with russia right across the...
TRANSCRIPT
With Russia Right acRoss the boRdeR Finland’s security policy
piotr szymański
73
With Russia Right acRoss the boRdeR Finland’s security policy
piotr szymański
nuMBer 73WarsaWMay 2018
© copyright by ośrodek studiów Wschodnichim. Marka Karpia / centre for eastern studies
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Contents
THESES /5
InTroduCTIon /8
I. AuTonomy, IndEpEndEnCE, FInlAndISATIon /9
II. ruSSIA: An opporTunITy And A THrEAT /14
1. russia as a source of opportunities /142. russia as a source of threats /18
III. Co-opErATIvE non-AlIgnmEnT /24
1. Co-operation with Sweden /242. Co-operation with the uSA /263. Co-operation with nATo /284. Co-operation in the European union /30
IV. FInlAnd’S ArmEd ForCES: A modEl dETErrEnCE or A pApEr TIgEr? /31
1. The conscript army and the defensive doctrine /312. Adjustment to the new challenges /33
AppEndICES /38
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THESES
• FinlandviewsRussiathroughtheprismofeconomicandpoliticaloppor-tunities. Russia is an important outlet for Finnish exports and a sourceofsuppliesofnaturalresources.Frequentmeetingsofthetwocountries’presidents and prime ministers are part of the intensive bilateral politi-calrelations.FromHelsinki’spointofview,thesemeetingsprovideaboostforFinland’sinternationalprofileasabrokerinthedialoguebetweentheWest and Russia. Finnish decision-makers also capitalise on diplomaticcontactswithRussiaindomesticpolicy:asanopportunitytodemonstratetotheelectoratetheirpragmaticattitudeinrelationswithacountrywhichisviewedinFinlandasagreatpower.
• Ontheotherhand,FinlandseesRussiaasasourceofchallengestoitssov-ereignty.ThisiswhyFinland’sstrategytowardsRussiacombineseconomicandpoliticalco-operation,intendedatreducingtheriskofbilateraltensions,withmilitarydeterrence.FinlandisconcernedbyRussia’srisingmilitaryandtheRussianvisionoftheinternationalorderbasedongreatpowers’spheresofinfluenceinwhichFinlandhastoplaytheroleofabufferzonebetweenRussiaandNATO.ProofthattheFinnisharmedforcesarebeingpreparedforadefenceoperationagainstRussiaincludemaintaininggeneralconscriptionwith a huge trained reserve force, focusing on territorial defence, and ex-cludingRussianequipmentfrommilitaryprocurements.Regardlessofthis,FinlandofficiallydoesnotdefineRussiaasathreat.ItarisesfromFinland’seffortstomaintaingoodrelationswithMoscowanditsnon-alignmentthatgivesHelsinkinoreasontoseepoliticalandmilitarybenefitsinhighlightingthethreatposedbyRussia’sarmedforces.
• Finlandasanon-alignedcountrysituatedintheperipheryofitscivilisa-tionalbase(theWest)andborderingonapotentiallyhostilepower,iscon-stantlydemonstratingitswilltodefenditsindependence.Itdoessomainlythroughgeneralconscriptionandbyorganisingrefreshertrainingforre-servists.Focusingonmaintainingadequatelytrainedreserveunits,withmoderatedefenceexpenditure,FinlandwantstodeterRussiaaboveallbyway of its armed forces’ wartime strength (currently being increased to280,000soldiers).Thiscapabilitytomobiliseasignificantnumberoftroopsraisesthecostsofpossibleaggression.
• TheRussian-Ukrainianwarhasbreathednewlife into thediscussiononthe weaknesses of the Finnish defence model. Along with the materiel
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shortagesresultingfromunderfundingthetotaldefencesystem,anotherdrawbackoftheFinnisharmyisthetime-consumingmobilisationprocess.Thisconcernsmainlythelandforceswhicharecomposedofreserveunitsandinpeacetimearefocusedontrainingconscripts.Inthecomingyears,Finland will invest in improving the level of the armed forces’ combatreadiness and will allocate additional funds to technical modernisation.However,theplanstoincreasethedefencebudgetneedtobeviewedwithcaution,becausewelfarestateexpensesaregiventoppriorityinFinland.WhatFinland’sministryofdefencewillfindasthegreatestchallengewillbeensuringadequatefundingfortheambitiousprogrammesofrearmingthenavyandtheairforceoverthenextdecade.
• SincethecollapseoftheUSSR,thenon-alignedFinlandhasactedwithcau-tionasregardsenhancingmilitaryco-operationwiththeWest.Besides,ithas avoided developing military capabilities which Moscow might inter-pretasoffensive.However,theincreasingpotentialoftheRussianarmedforcesandthemilitaryinterventions inGeorgiaandUkrainehavemadeFinland decide to intensify its defence co-operation with NATO and theUSA.Thegradualchangeoftheapproachinthisrespectsparksincreasingcontroversiesintheparliament.TheFinnishpoliticalcentre-rightwantsasclosedefenceco-operationwithNATOandtheUSAaspossible,whilethecentre-leftoptsforabalancebetweenthepro-WesterncourseofdefencepolicyandtheneedtomaintaingoodrelationswithRussia.
• FinlandhasnotappliedforNATOmembershipbutdoesnotrulethisoutinthefutureingovernmentaldocuments.Bydoingso,ithintstoMoscowthattheunfavourablechangesintheRussianpolicytowardsFinlandmayencourage it to withdraw from its non-aligned status. However, there isa strong political and social resistance to NATO membership in Finland.Thetraditionofmakingstrategicdecisionsonthebasisofpoliticalconsen-susmeansthatanypotentialapplicationforNATOmembershipwouldre-quiresupportfromallthemajorpoliticalparties.
• Finland’sclosestpartner indefenceco-operation isnon-alignedSweden.ThiscountrywouldbeabletoprovidemilitaryaidtoFinlandfastestofall,andtheSwedishterritorywouldsecurestrategicdepthfortheFinnishairforceandnavy.However,bilateraldefenceco-operationisstillhinderedbyacertainlevelofmistrustbetweenFinlandandSweden.Itismissingcom-monplanningforwartimeandbothpartiesarefarfromestablishingafor-malbilateralmilitaryalliance.FinlandiswatchingtheSwedishdebateon
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NATOmembershipclosely,sincearevisionoftheSwedishstanceonthisissuemighthaveastrongerimpactonincreasingsupportforNATOacces-sioninFinlandthanthethreatposedbyRussia.
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InTroducTIon
TheRussianannexationofCrimeahasprovokedareturntoviewingsecurityintermsofthereadinesstodefendone’sownterritoryintheNordic-Balticregion.ThishasledtointensifyinginterestintheFinnishdefencemodelbasedongeneralconscription,ahugetrainedreserveforce,andterritorialdefence.IthasalsointensifiedthedebateonFinland’spotentialNATOmembershipanditsperceptionofRussia.ItisthusworthhavingacloserlookatFinland’ssecu-ritypolicyandarmedforces,takingintoaccountthespecialnatureofFinnish--Russianrelations.
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I. AuTonomy, IndEpEndEncE, FInlAndISATIon
Since Finland gained independence in December 1917, it has treated Russiaalternatelyasanenemyandafriend.Theanti-SoviettrendcametotheforebetweenWorldWarIandWorldWarII.DuringtheColdWarperiod,Finland--USSRfriendshipwashighlightedintheFinnishgovernment’sofficialnar-rative.SincethecollapseoftheUSSR,Finlandhasmadeeffortstomaintainpartnership-basedrelationswithRussia,havingabandonedthinkingintermsofantagonismorsubordination.
WhenasaconsequenceoftheRussian-Swedishwarin1809RussiaannexedSweden’sFinnishprovinces,TsarAlexanderIgrantedconsenttotheestab-lishment of the Grand Duchy of Finland. The Russian Empire adopted thisconciliatorypolicyinordertoguaranteeFinns’loyaltybecauseitfearedthatSwedenmightmakeeffortstoregainthelostFinnishlandswhichRussiausedasaprotectivebufferforSaintPetersburg.PositiveconnotationsprevailintheFinnishmemoryoftheRussianruleinthe19thcentury.ItisviewedasafactorwhichfacilitatedtheFinnishstate-buildingandnation-buildingprocessandcontributedtothemodernisationofthecountry1.TheGrandDuchyofFinlandwasbondedwithRussiathroughpersonalunionasanautonomouspartoftheEmpirewithitsowngovernment,parliament,currencyandarmy2.ThefactthatFinnishwasgrantedthestatusofthesecondofficiallanguageinadditiontoSwedishplayedanimportantroleinFinns’nationalemancipation.Amonu-mentofTsarAlexanderIIstillstandsinthecentreofHelsinki.
ThesituationchangedalreadyduringtheruleofAlexanderIII,andtherestric-tionofFinland’sautonomybyNicholasIItooktheformofRussification(from1899)3.FinlandcapitalisedontheOctoberRevolutiontobreakfreefromRussiaandannouncedindependenceon6December1917.Theseeventswereaccompa-niedbyaseverepoliticalcrisis.Thefutureofthestatewasdecidedinthecivilwar(January–May1918),whenthegovernmental ‘White’troops(represent-ingbourgeoispartiesandsupportedbyGermany)defeatedtherevolutionary
1 M.Klinge,Krótka historia Finlandii,Helsinki1997,pp.64–65.2 The status of the Grand Duchy of Finland was similar to that of the Kingdom of Poland
in1815–1832.3 ThiswasaneffectofRussia’sconcernaboutthedestabilisinginfluenceoftheliberalFinnish
experimentonthesituationinsidetheEmpireandthedesiretotightenthegriponFinlandout of fear that its territory could be used by Germany in case of war. The Russificationprovokedtension,onemanifestationofwhichwastheassassinationoftheTsar’shighestrepresentativeinHelsinki,NikolaiBobrikov,Governor-GeneralofFinland,in1904.
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‘Red’forces(i.e.FinnishsocialistsbackedbySovietRussia).Intheinter-warperiod,anti-Sovietandanti-RussianrhetoricinFinlandwasaimedatunifyingaFinnishsociety–thathadbeenstronglydividedduetothecivilwar–inthefaceoftheexternalenemy4.ThisfittedinwiththenarrativeofFinland’sroleastheWest’soutpostagainsttheSovietthreat.TheSovietaggressiononFinlandandtheWinterWar(1939–1940)aswellastheContinuationWar(1941–1944;theFinnishcampaignagainsttheUSSRfoughtalongsidetheNaziGermanywiththeintentionofregainingthelandslostintheWinterWarandtoavoidGermanoccupation)reinforcedtheimageofRussiaasanenemy5.AsaresultofWorldWarII,Finlandlostaround2.5%ofitspre-warpopulationand10%ofitsterritory,whichentailedtheneedtoresettle400,000refugees.TheobligationtopaylargewarreparationstotheUSSRwasalsoimposedonit.InWorldWarIIFinlanddefendeditsindependencebutitdidfinditselfinMoscow’ssphereofinfluence(eventhoughFinlandwasnotmadepartoftheEasternBloc).ItwassymbolisedbytheFinno-SovietTreatyof19486andtheSovietmilitarybaseinPorkkalanearHelsinki(leasedin1944–1956).
