wills and succession in the philippines

8/11/2019 Wills and Succession in the Philippines

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XIX. DISINHERITANCECHING VS. HON JANSSEN RODRIGUEZRamon S Ching v Hon Jansen Rodriguez(with Joseph Cheng, Jaime Cheng,Mercedes Igne, and Lucina Santos)Facts:

Case is about a review under rule 45 of ROC wherein Petition for motionof reconsideration of appeal were denied and RTC decision was affirmed

Sometime between Nov to Dec 2002, respondents filed a complain

against stronghold Insurance company and Global business bank and allpersons claiming rights or titles from Ramon Ching and his successors ininterest.

In the complaint for disinheritance, respondents allege the following ascauses of action:

o 1st: They are the heirs of Lim San also known as Antonio Chingo Joseph Ching an Jaime Ching, allegedly are the children of

Antonio from his common law wife, respondent, Mercedes Igneand Lucina Ramon

o Ramon misrepresented himself as his son and when he was infact adopted and his birth certificate was simulatedo Ramon is a primary suspect for Antonios murdero According to respondents: he may be disinherited under Art919

of CC:o 2nd: Respondents allege that Ramon illegally transferred to his

names 6 real estate properties left by Antonio. Also, there are 2lots, cash and Jewelries in Possession of Antonio

o 3rd: Mercedes was sweet talked by Ramon to surrender to himGlobal Business bank, time deposit of PHP4,000,000 and condo

in Binondoo 40000 shares in Po Wing were illegally transferred to Ramon to

his own nameo

5th: Ramon Executed an affidavit of Extra Judicial Settlement ofestate, adjudicating only to himself prejudicing the heirs

o 6th: Ramons selling of Navotas lots are void since he lacksauthority to dispose them

Ramons wife Belen Dy Tan Ching manages Antonios estate with nointent to convey to the respondents

Defendants prayed that; Ramon Ching be disinherited since he murdered

his father, nullity of all transactions mentioned above since it was illegallyprocured

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss: alleging forum shopping, andrespondents are not real parties in interest.

RTC: dismissed the petition of motion to dismiss CA: affirmed RTC, action of private respondents should be threshed out

in a special proceeding, allegations were substantially for theenforcement of their rights against fraudulent acts of Ramon Ching

Issue:

WON there can be disinheritance in intestate succession?WON Ramon Ching can be disinherited from the estate of his father.WON RTC should have granted the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners on theground that RTCs lack of jurisdictionHeld:

Petition denied since they failed to comply with a lawful order, prescribedperiod has expired.

No reversible errors were committed by the RTC and CA Under Art 916; disinheritance can be effected through the will wherein

the legal cause therefore shall be specified

XX. INTESTATE SUCCESSIONA. INTESTATE HEIRSRODRIGUEZ ET AL VS. BORJARodriguez v. De BorjaFacts:1. Fr. Rodriguez died in the City of Manila. Both parties in this case stipulatedthat Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paranaque, that he was a parish priest of theCatholic Church in Hagonoy from 1930 to 1963 and that he left real properties inRizal, Cavite, QC and Bulacan

2. March 4, 1963 = Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered toClerk of Court (Bulacan) a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez3. March 8, 1963 = Maria and Angela Rodriguez (petitioners), filed a petition toexamine the alleged will however it was withdrawn4. Petitioners filed a petition for the settlement of intestate estate of Fr.Rodriguez alleging that the latter left no will. They also prayed that MariaRodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate5. On the other hand, Apolonia and Adelaida filed a petition for the probation ofthe will.6. Maria and Angelas claim: that CFI Rizal has no jurisdiction to entertain the

petition for probate since the intestate proceedings was filed at 8 AM (March 12,1963) while the petition for probate was filed in the CFI Bulacan at 11 AM


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7. Apolonia and Adelaidas claim: CFI Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over thecase upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court and that the case inthis court has precedence over the case filed in Rizal8. CFI denied the motion to dismiss filed by Maria and Angela saying that timedifference did not entitle one proceeding to preference over the other. That theyare aware of the existence of the will of Fr. Rodriguez since they filed a petition toexamine the same, and that movants filed the intestate proceedings in Rizal for

no other purpose than to prevent the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over theprobate proceedingsIssue: Whether the CFI Bulacan has jurisdiction to entertain the petition forprobate filed by Apolinia and Adelaida despite there was an existing intestateestate case that was filed by Maria and Angela.Held: No.1. The jurisdiction of CFI of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery of thewill of late Fr. Rodriguez even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later,because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu propio have takensteps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding

notices conformably to what is prescribed by Sec. 3, Rule 76 of ROC.2. In the aforementioned rule of Civil Procedure, the use of disjunctive wordswhen a will is delivered OR a petition for the allowance of a will is filed indicatesthat the court may act upon the mere deposit there of a decendents testament,even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate ismade after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the timewhen the will was delivered.o Since the testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Courtof Bulacan March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in CFI Rizalonly on March 12, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court

is incontenstable.3. On the petitioners objection that Bulacan court has no jurisdiction since thedecedent was domiciled in the province of Rizal: the Court cannot disregard Fr.Rodriguezs 33 years of residence as parish priest in Hagonoy and even if there isan animus revertendi to the place of his birth in Paranaque, that detail would notimply that the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction (law: the power to settle decedentsestates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile oftestator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court)o The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan court, that court isentitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a

case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73

4. Another reason that militate against the success of petitioners: in oursystem of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to thetestate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will.o Castro v. Martinez: only after final decision as to the nullity of testatesuccession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre-established action. So, the institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may notthus proceed while the probate of the will of Fr. Rodriguez is pending

5. Ruling: the Bulacan court was entitled to priority in the settlement of theestate in question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate proceedings, saidcourt did not commit any abuse of discretion. It is the proceedings in the Rizalcourt that should be dismissed.

MADARCOS VS . DE LA MERCEDMadaracos v. Dela MercedFacts In this case, the issue is the construction of the phrase Legal Heirs in P.D.

119 which states:o Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent homestead provisionswhen proper shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legalheirs w/in a period of 5 years at the date of conveyance. Madaracos was the Niece of the decedent.o she is seeking the repurchase of the property she sold for 4,800 pesos of LotB. of the estate of the decedent under the same law. Sta. Maria said that this is no longer possible because under the law, she isnot a legal heir as contemplated by 119.Issue

W/N Madaracos is a legal heir as contemplated in 119.Held The SC first discussed legal heirs according to intestacy1. Legitimate children and their descendants2. Parents and Ascendants3. Illegitimate children and their descendants4. Spouse without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters andnephews and nieces.5. Collateral Relatives within the 5thdegree.6. The state

In this case, there Is a right to repurchase by madacaros. The law is to be interpreted in favor of liberal construction.


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ROSALES VS. ROSALESRosales v RosalesFacts:1. Mrs Petra Rosales died intestate2. The survivors are:a. Her husband

b. Two children Magna Acebes and Antonio3. Carterio Rosales, married to Irenea Rosales, was also the child of thedeceased but predeceased his mother, Petra.4. Macikequerox was the child of Carterio and Irenea5. Magna instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of thedecasesd.6. The trial court issued an order declaring the shares as follows:a. Husband Fortunato b. Magna Acebes (daughter) c. Macikequerox (grandson)

d. Antonio (son) 7. Irenea insists on getting a claim for the estate in her capacity as thesurviving spouse of the late Carterio using Article 887 of the civil code and that hishusband had an inchoate right to the estate of Petra as compulsory heirIssue: WON, the widow is an heir to her mother-in-lawHeld:A - No.L - There is no law which gives a right to the widow to represent hishusband in the estate of his mother or father in law

- 887 in referring to the widow refer to the widow of the deceased spouse

whose heir is in question.- 999 confirm that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of thedeceased spouse.

