woods v dobbertin

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

Dennis I. Wilenchik, #005350

Kathleen E. Martoncik, #023982

[email protected]

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ALAN PATRICK WOODS,

Plaintiff,

v.

EDWARD S. DOBBERTIN, in his

individual and official capacity as Police

Chief of the Town of Patagonia; JANE

DOE DOBBERTIN, a married

individual; DALE L. STEVENSON in his

individual and official capacities; JANE

DOE STEVENSON, a married

individual; PATAGONIA POLICE

DEPARTMENT and the TOWN OF

PATAGONIA;

Defendants.

No. ________________________

COMPLAINT

(TORT: Non-motor vehicle)

(JURY TRIAL DEMANDED)

Plaintiff, Alan Patrick Woods, (hereinafter “Mr. Woods” or “Plaintiff”) for his

Complaint against the Defendants, alleges as follows:

Case 4:11-cv-00385-HCE Document 1 Filed 06/29/11 of 18

mailto:[email protected]

2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

JURISDICTION

1. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Jurisdiction is founded upon 28

U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343(3) and (4) and the aforesaid statutory and constitutional provisions.

2. Plaintiff has satisfied the provisions of A.R.S. §12-821.01 by serving upon

Defendants a Notice of Claim more than sixty (60) days prior to the date of the filing of this

Complaint. Defendants have not responded to the Notice of Claim.

3. Venue is proper because the events at issue occurred in Santa Cruz County,

Arizona.

PARTIES

4. Plaintiff Alan Patrick Woods is, and was at all times mentioned, a resident of

Santa Cruz County, Arizona.

5. Defendant Town of Patagonia (hereinafter “Town of Patagonia” or “Town”) is

a political subdivision of the State of Arizona, and a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.

6. Defendant Patagonia Police Department (hereinafter “Patagonia PD”) is a

political subdivision of the State of Arizona, and a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §

1983.

7. Upon information and belief, Defendant Edward S. Dobbertin (hereinafter

“Defendant Dobbertin”) is a married individual who resides in Pima County, State of

Arizona. At the time of the events in question, Defendant Dobbertin was the Chief of the

Patagonia Police Department, or “Town Marshall” of the Town of Patagonia, Arizona. He


3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

was dismissed from that position in October 2010, in part due to the events described herein.

Defendant Dobbertin caused events to take place in Santa Cruz County, Arizona and was at

all relevant times acting in furtherance of his marital community. He was the official

policymaker for the police department of the Town of Patagonia. Additionally, Defendant

Dobbertin, the Patagonia Police Department and the Town of Patagonia are vicariously

liable for the actions of their agents, officers, and employees. Defendant Dobbertin is

named herein in his individual and official capacities.

8. Upon information and belief, Defendant Dale L. Stevenson, (hereinafter

“Defendant Stevenson”) is a married individual who resides in Pima County, State of

Arizona. At the time of the incidents at issue, Defendant Stevenson was employed by

Defendant Town of Patagonia, through the Patagonia Police Department. Defendant

Stevenson caused events to take place in Santa Cruz County, Arizona and was at all relevant

times acting in furtherance of his marital community. All actions, omissions, or other

conduct of Defendant Stevenson as described herein were undertaken due to his

employment with the Town of Patagonia and the Patagonia Police Department and under

color of state law.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

9. Defendant Stevenson was a certified police officer with the Tucson Police

Department prior to the incidents at issue in this case. Defendant Stevenson’s certification

as a police officer lapsed in 2002, following his retirement from the Tucson Police

Department.

10. Defendant Stevenson was not re-certified until October 8, 2009.


4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

11. Defendant Stevenson was appointed by Defendant Dobbertin to be a peace

officer in the Patagonia Police Department on September 8, 2009. Stevenson was issued a

badge, uniform, and firearm during the first week of September 2009; he had keys to the

police station and access to its computer system; and he drove a police vehicle or otherwise

performed the official duties of a peace officer from that time forward.

12. On September 22, 2009, Patagonia Police Officer Rick Ramsey (hereinafter

“Officer Ramsey”) and Defendant Stevenson responded to a domestic violence call. As a

result of that call, Officer Ramsey and Defendant Stevenson arrested the Plaintiff.