TheColdWarinitiatedanewerainFinnish-Sovietrelations.TheFinno-SovietTreaty of 1948 envisaged the possibility of military consultations and jointdefenceincaseofaggressionfromGermanyoritsally,imposingtheundertakingonHelsinkiandMoscowtorefrainfromjoininganyalliancestargetedagainstoneanother7.FromHelsinki’spointofview,themostimportantpartwasthepreamblewhichmentionedFinland’sdesiretoremainoutsidetheconflicting
4 Intheinter-warperiod,theantagonismwasfuelledbytheissueofKarelia,thelandspread-ingonbothsidesoftheFinnish-SovietborderwhichwasbelievedtobethecradleofFinn-ish culture and the nation; this belief originated from the 19th-century Finnish nationalepicpoemKalevala.Variousorganisationsspreadingryssänviha,i.e.hatredofeverythingthatisRussian,wereactiveinFinland.H.Luostarinen,Finnish russophobia: the story of an enemy image,“JournalofPeaceResearch”,vol.26,no.2,1989,pp.123–137;B.Szordykowska,Historia Finlandii,Warszawa2011,pp.246–247;C.Browning,P.Joenniemi,Karelia as a Finn-ish-Russian Issue: Re-negotiating the Relationship between National Identity, Territory and Sov-ereignty,UniversityofTartu,May2014,http://ceurus.ut.ee/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Browning-and-Joenniemi-2014.pdf
5 InSeptember1944,Finlandwithdrewfrommilitaryco-operationwithNaziGermanyandsignedanarmisticewiththeUSSRunderwhichitbeganthewaragainstGermany(theLap-land War). Owing to this Finnish territory was not occupied, and Finland, despite majorcombatantcasualties(around95,000),sustainedminorlossesamongitscivilianpopulation.
6 ItsfullnameistheAgreementofFriendship,Co-operationandMutualAssistancebetweentheUnionofSovietSocialistRepublicsandtheRepublicofFinland.TheperiodbetweenthearmisticewiththeUSSRandsigningtheFinno-SovietTreaty(1944–1947)isknowninFin-landas‘theyearsofdanger’becauseofthefearofacommunistcoup.
7 R.Penttilä,Finland’s search for security through defence, 1944–1989,London1991,pp.29–34.
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interestsofthegreatpowers.ThismadeitpossibleforFinlandtorefertothetreaty,declaringapolicyofneutralityandseekingrecognitionforitintheWestandintheUSSR.Finland’sneutralitypolicyduringtheColdWarwasinfacttargetedatmarginalisingthemilitaryprovisionsofthetreaty,eventhoughofficiallyHelsinkiemphasiseditssignificanceinitsforeignandsecuritypolicy.
Finland’smilitarypotentialintheColdWarperiodwasofficiallydevelopedtorepelNATO’sattackagainstSovietUnionthroughFinnishterritory.TheUSSRwasanimportantsupplierofarmamentandmilitaryequipmenttoFinland,offeringloansfortechnicalmodernisationoftheFinnisharmedforces.However,theseinvestmentsinthedefencecapabilitieswereactuallyaimedatimprovingFinland’sprospectsforavoiding‘militaryassistance’incaseofacrisisbetweentheWestandtheUSSR(i.e.theentryofSovietforcesontoFinland’sterritoryandthelossofindependence)8.
IntheColdWarperiod,Finland’spolicytowardstheUSSRwasbasedontheassumptionthatthebetterthebilateralrelationswere,thegreaterthetrustbetweenHelsinkiandMoscowwouldbeandthemoreroomformanoeuvretherewouldbeindevelopingFinland’sco-operationwiththeWest9.ThispolicythatFinlandhadtoadoptasaresultofthenewbalanceofpowerrequiredpublicsupport,whichwasbuiltinatop-downmannerbycreatingapositiveimageoftheUSSR.ThemeansemployedincludedtheactivityoftheFinnish-SovietSociety, censorship of the media, destructions of book collections, removalofanti-Sovietmonumentsandcontents fromschool textbooks, thedissolu-tionofanti-Sovietorganisationsandpersonnelchangesatstateinstitutions(includingthearmyandthepolice)10.AnothercontributoryfactortothechangeoftheperceptionoftheUSSRwasthedynamicdevelopmentofFinnish-SoviettradewhichbecameoneoftheeconomicpillarsofthewelfarestateinFinland.TheUSSRwasFinland’smost importanttradepartner– inthepeakperiod(1980s),exportstotheUSSRaccountedfor25%oftotalFinnishexports.In1973,
8 One example of strengthening defence against a NATO attack were considerable invest-mentsintheairdefenceoftheLaplandregion(northernFinland)whichwaslocatedalongthelineofpossiblestrikeontheSovietnucleararsenalontheKolaPeninsula.
9 U.Kekkonen,Nie szukajcie przyjaciół daleko, a wrogów blisko,Warszawa1983.10 Thepenaltyofuptotwoyears’imprisonmentforjournalistspublishinglibellousmateri-
alsaboutothercountries(implicitlytheUSSR)wasremovedfromthecriminalcodeonlyin1995.D.Arter,Kekkonen and the ‘Dark Age’ of Finlandised Politics?,“IrishStudiesinInterna-tionalAffairs”,1998,p.41;C.Browning,M.Lehti,Beyond East-West: marginality and national dignity in Finnish identity construction,UniversityofWarwick,p.21.
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FinlandenteredintoafreetradeagreementwiththeEEC11,whilestillbeingboundbylong-termtradeagreementswiththeUSSR.
ThedesiretokeepFinlandoutofthegreatpowers’rivalryandthenarrativeoffriendshipwiththeUSSR(combinedwiththeofficiallydictatedamnesiaasregards,forexample,territoriallosses)wereaneffectofbothpressurefromMoscowandindependentFinnishreflection.ItwasassumedthatFinlandcouldneveragainbecomeengagedinawaragainsttheUSSRbecauseitmightputthesurvivalofthissmallnationatstakeinthenuclearepoch.TheFinnishnationalhero,MarshalCarlGustafMannerheim(heservedaspresidentin1944–1946)backeddefenceco-operationwiththeUSSRandpersonallydraftedtheproposalfortheFinnish-Soviettreatyin194512.
ThepolicyofbuildingspecialFinnish-SovietrelationsknownasFinlandisationwaspursuedbyUrhoKekkonenfromtheagrarianparty(currentlytheCen-treParty)whoservedasFinland’spresidentformanyyears(1956–1982).Fin-landisationhadbothinternationalanddomesticdimensions.Firstly,itmeantrespectingtheKremlin’sinterestsinforeignandsecuritypolicysothatFin-landcouldpreservepoliticalpluralismandafree-marketeconomy.Secondly,FinlandisationentailedFinland’smostseniorpoliticiansseekingtheKremlin’ssupport,whichwashelpfulinthedomesticpowerstruggle13.OneexamplewasPresidentKekkonen’suseofcrisesinrelationswithMoscowtostrengthenhispositionathomebybuildingtheimageofapoliticianwhohadanexclusiverecipeforwarmingrelationswiththeKremlin.Themostimportant‘sideeffects’ofFinlandisationincludedtheSovietinterferencesinFinland’sdomesticaffairsandtheSovietspecialservices’infiltrationoftheFinnishpoliticalandbusi-nesselites.ItcanevenbesaidthattherewasaninformalalliancebetweenPresidentKekkonenandtheKGBatthetimeoftheColdWar;andbothsidesbenefitedfromthisalliance.Ontheonehand,KekkonendidnotallowFinnishcommuniststomonopolisecontactswithSovietspecialservices(theFinnishPeople’sDemocraticLeagueuntilthe1980swasoneofthestrongestpoliticalpartiesinparliament)andthroughhiscollaborationwiththeKGBhegainedthe
11 P.Sutela,Finnish trade with the USSR: Why was it different?,BOFIT,2005,p.6,https://helda.helsinki.fi/bof/bitstream/handle/123456789/12616/118461.pdf?sequence=1
12 Hearguedthat“Finlandcanno longerassumetheroleofaWesternfortressagainst theEast.Wemustleavesuchtalkbehind(…).OurarmywillneveragainfightawaragainstRussia”.R.Penttilä,op. cit.,pp.12–13.
13 J.Lavery,All of the President’s Historians: The Debate over Urho Kekkonen,“ScandinavianStud-ies”,vol.75,no.3,2003,pp.378–381.
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SovietUnion’sconsentforFinlandtodevelopeconomicrelationswiththeWest.Ontheotherhand,theKGBgainedsignificantfreedomforitscovertoperationsinFinlandandinfluenceontheFinnishministryoftheinteriorandthepolice14.Kekkonen’ssystemwasalsousedbythegoverningpartiestomarginalisethepoliticalright(theNationalCoalitionParty)15.
ThecollapseoftheUSSRforFinlandmeantreorientationtotheWestandtheendofitssubordinationtoMoscow.However,FinlandisationhasleftadurablemarkonFinnishpoliticalcultureandtheperceptionofRussia.Eventhoughin201659%ofFinnswereoftheopinionthatRussia’smovesadverselyaffectFinland’ssecurity,atthesametime,83%ofrespondentsbelievedthattheRus-sianpresident,VladimirPutin,iswelcomeintheircountry16.
14 K.Rentola,President Urho Kekkonen of Finland and the KGB,2008,https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10224/4054
15 Thissituationwasanalogoustotheinter-warperiod,whenthegoverningpoliticalcentre-rightisolatedthesocialdemocrats.
16 11% were of the opposite opinion. Putin saapuu tänään Suomeen, “Aamulehti”, 1 July 2016,https://www.aamulehti.fi/kotimaa/putin-saapuu-tanaan-suomeen-kysely-suurin-osa-kansasta-toivottaa-tervetulleeksi-23760173/; Finns' opinions on foreign and security policy, national defence and security,MinistryofDefenceofFinland,December2016,http://www.defmin.fi/files/3579/ABDI_(MTS)_December_2016_Report_in_english.pdf
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II. ruSSIA: An opporTunITy And A THrEAT
Finland views Russia simultaneously as a source of opportunities (mainlyeconomic)andasthegreatestthreattoitssovereignty.FromFinland’spointof view, developing co-operation with Russia results in reducing the riskofbilateraltensions.ThisapproachisofkeysignificanceforunderstandingtheFinnishstrategytowardsRussiathatcombinesmilitarydeterrencewitheffortstomaintaingoodpoliticalandeconomicrelations.TheintensivepoliticalcontactswithRussia,inheritedaftertheColdWar,havebeenusedbyFinnishpoliticianstobuildsupportonthedomesticarenaandtoaspiretoplayingtheroleofabrokerbetweentheWestandRussia.Ineconomicterms,RussiaisFin-land’smostimportanttradepartneroutsidetheEUandasourceofsuppliesofnaturalresources.FromFinland’sperspective,theRussianmarkethasanunlimitedcapacitytoreceiveFinnishexportsanddirectinvestments(Peters-burgandLeningradOblastalonehavemoreresidentsthanFinlandasawhole).
Russiaappreciatesitspoliticaldialogueandeconomicco-operationwithFin-land.However,itisawareofthefactthatHelsinki,despiteitspragmaticrela-tionswithMoscow,isunabletosignificantlyinfluencetheEU’spolicytowardsRussia(forexample,onliftingthesanctions).RussiahasalsostronglycriticisedFinland’sparticipationinmilitaryco-operationwithNATOandtheUSA.Ithasregularlydemonstratedthatitisreadytocounteractanypotentialattemptsto change Finland’s policy of non-alignment, employing both military andhybridmeans.Inturn,onthesociallevel,FinlandisafrequentleisureandbusinessdestinationfortheSaintPetersburgmiddleclassandtheKremlinelite.
