winning hearts and minds? examining the relationship between aid and security in afghanistan

8/3/2019 Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship Between Aid and Security in Afghanistan

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Strengthening the humanity and dignity of people in crisis through knowledge and practice

Winning Hearts and Minds?

Examining the Relationship between

Aid and Security in Aghanistan

January 2012

Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder


2/92Feinstein International Center2

2011 Feinstein International Center. All Rights Reserved.

Fair use o this copyrighted material includes its use or non-commercial educational

purposes, such as teaching, scholarship, research, criticism, commentary, and news

reporting. Unless otherwise noted, those who wish to reproduce text and image fles

rom this publication or such uses may do so without the Feinstein International

Centers express permission. However, all commercial use o this material and/or

reproduction that alters its meaning or intent, without the express permission o the

Feinstein International Center, is prohibited.

Feinstein International Center

Tuts University

200 Boston Ave., Suite 4800

Medord, MA 02155

USA

tel: +1 617.627.3423

ax: +1 617.627.3428

fc.tuts.edu
https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/FIC/Feinstein+International+Centerhttps://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/FIC/Feinstein+International+Center


3/92

Authors

Paul Fishstein is a visiting Fellow at the Feinstein International Center at Tuts

University, Medord, Massachusetts. Andrew Wilder is Director, Aghanistan and

Pakistan Programs, United States Institute or Peace, Washington, District o Columbia

and ormer Research Director at the Feinstein International Center.

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank the ollowing people and institutions and acknowledge their

contribution to the research:

ResearchcolleaguesAhmadHakeem(Shajay),SayedYaseenNaqshpa,Ahmad

Gul,SayedYaqeen,FaraidoonShariq,andGeertGompelmanfortheirassistanceand

insights as well as companionship in the eld.

FrancesBrown,DavidKatz,DavidManseld,andAstriSuhrkefortheirsubstantive

comments and suggestions on a drat version.

Will iamThompsonandDAIforfacilitatingeldresearchinPaktiaProvince,AusAIDstaandtheUNAMAoceinTarinKotforfacilitatingeldresearchin

UruzganProvince,andtheACTEDoceinMaimanaforfacilitatingeldresearch

in Faryab Province.

RobertGrantandtheWiltonParkconferencecenterfortheirjointsponsorshipof

theMarch2010conferenceonWinningHeartsandMindsinAfghanistan:

AssessingtheEectivenessofDevelopmentAidinCOINOperations.

StaoftheAfghanistanResearchandEvaluationUnit(AREU)forsupportduring

visits to Aghanistan.

PaulFishsteinalsowishestothanktheCarrCenterforHumanRightsPolicyatthe

HarvardKennedySchoolforthefellowshipduringwhichmuchofthisworkwasdone.

TheBalkh,Faryab,andUruzgananalysisbenettedfromhistoricalandpolitical

backgroundoverviewsproducedbyMervynPattersonandMartinevanBijlert,leading

analysts o these provinces. The section on the evolution o security-driven aid

benetted rom the very substantive contribution o Dr. Stuart Gordon.

Thanks go to Joyce Maxwell or her editorial guidance and or helping to clariy

unclearpassages,andtoBridgetSnowforherecientandpatientworkonthe

production o the nal document.

Thank you

Generous unding or the research was provided by the Aghanistan Research and

EvaluationUnit(AREU),theAustralianAgencyforInternationalDevelopment

(AusAID),theRoyalNorwegianMinistryofForeignAairs,andtheSwedish

InternationalDevelopmentCooperationAgency(SIDA).

Cover photo

U.S.militaryandchildrenathealthcenter,Helmand

PhotobyKateHolt/IntegratedRegionalInformationNetworks(IRIN)


4/92

Acknowledgements

Glossary o non-English words and expressions vii

Acronyms and abbreviations viii

Executive Summary

1. Introduction 8

1.1 Purpose, rationale, and description o study 8

1.2 Methodology 10

1.3 Similar and related research in Aghanistan 11

2. Evolution o security-driven aid 13

2.1 Current approaches 15

3. Aid and security in Aghanistan 20

3.1 Provincial background 20

3.2 Models used or employing aid in the ve provinces 21

4. Drivers o conict and insecurity 29

4.1 Corruption, poor governance, and predatory government 29 4.2Ethnic,tribal,andfactionalissues 31

4.3 Poverty and unemployment 34

4.4 International military orces 35

4.5 Religious extremism 36

4.6 Confict over scarce resources 38

4.7Pakistanandtheotherneighbors 38

4.8Opportunitiesforinsurgentstoexploitgrievances 40

5. Perceptions o aid projects 41

5.1Nothing,ornotenough,wasdone 42

5.2Inequitabledistribution:Theygotmorethanwedid 42

5.3 Corruption 44

5.4Wrongkindofprojects 46

5.5Poorlyimplemented(lowquality) 47

5.6Non-sustainable 50

5.7 Positive views: Some good news 51

Contents


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6. The stabilizing and destabilizing eects o aid 54

6.1 Addressing the wrong drivers o insecurity 57

6.2 Subverted by insurgents 60

6.3Poorqualityofimplementation 61

6.4Destabilizinginuencesofaid 61

6.4.1 Corruption 61

6.4.2 Competition over resources: The war-aid economy and perverse incentives 62

6.4.3 Reinorcing inequalities and creating perceived winners and losers 64

6.4.4 Regional disparities 64

7. Summary o conclusions and recommendations 67

Annex A: Research Methodology 72

Bibliography 78

v


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MAP

vi

Map credit: Hans C. Ege Wenger, Tufts University


7/92

Glossary o non-EnGlish words and ExprEssions

arbab/khan Headofcommunityortribe

arbakai Tribal security orces indigenous to the Loya Paktia region. The term has been

inormally adopted to reer to irregular local security orces.

bakhsheesh Financial git, usual ly small, oered as a avor to accomplish a task

jihad Holywar,usuallyreferringtothe197992waragainsttheSovietoccupation

jihadi Commander or political leader who gained his strength during thejihadyears

(197992)

karez Traditionalirrigationsystemthattapsaquifersandbringswatertothesurface

through oten-lengthy underground canals

komak Help,aid,orassistance

kuchis Nomads

kunjala Type o animal eed

madrassa Religious school or training academymahroum Deprived, let out, oten with the implication o being discriminated against

malek Local leader

mujahidin Guerillaswhofoughtinthe197992waragainsttheSovietoccupation(literally,

those who ghtjihad,orholywar)

mullah Religious leader

sharia Islamic law

shura Council

sudh Usury, excessive interest rates

tak o took A bit o noise

talib Islamicstudent(singularoftaliban)

tanzim Organizationorpoliticalparty

tashkil Approvedstangpatternorlistofsanctionedpostsinagovernmentoce

tekadar Contractor, one who does a piece o work or payment

ulama Sunni religious scholars

wasita Personal relationship or connection oten used to obtain a avor such as employment

or processing o paperwork

woleswal District administrator or governor; i.e., one who administers a woleswali

woleswali Administrative division within a province

zulm Cruelty

vii


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acronyms and abbrEviations

ADF Australian Deense Force

ANA AfghanNationalArmy

ANP AfghanNationalPolice

ANSF AfghanNationalSecurityForces

AREU AfghanistanResearchandEvaluationUnit

AusAID Australian Agency or International Development

CDC Community Development Council

CERP CommandersEmergencyResponseProgram

CFW Cash-For-Work

CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation

COIN Counterinsurgency

CSO CentralStatisticsOrganization

DDR Disarmament,Demobilization,andReintegrationDFID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(UK)

DOD DepartmentofDefense(U.S.)

DODD DepartmentofDefenseDirective

EQUIP EducationQualityImprovementProgram

EU EuropeanUnion

FATA Federal ly Administered Tribal Areas

FCO ForeignandCommonwealthOce(UK)

FIC Feinstein International Center

GAO GovernmentAccountabilityOce(U.S.)

GIRoA Government o the Islamic Republic o Aghanistan

IDP Internally displaced person

IED Improvisedexplosivedevice

IMF International military orces

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

MOD MinistryofDefense(UK)

MRRD Ministry o Rural Rehabilitation and Development

NATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization

NGO Non-governmentalorganization

NSP NationalSolidarityProgram

ODA OcialDevelopmentAssistance

OECD OrganizationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment

PDC Provincial Development Committee

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

viii


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PsyOps PsychologicalOperations

QDR QuadrennialDefenseReview

QIP QuickImpactProject

S/CRS OceoftheCoordinatorforReconstructionandStabilization(U.S.)

SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

SIGAR SpecialInspectorGeneralforAfghanistanReconstruction(U.S.)

START StabilisationandReconstructionTaskForce(Canada)

UNOCHA UnitedNationsOceofCoordinatorforHumanitarianAairs

UNAMA UnitedNationsAssistanceMissionforAfghanistan

UNFPA UnitedNationsPopulationFund

UNTAG UnitedNationsTransitionAssistanceGroup

USDA U.S. Department o Agriculture

USG United States Government

ix



Politicalandsecurityobjectiveshavealways

infuenced U.S. oreign assistance policies and

priorities.Since9/11,however,developmentaid

forcountrieslikeAfghanistan,Iraq,andPakistan

hasincreasinglyandexplicitlybeenmilitarized

and subsumed into the national security agenda.

