woodcock--knowing where you stand

Running head: KNOWING WHERE YOU STAND 1

This is an author’s accepted manuscript of an article published in the Journal of Comparative

Social Welfare, 28(1), February 2012, pp. 1-15 (copyright Taylor & Francis), available online at

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17486831.2011.595077#.Uwy7WLQwDdc

Knowing Where You Stand:

Neoliberal and Other Foundations for Social Work

Ray Woodcock, MSW, JD, MBA

Indiana University

School of Social Work

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES FOR SOCIAL WORK 2

Knowing Where You Stand:

Neoliberal and Other Foundations for Social Work

Abstract

The neoliberal philosophy that presently dominates social work in America is often accepted by

social workers without question; and when it does come into focus, it is commonly treated as the

only perspective that could make sense or be ethical. But in fact every philosophy, including

neoliberalism, sometimes calls for tough judgments and requires unpleasant commitments.

Many social workers may find that an eclectic and dispassionate – but informed – approach

works best in practice. This article provides thumbnail sketches and cross-comparisons among

some of the most commonly mentioned political philosophies, so as to help social workers

interpret dialogues, understand clients’ views, and identify potentially divergent threads in their

own political orientations.


Maybe social work required its practitioners to facilitate Nazi exterminations. Maybe it

called for putting Asian-Americans into concentration camps. Maybe it meant providing mental

health services to middle-class white people, in the 1920s, while other families went hungry.

Or maybe that’s not what social work actually required. But if not, how did social

workers become implicated in such events? It may be convenient to hope that those were

historical anomalies, and that we know better now. It is probably safer, though, to treat ideology

as an ongoing fact of life. One can expect that there will be other social workers, in the future,

who find themselves similarly inclined or constrained to participate in abusive behaviors and

even human rights violations against vulnerable populations – and who, moreover, will persist in

doing so without having (or wanting) an outsider’s perspective upon their actions.

Political and economic philosophies go by many labels. It can be difficult to understand

them, not only because of the varieties of labels and the numbers of issues they address, but also

because labels are not necessarily used consistently. People who are supposedly liberal can be

acting like conservatives, and vice versa; those who speak loudest about their country, or their

rights, are often caught behaving in ways that directly contradict their own professed principles.

That sort of thing can become frustrating and discouraging. At a certain point, it can be easier,

and can seem more practical, to just tune it out and stick with what’s familiar – to proceed on the

assumption that a “conservative” or a “liberal” or a “communist” is just wrong and should be

ignored or, perhaps, silenced.

This article provides an introduction to some frequently cited political philosophies, with

a focus on characteristics of particular interest to social work. A basic orientation to these

philosophies, and to how they relate to one another, may yield some unexpected conclusions

about one’s own stance. In a pinch, social workers may find such an understanding invaluable.


The article proceeds on the assumptions that smart, honest, and kind people can disagree, for

reasons that seem persuasive when one comes to understand their perspective, and that the best

approach to this sort of discussion is to remain dispassionate to the extent possible.

A Survey of Some Established Political Philosophies

Not everyone agrees even on the rough distinctions among political philosophies. The

terms and meanings used here have broad support, but may seem mistaken from some

perspectives. Some such disagreements are impossible to resolve. People must choose among

the things they wish to emphasize, and in doing so will inevitably find some distinctions more

important than others. The reader who becomes interested in such matters is encouraged to

develop his/her own ability to characterize relevant political phenomena for his/her needs.

In particular, and consistent with much of the literature of political philosophy, this

article diverges from the popular treatment of “liberal” and “conservative.” In the media,

“liberal” is often used as a catch-all for non-radical views on what is commonly called the left

side of the political spectrum, and “conservative” likewise on the right. Without getting ahead of

the story, what the popular press considers “liberal” might be better called socialist or left-

libertarian, and much of so-called “conservativism” is actually liberal (sic) or right-libertarian.

Note, also, that there are alternative, multidimensional understandings of political diversity (e.g.,

Slomp, 2000, pp. 18-30; Mitchell, 2007, p. 18). This article uses left and right terminology for

convenience; it does not mean to endorse unidimensionality.