1. russia as a source of opportunities
(1) The political opportunities. ThespecialnatureofFinnish-Russianrelationsismanifestedinregularcontactsofthepresidentsandprimeministersfromthetwocountries.ThepresidentsofFinlandandRussiaasarulemeettwiceayear17.PresidentSauliNiinistötothiseffectcontinuesthepolicyofhispre-decessor,TarjaHalonen(president2000–2012).ThisoffersRussiatheoccasiontodemonstratethattherearecountriesintheEUthatarewillingtomaintaingoodrelationswithit,whileFinnishpoliticianshavetheopportunitytopresent
17 ThepresidentinFinnishpoliticalcultureperformsthefunctionoftheguarantorofgoodrelations with Moscow. The annexation of Crimea has not affected the frequency of thepresidentialmeetings–in2014–2017SauliNiinistöandVladimirPutinheldeightbilateralmeetings.
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themselvesasresponsibleactorsinrelationswithapowerfulneighbour.Fur-thermore,FinlandwantstoplaytheroleofapragmaticstatewhichisanexpertinRussianaffairsandanon-alignedbridgebetweentheWestandMoscow,whichisexpectedtoraiseitsinternationalprestige.Theroleoftheintermedi-arydatesbacktothetimeswhenFinlandwasengagedintheColdWardétentepolicy.In1973–1975,ithostednegotiationsbetweenWesterncountriesandtheEasternBlocaspartoftheConferenceforSecurityandCo-operationinEurope(theso-called‘HelsinkiProcess’whichendedinthesigningoftheCSCEFinalAct).Examplesofthistraditionbeingdrawnuponare:thetalksofrepresenta-tivesoftheRussianMinistryofForeignAffairsandtheUSDepartmentofStateinHelsinkiinSeptember201718,andtheworkundertheauspicesofFinlandunderwaysince2016aspartoftheInternationalCivilAviationOrganization(ICAO)toimprovethesafetyofflightsintheBalticSearegioninconnectionwiththenumerousincidentsintheairspacebetweenRussiaandNATOsincetheannexationofCrimea19.
However,thespecialnatureofFinnish-Russianrelationsshouldnotbeviewedas‘neo-Finlandisation’.TheroleoftheRussianfactorinFinland’sforeignpolicyhasbeenreducedsincethecollapseoftheUSSRascomparedtotheColdWarperiod.However,FinlandmaintainsapoliticalconsensusasregardstheneedtodevelopgoodrelationswithRussia.PoliticalpartiesonlydisagreeabouttheextenttowhichthedesiretokeepgoodrelationsistoaffectFinland’ssecuritypolicy.Thecentre-leftviewsitselfastheguardianofPresidentKekkonen’sleg-acyandismorewillingthanthepoliticalcentre-righttotakeRussiansecurityinterestsintoconsiderationinFinnishstrategicthinking.
(2) The economic opportunities. Thewell-developedFinnish-Soviettraderela-tionsoriginatedfromFinland’spaymentofwarreparations.Theneedtosup-plygoodstotheUSSRaspartofreparationsledtotheemergenceofbranchesofindustryspecialisedinexportstotheSovietUnion(mainlyproductsoftheelectromechanicalandshipbuildingindustries)aspartoffive-yeartradeagree-mentsimplementedfrom1950.RussiawasFinland’slargesttradepartneruntil2013(withabreakinthe1990scausedbythecollapseoftheUSSRwhichbroughtaboutaneconomicrecessioninFinland).Ineffectofthefinancialcrisisin2008,theEU-Russiansanctionsandcounter-sanctionsafter2014,thedevaluation
18 Under Secretary Shannon Travel to Helsinki, Finland,U.S.DepartmentofState,9September2017,https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/09/273930.htm
19 J. Gotkowska, P. Szymański, Rosyjski „plan Niinistö”, “OSW Analyses”, 24 August 2016,https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2016-08-24/rosyjski-plan-niinisto
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oftherouble,andlowoilprices,itfelltothirdtofinditselfbehindGermanyandSweden(2016).ThevalueofFinnishexportstoRussiain2008–2016wasreducedmorethanthree-fold.Russia’sshareinFinnishexportsandimportsin2016reached5.7%(5thposition)and11.2%(3rdposition)respectively20.Fin-landexportstoRussiamainlyproductsofthechemicalandtimberandpaperindustries,andindustrialandelectricmachines.Itimportsmainlyenergyprod-ucts.In2016,theirshareintotalimportsfromRussiareached70.5%(including58.2%ofoiland7.1%ofgas)21.ForRussia,Finlandisanoutletoflimited,mainlyregionalsignificance.HelsinkiwantstorevivetradewithRussiaintheareaswhicharenotcoveredbyRussiansanctions.ItisintendedtostimulateFinnishexportsbutalsotomaintainthepositionofFinnishcompaniesontheRussianmarket22.FinlandremainsintheEU’smainstreamasregardscontinuingthesanctionsimposedonRussia.However,ifthestanceofthekeyEUmemberstateschanges(inparticular,thatofGermany),consideringFinland’seconomicinterests,itwouldnotfinditselfinthegroupofcountriesopposingtheliftingofthesanctions.
Energyco-operation,whichmorethanotherareashasenabledFinlandtofillbilateralrelationswithRussiawithrealcontentoverthepastfewyears,hasthegreatestsignificanceasregardsdirectinvestments23.TheFinnishstate-con-trolledenergycompanyFortumownseightheatandpowerplantsincentral
20 Finnish exports to Russia finally on the rise, BOFIT, 3 March 2017, https://www.bofit.fi/en/monitoring/weekly/2017/vw201709_3/; Finnish foreign trade 2016: Figures and diagrams,FinnishCustoms,7February2017,http://tulli.fi/documents/2912305/3437550/Figures+and+diagrams+2016+%28preliminary+data%29/b2fc0c2b-a4eb-4410-a53d-1e961ae2273a
21 In2016,Finlandimported100%ofitsgasfromRussia(6%oftotalenergyconsumption)and88% of its oil (23% of total energy consumption). Finland views Russia as a reliable sup-plierofoilandgas–Helsinkihasneverexperiencedpoliticallymotivatedcutsinoilandgas deliveries. However, in the longer term, Finland’s dependence on imports of energyresourcesfromRussiawillbedecreasing.Helsinkiisintensifyingadiversificationofgassupplies inside the EU (the construction of a gas pipeline connection with Estonia andLNG terminals) and is investing in renewables. Energy supply and consumption, StatisticsFinland, 23 March 2017, https://www.stat.fi/til/ehk/2016/04/ehk_2016_04_2017-03-23_en.pdf;Finland – Energy System Overview,InternationalEnergyAgency,2016,https://www.iea.org/media/countries/Finland.pdf
22 ThefollowingcompaniesareamongthosepresentontheRussianmarket:Fortum(energysector), K-Group (retail chain), YIT (construction sector), Neste (fuels), Nokian Tyres(tyres),Fazer(foodindustry)andStoraEnso,UPMandMetsäGroup(allthree:forestindus-tryandbiomass).
23 Finland’sdirectinvestmentsinRussiain2014reached2.2billioneuros(2.3%oftotalFDI),andRussian investments inFinlandwerehalf that (1.4%of totalFDI). Finnish investment in Russia continues to heavily exceed Russian investment in Finland,BOFIT,13October2015,https://www.bofit.fi/en/monitoring/weekly/2015/vw201546_3/
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Russia,hydroandthermalpowerplantsinnorth-westernRussiaandawindfarminUlyanovsk24.Inturn,RosatomwillbuildareactoratanewnuclearpowerplantinPyhäjoki.Theimplementationofthiscontroversialprojectisplannedfor2018–2024andwillbeofkeysignificanceforthefutureofFinnish-Russianenergyco-operation(itstillneedsfinaladministrativeconsent)25.Onesignofthisco-operationisalsoFinland’sneutralstanceontheNordStream2pro-ject.PipesfortheconstructionoftheNS2arecoatedandstoredattheFinnishportsHamina-KotkaandKoverhar26.Furthermore,inthemiddleof2018,For-tumwillbecomethemainshareholderattheGermanenergycompanyUni-per,whichisapartnerintheNS2project(UniperalsoownsfivepowerplantsinRussia).ThismeansthattheFinnishgovernmentwillindirectlybecomepartofthisundertaking.
Finland wants to participate in the benefits of using the Arctic NortheastPassageconnectingEuropeandAsia,whichmaycontributetotheeconomicdevelopment of Finnish Lapland. Finland is also counting on co-operationwithRussiaasregardsconstructionof theRussianfleetof icebreakersandintheArcticConnectproject–thelayingofanunderwatertelecommunica-tioncablealongRussia’sArcticseashore(10,500km)thatwouldconnectChinaandJapanwithEuropeviaRussia,NorwayandFinland(usingtheHelsinki––Rostockconnection)27.Additionally,despitethedevelopmentofcargocapacityofUst-LugaPortbyRussia,FinnishportsintheGulfofFinlandareimportant
24 Fortum in Russia, https://www3.fortum.com/about-us/our-company/fortum-worldwide/fortum-russia
25 Rosatomholdsa35%stakeinFennovoima,acompanysettobuildthenewnuclearpowerplant.Theprojecthassparkedcontroversiessincethebeginning–in2014,theGreensleftthegovernmentcoalitioninprotestagainstfurtherinvestmentsinthenuclearenergysec-tor,andin2015,theFinnishgovernmentblockedtheparticipationinFennovoimaofacom-panyregisteredinCroatiaduetoitslinkstoRussiancapital.Theestablishmentofthiscom-panywasmost likelyinspiredbyRussiatoresolvetheproblemwiththelackofthe60%shareofentitiesfromtheEUinFennovoimarequiredbytheFinnishside.Twotwo-reactornuclearpowerplantsbuiltinthe1970soperateinFinland:LoviisaandOlkiluoto(theywillbedecommissionedin2027–2042).TheconstructionofathirdreactorinOlkiluotoiscon-tinuedwithdelays.
26 The former social democratic prime minister, Paavo Lipponen, was hired as an advisorbytheNordStreamcompanywhenthefirsttwolinesofthegaspipelinewereconstructed.
27 Report on the Northeast Passage telecommunications cable project,MinistryofTransportandCommunicationsofFinland,Report3/2016,https://www.lvm.fi/documents/20181/880507/Reports+3-2016.pdf/db8fcdda-af98-4a50-950d-61c18d133f74. Russian investments areimportantfortheFinnishshipbuildingindustry–theRussianUnitedShipbuildingCorpo-rationownstheHelsinkishipyardswhereicebreakersarebuiltalsofortheRussianMinis-tryofTransport(informationwasreceivedtowardstheendof2017thatRussiansareplan-ningtoselltheshipyard).
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forRussianimportsviatheBalticSea(goods,afterunloading,aredeliveredbyroadandrailwaytransporttoRussia)28.
Intheservicesarea,RussiantouristsareanimportantsourceofincomemainlyinHelsinkiandthefrontierregions,beingthelargestgroupofforeignersvisit-ingFinland.AccordingtodatafromtheRussianstatisticaloffice,in2016Fin-landwasthesecondmostfrequentlychosendestinationforRussianstravellingabroad29.
2. russia as a source of threats
(1) The political threats. RussiaposesapoliticalthreattoFinlandonthreelevels.Firstly,ontheinternationallevel,HelsinkiisparticularlyconcernedwiththeRussianfocusonmultipolarity,whichisalong-termchallengetothedurabilityofFinland’sintegrationwithWesternstructures.TheRussianvisionoftheinternationalorderincludestheconceptofgreatpowers’spheresofinflu-ence,withFinlandbeingassignedtheroleofabufferzonebetweentheWestandRussia.FromRussianperspectivethisexcludesforexampleFinland’sNATOmembership.RussiathuswantstomaintaintheremnantsoftheColdWar‘Nor-dicbalance’, elementsofwhich includedtheFinno-SovietTreaty,Sweden’sneutralityandDenmark’sandNorway’sNATOmembership(however,withnoNATObases).