- 970-971 Essence and nature of right of representation. Therepresentative does not succeed the person he represented but instead takes theplace of the one represented.A - in the case at bar, the person being referred to in Article 970,971 and982 is Macikequerox.

- Since Macikequerox already took the place of his deceased father, thewidow cannot take the place of his husband.

- in Fact as stated earlier, there is no provision which gives her right.

- The defense of the widow that she represents the inchoate right of herhusband is unmeritorious because such inchoate right has been extinguished bydeath of the husband.

B. EXCLUSION AND CONCURRENCEDELOS SANTOS VS. DELA CRUZG.R. No. L-29192 February 22, 1971

GERTRUDES DE LOS SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

MAXIMO DE LA CRUZ,defendant-appellant.Facts:On May 21, 1965, Gertrudes de los Santos filed a complaint for specificperformance against Maximo de la Cruz alleging that: August 24, 1963, she and several co-heirs, including the defendant,executed an extrajudicial partition parties thereto had agreed to adjudicate three (3) lots to the defendant oncondition that the latter would undertake the development and subdivision of theestate which was the subject matter of the agreement, all expenses in connection

therewith to be defrayed from the proceeds of the sale of the aforementioned three(3) lots; the defendant refused to perform his aforesaid obligation although he hadalready sold the aforesaid lots.In his answer, the defendant admitted the due execution of the extrajudicialpartition agreement, but set up the affirmative defenses that the plaintiff had nocause of action against him the said agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason that theplaintiff was not an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz, and was included in the extrajudicialpartition agreement by mistake;

although he had disposed of the three lots adjudicated to him, neverthelessthe proceeds of the sale were not sufficient to develop and improve properly thesubdivided estate. The answer contained a counterclaim wherein the defendant alleged thatthe plaintiff had likewise sold her share in the estate for P10,000.00, and that theextrajudicial partition agreement being void insofar as the latter was concerned, hewas entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of the proceeds as his share by way of reversion.The defendant prayed that the complaint be dismissed; that the extrajudicialpartition agreement be declared void with respect to the plaintiff; and, on hiscounterclaim, that the plaintiff be ordered to pay him the sum of P2,500.00.

On July 6, 1966, the case was submitted for decision on the following stipulation offacts:


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That the parties agree that the defendant is the nephew of the deceasedPelagia de la Cruz aforementioned, who was the owner and predecessor ininterest of the land which was the subject matter of the extra-judicial partitionagreement; That the parties agree that the plaintiff is the grandniece of the said Pelagiade la Cruz; That Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue on October 16,

1962. That Marciana de la Cruz is the mother of the plaintiff and the niece of thesaid Pelagia de la Cruz, and that the said Marciana de la Cruz died on September22, 1935.TC Held that the extrajudicial partition is VALID and plaintiff can INHERIT byrepresenting the motherISSUE: Whether the plaintiff is an heir (NO)Ruling:ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the moredistant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. ... .

In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz are hernephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.But what is the legal effect of plaintiff-appellee's inclusion and participation in theextrajudicial partition agreement insofar as her right to bring the present action isconcerned? She was included in the partition.It is quite apparent that in executing the partition agreement, the parties theretowere laboring under the erroneous belief that plaintiff-appellee was one of thelegal heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not being such a heir, thepartition is void with respect to her, pursuant to Article 1105 of the Civil Code,

which reads:ART. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be a heir, but who isnot, shall be void only with respect to such person.Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from thedeceased owner thereof and another person who thought he was an heir, when hewas not really and lawfully such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true heirdesignated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and void (De Torres vs. DeTorres, et al., 28 Phil. 49). A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from theagreement the right to have its terms enforced.side issue: can the defendant recover the said property by way of reversion?

No, pag wala pang buyer in good faith.

Remote relatives or unrelated person who unduly received and took possession ofthe property of a deceased person without any right, by virtue of a null and voidpartition, must restore it to the legitimate successor in the inheritance (De Torresvs. De Torres, et al., supra).Of course, if such share has already been disposed of by appellee to a bona fidepurchaser, as seems to be indicated in the unproven allegations of thecounterclaim, We cannot render judgment awarding any specific amount to

defendant-appellant as his proportionate share of the proceeds of such sale forthe reason that, as already stated above, this aspect of the counterclaim has notbeen touched upon in the stipulation of facts nor has it been supported byevidence which appellant should have presented in the lower court but did not.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed fromis hereby reversed and set aside; the defendant-appellant is absolved from anyability to and in favor of plaintiff-appellee; and, on appellant's counterclaim,appellee is hereby sentenced to restore or reconvey to him his correspondingshare of the property she has received under the extrajudicial partitionhereinbefore mentioned if the same has not already been disposed of as alleged.

Costs in both instance against plaintiff-appellee.

BAGUNU VS. PIEDADBAGUNU V. PIEDADFACTS:Petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special ProceedingsNo. 3652, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate ofAugusto H. Piedad. Asserting entitlement to a share of the estate of the lateAugusto H. Piedad, she assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awardingthe entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the proceedings

were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publication of thenotice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularityin the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of theestate.Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants.Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the

decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or afifth-degree relative of the decedent.Admitted are the facts that intervenor-appellant is a collateral relative within thefifth degree of Augusto H. Piedad; that she is the daughter of the first cousin of

Augusto H. Piedad; that as such, intervenor-appellant seek to inherit from theestate of Augusto H. Piedad; that the notice of hearing was published for three


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consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation; that there was no orderof closure of proceedings that has been issued by the intestate court; and that theintestate court has already issued an order for the transfer of the remaining estateof Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee.ISSUE:Can petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongsiderespondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree? Elsewise stated, does

the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application among collateralrelatives?HELD:NO. The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degreeto the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to theextent that the right of representation can apply. In fine, a maternal aunt caninherit alongside a paternal uncle, and a first cousin of the full blood can inheritequally with a first cousin of the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth-degreeof relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree

relative.Thus, Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes themore distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takesplace."Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to theprovisions of article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and ofarticle 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between the paternal and maternallines."By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by

operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of acloser blood relative of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps intothe shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter, but fromthe person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded."ART. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtueof which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of theperson represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have ifhe were living or if he could have inherited.""ART. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law andnot by the person represented. The representative does not succeed the person

represented but the one whom the person represented would have succeeded."

In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never inthe ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only takeplace in favor of the children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when suchchildren survive with their uncles or aunts."ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the directdescending line, but never in the ascending."In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers

or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood.""ART. 974. Whenever there is succession by representation, the division ofthe estate shall be made per stirpes, in such manner that the representative orrepresentatives shall not inherit more than what the person they represent wouldinherit, if he were living or could inherit.""ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of thedeceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if theysurvive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shallinherit in equal portions."The right of representation does not apply to "othercollateral relatives within the

fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who aresixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children anddescendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly, theillegitimate children and descendants, fourthly,the survivingspouse, and fifthly, thebrothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateralrelatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedentconcurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree ofrelationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Codegives direction.

