workers’ eu political alignments during the great recession andré freire luís cabrita mariana...

Workers’ EU Political Alignments during the

Great RecessionAndré FreireLuís Cabrita

Mariana Carmo DuarteHugo Ferrinho Lopes

ETUI EDU DAYS 2015 Conference, European Trade Union Institute, 19-20 November 2015 Berlin

Table of Contents

Introduction

Hypotheses Social cleavages and mass political attitudes and behaviour Attitudes towards the EU and the Great Recession

Data and Methods

The impact of socioeconomic factors upon support for the EU Project

Behaviour Attitudes

Conclusions and policy recommendations for Unions’ strategies

Introduction

Research Question: Does the Great Recession (the 2008 international crisis

and its aftermath, namely the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and the austerity policies that followed) changed the patterns found previously in the literature concerning workers’ EU political alignments (i.e. mainly Eurosceptic)?

(or, to put it another way, is the Great Recession linked with further workers’ support for the EU, or not?)

Objectives To study the impact of socioeconomic factors upon

support for the EU Project, after the Great Recession; behaviour (party vote in the 2014 EP elections). attitudes (diffuse EU support, also in mid 2014);

Literature review & Hypotheses (I): social cleavages and mass political attitudes and behaviour

H1: Hypothesis 1) - We expect to find a significant fragmentation in the political choices of the social classes;

H2: Hypothesis 2) - This fragmentation should be stronger in countries where new value divides are present and, above all, have a clear translation at the party system level.

Literature review & Hypotheses (II): Attitudes towards the EU and the Great Recession

H3 (Hypothesis 3) – According to the main findings in the previous literature, we expect that the less privileged social strata to be less supportive of the European Project, as compared with more well-off social groups;

H4 (Hypothesis 4) - According to the main findings in the previous literature, we expect that the less privileged social strata also tend to vote more in parties less supportive of the EU Project/ Eurosceptic parties (both from the radical left and the nationalist or radical right), as compared with the more well-off social groups, which tend to vote more on pro-European parties (social democratic parties and liberal conservative parties).

Data and Methods

European Election Studies of 2014 - micro level data to measure citizens’ attitudes regarding the EU and their electoral behaviour in EP elections

Case Selection – 8 Countries – Portugal, Spain, Greece, Hungary, Germany, France, Finland, Sweden.

1. High vs. Low Crisis Severity: Portugal, Spain, Greece, Hungary – vs. Germany, France, Finland, Sweden

2. Strong vs. Weak Nationalist/ Far Right Parties: Greece, Hungary,

France, Finland – vs. Portugal, Spain, Germany, Sweden

Sample Size – representative samples of adult populations in each country (N = 9290):

Portugal – 1033 Spain – 1106 Greece – 1085 Hungary – 1104 Germany – 1648 France – 1074 Finland – 1096 Sweden – 1144

Data and Methods

Dependent Variables:

Party family vote in EU 2014 elections;

Attitudes towards the EU.

• Independent Variables (special ocus on Socioeconomic Characteristics):

a) Occupation;

b) Trade union membership;

Cross validating indicators:

c) Education;

d) Goods ownership (Index);

e) Self-positioning social staircase.

Data and Methods

o Methods:

o 1st) present paper:

o Cross tabultations (bivariate analysis) & statistical tests & measures of association

o 2nd) follow-up to the present paper (revised version to send later, after meeting discussions):

o Multivariate analysis with binary and multinomial logistic regressions.

The impact of socioeconomic factors upon support for the EU Project (I): Behaviour