Starting with a general summary on the right, then, one does encounter the familiar

concept of conservatism. Many conservatives (like people of any other orientation) hold a mix

of views, and are not able and willing to apply those views consistently to all situations. This

sort of behavior can be characterized as desirable (e.g., “practical”) or undesirable (e.g.,


“hypocritical”). This article does not attempt to parse the logic, ethicality, or psychology of such

situational inconsistencies, in conservativism or elsewhere. In other words, “conservative” and

other labels, as used here, are intended for purposes of rough generalization, and do not purport

to capture the full measure of any complex human being in his/her life circumstances.

Conservatism, in political philosophy, tends to refer to a preference for tradition and/or

authority (e.g., O’Hear, 2005). In conservative thinking, the individual is not prioritized over

society’s enduring institutions (e.g., family, church). Key conservative philosophers (e.g.,

Burke, 1790; Hegel, 1821/1991) emphasize self-reliance and fulfilling one’s duty to society, in

contrast to demanding something from society. Conservative subordination of the individual

became extreme in, for example, Italy’s fascism of the 1920s-1940s (e.g., Gentile, 1929/2002).

Cranston (2006) summarizes part of Gentile’s perspective:

Whereas liberalism, socialism, democracy, and the other progressive movements of

the nineteenth century had asserted the rights of man, the selfish claims of the indiv-

idual, fascism sought, instead, to uphold the moral integrity and higher collective

purposes of the nation. And whereas liberalism saw the state simply as an institu-

tion created to protect men’s rights, fascism looked on the state as an organic entity

that embodied in itself all the noblest spiritual reality of the people as a whole.

Facism can be construed as pathology, though that may not be the most parsimonious explana-

tion (see Mudde, 2008). In contrast to the fascist embrace of the state, conservatives tend to

favor limited government, with checks and balances that prevent central authorities from

acquiring too much power. Much of the contemporary form of American conservatism

developed in the 1950s (e.g., Kirk, 1953/2001; Buckley, 1951/1986; see Mudde, 2010, p. 589).


At the extreme opposite from fascism, in terms of attitudes toward the individual and the

state, lies anarchism (e.g., Woodcock, 2006). Both reject democracy, but for different reasons.

Fascists do not want voting individuals to steer the state, whereas anarchists feel that voting

facilitates majority dominance. Anarchism has been confused with anarchy (i.e., chaos). It has

also been equated with terrorism. Some anarchists do take a violent revolutionary stance toward

the state, but anarchism is more commonly pacifist (Weart, 1998). In most forms (from e.g.,

Proudhon, 1840/1876; Bakunin, 1873/1990; Tolstoy, 1894/1984; Kropotkin, 1902/1989; Sorel,

1908/1999), anarchism emphasizes cooperative mutual aid, reminiscent of Marx’s (1875) famous

dictum, “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” (p. 27).1

To turn to another political philosophy, anarchism tends to be a form of libertarianism.

Libertarianism (e.g., Vallentyne, 2010; Sterba, 2005) opposes many if not most governmental

activities (e.g., Nozick, 1974), including laws that restrict individual freedom (e.g., regulating

sexual practices or drug use; compelling military service or the payment of taxes). Thus,

libertarians combine stereotypically leftist or countercultural social attitudes with traditional

rightist political opposition to intrusive government. Libertarianism’s core concept is self-

ownership: the individual (not the government or anyone else) owns him/herself; s/he engages in

(or avoids) action based largely upon his/her free choice. As with conservatives, support for the

needy is therefore provided via voluntary charity, not via the perceived evil of compulsory

taxation that finances the further perceived evil of governmental intervention. In economics,

1 Blanc’s (1840/1911) translator offers the formulation, “[E]ach worker should receive

according to his needs and contribute according to his abilities” (p. 7). Anonymous (2008) quotes Blanc as saying, “Let each produce according to his aptitudes . . . let each consume according to his need.” It does not appear that either such phrasing, or anything resembling it, appears in Blanc’s text. To the contrary, as the translator notes (p. 51), Blanc eventually dropped even the proposal that each worker receive equal wages, never mind taking only what he needed. It thus remains unclear whether Blanc himself originated the sentiment.


right-libertarians reject governmental monopolies (e.g., road maintenance, police service) that

prevent people from engaging in such activities themselves; meanwhile, left-libertarians focus on

societal resources, contending that they are owned in common by everyone, and that those who

exploit them should compensate everyone else.