In the U.S. as well as in other western nations,

the re-structuring o aid programs to refect the

prevailing oreign policy agenda o conronting

globalterrorismhashadamajorimpacton

development strategies, priorities, and structures.

The widely held assumption in military and

oreign policy circles that development assistance

isanimportantsoftpowertooltowinconsent

or the presence o oreign troops in potentially

hostileareas,andtopromotestabilizationandsecurityobjectives,assumesarelationship

between poverty and insecurity that is shared by

many in the development and humanitar ian

community.

Theassumptionthataidprojectsimprove

security has had a number o implications or the

U.S.andotherwesterndonors,including:1)a

sharpincreaseindevelopmentassistance;2)an

increasing percentage o assistance programmedbased on strategic security considerations rather

thanonthebasisofpovertyandneed;and,3)a

much greater role or the military or combined

civil-military teams in activities that were

traditionally the preserve o development and

humanitarianorganizations.Atthesametime,

civilian agencies, including non-governmental

organizations,havealsobeenincreasingly

enlistedinaidanddevelopmentprojectsthat

haveexplicitstabilizationobjectives.

Given how widespread the assumption is, and

givenitsmajorimpactonaidand

counterinsurgency policies, there is l ittle

empirical evidence that supports the assumption

that reconstruction assistance is an eective tool

towinheartsandminds,andimprovesecurity

orstabilizationincounterinsurgencycontexts.

To help address this lack o evidence, the

FeinsteinInternationalCenter(FIC)atTufts

University conducted a comparative study inAfghanistanandtheHornofAfricatoexamine

theeectivenessofaidprojectsinpromoting

securityobjectivesinstabilizationand

counterinsurgency contexts.

This paper presents a summary o the ndings

rom the Aghanistan study. Research was

conducted in ve provinces, three in the south

andeast(Helmand,Paktia,andUruzgan)which

were considered insecure and two in the north

(BalkhandFaryab)whichwereconsidered

relativelysecure,aswellasinKabulcity.

Through interviews and ocus group discussions

with a range o respondents in key institutions

and in communities, views were elicited on the

drivers o insecurity, characteristics o aid

projectsandaidimplementers(includingthe

military),andeectsofaidprojectsonthepopularity o aid actors and on security.

Drivers o insecurity

The study rst tr ied to understand the drivers o

insecurity in the ve provinces in order to be

abletoassesswhetheraidprojectswere

addressing them. The main reported drivers o

confict or insecurity were poor governance,

corruption,andpredatoryocials;ethnic,tribal,or actional confict; poverty and unemployment;

behaviorofforeignforces(includingcivilian

casualties, night raids, and disrespect or Aghan

culture);competitionforscarceresources(e.g.,

water,land);criminalityandnarcotics(and

counter-narcotics);ideologyorreligious

extremism; and, the geopolitical policies o

Pakistan and other regional neighbors. Many o

these actors are complex, intertwined, and

overlapping,soitwasdiculttoisolatethe

strength and infuences o each. Respondents

gave notably dierent weight to the various

actors in the dierent provinces. In the southern

and eastern provinces, poor governance and

tribal and actional conficts were given more

weight, while in the northern provinces poverty

and unemployment were given more weight. In

the south and east, the actions o the

international military were reported to be an

important source o insecurity, whereas in the

north international military orces weregenerally seen as more o a source o security. A

common theme that cut across many thematic

ExEcUtivE sUmmary


11/92WinningHeartsandMinds?ExaminingtheRelationshipbetweenAidandSecurityinAfghanistan 3

andgeographicalareaswasthatofinjustice,

includingtheperceivedinjusticethatafew

corruptocialsandpowerbrokerswere

beneting disproportionally rom international

assistanceattheexpenseofthemajorityof

Aghans. Insurgents were described as adept at

taking advantage o the opportunities oered by

communitiesgrievancesandperceptionsofinjustice.

Perceptions o aid projects

The study looked at whether and how aid

projectsaddressedthedriversofinsecurity

identiedbyrespondentsand/orwereeectiveat

winning hearts and minds. The research ound

thatdevelopmentprojects,ratherthangenerating

good will and positive perceptions, were

consistently described negatively by Aghans.

Responsessuggestedthatnotonlywereprojects

not winning people over to the government side,

but perceptions o the misuse and abuse o aid

resources were in many cases ueling the

growing distrust o the government, creating

enemies, or at least generating skepticism

regarding the role o the government and aid

agencies.Thechiefcomplaintswerethatprojects

wereinsucient,bothintermsofquantityand

ofquality;unevenlydistributedgeographically,politically, and socially; and, above all, associated

with extensive corruption, especially those that

involved multiple levels o subcontracting.

Communities did provide positive views on the

NationalSolidarityProgram(NSP),some

signicant and highly visible inrastructure

projects,andlong-servingaidagenciesthathad

established relationships with communities.

Stabilizing and destabilizing eects o aid

While the environments in the ve provinces

diered, a number o consistent observations

emerged concerning the eectiveness o aid

projectsinpromotingshort-andlong-term

stabilizationobjectives.First,insomeareasaid

projectsseemedtohavehadsomeshort-term

positive security eects at a tactical level,

including reported intelligence gathering gains

and some limited orce protection benets or

internationalforces.Insomecasesaidprojects

also helped to acilitate creating relationships, in

partbyprovidingaplatformorcontextto

legitimizeinteractionbetweeninternationaland

localactorswhowouldotherwisenditdicult

tomeet.However,despitetheselimitedtactical

benets, there was little concrete evidence in any

oftheveprovincesthataidprojectswere

havingmorestrategiclevelstabilizationorsecurity benets such as winning populations

awayfrominsurgents,legitimizingthe

government, or reducing levels o violent

confict.

The research actually ound more evidence o

thedestabilizingratherthanthestabilizing

eects o aid, especially in insecure areas where

the pressures to spend large amounts o money

quicklyweregreatest.Themostdestabilizing

aspect o the war-aid economy was in ueling

massivecorruptionthatservedtodelegitimize

thegovernment.Otherdestabilizingeects

included: generating competition and confict

over aid resources, oten along actional, tribal or

ethnic lines; creating perverse incentives to

maintain an insecure environment, as was the

case with security contractors who were reported

tobecreatingaproblemtosolveaproblem;

ueling conficts between communities over

locations o roads and the hiring o laborers; and,causing resentment by reinorcing existing

inequalitiesandfurtherstrengtheningdominant

groups, oten allied with political leaders and

regional strongmen, at the expense o others.

The research ound that while the drivers o

insecurity and confict in Aghanistan are varied

and complex, the root causes are oten political

in nature, especially in terms o competition or

power and resources between and among ethnic,tribal, and actional groups. International

stabilizationprojects,however,tendedtolay

more emphasis on socio-economic rather than

political drivers o confict, and thereore

primarily ocused on addressing issues such as

unemployment, illiteracy, lack o social services,

andinadequateinfrastructuresuchasroads.Asa

result,aidprojectswereoftennotaddressingthe

main sources o confict, and in some cases ueled

confict by distributing resources that rival

groups then ought over.



Conclusions and recommendations

The ollowing section highlights the main

conclusions and recommendations o this study,

which are largely consistent with ndings rom

several other evaluations and studies looking at

the relationship between aid and security in

Aghanistan. There is growing awareness bycivilian and military actors o some o the issues

raised here, and steps have been taken to address

someofthem.However,progresshasoftenbeen

slow because many o the institutional incentives

or why aid unds are spent in ways that can be

ineectiveordestabilizingremainunchanged.

1. Primacy o political over economic

drivers o conict

In the more insecure areas the reasons identied

by interviewees or insecurity and opposition to

thegovernmentwererelatedmostfrequentlyto

political issues such as the corrupt and predatory

behavior o government actors. Most

stabilizationinitiatives,however,have

emphasizedeconomicdriversofconict

ocusing on poverty, unemployment, illiteracy,

delivery o social services, and building o

inrastructure. In the less insurgency-aected

areas, where poverty and unemployment weregiven as more important drivers o confict,

well-delivered, confict-sensitive aid

interventions may have been more eective at

helping to consolidate stability than aid in

insecure areas was in reversing instabil ity.

The population-centered counterinsurgency

(COIN)approachofwinningthepopulation

away rom insurgents and over to the

government struggled to gain traction in partbecausethegovernmentsleadershipnever

seemedtosharetheobjectiveofwinningover

the population, and instead oten pursued a

patronage-based approach to buy the support o

local strongmen. Furthermore, the U.S. and

manyofitsNATO/ISAF(InternationalSecurity

AssistanceForce)allieshadcontradictory

strategies o simultaneously wanting to provide

services and good government to win over the

population, but also supporting local strongmen

whose predatory behavior alienated the localpopulation. Aid delivered by or associated with

corruptocialsorstrongmenwhowereinmany

cases responsible or alienating people in the rst

place has, not surprisingly, proven to be an

ineective way o winning people over to the

government. Lack o progress on governance has

not primarily been due to lack o money, but to

a lack o political will or a shared strategy on the

part o the government and the internationalcommunity to push a consistent reorm agenda.

