WorksofKarlMarx1843

CritiqueofHegel’sPhilosophyofRight

Written:1843-44;Source:Marx’sCritiqueofHegel'sPhilosophyofRight(1843);Publisher:CambridgeUniversityPress,1970.Ed.JosephO’Malley;Translated:AnnetteJolinandJosephO’Malley;Transcribed:AndyBlunden;HTMLMarkup:AndyBlundenandBrianBaggins(2000).

Introduction(1844)

Part1:TheState§§261-271

a.PrivateRightvis-à-vistheState

b.TheStateasManifestationofIdeaorproductofman

c.ThePoliticalSentiment

d.Analysis

Part2.TheConstitution§§272-286

a.TheCrown

b.SubjectsandPredicates

c.Democracy

d.RésuméofHegel'sdevelopmentoftheCrown

Part3.TheExecutive§§287-297

a.TheBureaucracy

b.Separationofthestateandcivilsociety

c.Executive'subsuming'theindividualandparticular

undertheuniversal

Part4:TheLegislature§§298-303

a.TheLegislature

b.TheEstates

c.Hegelpresentswhatisastheessenceofthestate.

d.InMiddleAgestheclassesofcivilsocietyandthe

politicalclasseswereidentical.

Part5:TheEstates§§304-307

a.HegeldeducesbirthrightfromtheAbsoluteIdea

b.Hegel’sMediations

c.RealextremeswouldbePoleandnon-Pole

d.TheAgriculturalClass

e.“ThestateistheactualityoftheethicalIdea”

f.TheRomansandPrivateProperty

Part6:CivilSocietyandtheEstates§§308-313

a.CivilSocietyandtheEstates

b.IndividualsconceivedasAbstractions

c.Hegeldoesnotallowsocietytobecometheactually

determiningthing

Hegel’sPhilosophyofRight|Marx-EngelsArchive

WorksofKarlMarx1843

AContributiontotheCritiqueofHegel’sPhilosophyof

Right

Introduction

Written:December1843-January1844;Firstpublished:inDeutsch-Französische Jahrbücher,7&10February1844inParis;Transcription:thesourceanddateoftranscriptionisunknown.ItwasproofedandcorrectedbyAndyBlunden,February2005,andcorrectedbyMatthewCarmodyin2009.

For Germany, the criticism of religion has been essentiallycompleted, and the criticism of religion is the prerequisite of allcriticism.

The profane existence of error is compromised as soon as itsheavenlyoratioproariset focis [“speech for thealtarsandhearths,”i.e.,forGodandcountry]hasbeenrefuted.Man,whohasfoundonlythe reflection of himself in the fantastic reality of heaven, where hesought a superman, will no longer feel disposed to find the mereappearanceofhimself,thenon-man[Unmensch],whereheseeksandmustseekhistruereality.

The foundation of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion,religiondoesnotmakeman.Religionis,indeed,theself-consciousnessandself-esteemofmanwhohaseithernotyetwonthroughtohimself,or has already lost himself again. But man is no abstract beingsquattingoutsidetheworld.Manisthe world of man–state,society.

This state and this society produce religion, which is an invertedconsciousness of the world, because they are an inverted world.Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaediccompendium,itslogicinpopularform,itsspiritualpointd’honneur,itsenthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and itsuniversal basis of consolation and justification. It is the fantasticrealization of the human essence since the human essence has notacquired any true reality. The struggle against religion is, therefore,indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma isreligion.

Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, theexpression ofrealsufferingandaprotestagainstrealsuffering.Religionisthesighoftheoppressedcreature,theheartofaheartlessworld,andthesoulofsoullessconditions.Itistheopiumofthepeople.

The abolitionof religion as the illusory happiness of thepeople isthedemandfor theirrealhappiness.Tocallon themtogiveup theirillusionsabouttheirconditionistocallonthemtogiveupaconditionthat requires illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, inembryo,thecriticismofthatvaleoftearsofwhichreligionisthehalo.

Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers on the chain not inorder that man shall continue to bear that chain without fantasy orconsolation, but so that he shall throw off the chain and pluck thelivingflower.Thecriticismofreligiondisillusionsman,sothathewillthink, act, and fashion his reality like a man who has discarded hisillusionsandregainedhissenses,sothathewillmovearoundhimselfashisowntrueSun.ReligionisonlytheillusorySunwhichrevolvesaroundmanaslongashedoesnotrevolvearoundhimself.

