FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-32328. September 30, 1977.]

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANO MALOTO: ALDINA MALOTO

CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN

CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, and ASILO DE MOLO, petitioners-appellants,

vs. PANFILO MALOTO and FELINO MALOTO, oppositors-appellees.

Ramon C. Zamora, Lorenzo E. Coloso, Jose L. Castigador, Arthur Defensor & Sixto

Demaisip and Flores, Macapagal, Ocampo & Balbastro for petitioners-appellants.

Nacianceno G. Rico & Felipe G. Espinosa for oppositors-appellees.

D E C I S I O N

FERNANDEZ, J p:

This is a petition to review the order dated April 13, 1970 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch

III, in Special Proceeding No. 2176 dismissing the petition for the probate of a will. 1

One Adriana Maloto died on October 20, 1963 in Iloilo City, her place of residence.

Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto, niece and nephews,

respectively, of Adriana Maloto, in the belief that decedent died intestate, commenced on November 4,

1963 in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an intestate proceeding docketed as Special Proceeding No.

1736. In the course of said intestate proceeding, Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo

Maloto and Felino Maloto executed an extrajudicial partition of the estate of Adriana Maloto on February

1, 1964 whereby they adjudicated said estate unto themselves in the proportion of one-fourth (1/4) share

for each. 2 The Court of First Instance of Iloilo, then presided by Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, approved the

extrajudicial partition on March 21, 1964. 3

On April 1, 1967, a document dated January 3, 1940 purporting to be the last will and testament of

Adriana Maloto was delivered to the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. 4 It appears

that Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto are named as heirs

but Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto allegedly have shares in said will which are bigger,

different and more valuable than what they obtained in the extrajudicial partition. The said will also

allegedly made dispositions to certain devisees and/or legatees, among whom being the Asilo de Molo,

the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor. LibLex

On May 24, 1967, Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736

a motion (1) for reconsideration; (2) annulment of the proceedings; and (3) for the allowance of the last

will and testament of Adriana Maloto. 5 The Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and

Purificacion Miraflor also filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 petitions for the allowance of the will of

Adriana Maloto. 6

Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto opposed the motion of Aldina Maloto Casiano and Constancio Maloto.

The Court of First Instance of Iloilo, through Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, issued an order dated November

16, 1968 denying the motion to reopen the proceedings on the ground that the said motion had been filed

out of time. A motion for reconsideration of said order was denied. Petitioners appealed from the order

of denial. On motion of Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto, the lower court dismissed the appeal on the

ground that it was filed late. A motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal was denied. A

supplemental order dated April 1, 1969 stating as additional ground that the appeal is improper was

issued.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R.

No. L-30479. This Court dismissed the petition in a resolution dated May 14, 1969 which reads:

"L-30479 (Constancio Maloto, et al, vs. Hon. Emigdio V. Nietes, etc., et al.) — THE COURT

RESOLVED to dismiss the petition for certiorari and mandamus, without passing on the issue

of whether or not the petitioners appeal from the order of November 16, 1968 of respondent

Judge was made on time, it appearing that the more appropriate remedy of petitioners in the

premises stated in the petition is for petitioners to initiate a separate proceeding for the probate

of the alleged will in question." 7

Acting on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration and clarification, this Court issued a resolution dated

July 15, 1969 which reads:

"Acting on the motion for reconsideration and/or clarification filed by petitioner in G. R. No. L-

30479, Constancio Maloto, et al., vs. Hon. Emigdio V. Nietes, etc. et al., dated June 11, 1969,

the Court resolved to DENY the motion for reconsideration, with the clarification that the matter

of whether or not the pertinent findings of facts of respondent Judge in his herein subject order

of November 16, 1968 constitute res adjudicata may be raised in the proceedings for probate of

the alleged will in question indicated in the resolution of this Court of May 14, 1969, wherein

such matter will be more appropriately determined." 8

Thereupon, the herein petitioners commenced Special Proceeding No. 2176 in the Court of First Instance

of Iloilo for the probate of the alleged last will and testament of Adriana Maloto. 9

Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto filed an opposition with a motion to dismiss on the following grounds:

"I. THAT THE ALLEGED WILL SOUGHT TO BE PROBATED HAD BEEN DESTROYED

AND REVOKED BY THE TESTATRIX.

II. THAT THE INSTANT PETITION FOR PROBATE IS NOW BARRED BY PRIOR

JUDGMENT OR ORDER (OR RES JUDICATA).

III. THAT THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO HAD ALREADY PASSED

OUT OF EXISTENCE AND TITLE THERETO HAD ALREADY VESTED IN THE

DISTRIBUTEES OF THEIR ASSIGNS.

IV. THAT PETITIONERS ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO AND CONSTANCIO MALOTO

ARE NOW ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING THE REMEDY UNDER THIS PROCEEDING,

THEY HAVING CEASED TO BE INTERESTED PARTIES." 10

In an order dated April 13, 1970, the probate court dismissed the petition for the probate of the will on

the basis of the finding of said court in Special Proceeding No. 1736 that the alleged will sought to be

probated had been destroyed and revoked by the testatrix. The probate court sustained the oppositors'

contention that the petition for probate is now barred by the order of November 16, 1968 in the intestate

estate proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 1736. 11

The herein petitioners allege that the probate court committed the following errors:

"I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ADMITTEDLY GENUINE LAST

WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO (THE SUBJECT OF

PETITION FOR PROBATE - SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 2176, CFI ILOILO) HAD

PREVIOUSLY BEEN REVOKED BY HER (ADRIANA MALOTO).

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SAID PETITION (FOR PROBATE OF

THE AFORESAID LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO)

IS NOW BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT. I. E., THAT THE MATTER CONCERNED IS

NOW RES ADJUDICATA.

III

THE LOWER COURT, THEREFORE, ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AFORESAID

PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF THE LATE

ADRIANA MALOTO AND IN NOT, INSTEAD, GIVING IT (THE PETITION ABOVE-

CITED DUE COURSE." 12

The instant petition for review is meritorious.

The probate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana

Maloto in Special Proceeding No. 1736. Indeed, the motion to reopen the proceedings was denied

because the same was filed out of time. Moreover, it is not proper to make a finding in an intestate estate

proceeding that the discovered will has been revoked. As a matter of fact, the probate court in Special

Proceeding No. 1736 stated in the order of November 16, 1968 that "Movants should have filed a separate

action for the probate of the will." 13 And this court stated in its resolution of May 14, 1969 that "The

more appropriate remedy of the petitioners in the premises stated in the petition is for petitioners to

initiate a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will in question."

In view of the foregoing, the order of November 16, 1968 in Special Proceeding No. 1736 is not a bar to

the present petition for the probate of the alleged will of Adriana Maloto.

WHEREFORE, the order dated April 13, 1970 dismissing the petition for the probate of the alleged will

of Adriana Maloto is hereby set aside and the lower court is directed to proceed with the hearing of the

petition in Special Proceeding No. 2176 on the merits, with costs against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Martin and Guerrero, JJ., concur

||| (Testate Estate of Maloto v. Maloto, G.R. No. L-32328, September 30, 1977)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 128525. December 17, 1999.]

MA. DIVINA ORTAÑEZ-ENDERES, for herself and as the Judicially Appointed

Special Administratrix of the Philinterlife Shares of Stocks of DR. JUVENCIO P.

ORTAÑEZ, JOSE N. ORTAÑEZ, ROMEO JOVEN N. ORTAÑEZ, ENRICO N.

ORTAÑEZ, CESAR N. ORTAÑEZ and LIGAYA S. NOVICIO, petitioners, vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

COMMISSION, JOSE C. LEE, CARLOS LEE, ANGEL ONG, CARMENCITA Y.

TAN, BENJAMIN C. LEE, MA. PAZ C. LEE and ALMA AGGABAO, respondents.

Arnold V. Guerrero for petitioners.

Picazo Buyco Tan Fider & Santos for petitioner.

T.P. Fernandez Law Offices for private respondents.

Ramon L. Carpio for private respondents.

SYNOPSIS

The late Dr. Juvencio Ortañez owned 51% of the capital stock of Philinterlife at the time of his death and

special proceedings were pending with the RTC for the settlement of his intestate estate. Later, when 112

of the shares of stock of Dr. Ortañez were transferred in the names of private respondents, SEC. Case

11-94-4909 was instituted for the annulment of the same and such other acts exercised by them.

Petitioners also prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, but the same was denied by

the hearing officer and the SEC En Banc. The Court of Appeals ruled that the denial by the SEC of the

application for a writ of preliminary injunction was proper and valid.

Petitioners had not established clear existing legal rights to entitle them to a writ of injunction to enjoin

private respondents from exercising their rights as stockholders on record of Philinterlife. Petitioners

failed not only to establish a threatened violation of a right but they also failed to discharge the burden

of clearly showing the right to be protected. On the mere contention that the shareholdings of private

respondents belong to the estate of the late Dr. Ortañez which is still the subject of settlement before the

RTC, petitioners had not established their clear legal rights to obtain injunctive relief against private

respondents. Injunction, whether preliminary or final, is not designed to protect contingent or future

rights. HCDAac

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; INJUNCTION; NOT WARRANTED IN CASE

AT BAR. — Injunction may issue pendente lite only in cases of extreme urgency, where the right to the

possession, during the pendency of the main case, of the property involved is very clear; where

considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in favor of the complainant seeking the possession

of the property pendente lite; where there was willful and unlawful invasion on plaintiff's right, over his

protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one. Before an injunction can be issued, it is

essential that the following requisites be present: (1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a

right to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.

We agree with the findings of the SEC as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that petitioners failed not

only to establish a threatened violation of a right but they also failed to discharge the burden of clearly

showing the right to be protected. On the mere contention that the shareholdings of private respondents

belong to the estate of the late Dr. Ortañez which is still the subject of settlement before the Regional

Trial Court of Quezon City, petitioners had not established their clear legal rights to obtain injunctive

relief against private respondents. Injunction, whether preliminary or final, is not designed to protect

contingent or future rights. Therefore, the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of violation of

an actually existing right of petitioner's over the shareholdings presently in the possession of private

respondents is no ground for an injunction being a mere damnum absque injuria. Moreover, the grant or

denial of an injunction rests in the sound discretion of the lower court. And the grant of the writ of

injunction against private respondents by restraining them from exercising their rights as stockholders

would in effect dispose of the main case without a trial. The SEC acted correctly in denying the issuance

of the writ until the merits of the case can be heard. Further, it is a basic procedural postulate that a

preliminary injunction is not proper where its purpose is to take the property out of control or possession

of one party and transfer the same to the hands of another who did not have such control at the inception

of the case and whose title has not been clearly established by law. TEHIaA

2. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PARTIES; WHEN NOT A PARTY TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW,

NO LEGAL PERSONALITY TO SEEK REVIEW OF THE SAME. — Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes,

who represents herself to be the Special Administratrix of the Estate of Dr. Ortañez, is one of the

petitioners in this case. Records show that neither the estate of Dr. Ortañez nor the Special Administratrix

Ma. Divina Enderes was a party in the main case docketed as SEC Case No. 11-94-49099 before the

Securities and Exchange Commission. In an Omnibus Order dated March 6, 1996, the SEC denied the

Motion to Intervene filed by the estate of Dr. Ortañez represented by the Special Administratrix on the

ground that the estate is not a stockholder of Philinterlife. When the case was elevated to the SEC En

Banc and later to respondent Court of Appeals, the estate of Dr. Ortañez was not included as petitioners.

Not being a party in the proceedings below, the Special Administratrix does not have any legal

personality to seek a review by this court of the decisions of the SEC and the Court of Appeals.

3. ID.; JURISDICTION; PROBATE COURTS; LIMITATION; NOT EXTENDED TO THE

DETERMINATION OF QUESTIONS OF OWNERSHIP THAT ARISE DURING THE

PROCEEDINGS. — The special proceedings for the intestate estate of the deceased Dr. Ortañez are still

pending before the court and the estate had not been partitioned and distributed. Notwithstanding the

proceedings being conducted by the intestate court, the petitioners' rights or interests over the estate or

over the assailed shareholdings in the name of private respondents are still future and unsettled rights

which cannot be protected by the writ of injunction. The rule is well settled that the jurisdiction of the

regional trial court as a probate or intestate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement

of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of questions

of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The intestate court may pass upon the title to a certain

property for the purpose of determining whether the same should or should not be included in the

inventory but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to final decision in a separate action

regarding ownership which may be constituted by the parties. The court in charge of the intestate

proceedings cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which

are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. EcTaSC

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of

preliminary injunction of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 1996 which affirmed the

rulings of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC for brevity) En Banc and the SEC Hearing

Officer. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals as well as that of the SEC En Banc and SEC

Hearing Officer denied the prayer of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to

restrain private respondents from exercising their rights as stockholders on record of Philippines

International Life Insurance Co., Inc. (Philinterlife, for brevity). cdasia

This case stems from a complaint filed on November 7, 1994 by petitioners before the Securities and

Exchange Commission, docketed as SEC Case No. 11-94-4909, 1 for the annulment of transfer of shares

of stocks to private respondents, annulment of sale of corporate properties authorized by private

respondents who compose the management of the corporation, annulment of subscriptions on increased

capital stocks, accounting and inspection of corporate books and records, and damages. Petitioners also

prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order against private

respondents to enjoin them from exercising their rights as stockholders of Philinterlife on the ground that

their shares of stock were acquired through illegal and fraudulent schemes.

Petitioners alleged that Philinterlife is a registered corporation founded in 1954 by the late Dr. Juvencio

Ortañez; that at the time of his death in 1980, Dr. Ortañez owned at least fifty-one percent (51%) of the

capital stock of the company; that special proceedings were pending with the Regional Trial Court of

Quezon City, Branch 85, for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Dr. Ortañez, where

Rafael S. Ortañez and Jose S. Ortañez were jointly appointed as special administrators. Petitioners further

stated that after the death of Dr. Ortañez and without the prior authorization of the intestate court, one-

half (1/2) of the shares of stock of Dr. Ortañez were transferred in the names of private respondents

through the manipulations, devices and machinations of the latter; that the shares of stocks of private

respondents lawfully belonged to the estate of Dr. Ortañez and hence, they are not entitled to enjoy and

exercise their rights and privileges as stockholders of the company. Petitioners also contended that

respondent Jose C. Lee misrepresented himself as president of Philinterlife and sold the parcel of land

owned by the corporation located in Manila to Citiriser Development Corporation without the

indispensable requisites prescribed by the Corporation Code; that private respondents obtained additional

subscriptions without consideration by way of unlawful corporate machinations; and that private

respondents had been conveying and disbursing corporate properties and funds as well as preventing

petitioners from inspecting the corporate books and records.

In their answer, 2 private respondents stated that the subject matter of the complaint is not within the

jurisdiction of the SEC but with the Regional Trial Court; that petitioners Ligaya Novicio and children

represented themselves to be the common law wife and illegitimate children of the late Dr. Ortañez; that

on March 4, 1982, the surviving spouse Juliana Ortañez, on her behalf and for her minor son Antonio,

executed a Memorandum of Agreement with her other sons Rafael and Jose, both surnamed Ortañez,

dividing the estate of the deceased composed of his one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal properties; that

in the said Memorandum of Agreement, Jose S. Ortañez acquired as his share of the estate the 1,329

shares of stock in Philinterlife; that on March 4, 1982, Juliana and Rafael assigned their respective shares

of stock in Philinterlife to Jose; that contrary to the contentions of petitioners, private respondents Jose

Lee, Carlos Lee, Benjamin Lee and Alma Aggabao became stockholders of Philinterlife on March 23,

1983 when Jose S. Ortañez, the principal stockholder at that time, executed a deed of sale of his shares

of stock to the private respondents; and that the right of petitioners to question the Memorandum of

Agreement and the acquisition of shares of stock of private respondents is barred by prescription. Private

respondents also alleged that they did not violate the provisions of the Corporation Code in the sale and

disposition to Citiriser Development Corporation of the parcel of land and improvements owned by

Philinterlife in Soler Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila; that this is evidenced by the Board Resolution dated June

15, 1987 which approved the authority of the corporation’s president, Jose C. Lee, to sign in behalf of

the company all documents pertaining to the sale; that private respondents did not commit any violation

of law when Philinterlife increased its capital stock from Five Million to Ten Million Pesos in 1984 as

this increase was based on a resolution passed by the stockholders owning more than two-thirds of the

outstanding capital stock during the stockholders' meeting held on March 21, 1984 and thru said

resolution, the unsubscribed capital stock of the corporation in the amount of P1.250 Million was offered

for subscription; that said increase was likewise approved by the majority of the board of directors of the

corporation; that records of all the business operations of Philinterlife have always been open and

available for examination and inspection not only by petitioners but by all other stockholders as well.

On December 7, 1994, SEC Hearing Officer Alberto Atas issued a temporary restraining order. 3

Hearings were thereafter held to determine the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction,

wherein both parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence.

On February 10, 1995, SEC Hearing Officer Atas issued an Order 4 denying petitioners' application for

the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that petitioners failed to make a valid cause

to entitle them to the relief applied for, and the pretended rights of the petitioners are still contentious,

unsettled and of doubtful character.

Not satisfied with the Order, petitioners elevated the same to the Securities and Exchange Commission

En Banc. LibLex

On March 24, 1995, the SEC En Banc issued a resolution 5 dismissing the petition and stating in part:

After a careful perusal of the arguments raised in the petition and answer as well as the evidence

submitted during the hearing, we find that the Hearing Officer did not commit grave abuse of

discretion in denying petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

One of the pieces of evidence submitted is the stock and transfer book of Philinterlife which

showed that private respondents are owners of Philinterlife shares. Hence, as stockholders of

Philinterlife, they are entitled to exercise all the rights and privileges pertaining thereto.

With respect to the alleged extrajudicial partition of the shares of stocks owned by the late Dr.

Juvencio Ortañez, we rule that the matter properly belongs to the jurisdiction of the regular court

where the intestate proceedings are currently pending.

. . . . The complainant's right or title moreover must be clear and unquestioned for equity, as a

rule, will not take cognizance of suits to establish title and will not lend its preventive aid by

injunction where the complainant's title or right is doubtful or disputed. The possibility of

irreparable damage, without proof of violation of an actual existing right, is no ground for an

injunction, being mere damnum absque injuria. 6

Aggrieved by the resolution of the SEC En Banc, petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari

with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-GR SP No. 36923, seeking to annul the aforesaid resolution

and the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against private

respondents. Petitioners alleged that the SEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the resolution

because (1) the stock and transfer book of the company was not adduced throughout the proceedings and,

(2) there is no valid and lawful basis for private respondents' claim that they are the stockholders of

Philinterlife.

On May 31, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 7 dismissing the petition on the ground that

the denial by the SEC of petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary injunction was proper and valid.

Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated March 11, 1997. 8

Hence, this petition was filed stating that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) not holding that the ownership

of the shares of stocks of Philinterlife is still an issue to be resolved by the SEC, hence, private

respondents have not yet been declared as stockholders thereof, and (2) not finding that the private

respondents' claim as stockholders of Philinterlife has no legal and/or factual support.

The sole issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the

SEC when it ruled that petitioners had not established clear existing legal rights to entitle them to a writ

of injunction to enjoin private respondents from exercising their rights as stockholders on record of

Philinterlife.

With regard to the assigned errors which are interrelated, petitioners contend that private respondents

cannot rely on the deeds of assignment of shares of stock in their favor because the same are void, no

evidence being adduced to show that the transfer taxes were paid. Petitioners further allege that private

respondents cannot exercise the rights and privileges of stockholders of Philinterlife because there was

no valid disposition or transfer to the latter of the shares of stock belonging to the estate of the late Dr.

Juvencio Ortañez. Petitioners also claim to possess legal personality to bring this suit on the ground that

they are stockholders of the corporation and that co-petitioner Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes is the Special

Administratrix of the estate of the late Dr. Juvencio Ortañez with regard to Philinterlife shares.

We cannot sustain petitioners' stand.

Injunction may issue pendente lite only in cases of extreme urgency, where the right to the possession,

during the pendency of the main case, of the property involved is very clear; where considerations of

relative inconvenience bear strongly in favor of the complainant seeking the possession of the property

pendente lite; where there was willful and unlawful invasion on plaintiff's right, over his protest and

remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one. 9

Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: (1) there must

be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction is to

be directed is a violation of such right. 10

We agree with the findings of the SEC as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that petitioners failed not

only to establish a threatened violation of a right but they also failed to discharge the burden of clearly

showing the right to be protected. 11 On the mere contention that the shareholdings of private respondents

belong to the estate of the late Dr. Ortañez which is still the subject of settlement before the Regional

Trial Court of Quezon City, petitioners had not established their clear legal rights to obtain injunctive

relief against private respondents. Injunction, whether preliminary or final, is not designed to protect

contingent or future rights. 12

Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes, who represents herself to be the Special Administratrix of the Estate of Dr.

Ortañez, is one of the petitioners in this case. Records show that neither the estate of Dr. Ortañez nor the

Special Administratrix Ma. Divina Enderes was a party in the main case docketed as SEC Case No. 11-

94-49099 before the Securities and Exchange Commission. In an Omnibus Order dated March 6, 1996,

13 the SEC denied the Motion to Intervene filed by the estate of Dr. Ortañez represented by the Special

Administratrix on the ground that the estate is not a stockholder of Philinterlife. When the case was

elevated to the SEC En Banc and later to respondent Court of Appeals, the estate of Dr. Ortañez was not

included as petitioners. Not being a party in the proceedings below, the Special Administratrix does not

have any legal personality to seek a review by this court of the decisions of the SEC and the Court of

Appeals. 14

In support of their position, petitioners cited in their reply the issuance of an Order by the intestate court

declaring that the shares of stock of Philinterlife belong to the estate. It is admitted that the special

proceedings are still pending before the court and the estate had not been partitioned and distributed.

Notwithstanding the proceedings being conducted by the intestate court, the petitioners' rights or interests

over the estate or over the assailed shareholdings in the name of private respondents are still future and

unsettled rights which cannot be protected by the writ of injunction. The rule is well settled that the

jurisdiction of the regional trial court as a probate or intestate court relates only to matters having to do

with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the

determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. 15 The intestate court may

pass upon the title to a certain property for the purpose of determining whether the same should or should

not be included in the inventory but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to final decision

in a separate action regarding ownership which may be constituted by the parties. 16 The court in charge

of the intestate proceedings cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the

estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. 17 Therefore, the possibility of

irreparable damage without proof of violation of an actually existing right of petitioners over the

shareholdings presently in the possession of private respondents is no ground for an injunction being a

mere damnum absque injuria. 18

Moreover, the grant or denial of an injunction rests in the sound discretion of the lower court. The

following findings of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the SEC are binding and conclusive on this

Court: LLphil

Applying the above jurisprudence in the instant case, this Court rules that the respondent SEC

En Banc did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioners' application for a writ of preliminary

injunction. Petitioners failed to show a clear and positive right to the questioned shares of the

late Dr. Juvencio Ortañez in Philinterlife from which respondents allegedly acquired their

possible respective shareholdings. Petitioners' alleged right over the shares of stock in question

as well as other properties spring from their yet to be established position as heirs of the late Dr.

Juvencio Ortañez. Said issue of heirship has to be established in the probate court particularly in

the settlement of estate of the late Dr. Juvencio Ortañez. As it is now, petitioner have mere

expectance on the properties of the late Dr. Juvencio Ortañez. The judicial protection of a writ

of preliminary injunction does not cover contingent or future right. An actual, clear, and positive

right should exist before the mantle of the powerful writ of injunction can protect its movant who

prays for the preservation of the status quo pending the hearing of the main case on the merits.

Petitioners, having only contingent and future right as alleged heirs of the late Dr. Juvencio

Ortañez, are not entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction. If respondents are dissipating the

said shares of stocks and properties of Philinterlife which allegedly form part of the estate of the

late Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, this issue could be properly brought to the attention of the probate

court, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, branch 85, in the estate proceedings in Sp. Proc

No. Q-30884. 19

Contrary to the contentions of petitioners, the SEC found that private respondents are bona fide owners

of shares of stock in Philinterlife constituting the majority thereof or 94% of the outstanding capital stock

of the company. Records show that they have been stockholders of Philinterlife since 1983 up to the

present. It was only in 1994 that petitioners sought the annulment of the shareholdings of private

respondents before the SEC. The grant of the writ of injunction against private respondents by restraining

them from exercising their rights as stockholders would in effect dispose of the main case without a trial.

The SEC acted correctly in denying the issuance of the writ until the merits of the case can be heard.

Further, it is a basic procedural postulate that a preliminary injunction is not proper where its purpose is

to take the property out of control or possession of one party and transfer the same to the hands of another

who did not have such control at the inception of the case 20 and whose title has not been clearly

established by law. 21

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 1996 is

AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. cdphil

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

||| (Orta, G.R. No. 128525, December 17, 1999)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 190 October 18, 1977

RE: CLAIMS FOR BENEFITS OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO, FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO, MARIO B. CHANLIONGCO II, MA. ANGELINA C. BUENAVENTURA and MARIO C. CHANLIONGCO, JR., claimants.ñé+.£ªwph!1

R E S O L U T I O N

MAKASIAR, J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£

This matter refers to the claims for retirement benefits filed by the heirs of the late ATTY. MARIO V. CHANLIONGCO an attorney in this Court, under the provisions of R.A. No. 1616, as amended by R.A. No. 4986, which was approved by this Court in its resolution of August 19, 1976, effective on July 12, 1976 it a g from the records that at the time of his death on July 12, 1976, Atty. Chanliongco was more than 63 years of age, with more than 38 years of service in the government. He did not have any pending criminal administrative or not case against him, neither did he have any money or property accountability. The highest salary he received was P18,700.00 per annum.

