-0-333-94944-3.

Ingrao, Christian (2013). Believe and Destroy: In-tellectuals in the SS War Machine. Malden, MA.:Polity. ISBN 978-0745660264.

Kershaw, Ian (2001). Hitler 18891936: Hubris.Penguin. ISBN 978-0140133639.

Kershaw, Ian (2000). Hitler, 19361945: Nemesis.New York; London: W. W. Norton & Company.ISBN 978-0-393-32252-1.

Klemann, Hein; Kudryashov, Sergei (2013). Oc-cupied Economies: An Economic History of Nazi-Occupied Europe, 19391945. Business & Eco-nomics. ISBN 978-0-857850607.

Kirby, D.G. (1980). Finland in the Twentieth Cen-tury: A History and an Interpretation. University ofMinnesota Press. ISBN 0-8166-5802-1.

Kirchubel, Robert (2005). Operation Barbarossa1941: ArmyGroup North. Osprey Publishing. ISBN978-1-84176-857-1.

Kirchubel, Robert (2007). Operation Barbarossa1941: Army Group Center. Osprey Publishing.ISBN 978-1-84603-107-6.

Kirchubel, Robert (2003). Operation Barbarossa1941: Army Group South. Osprey Publishing. ISBN978-1782004257.

Krivosheev, G. F. (1997). Soviet Casualties andCombat Losses in the Twentieth Century. GreenhillBooks. ISBN 978-1853672804.

Macksey, Kenneth (1989). Guderian. In Barnett,Correlli. Hitlers Generals. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.ISBN 0-297-79462-0.

Mawdsley, Evan (2003). Crossing the Rubicon:Soviet Plans for Oensive War in 19401941.The International History Review 25 (4): 818865.ISSN 1618-4866.

18 16 SOURCES

Majer, Diemut (2003). Non-Germans Under theThird Reich: The Nazi Judicial and Administra-tive System in Germany and Occupied Eastern Eu-rope with Special Regard to Occupied Poland, 19391945. Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 978-0-8018-6493-3.

Mazower, Mark (2009). Hitlers Empire: Nazi Rulein Occupied Europe. Penguin. ISBN 0141011920.

Mercatante, Steven (2012). Why Germany NearlyWon: A New History of the Second World War inEurope. Praeger. ISBN 978-0313395925.

Meltyukhov, Mikhail (2000). . :19391941 (in Russian). . ISBN 5-7838-0590-4.

Miller, Donald L.; Commager, Henry Steele (2001).The Story of World War II. New York: Simon andSchuster. ISBN 9780743227186.

Mosko, William (2002). The Bread of Aic-tion: The Food Supply in the USSR During WorldWar II. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521522830.

Murray, Williamson; Millett, Allan R. (2000). AWar To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War.Cambridge, MA:: Belknap Press of Harvard Uni-versity Press. ISBN 978-0674001633.

Patterson, David (2003). The Complete BlackBook of Russian Jewry. Transaction. ISBN 978-1412820073.

Rayeld, Donald (2004). Stalin and his Hangmen.Penguin Books. ISBN 0-14-100375-8.

Rich, Norman (1973). Hitlers War Aims Ideology:The Nazi State and the Course of Expansion. W.W.Norton. ISBN 978-0233964768.

Roberts, Cynthia (1995). Planning forWar: The Red Army and the Catastro-phe of 1941. Europe-Asia Studies 47 (8).doi:10.1080/09668139508412322.

Roberts, Georey (2006). Stalins Wars: FromWorld War to Cold War, 19391953. Yale Univer-sity Press. ISBN 0-300-11204-1.

Rssler, Mechtild; Schleiermacher, Sabine (1996).Der Generalplan Ost. Hauptlinien der national-sozialistischen Planungs- und Vernichtungspolitik (inGerman). Akademie-Verlag.

Sakwa, Richard (2005). The Rise and Fall of theSoviet Union. Routledge Publishing. ISBN 978-1134806027.

Seaton, Albert (1972). The Russo-German War,194145. Praeger Publishers. ISBN 978-0891414919.

Sharp, Jane (2010). Striving for Military Stability inEurope. Routledge. ISBN 978-1134325818.