Itis,therefore,thetaskofhistory,oncetheother-worldoftruthhasvanished,toestablishthetruthofthisworld.Itistheimmediatetaskofphilosophy, which is in the service of history, to unmask self-estrangement in its unholy forms once the holy form of human self-estrangementhasbeenunmasked.Thus,thecriticismofHeaventurnsintothecriticismofEarth,thecriticismofreligionintothecriticismoflaw,andthecriticismoftheologyintothecriticismofpolitics.

The following exposition [a full-scale critical study of Hegel’sPhilosophy of Right was supposed to follow this introduction] – acontributiontothisundertaking–concernsitselfnotdirectlywiththeoriginalbutwithacopy,withtheGermanphilosophyofthestateandoflaw.TheonlyreasonforthisisthatitisconcernedwithGermany.

Ifwewere tobeginwith theGermanstatusquo itself, the result–evenifweweretodoitintheonlyappropriateway,i.e.,negatively–would still be an anachronism. Even the negation of our presentpoliticalsituationisadustyfactinthehistoricaljunkroomofmodernnations.IfInegatepowderedpigtails,Iamstillleftwithunpowderedpigtails.IfInegatethesituationinGermanyin1843,thenaccordingtothe French calendar I have barely reached 1789,much less the vitalcentreofourpresentage.

Indeed, German history prides itself on having travelled a roadwhichnoothernationinthewholeofhistoryhasevertravelledbefore,oreverwillagain.Wehavesharedtherestorationsofmodernnationswithout everhaving shared their revolutions.Wehavebeen restored,firstly,becauseothernationsdaredtomakerevolutions,and,secondly,because other nations suffered counter-revolutions; on the one hand,becauseourmasterswereafraid,and,ontheother,becausetheywerenotafraid.Withourshepherdstothefore,weonlyoncekeptcompany

withfreedom,onthedayofitsinternment.

Oneschoolofthoughtthatlegitimizestheinfamyoftodaywiththeinfamy of yesterday, a school that stigmatizes every cry of the serfagainst the knout as mere rebelliousness once the knout has aged alittleandacquiredahereditarysignificanceandahistory,aschool towhich history shows nothing but its a posteriori, as did the God ofIsrael tohisservantMoses, thehistoricalschoolof law– this schoolwouldhaveinventedGermanhistorywereitnotitselfaninventionofthat history. A Shylock, but a cringing Shylock, that swears by itsbond,itshistoricalbond,itsChristian-Germanicbond,foreverypoundoffleshcutfromtheheartofthepeople.

Good-naturedenthusiasts,Germanomaniacsbyextractionandfree-thinkers by reflexion, on the contrary, seek our history of freedombeyondourhistoryintheancientTeutonicforests.But,whatdifferenceis there between the history of our freedom and the history of theboar’s freedom if it can be found only in the forests? Besides, it iscommonknowledgethattheforestechoesbackwhatyoushoutintoit.SopeacetotheancientTeutonicforests!

Waron theGermanstateofaffairs!Byallmeans!Theyarebelowthelevelofhistory,theyarebeneathanycriticism,buttheyarestillanobjectofcriticismlikethecriminalwhoisbelowthelevelofhumanitybutstillanobjectfortheexecutioner.Inthestruggleagainstthatstateofaffairs,criticismisnopassionofthehead,itistheheadofpassion.Itisnotalancet,itisaweapon.Itsobjectisitsenemy,whichitwantsnottorefutebuttoexterminate.Forthespiritofthatstateofaffairsisrefuted. In itself, it is no objectworthy of thought, it is an existencewhich is as despicable as it is despised. Criticism does not need tomake things clear to itself as regards this object, for it has already

settledaccountswithit.Itnolongerassumesthequalityofanend-in-itself, but only of a means. Its essential pathos is indignation, itsessentialworkisdenunciation.

It is a case of describing the dull reciprocal pressure of all socialspheres one on another, a general inactive ill-humor, a limitednesswhichrecognizesitselfasmuchasitmistakesitself,withintheframeof government system which, living on the preservation of allwretchedness,isitselfnothingbutwretchednessinoffice.

Whatasight!Thisinfinitelyproceedingdivisionofsocietyintothemost manifold races opposed to one another by petty antipathies,uneasy consciences, and brutal mediocrity, and which, preciselybecauseof their reciprocalambiguousanddistrustfulattitude,areall,without exception althoughwith various formalities, treated by theirrulers as conceded existences. And they must recognize andacknowledge as a concession of heaven the very fact that they aremastered, ruled, possessed! And, on the other side, are the rulersthemselves,whosegreatnessisininverseproportiontotheirnumber!

