woolgar, s. (1981) 'interests and explanation in the social study of science', ssos, 1981 11 365

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1981 11: 365Social Studies of ScienceSteve Woolgar

Interests and Explanation in the Social Study of Science

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Interests and Explanationin the Social Study of Science

Steve Woolgar

ABSTRACT

Recent applications of the strong programme in the social study of scienceinvolve

(I) appealsfor a

naturalistic studyof science and

(II)the invocation of

interests as an explanatory resource. It is argued that the notion of naturalismis insufficiently clear and that attempts to identify interests neglect importantfeatures of scientific practice. Studies of the content of scientific knowledge

have proceeded at the expense of attention to the character of argument Itself.A

detailed examination of one example of the many recent case studies hrghlights aseries of explanatory strategies used to gloss the fundamental difficulties of

interests explanation. It is argued that rather than unreflectively attempting toreveal interests it is more appropriate to turn our attention to the management

of explanatory strategies in the practice of scientific argument.

One of the more intriguing aspects of the recent sociology ofscience has been the emergence of the so-called strong programmein the sociology of scientific knowledge. One major claim of thestrong programme is that the very content of science should be

amenable to social study. Not surprisingly, this kind of claim has

provoked strongest reaction where it is seen to violate well-established definitions of the legitimate focus of inquiry. Thus,

philosophers adhering to traditional tenets about the scope of theirinvestigation have been disturbed by the potential intrusion ofsociologists into their domain.At the same time, sociologists withinthe Mertonian tradition have been puzzled by the daring extensionof sociological purview which is recommended. But quite apartfrom resistance to potential transgression of established boundariesof academic competence, one major reason for critical reservationabout the claims of the strong programme is uncertainty as to the

precise form of empirical work which could be said adequately tofollow the strong programme. What exactly does social study of thecontent of science look like?

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Those familiar with Barnes Scientific Knowledge and

Sociological Theory (SKST)2 and Bloors Knowledge and SocialImagery (KSI)3 will recall the main arguments which can be sub-

sumed under the rubric of the strong programme. In addition to thenotion that the very content of scientific knowledge should be

susceptible to sociological analysis, it is argued that such analysisshould adopt a causal explanatory scheme; that analysis should be

impartial with respect to the perceived status (true or false, rationalor irrational, and so on) of the knowledge under study; thatanalysis should be symmetrical in that the same types of causecould explain both (perceivedly) true and false knowledge; and that

analysis of this kind could in principle apply equally to sociologicalknowledge.4As presented in the opening chapter of Barnes morerecent Interests and the Growth of Knowledge (IGK),5 one mainthrust of these arguments can be summarized by the dictum that

passive, contemplative accounts of the character of knowledgegeneration should be replaced by a more active sociological concep-tion of the relation between knowledge producer and reality.6Byitself, however, the claim that the social is in some sense always in-

volved in the production of knowledge (even scientific knowledge)is surely no longer very remarkable.As Shapin puts it:

The mere assertion that scientific knowledge has to do with the social order orthat it is not autonomous is no longer interesting. We must now specify how,precisely, to treat scientific culture as social product.~7

The important question that remains in the wake of the pro-nouncements of the strong programme is how exactly should

sociologists proceed in constructing the influence of the social? Or,in case this way of expressing it should unduly anticipate my argu-ment, which specific aspects of the social are to be studied and howare they to be incorporated into our understanding of themechanisms of knowledge generation?

Recently, these kinds of questions have begun to be answered.Thus, in the few years since the publication of SKST and KSI, abody of work has appeared which can reasonably be said to repre-sent an attempt to extend and apply the initial programmatic for-mulations. This now makes it possible to discern a general trendand to begin a tentative evaluation. The central feature of this par-ticular body of work is the recommendation and use of interests as

an explanatory resource: change in (or involvement with) the con-



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tent of scientific knowledge, the relationship between the social andknowledge products, is to be explained or understood in terms ofthe social and/or cognitive interests of participants. I shall refer

to this usage as explanation in terms of an interests model. I sug-gest the time is now ripe for a close examination of the explanatoryschema employed in interests model explanations. In particular, weneed to ask whether there are any systematic weaknesses arisingfrom this particular interpretation of the general message of thestrong programme.

I should emphasize that the arguments I summarize under the

label of the strong programme are not per se the main focus of

discussion in this paper; a number of reviews and critiques areavailable. Instead, I shall concentrate on recent extensions and ap-plications embodied in the use of the interests model. In the writingof those who recommend interests explanations there is a recurrentappeal to the need for a naturalistic approach to the social studyof science. Indeed, the notion of naturalistic inquiry goes hand inhand with the idea of explaining scientific action in terms of in-terests. This suggests that an examination of the use of the concept

of naturalism is prerequisite to an appreciation of some of thedeficiencies of interests explanations. Since the most readilyavailable exposition which incorporates both the ideas ofnaturalism and interests is Barnes IGK, I shall begin my ex-amination of these notions with special reference to their use byBarnes in that volume. Subsequently, in the latter part of thispaper, I will turn my attention to empirical case studies employinginterests explanation in order both to illustrate and develop some of

the points made with reference to Barnes general discussion.

The Call for Naturalism

In the introduction to Natural Order (NO),9 naturalism is used to

characterize a recent change in the analytical perspective of socialstudies of science: Perhaps the most significant change in the

history of science, and indeed in the study of science generally, overthe last decade is that it has become more relaxed and

naturalistic. 10 Unfortunately, the most striking feature of its recentdeployment in the science studies literature is that the concept ofnaturalism is never explicated nor clearly defined.&dquo; Consequent-ly, we are left with a variety of different impressions of the kind of



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thing which is intended. Consider the following examples fromBarnes IGK.At one point, naturalistic seems to imply some

similarity to scientific method (... the forms of argument and ex-

planations... are avowedly naturalistic, in the sense that thenatural sciences can be said to be naturalistic),2 notwithstandingthe obvious difficulties of presupposing the nature of the

phenomenon (that is, scientific method) which is supposed to beone main object of study.3 Naturalistic also denotes a non-evaluative perspective, a descriptive rather than prescriptive ap-proach, which can be contrasted with the concerns of philosophersand epistemologists (The sociologist is concerned with the

naturalistic understanding of what people take to be knowledgeand not with the evaluative assessment of what deserves so to be

taken).4 It is also used to mean non-teleologica}l5 and, by contrastwith the grand speculative philosophical concerns of writers such asHabermas, it is used to denote a preoccupation with low leveltheoretical concerns. 16At other places in the text naturalismseems to denote coherence, straightforwardness (in the sense thatnaturalistic analyses should not be concerned with evaluative ques-

tions) and untaintedness or lack of bias (as when it is said that theorientations and conclusions of writers such as Smith and Ricardo

would have been naturalistic but for their modulation and amend-

ment at the hands of ideological determination&dquo;). The undefinedand multifaceted usage of naturalism makes it difficult to discern

which particular aspect is being appealed to. More importantly, it isunclear what precise form of explanatory account is envisaged. To

say, for example, that Historical materialism has been acceptedhere only insofar as it has merits as an entirely naturalistic accountof mans activity and its historical development ,18 is to leaveunclear the specific features of historical materialist accounts which

are being applauded.9In evaluating Barnes use of naturalism, it is instructive to draw

on the distinctions made by Matza in his attempt to develop anaturalistic perspective in the sociological study of deviance.2Matza notes the common use of naturalism to denote a philosophy

based on the methods and findings of natural sciences.2Naturalism in this first sense is opposed to subjectivism, idealismand phenomenology, and is largely equivalent to scientificphilosophy, experimental method, and a stress on the objective, ex-ternal or observable features of phenomena.22 But in a second

sense, naturalism can denote an entirely different approach to



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understanding. It is the philosophy that strives to remain true to thenature of the phenomenon under study. (In terms of one of themany slogans of latter-day interpretivists: Do not do violence to

the data.) It is against all forms of philosophical generalizationand in this sense is notable as an essentially anti-philosophicalphilosophy. There is no commitment to any one single preferredmethod for engaging and scrutinizing phenomena: observationalstudy can benefit from the inclusion of experience, introspectionand other methods usually associated with subjectivism. Matzaaligns himself unequivocally with this second version ofnaturalism.23

Matzas twofold distinction makes it possible to discern a sourceof confusion in Barnes usage. In very many respects, Barneysnaturalism is close to that of Matza. It is emphatically anti-philosophical in its desire to shun the concerns of philosophy andepistemology. But at the same time it espouses an unexplicated ver-sion of scientific method in its own explanatory format. In addi-

tion, there is a very definite commitment to one particular methodfor apprehending and explaining the nature of the phenomenon.

