The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 17 | Issue 1 | Number 4 | Article ID 5232 | Jan 01, 2019

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Will the Dormant Volcano Erupt Again? Mt. Paektu andContemporary Sino-Korean Relations

Katy Kwon and Pil Ho Kim

Abstract

Mt. Paektu/Changbai is a 9,000 foot volcanothat straddles the border of North Korea andChina. As the source of the Korean foundationmyth, it has become a potent symbol of bothNorth and South Korean nationalism.Historically, Sino-Korean border demarcationgenerally followed the Tumen and Yalu Riversconverging on Mt. Paektu. The Sino-NorthKorean border agreement in 1962, however, isstill disputed by South Korea and contentionsover territorial jurisdiction as well as culturalclaims to the region have generated tensionsbetween China and the two Koreas for decades.How significant is this national symbol inshaping foreign relations on the Koreanpeninsula? Will it become an issue on the pathtowards Korean reunification?

Key words: Mt. Paektu, nationalism, Sino-Korean relations, border agreements,Northeast Project

Introduction: The Summits, 2018

On April 27, 2018, the future of the Koreanpeninsula attracted world attention. For thefirst time in eleven years, the leaders of Northand South Korea met in person and Kim JongUn became the first North Korean leader to setfoot on South Korean soil since the 1953Armistice of the Korean War. In a peaceceremony on the southern side of theP’anmunjŏm Joint Security Area, they planted apine tree together using soil from Mt. Paektu,

which is located on the northern border withChina, and from Mt. Halla in the southernmostprovince of Jeju (Cheju) Island. The plantingsymbolized the dream of a unified Korea.

Tree planting ceremony at the North-SouthKorean Summit of April 2018 (KoreaSummit Press Pool)

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Map of the Korean peninsula indicatinglocation of Mt. Paektu (Baekdu) and Mt.Halla (Metropolitan Museum of Arts)

On May 26, 2018, the two leaders convened forthe second time on the northern side ofP’anmunjŏm, warmly embracing “like a routinemeeting between friends” as South KoreanP r e s i d e n t M o o n J a e - i n p u t i t . [ 1 ](https://apjjf.org/#_ftn1) The meeting roomwhere they talked for the next several hourshad a large folding screen in the backgroundshowing the beautiful landscape of HeavenLake atop Mt. Paektu, the Korean nation’smythical birthplace. The heavy deployment ofMt. Paektu imagery at the inter-Koreansummits is indicative of the significance that itscraggy peaks and the glistening azure watersof Heaven Lake hold for both Koreas.

First couples of North Korea (left) andSouth Korea (right) in front of HeavenLake (Korea Summit Press Pool)

The symbolic importance of Mt. Paektu wasmaximized during the third inter-Koreansummit from September 18-20, 2018 as MoonJae-in became the first South Korean presidentto travel to Mt. Paektu. The leaders,accompanied by their wives, rode a cable car tothe peak of Mt. Paektu. Gazing upon the watersof Heaven Lake, Moon told Kim that eventhough many South Koreans had visited Mt.Paektu by way of China, “I resolved that Iwouldn’t go through China. No matter what, Iwould ascend Mt. Paektu on our soil. Finally Ihave fulfilled my wish.” Moon was alluding to alonging among many South Koreans to climbthe Korean slope of Mt. Paektu, a dream that isoften associated with the goal of Koreanreunification.

Mt. Paektu (Paektusan in Korean andChángbáishān in Chinese) is a 9,000 footvolcano that straddles the border of NorthKorea and China. Korea’s foundation mythclaims that its founder, Tan’gun, was born heremore than four thousand years ago. In moderntimes, Mt. Paektu became the epicenter ofNorth Korean ideology to highlight thelegitimacy of the regime. The associaton withMt. Paektu indirectly portrays its leader as theheirs of Tan’gun. It also holds symbolicsignificance to many South Koreans for itsassociation with several religious movements.Mt. Changbai has also been the focal point of

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Chinese policies aimed at absorbing the regioninto the People’s Republic (PRC), such as the“Revitalizing Northeast China” Project(zhenxing dongbei) which sought to revive theregional economy as well as to reinforceChinese identity in the region (Lee 2005: 250).But how much power does this national symbolpossess in shaping foreign relations on theKorean peninsula and in Sino-Korean relations?

To answer this question, we trace the history ofterritorial agreements surrounding Mt. Paektuand review contemporary territorial claimsthrough the lens of Korean national identity toshow how the myth, historical memories,propaganda, and cultural representations ofth is mountain could have importantramifications for future Sino-Korean relations,particularly if Korean reunification becomes adistinct possilibity.

Tan’gun Foundation Myth, Mt. Paektu, andEthnic Nationalism

According to the earliest known text onTan’gun, Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms(Samgukyusa, 1281 AD), he was born atop Mt.T’aebaek – an ancient name for Mt. Paektu – in2333 BC. The offspring of the son of heaven(Hwan’ung) and a she-bear turned into awoman (Ungnyŏ), Tan’gun descended theslopes and went on to establish the first Koreankingdom of Kojosŏn. Given popular belief in Mt.Paektu as Tan’gun’s birthplace, it became animportant symbol of modern Koreannationhood. In the centuries following thepublication of Memorabilia, however, theTan’gun foundation myth did not hold the samesignificance for Koreans that it would developduring the late nineteenth and early twentiethcenturies. Aside from its significance ingeomancy, Mt. Paektu’s popularity paled incomparison to other Korean mountains and fellout of favor during the late Chosŏn dynasty dueto crit ique of geomantic practices byNeoconfucian officialdom (Schmid 2002: 221).