Table 1.1 Party Family Vote EU Elections 2014 by social class

Radical Left/ Greens

Social DemocracyLiberal/

ConservativesNationalist

ConservativesFar Right

Row N % Row N % Row N % Row N % Row N %

Greece

Occupation

Self-employed 40,6% 13,3% 25,9% 8,4% 11,9%

Managers 45,7% 8,6% 40,0% 2,9% 2,9%

Other white collars 49,5% 16,1% 17,2% 7,5% 9,7%

Manual workers 58,0% 12,0% 16,0% 4,0% 10,0%

Cramer's V 0.126

Pearson’s Chi-Square 15,372

Spain

Occupation

Self-employed 10,5% 26,3% 63,2% 0,0% 0,0%

Managers 38,9% 27,8% 33,3% 0,0% 0,0%


Manual workers 38,0% 23,9% 38,0% 0,0% 0,0%

Cramer's V 0.227*

Pearson’s Chi-Square 13,397*

Finland

Occupation

Self-employed 20,8% 6,3% 64,6% 8,3% 0,0%

Managers 26,1% 6,0% 63,4% 4,5% 0,0%


Manual workers 11,5% 29,5% 34,4% 24,6% 0,0%

Cramer's V 0.246**

Pearson’s Chi-Square 50,653**

France

Occupation

Self-employed 21,7% 8,7% 52,2% 0,0% 17,4%

Managers 26,8% 33,9% 28,6% 1,8% 8,9%


Manual workers 22,4% 22,4% 16,3% 4,1% 34,7%

Cramer's V 0.226**


Source: data elaborated by the authors from the European Election Study 2014;Notes: *p<0,05; **p<0,01.Legends: 1) Green (1st Choice in %); 2) Blue (2nd Choice in %); Red (3rd Choice in %); 4) Purple: Left-left majority (only the second element on the possible coalition is marked rose).


Table 1.2 Party Family Vote EU Elections 2014 by social class

Radical Left/ Greens

Social DemocracyLiberal/

ConservativesNationalist



Portugal

Occupation

Self-employed 18,5% 51,9% 29,6% 0,0% 0,0%

Managers 29,6% 25,9% 44,4% 0,0% 0,0%

Other white collars

28,6% 28,6% 42,9% 0,0% 0,0%

Manual workers 30,5% 42,4% 27,1% 0,0% 0,0%

Cramer's V 0.155


Sweden

Occupation

Self-employed 42,9% 10,2% 42,9% 4,1% 0,0%

Managers 44,5% 18,8% 33,5% 3,1% 0,0%

Other white collars

36,4% 23,3% 31,0% 9,3% 0,0%

Manual workers 48,7% 24,0% 23,3% 4,0% 0,0%

Cramer's V 0.109*


Germany

Occupation

Self-employed 37,5% 17,9% 42,9% 1,8% 0,0%

Managers 27,2% 28,1% 36,0% 8,8% 0,0%

Other white collars

20,0% 24,3% 47,1% 8,6% 0,0%

Manual workers 25,0% 40,0% 28,0% 7,0% 0,0%

Cramer's V 0.134*


Hungary

Occupation

Self-employed 0,0% 26,9% 0,0% 61,5% 11,5%

Managers 0,0% 40,0% 0,0% 56,7% 3,3%

Other white collars

0,0% 21,7% 0,0% 69,6% 8,7%

Manual workers 0,0% 20,0% 0,0% 57,6% 22,4%

Cramer's V 0.180


Source: data elaborated by the authors from the European Election Study 2014;Nots: *p<0,05; **p<0,01.Legends: 1) Green (1st Choice in %); 2) Blue (2nd Choice in %); Red (3rd Choice in %); 4) Purple: Left-left majority (only the second element on the possible coalition is marked rose).


First, there is considerable political fragmentation among the social classes, a clear indication that the decline of cleavage politics remained in spite of the great recession: confirming H1.

Second, the erosion of the political cohesion of social classes is particularly evident where the party system shows the presence of a strong libertarian-authoritarian value divide, namely indicated by the strong presence of «nationalist conservatives» and /or the «far right», confirming H2.

Moreover, among the lowest social class strata (manual workers) support for Eurosceptic parties («radical left/greens», «nationalist conservative», and «far right») is usually more widespread than among higher class strata (white collar workers, managers and self-employed), confirming H4 and H3.

Additionally, except for Finland, France and Hungary, there are always left-left majorities among workers.