Criticism dealing with this content is criticism in a hand-to-handfight, and in such a fight the point is notwhether the opponent is anoble,equal,interestingopponent,thepointistostrikehim.Thepointis not to let the Germans have a minute for self-deception andresignation. The actual pressure must be made more pressing byaddingtoitconsciousnessofpressure,theshamemustbemademoreshameful by publicizing it. Every sphere ofGerman societymust beshown as the partie honteuse of German society: these petrifiedrelationsmustbe forced todancebysinging theirown tune to them!The peoplemust be taught to be terrified at itself in order to give itcourage. This will be fulfilling an imperative need of the German

nation, and the needs of the nations are in themselves the ultimatereasonfortheirsatisfaction.

This struggle against the limitedcontentof theGerman statusquocannotbewithoutinterestevenforthemodernnations,fortheGermanstatusquoistheopencompletionoftheancienrégimeandtheancienrégime is the concealed deficiency of themodern state. The struggleagainsttheGermanpoliticalpresentisthestruggleagainstthepastofthemodernnations,andtheyarestillburdenedwithremindersofthatpast.Itisinstructiveforthemtoseetheancienrégime,whichhasbeenthrough its tragedy with them, playing its comedy as a Germanrevenant.Tragic indeedwas thepre-existingpowerof theworld,andfreedom,ontheotherhand,wasapersonalnotion;inshort,aslongasitbelievedandhad tobelieve in itsown justification.As longas theancien régime, as an existingworld order, struggled against aworldthatwasonlycomingintobeing,therewasonitssideahistoricalerror,notapersonalone.Thatiswhyitsdownfallwastragic.

On the other hand, the presentGerman regime, an anachronism, aflagrantcontradictionofgenerallyrecognizedaxioms,thenothingnessof the ancien régime exhibited to the world, only imagines that itbelievesinitselfanddemandsthattheworldshouldimaginethesamething.Ifitbelievedinitsownessence,wouldittrytohidethatessenceunderthesemblanceofanalienessenceandseekrefugeinhypocrisyandsophism?Themodernancienrégime is ratheronly thecomedianofaworldorderwhosetrue heroesaredead.Historyisthoroughandgoesthroughmanyphaseswhencarryinganoldformtothegrave.Thelast phases of a world-historical form is its comedy. The gods ofGreece, already tragically wounded to death in Aeschylus’s tragedyPrometheus Bound,hadtore-dieacomicdeathinLucian’sDialogues.

Whythiscourseofhistory?Sothathumanityshouldpartwithitspastcheerfully.ThischeerfulhistoricaldestinyiswhatwevindicateforthepoliticalauthoritiesofGermany.

Meanwhile,oncemodernpolitico-socialrealityitselfissubjectedtocriticism,once criticism rises to trulyhumanproblems, it finds itselfoutsidetheGermanstatusquo,orelseitwouldreachoutforitsobjectbelowitsobject.Anexample.Therelationofindustry,oftheworldofwealthgenerally,tothepoliticalworldisoneofthemajorproblemsofmodern times. Inwhat form is this problembeginning to engage theattention of the Germans? In the form of protective duties, of theprohibitive system, of national economy. Germanomania has passedout ofman intomatter, and thus onemorningour cottonbarons andironheroessawthemselvesturnedintopatriots.Peopleare,therefore,beginninginGermanytoacknowledgethesovereigntyofmonopolyonthe inside through lending itsovereignty on the outside.Peopleare,therefore,nowabouttobegin,inGermany,whatpeopleinFranceandEngland are about to end. The old corrupt condition against whichthesecountriesarerevoltingintheory,andwhichtheyonlybearasonebearschains, isgreeted inGermanyas thedawnofabeautiful futurewhichstillhardlydarestopassfromcraftytheorytothemostruthlesspractice. Whereas the problem in France and England is: Politicaleconomy,ortheruleofsocietyoverwealth;inGermany,itis:Nationaleconomy,orthemasteryofprivatepropertyovernationality.InFranceand England, then, it is a case of abolishing monopoly that hasproceeded to its last consequences; in Germany, it is a case ofproceedingtothelastconsequencesofmonopoly.Thereitisacaseofsolution,hereasyetacaseofcollision.ThisisanadequateexampleoftheGermanformofmodernproblems,anexampleofhowourhistory,likeaclumsyrecruit,stillhastodoextradrillonthingsthatareoldand

hackneyedinhistory.

If, therefore, the whole German development did not exceed theGermanpolitical development, aGerman could at themost have theshareintheproblems-of-the-presentthataRussianhas.But,whentheseparate individual is not bound by the limitations of the nation, thenation as a whole is still less liberated by the liberation of oneindividual.ThefactthatGreecehadaScythianamongitsphilosophersdidnothelptheScythianstomakeasinglesteptowardsGreekculture.[AnallusiontoAnacharsis.]