Locke (1689/2007) is a founding figure for classical liberalism, which shares the

libertarian emphasis on individual liberties (e.g., Waldron, 2005; Gaus & Courtland, 2010).

Classical liberalism parted ways with libertarianism when early liberals (especially Rousseau,

1762/2008, and Kant, 1797/1996) accepted restrictions on individual liberty for social purposes.

Liberal individualism, in various forms, has dominated western thought in recent centuries (see

Kagitçibasi, 1997, pp. 3-4). One liberal concept is that of the state of nature, in which (at least

heuristically) people are imagined to have lived simply and equally, forming natural bonds

among themselves and voluntarily entering into an implicit social contract giving everyone

certain rights and duties. Classical laissez-faire liberalism sees the market, private property, and

the rule of law as preeminent among the few social institutions that would have evolved

naturally. Classical liberals (e.g., Hayek, 1960, p. 400) consider the market an energetic,

enterprising medium that broke the stagnation and oppression of the old conservative order,

yielding profits for the individual and benefits for society (Roemer, 2010, p. 11). While classical

liberalism is typically associated with free-market capitalism, its emphasis upon individual

freedom also includes protections against governmental power – for the sake of the individual,

not for protection of conservative social institutions – such as voting rights, the free exchange of

ideas, and tolerance of diversity among people.

Classical liberalism is thus very different from Marxist/Leninist communism as instituted

in the former Soviet Union (see Fitzpatrick, 1998, p. 204; Roberts, 2004, p. 350). Earlier writers


(e.g., Plato, c. 380 BC / 2003; More, 1516/2003; Rousseau, 1762/2008) had presented some

communistic concepts, but Marx (e.g., 1867) offered a remarkable new attack on capitalism.

Echoing Proudhon’s (1840/1876, p. 33) “Property is robbery,” Marx charged not only that the

profit-seeking encouraged by classical liberalism constituted systematic theft from workers, but

also that the internal contradictions of capitalism would inevitably lead to revolution – and that

the revolution would be successful, as workers eagerly shed their chains. But instead, Marxists

of the early 20th century – seeing workers kill each other during World War I in defense of their

respective homelands’ capitalist economies – concluded that capitalism was not nearly as fragile

as Marx had imagined. The Soviet Union arose on the Leninist belief that “history [shows] no

other way of breaking the class will of the enemy except the systematic and energetic use of

violence” (Trotsky, 1920/1961, p. 55, quoted in Fitzpatrick, p. 210). In suitably grand and

violent style, in the 1930s Stalin’s Soviet Union implemented disastrous restructuring schemes in

agriculture and industry and conducted sweeping political purges, starving and murdering tens of

millions of the country’s own citizens, and imprisoning tens of millions more. Despite

impressive achievements, including stopping the Nazi war machine in World War II, soviet

communism produced many significant failures in both humanity and economics. By the time of

the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, Leninist Marxism had been widely discredited.

Like conservatism and Marxism, classical (i.e., non-revolutionary) socialism (e.g., Cole,

2006; O’Neill, 2005) rejects liberal economic individualism. Yet diverging sharply from

conservatism, this form of socialism shares, with Marxism, the goal of achieving enormous

social changes, notably putting the means of production (e.g., farms, factories) into the hands of

citizens or of a representative government and/or of distributing the proceeds from production

(e.g., food, merchandise, money) equitably to everyone within a society (Berman, 2009;


Fitzpatrick, 1998, p. 209). The goal of such transformation is to replace liberalism’s wage labor,

social classes, selfishness, inequality, and competition with social organization (which

libertarianism rejects, McLaverty, 2005) oriented toward equality, cooperation, and mutual

support. Statements of socialist principles, such as the Erfurt Program of 1891 (Laidler, 1968,

pp. 235-236), anticipate present-day social work concerns:

With the extension of world commerce and of production for the world market,

the condition of the workmen of every single land always grows more dependent

on the condition of the workmen in other lands. . . . [We struggle] not only against

exploitation and oppression of the wage-workers, but against every [form] of

exploitation and oppression, whether directed against class, party, sex, or race.