Naturalism and Interests

The confusion in Barnes use of naturalism is carried over into the

invocation of interests as a primary explanatory resource. Interestsof whatever kind are to be regarded as an explanatory resource

whose existence is taken for granted. It follows that interests not

only enjoy an unproblematic existence, to be drawn on at will bythe investigator, but that existence is essentially separate anddistinct from the scientific content they are said to explain. Giventhe assumption of essential independence of phenomenon and ex-

planatory resource, the stage is set for the deployment of a causal-type explanatory scheme. Interests can be used to explainknowledge generation. This is not to suggest that the scope of thegame is restricted to simple causal determination, which is why I

referred to the scheme as causal-type. This means that interests canbe shown to influence rather than determine knowledge produc-tion, or that particular scientific episodes can be better understoodin the light of the particular interests of the involved parties, and soon. The general strategy is to reveal interests as a kind of backclothof attendant circumstances, and to imply that this revelation



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throws into better perspective the knowledge claim or event whichis at issue. In its weakest form the job can be managed merely byjuxtaposing, in the same report, the knowledge event and the

revealed circumstances, preferably with cautious caveats about thedifficulty of speculating on the precise causal mechanisms at work.(But note how stressing the difficulty of specifying the nature of amechanism can do substantial rhetorical work in establishing its ex-

istence.)In terms of my earlier comments, and to employ a contemporary

metaphor, Barnes version of naturalism is essentially two-tone.For the phenomenon to be explained, Barnes quite rightly argues

for a perspective adhering to naturalism in the second of Matzassenses. But when it comes to the explanatory format, Barnes goesfor a neo-Durkheimian form of causal explanation which isnaturalistic in the first of Matzas usages. This means that the ex-

planatory resource (interests) is emphatically not to be considered asocial resource. Interests are not to be treated as actively con-

structed assemblages of conventions or meaningful cultural

resources, to be understood and assessed in terms of their role in

activity, even though this is precisely the formula which Barnessays has to be applied to all representations, pictorial or verbal,realistic or abstract .24 For Barnes, knowledge products and scien-tific events of all kinds fall under the rubric of socially constructed

representations, but interests do not.All this could be summarized by saying that the standard com-

plaint made in connection with Mannheim could be turned back onitself. To adopt Barnes own criticism of Mannheim, we could say

that Barnes knew and advanced many good arguments against thecontemplative account and in favour of the alternative he explicitlyadvocated, but this did not suffice to orient his practicalapproach.z5 The complaint against Mannheim is that he explicitlystopped short of making natural science and mathematics the focusof sociological study. The practical approach to which Barnesalludes here had to do with Mannheims choice of focus. Barnes

thus criticizes Mannheim for failing to see the implication of his

own programmatic arguments; Mannheim is allegedly inconsistentin practising a sociology of knowledge which assumes that (certainkinds of) scientific knowledge are contemplatively available. But asimilar inconsistency is evident in Barnes own argument. ForBarnes practical approach itself involves the deployment of a bodyof unexamined phenomena (interests) as sources of explanation in



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spite of their actively constructed character. For the practical pur-poses at hand, interests themselves are assumed not to be amenable

to explanation; they are, as it were, contemplatively available to the

sociologist.To anticipate one obvious objection, it could be said that someaspect of explanation must always remain unexplicated. Indeed, itcould be argued, explanation of this kind simply cannot proceedwithout assuming the pre-given status of one or other entity. Letme return to this issue below and, for the time being, concede thatat least one factor in explanation must remain unexplicated. Even ifthis is the case, it is not at all clear that there is any strong justifica-

tion for the choice of interests, apart from the prevalence of thisconcept in the traditional sociology of knowledge literature. Un-doubtedly, Barnes arguments, especially as presented in IGK, areboth addressed to and influenced by the sociological concerns ofwriters such as Marx, Lukacs and Habermas.26 Unfortunately thisorientation completely ignores evidence that the importance ofterms like interests should be approached from an entirely different

perspective.2 Scientific practice involves, crucially, the imputation

of social characteristics.28 In other words, scientists themselves canbe seen to be constantly engaged in monitoring, evaluating, at-

tributing (in short, in accounting for) the potential presence orabsence of interests in the work and activities both of others and of

themselves. Interest-work is thus constitutive of scientific practice.But it would not be unduly cautious to say that we have as yet little

appreciation of the way this kind of work is done by scientists. It isat best inappropriate, therefore, to use interests as a resource at the

expense of investigating how they are accomplished. The construc-tion and use of interests is an aspect of scientific activity whichdemands treatment as a phenomenon in its own right.

In any case the notion that some aspect of explanation must re-main unexplicated can only be offered as a solution given a com-mitment to causal-type explanation. If, for example, we undertakean ethnographic approach to the study of scientific activity, it istrue that this will also involve the use of unexplicated resources. We

are necessarily unable simultaneously to make all features of thescientists world the subject of our study. But since no causal ex-planation is required, less significance need be attached to the roleof these uninvestigated features. They remain available for further,extended ethnographic study and our discussion need not be under-mined by the suspicion that they have been constructed by the



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analyst so as to perform his explanatory work.As we shall see later,a close examination of the explanatory work involved in one exam-

ple of interests explanation reveals a series of rhetorical and

argumentative strategies by which analysts attempt to avoid thiskind of suspicion. Before turning to a specific example of explana-tion in terms of interests, however, it is important to note one last

feature of Barnes general discussion.Consider the following two excerpts from IGK:

... knowledge has the character of a resource, communally exploited in theachievement of whatever interests actors decide.29

Natural science, history, sociology, are (or potentially are) bodies of knowledgewhich serve as resources to facilitate prediction and control in differentcontexts. 30

Both these statements exhibit similar formats: the first part of the

statement characterizes the phenomenon to be explained(knowledge) in terms consistent with the constructivist perspective- that is, knowledge is not just a pre-given, it is socially malleable

(one might say negotiable). In other words, knowledge is to beunderstood as a resource. However, the second part of each state-ment indicates that actors treatment of this resource must be

understood as their treatment of a resourcefor a purpose. The in-

itial part of these statements suggests that we attempt to get to gripswith the how of actors dealing in and with knowledge; the latter

part makes clear that this is just a means to an end - a second and

overarching analytical objective is that we understand why actors

do things in this way. Once again a basic asymmetry in the schemebecomes apparent. The objects of the how domain (representa-tions, arguments, knowledge) are to be treated naturalistically inthe sense that they are all to be viewed as actively constructed; bycontrast, the objects of the why domain are to be taken as pre-given, to be used as sources in a kind of causal explanation, and tobe invoked without making problematic their constructed

character.