The Tan’gun myth was revived by nationalistscholars and Korean independence activists,such as Sin Ch’aeho (1880-1936) and Na Ch’ŏl(1863-1916) just prior to Japanese colonization.Sin Ch’aeho played a key role in forming ablood-based, ethno-nationalist historiographywhich maintained that the Korean nation couldbe traced from the progenitor, Tan’gun(Schmid 2002: 181-182). Beginning in 1906,the image of Tan’gun visibly shifted from amythical to an historical figure in the Koreanpublic psyche as history textbooks describedhim as a human who had actually lived (Em2014: 79-80). Sin insisted that Korea must“demand the return of the old territory ofKoguryŏ and revive the glory of Tan’gun.”2

In 1909, Na Ch’ŏl brought the myth full circleby founding Taejonggyo, the first religion thatworshipped Tan’gun. Na believed that areligion based on the Korean progenitor wouldbind the country together through a sharedhistory and spirit, creating resistance againstencroaching Japanese imper ia l i sm.Taejonggyo’s strong association with theKorean independence movement and ferventevangelism contributed to its rise in popularity,and its membership was estimated to be nearly400,000 followers by 1920 (Kim 2014; Yi 2016:54). It is also Taejonggyo that startedcelebrating Tan’gun’s presumed birthday onOctober 3, which became known as NationalFoundation Day (Kaech'ǒnjǒl) and wasrecognized by the Korean ProvisionalGovernment in exile during Japanese colonialrule. Tan’gun worship, intertwined with ethno-nationalist historiography, seared a sacredimage of Mt. Paektu in the Korean mind.

National division, internecine war, and ongoingconflict between North and South Korea havenot dampened the fervor of ethnic nationalismsurrounding Tan’gun and Mt. Paektu.3 In thesouth, various attempts were made to buildTan’gun’s presence in the public consciousnesssoon after the establishment of the Republic ofKorea (ROK). An official calendar (Tan’gi) was

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created based on the reported birth of Tan’gun,and continuously used until 1961. In addition,National Foundation Day was officiallydesignated as a national holiday in 1949 andcontinues to be observed as a public holiday inSouth Korea. While not a public holiday inNorth Korea, National Foundation Day isusually marked by a ceremony held at theTan’gun Mausoleum outside of Pyongyang.4

Mt. Paektu as South Korea’s SacredMountain

Mt. Paektu, along with the Tan’gun myth,remains a powerful symbol of the ultimate goalof national reunification. The first line of theSouth Korean national anthem enshrines Mt.Paektu in the mind of the public by portrayingit as the upper reaches of the ROK’s legitimateterritory.5 Although the majority of SouthKoreans today seem to acknowledge thatTan’gun is a mythical, symbolic figure, theopposite might have been true in the lastcentury.6 Promoted by the government andpoliticians, the ethnic nationalist fervorsurrounding Tan’gun created the fringe history(chaeya sahak) movement.7 Fantasizing aboutKorea’s glorious ancient history, this movementis “distinguished by the irrational obsessionwith national power and territory” to beexpanded over Manchuria and beyond. Theattraction of such nationalistic “pseudo-history”remains strong today across the politicalspectrum, “embraced by left and right as wellas conservative and progressive alike” (Ki2017: 220, 236).

As Cold War tensions relaxed internationallyand the struggle for democracy intensifieddomestically, South Korean reverence for Mt.Paektu increased. References to Mt. Paektu as“the national sacred mountain” (uri minjogŭiyŏngsan) began to crop up in newspapers inthe 1980s (Ten 2017: 38). This belief,compounded by the fact that access to Mt.

Paektu was not possible for South Koreansduring the Cold War, contributed to anincreased longing for the spiritual home of theKorean people. The establishment of formaldiplomatic relations between the ROK and thePRC in 1992 provided the opportunity for SouthKoreans to travel to Mt. Paektu via China,allowing South Koreans to directly engage withthe national symbol for the first time. Since2011, the annual number of tourists visiting Mt.Paektu from the Chinese side has passed theone million mark and continues to increase. In2016, Nearly 80% of foreign tourists to Mt.Paektu on the Chinese side were reportedlyfrom South Korea.8

Mt. Paektu also began to appear frequently inSouth Korean television broadcasts. Forexample, the cast of the popular reality-varietyshow, Two Days and One Night (Ilbagiil),traveled to Mt. Paektu in 2008. As the groupgazed upon Heaven Lake with tears streamingdown their face, a cast member stated, “Mt.Paektu is the spiritual essence of the Koreanpeople.” And “Tokto is Korean territory and Mt.Paektu is ours, too” was displayed across thescene.9 Each cast member then poured bottlesof water that were collected from regionsacross South Korea into Heaven Lake,illustrating the hope that all the waters ofKorea will one day be reunified. A smallbroadcast segment explained that the nationalwaters needed to be disguised in regularbottles, as Chinese officials forbade Koreannationalistic activities such as singing thenational anthem and waving the Korean flagwithin the vicinity of Mt. Paektu. The televisedstunt appealed to the emotional attachmentmany South Koreans felt toward Mt. Paektu,highlighting their sorrow for the ‘lost’ territory.

Similarly, South Korean First Lady Kim Jung-sook also furnished a bottle filled with waterfrom Mt. Halla for Moon Jae-in to take waterfrom Heaven Lake during their visit onSeptember 20, 2018. This ritual resonates witha common slogan in Korea: “from Mt. Paektu to

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Mt. Halla (Paektusanesŏ hallasankkaji).” Thephrase, enshrined in the South Korean nationalanthem, evokes images of national reunificationand is used to spur inter-Korean cooperation.For example, a Uni-Korean art exhibitionentitled, “From Baekdu [Paektu] to Halla,” washeld in 2015. This exhibition, held in both Seouland Pyongyang, displayed the work of bothNorth and South Korean artists “to sustainablyexpress the connectedness of both parts ofKorea.”10

The banner for the Uni-Korea Exhibition inBerlin, Germany

Taekwondo, the Korean martial art, is governedby World Taekwondo (formerly the WorldTaekwondo Federation) in South Korea, anorganization created by the ROK government.World Taekwondo requires its students to learnvarious forms (p'umsae), one of which is called“T’aebaek,” referring to Mt. Paektu’s old name.According to the World Taekwondo website,T’aebaek is the "name of a mountain meaning‘bright mountain’, where Tan’gun, the founderof the nation of Korean people, reigned overthe country”, and “has been typically known asthe cradle of Korean people”.11 Naming a formafter such a national symbol is hardlysurprising for the governing body of thenational martial art. Many South Koreanchildren attend taekwondo classes and by2018, nearly 8.8 million South Koreans hadearned black belts, with 9,699 official WorldTaekwondo studios operating in SouthKorea.12 A significant number of South Koreansare therefore exposed to this training which

reinforces the strong link between Tan’gun andMt. Paektu.