13. Defendant Stevenson wore a Town of Patagonia police officer’s uniform at

the time of the arrest and also carried a firearm and badge.

14. Plaintiff was not combative at the time of his arrest. He was handcuffed with

his hands behind his back.

15. Officer Ramsey and Defendant Stevenson brought Plaintiff to the Patagonia

police station, which was less than half a mile away from where the arrest occurred.

16. The Patagonia police station is, and was at the time, a trailer that is over 20

years old, roughly 50 feet long, and does not contain a holding cell.

17. Plaintiff was instructed to sit on a couch in the Patagonia police station and

complied with this instruction. The locked entryway door to the station was approximately

10 feet in front of him. Defendant Stevenson sat at a desk 10 feet in front of Plaintiff and 30

feet to his left. While sitting at the desk, Defendant Stevenson faced in the same direction as

Plaintiff, away from Plaintiff and toward the wall in front of him.


5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

18. Officer Ramsey left the trailer to interview witnesses at two locations nearby.

He returned approximately every 30 minutes. Plaintiff saw Officer Ramsey lock the front

door every time before he left.

19. Defendant Stevenson questioned Plaintiff for basic information, and Plaintiff

was very cooperative.

20. Plaintiff told Defendant Stevenson that he was experiencing shoulder pain.

Defendant Stevenson sought permission from Defendant Dobbertin to move the handcuffs

from back to front. Because Plaintiff had been very cooperative, the request was granted.

Defendant Stevenson moved Plaintiff’s handcuffs from his back to his front, and Plaintiff

continued to sit on the couch without incident.

21. Defendant Stevenson and Plaintiff then sat in the trailer for approximately two

hours.

22. At the time of the arrest, Plaintiff had a history of attempted suicide.

23. While Plaintiff was at the police station, four full Coors Light beer bottles

were on a desk to the right of Plaintiff.

24. Plaintiff stood and picked up one of the Coors Light bottles, intending to

break it and then use the broken bottle to cut his own throat.

25. At that time, Plaintiff did not see Defendant Stevenson, who was behind him

30 feet and 10 feet to the side. Plaintiff never turned towards Defendant Stevenson at any

time with the bottle in his hand.


6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

26. Plaintiff tried to break the bottle three times on the desk. Because it would not

break, Plaintiff moved past the desk toward a door jamb in the hallway, and further away

from Defendant Stevenson.

27. Plaintiff broke the bottle on the door jamb and then used it to cut his own

throat.

28. At this time, Defendant Stevenson knocked Plaintiff to the floor and held him

in a headlock.

29. After Defendant Stevenson knocked Plaintiff to the floor, he realized that

Plaintiff had cut his own throat.

30. Plaintiff was taken to the hospital, where a doctor determined that the cuts had

come very close to his jugular vein.

31. Defendant Stevenson later authored a police report in which he identified

himself as the “reporting officer.”

32. The report stated that Plaintiff slashed and stabbed at Defendant Stevenson

with the broken beer bottle.

33. Plaintiff did not slash or stab at Defendant Stevenson with the beer bottle.

Plaintiff used the bottle only to cut his own throat.

34. Defendant Stevenson stated in his police report that Plaintiff tried to escape

through the front door of the police station.

35. Plaintiff did not try to escape through the door to the station.


7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

36. Patagonia is a very small town with a few police officers. Defendant

Dobbertin had spoken with Plaintiff before his arrest and recognized him at the time of the

arrest.

37. Defendant Dobbertin authored a police report in which he stated that “Plaintiff

used the broken bottle to slash at Officer Stevenson.”

38. Defendant Dobbertin’s report also stated that Plaintiff “jumped up and ran to

the locked door in an apparent attempt to escape custody.”

39. Defendant Dobbertin swore out a Complaint on September 25, 2009, in which

he charged Plaintiff with committing aggravated assault against “Officer D. Stevenson,

while engaged in the execution of official duties, a Class 2 Felony.” A copy of the

Complaint is attached as Exhibit A.

40. Defendant Dobbertin also charged Plaintiff with escape, a class 4 felony.

41. Defendant Dobbertin knew that Defendant Stevenson was not a certified

police officer at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest and at the time that he swore out the Complaint.