As already noted, this distinction between how and why ques-tions leaves unexamined the way in which interests are constructed,invoked, and utilized. In addition, the unproblematically assumedexistence of interests has an important effect on the structure of en-

suing explanation. If knowledge can always in principle be ex-

plained by recourse to the interests of the actors involved, then any



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problem encountered in specifying the nature and extent of theseinterests is merely technical. In other words, the problemsassociated with attempts to specify the determinants of actions may

be severe but they are never sufficiently significant to threaten theexplanatory enterprise: the assumed existence of interests ensurestheir eventual discovery or approximation, notwithstanding theback-breaking sociological labour which might be said to be re-quired. Of course, Barnes is aware of the difficulties. He notes thatthe task of specifying concealed interests is particularlytroublesome. He speaks of the great technical difficulty involvedin identifying the role of concealed interests3 and concludes that

the difficulty of the task contrasts starkly with the confidence withwhich sociologists and polemicists typically undertake it.32Nonetheless, for Barnes, the problem remains a technical irritantrather than the basis for any deep reappraisal of the nature of thetask. Relative to the goal of revealing the effect of interests, theproblem of identifying and attributing interests is portrayed as anecessary evil: such technical difficulties should not obscure thefact that the approach can be successfully applied in a considerable

number of instances.33Thus far I have identified effects stemming from Barnes usage

of naturalism and from the selection of interests as an ex-

planatory lynch-pin. The recourse to a causal-type explanatory for-mat and the attempt to portray interests as the explanation of scien-tific action are both neglectful of the constructive activity involvedin scientific work. The proposed focus of investigation remains ad-mirable : even the most esoteric detail of scientific knowledge

should be analyzed. But the specific form of proposed investigationis very unsatisfactory. We are led to the heart of scientific practiceby arguments about focus, only to find that the phenomenon isthen to be subject to a sociological sledgehammer. It is not just thatthe particular choice of explanans (interests) is at fault: I am notsimply advocating the replacement of interests by some alternativeexplanatory factor. Instead, I am arguing that far greater reflectiveattention be given to the explanatory form of interests explana-

tions. In order further to explore the character of this explanatoryform, I now turn to an examination of some of the empirical casestudies which have adopted an approach similar to that recom-mended in IGK.



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Case Studies of Interests

There is now a plethora of such case studies. Thus we find, for ex-

ample, arguments that the debate between the statisticians Yule andPearson over measures of nominal association was informed by the

cognitive and social interests of these parties;34 that debates be-tween biometricians and Mendelians must be understood in the

light of the different manipulative goals of the parties;35 that thesocial interests of early nineteenth-century phrenologists affectedboth the way in which character traits were said to be available

from the shape of a persons skull and the course of cerebral

anatomy itself;36 that the functional interests of the scientific com-munity as a whole served to minimize the possibility of opendispute about. the erroneous nature of Barklas discovery of Jphenomena;37 that the differing professional interests ofhereditarians and environmentalists shaped the substance of the

race-intelligence controversy;38 that interests gave rise to the ascen-dancy of charm over colour interpretations of particlecharacteristics in theoretical high energy physics;39 that botanical

classifications are maintained, sustained and modified in the lightof social interests ;40 and so on. Similarly, some authors, althoughnot explicitly concerned with the revelation and use of interests,

argue that the context (whether social, historical or cultural) has a

marked effect on scientific work. 41 Of course, it is quite possible toextend the present critique of the explanatory use of interests to theuse of context: here again is a notion mobilized by historians andsociologists with little regard for its currency as a resource which is

constitutive of scientists argument; the concept is employed as un-problematically fixed (rather than constructed) with little reflectiveattention to its employment. However, for reasons of space, I shallconfine my remarks to the use of interests.

This recent upsurge of explanations in terms of interests suggeststhat we may soon reach a situation where, to borrow from the title

of Denis Wrongs famous paper (On the Oversocialized Concep-tion of Man in Modern Sociology), we have an over-interested

conception of the scientist in modern sociology of science.42Wrongs central complaint was that sociologists too readily assumesome processing of humans (socialization) whereby they passivelyinternalize norms and almost automatically respond to these inter-nalizations in their subsequent actions. In the interests model ap-proach we have a portrayal of scientists who act (that is, produceknowledge) in response to their interests. For those who thought



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the Mertonian model had been radically displaced, the force of this

parallel is particularly striking. Granted, a major change has occur-red in arguing that a focus of sociological analysis can be the verycontent of scientific

knowledge.But the

formof

analysisremains

essentially unchanged: instead of norms we now have interests.Garfinkel has argued that the social sciences have an unfortunate

habit of making out actors to be cultural or judgemental dopes:43that is, individuals behaviour is too readily explained by portray-ing it as both complying with and resulting from pre-establishedalternatives of action provided by the available culture.As Gar-finkel points out, this kind of portrayal neglects significant aspectsof individuals behaviour - for

example,the work

theydo in an-

ticipating possible rule violation, their management of therelevance of alternative courses of action, their assessment of the

possible conditions and consequences of action, and the like. In

short, the portrayal of the individual as a judgemental dope ignoresan analysis of the individuals own language game.To apply this to the present problem, we can see that we are deal-

ing with two kinds of dope. On the one hand, we are all familiarwith

complaintsabout

philosophicalidealizations of science.

Scientists have frequently committed themselves to print with theview that there is no such thing as the scientific method, that

philosophers attach undue significance to the formal products ofresearch, that philosophers dwell selectively on instances of suc-cessful science, and so on. Recently, writers in the social study ofscience have echoed these criticisms with enthusiasm, taking the in-adequacy of these philosophical versions as the justification formore

sociologically-informed analysis. Indeed,as we shall see

below, some kind of preliminary invective against philosophicalcharacterization of science is a rhetorical sine qua non of nearly allthe interests model contributions. In short, the butt of the criticism

by sociologists is the philosophical portrayal of scientists asrationality-dopes. That is, philosophers are held to portray scien-tific action as the actors response to existing knowledge and his ex-

trapolation along some rational course. On the other hand, just as

philosophersoften seem intent on

portrayingscientists as ration-

ality dopes, it is now apparent that a growing body of authors areintent on portraying scientists as interest-dopes. Once again, thesignificance of this is that the social study of science, as exemplifiedby interests model explanations, ignores the processes of construc-tion whereby scientists themselves manage and attribute interests.



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I should emphasize that I am not claiming any of these often verycareful case studies to be wrong: within their own terms theydisplay admirable consistency.44 In his review of NO, Neve also

seems to find the general approach fruitful from an historical pointof view, although he has some reservations about specific applica-tions of the model in that volume, noting an unease which accom-panies certain versions of the &dquo;interest&dquo; analysis,45 and referringto the difficulty of the reductionist use of &dquo;interest&dquo; as a

methodology .46 In the light of the problems already raised in rela-tion to Barnes argument, let us look in detail at an example of the

empirical application of the interests model. Apart from il-

lustrating some of the argument already made about interests ex-planations, an examination of an empirical example also providesan opportunity for inquiring into the social character of explana-tion in general. In other words, I shall take the critical examinationof empirical interests explanations as an occasion for beginning toformulate key questions about the nature of explanatory techni-ques and strategies.