In various countries, this struggle has sometimes involved dramatic measures, such as outright

nationalization or seizure of property. In the 20th century, however, socialism gradually became

more tolerant of liberal capitalism and more inclined toward evolutionary changes, including

social reforms along with some governmental control of businesses and/or of the market and

redistributive taxation of the rich. Socialism is often believed to have corrosive effects upon

individuals and society and to be inefficient, compared to the market, in ending poverty and

meeting people’s needs (O’Connor & Robinson, 2008, p. 40). Given the association of socialism

with communism, and the long Cold War decades of antagonism toward communist states,

Americans have tended to be deeply suspicious of socialism and receptive to its sometime

characterization as a doctrine held by a motley collection of malcontents espousing random

“liberal” causes.


Three Contemporary Variations

Starting in the late 19th century, a series of financial crises (e.g., the Panic of 1893, the

Great Depression) strained classical liberal faith in the market. Meanwhile, national govern-

ments were demonstrating enormous power (in e.g., their ability to wage world wars). Many

liberals concluded that governments might be more effective than the market for some social

purposes (e.g., education, elimination of poverty, creation and maintenance of markets) (Fergu-

son, 2008, p. 25). Rawls (1971) epitomizes this “neo” (sometimes called “welfare state”)

liberalism. He suggests that the social contract to which people would have agreed, in a state of

nature, would protect against socioeconomic inequalities by providing the greatest benefits to

people who experience the greatest disadvantages. This restorative orientation appears to rest on

a belief that people would want to provide such benefits in case they, themselves, would

someday need such assistance. Consistent with a liberal orientation, Rawls is interested almost

exclusively in individual rights (and concomitant tax cuts, e.g., Mulvale, 2008, p. 21), as distinct

from socialist goals for various classes or for society as a whole. He suggests that basic liberties

include freedom of speech, of personal property, and of conscience. He assumes that people tend

to be rational and reasonable, and suggests that freedoms of speech and assembly may be

restricted when they change from reasonable dialogue to political protest (Paris, 2002, pp. 681,

685-687). In that event, Rawls prioritizes the state’s interest in controlling the populace, on the

theory that the police power is necessary to protect the liberty of others.

Going in the opposite direction, neoconservative (“neocon”) philosophy began with

1960s leftists, predominantly Jewish, who adopted conservative foreign policy views (Peters,

2008; Mudde, 2010, p. 591). Both neo and “paleo” conservatives (see Mudde, p. 589) oppose

internationalism (as in e.g., the United Nations) because it shifts power from individuals and


elected governments to more remote and less accountable bureaucrats. Neocons differ from

other conservatives in several regards, however: they are interventionist rather than isolationist

on matters of foreign policy (e.g., favoring the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003); they have not been

consistently concerned with traditionalist domestic social issues (e.g., school prayer, abortion);

and they favor a strong central government and the taxation it requires (Berlet & Lyons, 2000,

pp. 243-244; Mudde, p. 589). Neocons take that last position because they reject Locke

(1689/2007). Specifically, far from sharing Rawls’s (1971) faith in the reasonableness of

humanity, neocons tend toward Hobbes’s (1651/1904, pp. 83-84) view that people, left to

themselves, will fight for all sorts of trivial reasons, and may even be perplexingly most likely to

do so (in e.g., developed societies) where conditions might seem most conducive to a Lockean

peace. For Hobbes (p. 130), the state of nature is dangerous, not amicable, and people want a

strong government that will remain capable of protecting them. Such strength requires govern-

ment to remain somewhat exempt from the liberal rule of law. Otherwise, dangerous people

would use law to manipulate government to their advantage (Drolet, 2010, p. 542; Freeman,

2005; Fukuyama, 2006, pp. 154-155). In terms of political influence, neoconservatism,

prominent during the G. W. Bush administration, has recently been overshadowed by moderate

and paleoconservatism (Mudde, p. 593).

Communitarianism (e.g., Bell, 2009; Buchanan, 2005) is another significant contempor-

ary sociopolitical perspective (Gewirtz, 2001, p. 53), with roots in ancient and medieval sources

including Plato (c. 380 BC / 2003), again, as well as monasticism (e.g., Ingham, 2006, p. 483;

see Butcher, 1995). In the 19th century, Brint (2001, pp. 2-4) suggests, the idea of community as

a relatively local and personal phenomenon became distinguished from that of the larger society

(see Tönnies, 1887/2001, p. 17). Community has been most productively studied, Brint says, not


as a romanticized and geographically bounded ideal, but rather as a matter of shared interests

(e.g., social ties; rituals; perceived similarity with others’ characteristics, beliefs, or experiences)

(e.g., Durkheim, 1915, p. 47; Putnam, 2000). Communitarianism can have a conservative flavor:

leading communitarians (i.e., Sandel, 1982/1998; Walzer, 1983; MacIntyre, 1984; Taylor, 1989)

often treat religion, tradition, and family as central foci of community.