42. Defendant Dobbertin knew or should have known that under Arizona law, no

person may exercise the authority or perform the duties of a peace officer unless he is

certified.

43. Defendant Dobbertin knew that he employed Defendant Stevenson to perform

the duties of a peace officer in violation of Arizona law.

44. Defendant Dobbertin had signed an application for waiver request for

Defendant Stevenson with AZPOST on September 9, 2009, but he understood or should


8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

have understood that Defendant Stevenson was not a certified police officer until the waiver

request was granted.

45. Defendant Dobbertin had himself applied for a waiver when he was hired by

the Tucson Police Department in 1982.

46. On September 24, 2009, Plaintiff’s bail was set at $400,000.00, largely based

upon Defendant Dobbertin’s sworn complaint alleging that Plaintiff had assaulted a peace

officer and attempted to escape custody.

47. At the preliminary hearing for Plaintiff’s criminal trial on October 8, 2009,

Defendant Stevenson was the only witness for the police. He testified that he had been a

police officer for the Town of Patagonia for four months.

48. In fact, Defendant Stevenson was not entered onto the City’s payroll until one

week before the hearing, Oct 1, 2009.

49. In addition, Defendant Stevenson was not a certified police officer until his

recertification on October 8, 2009.

50. Upon information and belief, Defendant Stevenson did not know that his

recertification had been approved when he testified that he was a police officer.

51. Defendant Stevenson testified at the preliminary hearing that he was on duty

on September 22, 2009. He also testified that he took custody of Plaintiff.

52. Defendant Stevenson testified that Plaintiff slashed at him with the broken

beer bottle and that Plaintiff tried to escape through a locked door.

53. Based on this testimony, a justice of the peace found that there was probable

cause to prosecute Plaintiff for assaulting a peace officer and escape.


9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

54. On October 9, 2009, the Santa Cruz county attorney issued an information

charging Plaintiff with assaulting a peace officer and escape, in addition to unrelated

charges arising out of the domestic violence incident.

55. At Plaintiff’s trial on those charges, Defendant Stevenson was asked how long

he had been a police officer. He testified that he had been a police officer since 1979.

Defendant Stevenson failed to disclose that he was not a certified peace officer when he

arrested Plaintiff.

56. At Plaintiff’s trial, Defendant Stevenson was asked how long he had been with

the Patagonia police department. He testified that he started with the Department in April

2009.

57. Plaintiff was tried and sentenced to 20.75 years in prison on May 26, 2010. Of

those 20.75 years, 15 were for assault on a peace officer and an additional 3.75 were for

escape. The remaining two years were for unrelated convictions arising out of the domestic

violence incident.

58. The only crime that Plaintiff was convicted of and that carries a mandatory

prison sentence under law is assault on a peace officer. If Plaintiff had not been charged

with and convicted of assault on a peace officer, he might have obtained a probation

sentence.

59. Plaintiff had been in jail for 8 months at the Santa Cruz County Jail at the time

of his sentencing. Plaintiff had never been in prison before he was sentenced.

60. After the sentence, Plaintiff was transferred to Florence prison. Due to the

length of his sentence, he was placed in the “4 yard” at Florence prison.


10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

61. Plaintiff was assaulted and beaten while in the “4 yard.”

62. Sometime after Plaintiff was sentenced, it was discovered that Defendant

Stevenson was not a certified police officer at the time of the arrest. Based on that

information, Plaintiff’s criminal defense counsel filed a Motion to Vacate his sentence.

63. The Prosecutor agreed to vacate Plaintiff’s conviction for assault on a peace

officer, admitting that “Defendant was inappropriately tried on the charge of aggravated

assault of a peace officer, inappropriately convicted and inappropriately sentenced.”

64. The Prosecutor also stated that the Patagonia Police Department “misled the

Prosecutor’s office by not disclosing Stevenson was not AZPOST certified on September

22, 2009.”

65. On September 8, 2010, Judge Montoya-Paez of the Superior Court in Santa

Cruz ordered that the charges against Plaintiff for escape and assault on a police officer be

dismissed with prejudice. The Judge ordered Plaintiff to be released from custody, and the

remaining charges arising out of the domestic violence incident to be dismissed without

prejudice.