The Example of the Yule-Pearson Debate

In what follows I will make special reference to MacKenzies

analysis of the debate between the statisticians Yule and Pearson inthe early years of the twentieth century. 41 I have not chosenMacKenzies study because it provides the easiest opportunity forpicking holes; nor is that my objective. On the contrary, his is one

of the most careful and fascinating studies of the genre. I havechosen it here because the extent of detail and care of presentationmake it especially useful as the basis for an examination of themethod employed.MacKenzie begins with an account of the divergent views of Yule

and Pearson.As represented in their publications of 1900, Yule andPearson proposed alternative and competing measures of statisticalassociation between two nominal variables. Yules reasoning was

based, in part, on values which a measure should assume if the twovariables under study turned out to be independent (Q = 0), fullypositively associated (Q = + 1) and fully negatively associated

(Q = - 1). His proposed measure, Yules Q, is calculated by a for-mula comprising the four observed cell frequencies of a 2 by 2table. Pearson reasoned that the observed frequencies should more



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exactly be regarded as resulting from the conjunction of underlyingnormal distributions. He proposed a measure (r) which reflectedthis underlying distribution and went on to develop another

measure (Pearsons C) which could handle association betweennominal variables in tables larger than 2 by 2. Briefly, the substanceof the controversy between the two statisticians involved attacks byYule on Pearsons assumption about the nature of the underlyingdistribution, and counterattacks by Pearson that Yules criticismwas ill-founded and that the Q measure was too simplistic.MacKenzie argues that it is insufficient to account for this con-

troversy simply by noting the objections exchanged between the

disputants. Instead, he suggests, it is preferable to take note of thecognitive interests of the two parties. Pearson is said to have had a

deep-rooted commitment to the utility of statistical prediction; ex-isting interval level theory of correlation and regression satisfiedthis concern, and MacKenzie claims that it was therefore in Pear-

sons interest to develop nominal measures by analogy with the ex-isting theory. Yule, on the other hand, is said to have exhibited amuch more pragmatic concern with the data itself, rather than with

any desire to maximize analogy with existing statistical theory.Yules methods were thus structured by a cognitive interest inprediction using nominal data as phenomena in their own rightsMacKenzie then argues that the cognitive interests of the two canbe related to their differing objectives in the development ofstatistical theory and perhaps ultimately to differing social in-terests.49A further deep-rooted commitment of Pearson is reveal-ed : the overarching objective of his work turns out to be the

development of measures of hereditary relationship between suc-cessive generations and, in particular, the pursuit of some means oftesting association between non-measurable (nominal) variablessuch as mental character and individual type. Yules proposedmeasure did not facilitate direct comparison with existing intervalmeasures of association and hence did not serve Pearsons eugenicinterests. Yule had no particular interest in eugenics. MacKenziedescribes him as having a more diffuse goal orientation which ledto a looser and more empirical approach which embodied cognitiveinterests of a more general nature.10 MacKenzie takes the argu-ment further by locating the controversy in the context of the con-

temporary statistical community: Pearsons work, and the supportfor his side of the debate, is found to be associated with member-ship of a small coherent school of statisticians working in



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biometrics; whereas Yules affiliation was less specific. MacKenziefinally suggests that the different attitudes of Pearson and Yule canbe further understood within two differing constellations of con-

temporary social interests: Pearsonwas an

archetypical member ofthe rising professional class whose growing importance wasassociated with its espousal of ideologies which emphasized its dif-ference from, and superiority to, the manual working class, and... pointed to the social value of professional knowledge and skillas against the mere ownership of capital or land;5 Yulesbackground, by contrast, was that of the downwardly mobile tradi-tional elite with generally conservative tastes and a dislike for

eugenics.The central facets of MacKenzies argument are clear: firstly, thefocus of his analysis is the very nature of the alternativemathematical measures proposed by Yule and Pearson; secondly,differences in these measures are to be explained by various sets ofprevailing interests. For our immediate purposes, little significanceneed be attached to the claimed distinction between cognitive andsocial interests. Suffice it to note that the distinction does raise

issues requiring further consideration. In the first place, as has beenargued in some detail elsewhere, the distinction between what is tocount as cognitive rather than social (and vice versa) is an im-

portant feature of participants own discourse; the active achieve-ment and management of the distinction is central to scientific

argument.52 Proponents of interests explanations overlook the im-portance of the social/cognitive distinction for scientists by attemp-ting to provide definitive accounts of the type of interests at work.

Secondly, the particular distinction which is claimed to exist be-tween cognitive and social interests can be read as indicatingthat certain kinds of scientific action derive from the existing cor-

pus of scientific knowledge while others do not.At least in some

forms, then, the claimed distinction between cognitive andsocial interests (strangely reminiscent of the well-worn inter-nalist/externalist dichotomy) is in danger of being heard as a pleafor the reintroduction of a classical philosophy of science.

As can be seen, even from a necessarily brief rendering ofMacKenzies argument, considerable constructive work has goneinto his revelation of the interests involved. Let us now begin tounpack (or deconstruct) this work and, bearing in mind theassumption that this is roughly typical of the case studies listed

above, identify some of its main explanatory features.



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Explanatory Features ofInterests Explanation

J. What seems rational is actually social

One strategy frequently employed in interests model explanationsin the sociology of science is to set up an initial springboard againstwhich the thrust of the argument is to be directed. Thus MacKenzie

opens his account with the following:

The esoteric knowledge to be found in the mathematical sciences is frequently

held to develop accordmg to its own laws, immune from social influence. Thepurpose of this paper is to cast doubt on that assumption.53

This has the effect of supplying the reader with an existing state ofaffairs (a philosophical characterization of mathematical practice)and suggesting that this state is somehow incorrect, wrong or other-wise requires re-examination. To contrast an allegedly incorrectstate of affairs with what is to follow is to claim strong grounds for

justification.54Thus the interests model

argumentis claimed to be

an alternative to a deficient philosophical model - or, in terms ofthe earlier discussion, a picture of scientists as interest-dopes is tobe substituted for their previous portrayal as rationality-dopes. Forpresent purposes the important point is that both are alternativeconstructions. To replace one by the other misses at least two im-

portant questions: what counts as legitimate construction in prac-tical argument; and what counts as adequate grounds for substitu-tion of one construction for another? The central

importanceof

this initial justification can be assessed by discerning the effects onthe argument of its removal. Without the alternative philosophical-rational version for contrast, the claim for the social character of

science becomes rather mundane. This is evident from MacKenziess

own very candid concluding remarks:

In the absence of a great deal of further research, particularly on the

hypothetical constellation of interests suggested in the previous section, this con-clusion must remain tentative.I hope, however, that this paper has shown thathard sciences, such as the mathematical theory of statistics, should not be ex-cluded a priori from analysis in terms of social interests.55

Elsewhere I have discussed the particular form of contrast beingworked with here in terms of the debate between rationalists and



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the strong programme, and concluded that alignment to one orother position is of little consequence for a fruitful understandingof scientists activity.56 Instead we should recognize that the con-

struction and attribution of everyday versions of both rationalistand strong programme positions is a continual feature of inter-action between scientists. It is the localized management of these

positions (which usually has both immediate and significant prac-tical consequences) which demands our attention as analysts.

2. Scientific action is expressive of concomitant interests

A second related strategy is crucial to the interests model. This isthe demonstration or revelation of interests behind instances ofscientific action to be explained. It is possible to represent thisstrategy schematically as an algorithm without, I think, undulysimplifying the explanatory forms

a. Identify an instance of scientific action.b. Take action to be an indicator of an underlying desire on the

part of the actor.

c. Repeat steps a and b so as to generate a set of desires.d. Equate this set of desires with actors concomitant interests.e.Argue that action to be explained is consistent with concomi-

tant interests.

In this general scheme, scientific action denotes a wide range ofactivities corresponding to a number of different kinds of sources.For example, action can refer to an entire dispute, to a specificitem of correspondence between scientists, or to a particular utter-ance made in the laboratory. In each case, the item is taken as anindicator of some external or underlying desire. 58 In MacKen-zie, for example, Yules formulation of the Q measure is taken asindicator of his desire that it should attain certain values under cer-

tain conditions.Another action, Pearsons criticism of Yule, istaken to indicate Pearsons desire to create a measure consistent

with existing statistical theory. Note also that the same instance ofaction can be read as indicative of more than one desire, and con-

versely, that different actions can be interpreted as indicative of thesame desire. Thus in MacKenzies account, Pearsons developmentof the C measure, just like his criticism of Yule, indicates his con-cern to maximize analogies with interval level theory.