Against neoliberal individualism, Stöckl (2007, p. 45) finds Sandel’s (1982/1998)

communitarian critique particularly lucid. Neoliberalism, says Sandel, depends upon concepts of

society and social justice, and yet refuses to grant either society or the community a place in

discussions of individual rights. As Sandel notes, part of the problem is that liberalism bases its

views upon hypothetical individuals contemplating artificial scenarios (e.g., the state of nature)

in the abstract, whereas real people are always inextricably embedded in the real world (compare

Sartre, 1945/2007, p. 22) and, as such, have both individual- and community-oriented dimen-

sions (see Etzioni, 1996, p. 157; Crowder, 2006). The isolated Rawls-type pure thinker is an

idealization and/or concretization (see Whitehead, 1925/1997, pp. 50-51) of rational thought;

sociopolitical thought is actually just one of many things that happen in real minds (see Taylor,

1995, p. 66). Communitarianism also rejects philosophies of nationally or internationally

centralized loyalty – which might be roughly encapsulated as authoritarianism and totalitarian-

ism in political (e.g., fascist, communist) and religious forms (see Linz, 2000, p. 174) – because

standards of justice vary among communities, and laws handed down from above disregard that

(Bell; Bednar, 2005). Communitarianism appears to be achieving growing recognition as a

philosophy (or at least as a buzzword, see Zakaria, 1996): both President Obama (see Etzioni,

2008; Payne, 2010, p. 161) and fundamentalist Christianity (see Gedicks, 2009, p. 283) have

been characterized as communitarian.


Some Cross-Philosophical Implications of Neoliberal Social Work

In the U.S. (and elsewhere, to varying degrees), neoliberalism provides much of the

foundation for social work ethics generally and for the understanding of social justice in

particular (Finn & Jacobson, 2008; Stark, 2010, pp. 14-15; see Garrett, 2010, p. 3; Reamer, 2006,

p. 69). This section presents some considerations that warrant softening the hard linkage of

social work to that (or any) political philosophy.

When a profession becomes equated with an ideology, it runs the risk of adopting

ideological prejudices and illogics. As a form of political extremism, the Nazi version of fascism

serves as a foil to illustrate this point. It goes without saying that Naziism was horrendous in

many ways. But even in response to Naziism, a politicized stance can have undesirable side

effects. Politicization can mean rejecting the very possibility of saying anything positive about

Nazi Germany. Wisdom calls, rather, for understanding one’s opponent. Somehow, the Nazi

movement came from nowhere to take over and wreck much of Europe. The movement had

political complexity (see Uekötter, 2006, pp. 9-10) and intellectual achievements (e.g., Proctor,

1999). It is worth trying to grasp why such a movement developed, how it worked, and what it

did right and wrong. Self-inflicted ignorance is not conducive to that.

Naziism has been made into a target of safe deprecation. There are not many races,

creeds, genders, orientations, or other demographic characteristics that are still available for use

as “obvious” examples of the worst in humanity. Yet the overuse of this historical example has

culminated in its trivialization. These days, there is a veritable genre of humorous Hitler

material (e.g., YouTube, 2011). But already in 1953, Strauss had noted what he called the

reductio ad hitlerum fallacy, which he rebutted with the observation, “A view is not refuted by

the fact that it happens to have been shared by Hitler” (p. 43). In similar spirit, Godwin’s (1995)


Law proposes that, “As an online discussion grows longer, the probability of a comparison

involving Nazis or Hitler approaches one” (i.e., 100%). Teninbaum (2009, pp. 12-13) lists a few

of the many settings in which such arguments have been used and overused, often for the

purpose of smearing one’s opponent.

