35

when they consented to that treaty. Indeed the American commit~ ment under SEATO has been reshaped into an instrument directly at variance with wha,tthe Senate originally interded, emerging as a means for Presidential military initiatives unfettered as yet by any effective congressional restraints. And as a weapon available to the President for military intervention in Southeast Asia its cutting edge now faces not toward China but rather toward those rebels and po­tential rebels that IO,cal American-backed regimes are unable to sup· press on their own. .

I submit that it is a, dangerous weapon and that it ill befits a re­sponsible Senate to leave it in his hands. Thank you.

[Dr. Kahin's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT .oF DR. GEORGE MoT. KARIN, CORNELL UNIVERSITY

An efi'ective reassertion by Congress of its foreign policy role in Southeast Asia is incompatible with a continuing Americll,n participation in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. That old pact may ,be' dormant, but it is still very much alive,. operative and available as an instrument for further presidentially initiated military interventions in Southeast Asia. The Executive Branch has found the way to employ it in a way diametrically opposed to the intent of· the Senate when that body consented to the treaty. Congress has been unable to con~ strain the President from violating that intent, and there is little reason to expect that It will be able to do so as long 'a. the United States'remalns In SEATO,

It was before this Committee almost two decades ago that J 9hn Foster Dulles in urging Senate approval of-the:,,southeast ASia Collective,Defense Treaty sought to relieve anxieties of those senators who were appreb,enslve lest its insurgency or "subversion" clause (paragraph 2 of article 4) draw" the United States into the support of unpopular governments ,against broadly-based 'political opposi­tion. In trying to assuage their concern, he pledged,:

"If there is, a revolutionary movement in Vietnam or Thailand we [the SEATO] allies would consult together as to what to do about it ... but we have no undertaking"to'put it down:_ ,all We -have is an underta:king to COJ;l. .. sult together a~,to wbat to d~ abQut 1t."

On being turtber, pressed, he' -ass\1re,d the Senators that there was, no obliga­tion for action in such cases and tha,t'the authority" for action in cases of armed attack from outside the treaty area ,woul<1 "not be -employed as subterfuge for dealing militarily with situations,involv1ng'Sl,lbv~~i.on. Yet this is pr~~lsely what did happen in, Vietnam and could easily happen'm Thailand or ,the, 'PhiUppines.

Certainly as it was understood and endorsed'/b:v. the Senate 19 years ago, SEATO did not authodze .U.S. Il1ilitary intervention in sJtU(ltlo~e such as the one that ,arose in. Vietnam.' B~ through a quite unjustified: Presidential inter~ pl1etation of that treaty, in whIch Conp:ress acquies~ed, it came'to be employed as the Executive Branch's principal authority for p:p,tting down·, a revolutionary movement in Vietnam. By March of 1966, as Arthu~.,Xrock then noted in his column, the Johnson Administration had moved from 'the Tonkin Gulf Resolu~ tion to SEATO as the major justification for its Vietnam policy, Dean Rusk citing the treaty as "the' ;fundamental sour~e of ,PrealdeI;lt ,JQh"nson's authority to commit the United 'States to whateyer eJt!pendttuIIe of :imanpower and treasure he deems necessary to sustain the war in Vietnfl:in". 1'"

This Administration has, renounced the authority' for,"mJlitary lntervfmtton once provided by the ''li'onldn 6-u1f ResolUtion" but it\has,never repudiated th!'\t, specious .interpretation of the American SEATO, ~'(!o;inmitment that ·provided Fr{'sident Johnson with his major rationale for' American mlUtary involvement in ,Vietnam.

The record of American partlcipat10~ ,in SEATO p~o:vldes vivid evldence that where the operation of a treaty is depe~4ent up0:t:\ the __ ~:xecut1ve Branch's :~:p.dings

, as to the nature of relevant condltionf!!,;abroa:d-, a~d ',Congress has no independent meaps for checking- them, a'rt assertive -'President can easily ignore th'e under~ standing. upon' whIch' Senat9r1aI conllrnu'tlon. Of. the t.eaty,.orlglnall~ rested .. In the caSe of SEATO, all the President had, to do ;Was .oo'jif!!f!lert that a locally rooted insu~gency was actually' a cas~ of clea,r-cil:,t' 01.itsld~;aggIlession~the very subter·

36 luge: that the Senate had been,l~_revlously' assured would never be resorted- to.l

Au- understandidg of how ;tbis 'could happen .In Vietnam ·is hnYP:rtant tQ an appr:eGJ~t,!on of ,b,ow the surv1;VJa~ of S;IDATO, :wilita~~, ~ga1nst Congress; .. ,ability to restrain the President from laup,ching furth~f, milUary- a~ventures in South-east Asia. . .,' > , •

One must' begin with a carefuf scrutiny ot the actual nature of dur SlliATO t'ommltment, andlespec:taUy of·its two princlp1J,l!prongs-addressed ;respectively tp outside aggressi9ll. (PaJjIl! ;1, .t\:.rticle IV) :llnliL ~nte)Jnal ins,ul'rection, o~ "subversi?:p." as it was originally termed (Para. 2,. Ar.ticle IY).·It Is' on1\y: in. cases of outslde aggression that the Hmguage o'f the treaty can be'constr:ued':M'prQviding author~ ity for a signatory to respond with action, and even that p'osslbiUty, was quaU· fied by the proviso that any ,such move had,teibe in'RCCQrdance with the <:ountJ;:Y's "constitutional pr,oe.e.sses". With respect.to ;situat~ons ,involv.ing insurrection, the treaty is susceptible to no such lnterpretation. In sucl\ instl\llces It- signatpry is not empowered to act, it being 's'ti];)ulated merely 'that the" "pafties"shall'consult imIlJo~diately in order to agree on th~ m~asu:J.:,es which ,should oe taken for the common defense." 'Oon8uUation, among the SEATO signatories, then, and not aC,tf~ith~l' collecti"«ft, ,or, 1,ln¥?:teral-is j _ all. t~~-t is P'l'o:v:t(l~d., fo,l' in' cases-, of fnsurgenGY. ,;If this c0D:su~~~t!qn- sh01.l~d \e~,d ,to a s~ffici~nt ~onseJ1.sus, then ,re?~ omDfe:qd8.tiqn~.: :tQ the .. se:v;eral ~iW1.atory ... g.overn. plents.as to. ·.a~ nppropri.ate cOUrse Of. ,action .. ll).lght ,.~sue. B. ut as"tb,. ' e S~ma. t.e CI.earlY unde.~., ¥~o.qd when it cOI].s.ented to the. Sl!lATO treaty. nothing: In ItS terms cons1;ituteil:.any Comll)U"'''ent to or auj;4ority,for the United States or any other-signatbry-'.to take fi\.bt1on in such cases. _ !, ,"',', ,',.,' ,,' '_ ",

H,owev;e"f,,,, t,l;l. ?s. ~' .. ll. ~Jla. tors _ whq e1\d.orse.d the ,trea .. t.Y :11. ad. ',~t, r., e~koned willi qte. power of a 'Pr~'IMI\t.,t9 dfftne,InsiJrgen,CY, a,s .()utsid~ a:ggre$,slb)1, ~y "esortlng . to this exp .. ~.d\~e"t,lle \iI~s.· ~ .. ~ .. ')et6 shift p.yer 'til a. ba.s,i$. of ti'cla,ty "uth. orlty that em­powered a s. na:t<1ry to-.ao,t"J.:athe:r ,tbah,merelt 'C,Qh,U~'t With his feUow pactlmeln~ bers (Para, ... ,ra(Jier.tli .. a~nl'rNra .. ·'.' .. ~ .. ""Qr 'ArUde Ii$.A':.·:illi .. ~:~OIl.dlt\O.il"'.'ltn.· the'6;~.a. ti stipulating that Inv9qKt\~, 9tSl1c]\' authQrlty b,~ Iilconfotinitl"\Wtl\ a ·signatdry·s .. 1.'~9~stitutiOn~lj}l)o,~ce~~e~',':;~0~~s n~ V~"t')ble~ __ , ~o' 'a, 'preSlder£t;,'(g~I-10l),lg as 'C~~gress at!quiesces in his simplY c(Jnsulting with a few o'f_ its 11l0re' aHienable ,mel'l'l.bers. For such casuis~I;Y to succeed,;dnd the' Otlg1nal'interlt.'b'f",the .senate 1n"end'orSing S~ATO to 'be: 'defied, aU that iM" ,requirejl' is an"'llpa:thm'ic' and poorly informed Congress. Thi,s :zpade it~Iios~ib'le 'to" ~hvolte:'S:ffiATO 'in, tJi:e',/¢ase! of 'Viet'nam~', and It'coUld a~.!n 'wlrh r"p,,"t to otho'r' cHllntdes In Sdtithe~s't'Aslw;;.'

TiJ.e sam~ authority :under SlIlAT0 'clahh~d ~y '!he' bfiletJlIlii<'eei/tlve in' ~ust\fi­cation of Ailieric/iii il;l~ntaty i~tel'ventibn tn: 'Vi~tn·ttm ,stHFr'emntns imme'dtately av.lIlible to ·.rty A'il'l:etican Pre~ldetlt i','>IIe!.llf;utd .. a~t!ld.' to 1I1tilr"~e''I'nllltarlly againstr.b.ls In· Thailand' o,r' the.1?hilillplhes., Norea" tIld,.possibllity be en­I!!relyd!sfuiElsedtliat SIllAT<!I\'I\I:I~ht b~ draWif,on .s lustification 'for renewed Aliiericau-',iiii11ttu;y intel'v~:fitl()~ "tn'llrltlbchina,' Aesp1te"the actions ~llren by 'Con ... gress deslgnetljt9, restrain the ;Ex~'Ohtli:ve,'[brahch:f,rort1!,'J;eembarlt1ng UI!loh such a course. an'd 'd~sP:~~ ,the Adfi11nistr~t1'i:m'S'ha:'V~V;~_:~ighed. ·.'the P,aris peace aC.dbrd. s,

Some confUSion- seems to. haVe -arisen! Wit'fi'J1,:egard" ~to ·the appl1cability"of SEATO'to CamJj-odia, and perhapgl SOrnG;.'Clarificlttlon,,:]'s',ln 'order. As' the pllo,tb­col of the Southeast Asia ne~lonal:Defense',Treaty: ,mB!kes- explicit, the pl'otec~', tron made availAble appli«;!lra~flmuch to 'Crifubodi,a, as it ever,didito' South Vietnam. There is nothing to' prevent the present PhnoJ,\l,'"'Fenh ·reg.ime·~trom Tepudiatiilg Sihanotlk':s ,,~huI),ciatlon of SIDA'J;(t)"s protection and!·r'equesting SUpportive Ameri'­·can mllltltrY'intet!l'lmtiorl, IfPresii1ent'Nixon chos,do~'gra!lt the request he could resort ito tbat';saIfie'.pen":ersion A1:e ,Slll-:M'cO;. utilized iby hla<p'rede.cessor, asserting that the Intelligence ava!l<t\lle!o."bim, established ithat the situation in OambOdi ... was ,bflSlaaUy' onS lof '/oU'tsh:Je-'\ltitres$ion" 'rather .than'rebelUon or civil wEi':r,.~,' ,'- ~

.. 1f. dl1~ ,dismisses' t,,"possfliil~t~.9f the P·resinertt precip\ilatlnga resumptto. Ii ·0£: American b.oroblng~'d.n ViQtm,8!~i"XOtlhbodia Qr' Laos, one must' also' be"ptiepaTed' ,to __ ~.-" .. _ ,,''', ,,~",iJ,(":'"':'C--\>".:";: , ' " , . :; -:',' ,,' ~,->\ .-,. ,:"/

1 As the history' of our IndocllIna .1nvolv{)f.llent so, eloquently testifies, the means~f(jr·'ilil,l:k--i ' .. ng an. on.-th'e~grottn(lvd,l}. t~P'IJlM~t~.on:,q.l'e,. ',,(lIlU.O.~, '1!X~\l,l. 81velfdn the bl!!.!~s Of.'.'the., Br,."i., &ep. t, It Is ~oX' bim {lS well as -to",n}nt~not Congr~JI -,: tlj.\lt P9th, eJd ",nd WashIngton-based for­etl1n' aitlllrS spec1allsts trom: 'If~tiltr'tmehts :.6t~, etense -and' tatie' ail'd 'from 'the CIA' ,,report' and ~lt 1s unusual fo~ ·t.beJ'tt; to"}j'llo"V:~dehhlm WJ.tMlnfor.mation. that ,cha>llengds"!il'edulfSQ '6t " action they know. 'b~ 'l~'fthl'ea.dY\'.d •. t~tmin. ed, ttO .... t~lfJk".lJn.l~a:~ Clilpgp.~Sij:l¥.~u;t:ejilico.Jl.!j, 'lb'Y ."at., h.lp f'O!n,outlld"'~I"'lh"I' nQ'1ll.IIY,~hq caM,.(OX'P~~";· ,"s, I""" ucP 11\O~e' f;ltib.stantiJl,t. l)l~lls,"'(jf~ .il..0~n);;lt Will"tOf.'cou'''-l;>ElI.''.alwaYs'fft.)'il(I' 1 lfilClllt. to' tes,t Relse'FII'.IWtoil1;s 'madij b:9i'thi:pm~iI v.uvb tBila,nch; j ,r l)" "',' ( '~'; ,: d,;. L! I"~ J: ': ">':' '. ", ',j),

II For 'furtnelul~ttUAA', I2QnilA n\pW~~tU91:l0djl,4!f!: ljeI,atlo,n ,t~$EATO, see ,t»-e ~!>te ;at "thei~nd, of, ,thIs ,paper. ' - e, .. ' " -' "

3.7

dismiss· the possibility' that '!no order to shift public attention awa}!. trom Water­gate;·R president who:is'increasingl·y,'bele'agUered on the domestic'front'migh:t not welcome -n -well-publicizedl confr"()utatliOn with' Congress over a 4ighly, controver­sial issue of foreimtl !policy. ,Unless Oongress is' certain that Mr .. ' Nix6n 'would never be that reckless, it would be irresponsible not to remove the encouragement to embark'on such action that SlDAillO's continu~d'existence might give him:

Although Congress -has" not' depri:V:ed< the Presi'dent of whatever ~e'glth:nacy SEATO might bestow on, a,. renewal Of American: bombing in Cambodia, it has certainl;y made this course difficult by denying him funds for this purpose. But it has not 'undertaken: any 'such pre.emptlve action to ~afeguard agllinst his launching military ,.~ctions to' protect the governments of the Philippines and 'l'hailand' against l;Qbels they have by themselves been unable to suppress. In those-two countries the door is still'wide open to presidentially initiated military intervention against an insurgency. A:s was the case with Soutb Vietri.am, the only existing constraint against such- an initiative is that same provision of SEA'ro that proved so ineffective in: Vietnam....:....:the condition that this be 'undertaken in accordance with this country's conStitutional, processes. There appears nothing in the record to suggest' that· the prese,nt Administration would be. l1lt~;Hy to in­terpret that limitation any more stringently than its predecessor. 'NUr do this Congress and the public appear to appreciate how extensive is our commitIl}.ent to 'baclt the rhai and Philippine' governments in putting down politically dis-affected elements that challenge them. ' , ,

THAILAND

The American t;ommitment. to Thailand is tied to and cruclB.lly depeildent'upon a speoial reinterpr~1;a:blon of the SEATO treaty by executiiv-e acti'on in Itfie':Ken­nedy Administration that was never submitted to Congress for approvaratiil"thtit considerably increaises' ·the . possibiLity forl committihg. American forces against an internal insurgency as well as '!lgadnst' outside aggreSSion. A 'j()ii1:t communi .. que,by Secretary; of 'State Rusk and Foreign ,Minister 'l'bana;t Khoman'df March 6, c 1962, i,n effect ·\·btlatellalized.'?' ,the SEATO agreement" a'!Jse'Dt1'ng that' the -'United States' was obliged'!to'come to Thanand's-support even lif other'$lDA~O' ,signatories refused to' go' IUong. , '" . "~'I; 1 i .' ,

. ".;,Citing the cf:t:se'-of, ,vietnam :a's' an",appropffate! example. of how'titlder' 'SEATO Thailand' ~ould rely on United States 13uppovb:ag(ltnst the threat of,.fnsurgency, this communique employs -language .that Thai Ieaaers ha-v:~ tin:&et~t(60a' provides the }Jagis for active, U~'military, snpPOl't"against any major lnS-W'~enct Ui\Th'~nand, as"well as aga-inst(outside' aggresslon;:'r:Dhtts; IjlJst after the "cdru.¢urtillU~'-WitS 'signed, the Thai Prime Minlste»; Jilleld MarshalSarlt;announcedtnat 'tllellnlted:States had' ,pledged aid to} Thailand against" ihdirect' :a:ggressiO'll',' subv~rs'i0n'lor',i1iflltra­tion-'~the same ,way itJ;isfdoing in :South'¥letnam now." :pt!ltlembers.ot,·(tlongress have been confusetl by the seeming ambtguity"of the:, 'Americaf1~"'defeijse"com'!rt1t~ ment to Thailand; that, country's mllitaI'yJeaders ha-\re';1iot' b'Q'en:; , ".-

Nor ,did the present Administration· shake: thlllr' faith as to· the 'strength of that commitment. ;Wha.tever· aUXii~ty ~there .. :may 'have' 'be&n:,'a~te.i"'the'lnlt1al 'proclama­ition·at the: "NtX!on Doctvine" was q:ul~lY' put to!l'e~t11~'l?lleSi'dent: Nixon's 'public statement !no Bangkokpn;ruly 28,,' ~OO9.MtelilI>ledgtjt!f'~O"!lililntalu all existing Ameiqcan commitments ·to Thailand. lie -went:"Qn'iO sKY, wrhe',UtiitedL,Stateiih~tlI stand proudly witbl·ThMland aga'inst ,all '.of :~thosel\-~lio1. might :thr~at'el':l it'frop1 abroad or from within". Echoing the' feelings.. of T1taila~(l's military lead.ers the BOIngkok"WorUL Observed:: "The inclusion,of threats fr.ot:p 'wtthin'ds seen as a startling vote of coJUlIie)l,ce,.tq a Thai n~tidn, c~utl,()lls 0Y6:r 'tb~, pro,.E!p,ects of Amer­ican involve:meD;t i-ll. ".futur. e .SOu .. theastAsial} pro.~b~~W. Ii)\,:~ • Mr .. NI~.on'S state. ill., ent ... came t'l-s a, surp;ti&e to, Thai' leaders f~~r1l\g, that "his ru1ssiqn here 'was o:p.lY to ,p:repare the nation i,Qr' the' eve~tualit1 o~ ,am~l'rcti:~ diseng~ge~u:mt .... The, Xhfl,i­US relationshlp'ls":. stronger now than <\t,~ny iln:rUn, qar.s past." As Vlc~Pres­Ident Al!1lew.made.evldent durlngl:!l.,y!slttli.j3angltolt on M~y IT, 1972, theNixon Adhl!nlstr~t!ijn i1!dlcated.n1) .~1)bsequent :re'l~rvatIQM about :t~ls: Illedge; and, Indeed. itretnforced tile' That leader~blp's h6!)vtctlQntl\~t.!! :any:.btthelr Insur­~~Mle~. : ~:ec •. me a ."';i9.'i~ .. thr~.at they .. ';o.u, Id. ,'~?,un. t upon t~ •. :'.JllIlte .. d. States to come. ,to\~(!ir rescue." ,.'" . ,.", , r', .,", ,(" ,,' . ,_ '''l\aiier\can support~ga!hstlhSur~ency 'In Tlla!land Is,IOf coutse, liot a hypo­

thetical ',(,luestion; Oountep~itisu'rgency traini'it.g, by American, Special foroes and CIA per.9'onnella ,knOWn tlJ have been ~olnlif on there for ,~any years, and Thai ",counter,~~nsurg~n~y military operations,., have enlisted th'e 'assistance of U.S. , " .. ,:", ,.",.',~,.~: " , .,

38

military advIsers in the field 'as well ,as in Bangkok. It is difficult to check. out rumors that American military per~onnel have,in recent years been directly'in­volved in military operations against, insurgents in ·Thailand j _ but we do know that the U;S. 606th Air Commando Squadron was intimately involved in Bang­koit's efforts to suppress insurgents in 1966-67. Apparently, Congress wasn't COD­sulted about this involvement and there would seen1 Jittle reason to assume that it. would be if ,the present administration 'arranged for a similar operation.