North Korea’s “Sacred Mountain ofRevolution”

North Korea has used the myth of Tan’gun andMt. Paektu to bolster the legitimacy of the Kimruling family. Unlike their South Koreancounterpart, North Koreans are taught thatTan’gun existed as a historical figure, and hetakes on a larger than life role in the Kimfamily saga. The peaks of Mt. Paektu arefeatured across North Korean propaganda,from news reports to paintings of the leaders.The Kim family has anchored itself to Mt.Paektu. Its rugged slopes are depicted as theplace where Kim Il Sung’s anti-Japaneseguerrilla fighters fought valiantly against theJapanese imperialists before founding NorthKorea. Indeed, the historic raid on Poch’ŏnbofrom his Mt. Paektu hideout in June 1937 madeKim Il Sung famous throughout colonial Korea(Suh 1995: 34-36).

A North Korean 2000 won note depictingKim Jong Il’s birthplace in Mt. Paektu

North Korean propaganda further underlinesthe Kim family connection through the “Paektubloodline (hyŏlt’ong)” to highlight its strongties to the location. According to official NorthKorean historiography, Kim Il Sung’s son andsuccessor Kim Jong Il was born in a small cabinon Mt. Paektu in the midst of a snowstorm (Ahn2007).13 The area is now a key site for NorthKoreans on state-sponsored pilgrimages to Mt.Paektu, which is referred to as “the sacred

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mountain of revolution.” Upon the death of KimJong Il in 2011, the Korea Central News Agencydescribed a series of supernatural occurrencesat Mt. Paektu:

On the morning of Dec. 17 layersof ice were broken on Lake Chon[Heaven Lake] on Mt. Paektu,shaking the lake with big noise…Kim Jong Il's writings "Mt. Paektu,holy mountain of revolution. KimJong Il." Carved on the mountain,in particular, was a bright glow… AManchurian crane was seen flyinground the statue three timesbefore alighting on a tree. Thecrane stayed there for quite a longwhile with its head drooped andflew in the direction of Pyongyangat around 22:00.14

The current, third-generation leader Kim JongUn is referred to as the “Prince of Paektu”. Onseveral occasions, he was praised by the statenews media for having hiked up Mt. Paektu inorder to view Heaven Lake. The Kim family’sclose association with Mt. Paektu is used toportray them as direct descendants of Tan’gunhimself, imbued with a mystical quality as theleaders of the Korean nation.15 In the words ofNorth Korean defector, Sungju Lee, “in myimagination, Kim Il Sung was a descendant ofTan’gun. He was part god, too” (Lee andMcClelland 2016: 7). North Korean propagandahighlights images of of Mt. Paektu in art andrepeatedly references it in official texts. Eventsare regularly held to strengthen the linkbetween the ruling party in Pyongyang and Mt.Paektu. For example, a relay race between Mt.Paektu and Pyongyang was held in 2012.16

North Korea created the InternationalTaekwondo Federation to rival South Korea’sWorld Taekwondo. Students of North Koreanstyle taekwondo are required to learn patterns(t’ŭl) equivalent to South Korean forms

(p’umsae).17 The first pattern that studentslearn is called “Ch’ŏnji”, whose meaning is‘heaven and earth’ (天地) interpreted as ‘thebeginning of the universe’. Interestingly, it isalso a homonym of Heaven Lake (天池). Thesecond pattern is “Tan’gun”, named after themythical founder of the Korean nation.Learning such concepts as a part of dailytraining reinforces the sacred importance ofboth Tan’gun and Mt. Paektu amongpractitioners of North Korean taekwondo.

Mt. Paektu/Changbai: Overlapping Spheresof Chosŏn and Qing

As a result of the increasing reverence for Mt.Paektu, many Koreans believe that Mt. Paektuis their ancestral land. Some contemporaryChinese scholars, however, insist that “earlyKorean kings did not regard Changbaishan [Mt.Paektu] as the birthplace of their first ancestor.The Koreans called Changbaishan ‘mountain infore ign lands’” (Shen and Xia 2013:3).18 Whatever the status of Mt. Paektu mighthave been in pre-modern Korean minds, theSino-Korean border along the region has ahistory of overlapping territorial claims andtrade, several rounds of border negotiations,foreign incursion, and the division of thepeninsula. All of this has generated clashingviews over the right to control the region.

North Korea and Chinahare a 1,334 km longborder. At first glance, the border between thetwo countries appears clearly delineated alongthe Yalu and Tumen Rivers. However, theostensibly distinct aquatic border belies anambiguously defined borderland that has beensubject to continuous investigation andrenegotiation between Chinese and Koreanauthorities from the eighteenth century to wellafter the founding of the Democratic People’sRepublic of Korea (DPRK) in 1948. Sino-Koreanborder negotiations centered around the Mt.Paektu/Changbai region, from which both theYalu and the Tumen originate. There is an

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extensive literature on the history of Sino-Korean border negotiations (Schmid 2002; Lee2017; Kim 2017; Song 2018).

Beginning in 1459, the Royal Court of Korea’sChosŏn Dynasty banned settlements in theregions south of the Yalu to prevent interactionand conflict with the Jurchen population acrossthe river. However, shifting Sino-Koreanrelations ultimately tested the stability of thisborderland as human migration and tradepatterns would call it into question. The dawnof the Manchu-led Qing Dynasty resulted in thedesignation of the Mt. Paektu/Changbai regionas the Manchu birthplace. With its rich naturalresources, the region became a pillar of bothKorean and Chinese trade. Such resourcesincluded sable, pearls, leather, and mostimportantly, ginseng. Ginseng was a highlyprofitable commodity and the desire to harvestand sell it propelled Korean and Chinesetraders to traverse the region, testing theborder structure. Activity in the forested andriverside regions brought Chinese and Koreansinto greater contact, and increasingly, conflict.The value of the ginseng trade demanded aresolution to the increasing tension in theregion.