Table 2 Party Family Vote EU Elections 2014 by Union membership

Radical Left/ Greens Social Democracy Liberal/ ConservativesNationalist



Greece

Trade Union Mebership

Non Unionized 44,8% 13,3% 26,5% 6,3% 9,1%

Unionized 54,2% 16,7% 16,7% 4,2% 8,3%

Cramer's V 0.051Pearson’s Chi-Squared 1,690

Spain


Non Unionized 28,2% 29,5% 42,3% 0,0% 0,0%

Unionized 51,4% 25,7% 22,9% 0,0% 0,0%

Cramer's V 0.161*Pearson’s Chi-Squared 8,617*

Finland


Non Unionized 19,1% 8,5% 62,6% 9,8% 0,0%

Unionized 20,4% 20,1% 49,1% 10,4% 0,0%

Cramer's V 0.176**Pearson’s Chi-Squared 16,491**

France


Non Unionized 22,4% 27,4% 33,3% 1,2% 15,6%

Unionized 29,5% 31,8% 18,2% 2,3% 18,2%


Portugal


Non Unionized 23,6% 44,7% 31,6% 0,0% 0,0%

Unionized 41,7% 20,8% 37,5% 0,0% 0,0%


Sweden


Non Unionized 26,4% 18,1% 46,3% 9,3% 0,0%

Unionized 44,5% 23,5% 28,6% 3,3% 0,0%


Germany


Non Unionized 20,9% 31,9% 41,3% 5,9% 0,0%

Unionized 22,7% 45,5% 21,8% 10,0% 0,0%


Hungary


Non Unionized 0,0% 26,6% 0,0% 61,4% 12,0%

Unionized 0,0% 25,0% 0,0% 56,3% 18,8%


Source: data elaborated by the authors from the European Election Study 2014;Notes: *p<0,05; **p<0,01.Legends: 1) Green (1st Choice in %); 2) Blue (2nd Choice in %); Red (3rd Choice in %); 4) Purple: Left-left majority (only the second element on the possible coalition is marked rose).


Considering now the political cohesion of union members (either the respondents themselves and/or someone in their household) as compared to non-union members (see Table 2), we can say that for all the countries expect Finland and Hungary (where the «liberal conservative» and the «nationalist conservative» or the «nationalist conservative» and the «far right», respectively receive an absolute majority of the union members’ vote) the political cohesion of union members is much higher than for social classes.

This is so because in each and every of the remaining countries there is always a left-left absolute majority («radical left/greens» and «social democracy»).

However, only in Spain, Finland, Portugal, Germany and Sweden are these relationships statistically significant.

Thus, political fragmentation is much lower in this case, not confirming H1, except for countries where there is a significant authoritarian-libertarian divide at the party level, confirming H2.

The left-left majorities among union members in all countries except Finland and Hungary means also that support for the EU project is mixed, not confirming at least completely H3.

The impact of socioeconomic factors upon support for the EU Project (II): attitudes

QP7 Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the EU is...?

A bad thingNeither a good nor a bad

thingA good thing

Row N % Row N % Row N %

Greece

Occupation

Self-employed 24,0% 33,7% 42,3%

Managers 14,3% 19,6% 66,1%

Other white collars 23,4% 31,0% 45,5%

Manual workers 26,4% 40,0%33,6%

Cramer's V 0.126*

Pearson’s Chi-Squared 16,439*

Spain

Occupation

Self-employed 11,0% 27,4% 61,6%

Managers 1,8% 29,8% 68,4%


Manual workers 14,6% 23,7% 61,6%

Cramer's V 0.104

Pearson’s Chi-Squared 8,955

Finland

Occupation

Self-employed 5,3% 26,3% 68,4%

Managers 7,3% 16,8% 75,9%



Cramer's V 0.191**


France

Occupation

Self-employed 15,6% 22,2% 62,2%

Managers 5,7% 19,3% 75,0%



Cramer's V 0.206**

Pearson’s Chi-Squared 39,689**

Source: data elaborated by the authors from the European Election Study 2014; otes: *p<0,05; **p<0,01.Legends: 1) Green (1st Choice in %); 2) Blue (2nd Choice in %); Red (3rd Choice in %); (Now considering only «A good thing» option»: EU Support)



A bad thingNeither a good nor a

bad thingA good thing


PortugalOccupation

Self-employed 28,0% 25,3% 46,7%

Managers 9,6% 24,7% 65,8%




SwedenOccupation

Self-employed 11,5% 19,7% 68,9%

Managers 12,3% 22,4% 65,4%




GermanyOccupation

Self-employed 13,8% 12,8% 73,4%

Managers 6,8% 10,9% 82,3%




HungaryOccupation

Self-employed 17,3% 25,0% 57,7%

Managers 9,9% 39,4% 50,7%




Source: data elaborated by the authors from the European Election Study 2014; otes: *p<0,05; **p<0,01.Legends: 1) Green (1st Choice in %); 2) Blue (2nd Choice in %); Red (3rd Choice in %); (Now considering only «A good thing» option»: EU Support)


Even in the cases where there is an absolute majority of supporters of the EU project («country’s EU membership is a good thing») within each and every social class (Spain and Germany), the workers (white-collar and manual, but especially the latter) are the least supportive or are among the least supportive occupational groups.

In the case of the other countries, white-collar workers and, above all, manual workers are the occupational groups which are the least supportive of the EU Project and that usually means only minority support (except white-collars in Finland, Portugal, Sweden, and Hungary).

Thus, the least privileged strata of the population, i.e. the manual workers are indeed the occupational group that is least supportive of the EU Project (sometimes, in some countries, they are also joined by the white-collar workers: Finland, France, and Germany). These relationships are always statistically significant, except in Spain.