Secondly,onthepoliticalandbusinesslevel,theRussianspecialservicesarestillactiveinFinlandeventhoughtheFinlandisationpolicywasdiscontinuedin1991.AreportoftheFinnishSecurityIntelligenceService(Supo)for2016men-tionsasignificantnumberofagentsfromothercountriesoperatinginFinland,butonlyRussia’snameismentionedexplicitly30.Theactivityofforeignintelli-genceinFinlandisconcentratedonrecruitingyoungpoliticiansandobtaininginformationontopicssuchassupportforNATOmembership,energypolicy,theattitudeofbusinesscirclestowardstheEUsanctions,theFinnishchairmanship
28 Finland as a Gateway to Russia, Baltics and the Nordic Region,EmbassyofFinlandintheUSA,5 June2013,http://www.finland.org/public/default.aspx?contentid=275909&nodeid=35833&contentlan=2&culture=en-US
29 Число выездных туристских поездок, Federal State Statistics Service of Russian Federa-tion,http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/business/torg/tur/tab-tur1-2.htm;Demand for accommodation services grew by 3 per cent in 2016,StatisticsFinland,27April2017,https://www.stat.fi/til/matk/2016/matk_2016_2017-04-27_tie_001_en.html
30 SUPO 2016,FinnishSecurityIntelligenceService,http://www.supo.fi/instancedata/prime_product_julkaisu/intermin/embeds/supowwwstructure/72829_SUPO_2016_ENG.pdf
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oftheArcticCouncil(2017–2019)andcybersecurityinfrastructure31.Charac-teristicareasofactivityofRussia’sspecialservicesincludemonitoringthecasesoftakingcustodyofchildrenfromRussianfamiliesinFinland(thisinforma-tionisthenpublicisedintheRussianpresstoacuseFinnsofRussophobia)andattemptstorecruitagentsamongholdersofdualFinnish-Russiancitizenship32.However,RussiadoesnotplaythecardoftheRussian-speakingminorityinFin-land(around70,000people)totheextentitdoesintheBalticstates.
Thirdly,onthelevelofsociety,RussiawantstoinfluenceFinnishpublicopin-ion.Inthisarea,Russia’sgoalsinclude:underminingpublicconfidenceinthegovernment,weakeningpeople’spro-EuropeanorientationandentrenchingthelowlevelofsupportforNATOmembership.Moscowhasemployedvarioustoolstoachievethesegoals.Forexample,inlate2015/early2016amigrationroute(around1,700people)wasformedontheFinnish-RussianborderintheFarNorthmostlikelywiththeparticipationofRussiansecurityservicesandorganisedcriminalgroups33.ThesemoveswereaimedatescalatingthelargestasylumcrisisinFinland’spost-warhistory(aninfluxofaround32,000asylum-seekersfromtheMiddleEast)and,asaconsequence,afurtherpolarisationoftheFinnishpublicoverreceivingmigrantsandrefugees.Itentailedincreas-ingsupportforradicalorganisations(SoldiersofOdin,theFinnishResistanceMovement)andsloganscontestingthemainstreampolicy.
FinlandisalsooneofthefrontsoftheRussianinformationwar,eventhoughitslinguisticdistinctnessandhigheducationlevelposeabarriertoRussian
31 Russiaisnottheonlycountryinterestedintheseissues,butitiscertainthattheyattractthespecialattentionoftheRussianintelligence.
32 One proof of this is the Finnish debate on blocking holders of dual Finnish-Russian citi-zenship the right to serve in the Finnish armed forces and border guard (the ministriesofdefenceandinteriorareworkingonrelevantlegalchanges).In2015,thenumberofhold-ersofdualcitizenshipinFinlandreached95,000.Russiansformthelargestgroupamongthem–25,000people(followedbySwedes–7,000peopleandEstonians–4,000).Around60holdersofdualcitizenshipserveinthearmedforces.Number of persons receiving Finnish citizenship fell in 2015,StatisticsFinland,12April2016,https://www.stat.fi/til/kans/2015/kans_2015_2016-05-12_tie_001_en.html; J. Huhtanen, Puolustusministeri Niinistö pitää kaksois kansalaisia turvallisuus uhkana – ‘Viides kolonna on torjuttava jo rauhan aikana’,“Hels-inginSanomat”,22January2018,https://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/art-2000005534143.html
33 Finally, Finland and Russia signed an agreement introducing temporary restrictionson border traffic in the Far North. P. Szymański, P. Żochowski, W. Rodkiewicz, Enforced cooperation: the Finnish-Russian migration crisis,“OSWAnalyses”, 6April2016,https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-04-06/enforced-cooperation-finnish-russian-migration-crisis
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disinformation34. Pro-Kremlin internet ‘trolling’ has intensified in Finlandsince 2014 (concerning such issues as the wars in Ukraine and Syria). Anattempttolaunchapro-Russianradio(LoveFM,2016)hasalsobeenmade.Rus-sianpropagandainFinlandisfacilitatedbypro-Kremlinactivistsandsomeorganisations,forexampletheFinnishAnti-FascistCommittee.Inturn,theRussianmedia,dependingontheneeds,presentFinlandoccasionallyasacoun-trypreparingforwarwithRussiaandenteringintosecretmilitarydeals,andatothertimesasMoscow’strustedpartnerintheEU35.ForthisreasonFinlandformedaspecialgroupofexpertsandpublicservantsattheprimeminister’sofficein2015taskedwithmonitoringandcounteractingdisinformation36.
(2)The economic threats.Tradeandenergyco-operationwithRussiaisnotonlyasourceofeconomicandpoliticalopportunitiesforFinland,italsohasnegativeimplications.ThedependenceofsomesectorsoftheFinnisheconomyontheRussianmarketexposescompaniestolossesshouldpoliticalrelationsbetweenMoscowandHelsinkideteriorate(orinthebroadercontext,betweenRussiaandtheEU).TheRussiancounter-sanctionsimposedin2014(embargoonfoodfromtheEU)aboveallaffectedtheFinnishdairyindustry,causingtheemer-genceofgroupsofmanufacturerslobbyingfortheEUsanctionstobelifted37.In2015–2016,FinnishfoodexportstoRussia,whichhadbeenthemostimpor-tantoutletforFinnishmanufacturers,fellthree-fold38.Anotherexampleisthere-emergingthreatofwithholdingRussianexportsoftimbertoFinland(fortheneedsoftheFinnishforestindustryandbiomass).TheRussianparliamentwas
34 In2016,SputnikcloseditswebsitesintheFinnish,Swedish,NorwegianandDanishlan-guages.
35 Collectivework,Russia’s footprint in the Nordic-Baltic information environment,NATOStra-tegicCommunicationsCentreofExcellence,January2018,https://www.stratcomcoe.org/russias-footprint-nordic-baltic-information-environment-0,pp.60–66,73–74.
36 J.Rosendahl,T.Forsell,Finland sees propaganda attack from former master Russia,Reuters,19 October 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-finland-russia-informationattacks/finland-sees-propaganda-attack-from-former-master-russia-idUSKCN12J197
37 FinlandisinthegroupofthoseEUmemberstateswhichhavesustainedthelargestlossesasaresultoftheRussiansanctions.J.Hinz,Friendly fire. Zu den Handelsauswirkungen der Russlandsanktionen, IfW, December 2017, https://www.ifw-kiel.de/wirtschaftspolitik/prognosezentrum/konjunkt/ifw-box/2017/box_2017-17_russlandsanktionen.pdf How-ever,inaggregate,theestimatesoftheFinnishMinistryofFinancewereindicatingasmalleffect of the Russian ban on food imports on the reduction of Finland’s GDP (by 0.1 per-centage points) and a marginal influence on the unemployment rate. The economic effects of the EU’s Russia sanctions and Russia’s counter sanctions, Ministry of Finance of Finland,27 August 2014, http://valtioneuvosto.fi/documents/10184/1058456/venaja_pakotteet_en.pdf/11184e4f-b00a-4474-9576-66c89d9e18ae
38 J.Niemi,Finnish food exports to Russia down more than 70 percent,NaturalResourcesInstituteFin-land,2August2017,https://www.luke.fi/en/news/finnish-food-exports-russia-70-percent/
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consideringtheimpositionofrestrictionsonwoodtradewithFinlandin2015,whenFinlanddidnotallowtheRussiandelegationtoparticipateintheOSCE’sParliamentaryAssemblyinHelsinkiduetoEUsanctions.Furthermore,in2015,twoentrepreneursandfourcompaniesfromFinlandfoundthemselvesontheUSsanctionslist.TheDepartmentoftheTreasuryarguedthatthisdecisionwastakenbecausetheFinnishentitiesdisregardedtheUSsanctionsimposedontheRussianoligarchsGennadyTimchenkoandBorisRotenbergaftertheannexationofCrimea39.
DirectinvestmentsofFinnishfirmsinRussiamayalsoserveasabargainingchipinFinnish-Russianrelations.TheiropportunitiesofexpansionorretainingpositionontheRussianmarketmaydependonconcessionsofferedtoMoscow.ThechangeofthestancetakenbyFinland’sFortumontheparticipationintheFennovoimaprojectmost likelyfits inwiththismodel.TheFinnishenergycompanyinitiallywasnotinterestedinco-operationwithRosatom.However,whentheproblemwithensuringamajoritystakeofEU-basedfirmsfollowedbypoliticalpressureappeared,Fortum,whichownssignificantassetsinRussia,joinedtheconsortiumengagedintheconstructionofthenewnuclearpowerplant40.ThiswasmostlikelyaneffectofthetalksthatwereheldatthesametimebetweenFortumandGazpromonFortumtakingoveramajoritystakeintheRussianenergycompanyTGK-1operatinginLeningradandMurmanskOblastsandintheRepublicofKarelia41.ThenewFinnish-RussiannuclearpowerplantinFinlandwillprovidefurthermotivationfortheFinnishgovernmenttomaintaingoodrelationswithRussia,regardlessoftheinternationalsitu-ation.Asaresult,Finlandmayfinditselfinadifficultsituationinthefuture–FinnishexpertspointoutthatthereistheriskthatRosatommaybeplacedonthelistofcompaniescoveredbyUSandEUsanctions42.
39 BotholigarchshaveFinnishcitizenshipandhaveinvestedinFinland.Treasury Sanctions Individuals and Entities Involved In Sanctions Evasion Related To Russia and Ukraine, U.S.Department of the Treasury, 30 July 2015, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0133.aspx
40 T. Martikainen, A. Vihma, Dividing the EU with energy? Unpacking Russia’s energy geoeco-nomics,FIIA,1March2016,http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/571/dividing_the_eu_with_energy/
41 Researcher: Horse-trading behind planned Fortum-Fennovoima deal, YLE, 2 December 2014,https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/researcher_horse-trading_behind_planned_fortum-fennovoima_deal/7665234
42 T.Martikainen,K.Pynnöniemi,S.Saari,Venäjän muuttuva rooli Suomen lähialueilla,FIIA,30August2016,http://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/607/venajan_muuttuva_rooli_suomen_lahialueilla/
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Furthermore,fromthepointofviewofFinland,whichisbuildingitsbrandby promoting Finnish nature, Russia is a country that pollutes the naturalenvironmentinitsimmediateneighbourhood.ForthisreasontheFinnishsideraisestheissueoftheprotectionofthenaturalenvironmentintheBalticSea(theKrasnyBordumpsitenearSaintPetersburgpollutesthewatersoftheGulfofFinland)andintheArctic(thereductionofCO2emissions)duringallFinnish-Russianmeetingsonthepresidentialandprimeministeriallevel.