The Mukedeng Stele and the Tumen River

In 1712, Qing Emperor Kangxi dispatched hisemissary Mukedeng to Chosŏn territory and thetwo sides jointly designated the border. Koreanofficials were concerned that China mightsuggest a border far south of the Yalu and Mt.Paektu, resulting in a huge loss of Koreanterritory. Yhe Korean emissary Pak Kwŏninsisted that the border be set at the Yalu andTumen Rivers. Mukedeng agreed and climbedMt. Paektu to identify the sources of the riversand draw the boundaries. As a result, theMukedeng Stele – or Mt. Paektu DemarcationStele (Paektusan chŏnggyebi) in Koreanterminology – was erected to establish a Sino-Korean border accepted by both sides.

A map of the 1712 Sino-Korean borderwith the Mukedeng Stele19

With the established border, Korean-Chinesecommerce expanded and the number ofresidents grew throughout the eighteenth andnineteenth centuries. Counteracting the surgeof Korean migration, in 1881 the Qing Dynastyreversed its policy banning Han Chinesemigration to Manchuria, the sacred homelandof the Manchus. However, this did not stopKoreans from becoming the majority on bothbanks of the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. Koreanresidents petitioned Chosŏn that the bordershould be redrawn farther north because thename Tumen (土門) on the Mukedeng Stelereferred to a tributary of China’s SonghuaRiver rather than the river dividing Korean-Chinese-Russian territories.20

By 1883, Chosŏn authorities took up thisexpansionist argument by Korean residents inthe region. The Sino-Korean border had grownin significance for Korea as the region wastransformed from a frontier buffered by zonesof isolation, to a crucial commercial region.Chosŏn maintained the new official positionthrough border negotiations that began in Aprilof 1887. The Chinese were hesitant to placemuch emphasis on the 1712 negotiations as allexisting documentation had either been lost orhad rotted away. Instead, they proposed a new

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border marker at a Tumen River watershedfurther south within already existing Chosŏnterritory, an offer which Korean officialsrejected. Negotiations ended without asettlement, never to be reopened. The symbolicvalue of Mt. Paektu was not a major issue inthe border negotiations between Chosŏn andthe Qing. The Mukedeng Stele was located wellsouth of Heaven Lake, requiring Chosŏn tocede Heaven Lake and several peaks of Mt.Paektu to the Qing in 1712. However, Chosŏn’sexpansion in the 1880s resulted in Koreanclaims to a large portion of Manchuria,including the entire Mt. Paektu region. NeitherKorean residents nor officials in charge ofborder negotiations with China appeared to beconcerned about where Heaven Lake would belocated. This seems to corroborate theaforementioned Chinese scholars’ claim thatChosŏn regarded Mt. Paektu as a “mountain ina foreign land”. But the actual story is far morecomplicated as the Chosŏn kings and officialswent back and forth about worshipping Mt.Paektu as a sacred mountain before finallydeciding to do so in 1786 (Kwon 2010; Song2018: 65). This formal recognition of Mt.Paektu laid the groundwork for futuregenerations of Koreans to explore and expandon both the myth and meaning of the mountainand for the continuing Sino-Korean disputeover its territoriality.

The Kando Convention and the Sino-DPRKBorder Treaty

Japanese colonial rule over Korea had profoundramifications for the Sino-Korean border andits contemporary interpretations. FollowingJapan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War(1904-1905), Japan’s imperial gaze travelednorth towards Manchuria and accordingly, theTumen River and its northern environs (K:Kando C: J iandao ) became of crit icalimportance to Japan as it realized that valuableconcessions could be gained from China if they

supported China in the Sino-Korean borderdispute. Japan and China convened inSeptember of 1909 to sign the KandoConvention, which demarcated the borderalong Mt. Paektu. It closely followed theChinese proposal from the 1880s that Koreahad rejected. Heaven Lake, along with sixteenpeaks on Mt. Paektu, were subsumed intoChinese territory. In exchange, Japan receivedrail construction rights throughout the region,which ultimately paved the way for its invasionof Manchuria in 1931.

Map of the PRC/DPRK border around Mt.Paektu (Wikimedia Commons)

The Sino-Korean border was renegotiatedfollowing Japan’s defeat in World War II and itswithdrawal from the Korean Peninsula.Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the DPRKand the PRC compared historical sources toestablish a clear boundary. The DPRK insistedon scrapping the Kando Convention. Afterseveral rounds of high-level talks, the Sino-DPRK border treaty was concluded on October12, 1962, however, details concerning Mt.Paektu and the Yalu/Tumen Rivers were notrevealed to the public. The two parties agreedto divide Mt. Paektu along Heaven Lake, with alittle over half of its waters going to the DPRK.This means that China ceded nearly 280 squarekilometers of territory as defined by the KandoConvention to North Korea. These bordernegotiations between the PRC and the DPRK

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took place during a period of intense Sino-Soviet conflict. Kim Il Sung masterfully tookadvantage of the conflict between his twopowerful allies to maximize North Koreaninterests, thereby won significant territorialconcessions from China (Shen 2012: 59; Lee2017: 55).

South Korea’s initial response to the Sino-DPRKborder agreement was minimal due to theundisclosed nature of the agreement. However,on September 16, 1983, fifty-five NationalAssemblymen submitted a resolutionproclaiming that the entirety of Heaven Lake isKorean territory.21 This assertion could developinto a serious international issue should aunified Korean government reopen the questionof the 1962 Sino-DPRK agreement. This is notan implausible scenario as the ROK has longheld that the Sino-Korean border issue hasremained unresolved since the failure ofnineteenth century negotiations betweenChosŏn and Qing China.