The above named flied the appellants for benefits with the accruing and with the Government Service System.

Aside from his widow, Dra. Fidel B. Chanliongco and an only Intimate Mario it appears that there are other deceased to namely, Mrs. Angelina C. , Jr., both born out of wedlock to Angelina R Crespo, and duly recognized by the deceased. Except Mario, Jr., who is only 17 years of age, all the claimants are of legal age.

According to law, the benefits accruing to the deceased consist of: (1) retirement benefits; (2) money value of terminal leave; (3) life insurance and (4) refund of retirement premium.

From the records now before US, it appears that the GSIS had already the release the life insurance proceeds; and the refund of rent to the claimants.

What, therefore, to be settled are the retirement benefits and the money value of leave, both of which are to be paid by this court as the deceased's last employer.

The record also shows that the late Atty. Chanliongco died ab intestato and that he filed or over to state in his application for membership with the GSIS the beneficiary or benefits of his retirement benefits, should he die before retirement. Hence, the retirement benefits shall accrue to his estate and will be distributed among his Legal heirs in with the benefits on intestate s , as in the caw of a fife if no benefit is named in the policy (Vda. de vs. GSIS, L-28093, Jan. 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 315, 325).

Insofar therefore as the retirement benefits are WE adopt in toto, for being in accordance with law, the GSIS determination of the amount of the retirement the kill heirs and their e shares as indicated in its letter to US, dated March 15, 1977, to wit: ñé+.£ªwph!1

(a) Amount of retirement grautity:

1. Total creditable service

37.57169 years

2. Highest rate of salary

Pl,558.33333/mo.

3. Gratuity in terms of months

50.14338 months

4. Amount of gratuity (highest

salary) x (No. of grautity months)

P78,140,10

(b) Legal heirs:

1. Fidela B. Chanliongco.

widow

2. Mario B. Chanliongco II. legitimate son

3. Ma. Angelina C. Buenaventura

illegitimate child

4. Mario Chanliongco Jr. illegitimate child

(c) Distribution

(1) 8/16 share to Mario II P39,070.050

(2) 4/16 share to the widow, Fidela B. Chanliongco

19,535.025

(3) 2/16 share, or P9,767.5125 each to the two illegitimate children Ma. Angelina C. Buenaventura and Mario Chanliongco, Jr.

19 535 25

T O T A L P78.140.100

Coming now to the money value of the terminal leave, unpaid salary and 10% adjustment pursuant to Budget Circular No. 240, dated July 22, 1974, this Court's Finance Officer, in a memorandum dated March 23, 1977, indicated the breakdown of these items as follows:

Unpaid salary for July 8-12, 1976 @

P1,416.66/mo. P228.49

10% salary adj. for July 1-12, 1976

54.84

Money value of terminal leave for the

period from July 13, 1976 to September

14,1977 @ P1,558.33 21,962.54

Sub-Total P22,9245.87

Less:

Withholding Tax P1,400.00

Supreme Court

Savings & Loan

Association 7,340.42 8.740.42

NET PROCEEDS

P13,505.45

It further appears that at the time of his death the late Atty. Chanliongco had an outstanding account with the Supreme Court Savings & Loans Association in the sum of P7,340.42. Deduction this amount plus another sum of P1,400.00, representing withhold tax due from him, or a total of P8,740.42, from above sub-total sum of P22,245.87. WE have at the net sum P13,505.45, available for distribute to the claimants as follows:

1. Fidela B. Chanliongco

a. As her conjugal share

P 6,752.72

b. As a legal heir

P 1,688.18

2. Mario Chanliongco II

P 3,376.36

3. Ma. Angelina C. Buenaventura

844.10

4. Mario Jr. 844.09

T O T A L P13,505.45

It will be seen from the f distribution that the money value of the unused vacation and sick leave, unpaid will and 10% adjustment due to the has been treated as conjugal property. Accordingly, one-half (l/2) goes to the widow as her share in the conjugal hip and the other half P6,752.725 is to be distributed to the deceased's kill him, using the same one WE used in distributing the retirement benefits. This is so because "Vacation with pay is not a gratuity but is compensation for services rendered." (Ramey vs. State, 296 NW 323, 296 Mich. 449).

WHEREFORE, THE CLAIMS ARE HEREBY APPROVED. THE FINANCE AND/OR DISBURSING OFFICER OF THIS COURT IS ORDERED To pay IMMEDIATELY TO EACH AND EVERY CLAIMANT HE VARIOUS SUMS HEREUNDER INDICATED OPPOSITE THEIR NAMES, AS FOLLOWS:

1. FIDELA B. CHANLIONGCO

A. HER 4/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY P19,535.025

B. HER SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TEAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT:

(1) AS HER CONJUGAL SHARE 6,752.72

(2) AS A LEGAL HEIR P1,688.18

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HER P27,975.93

2. MARIO CHANLIONGCO II

A. HIS 8/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY P39,070.05

B. HIS SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT

3,376.36

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HIM P42,446.41

3. MA. ANGELINA C. BUENAVENTURA:

A. HER 2/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY P9,767.51

B. HER SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT

844.10

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HER P10,611.61

4. MARIO CHANLIONGCO JR. TO BE PAID THROUGH HIS MOTHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN, ANGELINA CRESPO):

A. HIS 2/16 SHARE OF RETIREMENT GRATUITY P9,767.51

B. HIS SHARE FROM MONEY VALUE OF TERMINAL LEAVE, UNPAID SALARY AND 10% ADJUSTMENT

844.10

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE HIM P10,611.61

SO ORDERED.

Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Muñ;oz Palma, Concepcion, Jr., Martin, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët

Fernando, J., is on leave.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 140975. December 8, 2000.]

OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU, petitioner, vs. PASTORA PIEDAD, respondent.

Ceferino Padua Law Office and Gatmaytan Law Office for petitioner.

P.C. Jose & Associates for respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin of the deceased, or a collateral relative within the fifth civil

degree of the decedent. Respondent, on the other hand, is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a collateral

relative within the third civil degree of the decedent. The issue here is the applicability of the rule on

proximity among collateral relatives. Thus, the question is: Can petitioner inherit alongside respondent?

The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes

the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. In the

collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or

sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts. The right of representation

does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner

and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference. Applying now the rule on proximity,

respondent relative within the third civil degree excludes petitioner relative within the fifth civil degree

from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; DIFFERENT MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP; SUCCESSION;

APPRECIATION OF THE LAW. — The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession embody

an almost complete set of law to govern, either by will or by operation of law, the transmission of

property, rights and obligations of a person upon his death. Each article is construed incongruity with,

rather than in isolation of, the system set out by the Code.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; RULE ON PROXIMITY; APPLICATION OF RIGHT

OF REPRESENTATION. — The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree

to the decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of

representation can apply. . . . By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is,

by operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative

of the same decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and

succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented would have

succeeded. . . . In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the

ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the

children of brothers or sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts. SacTCA

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE TO "OTHER COLLATERAL RELATIVES WITHIN

THE FIFTH CIVIL DEGREE." — The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives

within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the

order of preference following, firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate

parents and ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse,

and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives,

except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the

rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962 of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of

relationship of the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.

Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes

petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.

D E C I S I O N

VITUG, J p:

On 28 August 1995, herein petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in Special

Proceedings No. 3652, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H.

Piedad," pending before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting

entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, petitioner assailed the finality of the

order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora Piedad contending that the

proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an incomplete publication of the notice

of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of

allowances and withdrawals by the administrator of the estate. The trial court denied the motion,

prompting petitioner to raise her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent sought the dismissal of the

appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up on appeal only involved pure questions of law. Finding

merit in that argument, the appellate court dismissed the appeal, citing Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the

1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure which would require all appeals involving nothing else but

questions of law to be raised before the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance

with Rule 45 thereof and consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court.

In a well-written resolution, the Court of Appeals belabored the distinctions between questions of law

and questions of fact, thus:

"There is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law

is on a certain state of facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as

to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts. There is question of fact when the query necessarily

invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses,

existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances, and their relation to each other

and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation." 1

Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, speaking for the appellate court, ratiocinated that whether or not the RTC

erred in denying the intervention considering (1) that the intervenor-appellant had a prima facie interest

over the case, (2) that the jurisdiction over the person of the proper parties was not acquired in view of

the deficient publication or notice of hearing, and (3) that the proceedings had yet to be closed and

terminated, were issues which did not qualify as "questions of fact" as to place the appeal within the

jurisdiction of the appellate court; thus:

"The issues are evidently pure questions of law because their resolution are based on facts not in

dispute. Admitted are the facts that intervenor-appellant is a collateral relative within the fifth

degree of Augusto H. Piedad; that she is the daughter of the first cousin of Augusto H. Piedad;

that as such, intervenor-appellant seek to inherit from the estate of Augusto H. Piedad; that the

notice of hearing was published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general

circulation; that there was no order of closure of proceedings that has been issued by the intestate

court; and that the intestate court has already issued an order for the transfer of the remaining

estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee.

"These facts are undisputed.

"In this case, there is no doubt nor difference that arise as to the truth or falsehood on alleged

facts. The question as to whether intervenor-appellant as a collateral relative within the fifth civil

degree, has legal interest in the intestate proceeding which would justify her intervention; the

question as to whether the publication of notice of hearing made in this case is defective which

would amount to lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and the question as to whether

the proceedings has already been terminated when the intestate court issued the order of transfer

of the estate of Augusto H. Piedad to petitioner-appellee, in spite the absence of an order of

closure of the intestate court, all call for the application and interpretation of the proper law.

There is doubt as to what law is applicable on a certain undisputed state of facts. aHCSTD

"The resolution of the issues raised does not require the review of the evidence, nor the credibility

of witnesses presented, nor the existence and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances.

Resolution on the issues may be had even without going to examination of facts on record." 2

Still unsatisfied, petitioner contested the resolution of the appellate court in the instant petition for review

on certiorari.

The Court finds no reversible error in the ruling of the appellate court. But let us set aside the alleged

procedural decrepitude and take on the basic substantive issue. Specifically, can petitioner, a collateral

relative of the fifth civil degree, inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree?

Elsewise stated, does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find application among collateral

relatives?

Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt

of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first cousin

of the deceased, or a fifth degree relative of the decedent.

The various provisions of the Civil Code on succession embody an almost complete set of law to govern,

either by will or by operation of law, the transmission of property, rights and obligations of a person

upon his death. Each article is construed in congruity with, rather than in isolation of, the system set out

by the Code.

The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and excludes

the more distant ones, except when and to the extent that the right of representation can apply. Thus,

Article 962 of the Civil Code provides:

"ARTICLE 26. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant

ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.

"Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of article

1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of Article 987, paragraph 2,

concerning division between the paternal and maternal lines.

By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to

the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The

representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not from the latter,

but from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded.

"ARTICLE 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the

representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the

rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited."

"ARTICLE 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person

represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the

person represented would have succeeded."

In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In

the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or

sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.

"ARTICLE 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never

in the ascending.

"In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sister, whether

they be of the full or half blood."

"ARTICLE 974. Whenever there is succession by representation, the division of the estate shall

be made per stirpes, in such manner that the representative or representatives shall not inherit

more than what the person they represent would inherit, if he were living or could inherit."

"ARTICLE 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they

shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if

they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."

The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to

which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in order of preference following,

firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly,

the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and

sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of

nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed

in Article 962, aforequoted, of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of

the collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.

"ARTICLE 966. . . .

"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to the

person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from

his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin and

so forth." SCHATc

Accordingly —

Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes

petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding ab intestato the estate of the decedent.

The provisions of Article 1009 and Article 1010 of the Civil Code —

"ARTICLE 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers or sisters,

the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of

relationship by the whole blood."

Article 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree of

relationship in the collateral line." —

invoked by petitioner do not at all support her cause. The law means only that among the other

collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of succession), no preference or distinction shall be

observed "by reason of relationship by the whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit

alongside a paternal uncle, and a first cousin of the full blood can inherit equally with a first cousin

of the half blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree relative, excludes the cousins of the

decedent, being in the fourth-degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would have priority in

succession to a fifth-degree relative. ISADET

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

||| (Bagunu v. Piedad, G.R. No. 140975, December 08, 2000)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-26699. March 16, 1976.]

BENITA SALAO, assisted by her husband, GREGORIO MARCELO; ALMARIO

ALCURIZA, ARTURO ALCURIZA, OSCAR ALCURIZA and ANITA

ALCURIZA, the latter two being minors are represented by guardian ad litem,

ARTURO ALCURIZA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. JUAN S. SALAO, later substituted

by PABLO P. SALAO, Administrator of the Intestate of JUAN S. SALAO; now

MERCEDES P. VDA. DE SALAO, ROBERTO P. SALAO, MARIA SALAO VDA.

DE SANTOS, LUCIANA P. SALAO, RESTITUTO P. SALAO, ISABEL SALAO

DE SANTOS, and PABLO P. SALAO, as successors-in-interest of the late JUAN S.

SALAO, together with PABLO P. SALAO, Administrator, defendants-appellants.

Eusebio V. Navarro and Eusebio P. Navarro, Jr. for plaintiffs-appellants.

Nicolas Belmonte and Benjamin T. de Peralta for defendants-appellants.

SYNOPSIS

The question of ownership over the Calunuran fishpond, with an area of 47 hectares, located in that part

of Lubao which later became a part of Bataan, and one of the several properties left by the parties

predecessors, has given rise to the present controversy. Plaintiffs' version is that Juan Y. Salao, Jr., his

sister Alejandra and Ambrosia and their nephew Valentin Salao were engaged by joint venture in the

fishpond business; that the funds used by them were earnings of the properties supposedly inherited from

their father, and that these earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. On the other

hand, the defendants contend that the fishpond in question consisted of lands purchased by Juan Y. Salao,

Sr., and Ambrosia Salao who had secured a Torrens Title for the Calunuran fishpond in 1911 and who

exercised dominical rights over it to the exclusion of their nephew Valentin Salao.

The property was sold a retro and later redeemed. Since then, several of the parties have died and their

estates partitioned and thereafter, interest over the fishpond has been the bone of contention — whether

or not the same was held in trust for Valentin Salao by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao and

whether the property can still be subject to an action for reconveyance.

Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in the CFI of Bataan against defendants, asking for the annulment

of the donation to Juan S. Salao of a share in the fishpond and for reconveyance to them of the property

as Valentin Salao's supposed 1/3 share in the 145 hectares of the fishpond registered in the name of Juan

Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.

Juan S. Salao, Jr., in his answer with counterclaim, pleaded as a defense the indefeasibility of the Torrens

title secured by his father and aunt. He also invoked the Statute of Frauds, prescription and laches. Upon

his death, he was substituted by his widow, children and the administrator of his estate, the now

defendants.

The trial court found that there was no community of property among Juan Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao

and Valentin Salao when the Calunuran lands were acquired; that a co-ownership over the real properties

of Valentina Ignacio existed among her heirs after her death in 1914; that the co-ownership was

administered by Ambrosia Salao and that it subsisted up to 1918, when her estate was partitioned among

her 3 children and grandson, Valentin Salao. If further held that the donation was validly executed.

Both parties appealed, the plaintiffs, because their action for reconveyance was dismissed, and the

defendants, because their counterclaim for damages was likewise dismissed. The Court of Appeals

elevated the case to the Supreme Court as the amount involved exceeded P200,000.00.

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, ruling that there was no

resulting trust over the questioned property as the plaintiffs failed to measure up to the yardstick that a

trust must be proven by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence and even assuming that there was an

implied trust, plaintiffs' action for reconveyance is barred by prescription or laches, as a result of which,

they have no right and personality to question the validity of the donation made to Juan S. Salao, Jr. The

Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of defendants' claim for damages since the circumstances of the

case do not show that plaintiffs' action was manisfestly frivolous or primarily intended to harass the

defendants.

Judgment affirmed.

SYLLABUS

1. APPEAL; FORMAL REQUISITES; RULE 46, RULES OF COURT. — An appellant's brief should

contain "a subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the argument and page reference" to

the contents of the brief. Lawyers for appellants, when they prepare their briefs, would do well to read

and re-read Sec. 16 of Rule 46. If they comply strictly with the formal requirements prescribed therein,

they might make a competent and luminous presentation of their clients' case and lighten the burden of

the Court.

2. PLEADINGS; ANSWER; CONTENTS. — Under section 6, Rule 9 of the 1940 Rules of Court the

answer should "contain either a specific denial or a statement of matters in avoidance of the cause or

causes of action asserted in the complaint." Section 7 of the same rule requires the defendant to "deal

specifically with each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever

practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support his denial."

Material averments in the complaint, other than those as to the amount of damage, shall be deemed

admitted when not specifically denied" (Sec. 8). "The defendant may set forth by answer as many

affirmative defenses as he may have. All such grounds of defenses as would raise issues of fact not

arising upon the preceding pleading must be specifically pleaded" (Sec. 9).

3. ID.; ID.; AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE DEFENSES DISTINGUISHED. — A negative defense

is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the complaint essential to the plaintiff's cause

or causes of action. On the other hand, an affirmative defense is an allegation of new matter which, while

admitting the material allegations of the complaint, expressly or implied, would nevertheless prevent or

bar recovery by the plaintiff. It includes all matters set up "by way of confession and avoidance." (Sec.

5, Rules 6, Rules of Court).

4. ID.; ID.; GENERAL DENIAL, EFFECT OF. — An answer containing the statement that it denied

"generally and specifically each and every paragraph of the complaint" is really a general denial which

is tantamount to an admission of the allegations of the complaint and which justifies judgment on the

pleadings.

5. ID.; ID.; SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENTS; INSTANT CASE. — Where

the answer setting forth defendant's positive defenses contained matters in avoidance of plaintiff's cause

of action which supported his denials thereof, the contention that there was in effect an admission of

plaintiff's allegation that there was co-ownership cover the questioned property is unfounded. The answer

substantially complied with Rule 9 of the 1940 Rules of Court where obviously defendant did so because

he found it impracticable to state piecemeal his open version as to the acquisition of the questioned

properties or to make a tedious and repetitious recital of the ultimate facts contradicting the allegations

of the plaintiff's cause of action.

6. TRUST; DEFINITION. — In its technical legal sense, a trust is defined as the right, enforceable solely

in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another. A person

who establishes a trust is called the trustor; one in whom confidence is reposed as regards the property

for the benefit of the another person is know as the trustee; and the person for whose benefit the trust has

been created is referred to as the beneficiary. There is a fiduciary relation between the trustee and the

cestui que trust as regards certain property, real, personal, money or chooses in action.

7. ID.; KINDS OF; EXPRESS AND IMPLIED TRUSTS, DISTINGUISHED. — "Trusts are either

express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of the trust or or of the parties. Implied

trusts come into being by operation of law." (Art. 1441, Civil Code). "No express trust concerning an

immovable or any interest therein may be proven by parol evidence. An implied trust may be proven by

oral evidence" (Arts. 1443 and 1457). "No particular words are required for the creation of an express

trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended" (Art. 1444). "Express trusts are those which are

created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will or by words either

expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust" (89 C.J.S. 722). "Implied trusts are those

which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or

which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the

particular intention of the parties" (89 C.J.S. 724). They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting and

constructive trusts (89 C.J.S. 722).

8. ID.; ID.; RESULTING AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST DISTINGUISHED. — A resulting trust is

broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the act or construction of law, but in its more

restricted sense it is a trust raised by implication of law and presumed always to have been contemplated

by the parties, the intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their transaction, but not expressed

in the deed or instrument of conveyance (89 C. J. S.725). On the other hand, a constructive trust is a trust

"raised by construction of law, or arising by operation of law." In a more restricted sense and as

contradistinguished from a resulting trust, a constructive trust is "a trust not created by any words, either

expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but by the constructions of equity in

order to satisfy the demands of justice." It does not arise "by agreement or intention, but by operation of

law." (89 C.J.S. 726-727).

9. ID.; PROOF OF; PAROL EVIDENCE CANNOT BE AVAILED OF TO PROVE AN EXPRESS

TRUST CONCERNING REALTY; CASE AT BAR. — Not a scintilla of documentary evidence was

presented by the plaintiffs to prove that there was an express trust over the Calunuran fishpond in favor

of Valentin Salao. Purely parol evidence was offered by them to prove the alleged trust. Their claim that

in the oral partition in 1919 of the two fishponds the Calunuran fishpond was assigned to Valentin Salao

is legally untenable. It is legally indefensible because the terms of Art. 1443 of the Civil Code are

peremptory and unmistakable; parol evidence cannot be used to prove an express trust concerning realty.

Plaintiffs utterly failed to measure up to the yardstick that a trust must be proven by clear, satisfactory

and convincing evidence. It cannot rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or

indefinite declarations.

10. ID.; ID.; IMPLIED TRUST MAY BE PROVEN BY ORAL EVIDENCE. — Article 1457 of the

Civil Code allows an implied trust to be proven by oral evidence. Trustworthy oral evidence is required

to prove an implied trust because oral evidence can be easily fabricated.

11. ID.; NO TRUST CREATED OVER QUESTIONED PROPERTY. — There was no resulting trust

in this case because there never was any intention on the part of Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and

Valentin Salao to create any trust. There was no constructive trust because the registration of the two

fishponds in the names of Juan and Ambrosia was vitiated by fraud or mistake. This is not a case where

to satisfy the demands of justice it is necessary to consider the Calunuran fishpond as being held in trust

by the heirs of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the heirs of Valentin Salao.

12. ID.; RECONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY HELD IN TRUST; PLAINTIFFS ACTION BARRED BY

PRESCRIPTION OR LACHES. — Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation would apply if there

were an implied trust in this case, the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten years. The

Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. The written extrajudicial demand for its reconveyance was

made by the plaintiffs in 1951. Their action was filed in 1952 or after the lapse of more than forty bears

from the date of registration. The plaintiffs and their predessor-in-interest, Valentin Salao slept on their

rights, if they had any rigths at all.

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULING ON THE VALIDITY OF DONATION UNNECESSARY. — Where the

Court has reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reconveyance of the Calunuran

fishpond, it is no longer necessary to pass upon the validity of the donation made by Ambrosia Salao to

Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her half-share in the two fishponds. Plaintiffs have no right and personality to assail

that donation.

14. ACTIONS; PARTIES; GOOD FAITH IN FILING SUIT SHOWN. — The record shows that the

plaintiffs presented fifteen witnesses during the protracted trial of the case and that they fought

tenaciously, incurring considerable expenses therefor. Their causes of action turned out to be unfounded,

yet the pertinacity and vigor with which they pressed their claim were considered to indicate their

sincerity and good faith.

15. DAMAGES; MORAL DAMAGES; AWARD THEREOF NOT JUST AND PROPER IN INSTANT

CASE. — Where it cannot be concluded with certitude that plaintiffs' action was manisfestly frivolous

or was primarily intended to harass the defendants does not appear to be just and proper. The worries

and anxiety of a defendants an award for moral damages to the defendants does not appear to be just and

proper. The worries and anxiety of a defendant in a litigation that was not maliciously instituted are not

the moral damages contemplated in the law.

16. ATTORNEYS' FEES; AWARD THEREOF NOT JUST AND PROPER IN INSTANT CASE. —

Where it is conceded that the plaintiffs acted in good faith in filing their action, there would be no basis

for adjudging them liable to the defendants for attorneys' fees and litigation expenses. It is not sound

public policy to set a premium on the right to litigate. An adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the

award of attorney's fees to the winning party.

D E C I S I O N

AQUINO, J p:

This litigation regarding a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran, Hermosa, Bataan

involves the law of trusts and prescription. The facts are as follows:

The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal begot four children

named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in 1885. His eldest son,

Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child, Valentin Salao.

There is no documentary evidence as to what properties formed part of Manuel Salao's estate, if any. His

widow died on May 28, 1914. After her death, her estate was administered by her daughter Ambrosia.

It was partitioned extrajudicially in a deed dated December 29, 1918 but notarized on May 22, 1919

(Exh. 21). The deed was signed by her four legal heirs, namely, her three children, Alejandra, Juan and

Ambrosia, and her grandson, Valentin Salao, in representation of his deceased father, Patricio.

The lands left by Valentina Ignacio, all located at Barrio Dampalit, were as follows: prcd

Nature of Land Area in square meters

(1) One-half interest in a fishpond

which she had inherited from her parents,

Feliciano Ignacio and Damiana Mendoza,

and the other half of which was owned by

her co-owner, Josefa Sta. Ana 21,700

(2) Fishpond inherited from her parents 7,418

(3) Fishpond inherited from her parents 6,989

(4) Fishpond with a bodega for salt 50,469

(5) Fishpond with an area of one

hectare, 12 acres and 5 centares purchased

from Bernabe and Honorata Ignacio by

Valentina Ignacio on November 9, 1895

with a bodega for salt 11,205

(6) Fishpond 8,000

(7) One-half interest in a fishpond with

a total area of 10,424 square meters, the

other half was owned by A. Aguinaldo 5,217

(8) Riceland 50,454

(9) Riceland purchased by Valentina

Ignacio from Eduardo Salao on January

27, 1890 with a house and two camarins

thereon 8,065

(10) Riceland in the name of Ambrosia

Salao, with an area of 11,678 square

meters, of which 2,173 square meters

were sold to Justa Yongco 9,505

TOTAL 179,022 square

meters

To each of the legal heirs of Valentina Ignacio was adjudicated a distributive share valued at P8,135.25.