"Article 966. x x x"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent ismade to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person istwo degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother ofhis father, four from his first cousin and so forth."Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H.Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding abintestatoto the estate of the decedent.The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code"Article 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers

or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.


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"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them byreason of relationship by the whole blood.""Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifthdegree of relationship in the collateral line." -invoked by petitioner do not at all support her cause. The law means only thatamong the other collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of succession), nopreference or distinction shall be observed "by reason of relationship by the

whole blood."URIARTE VS. CAUriarte v CA, GR No. 116775, January 22, 1998FACTS:

Justa Arnaldo-Sering left upon her death a 2.7 ha piece of land inSurigao del Sur.

Private respondent, Benedicto Estrada, is the nephew of Justa by herhalf-sister, Agatonica Arreza.

Petitioners are the heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, son of Conrado Uriarte andPrimitiva Arnaldo whose father Domingo Arnaldo is the brother of Juan

Arnaldo, Justas father. Petitioners are thus grandchildren, the relatives within the fifth degree of

consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva Arnaldo Uriarte.ch The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her

brother Gregorio. These other petitioners are thus grandchildren and relatives within the

fifth degree of consanguinity of Justa by her cousins Gregorio andPrimitiva.

Benedicto brought the case in the RTC for the partition of the 2.7 ha landleft by Justa that the latter acquired 0.5 ha by inheritance from her

parents Juan Arnaldo and Ursula Tubil, and 2.2 ha by purchase after thedeath of her parents. Benedicto claimed to be the sole heir of Justa on the ground the latter

died without issue. He contended that Pascasio worked Justas land astenant and refused to give him his share of the harvest and that Pascasiohas no right to the entire land but only to one-half of the 0.5 ha.

Petitioners claimed that the land originally owned by their granduncleAmbrocio was bequeathed to Domingo and Juan Arnaldo in aholographic will wherein 2/3 will go to Domingo and 1/3 to Juan.

The land left by Ambrocio is only 0.5481 ha, 2/3 or 3,654 sqm to

Domingo and 1/3 or 1,827 sqm to Juan. Justa bought about 2 ha and increased the land to 2.7588 ha.

LC ruled in favor of herein petitioners. When she died intestate andwithout issue, her nearest surviving relatives are the children of her uncleDomingo.

CA reversed LC decision finding that the 0.5 ha were acquired by Justasparents during their marriage so as Justas nephew by her ha lf-sister

Agatonica, Benedicto is entitled to a share in Justas estateISSUE:

Who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to Justas estateas her nearest relative within the meaning of Art. 962 of the Civil code?RULING:

Benedicto as the nearest relative of Justa is entitled to her estate. Art. 962 states that in every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree

excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when itproperly takes place.

Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to theprovisions of Article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full and halfblood, and of Article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between

paternal and maternal lines. Since Benedicto is the son of Agatonica, Justas half-sister, he is a third

degree relative of Justa. Petitioners on the other hand are sons and daughters of Justas cousin,

thus fifth degree relative of Justa. Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, Benedicto is

the lawful heir of Justa, notwithstanding the fact that his mother is onlythe half-sister of Justa.

Benedicto being only a half-blood relative is immaterial. The CA held that"The determination of whether the relationship is of the full or half-blood

is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors." Petition is denied. CA decision is affirmed.

C. RELATIONSHIPD. REPRESENTATIONDELA PUERTA VS. CA

De La Puerta vs. CAFACTS:The right of representation does not extend to the adopted children of the personto be represented. This is because the fictional tie that binds the adopter and the

adopted does not extend to the relatives of the adopter. Thus, the adopter mayadopt an heir for himself, but he cannot adopt one for his relatives.


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1) DomingaRevuelta died on July 3, 1966, with a will leaving her properties to herthree surviving children, namely, Alfredo, Vicente and Isabel, all surnamed de laPuerta.2) The petition for the probate of the will filed by Isabel was opposed by herbrothers, who averred that their mother was already senile at the time of theexecution of the will.3) On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta adopted Carmelita de la Puerta. Soon,

Vicente died.4) Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in the probate proceedings, filed amotion for the payment to her of a monthly allowance as the acknowledged naturalchild of Vicente de la Puerta.5) The probate court granted the motion, and was affirmed by CA.PETITIONERs main argument is that Carmelita was not the n atural child ofVicente de la Puerta, who was married to Genoveva de la Puerta in 1938 andremained his wife until his death in 1978. Carmelita's real parents are JuanitaAustrial and Gloria Jordan.ISSUES and RULING:

1) WON Carmelita is an acknowledged ch ild of Vicente. YES.There was testimony from Vicente's own wife that her husband and Gloria livedtogether as a married couple, thereby rebutting the presumption that Gloria washerself the lawful wife of Juanita Austrial.Such testimony would for one thing show that Juanito and Gloria did notcontinuously live together as a married couple. Moreover, it is not explained why, ifhe was really married to her, Juanito did not object when Gloria left the conjugalhome and started openly consorting with Vicente, and in the same neighborhoodat that.The presumption of marriage between Juanito and Gloria having been destroyed,

it became necessary for the petitioner to submit additional proof to show that thetwo were legally married. She did not.And during the hearing of Carmelitas adoption case, Vicente de la Puertacategorically stated in court that Carmelita de la Puerta is his daughter with GloriaJordan and that it was Vicente de la Puerta during his lifetime who spent for hersubsistence, support andeducation.2) May Carmelita de la Puerta claim support and successional rights to theestate of DomingaRevuelta? NO.* The first reason is that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother; and

the second is that Carmelita is a spurious child.

It is settled that In testamentary succession, the right of representation can takeplace only in the following cases:first, when the person represented dies before the testator;second, when the person represented is incapable of succeeding the testator;and third, when the person represented is disinherited by the testator.In all of these cases, since there is a vacancy in the inheritance, the law calls thechildren or descendants of the person represented to succeed by right of

representation.Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the right toinherit from her directly or in his own right.No right of representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by Carmelita uponher father's death, which came after his own mother's death. It would have beendifferent if Vicente was already dead when Dominga Revuelta died. Carmelitacould then have inherited from her in representation of her father Vicente,assuming the private respondent was a lawful heir.* As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Domingabecause of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between the

legitimate and illegitimate families. This article provides quite clearly:- Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from thelegitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children orrelatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.The reason for this rule was (Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate CourtArticle 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that itprohibits absolutely a succession abintestato between the illegitimate child and thelegitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.- They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for thepurpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family

there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility.- The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family;the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child the latter considers theprivileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is therebydeprived; the former in turn sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product ofsin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more thanrecognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment. Indeed, even as anadopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from inheriting fromDomingaRevuelta for there would be no natural kindred tiesbetween them and consequently, no legal ties to bind them either. As aptly pointed

out by Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino:


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- If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the latter cannotrepresent the former in the inheritance from the parents or ascendants of theadopter. The adopted child is not related to the deceased in that case, becausethe filiation created by fiction of law is exclusively between the adopter and theadopted.- By adoption, the adopters can make for themselves an heir, but theycannot thus make one for their kindred.