Since 1970 an arrangement bas existed whereby several thousand Chinese Kuomintang troops police substantial hill and mountain areas of northern Thailand. Whether some Thai -are correct in their understanding that the U.S. has backed and funded the arrangement, it would appear that Congress has not been sufficiently concerned to' ask the administration pertinent ques­tions about this matter. But whoever pays, for these mercenaries, ,their military role in Thailand is something of a measure' of the extent of the insurgency in this area and of the Thai military's inability to handle the, problem on its own. In addition, if Bangkok'is willing to tUrn to foreign mercenaries to help contain insurgents it is not prepared to handle on its own, surely it is logical to asll: at what point it is likely to assert the right its leaders have assumed is guaranteed by the R\lsk-';rhanat amendment to SEATO and call on direct U.S. m1Utary support.

There is reason to hope that with Thailand~s king and students recently securing a considerable degree of control over Thai government policy the m{eli· hood of requests for American military support against insurgents is now less than it was six months, ago when Generals Prapas and Thanom .were politically dominant. But surely it would not be responsible to base our, policy on the assumptJ,9;D- that tl)e present political balance in ,Thailand wiU necessarily con­tinu~, and that the ,Thai army is not. capable' of reasserting the dominant position It held for so long. ,And what 'of our own military? They have'a considerable vested interest in

the huge complex.of :U.S. bases and we "av~ built up in Thailand-in financial terms alQne around a, billion d'Ollars. ,There are st111 reportedly more' than 30,000 American milital1Y: personnel 'On these bases and elsewhere in Thailand. One capnot be s:u,re, what the reactiQn of the Pentagon might' be to 'Un eff'Ort by Bangkok to have these bases and U.S. military persQnnel removed fr'Om Thailand. It W'Ould, howeverl seem plausibl~ to assume thatlit- -W'Ould press for an Ameri<;an, military, response if Thai 1p$urgents 'should, seriously threaten any of these

,bases 'Or, American s'Oldiers stati'Oned elsewhere in Thailand. Alth'Ough during the .last ,few years the several Insurgent groups in Thailand

have increased in'PQwer,and the extent of territ'Ory they control, as yet th~y have n'Ot ,seriously threatened ,JAmerican bases and personnel .or seized c'Ontrol 'Of areas 'Of vital importance to. the BangkQk g'Overnment. But what should we expect if either or botl1 of these situations arQse'? On the basis of his previous record what should 'we expect President Nix'On to do? Would he assert that we have a clear-cut ~ase of outside aggressiQn and invoke the, SEATO .pact as justification for American' intervention-at first presumably with the le~s con­tr'Oversial dimension, of additional m1l1tary advisers and' speCial fQrces'; along with tactical ai·r power? Or could he simply repair'to that formula that served him so well during' the, \ast, yettr's of United States' mUitary intervention in Vietnam~his duty tQ pr'Otect ,American 'm1l1tary personnel abroad? Or tQ strengthen his case in th~ face of probable c'Ongressi'Onal opPOSition WQUld he do both?' ,

The PMU,ppineB , ' In the Ph1Uppines, too, .. the c'Ontinuing existence 'Of SEATO increases the

possib1l1ty of the U.S. being'drawn intI) military, intervention against in~urgents. The same distortil)n of the· SEATO treaty that permitted it to be psed as a'u­th'Ority fQr a preSidentially-initiated m1l1tary 'interv,enti'OP aga-inst ,insurgents in Vietnam could be applied In the Philippines, ' ,

While SEATO' :constitutes the s'OI~'basl's,.fo,r. the, ~~can .d~ense commitment to Thailand, in 'the Phlllppln~s tl;lls backing cofiles not'bnly through SFlATObut also through the anpecedent bilateral, Mutual, Defense 'Treaty ~igned in 1951. Through a' serles"of executive a'cti'bns, never submitted',t'O the Senate fQr appr'Oval, this 1951' -tr.eaty has ,been re.interpret~d. in a· ,.way that has commtbt'e'd

", ,", "

39

the U.S. more heavily and with less flexibility than "originally envisaged.s In their combination, this Mutual Defense, Treaty and U.S. obligations under SEATO, especially when perceived in the context of the i,slands' major U.S. air and fleet bases, add up to a formidable American defense commitment.

Neither in the original 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty' ilOr.in any of the sub­sequent elueidations is ,it stipulated that an attack to which the U.S., would respond must come from outside of the I)hilippines. And ther~ Is' nothing in the Treaty itself or in these stronger supplementary statements that would hot con­form to and dovetail with that same, special interpretation of the American SEATO commitment that has been applied in Vietnam and made available for Thailand. With respect to these American treaty commitments the question of deciding what constituted an "armed attack" 011 or against the Philippines would be up t.o the President .of the United States. It would be he who would make the determination fl,S to whether an insurgency directed against the government in Manila would qualify as the sort of "armed attack" thl.lt, 'in corif.ormity witlJ, the authority provided in the tw.o tr,eaties, could legitimize American military .;nter­vention in support ot.that government.

The existence of major and geographically extensi~e American nay{tl aUQ ,air bases in the Philippines understandably increases the: possibility 6f American military inv.olvement there. The extensive vested interest ,of the U.S. ll}Uitary in these bases and in maintaining an unimpeded access t.o ,them leaves the possibility of armed U.S. intervention tb"protect them something of a, hostage to the course of insurgent activity. The proximity of'the largest American base, Clark Ineld c (180,000 acrel;l in area) to territory frequently penetrated by in-surgents make this pr.oposition s.omet~lng more than academic. '

Philippine rebels ,might be wise enough 'to avoid attacking t~ese bases lest the U.S. respond militarily in conformity with Articles IV and V of the, Mutual Defense Treaty. However, there w.ould be nothing t.o prevent a beleaguered gov­ernment in Manila from itself engineering incidents in and around these, ,bases and representingtbem 'as rebel attaclrs. But in any case, in view ot the fact that most of the iilsurgents currently operati:Q,g on LUzon are self-designated Com~ munists, the do.or is open to presid'ent Nixon to respond to an appeal for help against the:rp. via the same SEATO r.oute l'resident Johnson blazed for Vi~tnam.

In view of the heightened s.ocial tensions attending Presid'ent Marcos' recent seizure ,of -dictqrlal powers and the enSUing', increase in the ,size ,of both the

. Communist-led., insurgencies Luzon and. 'tbe VIsa,yas ~ and those led by :;Muslim rebels in the south, . .,1t would be unrealistic, to dlstn:iss the possibility that Marcos might call for U~S. counter~insurgency support well! " b.eyond 'what the ,Nixon Administration ,has already provided him...-:"Tultimatel~ ','~s.::alating to direct U.S.

3 In mid· 19M Secretary' Dulles pledged that: "A-n- 'attack on the Ph1l1pplnes could not but be also an attack upon the military forces of the.pulted f$ta.tes .' .. -any armed attack against the Ph111pplnes would Involve an attack against Un,1ted States forces stationed there 'ftJid. against the United States ·and would be Insta·ntly'repellpd:'" A joint communlqu~ of June~ 20, 191i.8 by President Eisenhower and President Garcia()stat'ed that "any armed attack against -6be Ph1I1ppines would, :involve an attack against. United States forces sta­tioned there,al'ld against the Uni,te. d States and would: instaptly .be Ile. pelled .... T.be following

-, year the Bohlen-Serrano Agreement strengthened and' spelled: out. the' Eisenhower pledge, 'adding: 'mnder our 14utual Defense Treaty and'related actions, th'ere have resulted aIr and -naval dlspos1t1ons of the United States In the' Philippines; such, that an armed attack on the ,Phlltppines could I),ot but be alsQ',an attnc~ upon the military i'orces of ·the .-pntted States. As' between our nations~ it Is no -1e¥al, flct18n to- say that an att~cl;t: j)n one Is- an attncJt on 80th. It Is a reality that an at'tack ·on the' P.hllipplnes Is an atb(ck also on the United States." Declarations signed 11),·;l966', by Presiq,ent Johnson and 'President,Marcos and by

'Secretary of State "Rusk and ForeIgn SecretarY Ramos reconfirmed 'lhese pr~vious declara­tions, and there has been no indication that the -Nixon Admlnlstrat on supports them less full:v. • '.

~ The first paragraph of ;..\rticle IV of the' U.S.·Phlllppines Mutual Defense Treaty states: "Each Party re<lognl,zes that an armed attack in the Pa-cfflc . ..¥rea on either of the Partles'would be dangerous to It~ own peace and, safety and declares, that it would act to meet the CO,~mon dangers In accordance with its constitutional processes." Article V states: "For the purpose of Article IV, an ,armed attack on either of the Parties Is qeemed, to in~ clude an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties. or 'on the island territorIes nnder Its jurlsdlction In the Paclflc,()r on Its arpIed- for.cas, publ1c vessels or aircraft In the 'PacUic." " ~ , II The New York Time8' of January 12, 1974' reported that'during the year following Marcos' ImpOsition of martlat,·ltlw mtlt1~· stud,ents have gone underground, In'crea!llng the llumber of armed communls~s I.nsur~ents by more than a third. . ':: . ' .

40

military intervention. On the fa~e, -of. it ,one might regard Marcos' ill$istence on referring'to the ant1-q~mmunist, M:usliro rebels in Su)u and Mindanao as I<~aoists'" as a clumsy, e~()];t 'M 'b.rac~et thew with pro-Communis;t insurgents in I.Juzon and some, Qf,the other'i~lands., But his dogmatic insistence on adhering to this terminolot&.JpftY fllso'b,esveal!: his appreciation of the fact that the, United States has from the outset made clear that under, its SEATO commitment American m1l1ta'ry 'power ,wlil be available only against CoplDfunist forces.6

SEA'J'O -tOday no'longer constitutes the means for containment Qf _Ohina that the Senate, origin-ally env. isnged. A:ctually, of course, the trea'ty has ne:ver been invoked for that purpose; for a supposedly belligere~t China failed to act its expected part, keepiri~, its arm~es back behind its southern !rontier rather than directing them into Southeast Asia, Apparently, the present Administration now acknowledg:es this, and in moving closer to Ohina recognizes that Peldng's own interests are 'not, compatible with such adventures,

By.t even ',With' Jthe rationale of China"s containment removed, the Nixpn, Ad­ministration' stU! ~'cli~~fl: to S,E4-TO-no longer fqr the,rea~ons for which, it ,was originally intended', But rather for purposes t4at wer~ ne:velj- q,Quntenanced, ,by the Sen~.te wheJ:\ It consented, to that treaty. Xndeed, tbe Ameri<;an com~itment under S)3)ATO ~~,s: been ·.:r~Hiliaped ,tnto au instrument dtrectly at varlance with what tht!: ,Senate originally intended, emerging a~ a means for,presidential mili­tarY,,:initiatives" u,nfettered by effective .Congressional ,constraints, And as a weapon available,' to ,the President f.or: military intervEmtion in Southeast As.ia, its cuttirig edge' 'nQw faces not towards' China, but rather towards ,those rebels and potent~al reb,els that local American~backed regimes a.'re unable; to, sup.press on their own', 'It is a: dangerQus,weapon, a,nd it ,ill,;befits.i}.t resppnf:llble $,enate to leave it in his hand~. " . ' , " _ '

Contiiming Amel'iclJ,n 'adherence to tPe Southeast Aslfi OolLective Defense Treaty, leaves the_ gate open ,for the Presidlrilt to La,unch militl.lry _interventions i'n Thaibirtd 'arid the Philippines as well as, in Indocllina, If, Oongress t~, serious apout rea~s~rt. In.g. ~ts. re. ".wmSibiUtieS in. th. e field of fOrtiig.n.' ,,:.;e., lat1o~,anJ(s4ou~d, ta]re pre.­eruptive ,actl?u .to d~ny him scope for. such Intt\a~ves by t~rmtn.ting U.S, par-ticipation Iii SIl1A',I'O as. promptly, as possIVl.e. .,:,:. . ...

,'I'

The' reportecf-statement>·,by.' Lon Nors government 'at'the enct.'ot'M~rClf'1970 that ,It. had '~nev:er-co:ri.templated joining SEATO" and (th!\t "Cambodia's attitude­remains' -unchanged ',and its' POlicY' remains, one of' ~trict neut~aJitY ,without pal'~ ,ticipa.tion tn, 'an:y" ":mlHta-ry pact" does not '8.iffeat the ~rotect1on:: f!rom,ised' to Cambodia, Laos,: 'and':;S{)IU1Jh -Vietna;m on,tlequest Utider'.the prottlcol'of' the 'South­east -Afsia, CollectiVe Defense Treaty. Though as with these Qth~r two ((protocol states':; Oam.bodia'is not requhled to.-"join' SEATO" in order to' ha;ve·,-9.ccess to its protection,'unlike them it hR'S n'Ot';b\?'~~""~arte~-by the~te1'lnS ot:',t4e 19~4 Geneva Ag~eements from,b~c __ oInlng an'9,ctuall)lem.ber of SEATO. At Geneva Ctppbodia was'successful fn',reta1nlng a degree of diplomatic. fret1dom not!lle-rm1tted Laos and the'&a~g(m regim~; including the right"lto"ente.~;i1tto"ll)1l1td~Y';·~llHmces.in conformity .with prlflclple~ ofthe.tJnfted Nations Q))&rte, and t~~ ~jght to permit<' establishment of foreign bases which its<govemment'vegarde.d a's'essent1al.to the country's security,7 But the posslbUi1;y 'of' Phnom Penh's 'pe'titioJimg ''for· actUAl membershlp,lnSEIlTO Is a matter'.thaq$\19t ,etll<\Y pert!ne\1t to, tM. qUestlp!, ,of wMther or llot. SI!l.<),TO's protectlonls·~v~tl.IIX~I;tM!:iambodla. That country d6 ... not have to 'join SEiATO to requ~stlts help .. 1>.. "'1tlJ South "Ietnalll and I<~O~i -~.'-' ... ,.... ..'

o Appended to the S'outheast Asia. Coll~cttve Defense Tr~eaty Is the "UiH;ler&t~ndlng of the Untted, 'StMes of America~.', )\':hlc-h- stipulates that U.S. action!; under' 'paragraph '1 of Article IV \n response to ,aggression, and armed attack can apply only ,to cases of '-4Communlst aggl'ession.1! , ' ' ':. ,,' ,- , '",":- '.

7 During the course of Ute 1954 Geneva, discussions Anthony Edon and" M-c.p.4es,Franee were repo,uted to have-assured Chou En-lal ,that t,f an armistice could -pe reaeli,ed that.-n\:lu­tralized Vletipam, Cambodia and Laos, these stMfS'CQuld not jo~n the' proPQsed'·-8EATO P(I.('<t. However, at the ,eleveJ;lt~ bOur the '~Ambodtan,delegatlon, balked aDd 'Mef,used to Buppor,t'the agreements ttnless' their ~'ou.ntrY was '~xempted 'from ltm1tation~ on ·l1l$-:1!r$e~()m :to enter Into secUl'iCy' arrangements with 9thel' cO,untties;',suci). ,a,s ,w,etll!!, :impose4:- on Laos and'Vte:tl)f1J)l. With the con'feren:e_Q'~ d,eliberati,ons ;almost cOMh.Hieil. l\:f:.o19tov (who' alternated, with' :mdi3U­as :chaij)man), reluctantly agreed to f).ccept,this'4titel!ent"staitus fOl'~,Cambodla-illl"ordei.':not-: to jeopardize successful ;reso!utlon.of what were regarded as more important po).nt,sr

','

41

even'thougli Call1bod!a r.'Dot A' ~!gnatOry o~ tfie 'S~utheast AS!a C~lie&t!ve rlJf~n.e Treaty, it :is covered '.by the :protective mantle of that pa-et' through, the tth'ms' 6f its proto,cql., ,A narticular, government: can' if,:it, wi:shes serve noticlil\ that it'rth I?udlates this ,prQte~ti9n,-a. ,S'iIWl,ouk, <\id. Eut tbere,!" ,o~,co.u.'e, nothlng,t!> It'eep' a ,snce'esMr' 'government, receg;rtl~,ed, by members of !3;E4.~,Q" fr9I» .~I's,aY()vrr lng or r'eversing tha~ action'. ,I., ' "', .

The CHAIRMAN. Thank YOll, Dr. Kahin. Dr. Gord,ori!'

STATEM:E;N1' OF DR. BERNARD K. GORDON, UN:rVll:'R~ITYO~NEW: , ,1IAMl'SlilRE

Dr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. ChaIrman." " " ' I want to thank you in particular for having, me here because it was

tljrou~h your early, student-exchange resolution that I, becames" iamlhar-you, started me, off.! ,went to ,New Zealan<;l and Australia many years before I went to Southeast Asia and it was with, the Fulbright support ,that I did that.

I w.ould like to ask that the statement I prepared forthis,hearing, be inserted in yonr record. ' ,'.:.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, it wmbe inserted.' ,

'1j

ORIGINAL INTENT 0 .. SE~TO , . , ,_ I

Dr. GOilDON. I think it is i!ll.portantto note at the outse'ttl\.at almost rrom·the beginning'SEATO was to some largeexterit'misunderstood. I don't think'that it'ever Was intended to be anyth'ing Ilklla f(lfIrial military alliance. I think ins~eiid, in gOing dver'the reco'rlf'of the beginning of it, it was only intended toh~~p dis»el some ofthe.dismay tll.at Secretary Dulles and others felt in 1954 In wake of the Geneva settlements, He only-inte'nded" with (t good deal ofrhetQric, to lay a hasis for some statement to the peoples in the area that the. United States, whatever Franoe did, was not about altogether to leave. An<;l to the degr~e that ite?ri~i!l~ ~oundedJike NATO, an~'th.Mitsoun~e~ so!ll.ewha,t hke a genume military alliance, hassom~tWie~ le,dto'cntJ~ oisms of SEATO for Mt having done things that aHni1itaX:y 'alliance might do. But that is by the by now and people don't really expect SEATO to be much more thrun just it formarorganizatio~in Iiarigko,k.

REASONS FOR REVIEWING, PROBABL'y DISBANDING, SEATO

It seems to me that the com!ll.ittee is to be congratulated for review­ing it at this timet nevertheless.W e are now, of course,jn, the 20th year. There is very little indication that the administration is .preparing to undertake a serious review itself1 although the fact that Secretary Kissinger did not attend the SEATO Council meeting in as close a place as New York I think gives us an indication of what he himself tll.inksa,bout the body. . . . .' .' ','

.' There. are many good reaSons for reviewing, thelnstrument and probably .fordisoanding·, !it, and I think some ofthQSe"l'ilght to be quickly just identifi~d. '. .' . ' ' .. ,,,:. .

Among, tiw.mo.st 'Important, It sei\!ll.s to? me, ls~hat the; env[l'onm~nt, ' the security envm:mment:inthe ,area, III fact,: IS c<'lllsltlerruhlymllteJ,

42

satisfying and more stable than it was in 1954, but I want to be very careful. I don't want to indicate that I want to go overboard in ex­pressing there is a general coloration of calm and stability throughout the regIOn, 'but considering what the projections might have been in 1954 the environment is not at all as it might have been expected tobe.

Another reason for disbanding the treaty altogether is its evident inconsistency with the Guam 01' Nixon doctrine of 1969. That whole instrument's thrust was to pull back from the role that you, Mr. Chair­man, have often referred to as the United States as a global policeman. SEATO seems to employ a policeman's role in a large part of the area. The inconsistency with overall American statements is evident.

A third reason for considering disbanding altogether the treaty is the familiar notion tho,tthe Pact, and all pacts tend to be provocative to adversaries and, particularly, to a state with whom we now no longer wish to have an extreme adversary relationship, and I mean, of course, China. .,

Fourth of the five reasons I would see as relevant is that, of course, SEATO has been, as a military alliance, essentially ineffective. It has never done any of the things that maybe its hoped-for optimists may have expected from the outset.

Fifth, it seems to me among the most important is that the treaty as it is now is a SOUrce of division among members of the alliance. I do not agree at all with Assistant Secretary Ingersoll's assessment of the Aus­tralian or the New Zealand view; nor do I agree with him that no other critics have ,come out from amollg the members of the organiza­tion. Secretary Romulo of the Philippmes as long ago as 1972 called for a very severe revisionl and undertook to indicate perhaps the whole thing might be disbanded. But cer,tainly Prime Minister Whitlam in Australia has gone very far to indicate tho,t he felt SEATO ho,d out­lived its usefulness, and that attitude in New Zealand and Australia, we should understand, because from the bel!inning of SEATO the two ANZUSpowers have always felt their major security reliance was in the ANZUS Treaty, What was simply a bit of dressing on the cake, by virtue of SEATO, was never of significance, major significance te them. ,

To the extent now that SEATO forms a divisive element in our own relationships with as longstanding' an American friend and close sup­porter as ,Australia, I think tho,t in itself gives rise to reviewing and re-considering the whole treaty instrument. , '

It seems to me that these are appealing, but not necessarily compel­ing reasons, however, for terminating the SEATO agreement altogether.