Shirer, William (1990). The Rise and Fall of theThird Reich: A History of Nazi Germany. Simon &Schuster. ISBN 0-671-72868-7.

Smelser, Ronald; Davies, Edward J. II (2008).The myth of the Eastern Front : The Nazi-SovietWar in American Popular Culture (Paperback ed.).New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN9780521712316.

Smith, Howard (2000). Last Train from Berlin.Phoenix Press. ISBN 978-1842122143.

Symonds, Craig (2014). Neptune: The Allied Inva-sion of Europe and the D-Day Landings. OxfordUniversity Press. ISBN 978-0199986118.

Taylor, Alan (1974). History of World War II. Oc-topus Books. ISBN 978-0706403992.

Thomas, Nigel (2012). The German Army 193945: Eastern Front 194143. Osprey Publishing.ISBN 978-1782002192.

Uldricks, Teddy (Autumn 1999). The IcebreakerControversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler?".Slavic Review 58 (3). doi:10.2307/2697571.

Waller, John (1996). The Unseen War in Europe:Espionage and Conspiracy in the Second World War.Tauris & Company. ISBN 978-1-86064-092-6.

Ward, John (2004). Hitlers Stuka Squadrons: TheJu 87 at War, 19361945. MBI Publishing. ISBN978-0760319918.

Weeks, Albert (2002). Stalins Other War: SovietGrand Strategy, 19391941. Rowman & Littleeld.ISBN 978-0-7425-2191-9.

Weinberg, Gerhard (2005). A World at Arms: AGlobal History of World War II. Cambridge Univer-sity Press. ISBN 978-0521618267.

Wette, Wolfram (2007). The Wehrmacht: History,Myth, Reality. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0674025776.

16.2 Online

Graham Royde-Smith, John. European History:Operation Barbarossa. Encyclopedia Britannica.Retrieved 16 May 2015. (subscription required)

19

Heeresarzt 10-DayCasualty Reports per Theater ofWar, 1941. World War II Stats. Retrieved 10 May2013.

AOK/Ic POW Summary Reports. World War IIStats. Retrieved 3 April 2015.

Army vs. NKVD gures. WorldWar II Stats. Re-trieved 3 April 2015.

Davidson, Nick (producer) (2009). Hitler StrikesEast (television documentary). World War II in HDColour. NM Productions (for IMG Media). Re-trieved 19 March 2015.

Knopp, Guido; Mllner, Jrg (directors); RenateBardong (producer) (1998). General Wilhelm Kei-tel: The Lackey (television documentary). HitlersWarriors. ZDF. Retrieved 24 March 2015.

Modern History Sourcebook: The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 1939. University of Fordham.Retrieved 19 March 2015.

Holocaust Denial on Trial, Trial Judgment: Elec-tronic Edition, by Charles Gray. Emory University.Retrieved 13 May 2015.

Nazi Persecution of Soviet Prisoners of War. TheHolocaust Encyclopedia. United States HolocaustMuseum. 20 June 2014. Retrieved 24 March 2015.

Grazhdan, Anna (director); ArtemDrabkin&Alek-sey Isaev (writers); Valeriy Babich, Vlad Ryashin, et.al (producers) (2011). Operation Barbarossa (tele-vision documentary). Soviet Storm: World War IIin the East. Star Media. Retrieved 19 March 2015.

Meltyukhov, Mikhail Ivanovich. " 19391941 (in Russian).Russian Military Library Moscow. Retrieved 19March 2015.

Grazhdan, Anna (director); ArtemDrabkin&Alek-sey Isaev (writers); Valeriy Babich, Vlad Ryashin,et. al (producers) (2011). Siege of Leningrad (tele-vision documentary). Soviet Storm: World War IIin the East. Star Media. Retrieved 15 May 2015.

Aitken, Andy, Dave Flitton & James Wignall (di-rectors), Dave Flitton (series producer); Dave Flit-ton, AndyAitken& JamesWignall (writers) (1996).The Battle for Russia (television documentary).Battleeld. PBS. Retrieved 19 March 2015.

Jones, Bill Treharne (producer); Christopher An-drew (presenter and co-producer) (1989). The FatalAttraction of Adolf Hitler (television documentary).BBC. Retrieved 19 March 2015.