- The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de laPuerta, has successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but not to theestate of DomingaRevuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance shouldtherefore be filed in the proceedings for the settlement of her own father's estateand cannot be considered in the probate of DomingaRevuelta's Will.

DIAZ VS. IACDiaz vs De Leon

DIAZ V. IAC

(1987)

FACTS:

FelipePamuti

PetronilaAsuncion

Pascual Santero(+1970) m

Simona(+1976) Juliana m

SimonJardin

Pablo (+1973) Felisa

anotherchild (+infancy)

w/Anselma Diaz

w/FelixbertaPacursa

Victor Federico

Rodrigo

another

child

Anselmina

Miguel

Felisa wasdeclared as thesole heir of

Simona Pamutivda. De Santero.

In sp.Proceedings forthe intestateestate of Pascualand Pablo,Felisa intervenedbut was declared

not anheir of Simona,which decisionwas reversed bythe IAC. Hencethis appeal of thenatural childrenof Pablo.

Petitioner'scontention wasthat Article 990of the NCCmodified the rulein Art. 941 (oldCivil Code) and

recognizes theright ofrepresentation

(Art. 970) to


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descendants,whetherlegitimate orillegitimate.

ISSUE:

Whether or notthe illegitimatechildren of Pablocan inherit fromSimona, byrightofrepresentation.

HELD:

No. Theapplicable law isArticle 992 of theCivil Code:

"An illegitimatechild has no right

to inherit abintestato fromthe legitimatechildren and

relatives of hisfather or mother;

nor shall suchchildren or

relatives inheritin the same

manner from theillegitimate child.

"

Thus, petitioners

cannot representtheir father PabloSantero in thesuccession ofthe latter to theintestate

estate of hislegitimate motherSimona Pamutivda. De Santero,because of thebarrier or ironcurtain

provided forunder Art. 992 ofthe New CivilCode. Xxx Theword "relative"includes all thekindred of the

person spokenof. Petition wasdismissed.

Reflections of JBL Reyes, which also finds support from other civilists: that in theSpanish code, the right of representation was admitted only within the

legitimate family. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to thisprinciple in Art. 992. While Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimatechild from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent, theillegitimates of an illegitimate can now do so.

TEOTICO VS. DEL VALTeotico v. Del ValVda. De Balsalobra died on july 14, 1955, she left properties worth 600,000. Sheleft a will leaving properties to Dr. Teotico worth 20,000, the husband of thedeceaseds daughter. She left the usufruct of the Calvo Bldg. to the her daughter

and herein petitioner.


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They filed a petition for the probate of the will.Aba Del Val Chan, the adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera who is the sister ofthe testatrix filed an opposition claiming the will to be executed: (1) Not inaccordance with the law; (2) with undue influence, improper pressure; (3) withoutpossession of her full mental faculties.The court moved forward with the dismissal of the petition for the probate of thewill.

IssueW/N a person who has no interest in the property may interveneW/N the adopted child has an interest to the willHeldNo, the intervenor cannot derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted childof Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established byadoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend tothe relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only asexpressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between theadopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the

adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.An interested party as defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, in thiscase, as she has no right to actually Inherit, and that she is not a creditor of thesame, she clearly is not an appropriate intervenor as mentioned by Section 2 Rule80 of the Rules of court.

SAYSON VS. CAG.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992(SAYSON VS CA)MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO, BASILISA, REMEDIOS and JUANA C.

BAUTISTAvs.COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBELSAYSON

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario,Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaelaon May 15, 1976.

Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wifedied nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the

possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim tobe their children.

On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together withJuana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting ofthe intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The action was resisted byDelia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the

disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants. Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for theaccounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson,against the couple's four surviving children. The complainants asserted thedefense, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel wasthe legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled toinherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.(focus dito)

Issue:1. Whether Delia, Edmundo (adopted children) and Doribel (legitimatedaughter) are entitled to inherit Teodoros (father) share in his parents(grandparents) estate by right of representation.Held:

YesDoribelNoDelia and Edmundo

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus thegranddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent herdeceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents.Under Article 981 she is entitled to the share her father would have directlyinherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents'other children. 13But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, towhom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted childshall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter,these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created bythe adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and doesnot extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14

Sayson v CA

FACTS:


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Eleno and Rafaela Sayson had 5 children: Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remediosand Teodoro. Elena died in 1952 and Rafaela in 1976.Teodoro married Isabel Bautista and died in 1972. Isabel died in 1981. They lefttheir properties to Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, their children.Mauricio, Rosario and Basilisa with Isabel's mother, Juana, filed a complaint forpartition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel.Delia, Edmundo and Doribel resisted this action and filed a complaint and partition

of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela.Being legally adopted children and the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel,they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right ofrepresentation.The lower courts decided in favor of private respondents in both cases beinglegally adopted children and legitimate daughter.Upon appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed the decision but modified in respect of thelegally adopted children Delia and Edmundo not inheriting from from the estate ofEleno and Rafaela.ISSUE:

Whether respondents Delia, Edmundo and Doribel have a right to representtheir deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of theirgrandchildren. RULING:YES as to Doribel. As legitimate daughter of Teodoro, she has a right to representher deceased dather and under Article 981, she is entitled to the share her fatherwould have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the sharesof her other grandparents' other childrenNo as to Delia and Edmundo who were total strangers to the grandparents. Whileadopted children are deemed legitimate and have the same right as the latter,

these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship create bythe adoption is between the adopting parents and the adopted children and doesnot extend to blood relatives of either party.Delia and Edmundo as adopted children and Doribel as legitimate daughter arethe exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel. Only Doribel has the right ofrepresentation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate. Petition isdenied.ARTICLE 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, byvirtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of theperson represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were

living or if he could have inherited.

ARTICLE 971. The representative is called to the succession by the lawand not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed theperson represented but the one whom the person represented would havesucceeded.ARTICLE 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants ofother children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, andthe latter by right of representation.

BACAYO VS. BORROMEOG.R. No. L-19382. August 31, 1965.]IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELOIDA FARRARIS. FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. GAUDENCIAFERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERRARIS DE VILLEGAS, JUANITOFERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, Oppositors-Appellees .Mateo C. Bacalso and Cesar A. Kintanar for Petitioner-Appellant.Gaudioso Sosmea and C. Tomakin for oppositors-appellees.

Facts:

Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred toIntramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944.Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summarysettlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are stillunknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she wasknown to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of openingher succession and distributing her estate among her heirs.The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, orspouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellanade Bacayo, an aunt, and half- sister of decedents father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by

Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces andnephew, who were the children of Melodias only brother of full blood, ArturoFerraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs claimto be the nearest intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of saidMelodia Ferraris.

Issue:1. Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person whenhe or she is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit: an aunt and thechildren of a brother who predeceased him or her?

2. Otherwise, will the aunt concur with the children of the decedentsbrother in the inheritance or will the former be excluded by the latter?


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RTC Ruling:the oppositors-appellees, as children of the only predeceased brother of thedecedent, exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent, reasoningout that the former are nearer in degree (two degrees) than the latter since niecesand nephew succeed by right of representation, while petitioner- appellant is threedegrees distant from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives are excluded

by brothers or sisters, or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent inaccordance with article 1009 of the New Civil Code.

Ruling: SCA decedents uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephewsand nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.

The absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is aprecondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to thesuccession. (Art. 1009 Civil Code.)

An aunt of the deceased is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (threedegrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong,degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and thendescending to the heir (Civil Code Art. 966).

Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., perstirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased.It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephewsand nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other

collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code ofthe Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and niecesand brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferredposition of the latter vis a vis the other collaterals.

"Other Collaterals.The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed inintestate succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children ofbrothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within the fifth degree.Beyond this, we can safely say, there is hardly any affection to merit thesuccession of collaterals. Under the law, therefore, persons beyond the fifth

degree are no longer considered as relatives, for successional purposes.

"Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article shouldbe understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest relativesexclude the farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, therebeing no right of representation. They succeed without distinction of lines orpreference among them on account of the whole blood relationship." ( Italicssupplied)

We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedentsuncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces ofthe decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.

The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to this rule, is herebyaffirmed. No costs.Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. andZaldivar, JJ., concur.Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.

CORPUZ VS. CORPUZ Corpus vs. CorpusFACTS:1. RAMONA ARGUELLES and TOMAS CORPUS were married, blessed with 5children: PABLO CORPUS, JOSE CORPUS and 3 others.2. When TOMAS CORPUS DIED, RAMONA wed LUIS RAFAEL YANGCO andhad 4 recognized acknowledged natural children, one of them was the decedentTEORORO YANGCO3. TEODORO Yangco died on April 20, 1939.a. His will was dated August 29, 1934 and was probated 1941. At the time of his

death, he had no forced heirs.b. He only had his half brother (LUIS YANGCO), half sister (PAZ YANGCO), wifeof Miguel Ossorio (AMALIA CORPUS), the children of his half brother PabloCorpus (JOSE and RAMON) and the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus(JUANA/JUANITA CORPUS). Juanita died in 1944.4. Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November26, 1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will.5. The said project was contested by the following, on the following grounds(oppositors):a. Estate of LUIS YANGCO: intestacy should be declared because the will does

not contain an institution of heir


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b. JUANITA Corpus, PEDRO MARTINEZ and JULIANA DE CASTO, throughATTY. CRUZ: the proposed partition was not in conformity with the will as thetestator intended that the estate should be CONSERVED and not physicallyparititoned.6. Nevertheless, the project of partition was approved by the Probate court, inessence holding that the testator did not really intend to a perpetual prohibitionagainst alienation when he stated that some of his estate be conserved

7. Oppositors appealed to SC but appeal dismissed after the legatees and theappellants entered into compromise agreements wherein the legatees agreed topay P35k to PEDRO MARTINEZ, the heirs of PIO CORPUS, the heirs of ISABELCORPUS, and the heir of JUANITA CORPUSher son TOMAS CORPUS (samename as that of their lola sa tuhods ex-husband).a. For the estate of Luis Yangco, a similar compromise agreement was entered.b. The dismissal of the appeal became final and executory8. Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus signed a receiptacknowledging that he received from the Yangco estate P2k as settlement in fullof my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding with Judge

Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case.9. The legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical partition ofthe Yangco estate which was approved by the probate court in 1949. 1945 projectof partition was pro-tanto modified.10. TOMAS CORPUS still filed action to recover JUANITAs supposed share inYangcos intestate estate, alleging that the dispositions in Yangcos will singperpetual prohibitions upon alienation which rendered it void under A785, OCCand that 1949 partition is invalid.a. The decedents estate should have been distributed according to the rules onintestacy.

11. TC: DISMISS: Res Judicata and laches. a. directly appealed to SC12. Petitioners contention: trial court erred in holding(1) TeodoroYangco was a natural child;(2) TeodoroYangcos will had been duly legalized;(3) Plaintiffs action is barred by res judicata and laches. ISSUE:Whether JUANITA CORPUS, TOMAS CORPUS mom, was a legal heir ofTEODORO YANGCO so that his mom would have a cause of action to recover asupposed intestate share in the estate? NoHELD: No.JUANITA CORPUS, the petitioners mother, was NOT A LEGAL HEIR of Yangco

because there is NO RECIPROCAL SUCCESSION between legitimate andillegitimate relatives.

Article 992, NCC: An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from thelegitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children orrelatives inherit in the same manner from the legitimate child.o based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by thelegitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the legitimate child* Law does not recognize blood tie and seeks to avoid further grounds ofresentment.

TEODORO YANGCO, and 3 other children, was ACKNOWLEDGED NATURALCHILD and NOT A LEGITIMATE CHILD, of LUIS RAFAEL YANGCO andRAMONA ARGUELLES. JOSE CORPUS (LOLO OF TOMAS CORPUS, FATHEROF JUANITA CORPUS) was the presumed legitimate child of TOMAS CORPUSand RAMONA ARGUELLES.* Therefore, TOMAS CORPUS (Petitioner) had no cause of action for the recoveryof the supposed hereditary share of his mother, JUANITA CORPUS, as legal heirin YANGCOs estate.legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child.* The natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the

estate of the legitimate grandparent.* The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, alegitimate brother of her natural mother.DECISION: WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs. SOORDERED.

DELGADO VS. RUSTIA

Delgado v Rustia

FACTS:Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died without a will. The claimants of theirestates may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado,consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, andgrandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia,particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child, and the defacto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.

The Alleged Heirs of Josefa Delgado


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The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one LucioCampo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely,Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. FelisaDelgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-bloodsiblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio Campo wasnot the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him was Ramon Osoriowith whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado.

The Marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado

Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a marriage infact took place is disputed. Several circumstances give rise to the presumptionthat a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted.

The Alleged Heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children but they took into

their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. Thesechildren, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the localdialect as ampun-ampunan. During his life with Josefa, however, GuillermoRustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, the intervenor-respondentGuillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria.

ISSUES:

1. Who are the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado?

2. Whether or not the grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado caninherit by right of representation?

3. Who are the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia?

RULING:

1. The Lawful Heirs of Josefa Delgado

It was found out that Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married.Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon

Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario,

Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamedDelgado, were her natural children.

The above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood,except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were allillegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitledto inherit from Josefa Delgado.

However, the petitioners in this case are already the nephews, nieces,grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the newCivil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only infavor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently,it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the onlycollateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestateestate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at thetime of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participatein the inheritance. The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for thetrial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or theirchildren) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with GuillermoRustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article1001 of the new Civil Code:

Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower,the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers andsisters or their children to the other one-half.2. The Lawful Heirs of Guillermo Rustia

Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be

entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition ofpaternity. She failed to present authentic proof of recognition. Together withGuillermina Rustia Rustia, they were held legal strangers to the deceasedspouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato.

Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants,ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shallsucceed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs ofGuillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, niecesand nephews.


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Therefore, the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of theintestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the fulland half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of anyof Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, alsosurviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews andgrandnieces are excluded from her estate. The trial court is hereby ordered todetermine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to

share in her estate.

Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate)shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz(whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late RomanRustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall beper stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and HortenciaRustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to theirestates.

E. ORDER OF INTESTATE SUCCESSIONSAYSON VS. CAG.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992(SAYSON VS CA)MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO, BASILISA, REMEDIOS and JUANA C.BAUTISTAvs.COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBELSAYSON

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario,Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaelaon May 15, 1976.

Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wifedied nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in thepossession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim tobe their children.