Recommendations:

Focusmoreonidentifyingthedriversof

confict and alienation, and i these are

primarily political, governance, and rule-o-

law related, do not assume they can eectively

be addressed through primarily socio-

economic interventions.

Theinternationalcommunityshouldtakea

better-coordinated and more orceul stand on

certain key issues that would help promote

bettergovernance(e.g.,merit-based

appointments into key national and sub-

national positions, more rigorous anti-

corruption measures including better

monitoring o donor expenditures, avoiding

all iances with notorious strongmen known or

corruptandpredatorybehavior).

2. Spending too much too quickly can be

counterproductive less can be more

Pressuretospendtoomuchmoneytooquicklyis

not only wasteul, but undermines both security

anddevelopmentobjectives,especiallyin

insecure environments with weak institutions.

However,powerfulcareerandinstitutional

incentivesoftencontributetoquantitybeingprioritizedandrewardedoverquality.These

incentives include the strong bureaucratic

imperative to grow budgets as much as possible,

andtothenspendasmuchmoneyasquicklyas

possibleinordertojustifyfurtherbudget

growth; or Provincial Reconstruction Teams

(PRTs),todemonstrateperformanceduring

short-termrotationsbasedonthequantityof

unds expended rather than on the impact that

the unded activities have had; or many

contractorsandNGOs,togenerateoverheadfundingforheadquartersbasedonprogram



budgetsspent.TheexperienceoftheNSPand

someotherdevelopmentprojectssuggeststhat,

intermsofdevelopment,qualityshouldnotbe

sacricedforthesakeofquantity.Theresearch

suggeststhatintermsofpotentialstabilizing

benets as well as positive development

outcomes, the process o development, especially

in building and sustaining relationships, despitebeing time-consuming, is as i not more

important than the product o development.

Unortunately, there are ew incentives or

spending less money more eectively over time.

Discussions with individual eld-level actors as

wellasseniorocialsconrmthattheproblem

is oten not that we do not know what needs to

be done, but rather that institutional incentives

rewardgettingandspendingmoney.Lessis

morecanneverbearealitywhenmoreis

moreisrewarded.

Recommendations:

Provideincentivesforqualityandimpactof

aidspendingoverquantity.Aidmoneyshould

only be committed when it can be spent in an

eective and accountable manner.

Addresstheuseitorloseitproblem,

whereby budgets are oreited i not spent, byallowing unused budget amounts to be rolled

over into ollowing years, establishing multi-

year predictable unding, and making more

use o longer-term trust und-type

mechanisms that could be drawn down based

on need rather than annual budget cycles.

These approaches would reduce the current

institutional incentives and negative eects o

spending too much too ast, while also

conveying a sense o long-term commitmentto Aghanistan.

3. Insucient attention has been paid to

the political economy o aid in

Aghanistan

Animportantconsequenceofthepressureto

spendtooquicklyhasbeeninadequate

consideration o incentive structures acing

policy makers, donors, implementers, and

communities.Evidencefromthisaswellasother studies indicates that the way in which aid

has been delivered has contributed to instability

through reinorcing uneven and oppressive

power relationships, avoring or being perceived

to avor one community or individual over

others, and providing a valuable resource or

actorstoghtover.Themostdestabilizing

aspect o the war-aid economy in Aghanistan,

however, has been its role in ueling corruption,whichdelegitimizesboththegovernmentand

the international community. Under the current

statusquoofweakinstitutionsandinsecurity,

some powerul actors are doing very well, and so

have little incentive to push or change.

Recommendations:

Investmoreinunderstandingthepolitical

economy o aid, including local confict

dynamics, the impact o the war-aid economy

on these dynamics, the perceived winners and

losers o aid programs, and the role o these

programsinlegitimizing(ordelegitimizing)

the government.

Givemoreattentiontounderstandingthe

incentive structures o national and

international civilian and military institutions

in terms o aid delivery, and the impact o

these incentive structures on the eectivedelivery o development assistance.

4. Insecurity rather than security is

rewarded

Becausetheprimaryobjectiveofpost-2001U.S.

aid to Aghanistan has not been development or

its own sake but rather the promotion o security

objectives,fundingforinsecureareashastaken

priority over secure areas. Thereore, the bulk oU.S. civilian and military development assistance

unds in Aghanistan have been spent in

insurgency-aected provinces in the south and

east. The last several years have seen an even

greaterprioritizationoftheinsecureareasdespite

the lack o evidence that the aid unds being

spent are promoting stabil ity or improving

attitudes towards the Aghan government and

the international community. The ndings rom

this study and other research suggest that aid is

more eectively spent in secure regions wheregood development practice and stronger



oversight is more easible, and less money has to

be spent on security. The research also suggests

that in areas where insecurity remained chronic

and governance structures broken, spending

resources(e.g.,forroadbuilding)risksfueling

corruption(bothperceivedandreal),inter-

communal strie, and competition among local

power-brokers. There is evidence that ininsecure areas local strongmen with militias that

werebeingpaidtoprovidesecurityrecognized

the need to perpetuate insecurity. The

prioritizationofinsecureoversecureareasisnot

surprisinglybeingbitterlycriticizedbyAfghans

living in more stable areas, who eel they are

beingpenalizedforbeingpeaceful.

Recommendation:

Reversethecurrentpolicyofrewardinginsecure

areas with extensive aid while eectively

penalizingsecureareaswhereaidmoneycould

be spent more eectively and accountably. Invest

in secure areas and, except or humanitarian

assistance, make aid in insecure areas more

contingent on security. While this study did not

specically examine the demonstration eect this

couldhave,itisquitepossiblethatproviding

incentives or communities to be peaceul would

be more eective than the current approach thatis perceived by many Aghans to be rewarding

insecurity.

5. Accountability and the measurement o

impact have been undervalued

Thepoliticalneedforquickimpactalongwith

institutional imperatives to spend money have in

many cases reduced the incentives or careul

evaluationofprojectimpact.Currentlyitisnotevenpossibletogetacompletelistoftheprojects

PRTs have implemented with the approximately

$2.64billioninCERPfundsappropriated

between 2004 and 2010, let alone an indication

ofwhattheimpacthasbeen.Thestudys

ndings have been reinorced by increasing

mediaandU.S.agencyreports(e.g.,Special

Inspector General or Aghanistan

Reconstruction[SIGAR],USAIDOceofthe

InspectorGeneral[OIG])onfundsthathave

beenwastefullyspentwithno(ornegative)impact.

In an environment with little reliable

quantitativedata,withnumerousindependent

variablesthatmakedeterminingcorrelation(not

tomentioncausality)virtuallyimpossible,and

where western-style public opinion polling

methodologies may not be reliable, the

determination o impact may oten have to be

moreartthanscience.Nevertheless,muchmoreocus should be given to trying to measure the

impactandconsequencesofaidprojectsthanhas

been done to date. Recent initiatives by SIGAR,

OIG,andstaattheSenateForeignRelations

Committee are positive, but they come late in

the game. In addition to the waste o taxpayer

resourcesandnegativeconsequencesonthe

ground, the discrediting oallprograms or

Aghanistan may be collateral damage i aid

resources are not spent in a more accountable

and eective manner.

Recommendation:

Reinforceatalllevelsthemessageandculture

o accountability. This is not a

recommendation to add several more

bureaucratic levels o cumbersome national

and international oversight mechanisms to

oversee inputs, but rather to invest more in

measuringoutcomes.Establishincentivestructuresforqualityworkandcareful

assessmentsofeectivenessandnotjustfor

spending money.

6. Development is a good in and o itsel

There is considerable evidence that development

assistance in Aghanistan during the past decade

has directly contributed to some very positive

development benets, including decreases ininant and maternal mortality, dramatic increases

in school enrollment rates or boys and girls, a

mediarevolution,majorimprovementsinroads

and inrastructure, and greater connectivity

throughtelecommunicationnetworks.One

consequenceofviewingaidresourcesrstand

foremostasastabilizationtooloraweapons

systemisthatthesemajordevelopmentgains

have oten been under-appreciated because they

did not translate into tangible security gains.

U.S. development assistance in Aghanistan hasbeenjustiedonthegroundsthatitispromoting



COIN/stabilizationobjectivesratherthan

developmentobjectives.Whileintheshortterm

this has led to much higher levels o development

assistance in Aghanistan, the ailure o these

resources to improve the security situation is

nowleadingmanypolicymakerstoquestionthe

value o development assistance despite some

very real development gains.

Recommendation:

Valuedevelopmentasagoodinandofitself.

Program development aid rst and oremost to

promotedevelopmentobjectives,wherethere

is evidence o impact and eectiveness, rather

thantopromotestabilizationandsecurity

objectives,wherethisresearchsuggeststhereis

little evidence o eectiveness.