17 External links Marking 70 Years to Operation Barbarossa on theYad Vashem website

Over 270 original private German color photos fromOperation Barbarossa on Pixpast website

Operation Barbarossa original reports and picturesfrom The Times

20 18 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

18 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses18.1 Text

Operation Barbarossa Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa?oldid=674558247 Contributors: AxelBoldt,TwoOneTwo, Derek Ross, Mav, Bryan Derksen, Szopen, Taw, Danny, SimonP, Mswake, Mintguy, Hephaestos, Jdlh, Edward, Patrick,Zocky, DopeshJustin, Bobby D. Bryant, Shoaler, Vic~enwiki, (, Ams80, Ahoerstemeier, Den fjttrade ankan~enwiki, Marco Krohn, PoorYorick, Jiang, GCarty, Ruhrjung, Johan Magnus, Dino, Yogi555, Bjh21, Tuomas, Thue, Joy, Raul654, Jason M, David.Monniaux, FinlayMcWalter, UninvitedCompany, Robbot, Frank A, Je8765, PBS, Kristof vt, Pibwl, Altenmann, Greudin, Chris Roy, Der Eberswalder, Hu-mus sapiens, Diderot, Halibutt, Bkell, Hadal, David Edgar, Goodralph, Lupo, Lysy, Whiskey, MaGioZal, Oberiko, Mintleaf~enwiki, Folksat 137, Hagedis, HangingCurve, Zigger, Monedula, Wwoods, Everyking, Lefty, Fleminra, Hans Zarkov, DO'Neil, Jason Quinn, Kpalion,Matthead, Bobblewik, SonicAD, OldakQuill, Stevietheman, Comatose51, Manuel Anastcio, Kolt, Ruy Lopez, Gdr, Yath, GeneralPat-ton, Tom the Goober, Bcameron54, Piotrus, Domino theory, Mzajac, Redroach, Rattlesnake, Gene s, Mpi, Balcer, Thincat, Brianyee0,Mozzerati, Sam Hocevar, Billthesh, Legionas, Irpen, Muijz, Subsume, Beringar, Adashiel, Esperant, Mike Rosoft, Shahab, N328KF,Rindis, KNewman, Sfeldman, Discospinster, Twinxor, Rich Farmbrough, Eric Shalov, Alistair1978, Pavel Vozenilek, Night Gyr, ESkog,Tavkhelidzem, Kelvinc, Neko-chan, Ylee, JustPhil, El C, Mwanner, Vecrumba, Shanes, Sietse Snel, Art LaPella, Weiwensg, RichardCane, Bobo192, Stesmo, NetBot, Hurricane111, DimaDorfman, Jagripino, .:Ajvol:., Giraedata, SpeedyGonsales, Vossiewulf, Jojit fb,Darwinek, SecretAgentMan00, Slinkyhead148, MPerel, Krellis, Licon, Wendell, Alansohn, Silver hr, LtNOWIS, 119, Andrewpmk, An-drew Gray, Trotboy, Axl, T-1000, Hohum, Snowolf, Max rspct, Miroslaw, Gpvos, Kober, Vuo, Kusma, BDD, Gene Nygaard, Mike-nassau, Tobyc75, Richwales, A D Monroe III, Smoth 007, Bobrayner, JALockhart, Boothy443, Woohookitty, Harveyj, MK2, FrankA,AlexSwanson, Before My Ken, Commander Keane, Tabletop, Lapsed Pacist, Tapir2001, Optichan, Bschorr, GregorB, MiG, Isnow,Brendanconway, LimoWreck, Graham87, WBardwin, Deltabeignet, Kbdank71, Josh Parris, Ketiltrout, Rjwilmsi, Bill37212, Bziobnic,Tangotango, Jmcc150, Jerey Henning, Oblivious, Ligulem, Lendorien, Lairor, The wub, Valip, Keimzelle, Dar-Ape, Sango123, MWAK,JanSuchy, Schapirama, Madcat87, Tswold, Wikiliki, Toresbe, Ground