In satisfaction of his distributive share, Valentin Salao (who was then already forty-eight years old) was

given the biggest fishpond with an area of 50,469 square meters, a smaller fishpond with an area of 6,989

square meters and the riceland with a net area of 9,905 square meters. Those parcels of land had an

aggregate appraised value of P13,501 which exceeded Valentin's distributive share. So in the deed of

partition he was directed to pay to his co-heirs the sum of P5,365.75. That arrangement, which was

obviously intended to avoid the fragmentation of the lands, was beneficial to Valentin.

In that deed of partition (Exh. 21) it was noted that "desde la muerte de Valentina Ignacio y Mendoza,

ha venido administrando sus bienes la referida Ambrosia Salao" "cuya administracion lo ha sido a

satisfaccion de todos los herederos y por designacion los mismos". It was expressly stipulated that

Ambrosia Salao was not obligated to render any accounting of her administration "en consideracion al

resultado satisfactorio de sus gestiones, mejoradas los bienes y pagadas por ella las contribuciones" pages

2 and 11, Exh. 21).

By virtue of the partition the heirs became "dueños absolutos de sus respectivas propiedadas, y podran

inmediatamente tomar posesion de sus bienes, en la forma como se han distribuido y llevado a cabo las

adjudicaciones" (page 20, Exh. 21).

The documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio her two children,

Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the Registry of Deeds

of Pampanga, in their names for a forty-seven-hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran, Lubao,

Pampanga (Exh. 14). It is also known as Lot No. 540 of the Hermosa cadastre because that part of Lubao

later became a part of Bataan.

The Calunuran fishpond is the bone of contention in this case.

Plaintiffs' theory is that Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and his sister Ambrosia had engaged in the fishpond business.

Where they obtained the capital is not shown in any documentary evidence. Plaintiffs' version is that

Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in that joint venture, that the funds used were the

earnings of the properties supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao, and that those earnings were used in

the acquisition of the Calunuran fishpond. There is no documentary evidence to support that theory.

On the other hand, the defendants contend that the Calunuran fishpond consisted of lands purchased by

Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao in 1905, 1906, 1907 and 1908 as shown in their Exhibits 8, 9, 10

and 13. But this point is disputed by the plaintiffs.

However, there can be no controversy as to the fact that after Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao

secured a Torrens title for the Calunuran fishpond in 1911 they exercised dominical rights over it to the

exclusion of their nephew, Valentin Salao.

Thus, on December 1, 1911 Ambrosia Salao sold under pacto de retro for P800 the Calunuran fishpond

to Vicente Villongco. The period of redemption was one year. In the deed of sale (Exh. 19) Ambrosia

confirmed that she and her brother Juan were the dueños proindivisos of the said pesqueria. On December

7, 1911 Villongco, the vendee a retro, conveyed the same fishpond to Ambrosia by way of lease for an

annual canon of P128 (Exh. 19-a).

After the fishpond was redeemed from Villongco or on June 8, 1914 Ambrosia and Juan sold it under

pacto de retro to Eligio Naval for the sum of P3,360. The period of redemption was also one year (Exh.

20). The fishpond was later redeemed and Naval reconveyed it to the vendors a retro in a document dated

October 5, 1916 (Exh. 20-a). llcd

The 1930 survey shown in the computation sheets of the Bureau of Lands reveals that the Calunuran

fishpond has an area of 479,205 square meters and that it was claimed by Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao,

while the Pinañganacan fishpond (subsequently acquired by Juan and Ambrosia) has an area of 975,952

square meters (Exh. 22).

Likewise, there is no controversy as to the fact that on May 27, 1911 Ambrosia Salao bought for four

thousand pesos from the heirs of Engracio Santiago a parcel of swampland planted to bakawan and nipa

with an area of 96 hectares, 57 ares and 73 centares located at Sitio Lewa, Barrio Pinañganacan, Lubao,

Pampanga (Exh. 17-d).

The record of Civil Case No. 136, General Land Registration Office Record No. 12144, Court of First

Instance of Pampanga shows that Ambrosia Salao and Juan Salao filed an application for the registration

of that land in their names on January 15, 1916. They alleged in their petition that "han adquirido dicho

terreno por partes iguales y por la compra a los herederos del finado, Don Engracio Santiago" (Exh. 17-

a).

At the hearing on October 26, 1916 before Judge Percy M. Moir, Ambrosia testified for the applicants.

On that same day Judge Moir rendered a decision, stating, inter alia, that the heirs of Engracio Santiago

had sold the land to Ambrosia Salao and Juan Salao. Judge Moir "ordena la adjudicacion y registro del

terreno solicitado a nombre de Juan Salao, mayor de edad y de estado casado y de s esposa Diega Santiago

y Ambrosia Salao, de estado soltera y mayor de edad, en participaciones iguales" (Exh. 17-e).

On November 28, 1916 Judge Moir ordered the issuance of a decree for the said land. The decree was

issued on February 21, 1917. On March 12, 1917 Original Certificate of Title No. 472 of the Registry of

Deeds of Pampanga was issued in the names of Juan Salao and Ambrosia Salao.

That Pinañganacan or Lewa fishpond later became Cadastral Lot No. 544 of the Hermosa cadastre (Exh.

23). It adjoins the Calunuran fishpond (See sketch, Exh. 1).

Juan Y. Salao, Sr. died on November 3, 1931 at the age of eighty years (Exh. C). His nephew, Valentin

Salao, died on February 9, 1933 at the age of sixty years according to the death certificate (Exh. A.

However, if according to Exhibit 21, he was forty-eight years old in 1918, he would be sixty-three years

old in 1933).

The intestate estate of Valentin Salao was partitioned extrajudicially on December 28, 1934 between his

two daughters, Benita Salao-Marcelo and Victorina Salao-Alcuriza (Exh. 32). His estate consisted of the

two fishponds which he had inherited in 1918 from his grandmother, Valentina Ignacio.

If it were true that he had a one-third interest in the Calunuran and Lewa fishponds with a total area of

145 hectares registered in 1911 and 1917 in the names of his aunt and uncle, Ambrosia Salao and Juan

Y. Salao, Sr., respectively, it is strange that no mention of such interest was made in the extrajudicial

partition of his estate in 1934.

It is relevant to mention that on April 8, 1940 Ambrosia Salao donated to her grandniece, plaintiff Benita

Salao, three lots located at Barrio Dampalit with a total area of 5,832 square meters (Exh. L). As donee

Benita Salao signed the deed of donation.

On that occasion she could have asked Ambrosia Salao to deliver to her and to the children of her sister,

Victorina, the Calunuran fishpond if it were true that it was held in trust by Ambrosia as the share of

Benita's father in the alleged joint venture.

But she did not make any such demand. It was only after Ambrosia Salao's death that she thought of

filing an action for the reconveyance of the Calunuran fishpond which was allegedly held in trust and

which had become the sole property of Juan Salao y Santiago (Juani).

On September 30, 1944 or during the Japanese occupation and about a year before Ambrosia Salao's

death on September 14, 1945 due to senility (she was allegedly eighty-five years old when she died), she

donated her one-half proindiviso share in the two fishponds in question to her nephew, Juan S. Salao, Jr.

(Juani). At that time she was living with Juani's family. He was already the owner of the other half of the

said fishponds, having inherited it from his father, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli). The deed of donation

included other pieces of real property owned by Ambrosia. She reserved for herself the usufruct over the

said properties during her lifetime (Exh. 2 or M).

The said deed of donation was registered only on April 5, 1950 (page 39, Defendants' Record on Appeal).

The lawyer of Benita Salao and the children of Victorina Salao in a letter dated January 26, 1951

informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in the two fishponds and that when Juani

took possession thereof in 1945, he refused to give Benita and Victorina's children their one-third share

of the net fruits which allegedly amounted to P200,000 (Exh. K).

Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically stated that Valentin Salao did not

have any interest in the two fishponds and that the sole owners thereof were his father Banli and his aunt

Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles issued in 1911 and 1917, and that he (Juani) was the donee of

Ambrosia's one-half share (Exh. K-1).

Benita Salao and her nephews and niece filed their original complaint against Juan S. Salao, Jr. on

January 9, 1952 in the Court of First Instance of Bataan (Exh. 36). They amended their complaint on

January 28, 1955. They asked for the annulment of the donation to Juan S. Salao, Jr. and for the

reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond as Valentin Salao's supposed one-third share in the 145

hectares of fishpond registered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.

Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer pleaded as a defense the indefeasibility of the Torrens title secured by his

father and aunt. He also invoked the Statute of Frauds, prescription and laches. As counter-claims, he

asked for moral damages amounting to P200,000, attorney's fees and litigation expenses of not less than

P22,000 and reimbursement of the premiums which he has been paying on his bond for the lifting of the

receivership. Juan S. Salao, Jr. died in 1958 at the age of seventy-one. He was substituted by his widow,

Mercedes Pascual, and his six children and by the administrator of his estate.

In the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his estate the two fishponds in question were adjudicated

to his seven legal heirs in equal shares with the condition that the properties would remain under

administration during the pendency of this case (page 181, Defendants' Record on Appeal).

After trial the lower court in its decision consisting of one hundred ten printed pages dismissed the

amended complaint and the counter-claim. In sixty-seven printed pages it made a laborious recital of the

testimonies of plaintiffs' fourteen witnesses, Gregorio Marcelo, Norberto Crisostomo, Leonardo

Mangali, Fidel de la Cruz, Dionisio Manalili, Ambrosio Manalili, Policarpio Sapno, Elias Manies,

Basilio Atienza, Benita Salao, Emilio Cagui, Damaso de la Peña, Arturo Alcuriza and Francisco

Buensuceso, and the testimonies of defendants' six witnesses, Marcos Galicia, Juan Galicia, Tiburcio

Lingad, Doctor Wenceslao Pascual, Ciriaco Ramirez and Pablo P. Salao. (Plaintiffs presented Regino

Nicodemus as a fifteenth witness, a rebuttal witness).

The trial court found that there was no community of property among Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao

and Valentin Salao when the Calunuran and Pinañganacan (Lewa) lands were acquired; that a co-

ownership over the real properties of Valentina Ignacio existed among her heirs after her death in 1914;

that the co-ownership was administered by Ambrosia Salao and that it subsisted up to 1918 when her

estate was partitioned among her three children and her grandson, Valentin Salao.

The trial court surmised that the co-ownership which existed from 1914 to 1918 misled the plaintiffs and

their witnesses and caused them to believe erroneously that there was a co-ownership in 1905 or

thereabouts. The trial court speculated that if Valentin had a hand in the conversion into fishponds of the

Calunuran and Lewa lands, he must have done so on a salary or profit-sharing basis. It conjectured that

Valentin's children and grandchildren were given by Ambrosia Salao a portion of the earnings of the

fishponds as a reward for his services or because of Ambrosia's affection for her grandnieces.

The trial court rationalized that Valentin's omission during his lifetime to assail the Torrens titles of Juan

and Ambrosia signified that "he was not a co-owner" of the fishponds. It did not give credence to the

testimonies of plaintiffs' witnesses because their memories could not be trusted and because no strong

documentary evidence supported the declarations. Moreover, the parties involved in the alleged trust

were already dead.

It also held that the donation was validly executed and that even if it were void Juan S. Salao, Jr., the

donee, would nevertheless be the sole legal heir of the donor, Ambrosia Salao, and would inherit the

properties donated to him. LexLib

Both parties appealed. The plaintiffs appealed because their action for reconveyance was dismissed. The

defendants appealed because their counterclaim for damages was dismissed.

The appeals, which deal with factual and legal issues, were made to the Court of Appeals. However, as

the amounts involved exceed two hundred thousand pesos, the Court of Appeals elevated the case to this

Court in its resolution of October 3, 1966 (CA-G.R. No. 30014-R).

Plaintiffs' appeal. — An appellant's brief should contain "a subject index of the matter in the brief with

a digest of the argument and page references" to the contents of the brief (Sec. 16[a] Rule 46, 1964 Rules

of Court; Sec. 17, Rule 48, 1940 Rules of Court).

The plaintiffs in their appellants' brief consisting of 302 pages did not comply with that requirement.

Their statements of the case and the facts do not contain "page references to the record" as required in

section 16[c] and [d] of Rule 46, formerly section 17, Rule 48 of the 1940 Rules of Court.

Lawyers for appellants, when they prepare their briefs, would do well to read and re-read section 16 of

Rule 46. If they comply strictly with the formal requirements prescribed in section 16, they might make

a competent and luminous presentation of their clients' case and lighten the burden of the Court.

What Justice Fisher said in 1918 is still true now: "The pressure of work upon this Court is so great that

we cannot, in justice to other litigants, undertake to make an examination of the voluminous transcript

of the testimony (1,553 pages in this case, twenty-one witnesses having testified), unless the attorneys

who desire us to make such examination have themselves taken the trouble to read the record and brief

it in accordance with our rules" (Palarca vs. Baguisi, 38 Phil. 177, 181), As noted in an old case, this

Court decides hundreds of cases every year and in addition resolves in minute orders an exceptionally

considerable number of petitions, motions and interlocutory matters (Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21

Phil. 308, 395; See In re Almacen, L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562, 573).

Plaintiffs' first assignment of error raised a procedural issue. In paragraphs 1 to 14 of their first cause of

action they made certain averments to establish their theory that Valentin Salao had a one-third interest

in the two-fishponds which were registered in the names of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. (Banli) and Ambrosia

Salao.

Juan S. Salao, Jr. (Juani) in his answer "specifically" denied "each and all the allegations" in paragraphs

1 to 10 and 12 of the first cause of action with the qualification that Original Certificates of Title Nos.

185 and 472 were issued "more than 37 years ago" in the names of Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia under the

circumstances set forth in Juan S. Salao, Jr.'s "positive defenses" and "not under the circumstances stated

in the amended complaint".

The plaintiffs contend that the answer of Juan S. Salao, Jr. was in effect an admission of the allegations

in their first cause of action that there was a co-ownership among Ambrosia, Juan, Alejandra and

Valentin, all surnamed Salao, regarding the Dampalit property as early as 1904 or 1905; that the common

funds were invested in the acquisition of the two fishponds; that the 47-hectare Calunuran fishpond was

verbally adjudicated to Valentin Salao in the 1919 partition and that there was a verbal stipulation to

register "said lands in the name only of Juan Y. Salao".

That contention is unfounded. Under section 6, Rule 9 of the 1940 Rules of Court the answer should

"contain either a specific denial or a statement of matters in avoidance of the cause or causes of action

asserted in the complaint". Section 7 of the same rule requires the defendant to "deal specifically with

each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set

forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support his denial". "Material averments in

the complaint, other than those as to the amount of damage, shall be deemed admitted when not

specifically denied" (Sec. 8). "The defendant may set forth by answer as many affirmative defenses as

he may have. All such grounds of defenses as would raise issues of fact not arising upon the preceding

pleading must be specifically pleaded" (Sec. 9).

What defendant Juan S. Salao, Jr. did in his answer was to set forth in his "positive defenses" the matters

in avoidance of plaintiffs' first cause of action which supported his denials of paragraphs 1 to 10 and 12

of the first cause of action. Obviously, he did so because he found it impracticable to state piecemeal his

own version as to the acquisition of the two fishponds or to make a tedious and repetitious recital of the

ultimate facts contradicting the allegations of the first cause of action.

We hold that in doing so he substantially complied with Rule 9 of the 1940 Rules of Court. It may be

noted that under the present Rules of Court a "negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact

or facts alleged in the complaint essential to the plaintiff's cause or causes of action". On the other hand,

"an affirmative defense is an allegation of new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of

the complaint, expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff".

Affirmative defenses include all matters set up "by way of confession and avoidance". (Sec. 5, Rule 6,

Rules of Court).

The case of El Hogar Filipino vs. Santos Investments, 74 Phil. 79 and similar cases is distinguishable

from the instant case. In the El Hogar case the defendant filed a laconic answer containing the statement

that it denied "generally and specifically each and every allegation contained in each and every paragraph

of the complaint". It did not set forth in its answer any matter by way of confession and avoidance. It did

not interpose any affirmative defenses.

Under those circumstances, it was held that defendant's specific denial was really a general denial which

was tantamount to an admission of the allegations of the complaint and which justified judgment on the

pleadings. That is not the situation in this case.

The other nine assignments of error of the plaintiffs may be reduced to the decisive issue of whether the

Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao by Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao. That

issue is tied up with the question of whether plaintiffs' action for reconveyance had already prescribed.

The plaintiffs contend that their action is "to enforce a trust which defendant" Juan S. Salao, Jr. allegedly

violated. The existence of a trust was not definitely alleged in plaintiffs' complaint. They mentioned trust

for the first time on page 2 of their appellants' brief.

To determine if the plaintiffs have a cause of action for the enforcement of a trust, it is necessary to make

some exegesis on the nature of trusts ( fideicomisos). Trusts in Anglo-American jurisprudence were

derived from the fideicommissa of the Roman law (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abadilla,

46 Phil. 642, 646).

"In its technical legal sense, a trust is defined as the right, enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial

enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another, but the word 'trust' is frequently

employed to indicate duties, relations, and responsibilities which are not strictly technical trusts" (89

C.J.S. 712)."A person who establishes a trust is called the trustor; one in whom confidence is reposed as

regards property for the benefit of another person is known as the trustee; and the person for whose

benefit the trust has been created is referred to as the beneficiary" (Art. 1440, Civil Code). There is a

fiduciary relation between the trustee and the cestui que trust as regards certain property, real, personal,

money or choses in action (Pacheco vs. Arro, 85 Phil. 505).

"Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of the trustor or of the

parties. Implied trusts come into being by operation of law" (Art. 1441, Civil Code). "No express trusts

concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proven by parol evidence. An implied trust may

be proven by oral evidence" (Ibid, Arts. 1443 and 1457).

"No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is

clearly intended" (Ibid, Art. 1444; Tuason de Perez vs. Caluag, 96 Phil. 981; Julio vs. Dalandan, L-19012,

October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543, 546). "Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and

positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly

evincing an intention to create a trust" (89 C.J.S. 722).

"Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction

as matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity,

independently of the particular intention of the parties" (89 C.J.S. 724). They are ordinarily subdivided

into resulting and constructive trusts (89 C.J.S. 722).

"A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the act or construction of law,

but in its more restricted sense it is a trust raised by implication of law and presumed always to have been

contemplated by the parties, the intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their transaction, but

not expressed in the deed or instrument of conveyance" (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of resulting trusts are

found in articles 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code. (See Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, L-31569, September

28, 1973, 53 SCRA 168, 179; Martinez vs. Graño, 42 Phil. 35).

On the other hand, a constructive trust is a trust "raised by construction of law, or arising by operation of

law". In a more restricted sense and as contradistinguished from a resulting trust, a constructive trust is

"a trust not created by any words, either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention to create a

trust, but by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice". It does not arise "by

agreement or intention, but by operation of law." (89 C.J.S. 726-727).

Thus, "if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is by force of law,

considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes"

(Art. 1456, Civil Code).

Or "if a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment, courts of equity will impress upon

the title a so-called constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party". Such a constructive trust is not a

trust in the technical sense. (Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the P.I., 49 Phil. 244). LibLex

Not a scintilla of documentary evidence was presented by the plaintiffs to prove that there was an express

trust over the Calunuran fishpond in favor of Valentin Salao. Purely parol evidence was offered by them

to prove the alleged trust. Their claim that in the oral partition in 1919 of the two fishponds the Calunuran

fishpond was assigned to Valentin Salao is legally untenable.

It is legally indefensible because the terms of article 1443 of the Civil Code (already in force when the

action herein was instituted) are peremptory and unmistakable: parol evidence cannot be used to prove

an express trust concerning realty.

Is plaintiffs' massive oral evidence sufficient to prove an implied trust, resulting or constructive,

regarding the two fishponds?

Plaintiffs' pleadings and evidence cannot be relied upon to prove an implied trust. The trial court's firm

conclusion that there was no community of property during the lifetime of Valentina Ignacio or before

1914 is substantiated by defendants' documentary evidence. The existence of the alleged co-ownership

over the lands supposedly inherited from Manuel Salao in 1885 is the basis of plaintiffs' contention that

the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao.

But that co-ownership was not proven by any competent evidence. It is quite improbable because the

alleged estate of Manuel Salao was likewise not satisfactorily proven. The plaintiffs alleged in their

original complaint that there was a co-ownership over two hectares of land left by Manuel Salao. In their

amended complaint, they alleged that the co-ownership was over seven hectares of fishponds located in

Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal. In their brief they alleged that the fishponds, ricelands and saltbeds

owned in common in Barrio Dampalit had an area of twenty-eight hectares, of which sixteen hectares

pertained to Valentina Ignacio and eleven hectares represented Manuel Salao's estate.

They theorized that the eleven hectares "were, and necessarily, the nucleus, nay the very root, of the

property now in litigation" (page 6, plaintiffs-appellants' brief). But the eleven hectares were not proven

by any trustworthy evidence. Benita Salao's testimony that in 1918 or 1919 Juan, Ambrosia, Alejandra

and Valentin partitioned twenty-eight hectares of lands located in Barrio Dampalit is not credible. As

noted by the defendants, Manuel Salao was not even mentioned in plaintiffs' complaints.

The 1919 partition of Valentina Ignacio's estate covered about seventeen hectares of fishponds and

ricelands (Exh. 21). If at the time that partition was made there were eleven hectares of land in Barrio

Dampalit belonging to Manuel Salao, who died in 1885, those eleven hectares would have been

partitioned in writing as in the case of the seventeen hectares belonging to Valentina Ignacio's estate.

It is incredible that the forty-seven-hectare Calunuran fishpond would be adjudicated to Valentin Salao

merely by word of mouth. Incredible because for the partition of the seventeen hectares of land left by

Valentina Ignacio an elaborate "Escritura de Particion" consisting of twenty-two pages had to be executed

by the four Salao heirs. Surely, for the partition of one hundred forty-five hectares of fishponds among

three of the same Salao heirs an oral adjudication would not have sufficed.

The improbability of the alleged oral partition becomes more evident when it is borne in mind that the

two fishponds were registered land and "the act of registration" is "the operative act" that conveys and

affects the land (Sec. 50, Act No. 496). That means that any transaction affecting the registered land

should be evidenced by a registerable deed. The fact that Valentin Salao and his successors-in-interest,

the plaintiffs, never bothered for a period of nearly forty years to procure any documentary evidence to

establish his supposed interest or participation in the two fishponds is very suggestive of the absence of

such interest.

The matter may be viewed from another angle. As already stated, the deed of partition for Valentina

Ignacio's estate was notarized in 1919 (Exh. 21). The plaintiffs assert that the two fishponds were verbally

partitioned also in 1919 and that the Calunuran fishpond was assigned to Valentin Salao as his share.

Now, in the partition of Valentina Ignacio's estate Valentin was obligated to pay P3,355.25 to ambrosia

Salao. If, according to the plaintiffs, Ambrosia administered the two fishponds and was the custodian of

its earnings, then it could have been easily stipulated in the deed partitioning Valentina Ignacio's estate

that the amount due from Valentin would just be deducted by Ambrosia from his share of the earnings

of the two fishponds. There was no such stipulation. Not a shred of documentary evidence shows

Valentin's participation in the two fishponds.

The plaintiffs utterly failed to measure up to the yardstick that a trust must be proven by clear, satisfactory

and convincing evidence. It cannot rest on vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or

indefinite declarations (De Leon vs. Molo-Peckson, 116 Phil. 1267, 1273).

"Trust and trustee; establishment of trust by parol evidence; certainty of proof . — Where a trust

is to be established by oral proof, the testimony supporting it must be sufficiently strong to prove

the right of the alleged beneficiary with as much certainty as if a document proving the trust

were shown. A trust cannot be established, contrary to the recitals of a Torrens title, upon vague

and inconclusive proof ." (Syllabus, Suarez vs. Tirambulo, 59 Phil. 303).

"Trusts; evidence needed to establish trust on parol testimony. — In order to establish a trust in

real property by parol evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if the act giving rise

to the trust obligation were proven by an authentic document. Such a trust cannot be established

upon testimony consisting in large part of insecure surmises based on ancient hearsay."

(Syllabus, Santa Juana vs. Del Rosario, 50 Phil. 110).

The foregoing rulings are good under article 1457 of the Civil Code which, as already noted, allows an

implied trust to be proven by oral evidence. Trustworthy oral evidence is required to prove an implied

trust because oral evidence can be easily fabricated.

On the other hand, a Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred

to therein (Sec. 47, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles were regularly issued and

that they are valid. In order to maintain an action for reconveyance, proof as to the fiduciary relation of

the parties must be clear and convincing (Yumul vs. Rivera and Dizon, 64 Phil. 13, 17-18).

The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land. "Once a title is registered, the owner may

rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the mirador de su

casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land" (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 593).

There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention on the part of Juan Y.

Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to create any trust. There was no constructive trust because

the registration of the two fishponds in the names of Juan and Ambrosia was not vitiated by fraud or

mistake. This is not a case where to satisfy the demands of justice it is necessary to consider the Calunuran

fishpond as being held in trust by the heirs of Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the heirs of Valentin Salao.

And even assuming that there was an implied trust, plaintiffs' action is clearly barred by prescription or

laches (Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December 3, 1974, 61 SCRA 284; Quiñiano vs. Court of Appeals,

L-23024, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 221; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-30889, February 29, 1972, 43

SCRA 503; Alzona vs. Capunitan and Reyes, 114 Phil 377).

Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation would apply if there were an implied trust in this case,

the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten years (Sec 40; Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado,

103 Phil. 261, 266).

The Calunuran fishpond was registered in 1911. The written extrajudicial demand for its reconveyance

was made by the plaintiffs in 1951. Their action was filed in 1952 or after the lapse of more than forty

years from the date of registration. The plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin Salao, slept

on their rights, if they had any rights at all. Vigilanti prospiciunt jura or the law protects him who is

watchful of his rights (92 C.J.S. 1011, citing Esguerra vs. Tecson, 21 Phil. 518, 521).

"Undue delay in the enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of a lack of merit in the claim, since it

is human nature for a person to assert his rights more strongly when they are threatened or invaded".

"Laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive

of a want of merit but may, according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself."

(Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435, 440-441).

Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reconveyance of the Calunuran

fishpond, it is no longer necessary to pass upon the validity of the donation made by Ambrosia Salao to

Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her one-half share in the two fishponds. The plaintiffs have no right and personality

to assail that donation.

Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional rights to

Ambrosia's share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr., her nearest relative within

the third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died, would have been also her legal

heir, together with his first cousin, Juan Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao, the daughter of Valentin, could not

represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia since in the collateral line; representation takes

place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood (Art.

972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a grandniece like Benita Salao or great-grandnephews like the

plaintiffs Alcuriza (Pavia vs. Iturralde, 5 Phil. 176).

The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' complaint.

Defendants' appeal. — The defendants dispute the lower court's finding that the plaintiffs filed their

action in good faith. The defendants contend that they are entitled to damages because the plaintiffs acted

maliciously or in bad faith in suing them. They ask for P25,000 attorney's fees and litigation expenses

and, in addition, moral damages.

We hold that defendants' appeal is not meritorious. The record shows that the plaintiffs presented fifteen

witnesses during the protracted trial of this case which lasted from 1954 to 1959. They fought

tenaciously. They obviously incurred considerable expenses in prosecuting their case. Although their

causes of action turned out to be unfounded, yet the pertinacity and vigor with which they pressed their

claim indicate their sincerity and good faith.

There is the further consideration that the parties were descendants of common ancestors, the spouses

Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio, and that plaintiffs' action was based on their honest supposition

that the funds used in the acquisition of the lands in litigation were earnings of the properties allegedly

inherited from Manuel Salao.

Considering those circumstances, it cannot be concluded with certitude that plaintiffs' action was

manifestly frivolous or was primarily intended to harass the defendants. An award for damages to the

defendants does not appear to be just and proper.

The worries and anxiety of a defendant in a litigation that was not maliciously instituted are not the moral

damages contemplated in the law (Solis & Yarisantos vs. Salvador, L-17022, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA

887; Ramos vs. Ramos, supra).

The instant case is not among the cases mentioned in articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code wherein

moral damages may be recovered. Nor can it be regarded as analogous to any of the cases mentioned in

those articles.

"The adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to the

payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate;

such right is so precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who may exercise it

erroneously." (Barreto vs. Arevalo, 99 Phil. 771, 779).

The defendants invoke article 2208 (4) (11) of the Civil Code which provides that attorney's fees may be

recovered "in case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff" (defendant is a

plaintiff in his counterclaim) or "in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable" that

attorney's fees should be awarded.

But once it is conceded that the plaintiffs acted in good faith in filing their action there would be no basis

for adjudging them liable to the defendants for attorney's fees and litigation expenses (See Rizal Surety

& Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, L-23729, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 61).

It is not sound public policy to set a premium on the right to litigate. An adverse decision does not ipso

facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party (Herrera vs. Luy Kim Guan, 110 Phil. 1020,

1028; Heirs of Justiva vs. Gustilo, 61 O.G. 6959).

The trial court's judgment is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, (Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.

Fernando (Chairman, of the Second Division), J., took no part.

Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.

||| (Salao v. Salao, G.R. No. L-26699, March 16, 1976)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-17759. December 17, 1962.]

ISABEL V. SAGUINSIN, petitioner-appellant, vs. DIONISIO LINDAYAG, ET AL.,

oppositors-appellees.

Gatchalian & Sison for petitioner-appellant.

Delgado, Flores, Macapagal & Dizon for oppositors-appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; APPOINTMENT; WHO MAY BE APPOINTED

ADMINISTRATOR; WHEN SISTER OF DECEDENT MAY NOT BE APPOINTED. — Where it is

undisputed that the decedent left a husband and three legally adopted children, a petition for issuance of

letters of administration in favor of the sister of said decedent was properly dismissed for lack of interest

in the estate, she being neither an heir nor a creditor thereof.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCEPT OF "AN INTERESTED PERSON" IN THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT. —

An interest party has been defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate, such

as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa

40 Off. Gaz. 1171).And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special

proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and

direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, 89 Phil., 710; Espinosa vs. Barrios,

70 Phil. 311).

3. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; MOTION TO DISMISS; HEARING; WHEN EVIDENCE MAY BE

PRESENTED; LACK OF LEGAL CAPACITY TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS AS GROUND. —

The rule is that the hearing on the motion to dismiss should be conducted as an ordinary hearing where

the parties are allowed to present evidence, except when the motion is based on the failure of the

complaint r of the petition to state a cause of action. (Asejo vs. Leonoso, 78 Phil., 467; 07 44 Off. Gaz.

No. 10, p. 3807.) Consequently, where the motion to discuss the petition was grounded on the petitioner's

lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings, the argument of the petitioner that only the facts alleged

in the petition should be considered in determining its sufficiency was properly overruled and the lower

court was correct in considering the evidence presented during the hearing of said motion to prove

petitioner's lack of legal capacity to commence the proceedings.

D E C I S I O N

DIZON, J p:

On November 10, 1959 Maria V. Lindayag died intestate in Olongapo, Zambales. On May 27, 1960 her

sister, Isabel V. Saguinsin, filed with the Court of First Instance of said province a verified petition for

the issuance in her favor of letters of administration over the estate of said deceased, alleging, among

other things, that the latter left real and personal properties situated in the provinces of Zambales and

Bulacan worth approximately P100,000; that the names, ages and residence of her surviving heirs were:

(1) Dionisio Lindayag, 60 years of age, surviving husband, residing at Olongapo, Zambales, (2) Isabel

V. Saguinsin, 54 years of age, sister of the deceased, residing at Hagonoy, Bulacan, (3) Aurora V.

Sacdalan, 46 years of age, sister of the deceased, and (4) Ines V. Calayag, 70 years of age, sister of the

deceased, both residing at Paombong, Bulacan; and that, as far as petitioner knew, the decedent left no

debts at the time of her death.

On June 21, 1960 Dionisio V. Lindayag, the surviving spouse, in his behalf and in representation of the

minors Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag, filed a motion to dismiss the petition

on the ground of petitioner's lack of interest in the estate, she being neither heir nor a creditor thereof.

The motion alleged that the late Maria V. Lindayag was survived by her husband — the movant — and

legally adopted minor children named Jesus Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag, the

descendent having left no legitimate, natural or illegitimate child. A certified true copy of the decision

of the Justice of the Peace of Olongapo, Zambales, dated July 6, 1953 decreeing the adoption of said

minors by the descendent and her husband was attached to the motion.

In opposing the motion to dismiss petitioner argued that only the facts alleged in the petition should be

considered in determining its sufficiency.

On July 28, 1960, after due hearing in the motion aforesaid, the Court issued the following order of

dismissal:

"It appearing that the herein petitioner is only a sister of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag; that

the deceased is survived by her husband and her three (3) adopted children named: Jesus,

Concepcion and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag who were adopted by the deceased on July 6,

1953; that the herein petitioner is obviously not an heir and has no interest in the estate; and that

the surviving heirs oppose the instant petition on the ground that they want to settle the estate

extra-judicially among them to avoid unnecessary expenses in prosecuting this case, the Court

finds the oppositors' opposition to be well taken.

"WHEREFORE, let this case be dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs."

Petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the above order having been denied, she took the present

appeal.

The question to be resolved in this appeal is whether petitioner is "an interested person" in the estate of

the deceased Maria V. Lindayag.

According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of administration must be

filed by an "interested person". An interested party has been defined in this connection as one who would

be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor

(Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil

actions as well as special proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto

must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-

3378, August 22, 1951; Espinosa vs. Barrios, 70 Phil. 311)

Petitioner's interest in the estate of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag was disputed, through a motion to

dismiss her petition, by the surviving spouse on the ground that said deceased was survived by him and

by three legally adopted children — thus excluding petitioner as an heir. In the course of the hearing held

in connection with said motion, evidence was introduced in support thereof which according to the lower

court, established that said deceased was survived not only by her husband but three legally adopted

children named Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag.

Upon these facts — which petitioner does not dispute — it is manifest that she is not an heir of her

deceased sister and, therefore, has no material and direct interest in her estate.

Petitioner's view that when a motion to dismiss a complaint or a petition is filed, only the facts alleged

in the complaint or petition may be taken into account is not entirely correct. To the contrary, the rule is

that at said hearing said motion may be proved or disproved in accordance with the rules of evidence,

and it has been held that, for that purpose, the hearing should be conducted as an ordinary hearing; and

the parties should be allowed to present evidence, except when the motion is based on the failure of the

complaint or of the petition to state a cause of action (Asejo vs. Leonoso, 78 Phil. 467; 44 O.G. No. 10,

p. 3832). In the present case, the motion to dismiss the petition was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal

capacity to institute the proceedings which, as already stated heretofore, was fully substantiated by the

evidence presented during the hearing.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala and

Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

||| (Saguinsin v. Lindayag, G.R. No. L-17759, December 17, 1962)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-24750. May 16, 1980.]

DOROTEO BANAWA, JULIANA MENDOZA, CASIANO AMPONIN and GLICERIA

ABRENICA, petitioners, vs. PRIMITIVA MIRANO, GREGORIA MIRANO, JUANA

MIRANO and MARCIANO MIRANO, respondents.

Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.

Recto Law Office for respondents.

D E C I S I O N

FERNANDEZ, J p:

This is a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April

12, 1965 1 in CA-G.R. No. 23597-R, entitled "Primitiva Mirano, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus,

Doroteo Banawa, et al., Defendants-Appellants", the dispositive part of which is:

"In view of the foregoing, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs against

defendants-appellants."

The judgment of the lower court which was affirmed reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

"(a) Declaring the plaintiffs to be the owners of the two parcels of land described in paragraph 3

of the complaint;

"(b) Ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of the said parcels of land to the plaintiffs;

"(c) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Roman Biscocho, Paula Biscocho and Maria Carmen

Mendoza in favor of Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, dated April 4, 1940, as evidenced

by Exhibit 'E' and its registration in the registry of deeds of Batangas, to be null and void;

"(d) Declaring null and void the deed of donation, dated August 7, 1956, evidenced by Exhibit

'D' executed by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza in favor of the spouses

Casiano Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica, as well as Tax Declarations No. 26818 in the names

of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, and No. 26845 in the names of the spouses

Casiano Amponin and Gliceria Abrenica, and the registration of the said deed of donation in the

registry of deeds of Batangas; and

"(e) Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs actual damages in the amount of P4,500 and

attorney's fees in the amount of P500.00, and the costs of this action.

SO ORDERED." 2

The spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza both died during the pendency of this case in the

Court of Appeals. They have been substituted by the petitioners Casiano Amponin and his wife Gliceria

Abrenica, legally adopted daughter of one of the deceased petitioners and donee of the Carsuche property.

3

The petitioners filed on May 20, 1965, a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of

Appeals. Said motion was denied on June 28, 1965. 4

As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts are:

"It appears that sometime in 1911, Maria Mirano, a niece of appellant Juliana Mendoza, and who

was then about nine years old, was taken in by the appellants-spouses, Doroteo Banawa and

Juliana Mendoza, in the latter's house in Mahabang Lodlod, Taal, Batangas. Appellants spouses

being childless, treated and reared her up like their own child. They hired a private tutor to teach

her the rudiments of reading, writing and arithmetic. They supported her, gave her money,

clothes and even jewelry. Maria reciprocated their care and affection by helping with the

household chores.

"A few years later, the spouses opened up a store for general merchandise in barrio Lutucan,

Sariaya, Quezon, from which they derived considerable income and which enabled them to

acquire several parcels of land.

"On July 31, 1949, after a lingering illness, Maria Mirano died in Taal, Batangas while still living

with the spouses. At the time of her death she left as her only nearest relatives the herein

plaintiffs, namely Primitiva Mirano, who is a surviving sister, and Gregoria, Juana and Marciano,

all surnamed Mirano, who are the children of a deceased brother, Martin Mirano.

"The parties do not dispute the identity of the two parcels of land in controversy, which are

described in paragraph 3 of the complaint as follows:

'1. A parcel of sugar land situated in the Barrio of Iba, Taal, Batangas, with an

area of 44,200 square meters, more or less. Bounded on the North, by Ravine; on the

East, by the property of Leodovico Garcia; on the South, by the property of Gregorio

Amponin; and on the West, by the property of Gregorio Maria Aniversario (now Doroteo

Banawa). Under Tax Declaration No. 25994 in the name of Maria Mirano and assessed

at P2,210.00.

'2. A parcel of sugar land situated in the barrio of Carsuche, Taal, Batangas, with

an area of 54,093 square meters, more or less. Bounded on the North, by the property of

Agapito Aro and Alley; on the East, by an Alley; on the South, by the properties of

Filomeno Diomampo, Gregorio de la Rosa and Andres Moratilla; and on the West, by

the property of Agapito Aro. Under Tax Declaration No. 19786 in the name of Maria

Mirano and assessed at P2,760.00.'

"For purposes of clearness and convenience, and since the respective assertions and evidences

adduced by the parties regarding the two parcels of land are in sharp divergence, we shall refer

to the first parcel as the Iba Property and to the second parcel as the Carsuche property and,

moreover, we shall treat and discuss the two separately.

"Parcel 1, or the Iba Property.

"The parties agree that the Iba Property was originally owned by Placido Punzalan from whom

it was acquired on May 5, 1921. Plaintiffs' evidence upon this point tends to show that the

acquisition of the said parcel of land was pursuant to a deed of sale contained in a public

instrument acknowledged before Notary Public Ramon A. Cabrera on the date aforesaid, a

photostatic copy of which was introduced in evidence as Exhibit 'A', the same having been

secured from an original copy on file with the Division of Archives, Bureau of Libraries. The

deed of sale in question states that the Iba property consisted formerly of two parcels of land and

that they were sold for the amount of P2,000.00 in favor of Maria Mirano. Defendant Doroteo

Banawa impliedly admitted the execution of this notarial document when he declared that in the

execution of the document concerning the purchase of the Iba property from Punzalan the notary

public charged him P20.00 and another P5.00 for stamps in the name of Maria Mirano since

1923 (Exhs. 'A-1' to 'A-7').

"By contrast, defendants' claim of ownership over the Iba property is predicated upon their

assertion that the money used in buying said land pertained to the spouses Doroteo Banawa and

Juliana Mendoza. Defendants contend that since 1919 Placido Punzalan borrowed money from

defendant spouses on three different occasions for the sums of P1,200.00, P1,800.00 and

P1,080.00, respectively, each of which was evidenced by Exhs. '1', '2', and '3', respectively. Upon

the failure of Placido Punzalan to discharge said obligations in 1921, he agreed to sell the land

aforementioned to the spouses for P3,700.00, but as the total value of the three loans was

P4,080.00, Punzalan had to reimburse to said spouses the difference of P380.00. The document

of sale stated the price to be only P2,000.00 in view of the fact that Doroteo Banawa had only

P25.00 with him when the deed was prepared by the notary public, and the latter was charging

P10.00 for every one thousand pesos mentioned as the consideration of the contract. Defendants

likewise maintain that the sale was made to appear in favor of Maria Mirano because said spouses

being already old, they wanted to leave something to Maria Mirano for her to lean upon when

they would have been gone. They, however, made Maria understand that although the property

was placed under her name, they would continue to be the owners thereof, to administer and

enjoy the fruits of the same as long as they live, and that she would become the owner of the

land only after their death. Maria supposedly expressed her conformity to and appreciation for

the said arrangement. Maria Mirano was 19 years old when the deed of sale was executed.

"Parcel 2, or the Carsuche Property.

"There is no dispute between the parties that the Carsuche property was acquired by way of

purchase from its original owners, to wit: Roman Biscocho, his sister Paula Biscocho, and sister-

in-law Carmen Mendoza. The sale took place sometime in December 1935. There is, however,

a sharp conflict of evidence between the parties concerning the form of the document evidencing

the same and in whose favor the sale was made at that time. The plaintiffs claim that the sale

was evidenced by a public instrument executed before and ratified by Notary Public Vicente

Ilagan of Taal, Batangas, and that the vendee mentioned in the said document was Maria Mirano.

The defendants, on the other hand, assert that the sale was evidenced by a private writing

prepared in the handwriting of Roman Biscocho and that it was in favor of the spouses Doroteo

Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. Neither the public instrument allegedly ratified by Atty. Ilagan

nor the private writing supposedly prepared by Roman Biscocho was presented before the lower

court.

"After laying the proper predicate for the presentation of secondary evidence, the plaintiffs

presented Atty. Vicente Ilagan and Roman Biscocho to testify upon the execution of the

aforesaid public instrument in December, 1935. These two declared that sometime in December,

1935, the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, Maria Mirano, Roman Biscocho, Paula

Biscocho and Carmen Mendoza, accompanied by Atty. Regino Aro, went to the office of Atty.

Ilagan in Taal, Batangas; that Atty. Aro, who was a classmate of Atty. Ilagan in the law school,

asked the latter's permission to use his typewriter on which he prepared a document in English

and which he asked Atty. Ilagan to ratify; that Atty. Ilagan translated into Tagalog the contents

of the said document to the parties and, the witnesses, after which they all signed the same; that

the document involved the sale of the Carsuche property in favor of Maria Mirano; that after

paying him P20.00 for his services which Atty. Ilagan would not accept at first, Doroteo Banawa

asked Atty. Ilagan in Tagalog whether the document that he ratified was 'strong enough'

(Matibay) to safeguard the rights of Maria Mirano, to which Atty. Ilagan answered in the

affirmative.

"Doroteo Banawa, on the other hand, stated that on being offered the Carsuche property by the

owners thereof, they agreed on the purchase price of P3,700.00 of which a down payment of

P1,200.00 was made and, later, an additional sum of P100.00 was given to Roman Biscocho,

both payments being evidenced by a receipt dated December 15, 1936 (Exh. '9'). A few days

later, Roman Biscocho prepared in his own handwriting a private document selling the Carsuche

property in favor of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza for the sum of P4,000.00,

the vendors having asked for a P300.00 increase in price. Doroteo Banawa, thereafter brought

said private document to the municipal treasurer of Taal Batangas, to whom he expressed the

desire to have the land declared in the name of Maria Mirano so that the latter might attend to

the payment of taxes over the land whenever he was away. This wish of Doroteo Banawa was

done by his thumb-marking an affidavit, thus accounting for the fact that said land appears in the

name of Maria Mirano in the tax declarations covering the same from 1934 to 1956." 5

The petitioners assign the following errors:

"I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT

THE PLACING OF IBA PROPERTY IN THE NAME OF THE LATE MARIA MIRANO WAS

IN THE NATURE OF A DONATION INTER-VIVOS.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT

PETITIONERS' INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 632 OF THE OLD CIVIL CODE IS TOO

LITERAL AND IGNORES THE RATIONALE OF THE LEGAL PROVISION.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT

THE 'EXCEPTIVE CLAUSE' OF ARTICLE 1448 OF THE CIVIL CODE IS APPLICABLE

IN THE PRESENT CASE.

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING THAT

SECTION 5, RULE 100 OF THE OLD RULES OF COURT DOES NOT APPLY IN THE

INSTANT CASE BECAUSE MARIA MIRANO WAS NOT LEGALLY ADOPTED.

V

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN LAW IN RULING WITH

RESPECT TO THE CARSUCHE PROPERTY (LOT NO. 2) THAT THE DEED OF SALE

EXECUTED IN 1940 IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS DOROTEO BANAWA AND HIS

WIFE JULIANA MENDOZA AND WHICH WAS DULY REGISTERED DID NOT IMPAIR

THE PRETENDED SALE TO MARIA MIRANO." 6

The first, second, third and fourth errors assigned refer to the Iba property, parcel 1, while the fifth error

assigned refers to the Carsuche property, Lot 2. 7

As may be discerned from the assignment of errors, the basic issue is the ownership of the two parcels

of land in question. The plaintiffs appellees, respondents herein, assert title to the lands as heirs of Maria

Mirano. Defendants-appellants, petitioners herein, claim ownership over them by virtue of purchase from

the original owners.

Considering that in the case at bar the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are not contrary to those

of the trial court, a minute scrutiny by this Court of said findings is not necessary. In Tolentino vs. de

Jesus, et al., 8 this Court held:

"The findings of facts of the respondent Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and on

this Court (Tamayo vs. Callejo, L-25563, July 28, 1972, 46 SCRA 27; Nery, et al. vs. Lorenzo,

et al., L-23096 & L-23376, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 431; Viacrucis vs. CA, L-29831, March

29, 1972, 44 SCRA 176; Dela Cruz, et al. vs. CA, L-24000, Nov. 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 68; Naga

Dev. Corp. vs. CA, L-28175, Sept. 30 1971, 41 SCRA 105, 115; Lacson & Basilio vs. Pineda,

et al., L-28523 July 16, 1971, 40 SCRA 35; Quiñano, et al. vs. CA, et al., L-23024, May 31,

1971, 39 SCRA 227; Reyes, et al. vs. CA, et al., L-28466, March 27, 1971, 38 SCRA 138, 142;

Gotamco Hermanas vs. Shotwell, et al., L-22519, March 27, 1971, 38 SCRA 112-117; Limjoco

vs. CA, L-20656, Feb. 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 663-669; De Garcia, et al. vs. CA, L-20264, Jan. 30,

1971, 37 SCRA 130, 136-137; Simeon vs. Peña, L-29049, Dec. 29, 1970, 36 SCRA 611), unless

(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the

inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment

is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the

case and its findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellees [Roque vs.

Buan, L-22459, Oct. 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 648]; (6) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals

are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation

of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in

the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents [Garcia vs. CA, L-

26490, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 622]; and (9) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals

is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record [Salazar vs.

Gutierrez, L-21727, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 243]."

The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions.

However, all the issues raised by the petitioners shall be passed upon individually.

The first error assigned reads:

"The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling that the placing of the Iba

Property in the name of the late Maria Mirano was in the nature of a donation intervivos."

The respondents 9 correctly pointed out that neither the Court of Appeals nor the Court of First Instance

of Batangas categorically stated that the placing of the properties in the name of Maria Mirano was in

the nature of a donation intervivos. In rejecting the petitioners' contention that a donation mortis causa

was executed, the Court of Appeals said that, under the facts and circumstances narrated by the

petitioners, the placing of the Iba property in the name of Maria Mirano — if it was to be called a donation

at all — was not in the nature of a donation mortis causa but rather it would be in the nature of a donation

inter-vivos, giving its reasons and citing the applicable law and decisions of this Court on the matter. The

Court of First Instance made the same hypothetical conclusion. 10

The finding of the Court of First Instance of Batangas which was sustained by the Court of Appeals is

that what was donated by the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza to Maria Mirano was the

money used in the purchase of the lands in question. This conclusion of the Court of First Instance of

Batangas was supported by the testimony of Macario B. Aro, a nephew of the deceased Doroteo Banawa,

that the money used by Maria Mirano in the purchase of the Iba and Carsuche properties was given to

her by Doroteo Banawa. 11

If the money used by Maria Mirano in purchasing the properties was given to her by the spouses Doreteo

Banawa and Juliana Mendoza, or by either of them, then the money had belonged to her. Maria Mirano

purchased and paid for the said properties with her money. As a matter or fact, the deed of sale, Exhibit

"A", 12 recites as follows:

"Que en consideracion a la suma de Dos Mil Pesos moneda filipina (P2,000.00) que me ha

pagado Maria Mirano . . .".

It is also contended by the petitioners that the deeds of sale executed by the owners of the land in favor

of Maria Mirano were simulated contracts intended to shortcut two different transactions: (1) a sale in

favor of the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza; and (2) a donation of lands by the spouses

in favor of Maria Mirano. 13

There are two kinds of simulated contracts, namely: the absolutely simulated contract and the relatively

simulated one. In both instances, however, their nullity is based on the want of true consent of the parties.

There is no intent to be bound or the true intent is hidden or concealed. Such contracts are even generally

regarded as fraudulent with intent of injuring third persons. The purpose, therefore, of a simulated

contract which may be annulled is to conceal the parties' true intent, or to deceive or defraud third

persons.

From the record, there is no showing of deception or fraud, nor of concealment of intent of the parties as

to the sale of the Iba property by the vendors in favor of Maria Mirano. The transactions which transpired

were purely: (1) donations of money or things representing or equivalent to money by the spouses in

favor of Maria Mirano which could be made and accepted verbally; and (2) purchase of lands by Maria

Mirano with the use of that money or credits (pre-existing indebtedness in favor of the spouses) as

consideration thereof.