A bad thingNeither a good nor a bad

thingA good thing


GreeceTrade Union Mebership

Non Unionized 25,8% 30,3% 43,9%

Unionized 39,3% 17,9% 42,9%Cramer's V 0.055


SpainTrade Union Mebership

Non Unionized 14,8% 26,1% 59,1%



FinlandTrade Union Mebership

Non Unionized 13,3% 29,4% 57,3%



FranceTrade Union Mebership

Non Unionized 14,7% 28,7% 56,6%



PortugalTrade Union Mebership

Non Unionized 25,5% 32,9% 41,6%



SwedenTrade Union Mebership

Non Unionized 15,7% 21,4% 62,9%



GermanyTrade Union Mebership

Non Unionized 7,8% 24,6% 67,6%

Unionized 7,3% 16,3% 76,4%Cramer's V 0.063*


HungaryTrade Union Mebership

Non Unionized 10,7% 43,2% 46,1%



Source: data elaborated by the authors from the European Election Study 2014; otes: *p<0,05; **p<0,01.Legends: 1) Green (1st Choice in %); 2) Blue (2nd Choice in %); (Now considering only «A good thing» option»: EU Support)


Looking at Table 3 we can conclude that, on the one hand, union members are the least supportive of the EU Project in Greece, Finland, France and Sweden, as compared with non-union members.

However, even in Finland and Sweden a majority of union members is nevertheless in favour of the EU Project, it is only a matter of relative support.

On the other hand, in all the other countries the union members are more supportive of the EU Project when compared with non-union members (but in Portugal this means, nevertheless, only minority support).

In any case, the differences between union members and non-union members are usually rather small, and that is why only in Germany are the differences statistically relevant.

Conclusions

Our paper basically confirmed our hypotheses (H1-H4) and provided a negative answer to our major research question. As for the latter, there are no signs that since the great recession (i.e. the 2008 international crisis and its aftermath, namely the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and the austerity policies that followed, especially in bailed out countries: see Blyth, 2013; Freire et al, 2016; Moury and Freire, 2013; European Commission, 2011; Monastiriotis et al, 2013) the workers (manual and white-collar, but especially the former) are now more in tune with the EU Project, quite the contrary.

First of all, the lower strata of the population (the manual workers, the less educated, with less material well-being, the ones self-reported as underprivileged) are still more distant from the EU Project than the better well-off groups.

Conclusions

Second, in line with the thesis about the decline of cleavage politics, there is a large fragmentation of workers’ voting choices which go from the radical left to the radical right, although with strong variations across countries.

Third, that fragmentation is even larger, as expected, in countries (like France, Finland and Hungary) where the party system reveals multiple dimensions of competition, namely the presence of an authoritarian-libertarian divide, cross cutting the classical left-right divide, evidenced by the presence of a strong far right or, at least, a strong nationalist conservative party.

Fourth, the detachment of workers vis-à-vis the European project is also evidenced by the workers’ significant support for Eurosceptic parties (on the left and on the right).

Conclusions

Fifth, on the positive side there is the indication of stronger political cohesion of union members (both more pro-European and more pro left-left coalitions) vis-à-vis non-union members.

Sixth, also on the positive side: in most of the countries (except Finland and Hungary) workers given majority support for left-left coalitions (i.e. social democracy and radical left/greens taken together), although in France this is true only for non-manual workers and in Germany it is the other way around.

Policy recommendations for Unions’ strategies

Our policy recommendations are the following:

First, unions should invest in new political alliances (namely in left-left coalitions, which usually gather a majority of support from workers in the countries under study) to fight for a Social Europe, a more democratic Europe and an Europe that gives more institutional representation to workers’ representatives vis-à-vis the status quo that clearly favors corporations (all problems identified in the literature and that can be said to be, at least in part, behind the divorce between workers and the EU Project: see Schmitter, 2000 and 2011; Crouch, 2004; Mair, 2013; Merkel, 2015; Streeck, 2015; Freire, 2015).

Policy recommendations for Unions’ strategies

Our policy recommendations are the following:

Second, the above mentioned new left-left political alliances are fundamental because otherwise you can end up with the nationalist conservatives and the far right/the radical right monopolizing the fight against euro liberalism (like in Hungary, Finland or France).

Finally, union membership still proves to be a strong element of political cohesion for the working class (manual and non-manual), thus investment in unionization is still worth to be pursued, namely to back more social and democratic versions of the EU Project supported by new left-left coalitions at the party level.

workers’ eu political alignments during the great recession andré freire luís cabrita mariana...

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