On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together withJuana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting ofthe intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The action was resisted by

Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to thedisputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.

Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for theaccounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson,against the couple's four surviving children. The complainants asserted thedefense, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was

the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled toinherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.(focus dito)

Issue:1. Whether Delia, Edmundo (adopted children) and Doribel (legitimatedaughter) are entitled to inherit Teodoros (father) share in his parents(grandparents) estate by right of representation.Held:

YesDoribelNoDelia and Edmundo

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus thegranddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent herdeceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents.Under Article 981 she is entitled to the share her father would have directlyinherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents'other children. 13But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, towhom the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted childshall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter,these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created bythe adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and doesnot extend to the blood relatives of either party. 14

Sayson v CAFACTS:Eleno and Rafaela Sayson had 5 children: Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remediosand Teodoro. Elena died in 1952 and Rafaela in 1976.Teodoro married Isabel Bautista and died in 1972. Isabel died in 1981. They lefttheir properties to Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, their children.Mauricio, Rosario and Basilisa with Isabel's mother, Juana, filed a complaint forpartition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel.


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Delia, Edmundo and Doribel resisted this action and filed a complaint and partitionof the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela.Being legally adopted children and the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel,they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right ofrepresentation.The lower courts decided in favor of private respondents in both cases beinglegally adopted children and legitimate daughter.

Upon appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed the decision but modified in respect of thelegally adopted children Delia and Edmundo not inheriting from from the estate ofEleno and Rafaela.ISSUE:Whether respondents Delia, Edmundo and Doribel have a right to representtheir deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of theirgrandchildren. RULING:YES as to Doribel. As legitimate daughter of Teodoro, she has a right to representher deceased dather and under Article 981, she is entitled to the share her father

would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the sharesof her other grandparents' other childrenNo as to Delia and Edmundo who were total strangers to the grandparents. Whileadopted children are deemed legitimate and have the same right as the latter,these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship create bythe adoption is between the adopting parents and the adopted children and doesnot extend to blood relatives of either party.Delia and Edmundo as adopted children and Doribel as legitimate daughter arethe exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel. Only Doribel has the right ofrepresentation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate. Petition is

denied.ARTICLE 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, byvirtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of theperson represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he wereliving or if he could have inherited.ARTICLE 971. The representative is called to the succession by the lawand not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed theperson represented but the one whom the person represented would havesucceeded.ARTICLE 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of

other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, andthe latter by right of representation.

BANAWA VS. MIRANOBanawa v. MiranoFacts:1. 1911Maria Mirano (niece of appellant Juliana Mendoza), and was still 9years of age, was taken in by Sps. Banawa (Doroteo and Juliana) in their house inTaal.2. Sps Banawa being childless, treated and reared her up like their own

daughter. They also hired a private tutor to teach her literacy.3. A few years later, the spouses opened up a store for general merchandisein Quezon from which they derived considerable income. They also acquiredseveral parcels of land.4. Maria Mirano died in Taal after an illness. At the time of her death she leftas her only nearest relatives (Primitiva Miranoher sister) and Gregoria, Juanaand Marciano (children of a deceased brother, Martin)5. There are two properties involved in this case: Iba property and theCarsuche property6. Iba property: owned by Punzalan from whom it was acquired in 1921. A

DOS in question states that the Iba property consisted of two parcels of land andthat they were sold for the amount of 2k in favor of Maria Mirano. DefendantDoroteo impliedly admitted the execution of this notarial document when hedeclared that in the execution of the document concerning the purchase of the Ibaproperty from Punzalan the Notary Public charged him 20 pesos and another 5 forstampsOn the other hand, defendants claim of ownership over the Iba property ispredicated upon their assertion that the money used in buying said land pertainedto the spouses Banawa. Defendants contend that since 1919, Punzalan borrowedmoney from Sps Banawa on three different occasions. Upon the failure of

Punzalan to discharge said obligations in 1921, he agreed to sell the land to thespouses for 3,700. Defendants also alleged that the sale was made to appear infavor of Maria because said spouses being already old, they want to leavesomething to Maria for her to lean upon when they would have been gone. Mariawas 19 years old when the deed of sale was executed.7. Carsuche property: original owners of this property were Roman Biscocho,Paula and Carmen Mendoza. Maria Mirano was mentioned by a public instrumentevidencing the sale. Defendants, on the other hand, assert that the sale wasevidence by a private handwriting prepared in the handwriting of Roman and that itwas in favor of Sps Banawa

In order to prove the due execution of the public instrument, the plaintiffspresented Atty Ilagan and Roman Biscocho. The witnesses declared that in 1935,


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Sps Banawa, Maria, Roman, Paula and Carmen went to office of Atty Ilagan. AttyAro asked Atty Ilagans permission to use his typewriter on which he prepared adocument in English and which he asked Atty Ilagan to ratify and that the lattertranslated the document into Tagalog. The document involved the sale of theCarsuce property in favor of Maria Mirano. Doroteo asked Atty Ilagan whether thedocument that he ratified was Matibay to safeguard the rights of Maria to whichAtty Ilagan answered in the affirmative.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in law in ruling that the placing of the Iba property inthe name of Maria was in the nature of donation inter vivos.Held:1. Respondents are correct when they stated that neither CA nor the CFIBatangas categorically stated that the placing of the properties in the name ofMaria was in the nature of a donation inter vivos.2. CA rejected the contention of petitioners that a donation mortis causa wasexecuted. CA said that the placing of Iba property in the name of Maria (if it was tobe called a donation at all) was not in the nature of a donation mortis causa but adonation inter vivos.

3. Both courts found that what was donated by the spouses Banawa to Mariawas the money used in the purchase of the lands in question. This conclusion ofthe CFI was supported by testimony of Aro, a nephew of Doroteo, that the moneywas used by Maria in the purchased of the Iba and Carsuche properties was givento her by Doroteo.4. Note that if the money used by Maria in purchasing the properties was givento her by the sps, then the money had belonged to her. Maria purchased and paidsuch properties with her money.5. From the record there is no showing of deception or fraud nor ofconcealment of intent of the parties as to the sale of the IP by the vendors in favor

of Maria.6. The intention of spouses to make Maria the owner of the said parcels ofland was shown by their conduct at the time of the execution of the DOS whichinfluenced the vendors to believe that Maria was indeed the vendee in theiragreement.7. The transactions in question took place before the Civil Code becameeffective on Aug 30, 1950. Hence, 1448 is not applicable. Moreover, there is noshowing that Maria bought the lands in question in trust for the petitioners.8. It is a fact that while Maria was alive she possessed the property in questionas the owner thereof. Hence, it is error for petitioners to claim ownership over the

IP by acquisitive prescription under Article 41 of Civ Pro for their possession of thesaid property became adverse and exclusive only in 1949 after Marias death.