The petitioners' contention that "the contract of sale had been intended to be a contract of sale between

the vendors and the spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza" has no merit. The petitioners were

present when the sales were made to Maria Mirano. They were the ones who caused the titles to the

properties to be placed in the name of Maria Mirano because they wished "that after our death Maria

Mirano could have something for her maintenance". 14 Moreover, the testimony of Vicente Ilagan, the

notary public before whom the deed of sale was executed, to the effect that he was asked by Doroteo

Banawa in Tagalog: "Kung matibay ang documentong ito para kay Maria" 15 and to which query he

answered, "Yes, sir", 16 supports this conclusion. The conduct of the spouses at the time of the execution

of the contracts are inconsistent with those which the petitioners, the late spouses and their successors-

in-interest, now assert. Their intention to make Maria Mirano the owner of the said parcels of land was

clearly shown by their conduct at the time of the execution of the deeds of sale which influenced the

vendors to believe that Maria Mirano was indeed the vendee in their agreement. The petitioners had full

knowledge of the facts surrounding the execution of the document of sale. They are equitably estopped

17 to deny that the transfer of the lands in question in favor of Maria Mirano was the actual and true intent

of the parties as embodied in the documents of sale of the Iba and Carsuche properties. The documents

are what they purport to be — contracts of sale from the vendors to the vendee, Maria Mirano.

The petitioners submit that since there was transfer of title to the land in litigation to Maria Mirano when

the purchase price was in fact actually paid by the petitioners-spouses, an implied trust was created. The

present law on implied trust is Article 1448 of the New Civil Code which provides:

"Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one

party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having beneficial interest of the property.

The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However if the person to whom the

title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no

trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child."

The transactions in question took place before the Civil Code of the Philippines became effective on

August 30, 1950. Hence Article 1448 of said Code is not applicable. 18

Moreover, there is no showing that Maria Mirano bought the lands in question in trust for the petitioners.

The petitioners also claim that they have become owners of the properties by acquisitive prescription

under Article 1957 of the Old Civil Code which provides:

"Ownership and other real rights in immovable property shall prescribe by possession in good

faith and under a just title for ten years as between persons present and for twenty years as

between absentees."

The above-cited provision speaks of two essential requirements: (1) possession for ten (10) years as

between persons present and twenty (20) years, for absentees; and (2) a just title.

As regards the Iba property (Lot No. 1), petitioners have not presented any title, just or otherwise, to

support their claim. And Article 1954 of the Old Civil Code provides, further, that a "just title must be

proven; it never can be presumed."

Not having a just title, as required by Article 1957 of the Old Civil Code, the petitioners cannot invoke

prescription with respect to the Iba property. llcd

The petitioners also assert ownership by acquisitive prescription over the Iba property under Section 41

of the Code of Civil Procedure. The pertinent portion of Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:

"Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any

land or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants,

or otherwise in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in

every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title, saving to the persons

under disabilities the rights secured by the next section. In order to constitute such title by

prescription or adverse possession, the possession by the claimant or by the person under or

through whom he claims must have been actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title

exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants . . ."

It is a fact that while Maria Mirano was alive she possessed the property in question as the owner thereof.

Hence, it is error for the petitioners to claim ownership over the Iba property by acquisitive prescription

under Article 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure for their possession of the said property became adverse

and exclusive only in July 1949 after Maria Mirano's death. From 1949 to the date of the filing in 1957

of the present action by the respondents only eight years had elapsed.

The second error assigned is:

"The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling that petitioners' interpretation

of Article 632 of the Old Civil Code is too literal and ignores the rationale of the legal provision."

Article 632 of the Old Civil Code provides: "Donations of personal property may be made verbally or in

writing. Verbal donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the gift. In the absence of this requisite

the donation shall produce no effect, unless made in writing and accepted in the same form."

It is contended by the petitioners that oral donation of personal property requires simultaneous delivery

of the gift. As regards the Iba property, the consideration given by Maria Mirano for the purchase of the

said property from Placido Punzalan was the pre-existing debts of the latter to the spouses Doroteo

Banawa and Juliana Mendoza.

The contention of the petitioners that there was no simultaneous delivery of the credits to Maria Mirano

is not meritorious. Delivery may be actual or constructive.

Actual delivery consists in the giving of actual possession to the vendee or his agent, as for example, in

manually transferring the possession of a thing from the vendor to the vendee.

Constructive delivery is a general term comprehending all those acts which, although not conferring

physical possession of the thing, have been held by construction of law equivalent to acts of real delivery,

as for example, the giving of the key to the house, as constructive delivery of the house from the vendor

to the vendee.

In the instant case, the oral donation of the gift consisting of pre-existing obligations of the vendor,

Placido Punzalan, was simultaneous or concurrent with the constructive delivery thereof to Maria Mirano

when the spouses consented to the execution of the deed of sale of the Iba property in favor of Maria

Mirano. The execution of the said deed of sale constituted payment by the vendor, Placido Punzalan, of

his outstanding obligations due to the spouses, Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza. Consequently,

there was constructive transfer of possession of the incorporeal rights of the spouses over the property in

question to Maria Mirano.

It is no longer necessary to discuss the third error assigned because of the holding that Article 1448 of

the New Civil Code has no retroactive application to the instant case.

Anent the fourth error assigned, the petitioners urge that the donor-spouses are entitled to the land in

question by virtue of Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which reads:

". . . In case of the death of the child, his parents and relatives by nature, and not by adoption,

shall be his legal heirs, except as to property received or inherited by the adopted child from

either of his parents by adoption, which shall become the property of the latter or their legitimate

relatives who shall participate in the order established by the Civil Code for intestate estate".

The submission of the petitioners is that extrajudicial adoption is within the contemplation and spirit of

this rule of reversion adoptiva. However, the rule involved specifically provides for the case of the

judicially adopted child. It is an elementary rule of construction that when the language of the law is clear

and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. prcd

The fifth error assigned is:

"The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in ruling with respect to the Carsuche

property (Lot No. 2) that the deed of sale executed in 1940 in favor of the petitioner Doroteo

Banawa and his wife Juliana Mendoza did not impair the pretended sale to Maria Mirano."

The Court of Appeals found that there was a sale of the Carsuche property in 1935 in favor of Maria

Mirano and that such sale was embodied in a public instrument. However, in 1940 the same land was

sold to the petitioners. The sale was duly registered. The petitioners immediately entered into the

possession of the land as owners.

The claim of the petitioners that they have acquired by acquisitive prescription the Carsuche property

(Lot No. 2) is meritorious.

Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "Period of prescription as to real estate — An action

for recovery of title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest therein, can only be brought within

ten years after the cause of action accrues."

That the aforesaid Section 40 governs the instant case is clear from Article 1116 of the New Civil Code

which provides that "prescriptions already running before the effectivity of the New Civil Code, shall be

governed by the laws previously in force." The prescriptive period commenced to run since 1940, the

date the sale in favor of the Banawas was registered with the Register of Deeds of Batangas. Hence the

Code of Civil Procedure governs.

The instant case, not having been filed within ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrued in

1940, prescribed under Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1950 because the same was filed

only in 1957, seventeen (17) years later.

The possession of the Banawas over the Carsuche property ripened into full ownership in 1950, ten (10)

years after 1940, when the possession of the petitioner-spouses which was actual, open, public and

continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claims, commenced.

(Sec. 41, Code of Civil Procedure). The sale in favor of the Banawas was registered in 1940 with the

Register of Deeds of Batangas. The actual and adverse possession of the petitioner-spouses was

continued by their present successors.

The alleged bad faith of the petitioners in that they knew that the land was previously sold to Maria

Mirano is of no consequence because Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that there is

prescription "in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced." As held in one case ". . . guilty

knowledge is of no moment for under the law title by prescription may be acquired in whatever way

possession may have been commenced or continued and so long as the possessor had possessed the land

openly, publicly, continuously and under a claim of title for a period of over ten years." 19

The trial court found that the two parcels of land in question with a combined area of a little less than ten

(10) hectares had an average annual net yield of P500.00, A total amount of P4,500.00 as actual damages

was awarded in as much as Maria Mirano had been dead for nine (9) years when the decision of the trial

court was rendered. An adjustment should be made in view of the finding of this Court that the Carsuche

property, Lot 2, belongs to the petitioners. LibLex

The Iba property, Lot 1, is about 45% of the combined area of the two lands in question. Forty-five

percent (45%) of the annual net income of P500.00 is equivalent to P225.00. Maria Mirano has been

dead for about thirty-one (31) years now. During all this period, the petitioners have been in possession

of the Iba property and receiving the products thereof. They should pay as actual damages the total

amount of P6,975.00 representing the net income for the period of thirty-one (31) years on the basis of

P225.00 a year.

The respondents are also entitled to attorney's fees in the amount of P1,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed as to the Iba property (Lot No.

1) but reversed as to the Carsuche property (Lot No. 2) which was acquired by the spouses Doroteo

Banawa and Juliana Mendoza who could validly donate the said property to Casiano Amponin and

Gliceria Abrenica. The petitioners are ordered to pay the private respondents the total amount of Six

Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-Five Pesos (P6,975.00) as actual damages and the amount of One

Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) as attorney's fees, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Teehankee (Chairman), concurs in the result.

||| (Banawa v. Mirano, G.R. No. L-24750, May 16, 1980)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-66574. June 17, 1987.]

ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all

surnamed SANTERO, petitioners, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of

FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and

FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.

Pedro S. Sarino for respondent F.P. Jardin.

D E C I S I O N

PARAS, J p:

Private respondent filed a Petition dated January 23, 1976 with the Court of First Instance of Cavite in

Sp. Proc. Case No. B-21, "In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de

Santero," praying among other things, that the corresponding letters of Administration be issued in her

favor and that she be appointed as special administratrix of the properties of the deceased Simona Pamuti

Vda. de Santero.

It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together

with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila

Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and

another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual

Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents

Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero

in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his

mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz

and two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

Judge Jose Raval in his Orders dated December 1, 1976 1 and December 9, 1976 2 declared Felisa Pamuti

Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. LLphil

Before the trial court, there were 4 interrelated cases filed to wit:

"a) Sp. Proc. No. B-4 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate

of Pablo Santero;

"b) Sp. Proc. No. B-5 — is the Petition for the Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate

of Pascual Santero;

"c) Sp. Proc. No. B-7 — is the Petition for Guardianship over the properties of an Incompetent

Person, Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;

"e) Sp. Proc. No. B-21 — is the Petition for Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Simona Pamuti

Vda. de Santero."

Felisa Jardin upon her Motion to Intervene in Sp. Proceedings Nos. B-4 and B-5, was allowed to

intervene in the intestate estates of Pablo Santero and Pascual Santero by Order of the Court dated August

24, 1977.

Petitioner Anselma Diaz, as guardian of her minor children, filed her "Opposition and Motion to Exclude

Felisa Pamuti-Jardin dated March 13, 1980, from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of

the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero

and Pablo Santero.

Felixberta Pacursa guardian for her minor children, filed thru counsel, her Manifestation of March 14,

1980 adopting the Opposition and Motion to Exclude Felisa Pamuti, filed by Anselma Diaz.

On May 20, 1980, Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from further taking

part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as well as

in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her to be, not an heir of the

deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero." 3

After her Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its order dated November 1, 1980,

Felisa P. Jardin filed her appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 69814-R. A decision

4 was rendered by the Intermediate Appellate Court on December 14, 1983 (reversing the decision of the

trial court) the dispositive portion of which reads —

"WHEREFORE, finding the Order appealed from not consistent with the facts and law

applicable, the same is hereby set aside and another one entered sustaining the Orders of

December 1 and 9, 1976 declaring the petitioner as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de

Santero and ordering oppositors-appellees not to interfere in the proceeding for the declaration

of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."

"Costs against the oppositors-appellees."

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) was denied by the

same respondent court in its order dated February 17, 1984 hence, the present petition for Review with

the following: LexLib

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I. The Decision erred in ignoring the right to intestate succession of petitioners grandchildren

Santero as direct descending line (Art. 978) and/or natural/"illegitimate children" (Art. 988) and

prefering a niece, who is a collateral relative (Art. 1003);

II. The Decision erred in denying the right of representation of the natural grandchildren Santero

to represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession to the intestate estate of their

grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero (Art. 982);

III. The Decision erred in mistaking the intestate estate of the grandmother Simona Pamuti Vda.

de Santero as the estate of "legitimate child or relative" of Pablo Santero, her son and father of

the petitioners' grandchildren Santero;

IV. The Decision erred in ruling that petitioner-appellant Felisa P. Jardin who is a niece and

therefore a collateral relative of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero excludes the natural children

of her son Pablo Santero, who are her direct descendants and/or grand children;

V. The Decision erred in applying Art. 992, when Arts. 988, 989 and 990 are the applicable

provisions of law on intestate succession; and

VI. The Decision erred in considering the orders of December 1 and December 9, 1976 which

are provisional and interlocutory as final and executory.

The real issue in this case may be briefly stated as follows — who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti

Vda. de Santero — her niece Felisa Pamuti Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo

Santero)?

The dispute at bar refers only to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and the issue here

is whether oppositors-appellees (petitioners herein) as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit

from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a

legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Now then what is the appropriate law on the matter? Petitioners contend in their pleadings that Art. 990

of the New Civil Code is the applicable law on the case. They contend that said provision of the New

Civil Code modifies the rule in Article 941 (Old Civil Code) and recognizes the right of representation

(Art. 970) to descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate and that Art. 941, Spanish Civil Code denied

illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased parents and inherit from their deceased

grandparents, but that Rule was expressly changed and/or amended by Art. 990 New Civil Code which

expressly grants the illegitimate children the right to represent their deceased father (Pablo Santero) in

the estate of their grandmother (Simona Pamuti)" 5

Petitioners' contention holds no water. Since the hereditary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of

Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the

provision of Art. 992 of the Civil Code which reads as follows: Cdpr

ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children

and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same

manner from the illegitimate child. (943a).

Pablo Santero is a legitimate child, he is not an illegitimate child. On the other hand, the oppositors

(petitioners herein) are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a

succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the

father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized

by law for the purposes of Art. 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is

presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully

looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter

considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the

former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish

broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.

6

Thus, petitioners herein cannot represent their father Pablo Santero in the succession of the letter to the

intestate estate of his legitimate mother Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, because of the barrier provided

for under Art. 992 of the New Civil Code.

In answer to the erroneous contention of petitioners that Article 941 of the Spanish Civil Code is changed

by Article 990 of the New Civil Code, We are reproducing herewith the Reflections of the Illustrious

Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also finds full support from other civilists, to wit:

"In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the

legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child

can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother.

The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article

943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles

(990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his

own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art, 992 prevents the

illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the

grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being

indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a

choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation,

in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify

Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude

vis-a-vis illegitimate children. (Reflections on the Reform of Hereditary Succession, JOURNAL

of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First Quater, 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41).

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and

relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" includes

all the kindred of the person spoken of. 7 The record shows that from the commencement of this case the

only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa

Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein

are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit

any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late

Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. cdll

Lastly, petitioners claim that the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court erred in ruling that the Orders

of the Court a quo dated December 1, 1976 and December 9, 1976 are final and executory. Such

contention is without merit. The Hon. Judge Jose Raval in his order dated December 1, 1976 held that

the oppositors (petitioners herein) are not entitled to intervene and hence not allowed to intervene in the

proceedings for the declaration of the heirship in the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

Subsequently, Judge Jose Raval issued an order, dated December 9, 1976, which declared Felisa Pamuti-

Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir of Simona Pamuti. The said Orders were never made the subjects of

either a motion for reconsideration or a perfected appeal. Hence, said orders which long became final

and executory are already removed from the power of jurisdiction of the lower court to decide anew. The

only power retained by the lower court, after a judgment has become final and executory is to order its

execution. The respondent Court did not err therefore in ruling that the Order of the Court a quo dated

May 30, 1980 excluding Felisa Pamuti Jardin as intestate heir of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de

Santero "is clearly a total reversal of an Order which has become final and executory, hence null and

void."

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr. and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Padilla and Bidin, J., took no part.

||| (Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-66574, June 17, 1987)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-51263. February 28, 1983.]

CRESENCIANO LEONARDO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA

CAILLES, JAMES BRACEWELL and RURAL BANK OF PARAÑAQUE, INC.,

respondents.

Porfirio C. David for petitioner.

Marquez & Marquez for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS;

GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED ON REVIEW; EXCEPTIONS. — It is a well-established rule laid

down by this Court in numerous cases that findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are, generally, final

and conclusive upon this Court. The exceptions are. (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded

entirely on speculation; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)

when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

and (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the

same are contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee. None of the abuse exceptions,

however, exists in the case at bar, hence, there is no reason to disturb the findings of facts of the Court

of Appeals.

2. CIVIL LAW; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN NOT ENTITLED TO

INHERIT AB INTESTATO FROM THE LEGITIMATE CHILDREN AND RELATIVES OF HIS

FATHER OR MOTHER; CASE AT BAR. — Even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero

Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased

Francisca Reyes considering that, as found by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as

shown by the fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother

were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most ,

petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate

children and relatives of his father like the Deceased Francisco Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the

Philippines.)

D E C I S I O N

DE CASTRO, J p:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 43476-R,

promulgated on February 21, 1979, reversing the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in favor

of petitioner: LLjur

"(a) Declaring plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo as the great grandson and heir of deceased

FRANCISCA REYES, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased, jointly with

defendant Maria Cailles;

"(b) Declaring the properties, subject of this complaint, to be the properties of the deceased

FRANCISCA REYES and not of defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell;

"(c) Declaring null and void any sale of these properties by defendant Maria Cailles in so far as

the share of Cresenciano Leonardo are affected;

"(d) Ordering the partition within 30 days from the finality of this decision, of the properties

subject of this litigation, between defendant Maria Cailles and plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo,

share and share alike;

"(e) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell, within 30 days from the finality of

this decision, to render an accounting of the fruits of the properties, and 30 days thereafter to pay

to plaintiff Cresenciano Leonardo his one-half share thereof with interest of 6% per annum;

"(f) Ordering defendants Maria Cailles and James Bracewell to pay jointly and severally plaintiff

Cresenciano Leonardo the amount of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees;

"(g) Ordering defendants to pay the costs; and

"(h) Dismissing defendants' counterclaim." 1

From the record, it appears that Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was survived by

two (2) daughters, Maria and Silvestra Cailles, and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter,

Pascuala Cailles who predeceased her. Sotero Leonardo died in 1944, while Silvestra Cailles died in

1949 without any issue.

On October 29, 1964, petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of the late Sotero

Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties, sum of money and accounting in the Court of

First Instance of Rizal seeking judgment (1) to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased

Francisca Reyes, entitled to one-half share in the estate of said deceased jointly with defendant, private

respondent herein, Maria Cailles, (2) to have the properties left by said Francisca Reyes, described in the

complaint, partitioned between him and defendant Maria Cailles, and (3) to have an accounting of all the

income derived from said properties from the time defendants took possession thereof until said

accounting shall have been made, delivering to him his share therein with legal interest.

Answering the complaint, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the subject

properties and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of

representation. For his part, the other defendant, private respondent James Bracewell, claimed that said

properties are now his by virtue of a valid and legal deed of sale which Maria Cailles had subsequently

executed in his favor. These properties were allegedly mortgaged to respondent Rural Bank of Parañaque,

Inc. sometime in September 1963. cdrep

After hearing on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive

portion of which was earlier quoted, finding the evidence of the private respondent insufficient to prove

ownership of the properties in suit. From said judgment, private respondents appealed to the Court of

Appeals which, as already stated, reversed the decision of the trial court" thereby dismissing petitioner's

complaint. Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, this petition for review was filed

on the following assignment of errors:

I

"RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION

ARE THE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.

II

"RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT

ESTABLISHED HIS FILIATION.

III

"RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER, AS THE GREAT

GRANDSON OF FRANCISCA REYES, HAS NO LEGAL RIGHT TO INHERIT BY

REPRESENTATION."

To begin with, the Court of Appeals found the subject properties to be the exclusive properties of the

private respondents.

"There being two properties in this case both will be discussed separately, as each has its own

distinct factual setting. The first was bought in 1908 by Maria Cailles under a deed of sale (Exh.

'60'), which describes it as follows:

'. . . radicada en la calle Desposorio de este dicho Municipio dentro de los limites

y linderos siquientes: Por la derecha a la entrada el solar de Teodorico Reyes por la

izquierda el solar de Maria Calesa (Cailles) arriba citada por la espalda la via ferrea del

Railroad Co., y la frente la dicha calle Desposorio'

"After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles paid the realty taxes starting from 1918 up to 1948.

Thereafter as she and her son Narciso Bracewell, left for Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes managed

the property and paid the realty tax of the land. However, for unexplained reasons, she paid and

declared the same in her own name. Because of this, plaintiff decided to run after this property,

erroneously thinking that as the great grandson of Francisca Reyes, he had some proprietary right

over the same.

"The second parcel on the other hand, was purchased by Maria Cailles in 1917 under a deed of

sale (Exh. '3') which describes the property as follows:

'. . . una parcela de terreno destinado al beneficio de la sal, que linda por Norte

con la linea Ferrea y Salinar de Narciso Mayuga, por Este con los de Narciso Mayuga y

Domingo Lozada, por Sur con los de Domingo Lozada y Fruto Silverio y por Oeste con

el de Fruto Silverio y Linea Ferrea, de una extension superficial de 1229.00 metros

cuadrados.'

"After declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles likewise paid the realty tax in 1917 and continued

paying the same up to 1948. Thereafter when she and her son, Narciso Bracewell, established

their residence in Nueva Ecija, Francisca Reyes administered the property and like in the first

case, declared in 1949 the property in her own name. Thinking that the property is the property

of Francisca Reyes, plaintiff filed the instant complaint, claiming a portion thereof as the same

allegedly represents the share of his father.

"As earlier stated, the court a quo decided the case in favor of the plaintiff principally because

defendants' evidence do not sufficiently show that the 2 properties which they bought in 1908

and 1917, are the same as the properties sought by the plaintiff.

"Carefully going over the evidence, We believe that the trial judge misinterpreted the evidence

as to the identification of the lands in question.

"To begin with, the deed of sale (Exh. '60') of 1908 clearly states that the land sold to Maria

Cailles is 'en la calle Desposorio' in Las Piñas, Rizal which was bounded by adjoining lands

owned by persons living at the time, including the railroad track of the Manila Railroad Co. ('la

via ferrea del Railroad Co.').

"With the exception of the area which was not disclosed in the deed, the description fits the land

now being sought by the plaintiff, as this property is also located in Desposorio St. and is

bounded by the M.R.R. Co.

"With these natural boundaries, there is indeed an assurance that the property described in the

deed and in the tax declaration is one and the same property.

"The change of owners of the adjoining lands is immaterial since several decades have already

passed between the deed and the declaration and 'during that period, many changes of abode

would likely have occurred.'

"Besides, it is a fact that defendants have only one property in Desposorio St. and they have paid

the realty taxes of this property from May 29, 1914 up to May 28, 1948. Hence, there is no reason

to doubt that this property is the same, if not identical to the property in Desposorio St. which is

now being sought after by the plaintiff.

"With respect to the other parcel which Maria Cailles bought from Tranquilino Mateo in 1917,

it is true that there is no similar boundaries to be relied upon. It is however undeniable that after

declaring it in her name, Maria Cailles began paying the realty taxes thereon on July 24, 1917

until 1948." (Reference to Exhibits omitted.) 2

Petitioner takes issue with the appellate court on the above findings of fact, forgetting that since the

present petition is one for review on certiorari, only questions of law may be raised. It is a well-

established rule laid down by this Court in numerous cases that findings of facts by the Court of Appeals

are, generally, final and conclusive upon this Court. The exceptions are: (1) when the conclusion is a

finding grounded entirely on speculation; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or

impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a

misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the

issues of the case and the same are contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee. 3 None of

the above exceptions, however, exists in the case at bar, hence, there is no reason to disturb the findings

of facts of the Court of Appeals.

Anent the second assignment of error, the Court of Appeals made the following findings:

"Going to the issue of filiation, plaintiff claims that he is the son of Sotero Leonardo, the son of

one of the daughters (Pascuala) of Francisca Reyes. He further alleges that since Pascuala

predeceased Francisca Reyes, and that his father, Sotero, who subsequently died in 1944,

survived Francisca Reyes, plaintiff can consequently succeed to the estate of Francisca Reyes by

right of representation.

"In support of his claim, plaintiff submitted in evidence his alleged birth certificate showing that

his father is Sotero Leonardo, married to Socorro Timbol, his alleged mother.

"Since his supposed right will either rise or fall on the proper evaluation of this vital evidence,

We have minutely scrutinized the same, looking for that vital link connecting him to the family

tree of the deceased Francisca Reyes. However, this piece of evidence does not in any way lend

credence to his tale.

"This is because the name of the child described in the birth certificate is not that of the plaintiff

but a certain 'Alfredo Leonardo' who was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and

Socorro Timbol. Other than his bare allegation, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence

showing that the 'Alfredo Leonardo' mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself.

Thus, even without taking time and space to go into further details, We may safely conclude that

plaintiff failed to prove his filiation which is a fundamental requisite in this action where he is

claiming to be an heir in the inheritance in question." 4

That is likewise a factual finding which may not be disturbed in this petition for review in the absence of

a clear showing that said finding is not supported by substantial evidence, or that there was a grave abuse

of discretion on the part of the court making the finding of fact. prLL

Referring to the third assignment of error, even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero Leonardo,

still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes

considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the

fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father and mother were not yet

married, and what is more, his alleged father's first marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner

would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and

relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes. (Article 992, Civil Code of the Philippines.)

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals sought to be reviewed in this petition is hereby

affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. cdphil

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Escolin JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., on leave.