BII:.~F1'ERAL RELATIONsI!np OF UNI'1'1!ID STATES' wr'l;'H THAILAND

The major reason why I find myself in, sOme degree of agreement wi~h AssistantSll~retary. Ingersoll and others who might sp~ak t,otlHs pom.t,ahoutcnot dIsbandIng and why I would be very cautIOus In en­dorslllg a wholesale overthrow or disbanding of the treaty, pertains to a factor that was just"addressed b:yPro£~sS<ir Kahin, and that is the relationshipwliich the United Stateii'has with Thailand. ' '

'43

As Mr. Kahin has indicated, Thailand has a bilateral relationship with the United States only ,by virtue of SEATO. The Australiansi New Zealanders,the Filipmos have sepaJ:"ate relationships, bilaoora mutual security arrangemeuts; the Thai have none. The Rusk-Thanat agreement of 1962 is the only relatively assured relationship in defense that the Thai have. ",

Now, it, might be argued that that is, not terribly important. It is' not, however, the view to which I come by lookin~ at primarily the international politics of East Asia as a whole. The Judgment to which I come is that Thailand represents in many respects a key state in Southeast Asia and in many significant respects a; key state ,in East Asia. Whether from the perspective of Indonesia, Australia, or Japan or Malaysia or Singapore, Thailand is seen as something of it bell­wether state in Southeast Asia. I want to emphasize that this 'view is held in Japan, among civilian staffs and among military leaders in Japan; it IS widely held in Australia, and it is in my VIew without question doctrine in Indonesia as well; that is, to perceIve and identify Thailand as a state the continued il'ldependence of which relates im­pressively to .the co~ti~ued security and independence of mainla~d Southeast ASIa and, In Important respects, tomsular Southeast ASIR as well. '

The reasons for this are very difficult to address. They are in part subjective, they are in part emprical but what they essentially come down to say is that from the viewpoint of leaders, and I think, in­formed indIviduals throughout tlieregion, ajld I would'try to project the view of the Indonesians on this, for example, tlie notion is essen­tially that if Thailand's 'continued independence cannot be assured then the continued security ani! independence of Malaysia will not be secure. '

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say what you mean by independence! Do you mean the preservation of the present Government!

Dr. GORDON. No, not the preservation of the present regime, becallse I think you have seen a relatively easy transition of a qUIte significant natnre in Thailand. I would mean instead an independent Thai Gov­ernment that is not in major terms 81)bject tq th" authority of either Ch1na, or more primarily to some extent, Hanoi. 'It is increasingly the view, in my judg~ent, that the Iongstanding rival!')!" which existed in the 18th century, m the 19th century between the Vietnamese and the' Thai and which was interrupted by the arrival of the West, by the arrival of the French ane! British, that that rivalry may indeed be resurrected. I cannot with any degree of ce'i<taihty s~y whether that is . a. fact, whether it i~ .~goal 9f h'?g~mony :iu South~R\j~ Asia on the part of the government m HanOI. Ida think, how8ver"thatthat apprehen­sion, that fear, is one that is held t'O'a large degree in Thaiiland, it is,. I think, held to a considerable degree among leaders in Indonesia l).i3' well. . "Jif'. '" ". ,I ,. , .. '"

The concern .that I .thinkexi~~s:'is ,.one th!\t wo~ld .fe¥" tll:e'disa,~:.' pearlince of an mdependent That Governmllnt .0£ the sort' JlIra~*ehave' become familiar with"ivertheB!\S(~6Ito 2~:y~~:rsl ilOt,llecess!ld~y tjed: intimately to t)le West but one ,~hat.I~knot.necessarIly tied, t.o.,any,maJ?£ .

t,., I \ '~' )

44'

bloc. 'rl;1I1~,.l thinill:, is what is ,desil1~d: in much of Southeast Asia lind · ... 't A ·, h'l" " " " In.l..f.Y,~!',-"i0"flla._aEl.a Ml Q e.; (',"" '. "j'.' ,.j' -I ,,;,," " : , "

,Conseql1entJ:v, i1Ud, to tha·ilP"tent. that 'lihailand ,d<l>es,l'lay a role' of sqme ,speci!}Hmportance,·the vie"! that I ,come ,downdo is one that I' thil)cki ,has a],~!l:ac\y ~n identil\eill,b;y Sena,tor ,Aibn;'!lJJJ.d which says essentially that t5EATO may go by the board but it is probaibly best looked at, if it is to ,go by the board, if there is some degree of substi­tution for it;

-REINFORCEM;ENT OF THAI RELATIONSHTP{\',

It seems to me that what is called for is a clear indication on the part ,of the United 'States that it will seek to reinforc~ somehow, ,and this may not be possible any longer within the framework of the, SEATO treaty, to reinforce somehow, ,the particular bilateral rela, tionship that the, United States has with Thailand. I would not under any circumst.anqes endorse a bilateral Telationship, 'or a reinforce­ment of a bilateral relationship, with the Philippines, largely for the reasons that Professor Kahin has already indentified. I think the dangers, the risks of even further American involvement, because the present reports do in fact,indicate that special forces, American special' Torces, are involved in the Philippines. I do think, as he does, that President Marcos has not by, accident identified the difficulties in the southern Philippines as Maoist. I don't think that is an accident.

My own view is that if all that rested on an abrogation of SEATO were the disappearance of the,Philippine relationshIp I would n<!)t for a moment say that that shouldn't be done:, But it, is: largely the con­nection with the Thai relaticmship that I think we ought to be quite cautious and recognize that there are likely to be changes that are not, in our interests were SEATO to be abrogated and if there were not to he instituted for it a substitute relationship, part~cularly and speci-fically with regard to Thailand., " ,

I have closed my formal remarks by qU0ting from the title of one Robert E. Ruark's books, and I would do that flgain.here: Before we scrap something old I think we,ou!\,pt to be sure we haven't done some" thing without substituting somethmg new of value in its place where it is required, and I think a Thai reI, ationship is required. Thank you.

[Dr. Gordon's prepared statement follows:j, '

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. BERNARD K~ GORDON, UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Mr. Chairman and Members ,of the Foreign Relations Oommittee, my name is Bernard K. Gordon, and r a,.m II Professor .of, PQJitical Science and Chairman of the Department at the University of New HampShire. I"'have also taught at other Universities', Includhtg"George Washi':ngtol)., Vanderbilt, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and ,the University of ·Singapore. 'Two of the books that I have written d~al specIfically with Soutbeast"Asia. r:Doward Disen­g~gement in Asia: A Strategy for America,n Foreign,Pollcy, and Dimensions'of Conflict in Southeast Asia. . .

I want first to thank yOU and Senator ,Ohurch in particu~ar_,for inviting me to Jl",~l;lcipate In your study of SlllAT.O', Weare now in the twentieth year of ex· perience ,WIth the Treaty; and evenJt there had not been the major changes in East Asia that have occurJ;'e(J durlng the P~$t, s~v~ral year~ 1n the region" it would

. be altog~ther appropriate tor the _ Unlt~d':,~'~ate~- to und,ertake"a' review R,t this time .. The Senate and ihiW OommltteeJiaveta'ken the initiaUve"for that purpose and are to be congratulated for the approach taken in Senate Resolution 174. For

45

Senate ResolUtion -114"does ,not preju.dge ~the policy or'"post'lire- that:'shduld'be taken towards SEATO ,at this tlme-jI'instead "Resolution· 174-'ealls fi'>r A'review' that: ".' . -'J' ': • ,.- ',' ., 1"" , , 'f

,1'Shall",lncliide reexamination of' the :basic foreign'poliey, considerations which' or1~nallY',11eadl ,the UnIted·,States to join -thei'SEATO organization

,and ·reassessment"of those (tensiderations in the Light"of subsequent develop­, 'menta relating Ito thatJ Otgiintzat1oilJ and the foregin policY 'iriterests of the

United States.~' I. S:IDATO BACKGROUND

,.In my jUdgment,,_t41s,~pproach-pa-r:tlQularlY the r,equire~ent tilat' we remind oursel v:es of 14e factors that J6d· to SEJA.'l'O in the, first place-is. very sound. For SEATO h.as been a mucl;l, misunderstQod element Qf, U.S. policy,. and many Qf the criticisms that hav,e ,been· directed at the Organization over the years stem from expectatiQns- that probably should never haye been placed upon it. I refer in particular to the notion that SEATO was somehow to be like NATO, i.e., a full­fledged ,col~ect1ve, defense 8Jrrangement, with a genuine capability'tQ engage in assuring the security of the region. I do not think this was ever the case.

Jnstead I, believe that, to understand SEATO we need\to \Jlemind ourselves ot tl).e cQntext in, Which it was ,establiahed in 1964. 'I'hat "canteJKt" was,one of_con­side,rable d,ismay about ,the prof$pects, !pJ! sta:b.ility .and, security in the Southeast Asia region,' for --SWATQ ,was ,formed, immediately in the ,wake of the I!'rench de­feat at, p,ieubienphu- and o:p.l;y weeks after the Geneva settlements of 1954. The initiative for the estabJ..1sbment of SEATO came from Secretary of State Dulles, and it is my judgment that he intended with its establishment to do little more than til, indicate to' all parties and, states that despite tne ,French defeat, nQt all Western 'states ,and interests would vacate the. region. ,His intent, I,believe, was larg(lly 'J3~,mbolic-more rhetQric than reality, if you like . ..In brief, Dunes' effort shoul,d be sean as Qne designed, to, "buy time", for the states in the area-time in whiGh, b,opefully, they would ,better develop their own defense capabilities and promote tbeir prosPOI'tsior Internal d.'e!opment and pp\ltlcal. stability. .

In 1969, as part of a larger examination ot presell,t and':f:uture security pros­pects in Southeast .Asia, I ,under,to.ok a 'sP~Qiftc examination of SEATO's history an~ ,contemporary relevance. I believe·,those findings to be· directly applicable to the purposes of Senate Resolution 174, Rnd for that ,reason I will repeat here what I WtQte at this time, dr&wing upon pp. 188-189 of my book, "TQward Disen~. gagement in ~sia,"

A. SEATO.: DULLES' EFFORT TO BUY TIME

There is a w!(lespread coriviction that the S.outheast Asia Tr~aty Organization demonstrates how. difficult'it is, if it is p.ossible at all, to apply the concept of defense cooperation in Southeast ASia. To those observers who already doubt that there are any genuine' ,prospects for security colla~oration among Asian nations, the ,sEATO exi>erft'!nce is_ regularly cited as a ready":made "proof" of their case. F.or SEATO, as its critics always note, has had .only partial Asian membership. It has never developed a defense potenti~l analogous to NATO, a'nd itS two Southeast :Asian members, Thailand and the Ph1l1ppines, appear to rely far more bea'Vl1y on their bilateral ties with tl}.e United States than on any SEATO guarantees. , '

Yet much of the criticism of ,sEATO, which after all at least sounds like NATO, rests' on the assumption that it was genuinely expe~~~d to apply familiar priD;ciples of collective security to Southeast Asta. It was not, and to assume that SEATO can be com1)ared 'usefully" to NATO see}lls to mieju<Ige not only the initial purposes of the Manila Pact, but also the underlYing purposes of U.S. security poliCy in East ASia, of which SEA'l;'O was just· one reflection in 1954. . . ..., . . .

It b~s to ·be recalled. tbat SEATO was created Immediately,in the wake of the' Geneva. settlements; whi<fu Se~rijtary of State :IDulles rega,rde'd -as the disbial retlection ,Qf:"a very, dif!tJ:essfng., .Af;!~an ertvi;vonment, and -with w:~i~,)le refused fohn .. I\Y'to assdciate tn. 'tlnit\ld States. It was In tbat.context,that)1e,bastened to M"n.ilar ;n'Ot-,;tO'}CP,·~ .. a.te. an." AS.i. an eq. uivalent Of,NATO, but to underscore a point. Tb,~lIo\nt wns .ijIil:w1y that the United States, despite tbe. Frencb. defeat and

'. w!t4dr~wal, :.lnt:l>.ude<\ to play .a continuing .and potentially ,'larger role .In the defense and,security of Southeast Asia.' . '-

34-499-74--4 ,.

46

The method Dulles chose to -make this point was the creation of the South~ east Asia Collective Defense Treaty, but be ,Was never under any illusion that Asian conditions allowed for collective security and defense burden-sharing arrangements along'the lines set. out in Europe. Indeed, b.o~h be and his prede­cessors had resisted the earlier urging of some Asian and Pacific nations tor just' such a multilateral security pact. Australia had wanted one, as had the Philippines, as early as 1949. But American policy had \Jeen instead to under­take bilateral guarantees on a quite seleCtive basis-satis:tytng Australia and New Zealand with .the ANZUS Pact, and others (like the Philippines) with bilateral commitments,' :'

At Geneva, however, Dulles stated that if ~he armistice arrangements reached by the French were unsatisfactory, if they "provide' a road to a Communist takeover and further aggression . . . then the need will be even more urgent to create the _conditions for united action " .. " l' Dulles clearly regarded 'the Geneva arrangments as less than satisfactory, and consequently he sought at Manila to restore some of the confidence which he felt had been destroyed in Geneva. At Manila, however, he resisted efforts to estabUsh a NATO-l1l{e structure:

At the 'Manila Conference in 1954 the United States was not in favor of the estabUshment of a unUled military command and a standing ,force, it did not want an Asian NATO' with joint, headquarters, joint -military forces, alid a common strategy .... Washington was opposed to earmarking American forces under the proposed Manila Pact for specific areas in the 'F~r East; sucb a step was considered neither n~essary, practical, nor desirable}'

The reason that Dulles adopted this posture, so different from the 'one in Europe, was precisely his recognition of the difference in circumstances 'between the two regions. American- interests in Europe and East Asia, as we have stressed repeatedly here, have' not been fundamentally different-in both regions the United States has' sought to prevent anyone-nation dominance-but as Dulles said about Southeast Asia, i( which could never be said about Europe) : "We have a material"mnd industrial strength which they lack and which 'Is an essential ingredient-of security." \I '

These sentiments should make clear the U.S. purpose in creating SEATO: to stake a claim, as it were, to the defense and security of the region, and to put others on notice that the U.S. would not shrink from providing the major, military force necessary' to prevent dominance' in Southeast AsIa: It was decidedly not Dulles' purpose to bind Southeast Asian nations into an orthodox collective security arrangement to which they could not usefully contribute. It was for this reason, for example, that be even -resisted calling the Manila Pact by the name that has since been given to it. "He made an effort to, have.it nicknamed MANPAC, for Manila Pact, by way of emphasizing that'lt ditrered from NATO, but SEATO stuck." 1G

Despite the SEATO label, howe'ver, the differences between it and NATO need to be remembered'. In Europe, at the time NATO was formed, the 'Red Army and Soviet pOlicies represented a more massive and more 'immediate level of potential threat to the security of the Western European states than was the threat in Southeast Asia when SEATO was _formed. These circumstances of the European ~nviron~ent -and the purpo~es envisaged for ',l';T~TO bQth called for and allowed for the permanent stationing 'Of sizeable American llIIut allied, military forces. That was an appropriate response'in that environment because for some years a' con..v~nt1onal Soviet mlUtalY move was seen as one of the inore 11k,ely threats to EUfo-pean security.' In' East Asia, on the other hand, a similar conventional military thr~at was not among the likely threats at the time SEATO was formed, nor -yvas B: permanent and ,collective military dep,loyment'

~'These, treaties took effect on August SO (with the Phlllpplnes), and on September 1 (with AustraUa aIlQNew .zealand), 1951.

1':Speech of Mny'7."19ti4,'in Departm6ht of Eftate Bulieffii.. May.1·"', 1'915~; pp. 789-44\ "Russell Flfield.~.-South6a8t Ada in Unit6. d Sta-t6S PoUcy (New ~or.k. :.ilJrederick A., Praeger.

Inc" l.963).,p. 18. . • • ' , '. [I From Gen,av'l1.,' peech of May 7. 19M, in Depar'tmefl,t. of 8tq.,t~ Butletin, 'May ;1.7,,19154. 10 John R. Beal, Jl)hn .. Foster Dulles (New York: Harper,'& RC>vVj'PubHsherlJ, ID<I .• ,19lS7):

see also' Fifield's comment that "Dulles;, in fact, tried to avoid, In the early's.tag~s ufj;th'e ,pact using the word. 'SI!l.ATO'le!!t an organizatIon like NATO. be tYl:pU~dl' (Fldeld.:.. op. _oit •• p, 12t:J.). I have since confirmed tllls Interpretation of Dulles" SEATO ,vlew,s whh tJ,e '$'tate Depart­me-nt officials responsfble\for 'cotnp1l1ng the Dulles J)ll.pers, 'and With' 'Pr6~essor Fifield 'In a ,'ouyt>rsatlon of October 6, 1961. " , ' ' ,

47

an appropriate response. The most that seemed feasible and necessary was almost precisely what Dulles set out to do: to convey the message that the U.S. remained committed to the security of the region" and to do this in a way that would bolster the confidence of small Asian nations. ,

Compared to NATO, these were quite limited purposes, and because of these limited goals the United States never tried. to bolster SEATO with the sort of infrastructure and jOint military forces that characterized its European aUinnce--and Washlngton~s posture toward that alliance. It seems clear from that evidence (or rather the lack of .any evidence suggesting that -the United States pressed for significantly intensified etrorts in SEATO), that the Manila Pact was not expected nor intended to become a conventional alliance system. The United States expected instead that should a high-level threat develop (from China, no doubt), the major defense and deterrent role in Asia and the Pacific would continue to be a function of American air and naval forces.

At the low end of the threat spectrum, that is, in terms of subversion and insurgency. the U.S. hoped that its essentially bilateral military assistance pro­grams would enable each potentl'ally threatened state to manage on its own re­sources. Certainly few, if any, efforts were made to develop joint programs for collective defense on the ground, and In the few-cases where outside troop assist­ance was implemented-as in Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam-the U.S. deployed American ground' units on the basis of bilateral agreements.n The' SEATO frame­work was almost incidental to those decisions, although within the American domestic context it may have been useful to point to the treaty as an added jusUfication for these actions.

B. THE NONAPPLICABILITY OF SEATO IN THE FUTURE

In sum, SEATO dId not represent an American aim to duplicate patterns that had been applied to Europe" aDd in all important respects it has, simply nQt been comparable to NATO/~ SElATO is better understood as an effort in image­building, and, at most, as 'an annex to and a, restatement of.the many bilateral arrangements that the U.S. bas conclQded in East Asia. In that context SEATO may have played an important and general deterrent nple since 1954-not because it was 'R formidable collective defense· agreemtmit but because it symbolized a high-level American military commitment in Southeast Asia. Any deterrent eftect during the years ,of SEATO's existence must be traced to a Chinese (and perhaps ,Soviet) perception of, Amer~can will, in Which SEATO per Be can have had only marginal meaning. ,

'rhat conditio~-tha-t:, deteJ;'rence 'against major con,v:entional and certainly nuclear aggression in Asia will continue to be largely an American function-is likely to remain essentially unchanged for the foreseeable future., That reality is increasingly understood ,in East Asia, and th~s implicit American defense um­brella-instead of detractipg"from indigenous interest in regional cooperation­appears to enhance those t,i'ends toward defense cooperation to which we pointed in the pr6v:ioUs chapter. This should\ltJe a welcome development for American foreign policy, especially in light of the U.S . .objective of encouraging multi­polarity in East Asia.

n It is wQrth noting, too, ,tAat even in the heyday of Secretary Dulles' alleged propensity for collecting ames and building "PRcts" (some have referred to thIs as his "pactomanla"), the United Stat'es did not seek to .enlarge the formal membership ot SEATO. CambOdia, for example, Is reported In the Immediate and depressing aftermath of the 1954 Geneva Settle­ments to have sQ,ugllt-more specific ,defense guarantees from the United States. Pl'1nce (then KIng) .siba~Duk, aecordlng to some sources, even expressed hI" wlllingness to join a "West­ern securitY- system fol' Southeast Asia" ,if an A:merican guarantee went with it (VirginIa Thompson' ,and :nichard .A.dloif Minoritv Problem8 in Southeaat Aaia J'Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955lt p; 189). Michael Leifer, a very close stu eDt of Cambodian affairs. slmllarly reports, that "cambodIa was the most anxlQus of the Indo-el;linese states to be militarily associated. w~th tl;l~.United States" "(~:Uchael Lei!er, QamborUa (tt!,d NeutraUtll [Canberra: Australian Natlonlil UniversitYi 10621, p. 28),.',Much 'the same point Is made in ~oger M: Smith", Oam-bodia'a Foreign Policy,,(-Ithaca, iN.Y. ': CorneU-Universlty P:;ressl _10615.). See the section "Cambodia Seeks an American Commitment," pp. 68-72.