From 1949 up to the date of filing in 1957 of the present action by the respondentsonly eight years had elapsed.9. On petitioners contention that oral donation of personal property requiressimultaneous delivery of the gift: the court said that delivery may be actual orconstructive. In the instant case, the oral donation of the gift consisting of preexisting obli of the vendor, Punzalan, was simultaneous or concurrent with theconstructive delivery to Maria when the sps consented to the execution of the

DOS of IP in favor of Maria. The execution of said DOS constituted payment bythe vendor Punzalan of his outstanding obli due to spouses. There was aconstructive transfer of possession of the incorporeal rights of the spouses overthe property in question to Maria.10. On the petitioners contention that the donor spouses are entitled to land inquestion by virtue of Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court: In case of the death ofthe child, his parents and relatives by nature, and not by adoption, shall be hislegal heirs, except as to property received or inherited by the adopted child fromeither of his parents by adoption, which shall become the property of the latter ortheir legit relatives who shall participate in the order established by the CC for

intestate estates.Petitioners contend that extrajudicial adoption is within the contemplation and spiritof this rule of reversion adoptive. However, the rule involved specifically providesfor the case of the judicially adopted child. It is an elementary rule of constructionthat when the language of thTEOTICO VS. DEL VALTeotico v. Del ValVda. De Balsalobra died on july 14, 1955, she left properties worth 600,000. Sheleft a will leaving properties to Dr. Teotico worth 20,000, the husband of thedeceaseds daughter. She left the usufructof the Calvo Bldg. to the her daughter

and herein petitioner.They filed a petition for the probate of the will.Aba Del Val Chan, the adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera who is the sister ofthe testatrix filed an opposition claiming the will to be executed: (1) Not inaccordance with the law; (2) with undue influence, improper pressure; (3) withoutpossession of her full mental faculties.The court moved forward with the dismissal of the petition for the probate of thewill.IssueW/N a person who has no interest in the property may intervene

W/N the adopted child has an interest to the willHeld


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MAKALINTAL, J.:Euguenio Del Prado filed for annulment of deed executed by Aurea Santos in CFIRIZAL in favor of Jesus del prado. (his nephew-son of Aurea to his brotherDeogracias Demetria)Plaintiff alleged that he was thus deprived of his rightful share in the estate of hisbrother.Defendant alleged that her son Jesus Santos del Prado, being an acknowledged

natural child of the deceased, was entitled to the property left by the latter.Parties stipulate that:1. Anastacio C. del Prado, died intestate in the City of Manila on August 11, 1958;at the time of his death, Anastacio C. del Prado was single;2. Plaintiff Eugenio C. del Prado is a legitimate brother of the late Anastacio C. delPrado;3. Defendant Aurea S. Santos was legally married to Deogracias Demetria in1945, but has been in fact separated from him;4. The deceased Anastacio C. del Prado and defendant Aurea S. Santoscohabited with each other without the benefit of matrimony; had a son Jesus

(acknowledged)5. After the death of Anastacio C. del Prado his estate consisting, among others,of a parcel of land situated at Caloocan, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate ofTitle No. 471848 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the name of Anastacio C. delPrado with an assessed value of P750.00, was adjudicated to the minor Jesus delPrado.TC dismissed the complaintHence this petitionIssue: whether the plaintiff was deprived of his legitime(NO. because descendant exclude the collateral relative)

The facts stipulated by him and by appellee are clear: "the deceased Anastacio C.del Prado and defendant Aurea S. Santos cohabited with each other without thebenefit of matrimony; as a result of that cohabitation, the late Anastacio C. delPrado and defendant Aurea S. Santos had one son the minor Jesus S. delPrado who was born on December 19, 1957, and whom Anastacio C. del Pradoadmitted to be his son in the latter's birth certificate."Since Anastacio C. del Prado died in 1958 the new Civil Code applies (Article2263). Illegitimate children other than natural are entitled to successional rights(Article 287). Where, as in this case, the deceased died intestate, withoutlegitimate descendants or ascendants, then his illegitimate child shall succeed tohis entire estate (Article 988), to the exclusion of appellant who is only a collateralrelative.

Judgment affirmed

CACHO VS. UDANCacho vs Udan L-19996 April 30, 1965Facts:Silvina G. Udan, single, and a resident of San Marcelino, Zambales, died leaving apurported will naming her son, Francisco G. Udan, and one Wencesla Cacho, as

her sole heirs, share and share alike. Wencesla Cacho, filed a petition to probatesaid Will in the Court of First Instance of Zambales on 14 January 1960. On 15February 1960 Rustico G. Udan, legitimate brother of the testatrix, filed anopposition to the probate. Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., filed his Appearance andUrgent Motion for Postponement for and in behalf of his client Francisco G. Udan,the appointed heir in the Will. Francisco G. Udan, through counsel, filed hisopposition to the probate of this will. On 15 September 1960 oppositor Rustico G.Udan, through counsel, verbally moved to withdraw his opposition, dated 13February 1960, due to the appearance of Francisco G. Udan, the named heir inthe will and said opposition was ordered withdrawn. After one witness, the Notary

Public who made and notarize the will, had testified in court, oppositor FranciscoG. Udan died on June 1961 in San Marcelino, Zambales, Philippines.After the death of Francisco G. Udan, John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan, bothlegitimate brothers of the testatrix Silvina G. Udan, filed their respectiveoppositions on the ground that the will was not attested and executed as requiredby law, that the testatrix was incapacitated to execute it; and that it was procuredby fraud or undue influence.Issue:Whether or not, the brothers John and Rustico Udan may claim to be heirs

intestate of their legitimate sister, Silvina?

Held:No. It is clear from Article 988 and 1003 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, in

force at the time of the death of the testatrix that the brothers may not claim to beheirs intestate of their legitimate sister, Silvina. The collateral relatives of one whodied intestate inherit only in the absence of descendants, ascendants, andillegitimate children. Having Francisco Udan as the illegitimate son of the lateSilvina which fact is not denied by the oppositor brothers. He is so acknowledgedto be in the testament, where said Francisco is termed "son" by the testatrix.Hence, the death of Francisco two years after his mother's demise does notimprove the situation of appellants. The rights acquired by the former are onlytransmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not to the appellants, who are


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legitimate brothers of his mother, for the reason that, the legitimate relatives of themother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. This is clear from Article 992 of theCivil Code. Francisco Udan did survive his mother, and acquired the rights to thesuccession from the moment of her death. While there is no document or pleadingin the records showing repudiation of the inheritance by Francisco Udan. Thelatter's own opposition to the probate of the alleged will is perfectly compatible withthe intention to exclude the proponent Cacho as testamentary coheir, and to claim

the entire inheritance as heir ab intestato

CUARTICO VS. CUARTICOCuartico v Cuartico, No. 11190-R, November 16, 1955FACTS:

Patricia Clavecilla, died single and ab intestato leaving 6 parcels of landand houses as inheritance.

The petitioners-appellants , Tranquilino, Cipriano, Luis, Demetrio andPancrasio, all surnamed Cuartico, are children of Macario Cuartico and

Maria Clavecilla. The oppositors-appellees, Feliciana, Gregorio and Paula, are the siblingsof appellees' father, Macario, whose parents are Eleno Cuartico andSusana Germodo, both deceased. Macario then deceased wasrepresented by a daughter named Generosa.

Maria's mother is Sinforosa Romano , who after Maria's birth marriedBenigno Martinez. Patricia's mother is Susana Germodo, who afterPatricia's birth married Eleno Cuartico from which wedlock were born theappellees.

The appellants claimed to be the natural nephews of Patricia Clavecillaaverring that their mother Maria is a natural sister of Patricia. Both wererecognized as natural daughters of Juan Clavecilla on the strength of aprivate instrument supposedly executed by Juan.