(3) The military threats. RegardlessofthepositivechangesthathavetakenplaceinFinland’ssecurityenvironmentastheresultofthecollapseoftheUSSR,suchustherestorationoftheBalticstates’independenceandweakeningofRus-sia’smilitarypower,FinlandneverstoppedperceivingMoscowasastrategicchallengeandthreattoitssovereignty.Finland’sborderwithRussiais1,340kmlong and it runs along areas of military importance for the Kremlin: SaintPetersburg(theNavyheadquarters)andtheKolaPeninsula(theNorthernFleetbase).Furthermore,sincePolandandtheBalticstatesjoinedNATO,theborderbetweentheallianceandRussiahasbeenshiftedclosertoFinland’ssouthernfrontier.
FinnishpoliticiansandmilitaryofficialsformallydeclarethatthereisnodirectthreatofRussianaggression.However,Finland’sentiremilitarypotentialsincetheendoftheColdWarhasbeendevelopedandprofiledtoconductadefenceoperationincaseofaRussianattack.ThefactthatithasretainedaconscriptarmyfocusedonterritorialdefencewithalargetrainedreserveprovesthatFin-landdoesnotruleoutthepossibilityofaclassiclandinvasion(withakeyroleofKarelianIsthmusdirection).However,FinnishexpertsbelievethataFinnish-RussianwarthatisnotpartofabroaderRussia–NATOconflictisunlikely,andthatapotentialconflictintheNordic-BalticregionwouldmostlikelyinvolveRussianstrikesonFinland’snavalandairbasesinordertopreventNATOfromusingthem,forexample,todefendtheBalticstates.NoraretheyrulingoutthepossibilityofasubversiveactionsaccordingtotheschemeadoptedbyRus-siansduringtheannexationofCrimea(forexample,onthedemilitarisedAlandIslands)43.
43 The status of the archipelago makes its defence more difficult, which was the sub-ject of debate in Finland in the 1990s and after the annexation of Crimea. J. Gotkowska,P.Szymański,Gotland and Åland on the Baltic chessboard – Swedish and Finnish concerns,“OSWAnalyses”,26October2016,https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-10-26/gotland-and-aland-baltic-chessboard-swedish-and-finnish-concerns
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Finland isconcernedaboutRussia’s increasingmilitarycapabilitiesand itsheightenedmilitaryactivityneartheFinnishfrontier inrecentyears.Thisincludesanintensificationofmilitaryexercises,thereactivationofthemecha-nisedbrigadeinAlakurtti(50kmfromtheFinnishborder)andtheviolationsofFinnishairspacebyRussianaircrafts(alienunderwateractivitywasalsospottedintheFinnishterritorialseain2015).Finlandreadsallthisasawarningagainstfurtherenhancingmilitaryco-operationwithNATOandtheUSA,andademonstrationofRussia’scapabilitytoblockpotentialjointmilitaryactionwithNATOincaseofconflictintheregion.RussiastraightforwardlydefinesFinnish-NATOco-operationasathreattoitssecurityanddeclaresthatFin-land’sNATOmembershipwouldresultinanadjustmentoftheRussianmili-taryposturetothenewsituationintheregion44.RussiawantstobuildasenseofuncertaintyaboutitsreactiontotheshiftinthebalanceofpowerintheNordic-Balticregion,whichisexpectedtoentrenchthestatus quoasregardsFinland’snon-alignedstatus.
Publicopinionpollshaverevealedthatthesenseof threat fromRussiahasintensifiedamongtheFinnishpublicsincetheRussianaggressiononUkraine,eventhoughterrorism,organisedcrime,theeconomiccrisisandglobalwarm-ingareviewedasmoreseriousthreats45.TheRussianthreathassuchadistantplaceinthepollontheonehandbecausethistopicisonthemarginsofpublicdebateand,ontheotherbecauseFinnsareusedtotheneighbourhoodwithRussiaandtrusttheirpublicinstitutions,inparticular,thearmy(thisleveloftrustisthehighestintheEU).
44 S. Blank, General Makarov Makes Incendiary Remarks in Finland, “Eurasia Daily Moni-tor”, 18 July 2012, https://jamestown.org/program/general-makarov-makes-incendiary-remarks-in-finland/
45 J. Raeste, J. Saarinen, Suomalaisten Venäjän-pelko kaksin-kertaistunut neljässä vuodessa,“HelsinginSanomat”,27September2014,http://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/a1411744065107;Finns' opinions on foreign and security policy, national defence and security, Ministry of Defenceof Finland, November 2017, http://www.defmin.fi/files/4062/Finns_opinions_on_For-eign_and_Security_Policy_National_defence_and_security_november_2017.pdf
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III. co-opErATIvE non-AlIgnmEnT
DuringtheColdWar,Finland’ssecuritypolicy,focusedonensuringinterna-tional recognition of its declared neutrality, employed above all diplomaticmeasures.InadditiontobuildingtrustinrelationswiththeUSSR,thismeantengagementintheUNsystemwhichmanifesteditself,forexample,throughparticipationinpeacekeepingoperations.FinlandcapitalisedonthecollapseoftheUSSRtoaccelerateitsintegrationwiththeWestencompassingco-opera-tionwithNATOaspartofPartnershipforPeacesince1994andEUmembershipsince1995.Thisledtoreplacingtheconceptofneutralitywithnon-alignment,i.e.remainingoutsidemilitaryalliancesandfreelyshapingitspoliciesincaseofconflict46.
Finland’ssecuritypolicyisbasedonfourpillars:itsnon-alignment, invest-mentsinitsowndefencecapabilities,maintaininggoodrelationswithRus-sia,andmilitaryco-operationwithWesternpartnerstowhichHelsinkihasattachedspecialsignificancesincetheannexationofCrimeain2014.Finlandviewsthisco-operationaboveallasanopportunitytoimproveitscapabilitytodefenditsownterritoryratherthanpreparationtojointheNATO.How-ever,asectionofFinland’spoliticalleftandcentreopposeenhancingdefenceco-operationwiththeUSAandNATOinresponsetogrowingtensionintheregionandappealformorebalancingbetweentheEastandtheWest.ThemostlikelyscenariointhecomingyearswillbethatFinlandwillmaintainitsnon-alignedstatuswhileactuallydevelopingmilitaryco-operationwithSweden,theUSA,NATOandaspartoftheEU.Themainmotivesbehindthisstrategyofco-operativenon-alignmentwillremainunchanged:Finland’sinsufficientmilitaryexpenditureandtheRussianthreat.
1. co-operation with Sweden
TheColdWardivisionofEuropepreventedthedevelopmentofFinnish-Swedishdefenceco-operationbecauseSwedenwaspartoftheWest.Sincethe1990s,bilat-eralco-operationhasbeenimpededduetothedifferencesinperceivingthreatsandthedevelopmentofdifferentdefencemodels–expeditionaryinSweden,andonefocusedonterritorialdefenceinFinland.Thecentreofgravitywastheco-operationofthetwocountries’naviesandco-operationincrisismanagement
46 Atpresent,thegovernmentaldocumentsincludeastatementthatFinlandisnotamemberofamilitaryalliance.
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operations47.In2003,FinlandandSwedenbeganholdingcross-borderairforceexercises.ThefactorsthattriggeredtheintensificationofFinnish-Swedishmili-taryco-operationwereatfirstthefinancialcrisis(lookingforwaystosavemoneythroughbilateralandmultilateralprojectsaspartofNORDEFCOsince2009)andthentheannexationofCrimea,afterwhichSwedenbecamefocusedonregionalsecurity.Otherfactorsthatcontributetotheirco-operationisthenon-alignedsta-tusofthetwocountriesandtheabsenceofpoliticalcontroversies–94%ofFinnswantcloserdefencebondswithSweden48.
Through this bilateral co-operation Finland wants to raise the possibilityofcoordinatedFinnish-Swedishresponseincaseofcrisisorconflict,becausethesuccessofFinland’sdefenceoperationtoagreatextentdependsonSweden.ThiscountrywouldbeabletooffermilitarysupporttoFinlandfastestofallandtoguaranteethetransitofmilitaryassistance.Sweden’sterritorycouldalsosecurestrategicdepthfortheFinnisharmedforces,mainlythenavyandtheairforce(refuellingandammunitionreplenishmentatSwedishbases).Thesetwobranchesofbothcountries’armedforceshavedevelopedmostintenseco-opera-tionsince2014.Itresultedinahighlevelofinteroperability,includingexercisesaccordingtothejointdefencescenario49.AlthoughtheFinnish-Swedishagree-mentsonstrengtheningmilitaryco-operationenvisagethemutualuseofeachother’sbaseinfrastructure,theyregulatedefenceco-operationatpeacetimeanddonotimposeanywartimeobligations50.
Enhancing military co-operation with Sweden will gain more significanceinFinland’sdefencepolicy(thereisagreatdealofunusedpotential,especially
47 C.Salonius-Pasternak,Deeper defence cooperation: Finland and Sweden together again?,FIIA,3December2017,https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/186091/bp163.pdf
48 Finns' opinions…,November2017,op. cit.49 ExamplesoftheseincludetheNorthernCoastsandRuskaexercisesin2017.Northern Coasts
exercise to deepen the bilateral cooperation between Finland and Sweden (FISE),FinnishDefenceForces, 12 September 2017, http://merivoimat.fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/nothern-coasts-harjoituksessa-syvennetaan-fise-yhteistyota;Ruska 17 and Baana 17 exercises taking place in October,FinnishDefenceForces,22September2017,http://ilmavoimat.fi/en/arti-cle/-/asset_publisher/ilmaoperaatioharjoitus-ruska-17-ja-lentotoimintaharjoitus-baana-17-jarjestetaan-lokakuussa
50 TheyadditionallyprovideforcreatingajointSwedish-FinnishNavalTaskGroup(by2023),closerco-operationonanti-submarinewarfare(forexamplecoordinatedpurchaseofSaabDynamicsAbtorpedoes)anddevelopingtheconceptofacombinedFinnish-SwedishBri-gade (by 2020). Final reports on deepened defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden,GovernmentofSweden,19May2015,http://www.government.se/49baf3/globalassets/gov-ernment/dokument/forsvarsdepartementet/final-reports-on-deepened-defence-coopera-tion-between-finland-och-sweden.pdf
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inthecaseofthelandforces).However,neitherHelsinki51norStockholmiscon-sideringabilateralmilitaryallianceatpresent(StockholmwouldratherchooseNATOmembershipasanalternativetoitsnon-alignment).Oneofthereasonsforthisisthestillinsufficientdegreeoftrustbetweenthetwocountriesandtheinsufficientdeterrencevalueofsuchanalliance.However,thisdoesnotruleoutjointdefenceplanninginthefuturewithoutassumingformalcasusfoederis.Helsinki’schoiceofanewfighteraircraftwillgreatlyinfluencethescaleofmilitaryco-operationbetweenFinlandandSwedeninthecomingdec-ades.SwedenwillcertainlyresorttotheargumentofinteroperabilityandthepossibilitytouseSwedishairbasesintheprocessoflobbyingsothatFinlandchoosestheSwedishaircraftJAS39Gripen.
2. co-operation with the uSA
TheColdWarbalanceofpowermadedefenceco-operationbetweenFinlandandtheUSAimpossible.ThesituationchangedimmediatelyafterthecollapseoftheUSSR,whenFinlanddecidedtoprocure62USF-18fighteraircraft(1992).ThustheUSAbecameastrategicpartnerinthedevelopmentofFinland’sairforce,whichstillaffectstheco-operationintrainingpilots,exercisesandthemodernisationofaircraft.SinceFinlandhassmallmissilestockpiles,suppliesfromtheUSAwouldbeofkeysignificancefortheFinnishairforceincaseofconflict(thedomesticdefenceindustryisworkingmainlyfortheneedsofthelandforces).Thenavyandthelandforcesareincreasinglyinterestedinco-operationwiththeUSA(procurementofnavalweaponsandmodernisa-tionoftheartillery).