66. The Judge’s minute entry stated that “the integrity of judicial system was

compromised with misleading and false statements”; that there was “a disservice to honest

and hardworking peace officers”; and that the case “was tainted and that the integrity of

[the] Court was compromised.”

67. The Court also set an Order to Show Cause as to the Town of Patagonia Police

and Defendant Dobbertin. After a hearing, the Court found that Defendants Dobbertin and


11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

Stevenson “acted in a matter [sic] to obstruct the administration of justice,” and Defendants

Dobbertin and Stevenson were found in criminal contempt of court.

68. Because of the Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff suffered psychiatric trauma that

continues to affect him, as well as pecuniary loss and physical injury.

COUNT ONE – 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Loss of Liberty

(As Against All Defendants)

69. Plaintiff reasserts and realleges each and every paragraph, 1 through 68,

above, as though fully asserted herein.

70. Defendants Dobbertin and Stevenson caused the wrongful arrest, prosecution,

and conviction of Plaintiff without probable cause for assaulting a police officer and escape,

in violation of Plaintiff’s due process rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

71. As a result of the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Plaintiff

sustained damages, including but not limited to pecuniary loss, loss of liberty, mental

anguish, injury, and pain and suffering, all in an amount to be proven at trial.

72. Defendants Dobbertin and Stevenson had reason to know of, and consciously

disregarded a substantial risk that their conduct would significantly injure Plaintiff. Plaintiff

therefore requests an award of punitive damages against Defendants Dobbertin and

Stevenson in an amount to be proven at trial. Plaintiff does not seek punitive damages

against Defendant Dobbertin in his official capacity or against the Town of Patagonia or the

Patagonia Police Department.


12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

COUNT TWO

Negligence / Gross Negligence


73. Plaintiff reasserts and realleges each and every paragraph 1 through 72 above

as though fully asserted herein.

74. Defendant Dobbertin, the Town of Patagonia and the Patagonia Police

Department had a duty of care to Plaintiff to employ only certified peace officers to perform

the duties of police officers. Defendant Dobbertin, the Town of Patagonia and the Patagonia

Police Department breached this duty by employing Defendant Stevenson to perform the

duties of a certified police officer before he was certified.

75. Defendants Dobbertin and Stevenson had a duty to Plaintiff in conducting a

criminal investigation to act reasonably and responsibly with respect to instigating,

encouraging, and providing the information on which Plaintiff’s criminal prosecution was

based. Defendants Dobbertin and Stevenson breached this duty by, among other things, not

disclosing Defendant Stevenson’s certification status.

76. Defendants Dobbertin and Stevenson breached these duties with actual or

constructive knowledge that their acts and/or omissions would result in harm to the Plaintiff.

Defendants Dobbertin and Stevenson’s actions were flagrant and evince a lawless and

destructive spirit, constituting gross negligence.

77. The Town of Patagonia and Patagonia Police Department are responsible for

the actions of their individual officers and employees under the doctrine of respondeat

superior.


13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

78. As a result of Defendants’ negligence and gross negligence, Plaintiff sustained

damages in an amount to be proven at trial.

COUNT THREE

Malicious Prosecution




80. Defendants Dobbertin and Stevenson wrongfully initiated or caused to be

initiated a criminal prosecution against the Plaintiff for the crimes of assaulting a police

officer and escape.

81. Defendants had no probable cause to prosecute Plaintiff for those crimes, and

they initiated the prosecution with malice. As such, Defendants Dobbertin and Stevenson

are liable to Plaintiff for the tort of malicious prosecution.

82. The prosecution terminated in Plaintiff’s favor when the counts of assault

against a peace officer and escape were dismissed with prejudice on September 8, 2010.

83. Defendants Town of Patagonia and the Patagonia Police Department are

reponsible for the actions of their individual officers and employees under the doctrine of

respondeat superior.

84. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ malicious prosecution of

Plaintiff, he was convicted and sentenced to 20.75 years in prison. Of those 20.75 years,

18.75 years were for assault on a police officer and escape.

85. As a result, Defendant suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial.


14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

COUNT FOUR

Abuse of Process




87. Defendants Dobbertin and Stevenson wilfully used the judicial process,

including the initiation and advancement of a criminal prosecution against the Plaintiff for

ulterior motives, including but not limited to diverting attention from the illegal employment

of Defendant Stevenson as a police officer.