Zero, WWC, Nihiltres, Vladko, OrbitOne, Wgfcrafty, Russavia,Valentinian, MoRsE, Chobot, Soyweiser, VolatileChemical, Ahpook, Gwernol, Noclador, Crotalus horridus, Kinneyboy90, Sceptre, A.S.Brown, Hairy Dude, Brandmeister (old), Kordas, RussBot, Timli, Kurt Leyman, GregLoutsenko, Elrith, Chaser, Kirill Lokshin, GaiusCornelius, XX55XX, Rsrikanth05, Manxruler, NawlinWiki, Lao Wai, Hawkeye7, UCaetano, Bjf, Poiman12, Spot87, Welsh, Kvn8907,Nightmare X, Howcheng, Ngorongoro, Brian Crawford, Tony1, AdamProcter, SColombo, 3 Lwi, Kkmurray, Dna-webmaster, Nick123,ClaesWallin, Jcrook1987, Bdell555, Capt Jim, Calaschysm, Silverhorse, Chase me ladies, I'm the Cavalry, Arthur Rubin, Mercenary2k,Petri Krohn, JoanneB, Barbatus, Tyrenius, Mais oui!, Curpsbot-unicodify, Nixer, Katieh5584, Kungfuadam, RG2, Meegs, Hirudo, Nick-D,Jaysscholar, Tom Morris, SaveTheWhales, Vanka5, SmackBot, Historian932, David Kernow, InverseHypercube, KnowledgeOfSelf, Test-Pilot, Bd84, DMorpheus, 0x6adb015, Chairman S., Delldot, Alephh, Scott Paeth, Elk Salmon, Geo B, Srnec, Peter Isotalo, Gilliam, Achpru, Skizzik, Kappus, The monkeyhate, Chris the speller, Ksenon, SchftyThree, Hibernian, Moshe Constantine Hassan Al-Silverburg, Pro-pound, Sadads, Ctbolt, Kungming2, Robth, Hongooi, Rcbutcher, Constanz, William Allen Simpson, Craiglen, Famspear, Trekphiler, Can'tsleep, clown will eat me, Tswold@msn.com, Ajaxkroon, Rhamiel, Writer 34, Kotare, SuperDeng, OrphanBot, General Grievous, KevM,Mark1800, Whatthree16, Lapisphil, Valpo, Rsm99833, Prattjon, Edivorce, Writer22, Jmlk17, Theonlyedge, Decltype, Nakon, Savidan,Valenciano, OranL, StephenMacmanus, Dreadstar, Thething88, Trieste, Badgerpatrol, PokeTIJeremy, Wuzzy, Gbinal, The PIPE, Big-gKwell, Breversa, DDima, Ohconfucius, JLogan, Byelf2007, Esrever, Nishkid64, Tymek, Rory096, RASAM, Attys, Jim@Gibson.org,General Ization, Bmhkim, Mugsywwiii, Lucius1976, Gang65, JorisvS, ApJilly, Mgiganteus1, Diverman, RandomCritic, Iska, Illythr,Slakr, Volker89, Booksworm, Stevebritgimp, Muadd, Tedman1973, CharlesMartel, E-Kartoel, Fluppy, Dl2000, DabMachine, Keith-264, KlaudiuMihaila, Laddiebuck, Clarityend, ES Vic, Joseph Solis in Australia, Tmangray, Tkasmai, J Di, R~enwiki, AlexWelens,Drogo Underburrow, Dbrower, Mulder416sBot, Courcelles, Esn, Tawkerbot2, Pudeo, Plasma Twa 2, IJK Principle, Lahiru k, WilliamMauco, RCS, CmdrObot, Sir Vicious, Aherunar, SciFi25, JohnCD, Banedon, ThreeBlindMice, KnightLago, Fullmetal.shinigami, AshLin,KingPenguin, Kenneth Vergil, Theocide, MrFish, KoRnRoCks, AndrewHowse, Necessary Evil, Cydebot, Marqueed, Kanags, Poeticbent,Gatoclass, Victorperton, Perfect Proposal, Gogo Dodo, R-41, JackMcJiggins, Bigwhiteyeti, Chrislk02, DBaba, Grant76, Piccolo Modi-catore Laborioso, Cancun771, Superpeer, Landroo, Michael