Clearly, the desires generated in this manner do not stem solelyfrom observed action. Proponents of the interests model obviously



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begin with some notion of the nature and variety of desires they willidentify. More importantly, the generation of various desires in-volves the specification of motives, intentions, underlying concerns

and so on in the light of previously revealed desires. Thus, thespecification of any particular desire is bound to be influenced byprevious interpretations of other actions. But my point is notsimply that the analysts choice of underlying desire is biased (itwould be difficult to imagine what an unbiased choice would looklike). Rather, it is clear that a very large (if not infinite) number ofalternative desires is in principle discernible; the selection and con-struction of a set of desires from the number potentially available

thus involves complex argumentative work.If a large number of alternative desires is discernible, how in

practice are we to identify one particular desire as demonstrablycorresponding to the observed action? The answer must be that theanalyst has to specify what it would be rational for the actor todesire in the prevailing circumstances: in other words, it isnecessary for the analyst to create some rational connection be-tween action and desire. However this is done, it will involve some

judgement as to what is rational. In the example from MacKenziesaccount, Pearsons criticism of Yules measure is taken to indicate

his concern to maximize analogies with other statistical measures,in part because criticizing is reckoned to be a rational course of

action given this concern. It need hardly be pointed out, of course,that other alternative actions follow rationally from this sameconcern: in other words, there is no necessary correspondence be-tween any specfic concern and any particular action. In addition, itis fairly obvious that other alternative desires could be said to bethe rational antecedent of the same action. Pearsons criticism ofYule could be said to follow rationally from his (Pearsons) desireto be bloody-minded.59 This kind of alternative is either consideredand rejected or, more likely, is simply not considered, by virtue ofthe influence on the analyst of his interpretation of the prevailingcircumstances in which the action took place. In a similar way, theconstruction of a set of desires (step c) seems to involve judgementsas to the rational coherence of that set.Actions and desires will beadded to the set only if they do not conflict with other members ofthe set. In general, the analyst will construct a two-way link be-tween action and desire: it is the basis for the initial inference as tothe nature of the desire; at the same time, the desire is used to ex-plain the occurrence of action.



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From one perspective, this modus operandi could be said to bepatently circular. The very phenomenon to be explained is the basisfor the constructed explanation. But whether or not this kind of ex-

planation actually is circular is of little concern here. Perhaps allattempts to reveal socio-historical circumstances inevitably followsome variant of this scheme. Nonetheless, the fact that a charge ofcircularity could be made raises some intriguing issues. How is itthat in most instances of practical argument no significance is at-tached to its defeasibility on grounds of circularity? What are themechanisms by which parties to an argument either reveal or ignorethe presence of circularity? Of course, these and similar questionsare of considerable import in the context of furthering ourunderstanding of science. They suggest that sustained study ofscientific practice should pay much closer attention to the details ofargumentative rhetoric. For now, however, I shall confine myremarks to the evasion of charges of circularity in sociologicalusage of the interests model.

3. The identified interests are independent

of the action they explain

Garfinkel speaks of the documentary method to denote the processby which underlying patterns are discovered on the basis ofobserved appearances .6 He shows that neither the appearancesnor the underlying pattern is fixed and independent of the other.Instead the sense and character of the appearance (in our presentcase, the instance of scientific action) is modified as its relation-

ship with the underlying pattern (in our case, the desires of theactor) is constructed. Identification of an underlying pattern thusinvolves a back-and-forth process whereby neither entity is ever in-

dependent of the other. The notion of reflexivity has also beenused to refer to the general property of discourse whereby the invoca-tion of an ostensibly underlying pattern is inevitably part andparcel of the scene which it purports to explain; the sense andmeaning of the scene depends on, and is inextricably tied to, the in-

vocation of underlying pattern.One of the best illustrations of reflexivity appears in Wieders

study of the convict code. 61 Indeed, there are some importantparallels between the present argument and that advanced byWieder. Wieder notes that the actions of the inmates of a halfwayhouse (in our case, the actions of scientists) could be sociologically



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explained by appeal to the existence of a set of rules (interests).However, he shows that the specification of correspondence be-tween any particular action and the rule (interests) which it is said

to be following (expressive of) is in principle defeasible. In addi-tion, rules (interests) often implied contradictory courses of action:that is, a particular action could be explained as being governedby one rule, even though it contravened another. The invocation ofthe rule-governed character of action was reflexive in that itsimultaneously modified the nature of the action and the inter-pretation of the rule to which it was said to be related.62 Mulkay hassimilarly pointed out that the interpretation of scientific action by

recourse to underlying rules (in particular, the norms of science) issubject to difficulties of interpretation and contradiction.63 Mostimportantly, both Wieder and Mulkay note that the issue of cor-respondence between action and underlying pattern (whether rules,norms or, in this case, interests) is crucially a matter for the par-ticipants involved. The programmatic implication is that we shoulddevelop an understanding of the practical management of cor-respondence between actions and underlying patterns, rather than

simply engage in unreflective attemptsto

advance suchcor-

respondences.Garfinkel notes that the essential reflexivity of accounts is

uninteresting to their proponents.64 By this I take him to meanthat accounting practice depends for its success on the routinedenial of the intimate interdependence between underlying pat-tern and the scene which is being accounted. Translating this intoterms more apposite to the current discussion, it is necessary for

purposes of successful argument to background65 the constructiveinterrelationship between the thing to be explained and the thingwhich does the explaining. In other words, an important, if notcrucial, feature of argument in general, and a fortiori of scientificargument in particular, is that independence be achieved between

explanans and explandum; in the present example, the desires ofthe actors have to be made to seem independent of the actions fromwhich they are created. Only then is it possible to argue for the

prior existence of the desires and hence to imply that the actionsresulted from these pre-existing desires.How is the independence of interests accomplished? We can shed

some light on this facet of interests model explanations by drawinga parallel with a recent discussion of the process whereby facts are

constructed in neuroendocrinology.66 Typically, fact construction



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comprises three main stages. Initially scientists deal in statementsof varying degrees of speculation. Secondly, however, as a stableform of a particular statement is gradually established, a transfor-

mation occurs whereby the statement is no longer just a statement,it is a statement about something. The collection of words acquiresa currency in discourse which creates a referent in the real world.The real worldly object is thus created by virtue of the statement:through a process of splitting, the statement becomes both separatefrom and independent of the object which it is supposed to beabout.A third stage involves the inversion of this relationship:the object becomes transformed into an entity which had existed

all along and, more importantly, the prior existence of the object isnow seen as having given rise to the statement about the object.The statement, far from being regarded as the basis for the objectsconstruction, is now seen as a report which attempts to reflectsome of the actual character of the object.

In MacKenzies account, we are initially presented with thepublished work of Yule and Pearson.As the account proceeds, wefind that the work of Yule and Pearson is the basis for MacKenzies

inference of underlying interests; the statistical publications aremade to speak to the existence of these interests. Thus the

arguments in these publications are presented not merely asarguments, but as arguments-made-for-a-purpose. This allows the

arguments and the purposes (interests) to appear as two analyticallydistinct entities. Finally, the interests which were initially con-structed from the actions of Yule and Pearson (their publishedarguments) are cited as the antecedents of these actions: The dif-

fering cognitive interests of Pearson and Yule led to their two posi-tions being incommensurable. 67

This rhetorical transformation seems crucial to the success of an

interests model explanation. Without splitting, scientific actionand underlying desire are inextricably tied in the manner Garfinkelpoints out. This is hardly the basis for adequate causal explanation.In addition, inversion is necessary to avoid the charge that the ex-planans (underlying desires) is simply being created from the ex-

planandum (the scientific action): this would be something akin toassuming the answer in a mathematical proof. 68 Without inversion,it would simply not do to take actions as indicative of underlyingdesires and then subsequently cite these same desires as the guidinghand behind scientific actions.