Luckily,weGermansarenotScythians.

Astheancientpeopleswentthroughtheirpre-historyinimagination,inmythology, soweGermans have gone through our post-history inthought, in philosophy. We are philosophical contemporaries of thepresent without being its historical contemporaries. Germanphilosophy is the ideal prolongationofGermanhistory. If therefore,insteadoftheoeuvresincompletesofourrealhistory,wecriticizetheoeuvresposthumesofouridealhistory,philosophy,ourcriticismisinthe midst of the questions of which the present says: that is thequestion. What, in progressive nations, is a practical break withmodernstateconditions, is, inGermany,whereeventhoseconditionsdonotyetexist,atfirstacriticalbreakwiththephilosophicalreflexionofthoseconditions.

German philosophy of right and state is the onlyGerman historywhich isal pari [“on a level”]with theofficialmodern present.TheGermannationmustthereforejointhis,itsdream-history,toitspresentconditionsandsubject tocriticismnotonly theseexistingconditions,but at the same time their abstract continuation. Its future cannot be

limitedeither to the immediatenegationof its realconditionsofstateand right, or to the immediate implementation of its ideal state andrightconditions,forithastheimmediatenegationofitsrealconditionsin its ideal conditions, and it has almost outlived the immediateimplementation of its ideal conditions in the contemplation ofneighboring nations.Hence, it iswith good reason that thepracticalpoliticalpartyinGermanydemandsthenegation of philosophy.

Itiswrong,notinitsdemandbutinstoppingatthedemand,whichitneither seriously implements nor can implement. It believes that itimplementsthatnegationbyturningitsbacktophilosophyanditsheadaway from it and muttering a few trite and angry phrases about it.Owingtothelimitationofitsoutlook,itdoesnotincludephilosophyinthe circle ofGerman reality or it even fancies it isbeneath Germanpractice and the theories that serve it. You demand that real lifeembryos bemade the starting-point, but you forget that the real lifeembryooftheGermannationhasgrownsofaronlyinsideitscranium.Inaword–Youcannotabolish[aufheben]philosophywithoutmakingitareality.

The samemistake,butwith the factorsreversed,wasmadeby thetheoreticalpartyoriginatingfromphilosophy.

Inthepresentstruggleitsawonlythecriticalstruggleofphilosophyagainst theGermanworld; it did not give a thought to the fact thatphilosophy up to the present itself belongs to this world and is itscompletion, althoughan idealone.Critical towards its counterpart, itwas uncritical towards itself when, proceeding from the premises ofphilosophy, it either stopped at the results given by philosophy orpassed off demands and results from somewhere else as immediatedemandsandresultsofphilosophy–althoughthese,providedtheyare

justified,canbeobtainedonlybythenegationofphilosophyuptothepresent, of philosophy as such. We reserve ourselves the right to amore detailed description of this section: It thought it could makephilosophyarealitywithoutabolishing[aufzuheben]it.

The criticism of theGerman philosophy of state and right, whichattained its most consistent, richest, and last formulation throughHegel,isbothacriticalanalysisofthemodernstateandoftherealityconnectedwithit,andtheresolutenegationofthewholemanneroftheGerman consciousness in politics and right as practiced hereto, themostdistinguished,mostuniversal expressionofwhich, raised to thelevel of science, is the speculative philosophy of right itself. If thespeculative philosophy of right, that abstract extravagant thinking onthemodernstate,therealityofwhichremainsathingofthebeyond,ifonly beyond theRhine,was possible only inGermany, inversely theGermanthought-imageofthemodernstatewhichmakesabstractionofreal manwas possible onlybecause and insofar as themodern stateitselfmakesabstractionofreal man,orsatisfiesthewholeofmanonlyin imagination. In politics, the Germans thought what other nationsdid. Germany was their theoretical conscience. The abstraction andpresumptionof its thoughtwasalways instepwith theone-sidednessand lowliness of its reality. If, therefore, the status quo of Germanstatehood expresses the completion of the ancien régime, thecompletionofthethorninthefleshofthemodernstate,thestatusquoof German state science expresses the incompletion of the modernstate,thedefectivenessofitsfleshitself.

Already as the resolute opponent of the previous form ofGermanpoliticalconsciousnessthecriticismofspeculativephilosophyofrightstrays,notintoitself,butintoproblemswhichthereisonlyonemeans

ofsolving–practice.

Itisasked:canGermanyattainapracticeàlahauteurdesprincipes–i.e.,arevolutionwhichwill raise itnotonly to theofficial levelofmodernnations,buttotheheight of humanitywhichwillbethenearfutureofthosenations?