Abad Santos, J., I concur with the observation that I would have dismissed the petition by minute

resolution for lack of merit.

||| (Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-51263, February 28, 1983)

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-22469. October 23, 1978.]

TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of

the Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco, RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V.

CORPUS, RAMON L. CORPUS, ENRIQUE J. CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD

ASPRER and CIPRIANO NAVARRO, defendants-appellees.

SYNOPSIS

Teodoro R. Yangco was the acknowledged natural son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles,

the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five

children with Tomas Corpus, one of whom was Jose Corpus. Jose Corpus had a daughter, Juana Corpus.

Petitioner Tomas Corpus is the son of Juana Corpus. As the sole heir of Juana Corpus, petitioner Tomas

Corpus filed an action in the Court of First Instance to recover his mother's supposed share in the

Yangco's intestate estate, claiming that the project of partition made pursuant to the order of the probate

court as invalid and hence, the estate should be disposed of under the rules of intestacy. The trial court

dismissed the action on the ground of res judicata stating that the intrinsic validity of Teodoro R.

Yangco's will had already been passed upon in a special proceedings approving the project of partition.

Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was certified to the Supreme Court as it involved

more than P50,00 pursuant to the Judiciary Law before it was amended.

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment on another ground, namely that since Teodoro R.

Yangco was an acknowledged natural child, and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose

Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the

recovery of the supported hereditary share of his mother, because there is no reciprocal succession

between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; WILL; DULY PROBATED WILL FORM PART OF JUDICIAL OR PUBLIC

RECORDS; CASE AT BAR. — Appellant's contentions that the probative value of the will of Luis R.

Yangco, dated June 14, 1907 which states that Teodoro R. Yangco was his acknowledged natural son,

cannot prevail over the presumption of legitimacy found in Section 69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of

Court and the statement of Teodoro Yangco's biographer that Luis Yangco had two marriages, the first

with Ramona Arguelles (Teodoro's mother) and the second with Victoria Obin have no merit. The

authenticity of that will which had been admitted and duly probated is incontestable. That will is now

part of a public or official judicial record.

2. ID.; FILIATION; PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY; CHILD BORN OUT OF A UNION OF A

MAN AND A WOMAN IS PRESUMED LEGITIMATE. — It is disputably presumed "that a man and

a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage";

(Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio) "that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce,

absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate", and "that things have happened according to the ordinary

course of nature and the ordinary habits of life".

3. ID.; ID.; SUCCESSION; NO SUCCESSIONAL RECIPROCITY BETWEEN LEGITIMATE AND

ILLEGITIMATE RELATIVES. — Article 943 of the old Civil Code "prohibits all successory reciprocity

mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The rule is now found in article 992 of the

new Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the

legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children and relatives inherit in

the same manner from the illegitimate child".

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTICLE 943, OLD CIVIL CODE (ART. 922 NEW CIVIL CODE); BASIS OF.

— The rule found in Article 943 of the old Civil Code prohibiting successional reciprocity between

legitimates and illegitimates is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon

by the legitimate family, while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The law

does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE ON SUCCESSION OF ACKNOWLEDGED OR LEGITIMATE

CHILDREN. — Under Article 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, if an acknowledged natural or

legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who

acknowledged such child shall succeed to his entire estate and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they

shall inherit from it share and share like. In default of natural ascendants, decedents' natural and

legitimated children shall be succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules

established for legitimate brothers and sisters.

D E C I S I O N

AQUINO, J p:

Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years. His will dated

August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 54863.

The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527.

The complete text of the will is quoted in that decision.

Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis

R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio, (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V.

Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita)

Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales.

Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas

Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas

Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus.

Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26, 1945 was submitted

by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. That project of partition was opposed by the

estate of Luis R. Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be declared because the will

does not contain an institution of heir. It was also opposed by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who represented

Juanita Corpus, Pedro Martinez and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was already dead when Atty. Cruz

appeared as her counsel. cdphil

Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partition was not in conformity with the will

because the testator intended that the estate should be "conserved" and not physically partitioned. Atty.

Cruz prayed "que declare que el finado no dispuso en su testamento de sus bienes y negocios y que ha

lugar a sucession intestado con respecio a los mismos, y que señale un dia en esta causa para la recepcion

de pruebas previa a la declaracion de quienes son los herederos legales o abintestato del difunto".

The probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of partition. It held that in

certain clauses of the will the testator intended to conserve his properties not in the sense of disposing of

them after his death but for the purpose of preventing that "tales bienes fuesen malgastados o desfilpar

rados por los legatarios" and that if the testator intended a perpetual prohibition against alienation, that

condition would be regarded "como no puesta o no existente". It concluded that "no hay motivos legales

o morales para que la sucession de Don Teodoro R. Yangco sea declarada intestada." (See Barretto vs.

Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which cites article 785 of the Spanish Civil Code as prohibiting perpetual entails,

and Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546.)

From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro, Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the estate of Luis R.

Yangco appealed to this Court (L-1476). Those appeals were dismissed in this Court's resolutions of

October 10 and 31, 1947 after the legatees and the appellants entered into compromise agreements. In

the compromise dated October 7, 1947 the legatees agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs

of Pio V. Corpus, the heirs of Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. Herein appellant Tomas

Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The estate of Luis R.

Yangco entered into a similar compromise agreement. As the resolutions dismissing the appeals became

final and executory on October 14 and November 4, 1947, entries of judgment were made on those dates.

Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus signed a receipt dated October 24, 1947 wherein

he acknowledge that he received from the Yangco estate the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000) "as

settlement in full of my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding with Judge Roman

Cruz, our attorney in this case" (Exh. D or 17).

On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical partition of

the Yangco estate. The probate court approved that agreement and noted that the 1945 project of partition

was pro tanto modified. That did not set at rest the controversy over the Yangco estate.

On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus, filed an action in the Court of

First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco' intestate estate, He alleged ill his

complaint that the dispositions in Yangco's will imposing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered

it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the

decedent's estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy. LLphil

The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata and

laches. It held that the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in its order dated December

26, 1946 in Special Proceeding No. 54863 approving the project of partition for the testator's estate.

Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution dated January 23, 1964 in CA-

G.R. No. 18720-R certified the appeal to this Court because it involves real property valued at more than

fifty thousand pesos (Sec. 17[5], Judiciary Law before it was amended by Republic Act No. 2613).

Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in holding (1) that Teodoro R. Yangco

was a natural child, (2) that his will had been duly legalized, and (3) that plaintiff's action is barred by

res judicata and laches.

In the disposition of this appeal, it is not necessary to resolve whether Yangco's will had been duly

legalized and whether the action of Tomas Corpus is barred by res judicata and laches. The appeal may

be resolved by determining whether Juanita Corpus, the mother of appellant Tomas Corpus, was a legal

heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to recover his mother's supposed intestate share in

Yangco's estate?

To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation. The trial court found that Yangco

"a su muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y Paz appellidados Yangco, hermanos naturales reconocidos

por su padre natural Luis R. Yangco". The basis of the trial court's conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco

was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate child was the statement in the will of his father,

Luis Rafael Yangco, dated June 14, 1907, that Teodoro and his three other children were his

acknowledged natural children. His exact words are:

"Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos, llamados Teodoro, Paz, Luisa y Luis,

los cuales son mis unicos herederos forzosos." (Exh. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro Yangco).

That will was attested by Rafael del Pan, Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus and Florencio Gonzales

Diez.

Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco, identified as Exhibit 1 herein,

which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20, as found in the record on appeal in Special Proceeding No.

54863. He contends that it should not prevail over the presumption of legitimacy found in section 69,

Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and over the statement of Samuel W. Stagg in his biography of

Teodoro R. Yangco, that Luis Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture with Victoria Obin,

implying that he had a first marital venture with Ramona Arguelles, the mother of Teodoro.

These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco, as reproduced in

Exhibit 1 herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the probate of Teodoro R. Yangco's

will, in incontestable. The said will is part of a public or official judicial record.

On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to be legitimate.

A marriage is presumed to have taken place between Ramona and Tomas. Semper praesumitur pro

matrimonio. It is disputably presumed "That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and

wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage"; "that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being

no divorce, absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate", and "that things have happened according to

the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb] and [cc], Rule 131, Rules of

Court). llcd

Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita

Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas

Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita

Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there

is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The trial court did not err in

dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus.

Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el legitimado no tienen derecho a suceder

abintestato a los hijos y parientes legitimos del padre o madre que lo haya reconocido, ni ellos al hijo

natural ni al legitimado". Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between

legitimate and illegitimate relatives" (6 Sanchez Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of

Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279, 287. See 16 Scaevola, Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 465-6) . . .

Appellant Corpus concedes that if Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, he (Tomas Corpus) would

have no legal personality to intervene in the distribution of Yangco's estate (p. 8, appellant's brief).

The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate

child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother;

nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child".

That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate

family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The law does not recognize

the blood tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment (7 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., pp.

185-6).

Under articles 944 and 945 of the spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child

should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged

such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit

from it share and share alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be

succeeded by their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate

brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate,

had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy.

Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the legitimate relatives of the

mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child (Cacho vs. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693.

See De Guzman vs. Sevilla, 47 Phil. 991).

Where the testatrix, Rosario Fabie, was the legitimate daughter of Jose Fabie, the two acknowledged

natural children of her uncle, Ramon Fabie, her father's brother, were held not to be her legal heirs (Grey

vs. Fabie, 88 Phil. 128).

By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the

estate of the legitimate grandparent (Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil.

322; Allarde vs. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909). The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased

uncle, a legitimate brother of her natural mother (Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29). LLpr

WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.

||| (Corpus v. Corpus, G.R. No. L-22469, October 23, 1978)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 117246. August 21, 1995.]

BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA

MANUEL, MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA

MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA

MANUEL, petitioners, vs. HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR

and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL, respondents.

Eufrocino L. Bermudez for petitioners.

Marcelo C. Espinoza for Modesta Baltazar.

Nolan R. Evangelista for Estanislaoa Manuel.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; ART. 992, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES;

"BARRIER" BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE FAMILY;

CONSTRUED. — Article 992 of the Civil Code, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly

referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate

family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line

between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does

not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will

of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions. This "barrier" between the

members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy is explained by a noted civilist. (Desiderio

Jurado, Comments and Jurisprudence on Succession, 8th ed., 1991, pp. 423-424.) His thesis: "What is

meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal or intestate heirs

of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing

members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of

this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate,

of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks

of 'brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces' as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate

brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and

sisters." The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain," firstly, in the early case of Grey

v. Fabie(40 O.G. [First S] No. 3, p. 196 citing 7 Manresa 110) and, then, in the relatively recent cases of

Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court (150 SCRA 645) and De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals. (181 SCRA

861) In Diaz, we have said: "Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely a succession ab

intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother

of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the

purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to

be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down

upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter

considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the

former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish

broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment."

The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases. Thus, it has

ruled that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to

the former's inheritance; (Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567) that the legitimate collateral relatives of the

mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; (Cacho v. Udan, 13 SCRA 693) that a natural child

cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; (Llorente

v. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Allarde v. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909) that the natural daughter cannot succeed to

the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; (Anuran v. Aquino and

Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29) and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate

children and relatives of his father. (Leonardo v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 890) Indeed, the law on

succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative

(Javellana v. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042) by, but must always be construed in relation to, any other part as to

produce a harmonious whole. (Sotto v. Sotto, 43 Phil 688; Araneta v. Concepcion, 99 Phil 709)

2. ID.; ID.; ORDER OF PREFERENCE AND CONCURRENCE IN INTESTACY; GRAPHIC

PRESENTATION. — We might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference and

concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz:

Order of Preference Order of Concurrence

(a) Legitimate Children (a) Legitimate Children

and Descendants and Descendants,

Illegitimate Children

and Descendants,

and Surviving Spouse

(b) Legitimate Parents (b) Legitimate Parents

and Ascendants and Ascendants, Illegitimate

Children and Descendants,

and Surviving Spouse

(c) Illegitimate Children (c) Illegitimate Children

and Descendants (in the and Descendants and

absence of ICDs and LPAs, Surviving Spouse

the illegitimate Parents)

(d) Surviving Spouse (d) Surviving Spouse

and Illegitimate Parents

(e) Brothers and Sisters/ (e) Brothers and Sisters/

Nephews and Nieces Nephews and Nieces

and Surviving Spouse

(f) Other Collateral Relatives (f) Alone

(within the fifth civil degree)

(g) State (g) Alone

3. ID.; ID.; WHEN A WARD IS NEITHER A COMPULSORY HEIR NOR A LEGAL HEIR. — A

ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir.

(Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 69679, 18 October 1988)

4. ID.; DAMAGES; WHEN NOT JUSTIFIED; CASE AT BAR. — An adverse result of a suit in law

does not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so wrongful as to justify an assessment of damages against

the actor. (Rubio v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488, Tiu v. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 51)

D E C I S I O N

VITUG, J p:

The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left by an illegitimate

child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or ascendant.

Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit.

During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From

this relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Several years passed before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz,

and his mistress Ursula finally crossed the bar on, respectively, 06 August 1960, 05 February 1981 and

04 November 1976.

Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In consideration of the

marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an area of 2,700 square meters, covered

by Original Certificate of Title ("OCT") No. P-20594 was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by

Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of land, covered by OCT P-19902 and Transfer Certificate of

Title ("TCT") No. 41134, were later bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple were not

blessed with a child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to take private respondent

Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter."

On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Sale Con

Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2) portion of his land

covered by TCT No. 41134. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21 February 1990. Two years later, or on

04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed away.

On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit of

Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land covered by OCT P-20594, OCT P-

19902 and TCT No. 41134 (all still in the name of Juan Manuel). Following the registration of the

document of adjudication with the Office of the Register of Deeds, the three titles (OCT P-20594,

OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134) in the name of Juan Manuel were canceled and new titles, TCT

No. 184223, TCT No. 184224 and TCT No. 184225, were issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-

Baltazar. On 19 October 1992, Modesta executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel

a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now

covered by TCT No. 184225) that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of

Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a

complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners sought the

declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.

The case, there being no material dispute on the facts, was submitted to the court a quo for

summary judgment.

The trial court, in its now assailed 15th August 1994 decision, dismissed the complaint

holding that petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were

not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit. Petitioners were also ordered to jointly and

severally (solidarily) pay (a) respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar the sum of P5,000.00 for moral

damages, P5,000.00 for exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 for litigation

expenses and (b) Estanislaoa Manuel the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for

exemplary damages and P500.00 for attorney's fees.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court.

The petition before us raises the following contentions: That —

"1. THE LOWER COURT (HAS) FAILED TO CONSIDER THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF

ARTICLE 994 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, AS THE CONTROLLING LAW APPLICABLE

BY VIRTUE OF THE ADMITTED FACTS, AND NOT ARTICLE 992 OF THE SAME CODE.

"2. THE LOWER COURT, IN NOT ANNULLING ALL THE ACTS OF, AND VOIDING ALL

DOCUMENTS EXECUTED BY, RESPONDENT MODESTA BALTAZAR, WHO

ARROGATED UNTO HERSELF THE RIGHTS OF AN HEIR TO THE ESTATE OF

DECEDENT JUAN MANUEL, (HAS) VIRTUALLY GRANTED SAID RESPONDENT THE

STATUS OF AN HEIR MANIFESTLY CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND PUBLIC

POLICY.

"3. TO ENFORCE ONE'S RIGHT WHEN THEY ARE VIOLATED IS NEVER A LEGAL

WRONG." 1

Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate (while the other half

would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the

Civil Code, providing thusly:

"ARTICLE 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be

succeeded by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire estate.

"If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces,

she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half ." (Emphasis

supplied.)

Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992 of the

Civil Code, which reads:

"ARTICLE 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate

children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the

same manner from the illegitimate child." (Emphasis supplied.)

Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on

succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the

illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between

legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not

totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will

of the decedent, it has no application, however, on testamentary dispositions.

This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy is

explained by a noted civilist. 2 His thesis:

"What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal

or intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there

is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family.

It is clear that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children,

whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the

illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks of 'brothers and sisters, nephews and

nieces' as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well

as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters." (Emphasis

supplied)

The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain," firstly, in the early case of

Grey v. Fabie 3 and, then, in the relatively recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court 4

and De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals. 5 In Diaz, we have said:

"Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between

the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said

legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the

purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is

presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is

disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated

by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the

resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing

but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than

recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment."

The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases.

Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter

had no right to the former's inheritance; 6 that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother

cannot succeed from her illegitimate child; 7 that a natural child cannot represent his natural father

in the succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent; 8 that the natural daughter cannot

succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; 9 and

that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and

relatives of his father. 10 Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general intent, and

thus no part should be rendered inoperative 11 by, but must always be construed in relation to, any

other part as to produce a harmonious whole. 12

In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference and concurrence in

intestacy expressed in Article 978 through Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz:

Order of Preference Order of Concurrence

(a) Legitimate Children (a) Legitimate Children and

and Descendants Descendants, Illegitimate

Children and Descendants,

and Surviving Spouse

(b) Legitimate Parents (b) Legitimate Parents and

and Ascendants Ascendants, Illegitimate

Children and Descendants,

and Surviving Spouse

(c) Illegitimate Children and (c) Illegitimate Children

Descendants (in the and Descendants and

absence of ICDs and Surviving Spouse

LPAs, the Illegitimate Parents)

(d) Surviving Spouse (d) Surviving Spouse and

Illegitimate Parents

(e) Brothers and (e) Brothers and

Sisters/Nephews and Sisters/Nephews and

Nieces Nieces and Surviving

Spouse

(f) Other Collateral Relatives (f) Alone

(within the fifth civil degree)

(g) State (g) Alone

In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an intestate

heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial)

adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. 13

We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the

Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's issued to her favor, as well

as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed

by the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest" 14 in the case, had neither the

standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.

The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts for moral and

exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. An adverse result of a suit in law does

not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so wrongful as to justify an assessment of damages against

the actor. 15

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan (Branch 37)

is AFFIRMED, except insofar as it has awarded moral and exemplary damages, as well as

attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in favor of private respondents, which portion is hereby

DELETED. No special pronouncement on costs.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Acting C.J., Romero, and Melo, JJ., concur.

||| (Manuel v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 117246, August 21, 1995)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-43905. May 30, 1983.]

SERAFIA G. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, MARIA

CLEMENTE and THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PAOMBONG, BULACAN,

respondents.

Amelita G. Tolentino for petitioner.

Hermin E. Arceo for Maria Clemente.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; ACTION FOR JUDICIAL DECLARATION AS

THE SURVIVING SPOUSE, A PROPER REMEDY, THOUGH THE ULTIMATE OBJECT IS

CORRECTION OF ENTRY CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND RULE

108 OF THE RULES OF COURT. — Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the correction of entry

contemplated in Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she initially seeks a

judicial declaration that she is the lawful surviving spouse of the deceased, Amado, in order to lay the

basis for the correction of the entry in the death certificate of said deceased. The suit below is a proper

remedy. It is of an adversary character as contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. A claim of right is

asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. Private respondent, as the individual most

affected, is a party defendant, and has appeared to contest the petition and defend her interests. The Local

Civil Registrar is also a party defendant.

2. ID.; ID.; REQUIRED PUBLICATION UNDER RULE 108, RULES OF COURT NOT

ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY WHERE NO OTHER PARTIES ARE INVOLVED. — The publication

required by the Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not absolutely necessary for

no other parties are involved. After all, publication is required to bar indifferently all who might be

minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. Besides, even

assuming that this is a proceeding under Rule 108, it was the Court that was called upon to order the

publication, but it did not. In the ultimate analysis, Courts are not concerned so much with the form of

actions as with their substance.

3. ID.; EVIDENCE; PLEA OF GUILT IN BIGAMY; NO BETTER PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF

MARRIAGE THAN THE ADMISSION BY THE ACCUSED. — Considering that Amado, upon his

own plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital status of

petitioner and the deceased. There is no better proof of marriage than the admission by the accused of

the existence of such marriage. The second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during

the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial

decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. It can be safely concluded, then, without

need of further proof nor remand to the Court below, that private respondent is not the surviving spouse

of the deceased Amado, but petitioner. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of the Local

Civil Registrar may, therefore, be validly made.

4. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION THAT ENTRIES IN PUBLIC DOCUMENTS SUCH AS DEATH AND

BIRTH CERTIFICATES ARE CORRECT, DISPUTABLE. — In fine, since there is no question

regarding the invalidity of Amado's second marriage with private respondent and that the entry made in

the corresponding local register is thereby rendered false, it may be corrected. While documents, such as

death and birth certificates, are public and entries therein are presumed to be correct, such presumption

is merely disputable and will have to yield to more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy.

D E C I S I O N

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:

The reversal of respondent Court's Order, dismissing petitioner's suit for her "declaration . . . as the lawful

surviving spouse of deceased Amado Tolentino and the correction of the death certificate of the same",

is sought in this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

The records disclose that Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with private respondent

herein, Maria Clemente, at Paombong, Bulacan, on November 1, 1948 (Annex "C", Petition), while his

marriage with petitioner, Serafia G. Tolentino, celebrated on July 31, 1943, was still subsisting (Annex

"A", Petition). LLphil

Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy in Criminal Case No. 2768 of the Court of First Instance of

Bulacan, Branch II, which Court, upon Amado's plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the corresponding

penalty. After Amado had served the prison sentence imposed on him, he continued to live with private

respondent until his death on July 25, 1974. His death certificate carried the entry "Name of Surviving

Spouse — Maria Clemente.".

In Special Proceedings No. 1587-M for Correction of Entry, petitioner sought to correct the name of the

surviving spouse in the death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her name.

The lower Court dismissed the petition "for lack of the proper requisites under the law" and indicated the

need for a more detailed proceeding.

Conformably thereto, petitioner filed the case below against private respondent and the Local Civil

Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan, for her declaration as the lawful surviving spouse, and the correction

of the death certificate of Amado. In an Order, dated October 21, 1975, respondent Court, upon private

respondent's instance, dismissed the case, stating:

"The Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants in this case, thru counsel Atty. Hermin E. Arceo,

for the reasons therein mentioned, is hereby GRANTED. Further: (1) the correction of the entry

in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar is not the proper remedy because the issue involved is

marital relationship; (2) the Court has not acquired proper jurisdiction because as prescribed

under Art. 108, read together with Art. 412 of the Civil Code — publication is needed in a case

like this, and up to now, there has been no such publication; and (3) in a sense, the subject matter

of this case has been aptly discussed in Special Proceeding No. 1587-M, which this Court has

already dismissed, also for lack of the proper requisites under the law.

"In view of the above dismissal, all other motions in this case are hereby considered MOOT and

ACADEMIC.

"SO ORDERED." 1

Thus, petitioner's present recourse mainly challenging the grounds relied upon by respondent Court in

ordering dismissal.

We rule for petitioner.

First, for the remedy. Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the collection of entry contemplated in

Article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she initially seeks a judicial declaration

that she is the lawful surviving spouse of the deceased, Amado, in order to lay the basis for the correction

of the entry in the death certificate of said deceased. The suit below is a proper remedy. It is of an

adversary character as contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. A claim of right is asserted against one

who has an interest in contesting it. Private respondent, as the individual most affected; is a party

defendant, and has appeared to contest the petition and defend her interests. The Local Civil Registrar is

also a party defendant. The publication required by the Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of

Court is not absolutely necessary for no other parties are involved. After all, publication is required to

bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be

established. 2 Besides, even assuming that this is a proceeding under Rule 108, it was the Court that was

called upon to order the publication, 3 but it did not. In the ultimate analysis, Courts are not concerned so

much with the form of actions as with their substance. 4

Second, for the merits. Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that

sentence furnishes the necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no

better proof of marriage than the admission by the accused of the existence of such marriage. 5 The

second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null

and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. 6 No judicial decree is necessary to establish the

invalidity of a void marriage. 7 It can be safely concluded, then, without need of further proof nor remand

to the Court below, that private respondent is not the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado, but

petitioner. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar may, therefore,

be validly made. prcd

Having arrived at the foregoing conclusion, the other issues raised need no longer be discussed.

In fine, since there is no question regarding the invalidity of Amado's second marriage with private

respondent and that the entry made in the corresponding local register is thereby rendered false, it may

be corrected. 8 While documents, such as death and birth certificates, are public and entries therein are

presumed to be correct, such presumption is merely disputable and will have to yield to more positive

evidence establishing their inaccuracy. 9

WHEREFORE, the Order, dated October 21, 1975, of respondent Court is hereby set aside and petitioner,

Serafia G. Tolentino, hereby declared the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado Tolentino. Let the

corresponding correction be made in the latter's death certificate in the records of the Local Civil

Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Relova, J., is on leave.

||| (Tolentino v. Paras, G.R. No. L-43905, May 30, 1983)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-37903. March 30, 1977.]

GERTRUDES L. DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, vs. DOROTEA O. CONANAN and

MARILOU DEL ROSARIO, respondents.

Dante P. Mercado for petitioner.

Laig, Ruiz & Associates for respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MAKASIAR, J p:

Review of the order of Court of First Instance of Rizal dated June 21, 1973, dismissing petitioner's

petition for settlement and partition of estate.

On November 13, 1972, petitioner filed with the court below the above-said petition, subject of which is

the estate left by her late son, Felix L. del Rosario, who died in a plane crash on September 12, 1969 at

Antipolo, Rizal (Partial Joint Stipulation of Facts, p. 2, petition, p. 6, rec.).

On March 17, 1973, respondents filed their opposition.