The recent brouhaha in South Korea over theKando Convention is a case in point. In 2004,ROK Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon declaredthat the Kando Convention was null and void asit had been made by Japan usurping Koreansovereignty.22 This statement came out in themidst of tensions surrounding China’sNortheast Project (described below). However,on the day that such statements and evidencewere to be presented to the National Assembly,they were suddenly recalled and the Kandop o r t i o n w a s e x p u n g e d f r o m t h edocuments.23 This decision was due to SouthKorean reluctance to spark a diplomatic rowwith China over the potentially explosivenorthern border issue. The South Koreangovernment continues to question thelegitimacy of the border agreements, but thusfar it has taken great pains to prevent theseconcerns from inhibiting peaceful Sino-ROKrelations which have flourished since the1980s.

China’s Northeast Project and the Sino-Korean History Wars

China launched the Northeast Asian HistoryProject (hereafter ‘Northeast Project’) in 2002with the proclaimed goal of deploying academicresearch to restore historical facts “distortedby some countries’ institutions and scholars”and “to further maintain the stability of theNortheast Frontier Region” of China.24 ManySouth Koreans, however, view the NortheastProject as a thinly-veiled attempt to claimpolitical control over North Korea, should thesituation on the Korean Peninsula change. Thescope of this project includes territory underthe jurisdiction of the Kando Convention andthe modern Sino-Korean border, which hadlong been at the heart of discord betweenChina and the two Koreas. Specific points ofcontention were the borders of contemporaryChinese provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, andLiaoning, and the ancient kingdoms of Koguryŏand Parhae.

Unlike the ROK, the DPRK has been silent onthe modern border issue, presumably to avoidrisking the loss of territorial gains from the1962 border agreement with the PRC. This isnot a baseless conjecture given internalChinese criticism of territorial concessionsmade in the 1962 border treaty (Pinilla 2004;Shen 2012). When it comes to the “historywars”, however, North Korea started battlingChina as far back as the early 1960s when aSino-DPRK joint archeological excavationproject was halted over the question of whetherKoguryŏ’s heritage belongs to Korean orChinese history. As the self-proclaimedlegitimate heir of Koguryŏ, the DPRK sternlyrebuked China’s repeated claims to the ancientkingdom; on November 27, 2003, at the heightof the Northeast Project controversy, the DPRKcondemned Chinese claims as “a patheticattempt to manipulate history for its owninterests.”25

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The tension generated by the Northeast Projectspurred unprecedented inter-Koreancooperation on border research. In 2005, SouthKorea’s Koguryŏ Research Foundation led ateam of North and South Korean scholars toMt. Paektu to conduct a joint investigation overwhere the “true” border marker lay.Foundation president, Kim Chŏngbae, statedthat the original 1712 border marker – theremains of the Mukedeng Stele – had beenfound near a North Korean army guard postabout 4 km southeast of Heaven Lake,contradicting Chinese research claims that theoriginal location of the Stele was 20 kilometerssouth.26

Further spurred by their desire to strengthenties between the border regions and Mt.Paektu/Changbai, Chinese authorities launchedthe “Mt. Changbai Culture” (Chángbáishānwénhuà) campaign elevating the mountain to akey cultural asset of Chinese culture andh i s t o r y ( Y o o n 2 0 1 3 ; 2 0 1 5 ) . M t .Paektu/Changbai has been accorded manytitles befitting its status including a UNbiosphere nature reserve, a top touristdestination, with Heaven Lake rated as the fifthmost beautiful lake in China (Yoon 2015: 199).In the first six months of 2016, 468,000 touriststraveled to Mt. Paektu/Changbai.27 The Chinesecampaign to change the narrative on Mt.Paektu/Changbai and shape it into a valuableasset has met with success domestically.

The “Mt. Changbai Culture” campaign involvessinification of the region. In Yanbian Provincewith its large ethnic Korean population, thename Mt. Paektu is no longer used; themountain is referred to exclusively as Mt.Changbai. Any signs or advertisementsincorporating Paektu in their name are refusedregistration and already existing contracts areabruptly cancelled (Yoon 2015: 209). TheKorean naming for geographical features isswiftly erased from all maps of the region.Careful to identify ethnic Koreans as Chinesecitizens, Chinese authorities have deliberately

closed all avenues through which these ethnicminorities may identify with the Korean nation.Korean ethnic minorities are no longer allowedto hold dual Chinese/Korean citizenship, andthe government barred the establishment of aKorean consulate in Jilin. The changing Chineseposition over citizenship is likely a result ofgrowing concern about the possibility ofKorean reunification and a scenario in whichgrowing Korean nationalism will lead todemands for Chinese territory in the borderregion. Documents released by the Jilinprovincial government in 2007 speculate onpotential actions that the two Koreas mighttake on Mt. Paektu/Changbai (Yoon 2015: 207).Interestingly, this action came at a time whenSino-Korean relations were relatively good.Trade between the two countries boomed andChina was deeply involved in summits heldbetween North and South Korea in 2000 and2007.

In this light, the Northeast Project and otherconsiderable efforts by the PRC to change theway that the Chinese – particularly ethnicKoreans in China – as well as the internationalcommunity think about the region, can be seenas indicative of possible future territorialcontention with a unified Korea. The domesticpursuit of such Chinese campaigns, however,has been met with increasing suspicion fromthe two Koreas. The tensions over Mt.Paektu/Changbai indicate that the issue mightcome to a head, particularly in the event thatKorean reunification becomes a realisticprospect.

Volcano Reactivated? Sino-Korean CultureWars over Mt. Paektu/Changbai

After the U.S.-China summit in April 2017, U.S.President Trump casually made the followingstatement in a media interview: “[ChinesePresident Xi Jinping] then went into the historyof China and Korea. Not North Korea, Korea.And you know, you’re talking about thousands

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of years… and many wars. And Korea actuallyused to be a part of China”.28 This statementinc i t ed rage in Sou th Korea wherecommentators suspected a Chinese attempt toundermine Korean sovereignty and rewritehistory in Chinese perspective. The Koreanpublic took the Chinese government’s silence inthe face of Trump’s remarks as proof that Xihad indeed rehashed claims from the NortheastProject. Commentators noted that theseassertions were made as the North Koreansituation took a major turn, creating thepossibility of a future Korean reunification, asituation with potential implications concerningChinese territorial ambitions. This belief wasfurthered when one news source claimed,“Korea will have to fight with China over thehistory problem as they had to when Japanasser ted tha t Dokdo I s land was i t sterritory”.29 The parallels drawn between thetwo controversies could not be clearer. Koreansfeels seriously threatened by Chinese historicalclaims.