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Of course, the application of the algorithm outlined above israrely as straightforward as I have suggested thus far. Sophisticatedapplications (such as that by MacKenzie) make the suspicion of cir-

cularity or, to be more precise, the accomplished avoidance ofsuspicion, much less immediately obvious. Three further featuresof interests-model explanation, which I shall now briefly illustrate,help to background or minimize the significance of possible cir-cularity.

4. Multiple instances of action affirmthe independent existence of interests

I earlier suggested that any constructed rational connection be-tween action and desire is in principle defeasible: that is, it is always

possible to propose an alternative candidate desire which underliesa specific instance of action. In the instance of Pearsons criticism

of Yule, for example, the desire to be bloody-minded is one suchsuggested alternative to the desire to maximize analogies with ex-isting statistical theory. One strategy for defending the choice of a

particular desire is the citation of other instances of action whichare said to support the initial interpretation as to the underlyingdesire.69 Thus, in MacKenzies account, we are told aboutPearsons work in general that it was dominated by its reference toan existing achievement of statistical theory, the interval leveltheory of correlation and regression.10 The reader is asked toassume that this is the outcome of the interpretation of severalother documents produced by Pearson. The fact that additional

constructive work is necessarily involved in the production of theseauxiliary interpretations is played down in several ways. Firstly,the reader is not told how many other instances of scientific action

(in this case, examples of Pearsons work) have been consulted. In-

stead, these instances are characterized as a category, namelyPearsons work, and the coherence of this category for itsrelevance to the overall interpretation is assumed. Secondly, thereis no explicit reference to the construction of interpretations whichmust have gone on. The facticity of the interpretation is enhancedby minimizing or backgrounding the active involvement of the in-

terpreter.&dquo; Sometimes (although not in the present example)authors adopt a variant of the inversion strategy mentioned above

whereby the facts of the matter are presented as apparent to anyonewho cared to look. In a later part of the paper, for example,



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MacKenzie refers to what does, I think, emerge from his [Yules]letters.. :.72 Notice here that MacKenzie himself appears largelyincidental to the process whereby the interpretation of Yules letters

gets done. Fairly obviously, this effect results, in part, from hisavoidance of phrases like what I can construct from Yules letters.Thirdly, it is implied that the multiple interpretations of differentinstances of action have been done in isolation from each other. Inother words, the supposition is that each interpretation is indepen-dent of, and hence uninfluenced by, any other.As mentionedalready, it is impossible to make interpretations in complete isola-tion from other existing interpretations, expectations about what

should be the case, and so on: interpretation is emphatically notobservation-neutral. Nonetheless, attention to this difficulty of

principle is diverted by, for example, stressing the difference be-tween the kinds of source on which multiple interpretations arebased. Thus, in the above case, the underlying personality of Yuleemerges not just from his letters, but also from comments on himby those who knew him well and from occasional passages in his

writings .73 Fourthly, not only are the resultant set of interpreta-

tions created independently, they also turn out to be the same.That is, each individual interpretation of action is presented as hav-ing given rise to the same underlying pattern even though there isno mention of the criteria employed to determine similarity or dif-ference.

A special case of the multiple interpretation strategy occurs whenparticular emphasis is given to the separation in time of actions andthe desires which supposedly underly them. Their presentation as

separated in time enhances the independence of action and underly-ing desire, and this in turn paves the way for the adequacy of theircausal relationship. Thus the desire purportedly underlying Pear-sons criticism of Yule is a desire which was there all along. Thedesire (to maximize analogies with existing statistical theory) is pro-posed on the basis of prior action - in this case, other work byPearson. Obviously, the same difficulty of principle applies in pro-posing a connection between Pearsons prior work and the desire it

is said to reflect. But possible accusations of circularity arebackgrounded because the focus of explanation is the more recentact of criticizing Yule. The action to be explained (the criticism) isnot directly the basis of the inferred desire.



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5. The relationship between action and interestsis not actually causal

As

already mentioned,the

aspirationto

causalityin the

proposedexplanation is frequently played down. This is because the criterionof independence of explanans and explanandum becomes much lessimportant if there are no strong claims for the causal character oftheir relationship. To say, for example, that a discussion of in-terests helps to shed light on a particular series of scientific ac-tions is significantly different from saying that these actionsresulted from or were caused by these interests. Typical in this

respectis the

admirablycautious nature of MacKenzies remarks

about

examining possible connections between eugenically relevant research and socialinterests .... Study of this situation can hopefully illuminate the choices [of in-dividuals such as Pearson and Yule], even if it cannot provide a causal accountof them. 74

Nonetheless, the format of the explanatory work is substantially

the same, however cautious the claim finally made for the disclosedrelationship: the portrayal of scientific actions in the light ofprevalent interests is axiomatic to this style of explanation.

6. The interests specified are those of a collectivity,rather than of an individual

Another feature of sophisticated uses of the above algorithm hingeson steps c and d and is almost exclusive to sociological explanation.The significance of the constructed relationship between action anddesire is minimized by the claim that the (constructed) set of desiresneed not actually apply to ~ny particular individual case. Thedesires are worked up on the basis of a variety of observed actions(usually on the part of individuals) and their internal coherence as aset of desires is built into the construction. The set as a whole is

then attributed to a particular collectivity. The interests are not

necessarily the interests of an individual; rather they become the in-terests of a social group in which the action to be explained tookplace.Although the construction of these interests is based on the

interpretation of individual actions, it is rhetorically necessary to



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remove the putative cause as far as possible from the scene of in-dividual action while nonetheless asserting its pervasive influence.

So a relationship between the needs of eugenic research and the cognitive in-terests manifested in the development of the theory of association by thebiometric school can be reasonably held to exist, irrespective of the particularmotives of individual members of the school. 75

In concluding a companion study of the debate between Yule andPearson, Norton made explicit his reservations about the adoptionof this kind of sociological strategy:

In short, we can see that many of Pearsons ideas appear to be enhancing theesteem of the group with whom he identified. Whether or not such harmonisa-

tion can be seen as explaining his espousal of these ideas is, it seems to me, a

question that brings us hard up against the philosophical difficulties inherent in

explaining an individuals thought in terms of the interests of a group to whichhe has attached himself.76

Conclusion

I began by noting that although the initial proposals of the strongprogramme in the sociology of knowledge were unclear as to theprecise form of explanatory account which sociologists should

follow, a larger number of more recent contributions have pursuedinterests model explanations. The objective of revealing the socialcharacter of the content of scientific knowledge has been inter-

preted as a programme of specifying the interests which give riseto scientists actions. In IGK in particular, we can identify a confu-sion between (a) the need to focus on knowledge content, and (b)the adoption of an unexplicated causal-type format for explainingthis content in terms of interests.