Despite CambOdia's interest at that time, the Untted States waij ~h)gUI~£lY l\Ulreceptlve, to"efforts to extend' tts guara'1i'tee~, ,on the mltinland beyond ?:,ballandi',~nd ce~~f'-.~lY Was not sa'eklng toenlarge,tbe fOl;'m#-l~cov~ra~e,o~,SEA~Q., _ ' .'" ;' ,',,~"" "12[n ,terms of Its gel:igr'ltphtc 'scope alone :SlD:A.TO 'cannot usefuJlr'M"'compalied with'

NATO-for. an Asian security framework that does not Include Jap'an;"lJ:'al~an ' iula Korea hardly expresses the full range of U.S. defense Interestljl and guarantees to .East Asia.

, 'It needs to 'be :stressed/howe'V-er, I that-the ,type and style ,ot' any ,emer,gen~ pat-: terns of Asian s&1Itity cooperatt,on',ate likely 'to be fairly unique, 'Qr art,least quite. different froID 'coUecUvlnle:i!ense' efforts: that"have been,·tried,elsewhere. This re"'! fleets the wld,espread negatiVism ~thT'Oughout Asia 'toward the concept of def~nse 'Ip'acts,ll and, ~;lso reflects certai,D security: conditions ·specific'to Southeast A:;na­the Asian' subregion 'where interest in' 'defense cooperation ,is strongest. Both factors suggest' the 'line's along' whl~h m:i11llary cooperation is most likely to de· velop, for at lea.st.the foHoWing tbree1boundaries,'or parameters of discussion, can even -nOW be iden:tified. "., , "',' '

Fir'st it is ,clear that. SlDAT0 will provide no model for foreseeable ,Aldan de­fell'se efforts, because SEA!J.'O wwr essentially a- unilateral American gU;f.ll,'antee w'itfi 'merely 'the ',c()i(n1 ',of multilateralism~, Leaders in contemporary Southeast Asia reject that model; they seel): instead to disassociate themselves as much as: possible from too heavy dependence on the Bnited States or any other gneat, power, '

Second. it cari' be safely presumed' that futUre defense arrangements ",ill in all likelihood grow out of presently 'discernible patterns of Southeast Asian re­gionalism, Asian leaders are 'extremelw ,unlikely to embark on an ad hoc collec­tive defense arrangement, or create a new organization specifically for defense purposes. Instead, there Is increasing evidence,that today's leaders. realize that defense cooperation is the most difficult form 'of International collaboration, and they recognize as 1ft, ,result that much 'common experience and trust is required before this more difficult form of cooperation can be attempted.

This is, of course, precisely the opposite of the process that developed in SEATO, CENTO, or NATO. Each of those bodies, and SEATO in particular, has striven to find new Unonmilitary~'. tasks and functions, to perform, as if by so dOing it could polisb a tarnished image. But that is a difficult (if not impossible) , transf91'matfon tb .achieve, and le'aders tn SoutQ.e:ast Asia today appear to recog­nize tlint defense cooperation will be'i'nore'soulidly bf!.~ed if i.t'-grows from other forms of collaborative exp'e_riences. 'Foreign Minister :Tl1anat Khoman has said as much in his recent callS for devoting mU'ch lilore' intensiVe et'torts to' ASEAN. Mutual interests developed through "ecdhdm:ic' cooperation and ... joint proj­ects," he has begun to etnJihasize~" will provi"de the ASEAN' nations "with some-thing they want to join together to defend." 11. '

Finally, it is reasonable to predict' that 'regional security arrangements, be­cause they will center on Snutheast Asia, will be primariZy oonoerned with.. de­ten8e against low-ZeveZ or in8urgent tM'eat8.' No ·responsible'leader in S.outbeast Asia deceives hl~self into believing that the full range 'o'f defense ~functions can be met by the 'Southeast Asian natinns'- thehlselve,s. '~dst of, them 'recognize (reluctantly perhaps, ,but at the same' time ·real1sticaUy) that the ultimate ele­Dlent of security against, <for e~a'mple, "nuclear blackmail" or large-scale aggres­sion, can be provided only by the'United- States, and "this is tlitfBine qua n()n for their own efforts. Indeed, if they are to become incF'ea,siQgly willing to shoulder a greater share of local defense burden's, these leaders 'Dlust at the same time be assured that the overall strategic'·umbrella provided by the United States will not be withdrawn. '

These characteristics suggest an ambivalance about the U.S. security role in Asia that must be regarded as 'One of the region's ,mpst, iIllPortant political fen-tures. There is a ~trong -desire to loosen. dependel)ae, :on the United State's, but thi~ is tempered by the belief of ~an;r, that 'Washfngton' ,$hould. continue to play some sort o~ protectiv.e I:9le. I~ Southeas,t, ,Asia especially" much of. the contemporary interest in regionalism, grows dll!ecU, from the' first part .of this attitude: from an Intense concern ~o _r~!iu~e c;lependell'ce on the west; ',part!icularly on ,the United Sta.tes. This convi,ctf:,(m. Is ,no doubt most -strong in Thailand, and only slightly less so in Indonesia, where".the interest in regionalism also derives from Djaka'rta's concern .. to play li),_,pOle of some: leadership. And even among

'those natIon's wbichdo .Dot.' yet .g!vepriorltY to 'r~glonali.m (like Burma and Camboqia)" ,there-is, nonetheles$, (agr~_er;n~t on'the need -to reduce dependEmc on

18 Ba""fl~:o'k PtiiJ,tj ,M$;fQh·~. 1966. It waJ;l for: IUds reasonJh4t tb~ That Foreign, :Minister (whose 'de."f!O.'t1tW.-' to relJlbOlH cooperatio .. n ca.4n. 'OJ), .,~e '!lues. done. d)'., ca .. l.ued for .umore planning mo,. e, WOrk}J..Ad Jn~.,l/e\SI;l<::r'-1lce.s" to ~.O;~e"ABll!ti'(1:t 1,IS'olDiJi6b.~ern;~,',~1f it is iIldeed ·to lead to a MglonQJ,(l'efenSG"rra~g~~~nt, ',,{;.' " . \:':, ";" .

49

the West. Alii that Is, would subscribe to the' three-fold tbesls In the 1967 AI;IIIlAN Declaration that: , ,,"

"(1) The' countries of Southeast-,~sla share a· prfmary respon:sibility tor strengthening the ~ .. sta·blUty Qf· the region ,

"(2) .. '. that they aDe determined to ens,ure their stability and security from external interference . " " [and,]

"(3) that aU ,foreign bases are temporary ... " It is probably fair to say 'that disdain for SEATO bas increased fn the lew

ye~rs since 'those pages were Wllitten. As we are 'all aware, Fran{:e and Pakistan 'have withdrawn from the bodlY, and ,since, 19:72 the Philippines as. well has Indl~ cnted strong reservations. Even·more r~QentlYt the Australian government, with New Zealand largely echoing the. same sentimel~ts, has also. strongly suggested that it might be best .to 4isband the' arrangement altogether. And ot course the growing 'relaxation of .tensions between the TJnited States and China has caused all of us to questioIl,_t)le appropriA.t~nes~"of, a Treaty, whose -major announced purpose was to pr.o:vide for securtty agaL:qst, externally-sponsored Oommunist aggressions. , " '

These are ot COurse ,.sOme of the cOQsifl,erations which no doubt led to the adoption ot Senate,Resoluti,On 174; ,For as SEATO's membership narrows, and as its remaining members becoIQ.e l~creasillgly,critical, the questton has to, arise whether' it ~~ iu the, continuing best intepests ot the United States, to, appear as its main supporter., By ~he same token, it is probably also necessary, to 'lace head-on the question of wheth.er the 'U.S. may wisll to take steps to bring SIDATO to an end altogether.

1:[', FACTORS FAV'ORt'NG DISBANDONM'ENT

There afe ~ood "r~a~ons to cpnsider- th1f3: G9~rSe, Among t~e" most lInPortant IS, that, the, C?;verall en, yirOnment, ot- deep d, I~, rop.y. Wl;ti, cll ,characte, rized the, region in 1954 hl).~ AI!lproved. I have to be very 'captious here,' bee,ause, :~fw()uld be, use­less to p,r,etend that,Southeast Asia is toaa,:y, a, tegion ot ea1Jll" gf,!1-,SSJf,re, d ~~c1fritYt or of l;lniversal and widesp"ead support 'tor t4~ gov;ernmep.t,s:'~ io, power. 'Yet the~,~1 h, ave ~ee,n im.p,ro.v~roe, p.,ts,,:to the, POIn", t,w, he~~,p, t9J~0t1Q,ns that might have ,)J~en made, hI lQ5f-'-for cQI\elnued det,etloratlon and oVe>:l:brow of governments by ~nti-W~~~n~b.> forees....:...ha:ve ~ot been' b,o;rne' :out~, _ " '"if , '

I have In WIU<) SlngaJ1(l,e, IndoneSia, Malaysia, arid Thailand. JY.hen we OOn" ~lder ,What.!!lI,glitJ,' av,e, ~ee,li In""tbo,",e"natl'ons, and conSider, as weil,'t,h4,t, t~erels stIlI ih PlabelnSouthVle!i!'~Ul a government that wasno~ deposed'~,tHanol, I ,t~lnklt reasonable'!.o ¢o~l\'udethat'wuch of the twenty-year, ejJ:oFt lly, tbe u.S. has helped to buy the time tIIat Secretary Dul1e~ had Ib mind bt1954. In this .context, i,t i$\a_re~,p~ctt:!.qle position"tor .A:.me:ric~ms to argu~ that,',';we have'done enougb"j 'that '.sJq~T()~: ':Q;L~y "have con:trit.;tl.ted., sorpewhat, to ,our' \Vlllingness to become anq stay inv~1+e(t;jp., th~ r~giQn fOi'!:s<;l:,'IO,ng, and1tha,t .ijow,is,'a: good time to conclude that what S1il~~O symbolized Is, 116 'longer !leeded:, "

Another factor '£hat-'9Jfgues for d1,$b(\nding' SEATO~'ditt'Yes trom the, overall thrust of t1ie"GUam or lItl'X6n Doctrine: Certainly the if' torle of'''tbe Kissinger­Nixon 'forei~n polldy' t$,' 'tbat th¢unltedSt~f,eswill :'~.e to reduce'lts overall colnmltmilnts, and also tbeclrcu1i!stahc •• underwhlc\l'we will be wllling to pray the role (as','Senator'-'Fulbright 'oas' often 'termed 'it) of the wo.~ldts)"pol1ce:man." SllIATO, It ~as to'be'c9nce~ed,atlea:~t 'Implies' a bontbilfedwHlhigness by tbe U.S. to bear Q'lal'ge se'C1~rttY bUJ,"d,en in~,Sol.'Jthea'st ~sia. ~6 the e:x.tent t;heretore' ',that t,he overall t,hrtlst 'of' 'the ':Nt~:Q:h Doctrine iff to' c;li'Se~ga, g, e" no better' place to begin th,an (1) ~outbe~st As\~, and thIS canbemi1d@ mosf:.vldentby 'bringing an end to 'the U.S. role'in SEAT'O; , ' ,~_ > ,:\I~ ': ':;

It can also be argued that $l!lAT0:bI\s'been provocativecand In a ~erlod In ,'which we,:seek to CoIiviIi(!~' ehil)1l tha~"we'wnL,adhti_re'to the mut,ual respect prin~'

ciples ,of 'the,';Shanghat.JM:l:nmutiique,,1t hardlr.~can 'be 'lri l ',our interests to shore up'a ('fOl1aC1li\'t~':dMense e:lfort thit:t alwa-ys!had CliirttUn mHLd as the, major ndver· "sstY-. 'Insteaq; 'alld if we 'hope also 'Ill) en~otij'9:ge dhh;ia,: to'takl,:! a rela;ed view of Sbutheast! Asian developmen:fs~ is it 'not best to dislinnd tJirs' vestige of what Hans ,~orgenthau ohce called OU'l',,"paetomania"~ SEATOj f~',after all, a prod· uet'of·the period ot bi·pOlar blocs aD(l,:aH1ances that'cliara:ct~'rlzed the cold war,; in the' context·, of 'R Nlxon.K!Ssinger foreign policy- that p*olllotes "mu1tit>olaTi'ty," SEA!.TO seems~ an\Rnachronism. I" ':", , i ,',' ,;'

:"~", ,", ,- 'J ',." '_',~'- ,,,'I, [';1

50

. Two remaining criticisms need to be mentioned. One is that SEATO, in an operational military sense, never did anything. As a military a1l1anee, SEATO

";was and is ineffective, if measured as NATO is measured This is nowhere doubted indeed the present SEA"rO Secretary-General has himself recommended that major cutbacks be achieved in the military staffing of SEATO. He recom­mends that its activities Increasingly be devoted to economic and social pro­grammes,. Rnd to support tor the internal security efforts of Thailand and the Philippines.

The final consideration that argues for the dissolution of SEATO Is that the Treaty is. now itself' a cause of division and disagreement among some of our oldest and closest associates of the past 25 years. The fad that the Aus­tralian- government would probably like to be" rid of SEATO is no light matter. In 1972, when Oanberra strongly indicated its desire to review the entire SEATO ~tructure-, probably with a view to Ultimate termination of the arrangement, it wa's the American Secretary of State (Mt". Rogers) who insisted th.at SEATO was too important to' be tampered 'with. More recently, there were reports (New York Time8, 22 January, 1973) that Our government broadly hinted to the Australians that abrogation of SEATO might bring A...~ZUS into question-and that warning goes to the heart of AustraUa's entire postwar foreign policy. Thus for the time being, the Australians seem not to be pressing ,hard for an e:p.d to SEATO, but it is true nevertheless that there would be no significant Australian complaints (nor from New Zealand 'either) if the United States now took the lead in bringing an end to the Treaty.

III. SHOULD BEA'ro BE TERMINATED?

An o~, these, considerations tb,at arguEl for an end to SEATO are appealing, but they are not p,ecessarlly compelling. For there IS .one element associated with SEATO which)s of major continuing importan-ce,' 'and which woul¢f: disappear were SEATO ,also to, disappear: the .. American security relationship With Thai­land. ,For unli~e each of the other Asi,an-Pac1ftc members of the Treaty Orga­nization, only Thailand has no other security connection with the United States. Australia and New Zealand 'have ANZUS, and"the Philippines has a separate bilateral security Treaty. Thailand, on the other hand, has a bilateral secllrity relationship dit:ectly .with the United States only as a result ot the Rusk­,Thanat '''a~reeinent'' or Hunderstandib$''' of 1962, and that arrangement is al­together t),ed tQ: SEATO. The Rusk Thaoat agree;ment ~nt1ally states that the United S~~tes,. wUl cohsider undertaldng direct sUP:QQl't of Thai security, in the context ,of, SEATO, even if there is an absence of unanimity among the other members." , '

For the Thai this has been very important, and I see very little pel'suasive evidenc~_ that Thailand, Includt~g, the leaders of the govefnment that came to -power in October, 1973, wish,tQ ,be rid of the American security guarantee. Instead, and almost simultaneouslY with Marshall Dawee's recent trip to Peking the Th,ai Rpreign Wnlster has requested an incroot'le in American economic assistance. The Thais have by no' means called for an end to,the ,Treaty, although lilre everyone else they have begun to wonder about, it. and to question very seriouslY the extent to which the Unifed States any longer conSlijers SEATO to be operational. Bangkok- newspapers commented ,poi~tedly, fob example, to Secretary Kissinger's, absence from the recent S,EA'DO ,Council meeting-despite the fact that it was '4eId il1 -New York. 'No, doubt this was taken as a signal that he, at least, doesllottRkQ~ElXU;p too seriously.

These "slg:p.als;" as well as the possibility that the U.S. might itself call for' an end to SEATO, will necessarily ha~.e an effect on Thai foreign policy. and it is the role of ,Th:(14larn'L in ,0vera,~I "Southeast Asia'l1, security matters to which, I want now to direct our attentlon;',Fol' I think the point to be ma_4e that aD end to S~ATO would seriously ~all'1nto, question the future assured"',$e-curlty pros­

·pects of ,T,~ailand-and that, 'in tu:.;.n, can bave a greater impa-ct on the overall se~2Urity prospects,,':of' Southeast Asia than events taking place in any otber state fn Southeast, Asia. "

I say this because all availaple evidence, whether from, the viewpoint of :Japan, In,90nesia, Singapore,,;M.alaysia, or' AUstralia points to the simple propositton,that Thailand is regarded 'as the crucial element in the futUre se,c,uX'ity .of at teast ma-i-nland Southeast Asfa. Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew in -'Slngtlpore has re­peatedly made _this ,point, and it is a pqlnt that has been made to me, regularly,

51

by leaders as far removed as those in Tokyo and Canberra. 'All,. that is, recog­nize that Thailand-with its 35 million people and 'its long-standing trad1tion of separate existence and Independence-is something of a bellwether in South-east Asia.' '

The Malays, for example, -do not believe that they would be able to hold out· against any political force that came tO'dominate the mainland, including Thai­land. The Indonesians, who regard the' security of Malaysia and Singapore as essential to their own, strongly make the same point. They regard Malaysian security as dependIng directly on the continued existence of a separate and dis­tinct Thailand as a state freely cooperating with the Western world. Japanese at­titudes at leadership levels are identical: when asked what is the most important element in Southeast Asian security they point without hesItation to Thailand, and'the way it bears upon the entire Strait of Malacca region.

If SEATO were abrogated, and if thereby Thailand's continued security guar­antee from 'the United States were also Jo end, aU this would be called into ques­tion. It is for that reason that I want'strongly to endor,se the view that I believe has been put forward bY Senator Aiken-for in your Committee Report dated 30 October, 1973, Senator Aiken "suggested that, as an alternative to SEATO, the United States might wish to consider worldng out separate understandings with the two remaining regional members of the pact, Thailand and the Philippines." I belieVe that insofar as Thailand is concerned, such a step is an essential re­quirement for the development of security in East Asia as a whole. And accord­ingly, I cannot e~dorse -American steps to bring about an end to SEATO unless simultaneously steps are undertaken to estabUsh firm bilateral security arrange­ments between the United States and Thailand.

I do not believe that any such step 'Is required in connection with the Philip­pines. Aside from the fact that the United Stq..tes and the Philippines are already tied together in a, mutual defense treaty that predates SEATO, it,ls my judg­ment that it would be beneficial for the United States to (Wold any further rein­forcement of Filipino expectations about American guarantees. Indeed ,] would g.o further and ask this Committee seriously to consider loosening the bilateral ties with Manila that we already have.

My reasons for ~~a~ng this are several-and long predate the unfortunate turn of events that has accompanied Pre$ident M!ircos' imposition .of m&rtial law,"and pis recent excesses in the Southern Philippines with regard to the non­Christian' Muslim population. Instead, my reasons have largely to do with the proposition that few in Southeast Asia, or East Asia for that matter, wUl believe overall,' security to be threatened or adversely affected no matter what takes place in the Philippines. Manila has for so long ad()pted the role of "odd mlJ,n out," and has fOJ;, so long persisted in adopting a non-respollsible policy in South­east Asia; ,that Philippine events can in 110 way be regarded, as a bellwether for the region.

Moreover, and as President MarpQs' ,repeated as~~rtions that he taces a j'MaoM ist" rebellion help demonstrate, there is a d~nger that even' present U.S.-Philip­pines ties can lead to an American military involvement in matters of Philippines security, brought about by Manila's own maladmin!stration and insensltivlts. This should at ,all costs be avoided, an'd; I am dJstressed and dismayed by pre'ss reports that American Special Forc'as are·'e,ve'n now operating in support of Philippines' armed forces in Mindanao· and the Soutbern Philippines. Frankly, if the Philippines were the only U.S.MSouthe'ltst Asian defense relationship that might bp sacrificed were SEATO to be terminated, I would be among those argu-ing strongly for'the end of the Treaty Organization. .