1.1 Purpose, rationale, and description o

study

Political and national-security considerations

have always infuenced U.S. oreign assistance

policiesandpriorities.Since9/11,however,this

infuence has grown greatly, as development aid

forcountrieslikeAfghanistan,Iraq,andPakistan

has been increasingly and explicitly subsumed

under the national security agenda. The U.S. is

not alone in viewing development through a

security lens; other Western nations, including

manyoftheU.S.sNATOallies,have,to

varying extents, restructured their aid programs

to refect the prevailing oreign policy agenda o

confrontingglobalterrorism.Themajorimpact

this has had on development assistance has been

at the policy and practice levels. It is refected in

1. introdUction

changing aid strategies, priorities, and structures.

At the same time, a widely held assumption in

military and oreign policy circles is that

developmentassistanceisanimportantsoft

power1 tool to win consent and to promote

stabilizationandsecurityobjectives.

Counterinsurgency doctrine in particular

emphasizestheimportanceofhumanitarianand

reconstruction assistance, oten in the orm o

QuickImpactProjectsthatareintendedto

winheartsandminds.

Theassumptionthataidprojectsimprove

security has had a number o implications,

includingthesharpincreasesince9/11inthe

absolute amount o unding available rom both

U.S. and other Western donors or humanitarian

U.S. military on patrol, Helmand

U.S.MarineCorpsphotobyLanceC

pl.JohnM.McCall

1 ThetermsoftpowerwascoinedbyJosephNyeinthe1980storefertoanationsabilitytoinuencethepreferencesandbehaviorofothernationsnotthroughcoercion(hardpower),butthroughprojectionofattractivenationalvalues,levelsofprosperity,andopenness.SeeJosephNye,TheBenetsofSoftPower,Working Knowledge(HarvardBusinessSchool,August2,2004),://k..eu/e/4290..
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.htmlhttp://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.htmlhttp://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.htmlhttp://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.htmlhttp://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.htmlhttp://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.htmlhttp://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.htmlhttp://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.html



and development purposes2; the increased

percentage o assistance that is programmed

based on strategic security considerations rather

than on the basis o poverty and need; and the

much greater role or the military or combined

civil-military teams in activities that were

traditionally the preserve o humanitarian and

developmentorganizations.Thisassumptionishavingamajorpolicyimpactonhow

development assistance is allocated and spent,

and provides an important rationale or the

growingsecuritizationofdevelopment

assistance.3Ontheonehand,militaryforces

have become increasingly involved in what

would previously have been seen as the work o

civilian humanitarian and development agencies.

Ontheotherhand,civilianagencies,including

non-governmentalorganizations,havebeen

increasingly enl isted in aid and development

projectsthatareseenashavingstabilization

objectives.Theassumptionhasbeenformalized

inthecomprehensive,wholeofgovernment,

and3D(diplomacy,defense,development)

approaches.(SeeSection2andAnnexA.)

Despite how widespread the assumption is,

anddespiteitsmajorimpactonaidand

counterinsurgency policies, there is l ittle

empirical evidence that supports the assumptionthat reconstruction assistance is an eective tool

towinheartsandmindsandimprovesecurity

or increase stability in counterinsurgency

contexts. To help address this lack o evidence,

theFeinsteinInternationalCenter(FIC)atTufts

University conducted a comparative study in

AfghanistanandtheHornofAfricatoexamine

theeectivenessofaidprojectsinpromoting

securityobjectivesinstabilizationand

counterinsurgency contexts.4

Aghanistan provided an opportunity to examine

one o the most concerted recent eorts to use

heartsandmindsprojectstoachievesecurity

objectives,especiallyasithasbeenthetesting

ground or new approaches to usingreconstruction assistance to promote stability,

whichinsomecases(e.g.,Provincial

ReconstructionTeams)werethenexportedto

Iraq.Whileotherstudieshavelookedatthe

eectiveness o aid in promoting humanitarian

anddevelopmentobjectivesaswellastheethical

and philosophical issues related to merging

humanitarianandsecurityobjectives,

surprisingly little eort has been given to

analyzingtheeectivenessofaidinpromoting

politicalandsecurityobjectives.Giventhata

signicant percentage o U.S. oreign aid is now

programmed(bothexplicitlyandimplicitly)to

achievesecurityobjectives,theneedto

determine the eectiveness o this use o

development assistance is real.5

Whileaidprojectsarenotalldesignedwith

stabilizationobjectivesinmind,thestudydidnot

distinguish between military and non-military aid,

although in some cases it ocused more on military-linkedaid.Whileprojectsthathadanexplicit

stabilizationfocusmighthavebeenofspecial

interest, the broad point is that aid in general is

assumed to promote stability. Also, while the U.S.

is the largest donor and has increased its aid

spending by the largest percentage post-2001, the

study did not intend to be primarily U.S.-ocused;

thereore, it looked at all aid.

2

AccordingtoCenterforGlobalDevelopmentstatistics,between2001and2009U.S.ocialdevelopmentassistancemorethandoubledinrealterms,whileDonorAssistanceCommitteecountriesassistanceincreasedbymorethanhalf.SeeNetAidTransfersdataset(19602009),://.ge.g/e/u/e/5492.

3 TheterminologyofthesecuritizationofaidandmuchofitsintellectualunderpinninghasbeenprovidedbyProfessorMarkDueld,who uses it to describe the important role o development aid to support a new system o global governance that helps protect westernsecurityinterests.Ratherthanbeingprimarilyabouthelpingthepoorthroughalleviatingpovertyandpromotingdevelopment,DueldarguesthataidisincreasinglybeingusedasagovernanceandsecuritytooltohelpstabilizeandgovernunstableandborderlandregionssothattheydonotthreatentheWestswayoflife.See,forexample,MarkDueld,GoverningtheBorderlands:DecodingthePowerofAid,Disasters,Volume25,Issue4,(December2001),pp.308-320;MarkDueld,Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging oDevelopment and Security,(London:ZedBooks,2001);andMarkDueld,Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World oPeoples,(Cambridge:PolityPress,2007).

4 ThispaperfocusesonthendingsfromAfghanistan.ForinformationonndingsfromtheHornofAfrica,see://k.u.u.eu/fuee/ge/ege.?gei=34807224. For inormation on the overall aid and security research program, see://k.u.u.eu/fuee/ge/ege.?gei=19270958.

5 AMarch2010conferenceco-sponsoredbyFeinsteinInternationalCenterontheuseofdevelopmentaidinCOINoperationsin

Afghanistannotedthatakeythemeisthecriticallackofmonitoring,evaluation,andempiricaldataavailabletoassesstheimpactofaidonstabilityinAfghanistan,especiallygiventheotherwisestrongtraditionsofrobustafter-actionreviewsbythemilitary.SeeWiltonPark,WinningHeartsandMindsInAfghanistan:AssessingtheEectivenessofDevelopmentAidinCOINOperations,ReportonWiltonParkConference1022,heldMarch1114,2010(July22,2010).://.k.g.uk/eue/e//22290903/22291297/1022-e.
http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/5492http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/5492http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/5492https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=34807224https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=34807224https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=34807224https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=34807224https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=19270958https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=19270958https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=19270958https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=19270958http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/resources/en/pdf/22290903/22291297/wp1022-reporthttp://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/resources/en/pdf/22290903/22291297/wp1022-reporthttp://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/resources/en/pdf/22290903/22291297/wp1022-reporthttp://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/resources/en/pdf/22290903/22291297/wp1022-reporthttp://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/resources/en/pdf/22290903/22291297/wp1022-reporthttp://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/resources/en/pdf/22290903/22291297/wp1022-reporthttps://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=19270958https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=19270958https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=34807224https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=34807224http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/5492



Ater presenting the study methodology below,

the paper continues in Section 2 with a

discussion o the evolution o security-driven aid

and the eects on current practice. Section 3

describes the ve provinces included in the study

andhowdierentmodelsofsecuritized

development have been used in each o them.

Sections 4 and 5 present the views obtained inthe eld on the causes o insecurity and the

characteristicsofaidprojects.Section6discusses

theeectivenessofaidinstabilizationin

Afghanistan,andSection7summarizesthe

studysconclusionsandpolicyimplications.More

detailed inormation on the research

methodology and related issues is contained in

Annex A.

1.2 Methodology

Research was conducted in the ve provinces o

Balkh,Faryab,Helmand,Paktia,andUruzgan,

aswellasinKabulcity.Intheseprovinces,asin

nearlyallofAfghanistansthirty-fourprovinces,

international civilian and military actors are

using humanitarian, reconstruction, and

development aid to promote greater stability and

security. The notable dierences among the ve

provinces provided the opportunity to examine

the development-security nexus in very dierentcontexts.BalkhandFaryabProvincesinthe

northweremuchmoresecurethanHelmand,

Uruzgan,andPaktiaProvincesinthesouthand

southeast where the Taliban-led insurgency was

more active. In the two northern provinces,

Pashtuns are a minority ethnic group, whereas in

the south and southeast they make up the

overwhelmingmajority.Anothersignicant

dierence was the variations in approach,

budgetary resources, and character o thedierentNATO/ISAF(InternationalSecurity

AssistanceForce)nationsheadingtheProvincial

ReconstructionTeams(PRTs)ineach

provincewithperhapsthemajordierencefor

the purposes o this study being the much greater

nancial resources available to U.S.-led PRTs.