In 2006 , Ch ina f i l ed a c l a im to Mt .Paektu/Changbai as a UNESCO Natural WorldHeritage site and expelled all internationalhotel investors from the region. Additionally, inSeptember 2012, the cash-strapped NorthKorean government turned over developmentrights of its portion of the mountain (25%) toChina. From this point on, North Koreanterritory was enfolded into the developingChinese tourism industry (Yoon 2015: 200). Inthe years since China’s launch of the NortheastProject, moments of tension have repeatedlycropped up over jurisdiction and territorialityof Mt. Paektu/Changbai.

One of the first rifts occurred during the 2007Asian Winter Games in Changchun, the capitalof Jilin Province. South Korean media criticizedChinese activity in the Mt. Paektu/Changbairegion, highlighting the techniques whichChina employed to stake ownership to themountain and its environs. For example, theofficial guidebook of the event addresses the

mountain only by its Chinese name, Changbai,omitting any reference to its Korean name,Paektu. Mt. Changbai played a central role inthe Winter Games opening ceremony; the torchlighting ceremony was held at the peakoverlooking Heaven Lake. Such a visual displayseemed geared towards establishing Chineseclaims to the land. China also proposed to hostthe 2018 Winter Olympics in the Mt. Changbairegion. Shi Guoxiang, the head of the Mt.Changbai Development Committee, made astatement that portrayed the mountain asChina’s Alps.30

What transformed these rifts into a mediaspectacle was a spontaneous Korean protestover the perceived Chinese encroachmentduring the same events. When the SouthKorean women’s short track team won thesilver medal, they mounted the podium at theaward ceremony and lifted up signs on whichwere written “Mt. Paektu is our territory!”China’s response was swift, arguing that suchan action was political, a violation of the rulesof the Asian Winter Games. The South Koreangovernment too, quickly downplayed theincident as an action by the individual playersand not representative of ROK policy. Thisincident highlighted the emotion that theKorean public has invested in Mt. Paektu.Despite government attempts to quell any sortof action that would inflame relations withChina by contesting China’s partial ownershipof the territory, some South Korean citizensprotested, setting off a large public debate onMt. Paektu territoriality (Ahn 2007).

The Mt. Paektu/Changbai controversy againboiled over in 2014, set off by an incidentinvolving celebrity advertisement. Korean popculture (hallyu) top stars Kim Soo-Hyun (KimSuhyŏn) and Jun Ji-Hyun (Chŏn Chihyŏn) signedan endorsement deal for a Chinese bottledwater company, Hengda Bingquan, thats o u r c e d i t s w a t e r f r o m t h e M t .Paektu/Changbai region. The South Koreanpublic took umbrage at the prospect of Korean

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celebrities endorsing bottled water that carriedonly the Chinese name for the mountain,Changbai, and profited a Chinese company.This was tantamount to a representative ofKorean culture endorsing Chinese claims towhat they believed to be Korean territory. KimSoo-Hyun actually held several positions ofcultural ambassadorship as an internationalcelebrity, including the PromotionalAmbassador for Korean Tourism. Despite callsto cancel the endorsement contracts, bothcelebrities followed through with theadvertisement campaign, generating significantpublic ire.

Korean celebrities Jun Ji-Hyun (left) andKim Soo-Hyun (right) endorsing Chinesebottled water from Mt. ‘Changbai’ (Source:Joongang Ilbo)

South Korea’s Legal Issues with the Sino-DPRK Border Agreement

To understand the ramifications of the borderissue in the event of Korean reunificationinvolves consideration of political, economic,a n d s o c i a l f a c t o r s t h a t a r e i n f l u xinternationally as well as domestically for bothKoreas. The speculative nature of suchconsideration has not deterred the SouthKorean government and legal community fromengaging in extensive international legalanalyses of the Sino-DPRK border agreement.The central premise of this speculation is this:should a reunified Korea emerge in future, thevalidity of the secret 1962 Sino-DPRK treatywould require review. Neither party haspublicly acknowledged its existence and detailsof the agreement were not revealed until 1999.

Since the treaty was not registered with theUN, it is difficult to know whether its termswou ld be opera t i ve i n the even t o freunification. Reunification would presumablyallow a reunified Korean state to take control ofcontemporary North Korean territory, and ifthe 1962 agreement was operative, this wouldinclude 55% of Heaven Lake at the peak of Mt.Paektu.

While a majority of legal opinions agrees onhonoring the 1962 Sino-DPRK treaty as thebest option for a reunified Korea (Lee 2007;Lee 2010; Chŏng 2016; Yi 2017), there is adissenting opinion that all previous Sino-Korean border agreements – including theMukedeng Stele, the Kando Convention, andthe 1962 treaty – would become null and voidand the reunified Korean state should be ableto start negotiat ing borders withoutpreconditions (Kim 2011). Even though thisminority view has met with much skepticism, itshows that strong nationalist ideology affectsnot only public sentiments but also some high-level governmental and expert opinions inSouth Korea. The enduring influence of ultra-nationalist fringe history in South Koreanpolitics and society shows an underlying desirefor territorial ‘reclamation’. In short, collectiveidentity in Korea may seriously impede theflourishing of Sino-Korean relations if thepublic comes to feel that its history and cultureis under attack.