On April 26, 1973, the court a quo, pursuant to a verbal agreement forged between the parties, issued an

order requiring them to come up with a joint stipulation of facts (p. 9, rec.).On May 19, 1973, the parties

submitted the following stipulation of facts:

"OPPOSITOR admits that petitioner is the legitimate mother of the late FELIX L. DEL

ROSARIO.

"PETITIONER admits that oppositor DOROTEA OTERA DEL ROSARIO is the legitimate

surviving wife of the deceased FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO.

"PETITIONER admits that MARILOU DEL ROSARIO, is the legally adopted child of the late

FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO and DOROTEA DEL ROSARIO CONANAN.

"THAT THE PARTIES admit that the late FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO died last September 12,

1969 at Antipolo, Rizal in a plane crash and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.

"That the only surviving nearest relatives of deceased FELIX L. DEL ROSARIO are the

petitioner and oppositors DOROTEO O. CONANAN and MARILOU DEL ROSARIO.

"Parties admit to pay their respective counsel in the amount to be determined by the court.

"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that on the basis of the facts

stipulated, the Court declare the heirs of the deceased" (pp. 9-10, rec.).

On June 21, 1973, the lower court issued the challenged order, pertinent portions of which read:

"A perusal of the petition shows that the instant case was filed under the provisions of Section

2, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, which reads as follows:

'Whenever the gross value of the estate of a deceased person, whether he died

testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that fact is made to appear

to the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an

interested person and upon hearing which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor

more than three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall

be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general

circulation in the province, and after such other notice to interested persons as the court

may direct, the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of an executor or

administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there

is, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate, and to

apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such debts of the estate as the

court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own right, if they are of lawful

age and legal capacity, or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified,

if otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession of the

portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. The court shall make such order

as may be just respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and judgment made

or rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the order

of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper registrar's

office.

"While it may be true that a petition for summary settlement is allowed under the aforequoted

provision of the rules, the same rule specifically limits the action to estates the gross value of

which does not exceed P10,000.00. The instant petition, however, clearly alleges that the value

of the real properties alone left by the deceased Felix del Rosario amounts to P33,000.00 which

is obviously over and above the value of the estate allowed under the rules. The action taker. by

the petitioner (cannot be) construed as one filed under an intestate proceeding as the requirements

provided by law for the same has not been complied with. Based on the foregoing observation

alone, the petition must perforce be dismissed.

"But granting arguendo that this Court may consider the petition as an exercise (of) the powers

of a probate Court in determining and declaring the heirs of the deceased as prayed for in the

aforequoted partial joint stipulation of facts, the law on intestate succession is clear that an

adopted child concurring with the surviving spouse of the adopter excludes the legitimate

ascendants from succession. . . . .

"The contention of the petitioner that Article 343 is applicable in the instant case finds no basis

for the said article is applicable in cases where there are no other concurring intestate heirs of

the adopted child. . . . .

"Based on the foregoing, therefore, the petitioner not being included as intestate heir of the

deceased cannot be considered as a co-owner of or have any right over the properties sought to

be partitioned and under the provisions of Section 1, Rule 69 in relation to Section 2, Rule 3 of

the Revised Rules of Court, such action must be commenced or instituted by the party in interest.

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings, the Court hereby DISMISSES THE

PETITION WITHOUT PRONOUNCEMENT AS TO COSTS" (pp. 10-12, rec.).

On July 10, 1973, petitioner filed a notice of appeal, record on appeal and appeal bond (see respondents'

comments, p. 18, rec.).

I

WE rule that on purely jurisdictional consideration, the instant petition should be dismissed.

Indeed, in a litany of precedents dating as far back as the 1938 case of Utulo vs. Pasiono Vda. de Garcia

(66 Phil. 302) and reaffirmed in Asuncion and Castro vs. De la Cruz (No. L-7855, November 23, 1955,

97 Phil. 910) and Gutierrez vs. Cruz (G.R. No. L-21027, July 20, 1968, 24 SCRA 69), WE uniformly

held that for the court to acquire jurisdiction in a petition for summary settlement of estate under the

rules, the requirement that the amount of the estate involved should not exceed P10,000.00 (P6,000.00

under the old rules) is jurisdictional.

In the instant case, both parties jointly affirmed that the value of the realty left by the deceased Felix del

Rosario is in the aggregate amount of P33,000.00 which, as the court a quo correctly found, is obviously

"over and above the value allowed under the rules."

II

However, by virtue of the transcendental implications of the holding of the court a quo, in the sense that

once wholly sustained, said holding would preclude petitioner from re-filling the proper action — a

consequence which, on the grounds of equity and fair play, WE cannot allow to befall on petitioner —

WE deem it essential, for the guidance of the parties, especially herein petitioner, to point out the demerits

of the appealed verdict.

A couple of important issues are posed for our consideration, to wit:

1. Which of the following articles of the New Civil Code will apply, Article 343 on the one hand, or

Articles 341, 978 and 979 on the other; and

2. Whether the material data rule enunciated by Rule 41, Section 6 of the New Rules of Court should be

followed, ex cathedra, in the present case.

A

The lower court found the following provisions of the New Civil Code germane to the instant case:

"Art. 341. The adoption shall:

"(1) Give to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he was a legitimate child of the

adopter;

"(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature;

"(3) Make the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter;

"(4) Entitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname."

"Art. 978. Succession pertains, in the first place, to the descending direct line."

"Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants,

without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages."

WE opine that the governing provision is the hereinafter quoted Article 343 of the New Civil Code, in

relation to Articles 893 and 1000 of said law, which directs that:

"Art. 343. If the adopter is survived by legitimate parents or ascendants and by an adopted

person, the latter shall not have more successional rights than an acknowledged natural child."

Article 343 of the New Civil Code is qualification to Article 341 which gives an adopted child the same

rights and duties as though he were a legitimate child. The reason for this is that:

"(I)t is unjust to exclude the adopter's parents from the inheritance in favor of an adopted

person" (Report of the Code Commissioner, p. 92).

It is most unfair to accord more successional rights to the adopted, who is only related artificially by

fiction of law to the deceased, than those who are naturally related to him by blood in the direct ascending

line.

The applicability of Article 343 does not exclude the surviving parent of the deceased adopter, not only

because a contrary view would defeat the intent of the framers of the law, but also because in intestate

succession, where legitimate parents or ascendants concur with the surviving spouse of the deceased, the

latter does not necessarily exclude the former from the inheritance. This is affirmed by Article 898 of the

New Civil Code which states:

"If the testator leaves no legitimate descendants, but leaves legitimate ascendants, the surviving

spouse shall have a right to one-fourth (only) of the hereditary estate.

"This fourth shall be taken from the free portion."

Article 343 does not require that the concurring heirs should be the adopted child and the legitimate

parents or ascendants only. The language of the law is clear, and a contrary view cannot be presumed.

It is, thus, OUR view that Article 343 should be made to apply, consonant with the cardinal rule in

statutory construction that all the provisions of the New Civil Code must be reconciled and given effect.

Under Article 343, an adopted child surviving with legitimate parents of the deceased adopter, has the

same successional rights as an acknowledged natural child, which is comprehended in the term

"illegitimate children". Consequently, the respective shares of the surviving spouses ascendant and

adopted child should be determined by Article 1000 of the New Civil Code, which reads: cdrep

"Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse and illegitimate children are left, the

ascendants shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the other half shall be divided

between the surviving spouse and the illegitimate children so that such widow or widower shall

have one-fourth of the estate, the illegitimate children the other fourth."

B

Anent the other issue, respondents, in their comment of June 29, 1973, emphasize that the petitioner's

record on appeal violates the material data rule in that.

"It does not state when the notice of appeal and appeal bond were filed with the lower court in disregard

of the requirement of Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court that the record on appeal must contain

such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time."

Recent jurisprudence has construed liberally the material data rule, whenever circumstances and

substantial justice warrant.

The cases of Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-36629, September 28, 1973 (53 SCRA 228) and

Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals (No. L-29719, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 216, 220) are particularly

in point.

In Villanueva, WE held:

"The deviation from the rigid rule adopted in the case of Government of the Philippines vs.

Antonio, et al., G.R. No. L-23736, October 19, 1965, is due to our realization that after all what

is of vital importance in the requirement of Section 6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is that the

Record on Appeal shall show that the appeal was really perfected within the reglementary period.

If it could he ascertained from the record of the case that the appeal was perfected within the

reglementary period, although such fact did not evidently appear on the face of the record on

appeal, the defect or deficiency is not fatal.

"If the appellate court is convinced that the appeal was perfected on time, it should not throw out

but assume jurisdiction over it. After all, that procedural requirement is only intended to enable

the appellate court to determine if the appeal is still within its jurisdiction and nothing more"

(Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 220, emphasis supplied).

From the docket and process slip of this case, it is shown that the date of notice of the Court of First

Instance decision is July 3, 1973 and that the expiry date to file petition for certiorari with the Supreme

Court is December 14, 1973. Petitioner filed her notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal on

July 10, 1973 — or still very much within the reglementary period to perfect an appeal. And although

this is not mentioned in the record on appeal, it is, nevertheless, a fact of record, the veracity of which

this COURT does not doubt.

Perforce, there being substantial compliance with the requirement of the Rules of Court, WE resolve this

issue in favor of petitioner. cdll

The liberal interpretation of the material data rule aimed at serving the ends of substantial justice has

found amplification in the recent cases of Pimentel, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-39423 and L-

39684, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 475; Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, Tomas Carag, et

al., L-40495, October 21, 1975, 67 SCRA 322, 328-332; and Manuel R. Luna vs. Court of Appeals,

Capati, et al., L-37123, October 30, 1975, 67 SCRA 503, 506.

WHEREFORE, THE INSTANT PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO

PETITIONER'S FILING THE APPROPRIATE ACTION IN A COMPETENT COURT. NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Muñoz Palma, Concepcion Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.

||| (Del Rosario v. Conanan, G.R. No. L-37903, March 30, 1977)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 7768. November 14, 1912.]

MANUEL SARITA ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ANDRES CANDIA, defendant-

appellee.

Felix Sevilla y Macam for appellants.

Vicente Urgello for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. ESTATES; RIGHTS OF INHERITANCE; COLLATERAL HEIRS. — The plaintiff who

joins as the representative of his grandfather in a complaint with others, who are brothers and nephews

of the predecessor in interest, lacks such right of representation, for it belongs in the collateral line

only to the nephews and not to the grandnephews. Hence, a sister and nephews of the deceased having

appeared to claim the inheritance, they, as the nearest of kin, exclude such a remoter relative as the

grandnephew.

2. ID.; CONJUGAL PROPERTY; WIDOW'S RIGHTS. — The widow who claims without

contradiction to be coowner with the deceased in the property he left, which the law presumes to be

conjugal partnership property, is entitled to one-half thereof, and also to usufruct of a half of the

remaining half, according to articles 837 and 953 of the Civil Code; and so long as this usufruct of

hers is not paid this half of the remaining half is subject to payment thereof, under article 838.

D E C I S I O N

ARELLANO, C.J p:

The spouses Apolinario Cedeno and Roberta Montesa acquired during their marriage a piece

of land, apparently of an area of 2 cavanes of corn upon which they had planted fruit trees.

Apolinario Cedeno died in 1895 and Roberta Montesa in 1909. It is alleged that during the lifetime

of these spouses, from 1886 to April, 1909, on which latter date Roberta Montesa died, Andres

Candia was holding and cultivating the said land, but that, as stated in the complaint, he did so

merely under a lease and paid the said spouses one hundred pesos semiannually; that, from May,

1909, he refused to pay the emphyteutic rent for the cultivation of the land, appropriated the land

and claimed ownership thereof; and that he also took possession of four mares, twelve carabaos,

and several pieces of furniture which were in the house erected on the said land — a house worth 50

pesos — which he also seized and claimed as his property. Apolinario Cedeno had three brothers

and one sister, Macario, Domingo, Leon, and Cristeta, of whom only the last mentioned is living.

Macario left five children, among them Tomas Cedeno; Domingo, the same number, among them a

daughter named Sofia, who died leaving a son, Manuel Sarita; and Leon, four, among them,

Gregorio Cedeno. All of these except Gregorio Cedeno and his brothers sue for the ownership of

the land and the other personal property of ownership of the land and the other personal property of

Andres Candia which, together with the fruits thereof, they requested the Court of First Instance of

Cebu to sentence the latter to return to them and, further, that he indemnify them in the amount of

P800, and pay the costs.

Andres Candia, a nephew of Roberta Montesa, as the son of her sister, testified that he had

been brought up, from the time he was very young, in the house of the spouses Cedeno and

Montesa; that he worked on the house which those spouses left at their death when it was under

construction, and, from his boyhood, assisted in the cultivation of the land; that said Apolonio

Cedeno, otherwise known as Isidario Cedeno, was a cabeza de barangay of the pueblo of Sibonga,

who, in order to pay certain shortages of the cabeceria under his charge, on the 24th of June, 1881,

sold the said land to Juan Basa Villarrosa, who held it in quiet and peaceable possession for twenty-

four years and at his death such possession was continued by his sons, Sinforoso and Vicente

Villarrosa, from whom witness, Andres Candia, acquired the property by purchase; that at no time

di he hold the same as a lessee nor pay for it any emphyteutic rent whatever; and that he never had

in his possession the animals mentioned in the complaint.

The scour absolved the defendant from the complaint, on the grounds that, with regard to the

animals and real property sued for, there was no proof whatever that they were in the possession of

the spouses at the time of their death, and, with respect to the land: (1) That the defendant was the

possessor in good faith continuously and was presumed to hold under just title so long as the

contrary should not be proved; and (2) that neither the plaintiffs nor their alleged predecessors in

interest made demand for it during the period of twenty-six years, since the ownership thereof was

conveyed by Isidario or Apolinario Cedeno to Juan Basa Villarrosa, on the 24th of June, 1881, it

being evident that during this very long period of time they did not obtain possession of the

property.

The judgment having been appealed through a bill of exceptions and the appeal having been

heard, we determine: With respect to the personal property, that the opinion of the trial court is

unchangeable, as, in this regard, it has not been impugned as erroneous on appeal, and is certainly

in accord with the merits of the case; and, as concerns the land, (1) that this action is one for the

recovery of possession from the present possessor, and, in order to bring it, the plaintiffs make use

of hereditary right, by styling themselves the heirs of Apolinario Cedeno; (2) that the plaintiffs are,

on the one side, Cristeta Cedeno, who is a sister of the deceased Apolinario Cedeno, on another,

some nephews and nieces of the latter, his brother Macario's children; and on the other, some

children of Domingo Cedeno, among them, Manuel Sarita, the principal plaintiff, in representation

of his deceased mother, Sofia, also a daughter of Domingo Cedeno; (3) that they assert their

hereditary right in an intestate succession, and that the land in question was the community property

of the deceased spouses, Cedeno and Montesa, as established hypothetically, especially by the

plaintiffs' witnesses, Estanislao Solano and Irineo Tormis; (4) that, such being the case, they could

demand, as the legitimate heirs of Apolinario Cedeno, only one-half of the land, but not the other

half which belonged to Roberta Montesa, of whom they are not heirs ab intestato, from the fact that

they are collateral relatives of this woman's husband: so that the claim to all the land is manifestly

unfounded; (5) that, moreover, it is manifestly unfounded in so much as Sofia's son, Manuel Sarita,

in representation of his mother, could not act as a plaintiff, nor could she, Sofia, do so by

representing her father, Domingo; on the hypothesis that the right of representation in the collateral

line can only take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters (Civil Code, art. 925, par. 2),

and the said Manuel Sarita is not a child of a brother, as are the children of Macario and Domingo

Cedeno; and, finally, that it was manifestly imprudent also to include as plaintiffs Gregorio,

Lorenzo, Abundio and Jose, the children of Leon Cedeno, a brother of the deceased Apolinario

Cedeno, when, as the first of them testified, they did not attempt to take part in this litigation:

"JUDGE. Is M Sevilla your attorney?

"WITNESS. No, sir.

"Q. Have you employed him? — A. No.

"Q. Have you spoken to him about this case? — A. No, sir.

"Q. So, then, you were never in Mr. Sevilla's office? — A. I do not know where it is.

"Q. Have you authorized this action against Andres Candia? — A. No, sir.

"Q. Have your brothers, Lorenzo, Juan, and the others, done so? — A. They have not.

"Q. So that in this suit neither you nor your brothers now have any claim against Andres Candia?

— A. No."

Elsewhere this same witness said:

"My uncles and cousins spoke to me about the institution of this suit; I told them that it

could not be, because the land was purchased by Juan Villarrosa at the time that our deceased

uncle found himself obliged to cover certain shortages against him in the cabeceria; it was sheen

that he sold the land."

In view of the foregoing considerations, we decide, with respect to the exercise of the

hereditary right derive from the intestate succession of Apolinario Cedeno:

First. That Manuel Sarita, the principal plaintiff, in whose house, according to Exhibit D,

there was drawn up at his request the engagement of all the plaintiffs to confide the suit to the

attorney who has conducted it, has absolutely no such right, because he cannot represent his

grandfather Domingo, since, as aforesaid, in the collateral line the right of representation can only

take place in favor of the children of brother or sisters, but not in favor of the grandson of a brother,

such as is the said Manuel Sarita, the son of Sofia Cedeno who, in turn, was the daughter of

Domingo Cedeno.

Second. That, on the hypothesis that such hereditary right derived from the intestate

succession of Apolinario Cedeno, does exist, it could only be exercised by Cristeta Cedeno, the

children of Macario Cedeno, and those of Domingo Cedeno, but not by Manuel Sarita, because in

inheritances the nearer relative excludes the more remote, excepting the right of representation in

proper cases (Civil Code, art. 921); from which it is inferred that, in pushing forward Cristeta

Cedeno, the children of Macario Cedeno and those of Domingo Cedeno, to exercise such a

hereditary right, it should have been noticed that the personality of these parties as the nearest

relatives excluded that of Manuel Sarita, the son of Sofia Cedeno, of a more remote degree.

Third. That, on the same hypothesis, in the eyes of the law no meaning whatever could be

given to the document, Exhibit H of the plaintiffs, wherein it is made to appear that the widow of

Apolinario Cedeno, Roberta Montesa, implored of the heirs of her deceased husband that she be

allowed to continue in the possession of the land and the house of the family; inasmuch as, as

coowner of such property, she was entitled to one-half of the other half of the same, pursuant to the

provisions of articles 837 and 953 of the Civil Code, and until she was satisfied for her part of

usufruct, this held of the other half remained liable for the payment of such part of usufruct. (Civil

Code, art. 838.)

Fourth. The hypothesis disappears from the moment that it is proved that at the death of such

alleged predecessor in interest in the inheritance, the land in question was not owned by him, it

having been transferred in 1881, according to a conclusion established by the trial judge. Therefore,

the action for the recovery of possession, derived from such alleged inheritance, cannot exist.

This transfer of the land affected by Isidario or Apolinario Cedeno was originally the title

alleged by the defendant — a title which must not be presumed in the present case, but proved. It is

true that the possessor, in the capacity of owner, has in his favor the legal presumption that he holds

under lawful title and cannot be compelled to exhibit it. (Civil Code, art. 446); but it also true that

when the defendant agrees with the plaintiffs that the thing demanded belonged to a determinate

person during his lifetime from whom these latter claim to derive their right, the existence is

thereby admitted of a right of ownership opposed to title of the present possessor, and hence

logically the necessity for the latter to prove his title and exhibit it, in order to destroy the contrary

presumption in favor of that prior ownership.

The defendant, according to the finding of the trial judge, has proved that he has such a title,

by the exhibition of three documents: one, of the sale of Isidario or Apolinario Cedeno to Juan Basa

Villarrosa (Exhibit 2); another, of the sale with pacto de retro by the latter's son, Sinforoso

Villarosa, to the defendant (Exhibit 3); and the other of a final sale by the other son, Vicente

Villarosa, to the same party, Andres Candia (Exhibit 4).

Against this finding of the lower court, the appellants allege: 1. That Isidario Cedeno, the

vendor, has nothing to do with Apolinario Cedeno, his predecessor in interest; and, 2. That the land

in Talamban known as that of Juan Basa Villarosa is about 15 or 20 brazas distant from the land in

Talamban which is concerned in this litigation.

But the finding impugned is in no wise erroneous. Tomas Cedeno, one of the plaintiffs,

testified that his uncle Apolinario had the baptismal or Christian name of Isidario, was better known

by the nickname of Adiot, and we the only cabeza de barangay in Sibonga with the surname of

Cedeno. Domingo Cedeno, who was erroneously made to appear as a plaintiff, said that the original

owner of the land in question was "his deceased uncle, Isidario Cedeno," and that Isidario was the

true name. The averment of the appellants that "the finding of the court is precisely contrary to the

agreement made by both parties," (brief, 8) is in all respects incorrect. "In the said agreement, they

say, no other name than that of Apolinario was recorded and admitted to be the name of the

plaintiffs' predecessor in interest. By that same agreement the defendant could not be heard to prove

another so different name as that of Isidario for the purpose of confusing it with that of Apolinario .

. . (brief, 8). The agreement only says: "By agreement between the attorneys for both parties, the

complaint in this case is understood to be amended in the sense that the name of Apolinario

Cedeno, which occurs in the first line of the first paragraph of the complaint, is substituted for the

name of Apolinario Cedeno; it being agreed that the amended answer which the court has just

admitted refers to the complaint so amended." The only point that appears to be agreed upon is that

where the plaintiffs say in their complaint Apolinario, the same shall be read Apolinario; but it was

not agreed that the party Apolinario might not be known by any other name than that of Apolinario,

nor that the defendant should not try to prove another name as that of Isidario.

It is also in all respects inexact that the land in Talamban, the subject matter of the

complaint, which formerly belonged to Apolinario Cedeno, is different from the land in Talamban

which the defendant claims was sold by Isidario Cedeno to Juan Basa Villarosa. The complaint

says: "Boundaries: On the north, by Calixto Nejarda; on the south, by the river called Grande and

Alejandro Mirafuentes; on the east, by the same river, Grande; and on the west, by a large rock."

Defendant's Exhibit 2 says: "Bounded on the north by Calixto Nejarda; on the east by Calixto

Nejarda; on the south by Alejandro Mirafuentes; and on the west by Miguel and a large rock." The

plaintiffs' witnesses, Solano and Cuestas, and the plaintiffs themselves, Sarita and Tomas Cedeno,

designate the same boundaries as does the defendant, giving also as the eastern boundary, besides

the river, Calixto Nejarda . . . The interposition of "Miguel" as being on the west, written in other

documents as on the south, is perfectly explained by the defendant: It refers to Miguel Calixto who

broke up the ground between the large rock and the land in dispute; and so it is that in subsequent

documents it also appears as the western boundary.

For the preceding reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this

instance against the appellants.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Trent, JJ., concur.

||| (Sarita v. Candia, G.R. No. 7768, November 14, 1912)

FUENTES VS. CRUZ

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-19382. August 31, 1965.]

IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELOIDA

FARRARIS.

FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant, vs. GAUDENCIA

FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERRARIS DE VILLEGAS,

JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.

Mateo C. Bacalso and Cesar A. Kintanar for petitioner-appellant.

Gaudioso Sosmeña and C. Tomakin for oppositors-appellees.

SYLLABUS

1.SUCCESSION; INTESTACY; COLLATERAL RELATIVES EXCLUDED BY NEPHEWS AND

NIECES. — A decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces

of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.

2.ID.; ID.; WHEN COLLATERALS ENTITLED TO SUCCESSION. — The absence of brothers,

sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins,

etc.) being called to the succession. (Art. 1009 Civil Code.)

3.ID.; ID.; DEGREE OF RELATIONSHIP OF COLLATERAL RELATIVES TO THE DECEASED.

— An aunt of the deceased is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the

collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong, degrees are counted by first ascending to the

common ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil Code Art. 966).

4.ID.; ID.; WHEN NEPHEWS AND NIECES INHERIT BY RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION. —

Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stirpes) unless concurring

with brothers or sisters of the deceased.

D E C I S I O N

REYES, J.B.L., J p:

This is a pauper's appeal, directly brought to this Court on points of law, from a resolution, dated

September 20, 1961, excluding petitioner-appellant herein, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, as heir in the

summary settlement of the estate of Melodia Ferraris, Special Proceeding No. 2177-R of the Court of

First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, as well as from the order, dated October 16, 1961, denying a motion

to reconsider said resolution.

The facts of this case are not disputed by the parties.

Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to Intramuros, Manila. She

was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22,

1960 of the petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her

whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was

known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and

distributing her estate among her heirs.

Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one third (1/3) share in the estate of her aunt,

Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding

No. 13-V of the same court.

The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or spouse, but was

survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt, and half- sister of

decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed

Ferraris, her nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo

Ferraris, who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest intestate

heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.

The following diagram will help illustrate the degree of relationship of the contending parties to said

Melodia Ferraris:

The sole issue to be resolved in this case is: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person

when he or she is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit: an aunt and the children of a brother who

predeceased him or her? Otherwise, will the aunt concur with the children of the decedent's brother in

the inheritance or will the former be excluded by the latter?

The trial court ruled that the oppositors-appellees, as children of the only predeceased brother of the

decedent, exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent, reasoning out that the former are

nearer in degree (two degrees) than the latter since nieces and nephew succeed by right of representation,

while petitioner- appellant is three degrees distant from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives

are excluded by brothers or sisters, or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance with

article 1009 of the New Civil Code.