In the present circumstance, however, that is not the case, and the. need to find some way by which to malntain an American defense guarantee to Thailand needs to be emphaSized. If the continued existence of SEATO is the only method available, I would ,endorse, the ,continued existence.of the Treaty, but that hardly seemS ,to be the most a-ppropriate form. The weaknesses of SEATO,,'cannot be wisped away, and its weaknesses are so strong that the United States ought to avoid being placed.in the position of defending or endorsing, a w,ide"ranglng and allegedly j'collective security" treaty that in reality hll-s application only.to one nation: ThaUand. ~or SEATO's original purposes, can n.o, IQnger be defended, and the Administration runs, the risk .of.' proc~ahll.ing t,o the American p~9ple a set 'ol,l1easons for the continued existence of' ,SEATO,:,that are not true; and lacking' tr~th. will ~ot be persuaaive. If, aS,is justified in my view, the' genufne

52

requ~r~ment" i~ fol' the United: States:to 'extend ,8: defense ,guar~ntee:to Thaila'ud, let 1J.~, teU, the truth, create an apPl'.opriate relatioD,ship ,with Bangkok, Rnd let SEATO come to an eud~ , ~:;"; .' " .. :,

I belie'\re finally that such a step will be endorsed, although ot COUrse tacitly by Peking. Already it is evident that"Pekillg, has dO,ubts, not ·very different from those entertAined in Indonesia and. other pl~ces, about the }pug-term aims of tUe. gover:,nment in H~noi. If ,those aims include the eventual establishment of a Hanolwdominated regime throughout mainland Southeast Asifl/ it. is very Jikely tbat such aims are not endorsed by the leader$ of Ohina. This is especially true to the ex:tent that Hanol bas associated itself with the aims of the Soviet Union dn, F1nst ant;l"Southeast Asia. Accordingly and, while I expect that China 1s not prE'sently greatly bothered by the contlnu~ existence of SEATO, China would not wish to see tak€\ place in Southeast,Asia any set_of circumstances that might lead tc;> an eventual enhancement of the,. role of the Soviet, Union in that region. ,I not~ for example, that China's leaqers have ceased Criticising Thailand for

its role in SEATO, and I expect that, were SEArrO to come to an end, and if that were accompanied by a specific bilateral connection between Bangkok and WaShington, China would not complain. For in point .of fact it is Hanoi about whom Thailand,may have to be most concerned in the ,future, and steps to in~ hlbit further expansion by_' Hanoi are consistent with China's own view of the ~egion., This is one reason wh~"SEATO itself is not,terribly crithdzed by 'China todaYl' and it suggests as well that China would not. be provolted by the creation of a specific,. bi-<latera,l security linll: between the U.S. and Thailand.

In any event, the step to,avoid'isJa~w-holesale throwing-out of SEATO! par~ ticularly if that means that nothing, stands in ita place so far as Thailand is concerned', If'we"are going to bririg;about,an' end to something old and outdated, it is 'imperative"that we put in its placEf,' as' ,Robert Ruark once wtote, Hsome~ thing of value." ,.,

'l'hnnk you:

I EFFECT OF HANOI GOVERNMENT'S ASFIRiATlONS IN INDOQHIN A

'TheCJ~AIm.!AN. I wiSh .You wou!d elaborat!\ Ilidl,ttle bit about the probabili~i~~ ofHaI\oi.!lSpIring tocpntrol Thl\,nahd:,1 hll;dnot;heard of this bef<!lre. You say a rivalry betwe.en them~an ancIent rIvalry, I tltke it. Do you thiilk Hanoi-· -'.'_. " .. ,. ..; , ... :Or. (lORDON.' Ancient but notI\ecessari1ipre-lti~toric..)' ,

·':TheCF!AIRl)i:AN, P6yp,uthink Hanoi has designs aM,lIt t~lllg.over Thailand! Ldidu'.tknow her appetite was that big. I thought South Vietnam was about all she could hannlo.

Dr. GOhDON,' 'Witlt the quali'flcatioli;tlIere I would not agree. It s~~ms.to me fE~hii,t\le tlnderS~tlin:din,¥"t~atI nave of the Hanoi (lov­,H.nment's ~spI~atioJ?s ltnd des)r,e~;",t;ls to succee,dj,to therol~ that France ;m!lllltal!1ed III FreI\C~'jlndj;)~i>llna; tha1;ou~tImately a deSIrable outcome w~u'ldbe~o have,;l~';'v,!~srb!e, Cp,mbodm and Laos"as we!! ,as, South V!etnam,()~'?ourse,';Wlthlll thetrttelal,te,ol,'"pel,'h!lps, if POSSI­ble, the ultImatepohtlCal control of the !tltno!(lo;vernment. '

I think what this represents to Thailand is alllajor apprehension because the Lao and the 'Cambodian borders.!l!re to, Thailand the most se.nsitlveo~ all. It was . precisely in the rSeHdl'l. in which ;~t seemed mQst;'cettltm thll,~the U.n. ited States would prevent t. hat kind of de­velopment that the Thai Goyermnent.began its most encouraging rellt­tionslI~ps.· '\'I'ith l:U(j.on.esia,' with MalaY}liroill . tlie AS:E1AN fram~'l"0rk. To the ~Xt~'8:«'thatt!)}!, 'lJlli!edStates Tias begun tovyithdraw,.lias lJ6-

. gun to IndIca.te" ]'he~her nghtly or wrongly', tbat It would perhaps ,notbe'inl,vQlyea in'the 51l1pport.o£ Thailalild,. the ']hakhave reverted ,tQ !1;'rr\'tichl)ll!rJj;,r Mj,1i"perha]Ds'moreclassicMldtmnitional role'l' that is. to' pay ntuch·II\6fte 'atten.tiot;; in 'ny jildgmoilt, to thoir traditional

53

concerns with the Cambodia and Laos borders. They ha'Ve now begun to 'pay much less at~ntio!, to' -,yhat were, ~ thi,!k, h~lpful.ltnd enco;,tr­agmg signs of relatlOnshlps wIth IndonesIa, wIth Malay-sm, and wIth Smgapore in a regionali£ramework. I think ·those developments were posItive, were helpful ina long term way from American interest viewpoint. . ., . . I think they have been interfered with and impeded because of these increasing Thai ap'pr~hensi?!,s. I don't 'Want? h9w~,:er, to be in-, ferred to. say that It IS ''1l!ly' Judgment that the HanOI Government would like to succeed to'the control of 3'hailand. I don'thlean that. I do mean that the rivalry of the. two.' with regard to territories in former French Indochina idiabre to be resuscitated, and I think. that is wh(tt in part has'taken place. . . .

. The CHAIRMAN. You. lOeanthey might fight ove'!' who' controls Cahlbodi(ji

Dr. GORDON. Cambodia, Laos, yes. . -., I d ~

u.s. INTEREST IN 'SQUTHEAST As;rA

The CHAIRMAN. Is whether ~me or.the other controls it a'vitltl American interest! How.doyou justify our mruint\1ining the kind of establishment that we are doing to determine, t)).at particular .£ltct, just taken as It hypotheticltl! How would our interests be affected if, by chance, Cambodia deckled either volUl,ltarily or involuntarily, it should be underThailand versus Hltnoi! I Itssume they don't want to We 'under either' one. I didn't know .sihltll<lUk, and 'Cambodia would like tb be under,either one.,

Dr. GOWON_' No, Cambodia would nou'and; Senanor, I have testified in the other body with regard to the .a wesome size of' our appro.pria­tions,to the Lori N01 government .and ~ was most distressed, with mruny..oth"!\S;)whell'PrinueSihanouk was overthrown. I.think that was an effecti've.;a:nd'vtii1oble gov.ernment that was being ;maintained there under his leadedhiF. .', ' . .

The relationship I draw.is an indirect one,.and, I recognize It diffi­cult .one. It is essentially this : what I thi,nk was taltingplace in the mid and .late 196.(,)'9 'IIl1>~ a degree of inoreaairtg as~>:tTance, abbtit'the long term secJl:ritYj"ospe0ts in East Asia;Mra; particularly, Southeast Asia on the part 0 the Governments ofM'IIJaya, MalaySia, Sirtgapor.e"Itl'.i dones\ru rurid Thailand, about the km'g term prospects. As a conse­quence of that sense of encouragement Itnd optimism, the governments in the region be~ltn to embark upQn systems which,ij],.the long past, in the early 1950 s, the UnitedSta:~,,"·r1ta';Htself eildol'8ed:; that is lIIloVe­ments 'toward negional cooperatioli:',:j;.thmtht\:t thosemoveihents, those, .tend;encies to'lllardre@h:malcooperation: ~ere; in fact, in the Am,encanJnterests. . , ) .' :.,'" 'J .

'1,'JiIH.lj,$i,extent that they would . lead to ,a .greater degree of ability <ll/l.the]illi!rtof t40se smaller,governments to seeto,t]j:eir own security, I think if 'Was iily the ,Ameriol>n interestto",ellGOurage cooperation,. re-gionaj:wil:esipl,l in S01;lt)a.ea.';!tAsia. ",j";: ,. .

'l'hilOH4;tl\J\1:-A~. 1,'I"\s4 you would .e)aliorlltexr'Werh!i(ve been engaged ~o lon~it Seem.sto me there is an ItSs~m.ptlon 'IIl~,have a'great interest m whIch partIcular group controls 'IIlhlCli:' I am not cleltr that we do.

54

What is our interest and why is it so different that it justifies the enor­mous expenditures that we are presently expending over there, with­out further intervention 1 I find it is hard to justify when we look at the state of our budget and the deterioration of our economy. A lot of these policies were developed in the days. of the dollar gap when we had so much money we didn't know what to do with it, so we went to the Moon and we went everywhere. . . I think our economic .conditions require a close examination of what our interest is. Why does it make any difference really 1 None of these governments are in our image exactly and we are not going to get them in our image and I am not sure that it wo.uld be good for them any­way. I have great difficulty in deciding whether it is worth $2 or $5 billion for us to maintain this particular setup, and I wish you would explore it for my benefit. I would like to be convinced that" there is some great important value to us in maintaining the status quo in Thailand or in Cambodia.

Dr. GORDON. I think our interest can be simply defined. It is not. a new one, and that is in seeing that East Asia is without

domination by any single state. I think that has been stated by this administration and by the last administration but I don't think it de­pends upon official administration statements to define it. I think this has been a reasonable view for a lo~g period.

CHINA'S INTENTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Now you are shifting back to China, it is against our interests fpr China to take it all, is that what you are saying j

Dr. GORDON. From my point of view I understand our policy has sought-and I think it is a reasonable notion-to prevent any major power to successfully take power throughout the East Asia r~gion, whether that was Japan earlier or China in a presentenvironm&nt, and. I don't see major likelihoodnow for China aspiring to that. '

The CHAIRMAN. There is nothing to indicate it. It wasn't at the time we entered, it was all an illusion of Secretary Rusk that we were protecting South Vietnam from China. China hasn't done anything to indicate she wanted to take over. I mean it is a lot of 1l0nsense, but ~e9ausehe stated it, people ha"e"now come to accept it. I don't think ,t"S true. :'c· ,

DOlou see any signs China is moving to take over the political con-trol 0 this area! " .

Dr. GORDON. Senator, I think that the Chinese have been up and down in their supportive efforl<!: I~i,s noteworthy-- ,

The CHAIRMAN. Supportive effort is another matter. We support a lot of people that nobody thinks we are going to take over, and I think in mary cases. without any jlisti~eatjon. You co~ld apply that to;Il;ny place;m the world and have us give treaty commItments,'and,s(); on,if :you .iust assume4 that -it is possible a;nywhere. I suppose" yiOli could JustIfy a treaty m Chad' or Upper Niger because it IS possible that China, might want ,toipfluence thell!' I .don't thi~k it !s reasonable, and Ldon t see anythmg reaHy that mdIcates Chma IS 'about to move against, these countries. ' ,. . . ,

• i • I

55

If :you come back to Hanoi, is it vitally important to us whether HanOI should control Laos or whether it shouldn't! We have our pref­erences, but I am trying to reconcile our own. dema!,ds at h,?me and the terrible condition we have gotten ourselves m by mtervenmg all over the world. I am trying to see if there is any justification for continuing this great expense of supporting these kinds of obligations, because this is the justification for keeping these bases.

I know one of these bases is used now-it says in this article, it says, U-Tapao is the aerial resupply point for the American-British base at Die~o Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Of course I think it is a very dubIOUS thing. We begin to spread out our military bases when we already have 1,800 or 1,900 all over the world and all of them estab­lished really during and after W orId War II.

What I am trying to suggest is in reconsidering these matters we should keep in mind our own condition here at home, which is very perilous, I think, politically speaking and economically speaking. Unless you can make a stronl{ case that this is very im 'portant to us, such. as one can make for the Panama Canal, I think it IS pretty clear that is important to us, I have never been quite able to understand why the character of the Government of Cambodia or Thailand is all important to us. .

You say communism-well, the word "communism" seems to equate with dictatorship which we tolerate, we even support, and I am not sure but what we encourage in places like Chile. That certainly is a diQtatorship just as much as any Communist regime is isn't it I It is just a different kind of dictatorship. I wish you would. explore just why do you think it is of great interest to us-if you say China, I say that is so· improbable I don't believe that is a valid basis for this policy. I don't see Il,nything, I haye heard nothing.

Do you think there is a probability that China will move physically to take over Thailand I <,

Dr. GORDON. No, Senator. The CHAIRMAN. You do notl Dr. GORDON. I do not under the present circumstances believe that is

likely. ..... The CHAIRMAN. We have tl) deal with present circumstances, don't

wei . '. PROSPECTS FOR CONI)ITIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Dr. GORDON. I do. However, l think that the prospect for even more unstable conditions in Southeast Asia and in East Asia than exist now would be enhltnced by virtue of China's, Russia's, and Japan's con­cerns w!th the instability of the region were all of the states of South­ellst ASIa to'.bezin to have to move· in their own separate 'directions, ~ach making h~s own separate. best ~argain for peace if he could get Itl alOlIg th,e hnes that the Mal!,ysIan~ have ~uggested, neutrality. A ang t!,e l!nes that the IndoneSIans mIght ultlJnately have to move toward If Smgapore as well felt there. Wa{l no p.rospect £or continued 'stability in the region.. '.' .

What I am saying essentially is that there would be lower prospect fOr invitin~ in and ror risking large power rivalries were the region to he in a sItuation where th~ states within it-by and large to me that ..

.,

56

means the ASEAN states, the five or sbthat are now in the.ASEAN grouping-werethe,Yto be enconraged to coalesce among them$elves. Tdon't see that taking place if there is major anxiety and aP12rehen­sionabout approximate security,and I think that the Thais wIll have that kind of apprehension about their own security, .

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be much more to the point if we affirmatively and aggressively supported neutr!l!lity of .this area, seek, ing adherence of R.ussia, China, and Japan, trying to bring about neu­trality to where nOne '"fils :have to be involved because our ,presence there and bur guaral).t(!e' is pr()vocative. I think to China,. it would naturally be provocative. . If they were messing around in Mexico I am sure.we would think

it provocative .and we were certainly very, very provoked about Cuba, 'have been and still are .. So I am bound to say I think it is provocative.

Why wouldn't neutrality for lthe<area 'be far superior to bilateral military engagements to Thaill)llrdor any other oountry 1 .

Dr. GORDG!". I don't th""k ~htLt!i'number of the g<>:vernments In the area believe, brleaders belie",,; that,neutrality is now or in the imme-diately foreseeable future ·avaih);bleprospect. ",:

,The CHAIRMAN. Why not!· " Dr. GORDON. Among other considerations the Indonesians have had,

in my judgment, too recent an experience with difficulties with China , t? yet pla~ereli~nc~" as~eN ras'witb: the Soviet'UniQn to yet place re­hance, ,upon 'assu!i1ncesand':guarantees that,would'come from that <\uartet. r'do!,ltthurl<'theYalre:yetlileadyfol'.that,''''/'·· ,', .

~'fron~t tinnlt"t.hrut twe Tl"o,p'!lIreyet'!t'eruil.Y"ior tJhat.<N;o,oneoi the stlttes has given any moreth&l\l:& p'leasairt'Mp'servide to the Mal!!,ysian Governmentls,proposwls Wihich', :aftera]]', lia"e:b~en'euO!rent for 5'years.

> " ',-'.', <, :, ,'~l.J',_' ; '~'" :::"f'.(1),I. ,,', '

'WHAT IS 'INTI'lIl'EsTOF PE@i1LE"GFUN,ITI'lD STA'i!ES,? , '0'. ': : 'j',> •

, The CHAIRMAN. Of course, if they are on,Qur payroll a1.).d we:aregiv­, ... !xtg them hundreds of :millions of dollarsthey:will continU'e. that. I

don't se.s oi1~,interests tlileue. . I still come back to what is the fnterest"of :my constituents and the

. people· "f this' couiJ:Itryin this :matter.,l,don't think we . eveD tested '!\gaurst that. We just pursue these 01\il, in many cases, discredited . justifications. in these policies., I don'kquite see it. ,r''W@\I:ld li!;;e to be

pcpstiaded ifI·am wrong about it,if~hereisareaUnter<ist. :(sit eeo- . IiQlllic! Do We ex. Ifeet:to e~'Itl ..... tih .. eni,¥. :%~tl:~Wt. :k'I\:$.w.th.at,~t>ls. We have Communist count.ri~sin Ea~te1!nJlf\'t;'~e imdin Russiatl'yb:\g:to do business with USI l!>iit 'w~'.lttr;l"si;l!\i6rhrhittetl'to the mirHtltry parti:lfit we resist it.w.henthey·l*ant'to doj)1!!sin,Bss with us. So I Il'l1ther it is n"t econ(M'dic,itis.id~()logi4ar,lbut,,,, don't'ilee where that ia'iLPJilr\,>priate eithe,r;'iIwish Ic@uld'be infi'i'i'med as'towh:y:it is intJilJ" inte~eststQ ifiteWene"ftll"l1voWll'd,the,wQrldpis:@ec;,iI1y in South,,~st Asia. ' . ..,

Wl1ly(!U~!!> a;JiieitdJ\lst6i~.Ithatpoijjt~", .. 'I"~ ..... :!.;;:' " Dr. G<1iIUl(D'lII.:I 'W!ilu:ld <b'Q,t)i.e last,one'toarguet:rr~weliave mterests, all aroundthii'worId. ." .', ""ii!" "" '.,

The' q1M~A:N •. 'In' 11hdsJ~ase, w hatls!.iJuv iilfitet:~stl; Is it economic i· , 1).rri(tt6nbON'.N()i<-. ~"I~(~l')'! ,He .\ .':': ,_",d;"l~'~"; },t(,' . " 'I (!~1

, ,The CErl\1Il)l&,,~:I~ ili'lfi<>t;eMJiomilY.>J:dt'J1>p1iti'CIlr,¥, ,\: Dr. GOllDON, Yel} ." :,:~.. ','

" "._,

5'7

-'Dhe CHAIllMAN.:A11right. And how,isthat important to us! _Imeau the l'oliticalmakeul' of the indhMnl!l states!, _ ,', _, _ -

Dr. G:ORDON, r mean: the .political makeup o;f the re~ion of Sovthe",st ASIa as It bears on East AsIa" _, . 'DheCHAIRMAN. By politicll<lyou mean you d\lii't _want thelll aU:­thol'itarian or Communists OF we ,don't want them "what!' . -

Dr. GORDON. I mean I do not think'itis in oUr_ interest to she o1;1e of either of two circumshlnces develop: Either the states in. that area be­come linked closely with a mlljor, another major power, either China or. the Soviet Union or Japan, nor do I think it is in our interest to see such circumstances of instability develop so that a. rjvalry begins to take place among,the preaent.major states in the area: Japan, China and possibly the Soviet Union' I think that would be a more tense en­vironment even than that we have recognized in the past 10 years. I think it is in our· interests to avoid that circumstance taking place.