China would certainly not be willing to cedeany of the Mt. Paektu/Changbai territory withinthe PRC to a reunified Korean state. This isevident from decades of policy aimed at boththoroughly assimilating ethnic Koreans into theChinese population and discouraging anyassociation of the region with the Koreanfoundation myth or even the Korean name ofMt. Paektu. China would also be concernedthat Korean terr i tor ia l gains on Mt.Paektu/Changbai would solidify Korean ethnicidentity, potentially encouraging Chineseethnic Koreans to identify with the unified

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Korean state and weakening Chinese hold overits northeast territory. Additionally, NorthKorea was only able to broker such anadvantageous territorial demarcation withChina in 1962 due to the unique politicalpressures that the PRC faced at the time. Sincethen, China has developed into a regional andglobal powerhouse that will be unlikely to maketerritorial concessions. In 2018, speakingamidst tension with the US surroundingTaiwan, Xi Jinping stated that it would be“absolutely impossible to separate any inch ofour great country’s territory from China.”31 AnyKorean challenge to established territorialboundaries could touch off a serious conflictwith China, jeopardizing prospects for regionalpeace and secur i ty through Koreanreunification.

Concluding Remarks

Following the division of the Korean peninsula,North and South Korea embarked on differentpaths. Despite this, Korean ethnic identityspanned boundaries and continued to diffuseinto both North and South Korean societies.Tan’gun, the progenitor of the Korean nation,ascended to legendary heights in the Koreanpsyche and Mt. Paektu developed into a potentsymbol of the nation. The possibility thatsomeday, the existing border may requirerenegotiation in a reunification era has fueledmany efforts to resolve the border by China andthe controversies raised by the two Koreas overMt. Paektu and the region’s history. TheNortheast Project is particularly interesting inthis regard as North and South Korea havefound considerable common ground overinterpretation of ancient Korean history andcollaborated in an effort to counter China'sperceived infringement on Korean history.

For the most part, the Sino-Korean border isclearly demarcated along the Yalu and Tumenrivers. Mt. Paektu lies at the headwaters of thetwo rivers, and border negotiations over this

mountainous terrain have suffered fromambiguity historically; several attempts weremade over the years to renegotiate the border.The modern border was first clearly establishedthrough the Kando Convention between Chinaand Japan, and further settled in a 1962 dealbetween China and North Korea. However,South Korea has periodically contested thelegality of previous border agreements. SouthKorean majority expert legal analysis ofprevious border arrangements, however,concludes that a reunified Korean state wouldhave scant international legal basis forchallenging the currently existing bordersituation. Thus, barring a fundamental shift inthe regional balance of power, a unified Koreanstate would be likely to pursue the leastcontentious route and accept the terms of the1962 Sino-DPRK agreement. Nonetheless, weshould not completely dismiss the risks ofrising ultra-nationalism, re-ignition of Sino-Korean history wars, and even diplomatictension given the significance of Mt. Paektu tothe Korean nation.

Related articles

Ahn, Yonson. 2006. “Competing Nationalisms:the Mobilisation of History and Archaeology inthe Korea-China wars over Koguryo/Gaogouli.”(https://apjjf.org/-Yonson-Ahn/1837/article.html) The Asia-Pacific Journal 4(2)

_____. 2007. “China and the Two Koreas ClashOver Mount Paekdu/Changbai: Memory WarsThreaten Regional Accommodation.”(https://apjjf.org/-Yonson-Ahn/2483/article.html) The Asia-Pacific Journal 5(7)

_____. 2008. “The Contested Heritage ofKoguryo/Gaogouli and China-Korea Conflict.”(https://apjjf.org/-Yonson-Ahn/2631/article.html) The Asia-Pacific Journal 6(1)

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We thank Mitch Lerner, Deborah Solomon,Charles Kim, Merose Hwang, Pae Sŏng-jun,June Hee Kwon, and Byung-ho Chung for theirvaluable comments and advice on our researchproject. We also thank Eugenia Han foreditorial assistance on this article.

References

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_____. 2007. “China and the Two Koreas ClashOver Mount Paekdu/Changbai: Memory WarsThreaten Regional Accommodation.”(https://apjjf.org/-Yonson-Ahn/2483/article.html) The Asia-Pacific Journal 5(7)

_____. 2008. “The Contested Heritage ofKoguryo/Gaogouli and China-Korea Conflict.”(https://apjjf.org/-Yonson-Ahn/2631/article.html) The Asia-Pacific Journal 6(1)

Armstrong, Charles. 1995. “Centering thePeriphery: Manchurian Exile(s) and the NorthKorean State.” Korean Studies 19: 1-16.

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Chŏng, Insŏp. 2016. Lectures on Treaty Law.Seoul: Pakyŏngsa (in Korean).

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Lee, Sungju, and McClelland, Susan. 2016.Every Falling Star: The True Story of How ISurvived and Escaped North Korea. New York:Amulet Books.

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Katy Kwon (née Straily) graduated from the Interdisciplinary Master of Arts Program in EastAsian Studies at Ohio State University. She is currently an intern at the National Committeeon North Korea.

Pil Ho Kim (http://u.osu.edu/kim.2736) is an assistant professor at the Department ofEast Asian Languages and Literatures, the Ohio State University. His recent publicationsinclude “Ownership and Planning Capacity in the Asian-Style Development Cooperation:South Korean Knowledge Sharing Program to Vietnam”(http://kiss.kstudy.com/thesis/thesis-view.asp?key=3613768), Korea Observer 49:2 (withWoojin Jung) and “Guns over Rice: The Impact of US Military Aid on South Korean Economic

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Reconstruction” (https://u.osu.edu/kim.2736/files/2017/04/GoR-final-w0lqqp.pdf),International Development Cooperation Review 9:1.