The study teams used a relatively consistent

methodology in our o the ve provincial study

areas(Helmandbeingtheexception),bearingin

mind that the varied security and otherconditionsallowedorrequiredapproaches

tailoredtodierentareas.Qualitativeinterviews

with Aghan and international respondents in

the eld provided the primary data source.

Interviews were conducted during multiple

visits to the provinces between June 2008 and

February 2010. In the our provinces as well as

inKabul,atotalof574respondents(340

Afghan,234international)wereinterviewed

either individually or in ocus groups at theprovincial, district, and community levels.

Separate semi-structured interview guides were

used or key inormant and community-level

interviews. Respondents included current and

formergovernmentocials,donors,diplomats,

internationalmilitaryocials,PRTmilitary

andciviliansta,UNandaidagencysta,

tribalandreligiousleaders,journalists,traders

and businessmen, and community members. In

Helmand,themethodologyconsistedof

analyzingqualitativedatafromfocusgroups

conducted in February-March 2008,

quantitativedatatakenfrompollingdatadrawn

fromcommunitiesinNovember2007and

provided by the PRT, and interviews with key

informants(e.g.,PRTsta,Afghangovernment

ocials).MostoftheinterviewswithAfghans

were conducted in Dari or Pashtu, although

somewithseniorgovernmentandNGO

ocialswereconductedinEnglish.Thetwo

international researchers leading the eldresearchinBalkhandFaryabProvinceswere

excellent Dari speakers and could directly

interview Aghan respondents. Aghan research

assistants helped in setting up and conducting

interviews, as well as in note taking and

analysis.Elsewhere,researchassistantsor

translators assisted researchers in translating

Dari and Pashtu. In al l provinces, secondary

sources were drawn upon or historical

informationandbackgroundtoaidprojects.TheBalkh,Faryab,andUruzgancasestudies

beneted rom background historical and

political overviews written by leading analysts

o these provinces.

Any research in Aghanistan or other confict

areasrequirescautionbecauseofthepotential

or respondent bias. This is par ticularly the case

or research that looks at the types o sensitive

issuesraisedinthisstudyorincludesquestions

that relate to deeply held social norms. Tomitigate these potential biases, the methodology

included repeat visits to allow ollow-up to and



triangulation o responses, fexible interview

guides that encouraged spontaneous responses

within specic themes, and the elding o

teams with extensive local experience.

The study relied primarily on the stated

perceptions o the wide range o respondents

mentioned above. Where relevant, thediscussion dierentiates the perspectives o

dierent types o actors. The researchers

acknowledge the need or caution when basing

ndings on the stated perceptions o

respondents,asrespondentsstatementsmaynot

always accurately refect their perceptions and,

in addition, may not match behavior. The study

also did not aim to measure causality, as this

was simply too ambitious in an environment

with so many conounding variables. Stil l,

becauseaidprojectsexplicitlyaimtochange

attitudes,perceptions(ifcapturedaccurately)

are relevant. Moreover, however imperect, the

research team believed that in the Aghan

contextthequalitativedatagatheredinin-

depth interviews provided a better data source

and gauge o perceptions than most data

collectedusingquantitativemethodologies,

such as public opinion polling.

Since the eld research was completed in early2010, a number o the issues raised by the

ndings have been acknowledged by the U.S.

and by ISAF, and some measures have been

taken to mitigate them, as discussed in the text.

Security conditions have also changed

somewhat.WhileBalkhandFaryabarestill

relatively secure, insecurity has widened in the

north in general, and in the troubled districts in

theprovincesofBalkhandFaryabinparticular.

Ontheotherhand,securityinareasofHelmandhasimprovedsincethetimeofthe

research.Nevertheless,basedonmorerecent

visits and discussions as well as the analysis o

others,theresearchersfeelthatthebroad

conclusions and concerns remain valid and very

policy-relevant.

Additional inormation on the research

methodology and related issues is contained in

Annex A.

1.3 Similar and related research in

Aghanistan

A number o other studies and evaluationsexamining the eect o development activities

on security have been conducted in Aghanistan

atthesametimeorlaterthanthisone.Oneof

the most comprehensive, conducted by Christo

Zrcher,JanKoehler,andJanBhnkein

northeasternTakharandKunduzProvinces

between 2005 and 2009, concluded that

communities that already elt more secure were

more likely to eel positively about aid, and that

anypositiveeectsofaidonthepopulations

attitudetowardsthestateareshort-termand

non-cumulative.6 Similarly, research

conducted in 2009 by Sarah Ladbury in

Kandahar,Wardak,andKabulProvincesfound

thatyoungmenjoinedtheinsurgencyfora

complex combination o reasons, some personal

and some related to broader grievances against

the government and oreign orces.

Developmentprojectswereseenasbeingtoo

small to have any impact, and as unemployment

(orunderemployment)wasonefactorleadingtomobilization,respondentsexpressedthedesire

forprojectsthatcreatedemployment.Thepoor

qualityofaiddeliverysuggestedthatmore

attention be paid to how services are delivered.7

Aquantitativestudydonewiththesupportof

the U.S. Army using district-level data or the

200210periodfoundthatwhileprojectscan

aect the number o security incidents in a

district, in most cases their infuence is so small

astonotjustifyusingthemasaconict-mitigation tool.8 Finally, a report prepared in

June 2011 or the use o the U.S. Senate Foreign

Relations Committee concluded, ater

examining the evidence rom several studies

(includingthepresentoneandthosementioned

above),thattheevidencethatstabilization

6 J.Bhnke,J.KoehlerandC.Zrcher,AssessingtheImpactofDevelopmentCooperationinNorthEastAfghanistan20052009:FinalReport,Evaluation Reports 049(Bonn:BundesministeriumfrwirtschaftlicheZusammenarbeitundEntwicklung,2010).

7

SarahLadbury,incollaborationwithCooperationforPeaceandUnity(CPAU),TestingHypothesesonRadicalisationinAfghanistan:WhyDoMenJointheTalibanandHizb-iIslami?HowMuchDoLocalCommunitiesSupportThem?IndependentReportfortheDepartmentofInternationalDevelopment(August2009).

8 SchaunWheelerandDanielStolkowski,DevelopmentasCounterinsurgencyinAfghanistan,Unpublishedmanuscript(DraftdatedJune17,2011).


20/92



The role o militaries in delivering aid andreconstruction is not a new phenomenon. What

has changed, especially since 2001, is the scale o

the involvement and the purposes underpinning

it.AccordingtotheOrganizationforEconomic

Co-operationandDevelopment(OECD),

between2002and2005,USAIDsshareofU.S.

ocialdevelopmentassistance(ODA)decreased

rom 50 to 39 percent, while the share o the

DepartmentofDefense(DOD)increasedfrom6

to 22 percent.12

WhilemorerecentOECDdatanowshowDODsglobalshareofU.S.ODAto

be shrinking, it still plays a dominant role in

Afghanistan.Between2002and2010,nearly$38

billionwasappropriatedtostabilizeand

strengthen the Aghan economic, social,

political, and security environment so as to bluntpopular support or extremist orces in the

region.13 Roughly hal o this has gone to

trainingandequippingtheAfghanNational

SecurityForces(ANSF),whilealittleover

one-third has gone to economic, social, political,

andhumanitarianeorts.Ofthetotalamount,

nearly two-thirds has been allocated to the

DOD,withUSAIDandtheDepartmentofState

receivinglesseramounts.Onespecicindicator

o the importance o security-driven aid is thedramaticgrowthoftheCommanders

EmergencyResponseProgram(CERP)14

fundinginAfghanistan,fromzeroin2003to

$1.2billionin2010(Figure1).

2. EvolUtion o sEcUrity-drivEn aid11

11 The authors would like to acknowledge the very substantive contribution o Dr. Stuart Gordon to this section.

12 OECD,DACPeerReview:MainFindingsandRecommendations,ReviewoftheDevelopmentCo-operationPoliciesandProgrammesofUnitedStates(2006),://.e.g/ue/27/0,2340,e_2649_34603_37829787_1_1_1_1,00..

13

CurtTarno,Afghanistan:U.S.ForeignAssistance(CongressionalResearchService,August12,2010).14 CERPisaU.S.militaryprogramwhichprovidesdiscretionaryfundsforPRTcommanderstoexecutelocalsmall-scalereliefand

reconstructionprojects.Projectsareintendedtobuildgoodwill,trust,andcondencebetweenthelocalpopulationandtheinternationalmilitary, thereby increasing the fow o intelligence and turning the population against the insurgents and other anti-government groups.CERPisdiscussedfurtherbelowandinBox2.