The appellees contended that Juan Clavecilla was legally married toBonifacia Cardente as evidenced by church records and from suchmarriage was born Romana.

Appellees also maintained that Patricia and Maria were both adulterouschildren and could not have been recognized by Juan being legallymarried to Bonifacia.

Appellees are legitimate children of Eleno and Susana and are thenatural half-brothers and half-sisters of Patricia while and they sought toinherit from the latter.

ISSUE:Whether appellees as legitimate children of Eleno and Susana can inherit fromPatricia who was a natural child of Susana.RULING:NO.

Art. 943 of the Old Civil Code (now substantially reproduced as Art. 992)states

"A natural child has no right to succeed ab intestato the legitimate children andrelatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor such children orrelatives so inherit from the natural child."

The reason for this prohibition on intestate succession is the interveningantagonism and incompatibility between members of the natural familyand those of the legitimate family.

The appellants cannot similarly inherit from Patricia by reason of theiralleged status as natural nephews of the latter.

Neither the appellants nor the appellees are entitled to succeed abintestato to the inheritance left by Patricia.

The State became the successor of Patricia.

CORPUS VS. CORPUSCorpus vs. Corpus

FACTS:1. RAMONA ARGUELLES and TOMAS CORPUS were married, blessed with 5children: PABLO CORPUS, JOSE CORPUS and 3 others.2. When TOMAS CORPUS DIED, RAMONA wed LUIS RAFAEL YANGCO andhad 4 recognized acknowledged natural children, one of them was the decedentTEORORO YANGCO

3. TEODORO Yangco died on April 20, 1939.a. His will was dated August 29, 1934 and was probated 1941. At the time of hisdeath, he had no forced heirs.b. He only had his half brother (LUIS YANGCO), half sister (PAZ YANGCO), wifeof Miguel Ossorio (AMALIA CORPUS), the children of his half brother PabloCorpus (JOSE and RAMON) and the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus(JUANA/JUANITA CORPUS). Juanita died in 1944.4. Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November26, 1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will.5. The said project was contested by the following, on the following grounds(oppositors):


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a. Estate of LUIS YANGCO: intestacy should be declared because the will doesnot contain an institution of heirb. JUANITA Corpus, PEDRO MARTINEZ and JULIANA DE CASTO, throughATTY. CRUZ: the proposed partition was not in conformity with the will as thetestator intended that the estate should be CONSERVED and not physicallyparititoned.6. Nevertheless, the project of partition was approved by the Probate court, in

essence holding that the testator did not really intend to a perpetual prohibitionagainst alienation when he stated that some of his estate be conserved7. Oppositors appealed to SC but appeal dismissed after the legatees and theappellants entered into compromise agreements wherein the legatees agreed topay P35k to PEDRO MARTINEZ, the heirs of PIO CORPUS, the heirs of ISABELCORPUS, and the heir of JUANITA CORPUSher son TOMAS CORPUS (samename as that of their lola sa tuhods ex-husband).a. For the estate of Luis Yangco, a similar compromise agreement was entered.b. The dismissal of the appeal became final and executory8. Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus signed a receipt

acknowledging that he received from the Yangco estate P2k as settlement in fullof my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding with JudgeRoman Cruz, our attorney in this case.9. The legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical partition ofthe Yangco estate which was approved by the probate court in 1949. 1945 projectof partition was pro-tanto modified.10. TOMAS CORPUS still filed action to recover JUANITAs supposed share inYangcos intestate estate, alleging that the dispositions in Yangcos will singperpetual prohibitions upon alienation which rendered it void under A785, OCCand that 1949 partition is invalid.

a. The decedents estate should have been distributed according to the rules onintestacy.11. TC: DISMISS: Res Judicata and laches. a. directly appealed to SC12. Petitioners contention: trial court erred in holding(1) TeodoroYangco was a natural child;(2) TeodoroYangcos will had been duly legalized;(3) Plaintiffs action is barred by res judicata and laches. ISSUE:Whether JUANITA CORPUS, TOMAS CORPUS mom, was a legal heir ofTEODORO YANGCO so that his mom would have a cause of action to recover asupposed intestate share in the estate? NoHELD: No.

JUANITA CORPUS, the petitioners mother, was NOT A LEGAL HEIR of Yangcobecause there is NO RECIPROCAL SUCCESSION between legitimate andillegitimate relatives.Article 992, NCC: An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from thelegitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children orrelatives inherit in the same manner from the legitimate child.o based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the

legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the legitimate child* Law does not recognize blood tie and seeks to avoid further grounds ofresentment.TEODORO YANGCO, and 3 other children, was ACKNOWLEDGED NATURALCHILD and NOT A LEGITIMATE CHILD, of LUIS RAFAEL YANGCO andRAMONA ARGUELLES. JOSE CORPUS (LOLO OF TOMAS CORPUS, FATHEROF JUANITA CORPUS) was the presumed legitimate child of TOMAS CORPUSand RAMONA ARGUELLES.* Therefore, TOMAS CORPUS (Petitioner) had no cause of action for the recoveryof the supposed hereditary share of his mother, JUANITA CORPUS, as legal heir

in YANGCOs estate.legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child.* The natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to theestate of the legitimate grandparent.* The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, alegitimate brother of her natural mother.DECISION: WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs. SOORDERED.

LEONARDO VS. CA

FACTS:Petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo claims to be the son of Sotero andgreatgrandson of Francisca Reyes. Reyes died intestate and was survived bydaughters Maria and Silvestra Cailles. Sotero's mother was Pascuala whopredeceased Francisca. To prove his filiation, Leonardo presented his allegedbirth certificate showing the name "Alfredo Leonardo," born on Sept. 13, 1935 toSotero and Socorro Timbol. He argued that being the son of Sotero he wasentitled to a right of representation of his father for the share in the estate ofFrancisca. The trial court ruled in favor of Cresenciano; however, decision wasreversed by the CA.

ISSUE:


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Whether or not Cresenciano may represent Sotero

HELD:No. Even if it is true that Cresenciano is the child of Sotero Leonardo, still hecannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceasedFrancisca Reyes considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he wasborn outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September

13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet married, and what ismore, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitionerwould be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from thelegitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes.(Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)

MANUEL VS. FERRERMANUEL vs. FERRERDoctrine: When the law speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces aslegal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as

well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers andsisters.FACTS:1. Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and BeatrizGuiling, initiated this suit.2. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with oneUrsula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Several yearspassed before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz, and his mistress Ursula finallycrossed the bar on, respectively, 06 August 1960, 05 February 1981 and 04November 1976.

3. Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. Inconsideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land,was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcelsof land, covered by OCT P-19902 and TransferCertificate of Title ("TCT") No. 41134, were later bought by Juan and registered inhis name. The couple were not blessed with a child of their own. Their desire tohave one impelled the spouses to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own"daughter".4. On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuelexecuted in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deedof Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half(1/2) portion of his land covered by TCT No. 41134.

5. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on 04February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.6. On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executedan Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land (allstill in the name of Juan Manuel).7. On 19 October 1992, Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondentEstanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed

one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by TCT No. 184225) that was soldto the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro.8. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaintfiled before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitionerssought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.9. The trial court, dismissed the complaint holding that petitioners, not being heirsabintestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit.ISSUE: WON the trial court is correct? Yes, except insofar as it has a

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