It is a negative interest, Senl\tor, and II very diffic1;llt one to state for that reason. It doesn't have the rhetoricatapl'eal of the COl11niuriist thing-that was so long-·,talked about. It does not have the attraction of sayiJilg there is trade there, as we argue with regard to Europe. It does not have the attraction of pretending that Latin A.m~rica is closer than it is. Of course, as you kuow" the states in Latin America are not, in many instances, any more proximate than those in Southeast Asia. Itis a negative reason and for that reason a much more difficult one to de­fend, but I think in·the long-llerm interests and stability and security of the United States. . -

EFFEOTIVENESS "OF MILITARY ALLIANOES 'QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. Even granting the interests, I would also raise a very serioU$' question of whether this type of approach even accom­plishes th",t purpQ~e. Even .grantin~ your statement that thisis a mat-. tel' of great int;erest. to us, ~ 91;l~stIOn w f:reth~r Jl'ilitary alliances are. clearly as'efl:ectn"e !til mor~ CIVIlIzed relatIOns whICh deyelop as a r~sult of tuade and.cultural relatIQl)s. _'. .

po you really. thil)l~ it~s~ilit~ry! B.ecl\u~eI think they a~e llr~voca­tive. It almost IS an mVltatwn to,th,,· other, powers to do lIkeWIse, to try to get another base, to !lifset it, just as imp shirting in Di~go GarCia no" doubt will enhan,ce the il,etermdJ;lJ!ot,ion of. the-RuSsians to get a pJace-.-.perhaps in India, they are ,b:Wlaing.upth~. I)ne in Somalia now. They int~ri1et.-<;ac~ coun~ry (provok~s the.other t\!.,take .similar meas­ures .. It IS allieadmg to va~t extr"¥agances 01)' both~Ides' Y QU say Indonesilldoes not rely on an agr,e,elAwrt,!,):qtif.the .~ui3sians .and the Chinese and the Japanese should' ageee wit)ttls,tliiit 'is :laoS! important. :[ don'! Imow wheth!lrthey w,ou14' \lr,~otw9Iet ;we.\lave jleyerinxesti­g~~ql, 1t .or'~!if; mYflnl<lw le!i~e, w~ha v;~n}t;,w,!lfl'~;I' .proposal. We i qst pursue ,.t4~:$lIllle ,po1WY 'wnlch. has gRt~ il!'I,1I).to, ,a rather temble, mess &t the moment. '_..' 'i" '.-,' '. . -

This is a cont~U\~lttionof the. s~me po~cl ~~t.le~ujtjl~,jn Vie~na..m. It seeme.'t<:> me It.la. ~ would~hmk. that'lt 18 worthwhile exal.'unmg ~()me pQsslbl~ alternative ap,p,roach. 1 am. ~wnk to say I. don't 11kethe Idea of makln&, ·further mIlitll;ry 90mlll1iflnent. to ThaIland. I don't know why she Isn't able to malntam her -own mdependence. She did for 2,000 yeare without our intervention. This has always,amaze~nle.

58

This part of the world got along pretty well without us for a long time and why we are important all of a sudden is beyond me.

Dr. GORDON. We got ourselves involved iu President McKiuley's administration and I think that started a train of events.

The CHAIRMAN. I never thought that was very wise. I have never thought of it as being one of our brightest moments in what we did a,bout Aguinaldo, is that right!

Dr. GORDON. No, I don't. The CHAIRMAN. So we still get ourselves involved pursuing

McKinley.' Dr. GORDON. I think we have seen in some instances where we can

back off. As I say, I would not make ~he argument that we should in any way endorse the present regimes, for example, in Cambodia nor do I make an argument that we should endorse the present regime, or, any regime frankly, in the Philippines. My argument essentially rests in large part on the role that I believe that Thailand plays in the political thinking of leadershIp groups in major East Asian gov­ernmentsl and I think we have to deal with that. We cannot wish that away. I do, however, think we can do away with SEATO as a body, \Jecause that, in fact, does imply a greater degree of expectation for American roles that I think is justified. I would be very much in support of,what Senator Javits said earlier, it is time, in fact long since time, that we tell the truth and not pretend we are going to get involved in many places where we ought not am'd I think there are indeed severe risks in SEATO to the extent that the protocol extends a relationship to Ca\llbodia and Laos.

TlIAILAND'S ROLE, IN EAST ASIA

As I say, my con' cern derives in part from the place and role that I think :rh~i1and has begun to pIa:), in th}nking and in .activities in East ASia m the past 10 or 15 years. It IS a fact that IS not easily wished away and it puts us in a dilemma and in a quandry about whether we will simply abrogate the thing quickly or whether we will seek to fiud steps by which to getoff the escalator and it would be that latter that 1 would wanf toeee taking place. . '

.~he CHAIRMAN. I w~lUld, to,?, I am not sure that makinl;(lt bilateral mlhtary agree,?ent .. w. Ith Tha!l~'d promotes~hat objectIVe. I don't know whether It would or not. 1 am not sure It would. Thailand has been. a: very ,reso.urceful ~ormtry mai~~a~ning her irtd~pendllnce from foreign domm!ltlOn.She Ist~e only One m the area'that was not dom-mated by !I Western cO\lnt~;, Isn~tthat"cotrect j "

Dr. GORDoN:That is correct,' '. .' The CHAIRMAN. Fora longtime and' she is probably--Dr. qORDON. Althoug!, :pI'otected I think by British influence dulting'

the perIOd of the 19t1i',~,entury but not certainlyinany fotlnailcolonial way..",...·

The CHAIRMAN. Right. ,_'

, I

59

ASSUMPTIONS, CONTINUED INT:ERVENTION ON' PART OF UNITED STATES

I won't prolong this,.but what concerns me is this continued inter­vention on our part and the assumption that we should or ought to have a responsibility to see that everybody is stable, no change takes place, and wherever there is an insurgency that is against our lllterest. I don't think that is necessarily so. Some of these places, I am not say­ing Thailand needs it, but some of them might well benefit from a change; I would hope it wouldn't be a change too radical. I don't be. lieve in violence and revolutions, they never do any good, but I don't know that we can control it efl'ectivelv. .

You .go ahead and say whatever you like.

POSSIBLE AGREEMENT WITH THAILAND

Dr. GORDON. No, Senator, I am done with the formal remarks. I would say the Government of Thailand in the kind of transition

it has been experiencing over the past 5 months since October I think should represent to us a favorable development, and if a constitution does, in fact, develop and take place, as seems now to be indicated, there is good .reason, I think, to 'expect a more widely, based govern· ment coming from a new constitutional framework.

The present leadership, the Prime Minister, has expressed appre­hensions about the coming to an end of the SEATO thing altogether but not because it is SEATO as a whole, but only by virtue of what the SEATO relationship represents to the Thai. I don't think that SEATO as an organization any longer represents anything of COll­sequence to anyone of the member states, and, more to leading Ameri­cans, and I include specificlllly Secretary Kissinger. I think It is only by virtue of the specific and sole relationship that the United States has with Thailand that SEATO represents anything of significance at all today, and that is why I asked ·for some cauti\1ll before it is abrogated. ': .' '

I think, as I said, that Senator Aiken's proposal to consider sub­stituting specific relationships with Thailand, a, Ithough ,J ,vecognize he included the Philippines, and I would not endorse that, I think that warrants and merits very serious attention.' ,

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if such an agreement with Thailand is the price of getting rid of SEATO it mIght be worthwhile but that is about the only.-,- .

Dr. GORDON. I am very encouraged to hear you say that, Senator. TheCHAtRMA~. What!', " ',' Dr. GORDON. I am verr encouraged to hear you say that. The CHAIRMAN. I saId it!might be. I just wonder whether we have

to pay .that big !I price or not. ~f w~ did, it would only be.to pacify the P",ntagon; Ithlllk. Tdon't"thrnk ~thas any reason to It other than just a deal as we saY' we have to makealld I recognize these have to

.be madeto'get anytliing done, Bo,itmight'be on that round worthwhil~" , I didn't give that as . a reason for it. I mean ,1 thin,kthatil$(the most

60

reasQnable, PQliti~alJy speaking, the, ,best reason, YOll have given for making the. agreement with SEATO if that is the price you have got to, give to, get rid Df SEATO.' . "'. . Do, ~Duhave anything further, Mr. Kahin, Dbser."ations to, make. It IS 1 0 ClDCk. WDuld YDU care to make an observatlOn abDut that and then we will-SimatDr Case may ha"e·sDmething.

SenatDr' CASE. May I just say, I certainly want YDUtD hear ,this Db· se~vatiDn, I am sDlIry I had to be DUt. I had· promised to, see a number of television editDrial writers frDm Philadelphia at a particular hDur and I had to, see them. .

PROBIJEMS BECAUSE OF u.s. INTERVENTION AND MAINTAINED PRESENCE

I wanted to, ask YDU hDW to, run the world and what YDur fDrmula was. If I dDn'thave a chance this time I will get at itIater.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kahin, wDula. YDU make' any remarks! Dr. KAHIN. It is late but maybe just a cDuple Df remarks, SenatDr

Fulbright. . I take exceptiDn to, sev.eral things that I glJessmy cDlleaglJe, Bernard

GDrdDn, has said. I think' basically I WQuid say that YDU dDn't keep Southeast Asia stable Qr frDm being dQminated by any major PQwer by maintainin~ the presence Df Qne Df thQse major PQwers, to, wit, the 'United States 111' the area .. That simply prQvQkes'cDuntervailing inter­ventiDn, it seems to me, frDm Dther major pDwers.

FurthermQre, I believe that there IS no, reason why Thailand can't 10Qk after its Qwn defenses. If one is w9rried Qver .the Thai relatiQn­ship with Vietnam, I wDuld nDt agree -that the 'histDrical recDrd prD­vides' much basis fDr being terribly cDncerned;The Dne instance where there was an invasion was Dne frDm ThaOiland' at the end Df the 18th century into, southern Vietnam, and 1 know of no, Vietnamese invasiDn into, Thailand.

As for LaDS, traditiDnally it was a buffer area. It IDDks like it may becDme Dne again and Dne Df the hDpeS is that it can be established as a viable buffer area)' as 'was the Driginal purpose of the 1954 Geneva agreement· ..

I dDn't really see any ioutside threat to, Thailand. I do, see prDblems which havedevelDped because DfAmericallinterventiDn in places clDse to, Thailand. If Dne IDDks clDsely at the insurgency ill·tlie north Df Thailand, SDme of the MeDs,.themost,m>litallt element there,pushed acrDSS the bDrder frDm LaDS, w~nting to get away from the' fighting there. A y'ea,r, !ligD,the last,tinIe'I e))conntered"statistics that were re­liable, it.was·something Dver 7,000 that hadcl'ossed: over into, Thailand.

The CHAIRMAN. Are 1J:hose,Lli0,! . . Dr. KAHIN. These:a,re Me@,that came Dv.erinto nDrthern Thailand

irom Laos, I , 'i, 'j ,:' ",'. ' ' i :" '." '

.... ~ am much !ess.sanguill:e, th!\Jl;ili'r@d'ilSS~l',Go~QOni!libbut the'possi:­bIhtyofanytl.llng('Jjlr@4uctrl!e"comm~ .fr9Jn<'AS¥AN.The~e iha ve beeni, l""years"fDr lIt, t@, cDnfl1llnt. lrea,l:1(y".dioant'lssuesj. there' ,lilaildbeen·' .' ntrlleh t~. d,lo>;ery a,t1ltle ,aetioU\ .': .,,, : "",., i·,.i., i.i n '" I·,ill! , .

61

NEUTRALIZATION OF SOUTHIMS'l' ASIA

It would seem to me it is a mistake to think that any neutralization would have to subsume all Southeast Asia. With respect to neutraliza­tion the critical area is continental Southeast Asia, and this doesn't embrace either Indonesia or the Philippines. I have found amongst local elements, who are likely to have a greater voice in the future than in the past, a disposition to look seriously at the possibility of some kind of a neutralization for continental Southeast Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case, ~o you have any, quest!ons! Senator CASE. No, I don't. I wIll read these thmgs wIth very great

interest from both of these gentlemen. ' The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen I apologize for having poor representa­

tion of the committee here. Senator CASE. It had quality.

COMMENDATION OF WI'l'NESSES

The CHAIRMAN. That is just what I had in mind. Senator Church anticipated holding'the hearing, and I think you have made a good record. Unfortunately, it came on a day in which the votes are very important in the Senllte because they involved (lur own housekeeping status. Anyway, I think 'you have made' a very good record and we appreciate your taking the time to give us your thoughts. The Con­gress is so .overwhelmed with other thmgs that they rarely give thought to anything. We have to depend upon you gentlemen to think for us. I beheve what you have said has been very useful and I am hopeful that it will be the heginningof a movement 1;owlllrd at least a serious review of our accumulated barnacles from the dead past. I would hope and we can begin to think about it in some different fashion anyway, and see if we can't rearrange our commitments to'where they are more in accord with our capacity to do justice to them. I, for one, think we are grossly overcommitted all over the world far beyond our capacity to service those commitJnents and in many cases inspiring other people to do things they might not otherwise do. Thank you very much, unless you have somethil)g further you.,care to say! Thank you. ,

[Whereupon: at 1 p.m., the committee was !.tdjourned, subject to the call of the ChaIr.] , .

84-400-74-.-c ~

ApPENDIX

STATEMENT BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD, U.S. SENATOR FJ;tO¥ THE STATE OF WEST , VXI\GINIA ON REVI,EW OF TH,E ~OUTH~AST ASIA COL;LE'CTIVE

J DEJj'ENSE TREATY ,

, , ' , I

Mr. 'Chairman, I appreciate this 'opportunIty to submit illy ,views regarding United States' participation in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. or,' as the treaty is more commonly- 'Called, SEATO. As a cosponsor of Senate ResolU~' tion 174, which calls'- f6r' this ;Jrev:iew to determine the advisability of United States renunciation of the SElATO pact, I am keenly interested in the conclu~ sions that might a.rise from these hearings.' '.

It is my beliet that 8l;iJATO _is an anachronism,' -and that 'the Treaty is an obstacle'to'a realistic 'and progressive -United States policy'in Asia. There is co.n~ siderable do.ubt in my mind wheth'er the SEATO paot ever pro.mo.ted ·American' interests and o.bjectives in Asia. There is no. doubt in my mind that currently, it do.esno.t. '

Twenty years ago., when the Senate gave its advice and co.nsent to' U.S. mem­bership in SEv\.TO, the situatio.n in so.utheast Asia was markedly different to. the co.nditio.ns that o.btain to.day. In the mid-1MO's, the entire area appeared, to. be threatened by Oo.mmunist expansio.n, spo.nso.red by So.viet RUSSia and the Peo.­pIe's Republic o.f Ohina. The reaso.nable judgment was made that a co.llective security agreement amo.ng certain so.utheast Asian natio.ns-backed by co.n­cerned Western po.wers-wo.uld', be an effective to.o.l 'fo.r maintaining regio.nal security. The recent diplomatic o.vertures made by the United States to. the Peo.­pIe's Republic, and the po.licy of detente with ,the So.viet Union, have substan~ tinIly reduced the Oommunist threat in Asia, and have further reduced the use~ fulness of the SEATO, agreement.

Our SEATO allie's have shown little enthusiasm for their treaty obligations, and have done little fo.r regional security. France has withdrawn from Asia, and has been a very inactive member ,o.f SEATO. Only to.ken British force's remain in Asia. Pakistan gave official no.tice in No.ve:JD,ber of 1972 that it was disassociat­ing itself fro.m the treaty. Australian and New Zealand leaders have criticized the pact, and have sharply ,questioned its usefulness, as have the Philippines and Thailand. The consensus of'the signatories makes ,it clear that the pact has out~ lived any usefulness that it may have enjoyed, and that, although U.S. po.licy to.ward Asia has ~ot been well articulated, it is time to scrap SIDATO and re~ !direct ,American effo.rts and reso.urces into. mpre reaUstic and productive chan~ nels. The primary U.S. o.bjective in Asia is peace. SEATO 'Was fo.~med in large part to. help maintain the peace, and, as events of the ,past twelve years proved co.nclusively, it failed. There Is far less reaso.n to believe that SIDATO would pro.vide today a 'significant hedge against the outbreak of war in southeast Asia than 1t did in the years from 19M up to, the beginning o.:t~he Vietnam War.

Belatedly, the United States reco.gnized that the Peo.ple'~, Republic o.f Ohina is a major force in Asia, and that, it must be drawn into cooperative invo.lve·

. ment in Asian programs. SEATO, which was, created in part to. co.ntain and iso­late the Peo.ple's Republic, is an unnecessary barrier to' such c;ooperation. There can be no. meaningful ro.le fo.r the Peo.ple's Republic as lo.ng as two Asian co.un· tries, two. 'Pacitlc island countries, and three western powers are linked by treaty to. an o.verall po.llcy that is inimical to Ohinese iiltere~ts and future devel· opment within the community.o.f J;latlons. . '

The Soviet Union and Japan ave practically ignored by Sl!lATO. It is wholly unrealistic fo.r the United States to malntain·alUnnces tbat:igno.re the interests, and preclude the constructive 'invo.lvement of three major po.wers in Asia. A continued U.S. involvement in the' So.utheast ,Asia Oollective pefense ,Treaty, ho.wever meaningless its pro.visions may have 1;Ieco:rp.e, is an obstruction in the path of the best interests of the United States in Asia.

(63)

64

A renunciation of the treaty ~by, the United States would not mean that we have abandoned our support of the southeast ASian states, or that we no longer associ­ate ourselves.with their aspiraUon's for polit1~al, social, and_economic we~lbeing. We will continue to offer our good offices in ,their efforts to achieve freedom from tyranny and political corruption, freedom .from hunger Rnd disease, and freedom from the shackles of illiteracy and inadequate technology. In tJIese yital fields, SEATO Is very poorly equipped tQ _help, rt 1t:{,p;rimarilY·R mechanism of defense, and is not geared to administrative 'help and ·s€n~~help 'programs. There are other international agenCies that are infinitely better equiped to ~ender the assistance that the countries of southeast Asia d'esperl1tely need, and American help should be channeled through filt\t;;Q Qrgani~~tions. , .- , '," ,

I 1l~mly believe that"the treaty, the memberShip, the org~))jzat1on, amI ~he basic purpose of ,tpe,Southeast"Asia Oollecttve Defense ''t'Fe'aty''ftl'e inaptiro'priate to, tb.e problems of .sou,tlma~t Asia itoda~' .... ,~,turther l;Ie11e"e that th~ fiI;1a:nc~'41 -com­mitment to SEATO b.iV ,the Unlte$1"States, amQul\ting- to, mQre"tha", ~al,~~a~million dollars annuaUy"is wholly ,lmj~i:!Ufiedi in the ligl:lt ()f the treaty's lac}!:: ,of;'usefuk, ness to ~he Uni~d,:-States,.' ~:pd, its it;l.vi/l:bilftY.. ... ~!:l, '~~ p~l\{,!e,}{.~ping instJ.lu~ent in southeast Asia. 'I. _", ',-_ ),_, ,':,''''_:,:,:':'.:,! .'1 ",",' "".-:'

I submit that the United States sbo.uld wltbdr';I\l·~rom,our.~owm1tment to this o,utmoded and' outdl\Jte(l ,international agreement.' ;;, ".', ,:' ,~'" . ", ;,' ,

Mr, Ohalrman, I thank. you, andthememb~tlfof t.h~qommlttee on Foreign Relations for giving-me tbis,~pportunity -to llral!l,fm~ ... my:",'v~ews~ ,( , ,

:1,· !.'

',.,"I

.'i,:" ,r

.. ;,(

'I,'

,TilE RoLli, OF SEaTO,' ~N u.~. FOREIGN POLICY

(llY' R",Ob'~tt,.~. Sh1iey,,,A~altst:in':AJil,'at),~'Affairs, a,nd Larry"A: Niksch, Ana.lyst in As!an 'A;I'fllirs, Congre$[,ional Reset}-rcll' Service, Lll~ra~y' of Oongress, Feb-Jiuit~l' 28, 1974) , , ',', '. . .'

A: THE ~6:.u:THEAST A'etA OOI.I;ll:OTIVE PE:fENSE 'TREATY-A NONBINJ)ING SOLUTION , .. ,',' ," , '

".

66

2. Degrees of ParUoipation SEATO has been given only Umited power to act, 'and its non-involvement since

1955 in various Indochina crises and other security problems in Southeast Asia is indicative of the difficulty of 'its members acting together. The parties that signed the South-East Asia Oollective Defense Treaty are under no 'formal obligation to act in unison, to follow the guidance of the S,IDATO headquarters, or to employ military forces to help defend threatened ,co-signers. There are no military forces assIgned to SEATO; alid thf're h'l no '.J;:·~l1tt'al commander to direct the operations of me:rnber-nations ,force~. SIDAT.O, is t\ul1ke NATO. :which has a command and a supreme commander. SEATO- he'a:dquarters prepares' military operation plans for defense against 'vaHons possible aggressors but does ilot'have the means to execute the plans. In the' field of national development, howev~r". there are SEATO institutions which are actively involved in programs of_ re 4

gional cooperation. " '.

3. StrttClU1'e 0/ SlJJA1.10' Headquairters C'. "

The loreign m'inisters of the membe~'hations ~onstltute the 'SEATO Oou~~l1 . which meets annually to discuss event!;! and provide guidance, At the most recent meeting (the'18th Council mef'ttn~ hp.ld in New YQr~' on Septe:mili~r 28,,1973) decisions were made to reol'~nml'7.('> 111e, 8lTIA.'l'O ~e#d'quartE:l's, Steps:a1reaqy have been tak~n to reduce the k'lf7.p of both t,he cfvn nhd mil1taty stlitffs;/p~rticul'arIY the mil~tary),_to integrate t.1w two states; a,ndto forD:). new offlces--w:ilfhin the_head­quarters whiC'h, would facilltnte a new ~m:PllasiS on internal stabiltly tind' 'devel­opment. The strllcture proposed _and now in the earl;v ·stf}ges of itnplementation by the Secretary General consists of four office~;" ' " . . '

Security Atea~rS:-'-r,esPo:nsib'le for insurgency,,' 'analr,sis, providing a~,'Vfs(jry servlcos. to the Phlllppines and Thailand, and preparing mll!t.ry exercls. plans,

Development Affairs-administer economic aid and educationalt programs for the Philippines ,and Thailand, _ _ '~ " ,_ , '.