88. Defendant Dobbertin also knew the Plaintiff and may have been motivated by

a personal bias to initiate criminal prosecution.

89. The Town of Patagonia and the Patagonia Police Department are responsible

for the actions of their individual officers and employees under the doctrine of respondeat

superior.

90. As a result, Plaintiff was damaged in an amount to be proven at trial.

COUNT FIVE

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress




92. The conduct of Defendants Dobbertin and Stevenson as described herein was

extreme and outrageous, and was either intended to cause emotional distress to Plaintiff or

was performed in reckless disregard of the near certainty that such distress would result

from their conduct.


15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

93. Plaintiff sustained severe emotional distress as a result of the Defendants’

wrongful conduct.

94. The Defendant Town of Patagonia and the Patagonia Police Department are

responsible for the actions of their individual officers and employees under the doctrine of


95. Plaintiff was damaged by these actions in an amount to be proven at trial.

COUNT SIX

Fraud/Negligent Misrepresentation




97. Defendant Stevenson represented that he was a certified peace officer with the

City of Patagonia at the time of the Plaintiff’s arrest. Defendant Stevenson wore a Patagonia

police uniform, carried a badge and gun, and identified himself as a police officer at the

scene.

98. Defendant Stevenson knew he was not a certified peace officer for the Town

of Patagonia at the time of the Plaintiff’s arrest and that his representation to the contrary

was false.

99. Defendant Stevenson intended for Plaintiff to rely on his representation that he

was a certified peace officer.

100. Plaintiff had a right to rely on Defendant Stevenson’s representations and was

ignorant of the fact that Defendant Stevenson was not a properly certified peace officer.


16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

101. Defendant Dobbertin signed sworn documents indicating that Defendant

Stevenson was a certified peace officer for the Town of Patagonia at the time of the

Plaintiff’s arrest and he intended for the Plaintiff to rely on his representations.

102. Defendant Dobbertin knew or should have known that Defendant Stevenson

was not a certified peace officer at the time of the Plaintiff’s arrest and Defendant

Dobbertin’s representations to the contrary were false.

103. Defendant Dobbertin intended for Plaintiff to rely on his representation that

Defendant Stevenson was a certified peace officer.

104. Plaintiff had a right to rely on Defendant Dobbertin’s representations and was

ignorant of the fact that Defendant Stevenson was not a properly certified peace officer.

105. Plaintiff relied on Defendants Dobbertin and Stevenson’s representations to

his detriment in, among other things, presenting his legal defense, causing him to be

convicted of assault on a peace officer and escape.

106. Defendants Stevenson and Dobbertin had a duty to Plaintiff not to provide

false information during the conduct of official duties, including but not limited to arrest,

filing of reports, signing of sworn documents, and testifying in court.

107. As a result of Defendants Stevenson and Dobbertin’s misrepresentations and

false statements, Plaintiff incurred damages in an amount to be determined at trial.

108. The Defendant Town of Patagonia and the Patagonia Police Department are

responsible for the actions of their individual officers and employees under the doctrine of



17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

109. Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff for fraud and/or negligent

misrepresentation in an amount to be determined at trial.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Alan Woods prays for judgment against Defendants as

follows:

A. For compensatory damages, including but not limited to economic losses,

hedonic damages, and emotional distress;

B. For taxable costs and pre- and post- judgment interest to the extent permitted

by law;

C. For punitive damages;

D. For attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988; and

E. For any other relief that the Court deems just.

DATED this 29th

day of June, 2011.

WILENCHIK & BARTNESS, P.C.

/s/Dennis UI. Wilenchik

Dennis I. Wilenchik, Esq.

Kathleen E. Martoncik, Esq.

The Wilenchik & Bartness Building

2810 North Third Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85004

[email protected]

Attorneys for Plaintiff


mailto:[email protected]

18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

Original filed using the Court’s

Electronic Case Management system

this 29th

day of June, 2011:

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Sandra Day O'Connor U.S. Courthouse

401 W. Washington Street, Suite 130, SPC 1

Phoenix, AZ 85003-2118

__/s/ K. Rhoad_


woods v dobbertin

Documents