AlthoughtheUSAhassuppliedaroundhalfofFinland’sarmamentandmili-taryequipmentpurchasedabroadsince1990,thishasnottranslatedintomoreextensivedefenceco-operation52.OntheonehandthereasonsforthisincludedthelackofFinland’sNATOmembershipandtheUSfocusonmilitaryengage-mentoutsideEurope(mainlytheMiddleEast).Ontheotherhand,enhancingdefenceco-operationwiththeUSAhasmetwithpoliticalresistance,especially
51 EventhoughavisionofsuchanalliancehasbeenpushedthroughbysomeFinnishpoliti-ciansandissupportedbynearlyhalfofcitizens.Poll shows support for military union with Sweden, YLE, 23 March 2014, http://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/poll_shows_support_for_military_union_with_sweden/7151598
52 Collectivework,NATO’s Northeastern Flank – Emerging Opportunities for Engagement,RANDCorporation,2017,https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1467.html,p.209.
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fromtheFinnishcentre-left;thereasonsforthatbeinganti-Americansenti-mentandanunwillingnesstoinflamerelationswithRussia53.
Over the past few years, these limitations have gradually been overcomeasaresultofthedevelopmentofRussia’smilitarycapabilities.Thestrengthen-ingoftheUSmilitarypresenceintheBalticstatesandPolandsince2014hasreinforcedtheperceptionoftheUSAinFinlandasaguarantorofthestatus quointheNordic-Balticregion.Inturn,Finland’ssignificancefortheUSAhasgrown,giventhepossibilityofmonitoringRussianmilitaryactivityintheFarNorthandguaranteeingthesecurityoftheBalticstates54.FinlandwantstousetheincreasedUSmilitarypresenceintheregiontointensifyco-operationwiththeUSAintheareaofbi-andmultilateralexercises,andthereforetoimproveinteroperability–mainlyofbothcountries’airforcesand,sincerecently,alsoofthelandforces.Arrow2016wasthefirstevermilitaryexerciseonFinnishsoilwhichengagedaUSmechanisedinfantrycompany.FinlandhasalsoinvitedtheUSAtotakepartinalargenationaldefenceexerciseplannedtobeheldin2021thatwillbemodelledontheSwedishAurora2017exercise55.TheFinn-ishengagementinUSmilitaryexercisesintheregion(SaberStrike,BALTOPS)has also increased. In 2016, the two countries signed a statement of intenttoenhancedefenceco-operation56.AllthisisaimedatdemonstratingtoRussiathatthenon-alignedFinlandispartoftheWestandinfactanorthernexten-sionofNATO’seasternflank.Militaryco-operationwiththeUSAissupportedby59%ofFinns(35%areopposedtoit)57.
In the future, Finnish-US military co-operation will include increasinglyadvancedmilitaryexercisesandfurtherUSengagementinthemodernisationofFinland’sarmedforces.TheUSoffersFinlandthesaleofanti-missileandanti-aircraft(ESSM)andanti-ship(Harpoon)missilesforthenavyandcoastal
53 FinlanddoesnotparticipateintheUSForeignMilitaryFinancingandtheNationalGuard’sStatePartnershipProgram.
54 FinlandisbuildingitspositioninrelationswiththeUSAalsothroughexpeditionaryengage-ment(100soldiersinIraqiKurdistanaspartoftheUS-ledcoalitionagainstIslamicState).
55 TheparticipationofUSforcesinsuchexerciseswillmarkabreakthroughintheFinnishdefencepolicy.
56 J.GotkowskaP.Szymański,Pro-American non-alignment. Sweden and Finland develop closer military co-operation with the United States,“OSWCommentary”,1April2016,https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2016-04-01/pro-american-non-alignment-sweden-and-finland-develop-closer; P. Szymański, Bliższa współpraca obronna Finlandii i USA w cieniu Su-27, “OSW Analyses”, 12 October 2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/pub-likacje/analizy/2016-10-12/blizsza-wspolpraca-obronna-finlandii-i-usa-w-cieniu-su-27
57 Finns' opinions…,November2017,op. cit.
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artillery58aswellasanewfighteraircraftfortheair force(F-35orSuperHornet).
3. co-operation with nATo
Despitethegradualopeninguptomilitaryco-operationwiththeWest,FinlandhasnotmadeeffortstojoinNATOsincetheendoftheColdWar.Thefactorsthatdecidedaboutthis includedbothfearsofMoscow’sreactionandofFinland’sbeinginvolvedinaconflictbetweenRussiaandtheWestaswellastheconvic-tionthatafterthecollapseoftheUSSR,Europewouldmanagetobuildanewsecurityorder.Finlandalsowantedtokeepthesenseofcontinuityinitsfor-eignandsecuritypolicyinwhichnosuchradicalturnhadbeenmadeafter1991asinthecaseofthecountriesfromtheformerEasternBloc.ItwasmotivatedbythefactthatoneofthepillarsofFinland’sinternationalidentityisthelegacyoftheCSCE,withFinlandplayingtheroleofabrokerbetweentheEastandtheWest.NATOmembershipiscurrentlysupportedby2outof9parliamentarypartiesand22%oftheFinnishpublic(62%areopposedtoit).Interestingly,thesupportlevelisthelowestamongtheagegroupwhichiscurrentlybecominginvolvedinpolitics(25–34years)59.Asectionofthepoliticalcentre-rightwhoperceiveaccessiontoNATOasaninvestmentinFinnishsecurityemphasisethesignificanceofalliedguaranteesindeterringRussia.Meanwhile,thecentre-left,whobelievethataccessiontoNATOwouldadverselyaffecttheFinland’slevelofsecurity,traditionallyviewsthenon-alignedstatusasafactorthatcontributestostabilityintheregion.Lowpublicsupportformembershipisaneffectofmanyfactors,including:thelegacyoftheWinterWar(thebeliefthatFinlandiscapableofindependentdefence)andtheColdWarneutralitypolicy,theunwillingnesstoparticipateindistantconflictsandtheperceptionofNATOasanaggressivealliance,aswellasthefactthatthisissueremainsasecondarytopicinpoliticalparties’agendas(andthereforeinelectoralcampaignsandpublicdebate)60.
Regardlessof thedivisions,subsequentgovernmentshavegraduallydevel-opedevercloserco-operationwithNATO,withoutapplyingformembership.
58 R. Häggblom, No Finnish Harpoon/ESSM-order (at least for now), “Corporal Frisk”, 7 February2018,https://corporalfrisk.com/2018/02/07/no-finnish-harpoon-essm-order-at-least-for-now/
59 Finns' opinions…,November2017,op. cit.60 J.Gotkowska,P.Szymański,Between co-operation and membership. Sweden and Finland’s rela-
tions with NATO, “OSW Studies”, February 2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2017-03-03/between-co-operation-and-membership-sweden-and-finlands-relations
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TheintroductionofNATOstandardsintheFinnisharmedforcesandthepar-ticipationinNATOexercisesandoperations(theBalkansandAfghanistan)wereanimportantinstrumentoftheirmodernisation.Thehighlevelofinter-operabilitywithNATOforcesdemonstratedthroughtheFinnishparticipationinNATOResponseForce(NRF)since2012meansthattherearenobarriersinmilitarytermstoFinland’smembershipinthealliance.HelsinkiwantsMos-cowtoviewitasareliablealternativetoFinland’snon-alignmentandthuspreventRussiafrompursuingapolicythatwouldposeathreattoFinland’ssecurityinterests.ForthisreasonFinlanddoesnotofficiallyruleoutapplyingformembershipincaseofunfavorablechangesinitssecurityenvironment.
NATO’s stronger concentration on collective defence since the annexationofCrimeacontributestoshiftingthecentreofgravityofFinland-NATOrela-tionsfromglobalcrisismanagementtotheBalticSearegion,thuscreatingnewperspectivesforestablishingcloserco-operation.OneexampleistheHostNationSupportagreementwithNATOthatmakeitpossibleforNATOtouseFinland’sterritory,territorialwatersandairspaceatpeacetime,incrisissitu-ationsandincaseofconflict–eachtimesubjecttotheFinnishgovernment’sconsent(thisagreementhasbeeninforcesince2016).Furthermore,since2014,FinlandhasbelongedtoagroupoffiveprivilegedpartnersofNATOaspartoftheEnhancedOpportunitiesPartnership,whichoffersitgreateropportuni-tiesofco-operationasregardsexercises,militaryoperationsandconsultationsonsecurityintheBalticSearegion61.Theseareheldinthe28+2format(NATOplusSwedenandFinland).
FinlandisunlikelytotakeactiontojoinNATOduringthenextparliamentaryterm(2019–2023).ObjectionfromtheSocialDemocratsandtheCentrePartywillnotbetheonlyobstacle–eventhepro-NATOparties(theNationalCoali-tionPartyandtheSwedishPeople’sParty)believethat,consideringthecur-renttensionsbetweenRussiaandtheWest,theapplicationformembershipneedstobepostponed.However,thedevelopmentofthediscussiononFinland’sNATOmembershiptoagreatextentdependsonthefutureofSweden’ssecuritypolicy.Sweden’sapplicationforNATOmembershipwouldstokeFinland’sfearsofremaininginthesecurity‘greyzone’betweenNATOandRussia,provideastrongargumenttoitssupportersinFinland,andweakentheobjectionofthecentre-leftandthepublic.ItisinHelsinki’sintereststocoordinatetheissuesofpossibleNATOmembershipwithSwedentoavoidrepeatingthesituation
61 Exchangeof informationwithNATOinordertobuild jointsituationalawareness isalsoveryimportantforFinland.
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fromthe1990s,whenSweden’sapplicationforaccessiontotheEuropeanCom-munitycameasasurprisetoFinland.ThefurtherreinforcementoftheallieddeterrenceintheNordic-Balticregionisanotherfactorthatmaycausearevi-sionoftheapproachtoNATOinFinland,asthisplacesincreasingemphasisonthedifferencebetweenmembersandnon-members.
4. co-operation in the European union
Finland,withitsperipherallocationandnon-alignedstatus,treatsenhanc-ingEuropeanintegrationasaninvestmentinitsownsecurity.ForthisreasonitactivelyparticipatesindiscussionsonthefutureoftheCommonSecurityandDefencePolicywhich,initsopinion,shouldbecomeaneffectiveinstrumentofimprovingmemberstates’militarycapabilities62.Finland,whichhasawell-developedarmsindustry,seesthebenefitsofestablishingtheEuropeanDefenceFund(EDF).HelsinkiactivelysupportedtheinitiationofPermanentStructuredCooperation(PESCO)intheareaofsecurityanddefenceandbecameengagedinthefirststageinthreeprojectsinradiocommunication,themobilityofforces(so-calledmilitarySchengen)andcybersecurity63.However,Finlandtradition-allyopposestransformingtheEUintoamilitaryalliance.ThisisaneffectnotonlyofFinland’snon-alignmentandunwillingnesstoprovidesecurityguaran-teestotheBalticstatesbutalsoofthedifferencesinthedefencepoliciesofthememberstates,includingtheunderstandingofthemutualassistanceclause(article42.7oftheTreatyoftheEuropeanUnion).