AdministratiOn.-provide adm~nI~.t. ra,tl-r.e, financial, and' persOll.n.el s .. ervtc.es, Office of the Secretary, General __ an executive office including the Deputy Sec~

retary ,General and other executive staff per-soJl)lel. .-The reorganization, if J;rp.plemented .in its entirety, is 'schedu~_ed, to' bz:ing, a re~

duction in military persormel, on the staff from .88,: 00 15 offi,cers, decrease the number of international civilian state, me:p;J.b~rs from ,82 ,to 2,8, and, reduce the ,number of 10ca1-.e:mployees by about lO.t;" , ;,', "".'

Prior to the decision to reorganize, the SmATO H~adqJlarters. in ;Bangkok .em~ ployed a full~t1-me staff' ot about 200 peoDle and operated«on 'a budget ot abol.lt $~,8 .~.illion a year. ~ J;t also has d'ra wD; ,on per~o:qnel from the meml,le,~~stl.tte; embas­SIes III BangkQk j, -in fact, the member~s, a,rubassadol'Si to, Thailand IDElet ~at least monthly-as SEA~O Council Representatives; provide supervision.and c;oP~ltation. and use their embassy' staffs to accomplish much ,of, the detailed wOF4.Jn 'thE;! past, ,an Intelligence Assessment Co~mitte,~. has met eyery six" mPR-.tb,s ,~tp':'evaluate regional trends'l\nd threats; -aR(l,»~~erous ad hoc,st~dy g,i'iJUps;"tccil!terenc~, and committees hav,e ,be~n conv,ened to study.' e-conomic" education. lie;a1th, labor, cul- " turnl, and securltj'o-onditioIiS in,the a,rea. f)," ,

, Prior ,to the-rQO;gllniza~o.itirQW in Pt'ogr.f)ss the Secret'a,ri,at,- headed·:py,:S,ecre­tary General Swnth,o'1{'l1! Hongll.u;l~rq}llt had a,.staff,o,f ap~ro:xim~t~liy ,1So. p.obple. It was re~ponslble. to the Oouncl! (orOouncil Repre~elltatlves).nd conslste~.~t six functiono:l Offic~s: ,Office for Counter-Subversion and <,J()wtt.er·lnsllr~tW:.G;v.·:; Rosearch Olllce; Omce of ·Ouit1)ral and Economic Are~lrST;lIJla. Adm,ll1lstf.ailon; Security, and p. U. blic\.l'fi£ormaUo,~ OtIlQes:", T.he.s ... ecreta ... r.J.ia~,a,l.SOn.E:lllp.el:W.Visecr(3.e,y.(} .. ral., ,schools _and training ap.d .resea~~h .p1:ograms lo~~t~~ ~:t;l S.ou~east A~i.a.-., 'tlie{J~}p.1fe discussed furthet: in ,~~ctlOn D ~elow. ",i'::; 'I., >'., .) ;, , ... "'-."" _:' _'" '" "

Military policy . deCiSions of the Oounell In,the pant. )wve?~ile\l amplified by , a. M1l1tary.Advisers 'Group.,. m. ade u .. p ot sen. lo~" om. c. er.~. {'~r:o ... ill.' "e~~ .. 'j.l. -~:~mb. e.r. ,,;bt\t.1. ()il~ ,(The American represe!).t.tli"es. h~', been ~he tJO~!\uIuder,tn,(j~\ef'lraol.ttc ·0'otii-

2 Secretary., Gen~ra1'8 '. press conferen~,~.;,:_ N!:p~~lnb~'~. 26;, 12i~:.~paQg~p~~('~)i;"J~'~~I' /,~~' , \\ '. ,!' ,",,',

8 U.S. Cotlgr~ss. House. Commtttt'li;l' on- Approm~la-th;lD~' Stibv,untmt~$ 'Olt Depn:r,tlllcntr-l"of_ " State, Just1c~' aild, 0om'iheroe" thE! .TU. ·dt()~a'J.'.t .. I.tn\d' Rel. ated ,~gefl~.I.fi .filS:' (\P'ltrtment~ ~(H' ,~f"a.-fflj Justice, and \..:ommerce'-,:th~'.JudiQiary, an.l'httelated'~*l)n;4teR- ApPl'!>p ijQpa fQJ1 U)711'.<J1l>gt- , " Hearings 92d Cong., 2d sess~ M~i';-15; 197-2. Wfl~hlngtontU.S, Govt. Prlnt~'Nft\. 1072,1'l."ot, •• " .. ' The United Stat,el,> normallw, provide~ ,25 'Jle.tcent of· the ',SlIlA.TO b\}:dge~~ l!~orl ,F¥- 1:,U7S".,!' ~:., U.S.no~tlon·'wasesttmti:te:d:,to'beMI'i2i7rl'O. ' ' " '\', 'T.,,':,'~,,',~.;:,",., ,,;,.h~,:',', "

i Under', the, propose-d orgap.lz~tlon,;;'tlle,' PubliC ,IlItb~mfl:t,on'''om~e Q1U',i'tl:ul:'~tosf.'nr~h om~e"" would be,abolished and,tbe otherI' would_be ~b8Qrb~d 'Illt!> neW U1l1ts. " , i "

\-,'

()7

mand.) The Group met twice a yea.r. to evaluate ·ro1l1tary imllllcntions of recent developments Rnd to provide guidance for defense planning. A MIUtary Planning Office, which is being aboUshed, prepared plans as directed by the Group. Neither the Advisers Group nor tbe Planning Offlce served as a central command for a standing military forGe. At the dfrection of the 18th Coutlcil Meeting, all military planning activities have been suspended,. with existing plans· shelved but not abandoned,lS Mllitary activities and p~rsonnel in SEATO h~nceforth will be re­duced and. will empuasize counter~subversion and c.ounter-insurgency.

In addition to preparing defense plans, SEA'rO has attempted to improve the military capabilities' of the membevs" primarily through the conduct of joint military training exercise!ll. The maneuverS are; designed to test plans, prov~de experience in working on international staffs, standardize procedures and eqUIp· ment, and, make SElATO's military capabilities __ ,more visible in' Asia. SEATO has had, as many as five exercises in ODe year, bu~ in recent years has held only one or two annually. According to the Secretary General, member countries have agreed in 'principle to continue such exercises. 4. The Oharacter of Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia includes Burma, Thailand, the states that make up Indo· china (Oambodia, Laos, North and· South Vietnam), Malaysia, Indonesia, Singa~ pore, the Philippines, Brunei, and Portugese Timor. It has a land area of greater than 1 % million square miles and is home for approximately 300 milUon people. The region ,is 'R major source of tropical raw materials such as rubber, :fibers, foodstuffs, and lumber, as well as tin, and oil. The United States has no critical .need for these _ regional resources at the present time, although several U.S. :firms have invested in raw'materlals extraction, particularly oil.

Most ot'.Southeast Asia is easily acce'sslble by water transportaUon, and main~ Jand Southeast Asia is also fairly accessible by land from the rest of the Asian continent. The pattern of islands, peninsulas, and waterways has made the region vulnerable to' -conquest and shifting ethnic groups, but it also fac1l1tates trade and other forms of cooperative contact.

Although Southeast Asia was the home of some very advanced ancient cul~ tures, it is typified today by economic and political underdevelopment. In most of the countries there is very little economic diversification, with inefficient food production do~inating the IQ'cal economy and a few specialty crops or mineral extraction industries dominating the export marltet. The various national econ~ omies are not complementary, so intraregional trade is not great. rer capita income is low throughout the'region, and farming families are especially poor.

The peoples of Southeast Asia -display a great diversity of race, language, religion, and culture; and many ethno~lingulst1e :gro-ups straddle the poorly de:fined national borders. Population is very ttn~v~uly dis.trlbuted through the area with extremely high densities in the fertil~ :Hv~r valleys and cities, and with the interior highlands and jungles sparsely populated. Th.e literacy rate Is low, and educat16n 'and medical facilities are insuftlclent. Most Southeast Asian nations suffer trom a severe gap between the elites and the masses. The a verage Southeast Asian' lives on farmland or in the remote countryside and has little contact with his government. 'National societies have been slow in forming, and the force of natiortalism has been unevenly experienced.o

There are sever~l ,forms of governtnent operating' in Southeast Asia, but typically the nations are governed by an autlloritarian, one~party 'System. Foreign alliances of Southeast Asian nations cover the spectru,m from 'Pro~West, to neu~ tral, to pro-Oommunist. ' '.

Diversity is perhaps the mosti.important charl,lcteristic ·d'escribing Southeast Asia-. In ,:Ilact, it is said that W the 1950's :when SIDATO was formed 'the only common denominator among these nations was, their, proximity and their mutual feelings of anticolonialism.' ,.. _.'

Southeast AS~,a has 'changed' a great denlin the last few d'Jcades and the pace of change has not appeared to slacken. Not only is the sense of national identity increasing, but regional cohesion is becoming· a significant force. ,Tensions wl11ch have exlsted between many of.the {\:J;'ea's nations hav~ dimillished in the last tew

IS. Secretary General's ~ress Conference Nov. 26; 1973. \ " 1) However, according to -fo.fmer :Asslsmnt Secretary of Starte for East Asian and, Pac1t1c

Aft'atrs 'Marshall Qreenl' "naV . .l2,nal1s. m ~~~ the ~trongest force.'in ASi. ~." Department of State Bulletin, v. 66.,Apr.17, 1972·.jP79. ',,' " " : .

7 Gurtov. Melvln._ SoutheM";, Ashl- "ltiomQrrpw: Problems and Prospects for U.S. Pol1cy. Baltimore, Johns HO.{Jklns Press [1970] 1>. 2. ',' " .

68

years, and there is a considerable and growing' amount of t-nterchan'ge aDd co­operation among the governments 'with regard to commoh economic concerns through organlzation~3' "such 'as the AssocHition of ,Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) aud the Asian Development Bank. ' .. ;' '

The American policy of detente with the major 'communist powers has affected the pOlicies of Southeast Asfan countries toward the Soviet Union, Ohina, and other Oommunist states. There is a great deal 'of 'support within the region for a policy of neutrality, although several of tlie major gove:r~ments, disagree on the definition of neutralism arid hoW' best to achieve ,it. The -People's Republic of China (PRO) is becoming increasingly active In W6rld affairs and will play an important role in the future of' Sbutheast Asia. -The 'PRC currently follows a two-tiered' policy in the r'egion, seeking improved gov~rn:ment-to-govermnent relations on the one hand;' wl\'Ue, on the other -hand, supporting- Oommunist in­surgencies and emphaslzing" a 'Hspecial rehitionship" with the Overseas Ohinese elements in Southeast 'Asia. Soviet intere'st in the area has grown considerably since 1965, with Moscow increasingly offering itself .to the nations of the region as a "protecting power" against China and advocating'a collective'security pact in Asia. ,) : _. .

Despite the infiuence ,of' thlil Co:mJDunist powers, It Is', quite apparent that the . Soviet Union, China, North .vietnam" al,ld the, Communist parties of Southeast Asia are not united in, a:monolithic campaign of conquest. However, all of the non-Oommunist COuntries eXilept Singapore face Communi!ilt',.J.nsur.;gen~ies of vary­ing strength and most still ure apprehensive over the future polIcies of the

. People's Republic of China in Southeast Asia. In 1973, ,lap,an's overall eQ,onomic ,involvementJ,u 'Southeast Asia was greater

than any other country in-terms of trade l ,in-vestment.atld aid. rrhls r,ole Is Ukely to grow, and it is also liltely to result in increasil1g JapaI;lese political and diplo­matic activity in the region. ,This does not ,mean, however, that J'apan will under~ tall:e security commitments'in the area. Strong- restraints still exist, against adop­tion. of such a policy, including the domestic political situation' in 'Japan, the new Sino·Japanese relationship, and the fear and distrust of the Japanese by the Southeast Asian peoples ~he,?selves. 5. Members' AttitUdqs Towwrd SEJATO

SEATO member nations 'now' ex;hibit less enthusiasID ·for the multilateral treaty than they did, in the 195\)'s;/ Even in',iha,tperiod several of the members placed qualifications on their own involv.ement. Other countries in the area, such as Indonesia, refused to join. There ,have been no new members since SEATO was formed, and one membel,'" h~s withdrawn. , '

Pakistan was actiy~ in:Sl11.~,,~O until the ea,dy 1960's but it viewed the alliance from two standpoints: (i-);:'PrQtectlon from'·ODmmunist aggression and (2) pro­tection from India. Until 1962, Pakistan's policy had been in line with the anti­Communist aims of SEATO.s But U.S. militlwy' assistance;to India following'the .Sino-lridian border flg~ting, ill the faU of 1962,and Washington's neutrality dur­

, ing the Indla·Pakistan'fWar of: 1965 prompted Pakistan- to re-Q.vu:luate its SEATO ties and become increasingly lnactlvEdn the 8Jlliance. In November 1972 Pakistan submitted its notice of withd:vawal trom ,the Manila Treaty. By ,that time East Pakistan, which bordered Southeast Asia" ha(l b,e~ome the J,ndependent state of Bangladesh as a res't.tlt of the 19ltl' India-Palt'istan- War, thus 'ending the ,a:lready tenuous Pakistani interest in the region.

France also bas been an inactive member, and has,annou,nced it wiH stop pay.lng SIDA'.VO dues aftel'" June 1974., Fral}ce, how,ever,':.has-'not 'given notice'that'it--in­tends to withdraw from;'SIDAT9. 'OJ-eat Britain pays its dues and pn~tclpates'l:p. SEA'rO meetings and, -exel'ciSSsf"bnt there Is serious, doubt that It:"W01Ud"deploy troops to defend a'llY Southeast Asian countries other than Mallly$iu and· Singa­pore. Britain has d'QUberateIY made a 'Viast 'i'~du<!tion In.;th,e: sl~e'!I1& its forces east of the Suez Canal q: .i,'· y' ,;;;,f:i:,\,._' '. ',' "

Australla and N~"'Zealand are not:usually considered part of SoutlieaJltAsia but are interested- in, 'the al'ea btlcalise of their 'f2lose,',pr,Qxlm1ty to' it; The new

8 For example. tbe g1"imtfu~ of ,ba~e r1~hte"t'o the unutj' ,'States Ayub ',KhA-n'S' public deClal'a.t1.on of D. ecembel' 1960: that. ,paklsta.n, WI\.f\ rea<l,y. t. 0",1,,1 .. 0. u1<1er its burd. i:lJ;l.,f in Laos If called upon under SEATO, A,'\"ub'e',191S9' offer':of' a <M!e'nSbljJ.; ancertQ I;hl,".~:g9.Jnf;lt Cblna which he ';renewed In March 1962ii' ',See ,Lerskl. ,Ge(ltg~"'ThI~~ " akJ§tIiJl-" ertcan Alliance: A Reevaluation of the PaS't Decs. e. A8I~ .. Sul'vey. v. :vI. " .19Q~-rI4~ 4U. '

69

governments iIistalled in the two countrie~ in late 1972 expressed grave mIs­givings about the future participation of their coun,tries 111 SEA'rQ., However, when U.S. officials pointed out that·their withdrawal from the treaty might prompt American withdrawal and might also raise questions about maintaining the triangular def~nse pact between the United' States, AustraUa, and New Zealand (ANZUS), the two Pacific nations reaffirmed their commitment to SEATO. However, they also called for a HlimLt to outside interference.!' \I and expressed support for a neutral zone in Southeast AsHt., r;r'hey hoth prefer an emphasis on the economic development role of SEATO and would like to broaden its membership.

Thailand is the nation' which apparently receives the greatest -"benefit from SEATO. Indicative of the Thai interest are the facts that SEATO is' head~ quartered in Banglwl{ and that three of the four 'inEm who have served as 'Secre~ tary General- have been 'I'hais. '.che SEATO 1!reaty"is the only formal COI11mit~ ment by the United States to l\elp defend Thailand'.

In 1962, Thailand-worried over the fighting in Laos' between communist and anti~comm1:dtist forces-sought and received from the United States a strong reaffirmation of the U.S. defense com'mitment under Sl,DATO. This stat,emi:mt, known as the RuSk~Thanat Communique, declared that the United States' C'OrIM sider-ed its commitment to Thailand under 'the SEATO Treaty to bilateral as well as multilateral. (For the text of the relevant clause of the' Rusk~Thanat COlnmunique, see Section B.2.) ,

The Thai Government has strongly supported the SEATO treatY' .link with the United States as security against the' Communist- threat from Indochina and as, 'assurance of continuing Am~rican' niilitary' assistance related to the Govern­ment's efforts against Communfst" insurgency within Thailand's borders. In recent years, how~ver, some Thais, including former Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, have qu~stione.d the U.S. military presence in Thailand and, by !n~ ference, the SEATO link 'between' the two countries. Thanat has expressed doubts over the value -and credibility of the' Americfl,ll defense commitment and has asserted that'the current U.S. role prevents Bangkok ,from movin'g toward imM proving relations with Pe'ldng and HanoPo Since the overthrow of the military government in October 1973, similar views have been e~J},J'essed I;ly 'stUdent leaders and by sQme newspapers. However, the caretaker 'government of :premier "Sanya ~~hamffi'asak likely will mQve slowly with respect to any major changes lri foreign policy, because its limited mandate being concerned primarily with gQyernM mental reform, adoption of 'a new constitution, and holding. of democratic elections. " " , ;

The Philippines is the only other' Asian me,mber of ,SEATO, '~nd although it has been an act1v~,:s\1Pporter, in 1972 its leaders called fOJ,'.'a trEihs~ormation in tll(> organization "and a clarification 'of its purposes. 'The' P,li1lippine Fbreis-n Secretary, Carlos P. Romulo, even characterized SEATO' as needl'ess(v ,provoca'~ , tiv€.' in the warmer climate now prevailing'in ASia.,ll. The PhillppUles .it-Iso has voiced support for a neutral Southeast Asia. The U.S.,~PbiUppines Mu'tual De~ fense Treaty Is the main U.S.-Philippine securltyllnk, 'aM the SE,ATO Treaty is more 01' leSS a wea~ duplication of the bilateral pact.. " , _ '

SOl1?-e Southeast Asian nations, such as Indonesia, Mala.,ysla, SIngapore, and Burma prefer neutralism and other regional groupings.' "Japan." has 'carefully ; avoided military'com,mitments. ~., ',{

B. TltE U:NlTED STATlCS',":AND' SEATO OnJEOTIVEB

1. OriginaZ 'P'lirpQ8e8"'an't't,'"Hi8t'orioal' dimtedJt of the /l'reat1i' In the spring of 19cr4'the United Stiltes attempted to form'. ~o;'IIt10n of West­

ern powers and SoutheaBt ASian nations ,TO ,SUPPQ.rt France". in, its struggle to defend Indochina ag~ln~t, ,Communist attack. America-"was contrlbutln'g,":l'arge amounts of military assr.r~tance -to the French, ~ut the Eisenhower AdmiJ)!.Strat1on believed it could 'not. 1':iltervene militarily' except as' "Q PRl'tl.oipt;mt ,lA, sl.lch a coaUM tiOll: ,or , treaty:' organlzat1on~ It also' felt that IT. S. interventLon ~ould be- underr­tak~n only up.on urgent, requ~t" o~ the F,ren~h and' In'd6cJ;i,1:!le~ ,G.overmnents'·

" ' ' , ~ ,

{I New York Tl~es, .Dec.A, 1972, Jan. 22, 2S',_ind 281,1978. " "' ';, "'. ., ,

,1011'or a statement :of ThIlnat's views see.: Washl~gton Star-News Mar. 18'.19-78 "', '11 New Yorj( Times, June 28, 1972. ': t, " , I; :"~I"-~ '.,' ,,' . "

70

·concerned, and only with the appr9val of Congress.12 Great. Britain, which the Administration con~ldered an esseIitial partner in the endeavor, was reluctant to ~oin for several reasons: it had reservations about including some of the coun­'tries suggested by the United States for the organization: it did not want to upset the Geneva Oonference on Indochina scheduled in May j and it doubted that the naval and air operations being considered by the United States would be sufllcient to salvage-the situation in Indochlna.18 Because of Britfsh hesitation, ,because of vocal opposition '\Vithin the. Oongress, aDd because of'divided opinion witbill the Administration,_ President Eisenhower decided not to intervene. The French garrison at Dienbienphu was overrun, and a ceasetlre and partition of :V1etnafi\ w~re arranged_ at,the Geneva Confe;r.ence~ Following these developlI,lents au alliance seemed even more necessary to the Administration, and Qn Septem~ ber 8, 1954, SEATO was tQrnwd. c

To-put, the treaty further into., the context of the period, it snould be noted that communism' then appeared to the U.S. to. be a mQnQlithic threat to friends and allies ,in East Asia. China had fallen to. communism in 1949; North Korea during the Korean war received vast amQunts of material assistaace' frQm the SQ:v:i~t trnion and massive troop support from China; and Communist insurgents had .tb~eatened tbe PhfUppines" aAd Malaya as well as Vietnam and LaQs. It generally was assumed that the _SQviet Union and Communist China would con~ t~nue eiforts, to, spread cQmmunism in vulnerable areas in East Asia. The domino theQry, under Which CQmmunist success' in Vietnam or IJaos was believed, to present R,' seriQUS threat to aU of SQutheast Asia, was widely accepted by Admin~ i~tration officials and by many members of Congress. Massive retaliation was then the U.S. strategic PQlicy and, former Senator Jo.seph McCarthy was con~ ducting his hearings on'the U.S, internal, threat of CQmmunism . . To counter the threat of ,ComJ)lunist expansion in ASia" the United States

had negotiated bUateral._mll1tary pacts with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, and a multilateral-,treaty with Australia, and New Zealand. To complete the barrier against communism it appeared that th~ weak SQutheast Asian natiQns' needed to be welded into. an anti~CQmmunist front covered by pledges, frQ1p' the maj,Qr Western powers. .