Against the above ruling, petitioner-appellant contends in the present appeal that she is of the same or

equal degree of relationship as the oppositors-appellees, three degrees removed from the decedent; and

that under article 975 of the New Civil Code no right or representation could take place when the nieces

and nephew of the decedent do not concur with an uncle or aunt, as in the case at bar, but rather the

former succeed in their own right.

We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased, she is as far distant as the nephews from the

decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong degrees are

counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art.

966). Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right

of representation (i.e., per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided

expressly by Article 975:

"ART. 975.When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall

inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they

alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."

Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the

de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is

readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that

provided as follows:

"ART. 1001.Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower,

the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their

children to the other half."

"ART. 1004.Should the only survivors be, brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit

in equal shares."

"ART. 1005.Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces who are the

children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita,

and the latter per stirpes."

"ART. 1009.Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the

other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate."

"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among by reason of

relationship by the whole blood."

Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a

precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. This was also

and more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the Civil

Code now in force (R. A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:

"ART. 952.In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces, children of the former,

whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of

divorce shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased."

"ART. 954.Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, nor a

surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate of deceased.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of the

whole blood."

It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces inherited ab

intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or

widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews

and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the

latter vis a vis the other collaterals.

Appellants quote paragraph 2 of Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009 of the present Civil Code as

declaring that Article 1009 does not establish a rule of preference. Which is true as to "other collaterals",

since preference among them is according to their proximity to the decedent, as established by Article

962, paragraph 1.

"ART. 962.In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones,

saving the right of representation when it properly takes place."

But Tolentino does not state that nephews and nieces concur with other collaterals of equal degree. On

the contrary, in the first paragraph of his commentaries to Article 1009 (Vol. II, p. 439) (which counsel

for appellants had unethically omitted to quote), Tolentino expressly states:

"Other Collaterals.— The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate succession

are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters. They are,

however, limited to relatives within the fifth degree. Beyond this, we can safely say, there is

hardly any affection to merit the succession of collaterals. Under the law, therefore, persons

beyond the fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives, for successional purposes.

"Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should be understood

in connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives exclude the farther. Collaterals of

the same degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of representation. They succeed

without distinction of lines or preference among them on account of the whole blood

relationship." (Italics supplied)

We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may

not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and

qualified to succeed.

The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to this rule, is hereby affirmed. No costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.

||| (De Bacayo v. De Borromeo, G.R. No. L-19382, August 31, 1965)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-37365. November 29, 1977.]

GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. GERONIMO

ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO CARTENA, defendant-appellant.

Antonio E. Lacsam & Cesar A. Azucena, Jr. for appellant.

Ricardo A. Fabros, Jr. for appellees.

D E C I S I O N

GUERRERO, J p:

This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 in accordance with the provisions of

Sec. 17, paragraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, since the only issue raised is the correct

application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter which is purely a legal question.

The following findings of fact by the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City in Civil Case

No. SP-265, and adopted by the Court of Appeals, show that:

"Simeon Bagsic was in married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859 (Exh. "D") Of this

marriage there were born three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic (Exhibit G), Igmedia Bagsic

(Exhibit F), and Ignacio Bagsic (Exhibit H). Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband

Simeon Bagsic.

On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso (Exhibit "E"). Of this second

marriage were born two children, Felipa Bagsic (Exhibit J) and Maura Bagsic (Exhibit I). Simeon

Bagsic died sometime in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died.

Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his

only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August 19, 1944 (Exhibit B) survived by the plaintiffs

Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino. LexLib

Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945 (Exhibit A). Surviving her are her heirs, the plaintiffs

Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.

Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on April 14, 1952 leaving no

heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of the second Geronimo

Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months before the present suit was

filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her husband, the defendant

herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese) and her father Geronimo Almanza."

(Rollo, pp. 2-3)

The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns the one-half undivided share of

Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5) parcels of land which she inherited from her deceased

mother, Silvestra Glorioso, to wit:

"A. A parcel of land in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with 38 fruit bearing coconut

trees, with an area of 1,077, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by German Garingan; on the E. by Juan

Aliagas; on the S. by Bernandino Alina; and on the W. by Feliciana Glorioso. Covered by Tax

No. 12713 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31232, assessed at

P170.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;

B. A parcel of land, also situated in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with fruit bearing

coconut trees, with an area of 9,455 sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Paulino Gajuco; on the E. by

Felisa Gavino and German Garigan; on the S. by Esteban Calayag; and on the W. by Laureano

Ambion, Covered by Tax No. 12714 for the year 1948 in the name of defendant Geronimo

Almanza;

C. A parcel of land situated in same Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with 376 fruit

bearing coconut trees and having an area of 11,739 sq. sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Jacinto

Alvero, Anacleto Glorioso and Bernandino Alina; on the E. by Bernandino Alina; on the S. by

Rosendo Banaad, Jacinto Alvero and Casayan River; and on the W. by Anacleto Glorioso.

Covered by Tax No. 12715 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No.

31234, assessed at P2,720.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;

D. A residential lot, situated at P. Alcantara Street, Int., City of San Pablo, with an area of 153,

sq. m. Bounded on the N. by heirs of Pedro Calampiano; on the E. by Petronilo Cartago; on the

S. by Ignacio Yerro; and on the W. by Melecio Cabrera. Covered by Tax No. 17653 for the year

1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No, 21452, assessed at P610.00 in the name of

Cristeta Almanza; and

E. A parcel of coconut land, situated at Bo. Buenavista, Candelaria, Quezon, planted with 300

coconut trees fruit bearing. Area — 24,990 sq. m. Bounded on the N. (Ilaya) by heirs of Pedro

de Gala; on the E. by Julian Garcia; on the S. (Ibaba) by Julian Garcia, and on the W. by Taguan

River. Covered by Tax No. 21452, assessed at P910.00."

(Record on Appeal, pp. 4-6)

Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children of

Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisca Bagsic, daughter of

Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City against the defendants

Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by

Maura Bagsic.

After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above described properties passed on to Cristela Almanza who took

charge of the administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs approached her and requested for the

partition of their aunt's properties. However, they were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to divide

the properties yet as the expenses for the last illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid.

Having agreed to defer the partition of the same. the plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in

1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly, had already been

paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division of the properties having been effected, thereby leaving

the possession and administration of the same to the defendants.

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs who are hereby declared

to be entitled to ten twenty-fourth (10/24) share on the five parcels of land in dispute. The

defendant Engracio Manese and the heirs of the deceased Geronimo Almanza, who are

represented in the instant case by the administrator Florentino Cartena, are hereby required to

pay the plaintiffs from July 23, 1959 the sum of P625.00 per annum until the ten-twenty fourth

(10/24) share on the five parcels of land are delivered to the plaintiffs, with legal interest from

the time this decision shall have become final.

With costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.

City of San Pablo, September 21, 1962.

(SGD) JOSE G. BAUTISTA

Judge"

Record on Appeal, p. 47

From the aforesaid decision of the trial court, Florentino Cartena, the substitute defendant for Geronimo

Almanza, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The other defendant, Engracio Manese, did not appeal and

execution was issued with respect to the parcels of land in his possession, that is, those described under

Letters D and E in the complaint. Hence, the subject matter of the case on appeal was limited to the one-

half undivided portion of only three of the five parcels of land described under letters A, B and C in the

complaint which defendant Cartena admitted to be only in his possession. 2

On appeal, defendant-appellant Cartena contends that the provisions of Arts. 995, 1006 and 1008 of the

New Civil Code, applied by the trial court in allowing plaintiffs-appellees to succeed to the properties

left by Maura Bagsic were not the applicable provisions. He asserts that in the course of the trial of the

case in the lower court, plaintiffs requested defendants to admit that Felipa Bagsic, the sole sister of full

blood of Maura Bagsic, died on May 9, 1955. Since Maura Bagsic died on April 14, 1952, Felipa

succeeded to Maura's estate. In support thereof, he cites Art. 1004 of the New Civil Code which provides

that "should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares,"

and he concludes with the rule that the relatives nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones. (Art.

962, New Civil Code)

On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellees claim that the date of death of Felipa Bagsic was not raised as an

issue in the trial court. It was even the subject of stipulation of the parties as clearly shown in the transcript

of the stenographic notes that Felipa Bagsic died on May 9, 1945. 3

The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the case have been duly established in the trial court and that

the only issue left for determination is a purely legal question involving the correct application of the law

and jurisprudence on the matter, hence the appellate court certified this case to Us.

We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are applicable to the

admitted facts of the case at bar. These Articles provide: cdll

"Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall

inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they

alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."

"Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters

of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter."

"Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or per

stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the full blood."

In the absence of descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, Article 1003 of

the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It

appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her husband and all her ascendants had

died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister

of full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood, in accordance with

the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.

By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own

right. In Abellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382, August 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court

held that "nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless

concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased."

Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces

are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased

is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews

and nieces of half blood. The only difference in their right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, N.C.C.,

in relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole

niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of half blood. Such distinction

between whole and half blood relationships with the deceased has been recognized in Dionisia Padura,

et al. vs. Melania Baldovino, et al., No. L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065 (unreported) and

in Alviar vs. Alviar, No. L-22402, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 610). prcd

The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa Bagsic, her sister of

full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half blood citing Art. 1004, N.C.C., is

unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic

died in 1955, which as indicated here before, is not true as she died on May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased

her sister Maura Bagsic.

We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and jurisprudence.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.

No costs.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Martin and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

||| (Bicomong v. Almanza, G.R. No. L-37365, November 29, 1977)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-21809. January 31, 1966.]

GIL P. POLICARPIO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. JOSE V. SALAMAT, ET

AL., defendants, VICENTE ASUNCION, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Tansinsin & Tansinsin for the defendants and appellants.

Eugenio Balabat for the plaintiffs and appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. USUFRUCT; DEATH OF ONE OF USUFRUCTUARIES BEFORE END OF USUFRUCT;

ACCRETION AMONG USUFRUCTUARIES; EXCEPTION. — There is accretion among

usufructuaries who are constituted at the same time when one of them dies before the end of the usufruct.

The only exception is if the usufruct is constituted in a last will and testament and the testator makes a

contrary provision. In the instant case, there is none. On the contrary, the testatrix constituted the usufruct

in favor of the children of her three cousins with the particular injunction that they are the only ones to

enjoy the same as long as they live, from which it can be implied that, should any of them die, the share

of the latter shall accrue to the surviving ones. These provisions of the will are clear. They do not admit

of any other interpretation.

D E C I S I O N

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J p:

In a duly probated last will and testament of one Damasa Crisostomo, she gave the naked

ownership of a fishpond owned by her to her sister Teodorica de la Cruz while its usufruct to the

children of her cousins Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo. The fishpond is

situated at a barrio of Hagonoy, Bulacan.

The children of Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto Lorenzo turned out to be fourteen, namely:

Maria, Pio, Fructuosa, Graciano, Vicente, Victoria, Teodora, and Juan, all surnamed Perez, Apolonio

Lorenzo, Bonifacio Lorenzo, Vicente Asuncion, Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio Perez and Servillano Perez.

On the other hand, Teodorica dela Cruz, the naked owner, bequeathed in her will all her rights to the

fishpond to Jose V. Salamat.

The fourteen usufructuaries leased the fishpond first to one Gil P. Policarpio who used to give them

proportionately the usufruct corresponding to them. During the term of the lease, however, three of the

usufructuaries died, namely, Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio M. Perez and Servillano Perez, and so, upon

their death, both the naked owner and the remaining usufructuaries claimed the shares corresponding to

the deceased usufructuaries in the amount of (P10,714.26. Because of these conflicting claims, the lessee

withheld said amount.

Subsequently, on May 31, 1962, the surviving usufructuaries leased the fishpond to one Batas Riego de

Dios who, after executing the contract of lease, came to know of the existing conflicting claims, and not

knowing to whom of the claimants the shares of the deceased usufructuaries should be paid, said lessee

was also constrained to withhold the corresponding part of the usufruct of the property. So, on November

15, 1962, the two lessees commenced the present action for interpleader against both the naked owner

and surviving usufructuaries to compel them to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims.

Defendant Jose V. Salamat avers as special defense that he is the successor-in-interest of Teodorica dela

Cruz and as such he is entitled to the shares corresponding to the three deceased usufructuaries in as

much as the usufruct in their favor was automatically extinguished by death and became merged with the

naked owner.

The surviving usufructuaries, on the other hand, adhere to the theory that since the usufructuaries were

instituted simultaneously by the late Damasa Crisostomo, the death of the three usufructuaries did not

extinguish the usufruct; hence, the surviving usufructuaries are entitled to receive the shares

corresponding to the deceased usufructuaries, the usufruct to continue until the death of the last

usufructuary.

When the case was called for hearing, the parties agreed to submit the case for decision upon the

submission of their respective memoranda considering that the issue involved was purely legal in nature,

and on March 29, 1963, the trial court rendered decision the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

"Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring defendant Jose V. Salamat entitled to the

sum of P10,714.26 representing the shares of the three deceased usufructuaries in the lease rental

due from plaintiff Gil Policarpio, ordering the latter to deliver to said defendant the aforesaid

amount; and likewise declaring said defendant Jose V. Salamat entitled to share with the eleven

usufructuaries in the proceeds of the lease contract executed by them with plaintiff Batas Riego

de Dios, ordering the latter to deliver to him such amount as would be equivalent to the shares

of the three deceased usufructuaries, with the parties bearing their own costs and expenses of

litigation."

The surviving usufructuaries took the present appeal.

The important issue to be determined is whether the eleven surviving usufructuaries of the fishpond in

question are the ones entitled to the fruits that would have corresponded to the three deceased

usufructuaries, or the naked owner Jose V. Salamat.

Appellants argue that it is the surviving usufructuaries who are entitled to receive the shares of the

deceased by virtue of Article 611 of the Civil Code which provides: "A usufruct constituted in favor of

several persons living at the time of its constitution shall not be extinguished until the death of the last

survivor." On the other hand, appellee contends that the most a usufruct can endure if constituted in favor

of a natural person is the lifetime of the usufructuary, because a usufruct is extinguished by the death of

the usufructuary unless a contrary intention clearly appears (Article 603, Civil Code). Hence, appellee

argues, when the three usufructuaries died, their usufructuary rights were extinguished and whatever

rights they had to the fruits reverted to the naked owner.

If the theory of appellee in the sense that the death of the three usufructuaries has the effect of

consolidating their rights with that of the naked owner were correct, Article 611 of the Civil Code would

be superfluous, because Article 603 already provides that the death of the usufructuary extinguishes the

usufruct unless the contrary appears. Furthermore, said theory would cause a partial extinction of the

usufruct, contrary to the provisions of Article 611 which expressly provides that the usufruct shall not be

extinguished until the death of the last survivor. The theory of appellee cannot, therefore, be entertained.

The well-known Spanish commentators on the counterpart of Article 611 we have copied above which

implicitly provides that the share of a usufructuary who dies in the meantime inures to the benefit of the

surviving usufructuaries, also uphold the view we here express. Thus, the following is their comment on

the matter:

"Al comentar el art. 469 (now Art. 564) hablamos, entre las formas de constitución del usufructo,

del disfrute simultaneo y sucesivo. Ninguna duda cabe, puesto que el derecho de acrecer es

aplicable a los usufructuaríos, según el art. 987 (now Art. 1023), sobre la no extinción del

usufructo simultáneo, hasta la muerte de la última persona que sobreviva . . .

". . . Al referirse . . . el art. 521 (now Art. 621) al usufructo constituido en provecho de varias

personas vivas al tiempo de su constitucion, parece referirse al usufructo simultáneo. Sin

embargo, es indudable que se refiere tambien al sucesivo, puesto que en esta especie de usufructo

el segundo usufructuario no entra en el disfrute, salvo expresion en contrario, hasta la muerte del

primero, y es claro que al morir el último llamado, se extingue el usufructo, que es precisamente

lo que ordena el presente articulo." (Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Español, 1931, Tomo

IV, p. 486).

". . . refiriendonos al caso de muerte natural, ha de tenerse presente que si son muchos los

llamados al usufructo simultáneamente, muerto uno, su porcian acrece á demás á no ser que el

testador exprese lo contrario, ó se infiriera así del título en que se constituyó el usufructo, para

lo cual puede verse la doctrina de la ley 33, tit. I, lib. VII del Digesto, que habla del derecho de

acrecer en el usufructo, y el tit. IV del mismo libro, en que se proponen algunos casos de

excepcion. — El usufructo constituido en provecho de varias personas vivas al tiempo de su

constitución. no se extinguírá hasta la muerte de la última que sobrevívíere. Cód. Civ. art. 521."

(Del Viso, Lecciones Elementales de Derecho Civil, sexta edicion, Tomo I, p. 86.)

"Si a varios usufructuarios se les lega la totalidad de una herencia, o una misma parte de ella, se

da el derecho de acrecer cuando uno de ellos muere despues del testador, sobreviviendo otro y

otros? — Como dice la obra anotada, el Digesto admitió, según un texto de Paulo, la solución

afirmativa, y Pothier reprodujo dicha doctrina.

"La jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supremo español ha admitido y sancionado también en le

sentencia de 29 de marzo de 1905, aunque no por aplicación del derecho de acrecer, y sí por

aplicación de la voluntad presunta del testador, que habiéndose legado el usufructo vitalicio del

remanente de sus bienes, por partes iguales, a dos hermanas, debe entenderse que ellas, o

cualquiera de las dos que sobreviviere a la otra, había de disfrutar dicho usufructo, no

constituyendo la separación de partes sino una previsión del testador, para el arreglo del

usufructo total durante la vida de las dos usufructuaries." (Colin and Capitant, Curso Elemental

de Derecho Civil, 1957, Tomo VIII, pp. 605-606)

It, therefore, appears that the Spanish commentators on the subject are unanimous that there is accretion

among usufructuaries who are constituted at the same time when one of them dies before the end of the

usufruct. The only exception is if the usufruct is constituted in a last will and testament and the testator

makes a contrary provision. Here there is none. On the contrary, the testatrix constituted the usufruct in

favor of the children of her three cousins with the particular injunction that they are the only ones to

enjoy the same as long as they live, from which it can be implied that, should any of them die, the share

of the latter shall accrue to the surviving ones. These provisions of the will are clear. They do not admit

of any other interpretation.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed. The eleven surviving usufructuaries are hereby

declared to be entitled to the shares of the three deceased usufructuaries and, hence, as a corollary,

appellees Gil P. Policarpio and Batas Riego de Dios are hereby ordered to pay to them the money

withheld by them respectively representing the shares of the deceased usufructuaries. No costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ.,

concur.

Barrera, J., took no part.

||| (Policarpio v. Salamat, G.R. No. L-21809, January 31, 1966)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 25966. November 1, 1926.]

In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased MANUEL TORRES,

special administrator, and LOPEZ DE BUENO, heir, appellees, vs. MARGARITA

LOPEZ, opponent-appellant.

Marcaida, Capili & Ocampo and Camus, Delgado & Recto for appellant.

Araneta & Zaragoza for appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. WILLS; JOINT HEIRS UNDER WILL; ACCRETION. — When one of two joint heirs

called by will to an inheritance without special designation of shares dies before the testator, the part

pertaining to such heir will, upon the subsequent death of the testator, go by accretion to the coheir;

and the additional circumstance that the predeceasing heir was, at the time of the making of the will,

disqualified to take, by reason of his being then the legal guardian of the testator with accounts

unsettled, does not make a case for intestate succession as to his part of the estate.

D E C I S I O N

STREET, J p:

This appeal involves a controversy over one-half of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez,

decedent. The appellant, Margarita Lopez, claims said half by intestate succession as next of kin

and nearest heir; while the appellee, Luz Lopez de Bueno, claims the same by accretion and in the

character of universal heir under the will of the decedent. The trial court decided the point of

controversy in favor of Luz Lopez de Bueno, and Margarita Lopez appealed.

The facts necessary to an understanding of the case are these: On January 3, 1924, Tomas

Rodriguez executed his last will and testament, in the second clause of which he declared:

" I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my property, my cousin Vicente F. Lopez

and his daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno."

Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, had been

judicially declared incapable of taking care of himself and had been placed under the care of his

cousin Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. On January 7, 1924, or only four days after the will above-

mentioned was made, Vicente F. Lopez died; and the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died on February

25, 1924, thereafter. At the time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez had not presented his final

accounts as guardian, and no such accounts had been presented by him at the time of his death.

Margarita Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent. The will referred to, after having

been contested, has been admitted to probate by judicial determination (Torres and Lopez de Bueno

vs. Lopez, 48 Phil., 772).

Our discussion of the legal problem presented should begin with article 753 of the Civil

Code which in effect declares that, with certain exceptions in favor of near relatives, no

testamentary provision shall be valid when made by award in favor of his guardian before the final

accounts of the latter have been approved. This provision is of undoubted application to the

situation before us; and the provision made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of Vicente F.

Lopez must be considered invalid, owing to the incapacity of the latter. But it is obvious that the

incapacity of Lopez was not any general incapacity on his part, but a special incapacity due to the

accidental relation of guardian and ward existing between the parties.

We now pass to article 982 of the Civil Code, defining the right of accretion. It is there

declared, in effect, that accretion takes place in a testamentary success when two or more persons

are called to the same inheritance or the same portion thereof without special designation of shares;

and, secondly, when one of the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces the

inheritance or is disqualified to receive it. In the case before us we have a will calling Vicente F.

Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to the same inheritance without special designation

of shares. In addition to this, one of the persons named as heir has predeceased the testator, this

person being also disqualified to receive the estate even if he had been alive at the time of the

testator's death. This article (982) is therefore also of exact application to the case in hand; and its

effect is to give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not only the undivided half which she would

have received in conjunction with her father if he had been alive and qualified to take, but also the

half which pertained to him. There was no error whatever, therefore in the order of the trial court

declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to the whole estate.

The argument in favor of the appellant supposes that there has supervened a partial intestacy

with respect to the half of the estate which was intended for Vicente F. Lopez and that this half has

descended to the appellant, Margarita Lopez, as next of kin and sole heir at law of the decedent. In

this connection attention is directed to article 764 of the Civil Code wherein it is declared, among

other things, that a will may be valid even though the person instituted as heir is disqualified to

inherit. Our attention is next invited to article 912 wherein it is declared, among other things, that

legal succession takes place if the heir dies before the testator and also when the heir instituted is

disqualified to succeed. Upon these provisions an argument is planted conducting to the conclusion

that the will of Tomas Rodriguez was valid, notwithstanding the fact that one of the individuals

named as heirs in the will was disqualified that as a consequence Margarita Lopez is inherit the

share of said disqualified heir.

We are of the opinion that this contention is untenable the appellee clearly has the better

right. In applying the provisions of the Code it is the duty of the court to harmonize its provisions as

far as possible, giving due effect to all; and in case of conflict between two provisions the more

general is to be considered as being limited by the more specific. As between articles 912 and 983,

it is obvious that the former is the more general of the two, dealing, as it does with the general topic

of intestate succession, while the latter is more specific, defining the particular conditions under

which accretion takes place. In case of conflict, therefore, the provisions of the former article must

be considered limited by the latter. Indeed, in subsection 3 of article 912 the provision with respect

to intestate succession is expressly subordinated to article 983 by the expression "and (if) there is no

right of accretion." It is that the same express qualification is not found in subsection 4 of article

912, yet it must be so understood, in view of the rule of interpretation above referred to, by which

the more specific is held to control the general. Besides, this interpretation supplies the only

possible means of harmonizing the two provisions. In addition to this, article 986 of the Civil Code

affords independent proof that intestate succession to a vacant portion can only occur when

accretion is impossible.

The attorneys for the appellant direct attention to the fact that, under paragraph 4 of article

912, intestate ,succession occurs when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed (incapaz de

suceder), while, under the last provision in paragraph 2 of article 982, accretion occurs when one of

the persons called to inherit under the will is disqualified to receive the inheritance (incapaz de

recibirla). A distinction is then drawn between incapacity to succeed incapacity to take, and it is

contended that the disability of Vicente F. Lopez was such as to bring the case under article 912

rather than 982. We are of the opinion that the case cannot be made to turn upon so refined an

interpretation of the language of the Code, and at any rate the disability to which Vicente F. Lopez

was subject was not a general disability to succeed but an accidental incapacity to receive the

legacy, a consideration which makes a case for accretion rather than for intestate succession.

The opinions of the commentators, so far as they have expressed themselves on the subject,

tend to the conclusion that the right of accretion with regard to portions of an inheritance left vacant

by the death or disqualification of one of the heirs or his renunciation of the inheritance is governed

by article 912, without being limited, to the extent supposed in appellant's brief, by the provisions of

the Code relative to intestate succession (Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo Civil Español, 4th ed.,

vol. VII, pp. 310, 311; id., 34; 13 Mucius Scaevola, pp. 372, 373, 285-287; 16 Mucius Scaevola,

186). Says Escriche: "It is to be understood that one of the coheirs or colegatees fails if nonexistent

at the time of the making of the will, or if he renounces the inheritance or legacy, if he dies before

the testator, if the condition be not fulfilled, or if he becomes otherwise incapacitated. . . ."

(Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, vol. I, p. 225.)

In conclusion it may be worth observing that there has always existed both in the civil and in

the common law a certain legal intendment, amounting to a mild presumption, against partial

intestacy. In Roman law, as is well known, partial testacy was not allowed and there has remained

in the derived systems a presumption against it, — a presumption which has its basis in the

supposed intention of the testator.

The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the

appellant.

Avanceña, C.J., Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez,and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

||| (In re: Estate Rodriguez v. Lopez, G.R. No. 25966, November 01, 1926)