Even in the extreme case of Naziism, political disparagement has several drawbacks for

the social work profession. First, it carries a whiff of latter-day self-righteousness. As noted

above, social workers themselves actively furthered Nazi causes and pursued opportunities for

personal advancement within the Nazi regime (Barney & Dalton, 2006, pp. 55-59; Bergen, 2009,

pp. 12, 62, 104, 128; Kunstreich, 2003; see Milgram, 1973, p. 66). It does make sense to

advocate against views like those of the Nazis on a macro level. It also makes sense to provide

education that may dispel misconceptions held by neo-Nazis, neoliberals, or anyone else. But

social workers are not likely to be ethical, to achieve positive results, or to inspire confidence in

the profession when they engage in class- or race-based belittling of the sociopolitical views of

disadvantaged individuals (e.g., Cleaveland, 2008; see NASW, 2008). The point is not that the

views of such individuals are correct. Many such views can be empirically rebutted. The point

is, rather, that proselytizing is not a primary obligation for social workers in direct practice.

If it is imprudent to adopt a simplistic, dismissive, or otherwise unprofessional or

deliberately ignorant attitude even toward the extreme historical travesty of Nazi Germany, it is

much more so in the case of less terrible political philosophies. One must expect that, just as

there were Nazi (and probably are neo-Nazi) social workers, there will be social workers of

every other political persuasion (see Rosenwald & Hyde, 2006). Some of their beliefs or

behaviors may conflict with the NASW (2008) Code of Ethics; then again, they may not be

NASW members. For that matter, one may not have to hunt too far to find NASW members


whose own beliefs or behaviors likewise contravene that code. In any event, members of other

professions are not typically subjected to a political litmus test that would reject those who

deviate from one true political creed – and if they were, one might question the propriety

(indeed, the constitutionality) of laws licensing them. That reference to law invites, moreover,

some comparative appreciation for members of the legal profession who have represented

unpopular peoples and causes – including some that are now part of the American mainstream –

without first filtering them through a sieve of personal ideology and favoritism.

It is not just that ethicality requires toleration of diverse views (Thyer, 2010; Galambos,

2009). A more philosophically gregarious perspective calls for humility with respect to one’s

own beliefs, whatever they may be. For example, while many neoliberals are loath to admit it,

stereotypically “conservative” people and viewpoints do have some strengths. Consider, for

example, the capitalist market of classical liberalism. That market has become a dominant

feature of the world economy, having overshadowed the alternative of socialist central planning

in such places as the Soviet Union and China, and having also pared back some aspects or

tendencies toward neoliberal governmentalism within the U.S. in recent decades. International

trade has been associated with reducing poverty, encouraging religious tolerance, and improving

life expectancies (e.g., Berger, 2010, p. 195; Jha, 2008; Owen & Wu, 2007). It is within that

capitalist market that some social workers are now developing social entrepreneurship as a

classical liberal alternative to reliance upon the government (e.g., Germak & Singh, 2010).

Some suggest that social problems of potentially psychological origin are likewise better

addressed clinically, in reimbursed private social work practice, rather than through less

precisely targeted governmental programs (e.g., Reid & Edwards, 2006, p. 468).


Or consider old-school conservatism, with its emphasis on, among other things, family.

This is not exactly an alien orientation for social work (see Woodcock, 2010). It seems likely

that, while social work is officially aligned with neoliberalism, it does incorporate conservative

propensities. Some authors (e.g., Cupp & Joshpe, 2008; Schweizer, 2008) contend that

conservatives have been shown to be happier, more hardworking, more generous, less envious,

less materialistic, and to have more close-knit families (see Koch & Steelman, 2009). It seems

clear in any event that neoliberal vilification of conservative people and/or ideas en masse risks

being unethical in multiple ways (see Thyer, 2010, p. 261; Hodge, 2002, p. 408). Unethicality in

this context may mean jeopardization of clients’ interests, possibly for no reason other than the

social worker’s mere personal preference.

Neoliberalism has its limits on the left as well. For all its enormous failings, soviet

communism did provide a better life for many of its most vulnerable people than individualism

has done – in material terms (Heyns, 2005; e.g., Klumbyte, 2008, p. 34) and also in such terms as

friendliness among neighbors (e.g., Heady & Gambold Miller, 2006, p. 38). Likewise, in the

case of classical socialism, recent difficulties in the U.S. economy recommend bearing in mind

that context can influence the success of any economic arrangement (e.g., Kogut & Zander,

2000), that liberalism remains capable of bringing great pain and destruction to large numbers of

people (e.g., Lee, 2005, pp. 1-3, 30-31), and that good governance can make a socialist country

(e.g., Sweden; see Bergh & Erlingsson, 2009) a very desirable place to live (e.g., UN, 2010).