62 J.Sipilä,Developing the EU’s defence dimension is in Finland’s interest,GovernmentofFinland,7 June 2017, http://vnk.fi/en/artikkeli/-/asset_publisher/paaministeri-juha-sipila-eu-n-puolustusulottuvuuden-kehittaminen-on-suomen-etu
63 TheEuropeanSecureSoftwaredefinedRadio,theMilitaryMobilityandtheCyberRapidResponseTeamsandMutualAssistanceinCyberSecurity.Finlandalsohasobserversta-tus in the Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform. T. Wie-gold, Vollzugsmeldung: PESCO, mehr Zusammenarbeit in der Verteidigung, in Kraft (Update),“Augengeradeaus”,11December2017,http://augengeradeaus.net/2017/12/vollzugsmeldung-pesco-mehr-zusammenarbeit-in-der-verteidigung-in-kraft/
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Iv. FInlAnd’S ArmEd ForcES: A modEl dETErrEncE or A pApEr TIgEr?
FromFinland’sviewpoint,Russia’swarswithGeorgiaandUkrainehaveproventhatitisrighttosticktotheprincipleoftotaldefenceandaconscriptarmycon-centratedonnationaldefencetasks64.Atthesametime,theRussianannexationofCrimeasparkedadiscussionontheweaknessesoftheFinnishdefencemodelresultingfromfinancialandmaterielshortagesandthetimeneededtomobilisereservists.Asaresult,Finlandbeganinvestinginimprovingthelevelofthearmy’scombatreadinessandisincreasingthewartimestrengthofitsarmedforcesforthefirsttimesincethecollapseoftheUSSR.TheFinnisharmedforcesarecomposedofreserveunitsandarefocusedontrainingconscripts,whichmakesitdifficulttoassesstheirrealdefencecapabilities.
1. The conscript army and the defensive doctrine
Since 1991, Finland has maintained the foundations of its defence doctrineformedinthe1950sand1960s–generalconscription,alargetrainedreserve,territorialdefenceprinciple,andatotaldefencesystem.Theargumentsformaintainingthisdoctrineincluded:thecontinuingsenseofthreatfromRus-sia,thesocio-politicalsupportforconscriptionandtheeconomiccrisisinthe1990s which discouraged the government from a costly professionalisationofthearmedforces.ThismakesFinlanddistinctfrommostcountriesintheregionwhich,sincethelate1990s,haveinvestedinexpeditionarycapabilitiesfortheneedsofNATOcrisismanagementoperations.
Finlandstillbelievesthataconscriptarmyischeaperandmoreeffective.Oneoftheargumentsfortheextensiveengagementofitssmallpopulation(5.5million)inthecountry’sdefenceistheneedtodefenditslargeterritory(338km2)65andlongborderwithRussia.Compulsorymilitaryserviceisalsoanimportantpartofcivileducation–around70%ofannualcohortofmalecitizens is drafted (during the Cold War period this ratio reached around95%).TheageingofsocietywillbeachallengefortheFinnisharmedforcesinthefuture.Thesmallernumberofconscriptsmayprovokeadiscussion
64 Totaldefencemeanstheparticipationofallstatestructuresandsocietyinwartimeefforts.Comprehensive security is building the country’s resilience to all kinds of military andnon-militarythreatsthroughcivilianandmilitaryco-operationatpeacetime.
65 FinlandhasthelowestpopulationdensityamongtheEUmemberstates.
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onagreateropeningupoftheFinnisharmedforcestowomen’smilitaryser-vice.81%ofcitizenssupportedconscriptionin201766.
Finlandassumesthatasacountrysituatedintheperipheryofitscivilisationalbase(theWest)andborderingonapotentiallyhostilepower,itmustconstantlydemonstrateitswillandreadinesstodefenditssovereignty.Itdoessomainlythroughconscription(over20,000conscriptstrainedannually)andrefreshertrainingforreservists(around18,000annually).Atthesametime,FinlandprofilesitsmilitarypostureanddefenceinvestmentsinawaythatwillnotbeinterpretedbyRussiaasdevelopingoffensivecapabilities.FromFinland’sviewpoint,themaindeterringfactorshouldaboveallbeitscapabilitytomobi-liseasubstantialreserveforce(in2017,thewartimestrengthofFinnisharmedforcesreached230,000soldiers,i.e.over4%ofpopulation),whichraisesthecostsofanypossibleaggression.Therefore,Finland’sarmedforcesatpeacetimeisatrainingstructurewithasmallnumberofprofessionalsoldiers(8,000)focusedonworkwithconscripts.However,thisisalsothecauseofthegreat-estweaknessoftheFinnishlandforces:thelowlevelofunits’combatreadi-ness67.Mobilisationofthereserveistime-consuming,whileRussiahastacticalmilitaryformationsalongtheborderthatcanlaunchoffensiveactionsatshortnotice68.Finland’sairforceandnavyaremoreprofessionalisedthanitslandforces,andassuchhaveahigherlevelofcombatreadiness.
The insufficient defence budget also has an impact on the condition of theFinnisharmedforces.InFinland,otherpriorities,forexample,welfarestateexpenses,oftenprevailovertheneedsofthearmy.ForthisreasontheFinnishplanstoincreasedefencebudgetneedtobeviewedwithcaution69.Thelong-standingstagnationindefenceexpenditureatalevelaround1.5%ofGDPhasresultedinshortagesinweaponsandmilitaryequipment,includingfortheneedsofwartimeforces.Forexample,thenumberofnavyvesselshasdecreased
66 Finns' opinions…,November2017,op. cit.67 The special forces are the only part of the Finnish land forces prepared for immediate
response.S.Forss,L.Kiianlinna,P. Inkinen, H.Hult, The Development of Russian Military Policy and Finland,NationalDefenceUniversityofFinland,2013,p.56.
68 Thisconcernsthemechanisedbrigades:138thinKamenka(LeningradOblast),80thinAlakurtti(MurmanskOblast)and200thinPechenga(MurmanskOblast).
69 One of the government’s priorities after the election in 2015 was to gradually increasedefenceexpenditurethatwasexcludedfromtheausterityprogramme.Meanwhile,in2016-2018militaryexpenditurewereraisedbyonly2.5%(from2.8to2.87billioneuros).
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overthepastfewyears,andtheparliamentaryreportpreparedin2014pointedtoshortagesofanti-tankandairdefencesystems70.
ThelandforceswhichhavesignificantartilleryandarmouredpotentialarethemostimportantbranchoftheFinnisharmedforces.Atpeacetimetheycon-sistoffivebrigades(includingtheArcticandthearmouredbrigade)andtworegiments(thespecialforcesandonetaskedwithurbanwarfare,especiallythedefenceoftheHelsinkiarea).Atwartimethemanoeuvrablecomponent(around35,000soldiers)istobethemainstrikeforceofthelandtroops.Theterritoriallyorganisedregionalcomponent(around125,000soldiers)istaskedwithslowingdowntheenemy(seeAppendix2).ThenavyisinchargeofprotectingthesealinesofcommunicationanddenyingaccesstotheFinnishcoastline(thegreatsignificanceofminelaying)71.Ensuringairsuperiorityusedtobethemainroleoftheairforce.However,sincethesecondmid-lifeupgradeoftheF/A-18Hornetfighterfleet(gainingair-to-surfacecapabilitiesbyequippingitwithJASSMmissilesandJDAMandJSOWprecisionbombs),whichwascompletedin2016,theirtaskshavebeenexpandedtoincludeairsupport72.Foracountrywithapopulationof5.5million,Finlandhasstrongfighterfleet–62modernisedF/A-18Hornets.
2. Adjustment to the new challenges
Eventhoughthekeyelementsofthedefencedoctrinehavebeenpreserved,theFinnisharmedforcesarebeingreformedundertheinfluenceofnewtrendsinmilitarytechnologyandinthesecurityenvironment.Investmentsinoffen-sivecapabilitiesarethemostimportantchange.Increasingthelevelofcombatreadinessalongwithagreaterreadinesstorecieveandprovidemilitaryaidalsocarrygreatweight.
70 Long-term challenges of defence: final report of the parliamentary assessment group,Parliamentof Finland, May 2014, https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/tietoaeduskunnasta/julkaisut/Docu-ments/ekj_5+2014.pdf
71 BalticSeatransportisofkeysignificanceforFinland,sincearound90%ofitsexportsand80% of its imports are transported by sea. H.Haapavaara, Merivoimille neljä 105-metristä korvettia – 1,2 miljardilla suurimmat alukset sitten panssarilaiva Ilmarisen ja Väinämöisen,“Tekniikka&Talous”,17January2018,https://www.tekniikkatalous.fi/tekniikka/metalli/merivoimille-nelja-105-metrista-korvettia-1-2-miljardilla-suurimmat-alukset-sitten-panssarilaiva-ilmarisen-ja-vainamoisen-6696642
72 All Finnish Air Force’s Hornets Upgraded to MLU 2,FinnishDefenceForces,16December2016,http://ilmavoimat.fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/kaikki-ilmavoimien-hornetit-on-nyt-paivitetty-mlu-2-tasoon
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(1) Quantity versus quality.SincetheendoftheColdWar,Finlandhascon-ductedanumberofreformsofitsarmedforcesguidedbytheprincipleofreplac-ing the quantitative approach with investments in improving the qualityofthetrainingofsoldiers,andofmilitaryequipment(seeAppendix3).Thisentailedgradualreductionsinthenumberofprofessionalmilitarypersonnelandinthesizeofwartimeforces,whichwerecorrelatedwiththeshrinkingoftheRussianarmyafterthecollapseoftheUSSR.Sincethe1990s,Finlandhasreduceditswartimeforcesbymorethanahalf—from530,000to230,000soldiers.Anothercausebehindthiswasthesearchforbudgetarysavings,whichwasessentialduringthemostthoroughreformconductedin2013–2014afterthe financial crisis. The wartime strength was reduced then from 358,000to230,000soldiers,whichmostofallaffectedthelandforces(cutfrom265,000to160,000).Therehavealsobeenreductionsinprofessionalmilitarypersonnel(from15,000to12,300,includingcivilians),thescaleofrefresherexercisesforthereserve(from25,000to18,000reservistsannually)andthegeneralnumberofstructuresinthearmedforces(from51to32)bymergingunits,centralisinglogistics,andeliminatingonelevelofcommand(i.e.fourregionalcommandswhosecompetenceshavebeentakenoverbybrigades),amongothermeasures73.
Ananalogoustrendhasalsobeenseen inmilitaryequipment.FinlandhasbeengraduallywithdrawingormodernisingitsColdWareraweapons(mainlypost-Soviet),focusingontheacquisitionofsmallerquantitiesofmoretechno-logicallyadvancedsystems.Givenitsbudgetlimitation,Finlandprefersbuyingsecond-handarmamentfromitspartners(e.g.LeopardtanksfromGermanyandtheNetherlands,MLRSmultiplerocketlaunchersfromtheNetherlandsandK9self-propelledhowitzersfromSouthKorea).Alessfrequentchoiceistoacquirenew armament, as was the case when Finland replaced the Soviet Buk airdefencesystemswiththeNorwegian-USNASAMS2.Ingeneral,theFinnisharmyhasa limitedquantityofmodernmateriel (mainly formanoeuvrableforces)andastilllargeColdWareraarsenal(mainlyforregionalforces).Fin-landistoallocateanadditional150millioneurosannuallytothenewprocure-mentsfrom2021.Inthecomingdecade,Helsinkiisplanningtoacquirenewmulti-rolevessels(atanestimatedcostof1.2billioneuros)andfighteraircraft(atanestimatedcostof7–10billioneuros).Bytheseambitiousmodernisationprogrammes Finland’s defence budget is intended to rise to the level of 2%
73 Kokonaisarvio puolustusvoimauudistuksesta valmistunut, Ministry of Defence of Finland,31 October 2016, http://www.defmin.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/kokonaisarvio_puolus-tusvoimauudistuksesta_valmistunut.8043.news;P.Felstead,Northern composure, “Jane’s”,2017,http://www.janes.com/images/assets/660/69660/Northern_composure.pdf
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ofGDPstartingfrom2022(increasingthepublicdebt).Duringtheimplemen-tationofbothprogrammesFinlandwillmostlikelytrytobalanceprocurementsfromSwedenandUSA.Giventhehuge(forFinland)costsofthenewvesselsandfightersFinland’sarmamentplansmayfacesomedelays.