U.S. military inspecting school construction, Helmand

PhotobyCpl.JeffDrew
https://www.oecd.org/document/27/0,2340,en_2649_34603_37829787_1_1_1_1,00.htmlhttps://www.oecd.org/document/27/0,2340,en_2649_34603_37829787_1_1_1_1,00.htmlhttps://www.oecd.org/document/27/0,2340,en_2649_34603_37829787_1_1_1_1,00.htmlhttps://www.oecd.org/document/27/0,2340,en_2649_34603_37829787_1_1_1_1,00.html



The contemporary origins o military

involvement in delivering assistance lie in the

AlliedpreparationsfortheinvasionsofNorth

AfricaandWesternEuropeinthecourseof

WorldWarII.However,itisperhapsmore

strongly associated with the Cold War

counterinsurgency campaigns o the 1950s

throughthe1970s,principallytheBritish

experiencesinMalaya,Oman,andAden

(Yemen),andtheU.S.experienceinVietnam.Thephraseheartsandmindsisusually

associated with Field Marshal Sir Gerald

Templer,15 and his ultimately successul conduct

oftheBritish-ledcounterinsurgencycampaign

inMalaya(194860).SincetheMalayan

Emergency,thephrasehasoftenbeenusedasa

formofshorthandfortheoverallBritish

approachtocounter-insurgency:emphasizing

winningtheheartsandmindsofthe

population through securing the support o thepeople.TheapproachshapedBritishstrategy

both in Malaya and in dealing with the Mau

MaurebellioninKenya.Inthe1970s,itwas

inuentialinNorthernIreland.Thekernelof

thestrategywastoestablishsecurezones,use

minimum orce, apply development, and address

political grievances that underlay the rebellions

all in order to turn the population against the

insurgents. At the same time, outside o the

secure areas, the strategy was to implement

military measures designed to infict attrition on

the military component o the insurgency. This

approach has been contrasted with tactics that

stress more conventional military means, are less

ocused on developing the support o thepopulation, and are less concerned with avoiding

civilian casualties.

The U.S. experience began as Civil Aairs in

WorldWarIIbuthasechoedtheBritishpathin

its association with counter-revolutionary warare,

particularly in programs such as the Civil

OperationsandRevolutionaryDevelopment

SupportProgram(orCORDS)duringthe

VietnamWar.Thesecounter-insurgency

approaches tended to bring together eorts to

separate the population rom the insurgents while

providing a variety o reconstruction programs to

win over the sympathy o the population. The

phraseheartsandmindswasalsoassociated

with the U.S. military and strategies adopted to

containthecommunistinsurgencyinVietnam.

PresidentLyndonB.JohnsonisquotedinMay

1965 when he argued that U.S. victory would be

builtontheheartsandmindsofthepeoplewho

actuallyliveoutthere.Byhelpingtobringthemhope and electricity you are also striking a very

important blow or the cause o reedom

throughouttheworld.16 This approach shaped

both U.S. strategy and rhetoric on the war in

Indo-China and led to eorts to coordinate

development and security approaches that would

counter communist propaganda and isolate the

insurgents rom the people. Under Johnson the

U.S.committeditselftopacicationofSouth

Vietnambyprovidingbothsecurityanddevelopmentsupport.U.S.ocials,bothcivilian

andmilitary,wouldprovideadviceandresources

foreconomicdevelopmentprojects,suchas

rebuilding roads and bridges, while the military

wouldtrainandequipSouthVietnamspoliceand

paramilitarygroupstohuntdowninsurgents.17

Figure 1

Source: Special Inspector General or Aghanistan Reconstruction,

Quarterly Report to the U.S. Congress (April 30, 2011),

1423.

15 John Cloake, Templer: Tiger o Malaya: The Lie o Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer(London:Harrap,1985).Footnote1statesthatTempler

rst used the term on April 26, 1952.16 LyndonB.JohnsonquotedinFrancisNjubiNesbitt,HeartsandMindsandEmpire.Foreign Policy in Focus(March20,2009),://

..g/e/e____ee.

17 Ibid.
http://www.fpif.org/articles/hearts_and_minds_and_empirehttp://www.fpif.org/articles/hearts_and_minds_and_empirehttp://www.fpif.org/articles/hearts_and_minds_and_empire



2.1 Current approaches

Recognition that the causes o instability are

complex has driven the ormulation o the various

models,suchasthecomprehensiveapproach,

3D(defense,diplomacy,development),whole

ofgovernment,andintegratedapproach.

These trends are discernible in a range ointernationalorganizations(particularlytheEU

andNATO)aswellasbetweenandwithin

ministries in individual states. For example, in

2004,theUKgovernmentestablishedaPost-

ConictReconstructionUnit(renamedthe

StabilisationUnitin2007),jointlyownedbythe

MinistryofDefense(MOD),Foreignand

CommonwealthOce(FCO)andDepartment

forInternationalDevelopment(DFID);in2004,

the U.S. Congress appropriated unds or the U.S.

StateDepartmenttoestablishtheOceofthe

CoordinatorforReconstructionandStabilization

(S/CRS);andin2005,theCanadiangovernment

established the Stabilisation and Reconstruction

TaskForce(START)withinitsDepartmentof

Foreign Aairs and International Trade.

The various models are all derived rom the

sense that the origins o confict are largely

socio-economic in nature, and that state ailure

isaconsequenceofthebreakdownofpublicservice delivery. Militaries have been attracted

to comprehensive or integrative approaches or

a variety o reasons related both to theories o

confict causation and resolution and to the

necessityforsoftpowertocontributeto

forceprotection.18 In terms o theories about

what causes conficts and how they are resolved,

conictisfrequentlyportrayedasaproductof

low levels o development as well as political

andsocialmarginalization.Inthecourseofaninternational military intervention, it is oten

assumed that tactical military progress cannot

be consolidated or translated into strategic

success, and viable states cannot be built,

without the host government constructing

legitimacy through the provision o public

services. In terms o orce protection, the

theory is that when an international military

forceprovidesinfrastructureandfacilities

(suchaspublichealthclinics,wells,andschools)

the population will be encouraged into

collaborative relationships with the

international militaryreducing opportunitiesor insurgents and providing intell igence to the

counter-insurgent orces.

TheU.S.DODhasmadeconsiderableeortsto

developthecapacitiesforstabilityoperations 19

and to link these with the work o the

Department o State and USAIDthe result is

an approach to security that makes a

undamental break with the past. The principal

change has been a reorientation to meet a

dierent perceived threat. The 2002 U.S.

NationalSecurityStrategystatedthattheU.S.

isnowthreatenedlessbyconqueringstates

thanwearebyfailingones.ThenSecretaryof

Deense, Robert M. Gates, argued that even the

emphasis on regime change that dominated

between 2001 and 2003 had changed:

Repeating an Aghanistan or an Iraqorced

regime change ollowed by nation-building under

reprobably is unlikely in the oreseeableuture. What is likely though, even a certainty, is

the need to work with and through local

governments to avoid the next insurgency, to

rescue the next ailing state, or to head o the

next humanitarian disaster.

Correspondingly, the overall posture and thinking

o the United States armed orces has shited

away rom solely ocusing on direct American

military action, and towards new capabilities toshape the security environment in ways that obviate

the need or military intervention in the uture.20

In2005theDODissuedDODDirective

3000.05(2005),emphasizingtheimportance

18 Force protection consists o preventive measures intended to reduce hostile actions against military personnel, resources, acilities, andinormation.

19 DODdenesstabilityoperationsasAnoverarchingtermencompassingvariousmilitarymissions,tasks,andactivitiesconductedoutside

the United States in coordination with other instruments o national power to maintain or reestablish a sae and secure environment,provideessentialgovernmentalservices,emergencyinfrastructurereconstruction,andhumanitarianrelief.SeeHeadquartersDepartmentoftheArmy,StabilityOperations,FM3-07(December2008),Glossary,p.9.

20 RobertM.Gates.(U.S.SecretaryofDefense)U.S.GlobalLeadershipCampaign.SpeechgivenonJuly15,2008attheU.S.GlobalLeadershipCampaign(Washington,DC).://.eeek./eee/ee.?ee=1262.
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1262http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1262http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1262http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1262http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1262



o stability operations as

a core U.S. military mission that the Department o

Deense shall be prepared to conduct and support.

They shall be given priority comparable to combat

operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated

across all DOD activities including doctrine,

organizations, training, education, exercises,materiel, leadership, personnel, acilities, and

planning.21

Thedirectiveemphasizedthatstability

operations were likely to be more important to

the lasting success o military operations than

traditionalcombatoperationsandelevated

stabilityoperationstoastatusequaltothatofthe

oenseanddefense.22 This represented a

signicantreorientationoftheU.S.militarys

traditionalfocusonwarghting.

More recently, this emphasis on the identication

o instability in other states as a threat to U.S.

interestswasreectedinboththe2008National

DefenseStrategyandthe2010Quadrennial

DefenseReview(QDR),whichnotedthat

preventingconict,stabilizingcrises,and

building security sector capacity are essential

elementsofAmericasnationalsecurity

approach.23 Understandably, this thinking hasplayed an important role in driving orce

preparationswithintheDOD,strengtheningthe

signicance o stability operations and

broadening the range o competencies that

wouldberequiredinafutureU.S.military.