Socialism continues to shelter minorities and movements seeking protection from the political

and economic establishment – and, more recently, from environmental destruction (Roemer,

2010, p. 11; Radice, 2010, p. 42). Here, again, there are numerous qualifications on the claim

that social work is neoliberal.


Political diversity is ultimately about change. The banner of change has been waved

especially by socialists, during these centuries of liberal ascendancy in the West, just as it was

waved by liberals in the East in those decades of communism. During the 2008 presidential

election, Barack Obama made it the URL of his campaign (i.e., http://change.gov); meanwhile,

opposing vice presidential candidate Sarah Palin (2009) retorted, “We were change when change

wasn’t cool” (p. 4). Thirty years earlier, the Republican Party had likewise been perceived by

some as “the party of ideas” (Moynihan, 1981/2009), when the Democratic Party was supreme.

To the extent that neoliberalism has been America’s dominant ideology in recent decades, social

work’s identification with it has meant that what this profession sought was not continuous

change (contra NASW, 2008; CSWE, 2010), but rather extension and consolidation of a

neoliberal status quo (Reisch & Andrews, 2001, p. 214).

Everyone who is not part of the reigning orthodoxy wants to change it. It seems

inevitable that perceptions of the proper solution to a social problem will vary as people of good

conscience differ in their opinions, where typically incompatible positive values (e.g.,

straightforward vs. subtle; generous vs. frugal; swift vs. careful) push toward different courses of

action, each having its advantages and limitations. Society as a whole cannot simultaneously

change in all of the directions recommended by various viewpoints. Whether localized or

otherwise narrowed parts of society can change in divergent directions is another question. In

any case, as one learns more about what people are trying to repair or achieve, with their various

beliefs, it becomes more difficult to roll one’s eyes and dismiss them as “fringe.” Political

diversity brings the same potential for enrichment as any other kind. Oppression of political

minorities, and politicization of dialogue with mainstream opponents, are not worthy solutions.


Implications for Practice

Common names for political philosophies are often used in confusing and conflicting

ways. No understanding of such terms will satisfy everyone or suffice for all occasions, but an

orientation to some basic distinctions among political viewpoints can enhance one’s ability to

understand political writing and to participate in political discussions.

It can be easy to assume that a social worker would naturally gravitate toward a

neoliberal viewpoint, that other viewpoints cannot be taken seriously, and even that a social

worker is expected to adopt a partisan stance in favor of neoliberalism (e.g., Chu, Tsui, & Yan,

2009; see Rosenwald, 2006). Such assumptions become problematic as one learns about various

advantages and drawbacks of neoliberal and other perspectives. Whatever the situation may be

with respect to specific political issues, an enduring and potentially unquestioning bias toward

one sociopolitical stance seems closeminded by definition. Ethical practice may instead favor

open, eclectic, and/or neutral approaches toward political philosophies (several of which may

prove useful within a particular situation), so as to increase respect for clients’ integrity, to

continue lifelong learning, and to avoid unnecessary barriers to professional service.

Social work is not politics or economics. A sophisticated understanding of such fields

can take years of study. While it is advisable to develop some understanding of such matters, the

time that practitioners devote to political philosophy is time that they could instead be devoting

to development of other knowledge and skills. People who want to practice social work are not

likely to spend hours immured in philosophical debates. Instead, they will tend to rely upon

what they pick up from other sources, especially social work writers and educators.

Paradoxically, then, their lack of interest in political philosophy is precisely why they need to be


exposed to some of the possibilities. If social work training does not make a conscious effort of

that nature, it may not happen at all.

Notwithstanding its seemingly normal and unremarkable nature within the context of

social work practice in the contemporary U.S., neoliberalism is in fact a political philosophy that,

every day, does enormous good and evil to people around the world. The same would be true of

any other political philosophy that might gain dominance in social work or in society at large.

Both irony and logic compel the observation that social work educators in Nazi Germany should

not have been providing training in a single doctrine, no matter how obvious or commonsensical

it may have seemed to its proponents at the time. It is not a stretch to recommend similar caution

toward what seems obvious in America as well.


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