The repo,rt by the S.el,late Foreign RelatiQns Committee recommending that the Senate giYe its advice' and consent to the ratificf!.tion of the Southeast Asia Col,lective De,f~nse Treaty" described the treaty1s main purpose as follows: U

"Designed to ,promote, security and to strengthen the fabric of peace in Southeast Asia and the Southwest, Pacific, the treaty is intended to deter aggression in ,that area by warning potential aggressors that an open armed attack upon the territory ,of any of the parties will be regarded by each of them ftfil d~ngerous toHs o'wn peace alid safety (art. IV, par. 1)."

"The' ,report ·also quote~' 'the testimony. of Secretary of state Dulles at the , :coninilttee's hearings fri, describing the tYPI;} of ,American mlUtary involvement cont¢ml>lated,vuder the treatf: ' ,

,,"We" do not'int~_:p.d to dedicate any major elements of the Uni~ed States ._Military Esta1?Itt;lh,m~nt to form an army of ,defense in the area.' 'We rely

primarily _ upon the deterrent, of our mQbile, _ striking power. . . . I believe -if t~ere ,spou~d be an open "armed attack in "that area the most effective step would: be to;strike at th,e sourc~ otJ\g-gression rather thantry to rush Ameri~ can ,manpoweJ; into the area tq try to fight,~ ;rpllIl4. war." 16

lll'J!llsonhower ... DwJght David; Mandat~: f91(-,'Ohange, G~rden City, New York, Doubleday [19631, p. 84O-ts41. ' ',"

13'Elaen, AnthonY. p1Ull Circle. The :M.emoJrs of Sir 'Anthony ,E.,de.J;l_,,' lJoston, Houghton Mifflin (1960)",p. 107-110., " "

U U,S'.l.Congress.;:SenA-te. Committee on FOllelgn Relations. The Southeast AsIa Collective n" ~ense neaty, ;. ~epott,on Executive K. Washtngtol}t U.S. Gov:ernm, eut Printing Office, 1955. '(84th Congress . 1st' s'ess .. Senate, Executive Report .NO, 1), p. '15,

'~J:bi4,"~;: 8:-80e rehlQ' u.s, ,!Department of Defense.i ,Un1i:ed Sta:Ms,.VJetnam Relations 1941'1--1MfT~, BQo ,1, Wasbing,tt;u}."U;/i3" GO~E11qment Printing OfflcQ. 191'1l Section IV. 21 A18-A21:S. This 'unw lltIi.gn~ss t~ CO:nM!!1t forces 0 a. permanent' SEATO ,force was a cardinal.principle of U,S.' pollcy t6wa~d"S1!l.A:ItO, At the Ntalllla Conference, the United State,sreslsted all pro­p,osals 'that the s~:gnatorieS(lUake permanent commitments of troops to SEA-TO and thatJhey

";,_estabIJsh: a_ perruan~~t",mtutary. org!lnizatton, thus ,structuring, S,EA'J10, along the ,lines of NATO, At "ldlintla and at the liH51'1 SEATO conference at Bangkok, the Asian members and Au_stralia and N"ew Zealand expressed a w1l1ingness to ))lake perlllane_J).t .troop' c,ommitments to a SENl'O force, arguing that expl1cif commitments were necessa-tr if- the treaty' was to Uave th'e ,(\esj)l,¢,.!'!eterrent e:l'fect 'on the ~Communist countrieS', The united 'Sta-tes' w-~nt no

"furtlier than, .. :tO',-S;upport the periodic lUeetings of the', Military ,A'd:visera GrouP and thl:;!'esta:b.' lishment of a sruhll secre'tttriat. ' ' I , ' ,

It -alse WI,lS ·emphasized by; the r~port thEJ"t th.e ·treaty "includes a ,p~pvision of majo:r,,iIllPoft.anc~ agablSt"subvers'lve attempts ,by ipterlJ.utional communism to destroy, J~e territorial integrity 91' political .1n~~peJildence of any party to the tl·_eaty."16. ," ',,' _ "" . , . ' " .

The -repo.rt concluded that by strengthenil).g, t~e resolve of the member nations ''to defend'-thei, f:t'eedom against the menace of'international_communism," thro,ugh tbe fo~mation of SEA.TO, 4<t:4e U;nlte,d,. States will 'make '"a. substl,mtial -eontrihutiQu- to ,the preservatio,p of ',ire'e, g{nr.el'nments, and. to the defense, of its own ,security.",~~ It added·: is. ,_, _ _ ,

I ,"The -principle upderlying _tl1is·tr~.aty i§ tl;:t~t adVanCe)lotice of our inten­tions and the ,intentions of the nations assocfated with us may ~erve to deter poteJ1tial aggIiessors 'from, reckless 'action thaJ, could plunge th~' Pacific

, 'into, Wll(p." ,

~. Evolution o!,U.S. Oommitment to'SEAT.6 O:blli6tive8 In .the, -t:w<@ty years since, the~ ,~_~tatillshment ,:of, -~ATO, there has been a

'noticeabl!,! i.S!ir:t.t .. in.,:~. ;1),\. S.' policy, towa ... vg :th.e, a.~~ll;r;).')esuitiug both. ,,from reevaIUR.­tion ot. ,ov.erall :0:.,1:1: ,fQreig:n, policy, ~;td ,:from slgniftcapt dev~19:{)mell:ts, within ,tpe region." SEATO, l)M, no,t, , taken., action ,in ma'jo~, .security ,pro~,le9?:s)p the, ',·area, includi,ng ,tl\e. Y,ie,t:n:am War, an~)ihas, been" criticizell for ine;ttectiv;eness. Official' American refere;nces' tp, the 'SQl.1,t~eaat Alsia 'Collecti-ve, ,Defense ',Treaty have changed their tone and.emphasis, "-,;:,,.' k' " "

Thr~(!:, :weelr§ ,aner t;tLe treatY"was_', 'siS':.ged, 'in )dan1h,l., the United ,States and Frapce', iSf;lued ,R jo1Ut, commun1q)J,,(t -?ttgalidillg" ,tlJd' tp,·;the,-'nationsl .0$,'- I~qochinR. It stated'in,part-:!~9 "'" " ' " 'rJ, J''itp ': ' ,': " ,,~

~he ,cQl!clusion .of, fpe,_"Southeast, ASia 'Collective Defenf;le Treaty ... haa., .'PJ;'ov:lded,.~ ::flrmer ba,sis tllan heretofore' to 'aBs1~t-.rthe tree :q:ations of Asin in developing and, maintp"blip.g their lnaepend'ellce\anq'security •...

\, 'l:be repl'esenta;'t1ives ofArrance' and,-:the', United Sta,teB 'reaffirm the intention 0:6 the1l'1'~.tw~ernlnents :'to ,supporti rth8't"complete, ind'E!pendence 'of Cambodia,

. Laos;i,Rm:l.,rv:ietrtam.'.J~,- , "'" '; _r,.~ -' ,_ ',~";; '1 " " '. "

How.eY~'r:; ',several times'in 19Q,S and 1956, Frince Sihanouk renounced SElA'XO -protectidn o:C'Ca'mbod~a off~red,by _th~ J)roto.coldf tH'e'Manila Treaty:~, , \'

Tlie'-' ,Ul)ited-' StateS" cQntinued .. " to.: )stl'pport':: S~ArrO' tlirougliout'-, the' 1950~s, ~especiany hi the treaty!s"applt~aJtlo&;t6 Vietnainl: President ,Eis.enhower _gave 'Rl:1: .,expand~d in~erpretat1on':1!O,-' the' 'treaty in- a joint, comnl'nnique signed 1n Wfl~hin~ton"WitIr South VfetnameseIPr.esi'1ent'N~o I?1nh Dl~I?l on'.:M'ay 1,1,~l,9157. The ct>mmun.!quo,iloted that the Republte of Vietnam '!s ~ojtered by' A~tl.I~' 4 of the, tr~atY',(·-and the' two Presid'ents, ag'teed: that ""aggll~s:st.t)rl' 01" subversion

- ,,-threatenfftgr:ttIe- pOlitical iIi'i'lepel1dence'-ot the'Republic of VMtnam. :would be ·ilOriS!de~ed'J!I's:eJtMn~e~lng'peac~and atabii!\y;,'~.. . ... '.'.' • . ... . ..

Asstat.a '1\rev\otisl&,'flitther !ntetP~et~tI6n,:tQ. tije treaty was 'given oil. March' fl;'1Q62f 'ln' 10: .jQj,nt s(,ate. mert! ishuea bY. tHe.JJf,~; , Sec. retary Of. S.ta!eand. tHe FO)'e!l1ii JWfltlsM"qf 1Cli.allarid. Partial text of ,thOt'do~iifu<int! .kn6Wj1· •• the' Rusk~Tha'l).!l,t C,OIllU1,ul1ique'fOIlows :,22 , - \,,,,-,:<;' :,'::": ,':, ",'_" '\ "_: "":, " ~,:": , '

. "Tlie. ,Secret«l:¥ pi . State . reaffirmed that, 'tit';: V~tted.~tate~ .r~!itirds tbe ',:,: pre!;!el!vat1dn Of, ',the "liideJilend~ncej: alJ,d~' int;egrity ,:01: j~h411'1id lis,: vital' to

'. the.' hailo. 1\.I:1nte .. ". ~S.!'Of.' ·tll .. e. Unl.,te.'9 .. "ti.~ ~at~ alid't6 .".orl. <1; P"M~:}l:. e.':eirp .. · re~.e<l; .. : .". tM 1Irm,in.·.tention. Of:·tll .. e. lJ. nf. te. <I. 'Ii!.ttlj<t~~ .. :!\l.,.~ .. i.~'.T1I)i. :jI~nll;~.!t •... '·al.l. y ... ~lld ·hls­

.q ,tor!c frlen.\I:''In resl.t!tig.p.ol1l~un!,st ~~I;i,if<l~s!oh'.aild:~Ub.~ersIQh. :. . . '''Vile For£ign llinlSter' and '.the S"cr<tPIJil\V ;<9t·Stl(t~ r~vl.w.d:tl\~~close

. assoc .. ' .... ti.O!,. ~f .. T.I! .. ~na. n .. d .. a .. n. d .. ~h .. eJ!.n. ~~e.d, .. ;'~lilt. ~M.;.I1.:.·.tli ... ·.'.e', S ... ·.OiJ,the.f1st. ·.'.A.·.· .• la . ('JoIMetlv'e !)efet1%eTr.eaty and, !>~.W'l',\ ~f'mmt.~i<soC!atio,riISaI}.eff~ct!v .• ,. ,. ,.de~e~rerlp".to. dlr'HObmmUnl$~'agM$~~s, :.Jg,,"I~.t .Th.\l~J>d., They agreed· , ~', ·:·that tM T~eaty prov,.<l,es the :lJJ\.,1~3 1, ·.: .• fg)jat!>H~'; :99,llect~V\\1;r.. to

. >, ,I!SS!~t ~~.n.lld. 1I1.: c~~",ru;, Q.oml!lm\}.t.:4~ll\l!datt'<Ik,aga:lns't 'fllat .coulltr;v. , The'. '~Mreta)"y' of .. ~tate assurod :tlW·:F:ofelll!l"·Mll:ilsfer: ~lui£ Ih tlle 'event

of '. 8lWh aggreSSion, the. ).Jnlted ~tateJi:ln~i.nd~, to give fuli effeci" io its , "".' ",,' <,

'" ~lo.Ibld. :,,~~~\r 'f" ',!' , l'l"Tbllf.,"P:, 1~;\ , .,.; '18!hld.'" , . '"',, , 11l TT.R. Pepftr,hnent of State Bulletin. vol. 81, Od. 11,:191'i4 : 584. IlO'Nlksch, ,Lar;t'-,y /1..; Oambodta's -ReJatlonshtp, 'Wtth SElATO! U,S. LlbrarN

, Congl'e>lslonal :a.esearch,Rer,vlc~.,197,8,12""'-4." ';, ,"'. '_,' !~,hU.R. DepaHment of State .. But1et'ln, vol. 86, M.ay 27; 19,1'S,?:: 81')1,--8152. , . 2!ilIU.S., nepartment,~G- ~tate Bulletin. yol., 46, Mar. 26, 19,6%: 498-499.,

, , , ·x ' - j:,;,

"-"

" > .. , of' Co~'kr~s~.

bbUgatiou's under the 'Treaty' to a'ct'to meet the common danger i11 accord­'ance with its constitutional' processes. The- Secret!lry ~of State reaffirmed that this obligation 1of'.'uhe" United States does not 'dependiupon .the prior agreement of all other partie's to the Treaty" since, this 'I'reaty obligation is individual as well as collective. '. .

"In 'reviewirig measures to meet indirect aggression, the,' Secretary o'f State stated that the 'United ,States regards its commitments to Thailand under the Southeast Asia OQ'Uective Defense Treaty and under,Us bilateral economic- and m1l1tary assis'tance agreements with Thailand as providing a'n: important'pasis for.;O:ulted States-actions to help· Thailand meen indirect aggression." ,', ," ,: '

Later in 1962, Laos was removed fvom the- jurisdiction of the treaty protocol. As part of the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, signed on JulW' 23, 1962, it was agreed that Laos would,. :p.~t <,,'recognize the protect~on of any alliance or military coalition, incllfding SEATO,"!lB,' ,

President Keilned:y,' in a ,television! lnte:rview, expressed sa~action with SEATO's performance 'arid"contInued Id~dication to 1ts object),ves"': u. . .

! "~e,. wonltl11ke to-haVe 'Oambodia, Thailand, and Sout,h Viet-Nam all ~n " harmony;' but there are ancient diff_ererices _there. We can't make the world

"oy-ertbut we can-infiuen~e the_ w'arld. The,'fac,t of the matter i~:,that with the assistance of the -Untted States and SEATO ([Southeast Asia Treaty Orga­nization], ,SQutheast ASia,and indeed all, ot'-Asia has-been maintained inde­pend~nt against _ a ,powerful force" the' ,Ohlnese Oommunists. What' I am concerned· about is ~at'Am€>rlcans'Wlll,get trapatieht and say, because they don't like events in Southeast Asia 'or' they don't Uke the Government in Saigon, that' we should 'withdraw. Tp,at only makes It easy _ for, the Com­munists. I think'we,shoul!l_stay. We should use our irifluence'ln',as"efi'ective a,-way' as ~e ,call,' but w'e should:not withdraw." .

The private- ftsseSsilie:J1t'of SEATO by'1,the Kenne(lY Administration was ~~s's -optimistic. At ·va·riOus thne~ during·,.the",b~ldup 'O£"ti'.8. advisors-ill' South Viet­nam, the Administration _assessed the_possibility of a.-SEATO miUtar,y.,:force for Indochina j but each time 'it was concluded th(\t the, tdea was impractical. Fol­lowing his, missiol;L to South Vietnam,.1u 1961:, then Yice:,President;'Johnson re­porte<J, to:,fP~esMe~t ltennedx~ that SEA:.lJ.'O_ was! not, .the: answer, to "Southeast Asian security _ b'eca'ij~e of ;B:t11Jish, and IDren¢h ·.:nliyilHingness to support decisive ' a(!tion. ,;Johnson'recommend'ed conslderati6n of It ~hew';collective 'secur-1ty aUiance o~ 8;lLfre~ miUon§l,of, the Pacific and Asia thftt-would have fI..<!lehr,cut command aut.lJ<>rlty (tl)~", silriilar to NATO). Other.ssessments of SE.ATO by the St.te Departroent" Det:ense DepartmentI" and CIA gave similar, evatuat~0:p.s.2Ii

The ',Rusk-Tlilinat .communique ,of ,·1962' was, in. effect, ,an' _t\<}mission that SEATO. ~ould not be counted on to' ft:ct',col1~ctively. TJle ~enIl,e,4'- ,Achrilnlstration placed its eJl}phasis ,on indiv.1dual.cQ;un,try" action_ under Arti~~e IV,_ Sect~on 1, as ,tl>e CQ!UIn .. un .. IQ.u.e .. I".dIC. a.to,<1, .. . i.' '.: Me, m.' orandum for the .:I:.re81. d~n~.:"I!1l. bmltt.ed ,b.y

~ SecretaJ!le."R'1$kand'Mb~~'!llt,. In, N;ovember 1961 s!ated'~!ie policy. mQre explicitly:, " '" ",":.-: .{",\,<_, ',:, ',' , " " ' _ ,i!" ',fl.,-,"

\ ,",We, nO'~t, tak.~ _ tl1\!}r~cisi.on ,to com1l,J,it, ourselves \,tQ~,,\,tli'e, objective of pre­. ~~niing,th~ .. faII of. SQllth .)i'let-Namtq pommunlsilJ:,aind that, In doing so,

we,recogrilze that tbeil!tr.,oductlon ,of. United. ~liates wild other:SEA;I'O forces ,!nay be nedi.sary,,~o:~cl\le,ve. thj~;.~Qjecf;lve, '(a:~,wever,lf ftlS.nec,essary tp commit, olltalde ~gr~,~:s to "i;!..91itev~ -the foreg,oing objective our de~slon to"·ln-

, .. tr.JldU.C. ¢. ,U. nlte. d St .. at .• ~,fQrc~.:S!lOui<j, not· M ·contll!. ge. nl. upon. UDallIID .. ous. "", \' S~:trq_ag.reew~m.tj)her~tQ),":_~ : _. ' .. 'I'hls em. PhaSls .. OJ;"'i\dIVl<!.llll~. 'r> .. ather't)l1\1l COlleCtive., ~ctlon bec •... IlI.e. ,t1;\" .. stand- ' ~r4 poliCY of botl> the Kenh,e<l:r,4,!),it ::tbhqsoll Administrations. ,',. ,

In AlI,iJ's! .l.~ ,~fter U,l't·\l;If~4~~h'PB'!\ad'been fired 6n by No'rth VI.tn~meso gu.nboll.ts.i !lll ... d'V .. s .. ' ... ll .. Iror."fl.h .. ad ... rO .. lalla. t.:.@0IP.re.sWent'.;16.hnoo.llreferr.edt6U.s". ~pm!pitmentsU{~~l'n~e SE4~?;.,T~e~~ll,)\.;~lsC:a11 M. congtesslonatsupport of '

113 Tri>~tl~s,a~d bthllr Int~rDlitl~n~i 'A~t-~ Ml'ci; :t~, nST 1104. ' ' ':, " , ,~4"U}t Denartment of'State Bnllethr. :V, 49, September flO, 1963 lA9S-MO. '. ' ' 23 B'or SLdls()usslort of the U,s" ntUtnde tOWJu;d Sl1JATO under' the'Kenn'e~v, AilmlrlIRt'rfi,-

tlo,n. 1'Ifle'lU.a. -Dflt)artment of Oefens:e. Unlltp<t StateR-Vietnam ,Relations 1945'-1967. Book II. W"~h!l)~ton', 'P,E!; Government PrInting .omce; 1971: Sectl.on IV. B.l, 4.3, 55, 81-'82, 129.

2tllbld;"J).129. 't, .' ", ",,,, , "