mills, Epbr123, Biruitorul, Kubanczyk, Wikid77, Vidor, Keraunos, MojoHand, Staberinde, Bruske, SGGH, Ufwuct, Tellyaddict, Dgies, WhaleyTim, PaulVIF, Michas pi, SparhawkWiki, PeterGh, AntiVandal-Bot, BokicaK, RabbitHead, Rhadoo32, Seaphoto, Dbrodbeck, Jj137, Real123, Musickna, Dendirrek, Dmerrill, Sluzzelin, Katous1978,HanzoHattori, JAnDbot, Husond, Achilies99, Dorotheou, Wanderer602, CosineKitty, Kedi the tramp, Avaya1, Ericoides, RedZebra, Jelt-Luthor, Murphy11, Daborhe, WolfmanSF, Dodo19~enwiki, Parsecboy, Bongwarrior, VoABot II, MartinDK, MastCell, Jsk Couriano,Buckshot06, Sodabottle, KConWiki, Bleh999, Fallschirmjger, Clich Online, Eldumpo, BilCat, Martynas Patasius, HebrewHammerTime,DerHexer, Edward321, Russian front1944, Species8471, Pikazilla, Spespatriae, Semper-Fi 2006, MartinBot, Pinkbluty, Rettetast, Dapi89,Mschel, R'n'B, CommonsDelinker, Nordgh, Markewew, Lilac Soul, Captain panda, Weedro, Svetovid, Anas Salloum, Aleksandr Grigoryev,Terrek, Rhinestone K, Uncle Dick, Maurice Carbonaro, MoogleEXE, DD2K, Hodja Nasreddin, Gzkn, 14thArmored, Routlej1, Trumpetmarietta 45750, Strelic, Jn25b, Gabr-el, Mrg3105, Mortcv, Beenhj, Colchicum, Adamdaley, NewEnglandYankee, Molly-in-md, Bucinka,Ko Soi IX, Boothferry, Tanaats, MisterBee1966, KylieTastic, Bogdan~enwiki, Listerz, The Spanish Inquisitor, Xyl 54, Wikimandia, Sher-bet lemon, RjCan, TehNomad, Xiahou, RJASE1, Idioma-bot, Spellcast, BigBobcool, Ripberger, Malik Shabazz, Xelous, Bacquesne,Svmich, Harveyqs, Carter, Nug, Firstorm, Toddy1, I-do-do-you?, Taraborn, Philip Trueman, Director, TXiKiBoT, Dojarca, Tovojolo,Dutchman1234, Vipinhari, Bigbob311, NVO, Lacantia, Carillonatreides, Matilda Sharks, LeaveSleaves, ^demonBot2, Mkpumphrey, Still-Trill, Scoop100, Thomas419ca, Wikiisawesome, Saturn star, Johnatx, Agent of the Reds, SwordSmurf, Rougieux, Piratedan, Eurocopter,Spinningspark, Viktorhauk, Melyn, Koalorka, Sealman, Pastel kitten, Qworty, Necktrips, Konder11111, Ehasbun, Born2x, Givegains,Golfrold, PeterBFZ, RogerInPDX, SieBot, Benji77, TJRC, Thebigt788, Gprince007, Work permit, WereSpielChequers, Kernel Saunters,Sakkura, Jokeguide~enwiki, MaltaGC, The1marauder, Cwkmail, Smsarmad, Yintan, Chiefteam, Househeard, Whichtrial, Johnjohnsy,Interchange88, FunkMonk, Winters457, ScrewyD, Tiptoety, Areasort123, Flamerfrogpig, Nrehak, Lightmouse, Doncsecz~enwiki, Cal-lidior, Steveshelokhonov, Vividcover, Jmj713, SakuYukihimesan, Recesende, Nimbusania, Jaan, Lipbrush, Paulinho28, Moneyocean666,Timeastor, Urgedover1234, Existenjoy, Alertwhile~enwiki, DaddyWarlock, MorganJoel, Muhends, ImageRemovalBot, Atif.t2, Sfan00IMG, De728631, Ecjmartin, ClueBot, Atomicspamer, Binksternet, Clivemacd, Noorkhanuk85, Hutcher, Lastdingo, The Thing That ShouldNot Be, Scartboy, XPTO, Chessy999, Ourswisher, Maxthatkillz, Irbergui, Mild Bill Hiccup, Sixtyveseven, Shinpah1, Counte