It seems to me that the latter is a disappointing and, at best,premature development from the former. Having admirably drawnattention to the need to analyze scientific content, some sociologistsand historians have too readily jumped to the deployment of in-terests without yet understanding how such deployment is achiev-ed, managed and sustained. This is particularly important in thesociology of science where the practical character of argument mustsurely be a major analytical concern. We should at least be commit-ted to a high degree of methodological reflection, as a first step in



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understanding the practical management of the many kinds of

philosophical difficulty inherent in explanation.In the second part of this paper, I examined an empirical exam-

ple of interests explanation. I have shown that the construction ofinterests on the basis of actions and their subsequent use in explain-ing actions entailed an explanatory schema in principle beset bymethodological difficulties. These difficulties were backgrounded,minimized and otherwise made to seem inconsequential by the useof various rhetorical and argumentative strategies. I suggest thatthe kind of methodological reflection which I am advocating, andwhich is tentatively illustrated by my examination of interests ex-

planations, can have a positive pay-off for the social study ofscience.Although the particular focus of my analysis here was anexample of the explanatory schema in recent contributions to thesocial study of science, it would obviously be highly desirable to ap-ply the same style of analysis to natural science. The central ques-tion is: what is the character of the constructive work involved in

scientific argument? More specifically, what counts as legitimateavoidance of what might otherwise be regarded as insurmountable

philosophical difficulties? How are presentational devices used tominimize the possibility of critical intervention by others? Whatargumentative strategies enable scientists routinely to accomplishand sustain the rationality of their interpretations in the face ofthe ever-present possibility of better alternative interpretations?

At the very least, detailed attention to these kinds of questions mayhelp redress the current imbalance of overly enthusiastic sociologiz-ing in the social study of science. More importantly, it is by this

kind of approach that we can most fruitfully proceed to realize thepotential of a programme which directs our attention to the verycontent of scientific knowledge.

0 NOTES

I am grateful for the comments and suggestions made by Peter Halfpenny andMalcolm Spector on their reading an earlier draft of this paper, and for the advice ofanonymous referees.



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1. See, especially, S.B. Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory(SKST) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974); D. Bloor, Wittgenstein andMannheim on the Sociology of Mathematics, Studies in the History and Philosophyof Science, Vol. 4 (1973), 173-91; Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (KSI) (Lon-

don : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976).2. Barnes, op. cit. note 1.

3. Bloor, op. cit. note 1.

4. Bloor uses reflexive to describe this last clause of the strong programme(KSI, 5). I reserve the term for use in the sense proposed by Garfinkel: see H. Gar-finkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967),7 ff. See also notes 61 and 62, below. For a discussion of reflexivity in the senseBloor uses the term, see B. Gruenberg, The Problem of Reflexivity in the Sociologyof Science, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 8 (1978), 321-43.

5. Barry Barnes, Interests and the Growth of Knowledge (IGK) (London:

Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).6. For present purposes,I leave aside the issue of reality and its relevance to

sociological arguments, except to note that Barnes is not arguing for simplesociological relativism: he sees social context as one additional feature of explana-tions which show how knowledge derives from reality. See IGK, 2 and 10. For cor-

respondence relating to this argument as presented in SKST, see H. Collins and G.Cox, Recovering Relativity: Did Prophecy Fail?, Social Studies of Science, Vol. 6(1976), 423-44; J. Law, Prophecy Failed (for theActors)!:A Note on RecoveringRelativity, ibid., Vol. 7 (1977), 367-72; Collins and Cox, Relativity Revisited: Mrs.

Keech A Suitable Case for Special Treatment?, ibid., 372-80.7. S. Shapin, Homo Phrenologicus: Anthropological Perspectives on anHistorical Problem, in B. Barnes and S. Shapin (eds), Natural Order: HistoricalStudies of Scientific Culture (London and Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979), 42.

8. See, for example, the review of SKSTby S. Lukes, Social Studies of Science,Vol. 5 (1975), 501-05; H. Meynell, On the Limits of the Sociology of Knowledge,ibid., Vol. 7 (1977), 489-500; E. Millstone, A Framework for the Sociology ofKnowledge, ibid., Vol. 8 (1978), 111-25; and G. Freudenthal, How Strong is DrBloors Strong Programme?, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science,Vol. 10 (1979), 67-83.

9. Barnes and Shapin (eds), op. cit. note 7.10. B. Barnes and S. Shapin, Introduction, in ibid., 9.11. Not that this is peculiar to science studies: cf., for example, N. Denzin, The

Logic of Naturalistic Inquiry, Social Forces, Vol. 50 (1971), 166-82.12. Barnes, IGK, viii.

13. In his review of Bloors KSI, Johnston notes that a similar position is stated

with a breathtaking simplicity that belies the magnitude of the shift in commonbelief involved: R. Johnston, British Journal for the History of Science, Vol. 11(1978), 65-66.

14. Barnes, IGK, 1.

15. Ibid., 12 and 66.

16. Ibid., 13.

17. Ibid., 32.

18. Ibid., 86.

19. Michael Neve makes a similar point with respect to Natural Order, when hesays that it is not clear ... what "naturalism" means for the purposes of that



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book: Neve, The Naturalization of Science, Social Studies of Science, Vol. 10

(1980), 375-91, at 386.20. D. Matza, Becoming Deviant (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969),

Chapter 1.

21. Of course, my use of based on belies a complex and yet to be understood

process whereby a version of scientific method is abstracted from scientific practicefor purposes of philosophical discourse.

22. Cf. a dictionary definition of naturalism as an approach to psychology andsocial science which assumes that human beings are essentially physico-chemicalsystems, and can be studied in exactly the same way as the rest of the physicalworld:A. Bullock and O. Stallybrass (eds), The Fontana Dictionary of Modern

Thought (London: Fontana, 1977), 411. Bhaskar similarly speaks of naturalism asthe thesis that there is (or can be) an essential unity of method between the natural

and social sciences: R. Bhaskar, On the Possibility of Social Scientific Knowledgeand the Limits of Naturalism, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, Vol. 8(1978), 2.

23. In an intriguing statement, Matza writes: The commitment of naturalism, asI conceive it, is to phenomena and their nature, not to Science or any other system of

standards (op. cit. note 20, 3).At first sight, this formulation seems to provoke arather knotty problem as soon as we apply it to the study of science. What happensif the phenomenon itself is science? But there is in fact no problem if we maintainthe distinction between science as a phenomenon, the character of which is managedby and made available to participants, and Science as a pre-given system of stan-

dards which some (positivist?) researchers would wish to employ as the majorcriterion of adequacy of their work.

24. Barnes, IGK, 9.

25. Ibid., 4.

26. IGK can be read as attempting to forge links between recent empirically basedwork in the sociology of science and the more theoretical discussion in the sociologyof knowledge. Specifically, Barnes aim is to show that some of the traditional

preoccupations of the sociology of knowledge are of use in analyzing the content ofscientific knowledge. In this respect, the treatment of sociology of knowledge tradi-tions in IGK is admirably more specific than we are

generallyused to.Another

discussion which relates sociology of knowledge concerns to the possibility of study-ing scientific content, and which includes a detailed appraisal of some recent em-pirical contributions in the sociology of science, is M.J. Mulkay, Science and the

Sociology of Knowledge (London: GeorgeAllen and Unwin, 1979).27. It is worth noting that I am not simply recommending a micro as opposed to

macro perspective. It would be misleading to formulate my argument in terms ofthis contrast because my main point is directed, not so much against the choice oflevel of substantive analysis in interests model explanations, as against the unreflec-tive form of explanation employed.As I hope will become clear, even those interests

explanations which try to explain the details of specific interactions between scien-tists suffer the same deficiencies of explanatory format which I am attempting toelucidate.

28. B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction ofScientific Facts (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979), Chapter 4; Woolgar, Discovery:Logic and Sequence in a Scientific Text, in K. Knorr, R. Krohn and R.D. Whitley(eds), Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook, Vol. 4: The Social Process of Scientific



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Investigation (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980), 239-68. Further evidence of a similar kind isavailable in some recent ethnographic studies of interaction between scientists inlaboratory settings: I am editing a collection of such studies for future publication asa Special Issue of Social Studies of Science.