The changing emphasis in the U.S. is also

consistentwiththechangingnatureofUN

peacekeeping missions, increasingly

characterizedbycomplexmandatesspanning

immediatestabilizationandprotectionof

civilians to supporting humanitarian assistance,

organizingelections,assistingthedevelopment

o new political structures, engaging in security

sectorreform,disarming,demobilizingand

reintegrating ormer combatants and laying thefoundationsofalastingpeace. 24 This integration

o diplomatic, human rights, military, and

development responses has been driven primarily

bytherequirementtoeectivelyconsolidate

ragile peace agreements and make the delicate

transition rom war to a lasting peace25the

fragi lityofpeaceoftenbeingascribedtoalack

o strategic, coordinated and sustained

internationaleorts.26 A signicant amount o

literaturedocumentstheincreasingsizeand

complexity o, particularly, the civilian

components o peace missions27(arguably

beginningwiththedeploymentoftheUNTAG

missioninNamibiain1989 28)andthe

diversication and growing importance o

non-militarytaskswithinUNmandates.Even

wheretheUNhasdeployedsolelycivilian

missions, their proximity and relationship to

military, peace-building, or state-building

missions in support o a government authority

has raised the same issue or some critics: theassociation o humanitarian and development

responses with one o the belligerents

underminestheUNsindependenceand

neutrality.

Despitethelackofevidencethatheartsand

mindsactivitiescangenerateattitudeor

behavior change, these broader strategic trends

21 DOD,Directive3000.05:MilitarySupportforStability,Security,Transition,andReconstruction(SSTR)Operations(November28,2005).p.2.Asnotedonthenextpage,thedirectivealsoclariesthatDODseesitsroleinU.S.governmentplansforSSTRaspartofinteragency partnerships.

22 FM3-07,StabilityOperations,p.vi.

23 LaurenPloch,AfricaCommand:U.S.StrategicInterestsandtheRoleoftheU.S.MilitaryinAfrica(CongressionalResearchService,July22,2011),://e./ue/rl34003/

24 EspenBarthEide,AnjaThereseKaspersen,RandolphKent,andKarenvonHippel,ReportonIntegratedMissions:PracticalPerspectivesandRecommendations,IndependentStudyfortheExpandedUNECHACoreGroup(May2005),p.3.

25 InLargerFreedom:TowardsDevelopment,SecurityandHumanRightsforAll,A/59/2005(March21,2005),paragraph114.

26 Eideetal.,ReportonIntegratedMissions,p.3.

27 Formoreonthechangingnatureofpeaceoperations,seeBruceJonesandFeryalCherif,EvolvingModelsofPeacekeeping:Policy

ImplicationsandResponses,(CenteronInternationalCooperation,NYU,September2003),://.eekeegee.u.g/.

28 TheUnitedNationsTransitionAssistanceGroup(UNTAG)wasaUNpeacekeepingforcedeployedinApril1989withaverybroadmissioninthetransitionfromthenSouth-WestAfricatoanindependentNamibia.See,UnitedNations,NamibiaUNTAGBackground(undated),://.u.g/e/eekeeg///ugt..
http://opencrs.com/document/RL34003/http://opencrs.com/document/RL34003/http://opencrs.com/document/RL34003/http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untagFT.htmhttp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untagFT.htmhttp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untagFT.htmhttp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untagFT.htmhttp://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/http://opencrs.com/document/RL34003/



and the hearts and minds approach have had a

dramatic impact on doctrine and tactics related

tostabilizationandontheorganizationofthe

U.S. military. Department o Deense Directive

(DODD)3000.05denedthebroadobjectives

o stability operations, stating that their

immediategoalwastoprovidethelocal

populace with security, restore essential services,

and meet humanitarian needs. Long-term goals

that refect transormation and oster

sustainability eorts include developing host-

nation capacity or securing essential services, a

viable market economy, rule o law, legitimate

and eective institutions, and a robust civil

society.29TheU.S.Armysmanual,Tactics inCounterinsurgency,statesthatatitshearta

counterinsurgency is an armed struggle or the

supportofthepopulation.30 This population-

centric view o confict is rooted in the

assumption that conditions such as poverty,

unemployment, illiteracy, and unmet aspirations

are the uels that drive insurgencies and that the

remedy is humanitarian, reconstruction, and

development assistance. The idea underpinning

theseperspectivesisthatproject-basedassistance,

includingsmall-scaleQuickImpactProjects,

cancapturetheheartsandmindsof

beneciary populations and lead to both a

change o attitude towards the government and

increasing co-operation with the international

military. The latter is most likely to be seen in

terms o intelligence sharinge.g., identiying

improvisedexplosivedevices(IEDs)orproviding

inormation on insurgentsa key component in

protectingonesownforces.Thedeteriorating

security situation in parts o Aghanistan, which

orced many traditional humanitarian anddevelopmentorganizationstosuspendactivities

and withdraw sta, also contributed to the

growing role o the military and PRTs in

directly supporting reconstruction and

development activities as they elt compelled to

step into the void.31

U.S. military and construction, Helmand

PhotobyCpl.AndrewCarlson

29 FM3-07,StabilityOperations,p.1-1530 U.S. Department o the Army, Tactics in Counterinsurgency,FM3-24.2(April2009),p.ix.

31 StewartPatrickandKaysieBrown,ThePentagonandGlobalDevelopment:MakingSenseoftheDODsExpandingRole,WorkingPaper Number 131(November2007).



The need to develop interagency partnerships

has been a recurring theme across recent U.S.

security policy.32 In the preace to FM 3-07

StabilityOperations,LieutenantGeneral

Caldwell, argues that at the heart o the program

toenhancestabilityoperationsisa

comprehensive approach . . . that integrates the

tools o statecrat with our military orces,international partners, humanitarian

organizations,andtheprivatesector. 33 The sum

ofthesechangesisanorganizational

reconguration around a military capable o

intervening in ragile states and having the

potential to assume responsibility or a range o

tasks that had traditionally been delivered by

government civilian agencies and development

andhumanitarianorganizations.Whilethis

guidancerecognizedthatmanystability

operations tasks are best perormed by

indigenous, oreign, or U.S. civilian

professionals,itsituatedthemilitary

stabilizationresponsewithinabroaderwholeof

government34 approach, but made clear that

U.S.militaryforcesshallbepreparedto

perorm all tasks necessary to establish or

maintainorderwhencivilianscannotdoso.

Ocially,U.S.developmentagencieshave

embraced this relationship. According to USAIDAdministratorRajivShah,inthemostvolatile

regions o Aghanistan, USAID works side-by-

side with the military, playing a critical role in

stabilizingdistricts,buildingresponsivelocal

governance, improving the lives o ordinary

Aghans, andultimatelyhelping to pave the

wayforAmericantroopstoreturnhome. 35

Whilepolicyhasreferredtopartnershipsand

integration o military and civilian agencies, the

militarysrelationshipwiththecivilianbrancheso government and the external humanitarian

communityisunlikelytobeanequalone.A

U.S. military with signicantly more nancial,

personnel, and material resources, and ar

greater reach than either USAID or the State

Department,inevitablymakesthemilitarysrole

strong and potentially dominant.

WhiletheAfghanandIraqifundingsurgesareclearlyonlytemporary,DODsapproachto

stabilization,andthesignicantroleofthe

militaryindeliveringODA,islikelytoendure.36

SomearguethattheDODsexpandedassistance

authoritiesthreatentodisplaceorovershadow

broader U.S. oreign policy and development

objectivesintargetcountriesandexacerbatethe

longstanding imbalance between the military

and civilian components o the U.S. approach to

state-building.37

The ocus on integrated and comprehensive

approaches to secure the support o the

population has led humanitarian and

developmentactorstocriticizebothstabilization

and counterinsurgency doctrines or leaving little

room or the undamental humanitarian

principles o independence, impartiality, and

neutrality. Assistance is increasingly

instrumentalizedbehindsecurityandpolitical

objectives.PatrickandBrownarguethatthesetrends are potentially damaging and raise

concernsthatU.S.foreignanddevelopment

policies may become subordinated to a narrow,

short-term security agenda at the expense o

broader, longer-term diplomatic goals and

institution-building eorts in the developing

world.38

Many aid practitioners and agencies are

concernedbytheincreasedpoliticizationandsecuritizationofaidbecausethisviolates

32 As eatured in the National Military Strategy, the National Deense Strategy,andthe2010QDR:DOD,The Quadrennial Deense ReviewReport(February2010),p.73.TheFY2011DefenseBudgetRequestisavailableat://.eeek./e/uge..

33 LieutenantGeneralandformerCommanderoftheU.S.ArmyCombinedArmsCenter,WilliamH.Caldwell,asquotedintheprefacetoFM3-07StabilityOperations.

34 DODdeneswholeofgovernmentasanapproachthatintegratesthecollaborativeeortsofthedepartmentsandagenciesoftheUnitedStatesGovernmenttoachieveunityofeorttowardasharedgoal.SeeFM3-07,StabilityOperations,Glossary,p.10.

35 CitedinScottDempsey,IsSpendingtheStrategy? Small Wars Journal(May4,2011),p.2.://u.///-eg-e-eg.

36 Somerespondentsforthisstudyquestionedwhetherthisexpandedrolehasbeenacceptedwholeheartedlyasbeingofequalstatusbythemilitary, or whether there will be resistance and reconsideration in light o experience in Aghanistan and elsewhere.