Notes1 Cheng, Jonathan and Jeong, Andrew. “Kim Reaffirms Korean Denuclearization Push, LooksForward to Trump Meeting, Moon Says”(https://www.wsj.com/articles/kim-jong-un-south-koreas-moon-meet-amid-uncertainty-over-u-s-summit-1527334020), The Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2018.2 Sin Ch’aeho cited in Song (2018: 214).3 For the historical development of Korean ethnic nationalism, see Shin (2006) Part I.4 N.A. “North Korea, How it Celebrates National Foundation Day”(http://www.tongilnews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=11825) (북한 개천절 어떻게 지내나), Tongil News, October 2, 2001.5 The lyrics translated into English: “Until the day when the East Sea's waters run dry and Mt.Paektu is worn away”; Mt. Paektu reference also appears in the second verse of the NorthKorean national anthem. Both Korea’s national anthems are entitled ‘Patriotic Song’ (officiallyromanized into Aegukka in the North and Aegukga in the South).6 This is based on Gallup Korea’s 2016 opinion poll(http://www.gallup.co.kr/gallupdb/reportContent.asp?seqNo=780), in which 47% answeredTan’gun as ‘myth’ as opposed to 37% ‘real’. The same poll in 1994 found the reverse, 49%‘real’ and 39% ‘myth’.7 An Hosang, South Korea’s first minister of education and a devout Taejonggyo follower, wasthe leading figure of this movement. See Shin (2006) for An’s role as the chief ideologue ofthe Syngman Rhee Administration.8 Park, Hee Chun. “Baekdusan Korean Tourists Rapidly Dropping Out of Fear of North KoreanTerror Attack” (http://www.ytn.co.kr/_ln/0104_201608212202183316) (백두산 한국인 관광객급감...北 테러 우려 때문), YTN News, Aug 21, 2016.9 KBS World TV. “2 Days and 1 Night Season 1 To Mt. Baekdu! Part 3”.(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=twCuS9G4vII) Aired July 2008. Tokto refers to theeasternmost islets under South Korean sovereign control; it has long been a focal point ofterritorial dispute with Japan.10 N.A. “Uni-Korean Art Exhibition – in Berlin From Baekdu to Halla”(http://www.art-place-berlin.com/english/03exhibition/2015-uni-korea.html), Art Place Berlin:Forum for Contemporary Art, accessed March 16, 2018.11 N.A. “Poomsae Taebaek” (http://www.premiertaekwondo.ca/poomsae-taebaek-.html),Premier Taekwondo Manitoba, accessed March 16, 2018.12 N.A. “Statistics and Policy Materials”(http://www.kukkiwon.or.kr/front/kor/information/report.action?cmd=View&seq=173&pageNum=1&searchKey=1&searchVal=) (통계 및 정책자료), World Taekwondo Headquarters,accessed March 17, 2018.13 Kim Jong Il’s purported birth on Mt. Paektu has been widely debunked by historical recordsoutside North Korea. See Armstrong (1995).

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14 N.A. “Natural Wonders Observed”(http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2011/12/18/kim-jong-il-is-dead/), Korean Central News Agency,December 19, 2011. 15 For the use of North Korean propaganda to parallel the life of Tan’gun and Kim Il Sung, seeNasr (2014).16 N.A. “Youth Carry a Torch Through a Cross-Country Relay”(http://chosonsinbo.com/2012/08/pyongyang_120830-4/) (〈청년절〉홰불을 들고 전국계주한 청년들), The Choson Sinbo Online, August 30, 2012.17 For a comparison of North and South Korean taekwondo forms/patterns, see Jang (2003:49-50).18 A US-based Chinese historian provides a balanced reading of Korea’s historical view of Mt.Paektu. See Song (2018: 63-66).19 Mukedeng himself ordered this map drawn and gave it to Pak Kwŏn. It clearly shows thatthe stele was located on Mt. Paektu’s foothills to the south of Heaven Lake. See N.A. “Mt.Baekdu Demarcation Stone”(http://contents.nahf.or.kr/english/item/level.do?levelId=iscd_003e_0050_0010), NortheastAsian History Network, accessed August 14, 2018.20 The name ‘Tumen’ has a Mongolian/Korean origin. While Koreans have always beenrendering it as 豆滿 (K: Tuman; C: Dòumǎn), the Chosŏn officials clearly understood that itwas the same river Mukedeng identified as 土門 (K: T’omun; C: Tǔmén). The current Chineserendering is 图们 (Túmén).21 N.A. “Territoriality Resolution Submitted: Paektu’s Heaven Lake is our Territory” (領有權決議案제출 "白頭山 天池는 우리땅), Donga Ilbo, September 17, 1983.22 N.A. “Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon: “Kando Convention is Legally Void”(http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=115&oid=055&aid=0000030907) (반기문 장관 "간도협약 법리적 무효), SBS News, October 22, 2004.23 Lee, Ha-Won. “Govt. Considers Gando Convention Null and Void: Foreign MinistryMaterials”(http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2004/10/13/2004101361017.html?related_all),The Chosun Ilbo, October 13, 2004.24 Institute of Chinese Borderland Studies, “Introduction: the Northeast Project”(http://bjs.cssn.cn/zdxm/zdxm_dbgc/dbgc_gcjj/201010/t20101025_1792820.shtml) (东北工程简介), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, accessed on December 1, 2018.25 Quotation from Kim, Tong-hyung. “North Korea Denounces China's Claim on Goguryeo”.The Korea Herald, December 15, 2003. For more about the Sino-Korean “history wars”, seeAhn (2006; 2007; 2008).26 “Mt. Baekdu Demarcation Stone”27 Robertson, Mark. “Chinese tourist trying to avoid the crowds? Try Mount Paektu”(https://www.nknews.org/2017/07/chinese-tourist-trying-to-avoid-the-crowds-try-mount-paektu/), NK News.org, July 20, 2017. 28 Lee, Michelle and Ye, Hee. “Trump’s claim that Korea ‘actually used to be a part of China’”(https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/factchecker/wp/2017/04/19/trumps-claim-that-korea-actually-used-to-be-a-part-of-china/?utm_term=.3d64992cac51), The Washington Post, April 19,2017.

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29 Choi, Young-Yun. “Korea a Part of China?...The Northeast Project Controversy Revived”(http://news.kbs.co.kr/news/view.do?ncd=3468227&ref=A) (한국은 중국의 일부?…‘동북공정’재연되나), KBS News, April 21, 2017.30 Park, Sang-Hu. “China and the Paektu Project”(http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=115&oid=214&aid=0000016860) (중국, ‘백두산 공정’), MBC News, September 7, 2006.31 McDonell, Stephen. “Xi Jinping warns any attempt to split China is 'doomed to fail'”,(http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-43466685) BBC News, March 20, 2018.