29. Barnes, IGK, 16.30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., 37.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., 35.

34. D. MacKenzie, Statistical Theory and Social Interests:A Case Study, SocialStudies of Science, Vol. 8 (1978), 35-83; B. Barnes and MacKenzie, On the Role ofInterests in Scientific Change, in R. Wallis (ed.), On the Margins of Science: TheSocial Construction of Rejected Knowledge (Keele, Staffs.: University of Keele,

SociologicalReview

MonographNo.

27, 1979), 49-66.35. Barnes, IGK, 59-63; D. MacKenzie and B. Barnes, Scientific Judgement:The Biometry-Mendelism Controversy, in Barnes and Shapin (eds), op. cit. note 7,191-210.

36. S. Shapin, Phrenological Knowledge and the Social Structure of EarlyNineteenth-Century Edinburgh,Annals of Science, Vol. 32 (1975), 219-43; Shapin,The Politics of Observation: CerebralAnatomy and Social Interests in the Edin-

burgh Phrenology Disputes, in Wallis (ed.), op. cit. note 34, 139-78; Shapin,Homo Phrenologicus, op. cit. note 7, 41-71.

37. B. Wynne, C.G. Barkla and the J Phenomenon:A Case Study in the Treat-

ment of Deviance in Physics, Social Studies of Science, Vol. 6 (1976), 307-47.38. J. Harwood, The Race-Intelligence Controversy:A SociologicalApproach. I

Professional Factors, Social Studies of Science, Vol. 6 (1976), 369-94.39.A. Pickering, The Role of Interests in High-Energy Physics: The Choice be-

tween Charm and Colour, in Knorr et al. (eds), op. cit. note 28, 107-38.40. J. Dean, Controversy over Classification:A Case Study from the History of

Botany, in Barnes and Shapin (eds), op. cit. note 7, 211-30.41. See, for example, B. Harvey, The Effects of Social Context on the Process of

Scientific Investigation: Experimental Tests of Quantum Mechanics, in Knorr et al.

(eds),op. cit. note

28,139-63.

42. D. Wrong, On the Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology,American Sociological Review, Vol. 26 (1961), 183-93.

43. Garfinkel, op. cit. note 4, Chapter 2, 67 ff.44. This is apart, of course, from the systematic inconsistency evident when these

studies include programmatic claims about the inadequacy of Mannheims sociologyof knowledge. See the discussion in the first part of this paper.

45. Neve, op. cit. note 19, 387.46. Ibid., 390.47. MacKenzie, Statistical Theory and Social Interests, op. cit. note 34. Since

completing this paper, MacKenzies work has become available as a book. I havenot been able to take this fuller version into account: see DonaldA. MacKenzie,Statistics in Britain 1865-1930 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981).

48. MacKenzie, Statistical Theory..., op. cit. note 34, 52.

49. Ibid., 53.

50. Ibid., 60.

51. Ibid., 67.



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52. Latour and Woolgar, op. cit. note 28, esp. Chapter 1.53. MacKenzie, Statistical Theory ..., op. cit. note 34, 35.54. This strategy enjoys general usage in sociological argument, most obviously

in the areas of deviance and studies of the media. Typically, a popular stereotype,for example what-homosexuals-are-like, is used as the strawman in demonstrationsthat this stereotype is false or inaccurate. False or inaccurate versions of the actual

state of affairs are then said to arise by virtue of the intrusion of social factors.

55. MacKenzie, Statistical Theory ..., op. cit. note 34, 71.56. Woolgar, Discovery ..., op. cit. note 28.57. I am grateful to Herminio Martins and Peter Halfpenny for pointing out that

this algorithm is a variant of the practical syllogism discussed by von Wright: seeG.H. von Wnght, Explanation and Understanding (London: Routledge and KeganPaul, 1971); also J. Mannien and R. Tuomela (eds), Essays on Explanation and

Understanding (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1976).58. Desire is used throughout to stand synonymously for terms such asmotive, intention, purpose, concern, reason, and so on.All such items areconstituents of sets of interests.

59. Those who assume that such a possibility is ludicrous should recall that

similar interpretations are regularly accomplished and sustained by scientists in their

attempts to account for the actions of others, especially those of their competitors insituations of controversy.

60. Garfinkel, op. cit. note 4, Chapter 3, esp. 94 ff.61. D.L. Wieder, Telling the Code, in R. Turner (ed.), Ethnomethodology

(Harmondsworth, Middx.: Penguin, 1974), 144-72.62. In his recent discussion of Wieders study, Leiter also notes the empirical con-

sequences of reflexivity for the use of rules as causal elements by sociologists: see K.

Leiter,A Primer on Ethnomethodology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980),esp. 198-200.

63. M.J. Mulkay, Interpretation and the Use of Rules: The Case of the Norms

of Science, in T.F. Gieryn (ed.), Science and Social Structure:A Festschrift forRobert K. Merton, Transactions of the New YorkAcademy of Sciences, Series II,Vol. 39 (1980), 111-25.

64.

Garfinkel, op.cit. note

4,7.

65. The term background is used throughout the remainder of the discussion in

place of the more cumbersome relegate to the background.66. Latour and Woolgar, op. cit. note 28, 174 ff.67. MacKenzie, Statistical Theory ..., op. cit. note 34, 52 (my emphasis).68. Of course, this simile is not exact in that it incorrectly implies that

mathematical proofs which do not assume the answer are free from the reflexiveinterconnection between explanans and explanandum. My argument here is thatsuch interconnections are symptomatic of all explanations, whether or not they are

subsequently said to be flawed. My thanks are due to Steven Yearley for raising this

point.69. This of course reflects the common-sense notion that it is always better to

base an interpretation on several different indicators rather than to rely on one. The

sociologists version of this idea appears in some methods texts as an injunction to

engage in triangulation: see, for example, N.K. Denzin, The ResearchAct

(Chicago:Aldine, 1970), Chapter 12; H.W. Smith, Strategies of Social Research(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1975), Chapter 12. While advising in-



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vestigators to triangulate, these texts are less forthcoming about ways of resolvingdifferences in interpretations which may result. For a preliminary discussion ofsome practical problems associated with a multi-method perspective in the sociologyof

science,see M.J.

Mulkay, Methodologyin the

Sociologyof Science: Some

Reflections on the Study of RadioAstronomy, Social Science Information, Vol. 13(1974), 107-19.

70. MacKenzie, Statistical Theory ..., op. cit. note 34, 49.71. This seems to be a recurrent theme in scientific literature. See for example, my

analysis of a Nobel Laureates account of his discovery: Woolgar, Discovery ... ,op. cit. note 28.

72. MacKenzie, Statistical Theory ..., op. cit. note 34, 69.73. Ibid.

74. Ibid., 66.

75. Ibid., 62.76. B.J. Norton, Karl Pearson and Statistics: The Social Origins of Scientific In-

novation, Social Studies of Science, Vol. 8 (1978), 30 (emphasis in original).

Steve Woolgar is Lecturer in the Department of

Sociology at Brunel University and currently VisitingProfessor in the Department of Sociology at McGill

University. His current research includes an extended

investigation of the relationship betweenethnomethodology and the social study of science, as

well as the development of strategies for the participant-observation study of scientific practice. His publicationsinclude (with Bruno Latour) Laboratory Life: The Social

Construction of Scientific Facts (Beverly Hills, Calif.:Sage Publications, 1979).AuthorsAddress: Departmentof Sociology, McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke Street

West, Montreal, PQ, Canada H3A 2T7.

woolgar, s. (1981) 'interests and explanation in the social study of science', ssos, 1981 11 365

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