37 Scott Dempsey.

38 StewartPatrickandKaysieBrown.
http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/budget.htmlhttp://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/budget.htmlhttp://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/budget.htmlhttp://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/budget.htmlhttp://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/budget.htmlhttp://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/is-spending-the-strategyhttp://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/is-spending-the-strategyhttp://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/is-spending-the-strategyhttp://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/is-spending-the-strategyhttp://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/is-spending-the-strategyhttp://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/is-spending-the-strategyhttp://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/is-spending-the-strategyhttp://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/is-spending-the-strategyhttp://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/is-spending-the-strategyhttp://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/budget.html



undamental humanitarian principles, and several

interviewed or this study expressed concern

aboutthenegativeconsequencesforcivilianaidworkersoftheblurringoflinesthatresulted

rom the direct role o the military in the

delivery o humanitarian and development

assistance.However,fewquestionedthe

undamental assumption o a causal relationship

between aid and security. In act, some aid

workers seemed to believe more strongly in this

relationship than military respondents, and were

very supportive o using aid to promote confict

resolution,stabilizationandpeacebuilding

objectivesaslongasthiswasdonebycivilian

rather than military agencies and personnel. The

objectiveofthisstudy,however,wasnotto

examine whether humanitarian principles were

beingviolated,ortheimpactofthesecuritization

o aid on humanitarian actors, but rather toexaminethefundamentalquestionis

development assistance eective in promoting

stabilizationandsecurityobjectives?

School, Balkh

PhotobyPaulFishstein



3.1 Provincial background

Thevestudyprovinces(seemaponpagevii)

were selected in part due to their varied

characteristics, and in part due to morepragmatic considerations o local contacts, donor

interest, and logistical support. The three

southernandeasternprovinces(Helmand,

Uruzgan,Paktia)wereselectedduetotheir

insecurity and because o the dierent aid

approachestakenineach(seeSection3.2).The

twonorthernprovinces(Balkh,Faryab)were

selected due to their relative security; they

provide a counterpoint to the less-secure

provinces by illustrating the response to aid in amore-secure environment. In 2007, the ve

provinces collectively accounted or 27 percent

o government and donor assistance. Unlike

Helmand,Uruzgan,andPaktia,Balkhand

Faryabarenon-Pashtun-majorityprovinces.

Beyondthat,eachoftheveprovinceshasits

own varied history, geography, economy, andpolitics.

HelmandProvinceliesinsouthwestern

Afghanistan,borderingPakistansBalochistan

Provincetothesouth.Nearly95percentofthe

population is Pashtun, living alongside small

numbersoftheTajiks,Hazaras,Uzbeks,Baluch,

andSikhswhoweresettledinthe1960saspart

ofthemajorHelmand-ArghandabValley

irrigation scheme. The dislocations o the lastthirty years are seen as having resulted in many

unsettlingsocialandpoliticalchanges.Helmand

3. aid and sEcUrity in aGhanistan

National ring road in Faryab

PhotobyGeertGompelman



produces a variety o eld and horticultural

crops, but has become synonymous with opium

production and trade. The provincial center is

Lashkar Gah.

UruzganProvinceliesinsouth-central

Afghanistan,borderingKandaharandHelmand

Provinces to the south and southwest,respectively. Approximately 90 percent o the

population is Pashtun, with much o the ormer

Hazarapopulationhavingbeenseparatedinto

thenewprovinceofDaiKundiin2004. 39

Uruzganhashistoricallybeenremote,poor,

conservative, and violent, even by Aghan

standards.Politicallyandtribally,Uruzganispart

ofgreaterKandahar,andisalsotheoriginof

manyoftheTalibansoriginalleaders,including

MullahMohammadOmar,whowasbornin

DehRawoodDistrict.AsinHelmand,tribal

structure is generally considered much less

cohesive and more ragmented than in the east

and southeast o the country. The provincial

centerisTarinKot.

Paktia Province lies in southeastern Aghanistan,

borderingPakistansFederallyAdministered

TribalAreas(FATA)ofKurram,North

Waziristan,andSouthWaziristan.Ninety-one

percent o the population is Pashtun, with mostoftherestbeingTajik.ThePaktiatribeshave

historicallyhadaspecialrelationshipwith

Kabulthatprovideddispensationssuchas

exemption rom military service, and tribal

structures remain strong. Paktia has limited

industry,andmajorlivelihoodsarecutting

wood, smuggling, and labor migration to the

Gulfstates.TheprovincialcenterisGardez.

BalkhProvinceliesinastrategiclocationinnorthernAfghanistan,borderingUzbekistanand

Tajikistan.ItisalargelyTajikprovince,although

with a mix o other ethnic groups, including

Pashtunenclaves.TheprovincialcenterMazar-e

Shari is the de acto political, economic, and

administrative hub o northern Aghanistan.

Emergingrelativelyunscathedfromthewar,

BalkhretainssignicantSoviet-erainuence,

including remnants o pre-war industrial

development and commercial linkages with the

central Asian states.

Faryab Province also lies in northern

Aghanistan, bordering Turkmenistan to the

north.FaryabisoneoftwoUzbek-majorityprovinces, with the remainder o the population

madeupofpocketsofTajik,Pashtun,Turkmen,

and other smaller ethnic groups. Although

located on the ring road, the province has

historically been an economic backwater, with

low-productivity agriculture, limited

horticulture, and virtually no industry. The

insecure, Pashtun-dominated district o

GhormachociallyliesinBadghisProvince,but

istemporarilybeingadministeredfromFaryabs

provincial center, Maimana, and was thereore

included within the scope o this study.

Additional background inormation on the

provinces is available in the individual provincial

case studies. 40

3.2 Models used or employing aid in the

fve provinces

Stabilizationthroughaidprojectswasanoverallstrategy o some donors, notably the U.S., and

notjustthroughthePRTs.Thestudytherefore

looked broadly at the eect o all types o aid on

stabilization,withspecialfocusonaid

implemented by or through the PRTs. The

models employed by PRTs in each o the ve

study provinces diered according to the lead

nationwithrespecttostrategies,objectives(e.g.,

consent-winning, orce protection,

development),aidpresence,levelsofresources,civilian-military relationships, relationship with

localandKabuladministration,roleofQuick

ImpactProjects(QIPs),theuseofCERPfunds,

relationwithapoliticalstrategy(e.g.,ink-

spot),41 and the extent to which they ollowed

an integrated, comprehensive, or whole-o-

government approach.

39 AsinotherareasofAfghanistan,theassignmentofcertaindistrictstooneprovinceoranotherisnotalwaysclear.GizabDistrictcontainsasignicantHazarapopulation,butmayormaynotbepartofDaiKundi.ForsomemattersitappearstobeinUruzgan,forothersinDai

Kundi.40 The case studies are accessible at ://k.u.u.eu/fuee/ge/ege.?gei=19270958.

41 Theink-spotstrategyiswheremilitaryforcesoccupyanumberofsmall,disconnectedareas,andgraduallyextendtheirinuenceuntilpockets(inkspots)becameconnected,leavingonlysmallandisolatedpocketsofresistance.
https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=19270958https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=19270958https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=19270958https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=19270958



BOX 1: Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

Embodyingthenotionofcivil-militarycollaboration,therstAfghanistanPRTwas

established in Paktia Province by the U.S. in late 2002, and by 2011, 26 more had been

establishedthroughoutAfghanistan.InitiallycalledJointRegionalTeamsduetotheir

jointcivilian-militarycomposition,theywereintendedtobeaninterimstructurefor

acilitating improvements in security and reconstruction and or supporting the extension ocentralgovernmentauthoritytoareasbeyondKabul.Theywereseenasacompromise

betweentheexpansionofISAFproposedbyPresidentKarzaiandtheUNandthereluctance

oftheU.S.togoalongwithamajorexpansion.

The PRT terms o reerence adopted in January 2005 identied a very general mission:

assist[ing]TheIslamicRepublicofAfghanistantoextenditsauthority,inordertofacilitate

the development o a stable and secure environment in the identied areas o operations, and

enableSSR[securitysectorreform]andreconstructioneorts. 42Overtime,theagendaof

thePRTshasbroadened;inadditiontodoingshort-termQuickImpactProjects,PRTshave

expandedtheirrolesingovernanceanddevelopmentalinitiatives,eitherbecauseNGOsandother civilian agencies could not operate in the insecure contexts o the south and east or or

overtly political reasons. These roles involve promoting the capacity o local administration

through engagement with local stakeholders; promoting budget execution, business

development, agriculture, public health initiatives, and governance; and supporting the

delivery o basic social services. PRTs have also been used to strengthen troop-contributing

nationsinteragencyorinterdepartmentaleortsthroughharnessingallaspectsofnational

power and leveragediplomatic, economic, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency eorts.

Despite a common name and mission, the 27 PRTs have a varied structure and make-up

refecting the characteristics o the local area as well as the philosophies, legal restrictions,

administrative arrangements, priorities, and available resources o the lead nation. There are

currently 14 PRT lead nations, although most PRTs are shared by two or more nations. A

number

winning hearts and minds? examining the relationship between aid and security in afghanistan

Documents