The Russian-Ukrainian war provoked a discussion in Finland as to whetherthearmyreformcompletedin2014hadbeenreasonable.Asaresult, inJune2017,Finlandadoptedanewstrategicplanningdocument(theGovernment’sDefenceReport)underwhichitsarmedforces’wartimestrengthwasincreasedto280,000soldiers,whichissettostrengthenmainlytheregionalforces74.How-ever,thesignificanceofthiscorrectionofthereformshouldnotbeoverstated,sinceitwillbeachievedpartlybyincludingconscriptsandborderguards,whohavepreviouslynotbeencounted,intothewartimeforces.Nordoesthissolvetheproblemoftheinsufficientnumberofprofessionalsoldiers(around600positionsremainedunmannedintheFinnisharmedforcesduetobudgetcuts).Besidesthis,itraisesthequestionwhetherarmyiscapableofprovidingmobilisedreservistswithsufficientquantityofweaponsandmilitaryequipment.ItispossiblethattechnologicalprogressandtheadditionalburdenlinkedtotrainingconscriptswillforceFinlandtoincreasethenumberofprofessionalsoldiers.
(2) Conventional versus hybrid conflict. TheFinnisharmedforcesarefocusedondevelopingitscapabilitiesofrepellingaconventionalattack.However,theconclusions made after the Russian Crimean operation have made Finlandattach greater importance to counteracting hybrid threats. As part of this,ithasstrengthenedtheborderguard(intermsofpersonnel,equipmentandnewpowers),updatedthemilitaryexercisesscenariosandintroducedanumberoflegalamendmentsenablingamorerapidresponsetotheemergenceofsub-versiveparamilitarygroupsandtheexpropriationofrealestatelocatedclosetomilitaryobjectswhenthereisasuspicionthatthesecanbeusedagainstthecountry’sdefencepotential.TheEuropeanCentreofExcellenceforCounteringHybridThreatsestablishedin2017inHelsinkiforNATOandEUmemberstatesisexpectedtobeanimportanttooltoimproveresiliencetohybridaggression.
(3) Combat readiness.Althoughtheneedtoincreasethelevelofcombatreadi-nessofthearmedforceshadbeendiscussedforalongtime,ithasonlybeen
74 Government’s Defence Report, Government of Finland, 16 February 2017, https://www.defmin.fi/files/3688/J07_2017_Governments_Defence_Report_Eng_PLM_160217.pdf
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inthepastfewyearsthatanumberofnewsolutionswereadoptedinthisarea75.Theseincludeupdatingthereservists’database(900,000reservists),increasingthenumberofrefresherexercisesforreservesoldiers(duetofundingshort-ages,only4,000-5,000reservistsparticipatedinthemannuallyin2012-2014;thisnumberis18,000atpresent)andadaptingadditionalairfieldstoaccom-modatestandbyfighters(QuickReactionAlert).Furthermore,since2016,thepresidenthashadtherighttocallupasmanyas25,000reservistsforsnapdrills(withoutthethreemonths’noticethathadhithertobeenrequired).ThislineofstrengtheningdefencecapabilitiesisalsoincludedintheGovernment’sDefenceReportwhichassignssomeconscriptstotherapidmanningofunitsintheeventofacrisisorconflict.Theirmilitaryservicehasbeenextendedfrom6to12months.Since2018,Finlandwillallocateanadditional55millioneurosannuallyonimprovingthelevelofitsarmy’scombatreadiness.ThesechangesareaimedatreducingRussia’sinitialstrikeadvantageincaseofaconflictandimprovingflexibilityinrespondingtoirregularwarfare.
(4) Offensive capabilities and retaliation. Thepurchaseof70USJASSMlong-rangecruisemissiles(air-to-surface) in2012,whicharealreadyintegratedwithFinnishHornets,wasadeviationfromtheprincipleofdevelopingstrictlydefensivecapabilities.Theyhavearangeofupto350km,whichmeansthatFinlandforthefirsttimeinhistoryiscapableofdestroyingtargetsattherearoftheenemy’sforces.Atthesametime,FinlandupgradeditsMLRSmultiplerocketlaunchers,gainingthecapabilityofusingGMLRSguidedammunitionwhichhavearangeofupto70kmandATACMSballisticmissileswitharangeofupto165km(purchaseoflatterwaspostponed).However,thesehavebeentheonlymovesmadebyFinlandsofarthatcanberecognisedasbuildingitsownoffensivecapabilities(mainlyduetodefencebugetconstraints)76.
(5) International co-operation. TheFinnisharmedforces,whichuntilrecentlystuck to the principle of independent defence, are increasingly opening uptotheoptionofreceivingandprovidingmilitaryassistance.ThispertainsnotonlytotheagreementwithNATO(HostNationSupport),butalsotolegisla-tionchangesintroducedinJune2017thatallowFinlandtoaskanotherstate,theEUandinternationalorganisationsformilitarysupport.Atthesametime,
75 P.Järvenpää,Preparing for the worst: conscription and reserve forces in the Nordics,ICDS,Octo-ber 2016, https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2016/ICDS_Analysis_-_Preparing_for_the_Worst_-_Pauli_Jarvenpaa.pdf
76 Inthecaseofthenavy,thepurchaseofHarpoonmissiles(RGM-84Q-4HarpoonBlockIIPlusER)wouldensuresuchcapabilities.
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Finlandwillbeabletosenditssoldiersabroadwithamandatetouseforceinordertoaidanotherstate77.TheseareessentialchangesintheFinnishdefencepolicybecauseuntilrecentlythelawpermittedengagingthearmedforcesonlyinthreecases:nationaldefencetasks,supporttotheadministration,andpar-ticipationincrisismanagementoperations.Workonamendingrelevantlegis-lationbeganin2009andgainedmomentumafterFranceactivatedthemutualassistanceclauseoftheTreatyofLisbon(article42.7)ineffectoftheterroristattacksin2015.
77 Decisionstothiseffectaretakenbythepresidentinco-operationwiththegovernmentandafterconsultationswithparliament(commissionforforeignaffairs).
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1. Finland’s military expenditure in billions of US$ and as a per-centage of GDP
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
[%][US$ bn]
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
1.0
1.5
2.0
Source:SIPRIMilitaryExpenditureDatabase,SIPRI,https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex
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App
endi
x 2.
Fin
land
’s ar
med
forc
es in
201
778
land
For
ces
nav
yA
ir F
orce
Tota
l
Prof
essi
onal
sold
iers
an
d ci
vilia
n pe
rson
nel
4,30
0(o
f whi
ch c
ivili
ans:
800
)1,
400
(of w
hich
civ
ilian
s:
n/a)
2,00
0(o
f whi
ch c
ivili
ans:
n/
a)
12,3
00(o
f whi
ch c
ivil-
ians
: 4,3
00)
Cons
crip
ts*
20,0
003,
400
1,300
25,0
00
War
tim
e st
reng
th16
0,00
020
,000
24,0
0023
0,00
0**
Mos
t im
port
ant
mili
tary
equ
ipm
ent
Tan
ks (1
80):
100
x Le
opar
d 2A
4, 8
0 x
Leop
ard
2A6
Infa
ntry
figh
ting
veh
icle
s (21
2): 1
10 x
BM
P 2,
102
x CV
9030
FI
NA
rmou
red
pers
onne
l car
rier
s (70
9), i
nclu
ding
:33
9 x
MT-
LBV,
260
x S
isu
XA-
180/
185
Trac
ked
carr
iers
(120
0)co
mm
and
vehi
cles
(161
)Su
ppor
t veh
icle
s (24
)H
owit
zers
(775
), of
whi
ch: 4
71 x
D30
tow
ed h
owit
zers
,13
2 x
K83
/K98
tow
ed h
owit
zers
, 72
x 2
S1 se
lf-pr
opel
led
how
itze
rs
mor
tars
(716
): 69
8 x
KRH
92
mor
tars
, 18
x A
MO
S se
lf-pr
opel
led
auto
mat
ic m
orta
rsm
ulti
ple
rock
et la
unch
ers (
75):
41 x
M27
0 M
LRS,
34
x RM
70A
nti-
tan
k w
eapo
ns: M
72 L
AW R
PG a
nti-t
ank
guid
ed m
issi
les
MBT
LAW
, Spi
ke a
nd T
OW
2A
ir d
efen
ce s
yste
ms:
24
x N
ASA
MS
2, C
rota
le S
AM
, Sti
nger
an
d RB
S70
(ASR
AD
-R) M
AN
PAD
SH
elic
opte
rs (2
7), of
whi
ch: 2
0 x
NH
90 ta
ctic
al tr
ansp
ort h
elic
opte
rsu
Av (1
1): 1
1 x re
conn
aiss
ance
AD
S 95
RA
NGE
R
mis
sile
boa
ts (8
)m
inel
ayer
s (5)
min
esw
eepe
rs (1
3)la
ndin
g cr
afts
(51)
Aux
ilia
ries
(29)
Figh
ter
airc
raft
(62)
:7 x
F/A
-18
D,55
x F
/A-1
8 C
Trai
ner
airc
raft
(74)
Tran
spor
t and
sur
-ve
illa
nce
airc
raft
(1
2), o
f whi
ch:
3 x C
ASA
C-2
95M
, 3 x
Le
arje
t 35 A
/S
*Num
bero
fcon
scri
ptst
rain
eda
nnua
lly,*
*In
addi
tion
toth
eth
ree
bran
ches
oft
hea
rmed
forc
es,f
ore
xam
ple,
logi
stic
sisc
onsi
dere
dpa
rto
fthe
war
tim
est
reng
th.
78
Dev
elop
edo
nth
eba
siso
fthe
web
site
ofF
inla
nd’s
arm
edfo
rces
,htt
p://
puol
ustu
svoi
mat
.fi/e
tusi
vu,h
ttps
://pu
olus
tusv
oim
at.fi
/en/
exch
ange
-of-i
nfor
-m
atio
nan
dTh
e Mili
tary
Bal
ance
201
6,II
SS,L
ondo
n20
16,p
p.9
2–94
.
40
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Appendix 3. Finland’s wartime strength of armed forces in thousands of soldiers and as percentage of population
1975 1990 2000 2010 2015 2020
[%]
700
530
450
358
230
280
[thousands of soldiers]
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
3
6
9
12
15
Source:P.Visuri,Evolution of the Finnish Military Doctrine, 1945-1985,“FinnishDefenceStudies”,WarCollege,Helsinki1990;R.Penttilä,Finland’s search for security through defence, 1944-89,London1991;Population,StatisticsFinland,https://www.stat.fi/til/vrm_en.html;The Military Balance,IISS
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map. Finland’sterritoriallossesinWorldWarII
FINLAND
RUSSIA
ESTONIA
Murmansk
Tallinn
Saint PetersburgStockholm
Helsinki
SWEDEN
SALL
AKA
RELIA
Borders in 1939
Bordes after 1944
PETS
AMO
/©
Source:R.Penttilä,Finland’s search for security through defence, 1944-89,London1991