Theweaponofcriticismcannot,ofcourse, replacecriticismof theweapon, material force must be overthrown by material force; buttheory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped themasses. Theory is capable of gripping the masses as soon as itdemonstratesad hominem,anditdemonstratesadhominemassoonasitbecomesradical.Toberadicalistograsptherootofthematter.But,forman,therootismanhimself.TheevidentproofoftheradicalismofGerman theory, and hence of its practical energy, is that is proceedsfromaresolutepositiveabolitionofreligion.Thecriticismofreligionendswiththeteachingthatmanisthehighestessenceforman–hence,withthecategoricimperativetooverthrowallrelationsinwhichmanisadebased,enslaved,abandoned,despicableessence,relationswhichcannotbebetterdescribedthanbythecryofaFrenchmanwhenitwasplannedtointroduceataxondogs:Poordogs!Theywanttotreatyouashumanbeings!

Even historically, theoretical emancipation has specific practicalsignificance for Germany. For Germany’s revolutionary past istheoretical, it is theReformation.As the revolution thenbegan in thebrainofthemonk,sonowitbeginsinthebrainofthephilosopher.

Luther,wegrant,overcamebondageoutofdevotionbyreplacingitbybondageoutofconviction.Heshattered faith inauthoritybecausehe restored the authority of faith. He turned priests into laymen

because he turned laymen into priests. He freed man from outerreligiosity because he made religiosity the inner man. He freed thebodyfromchainsbecauseheenchainedtheheart.

But,ifProtestantismwasnotthetruesolutionoftheproblem,itwasat least the truesettingof it. Itwasno longeracaseof the layman’sstruggleagainstthepriestoutsidehimselfbutofhisstruggleagainsthisown priest inside himself, his priestly nature. And if the ProtestanttransformationoftheGermanlaymanintopriestsemancipatedthelaypopes, the princes, with the whole of their priestly clique, theprivilegedandphilistines, thephilosophical transformationofpriestlyGermansintomenwillemancipatethepeople.But,secularizationwillnotstopat theconfiscationofchurchestatesset inmotionmainlybyhypocriticalPrussiaanymorethanemancipationstopsatprinces.ThePeasantWar, themost radical fact ofGerman history, came to griefbecauseoftheology.Today,whentheologyitselfhascometogrief,themostunfree factofGermanhistory,ourstatusquo,willbe shatteredagainstphilosophy.On theeveof theReformation,officialGermanywas the most unconditional slave of Rome. On the eve of itsrevolution, it is theunconditionalslaveof less thanRome,ofPrussiaandAustria,ofcountryjunkersandphilistines.

Meanwhile,amajordifficultyseemstostandinthewayofaradicalGermanrevolution.

Forrevolutionsrequireapassiveelement,amaterialbasis.Theoryisfulfilledinapeopleonlyinsofarasitisthefulfilmentoftheneedsofthatpeople.Butwillthemonstrousdiscrepancybetweenthedemandsof German thought and the answers of German reality find acorresponding discrepancy between civil society and the state, andbetween civil society and itself? Will the theoretical needs be

immediate practical needs? It is not enough for thought to strive forrealization,realitymustitselfstrivetowardsthought.

But Germany did not rise to the intermediary stage of politicalemancipation at the same time as themodern nations. It has not yetreached in practice the stageswhich it has surpassed in theory.Howcan it do a somersault, not only over its own limitations, but at thesametimeoverthelimitationsofthemodernnations,overlimitationswhichitmustinrealityfeelandstriveforasforemancipationfromitsreal limitations? Only a revolution of radical needs can be a radicalrevolutionanditseemsthatpreciselythepreconditionsandgroundforsuchneedsarelacking.

If Germany has accompanied the development of the modernnations only with the abstract activity of thought without taking aneffectiveshare in therealstruggleof thatdevelopment, ithas,on theotherhand,sharedthesufferingsofthatdevelopment,withoutsharingin itsenjoyment,or itspartialsatisfaction.To theabstractactivityonthe one hand corresponds the abstract suffering on the other.That iswhy Germany will one day find itself on the level of Europeandecadence before ever having been on the level of Europeanemancipation.ItwillbecomparabletoafetishworshipperpiningawaywiththediseasesofChristianity.

IfwenowconsidertheGermangovernments,wefindthatbecauseof the circumstances of the time, because of Germany’s condition,becauseofthestandpointofGermaneducation,and,finally,undertheimpulse of its own fortunate instinct, they are driven to combine thecivilized shortcomings of the modern state world, the advantages ofwhichwe do not enjoy,with thebarbaric deficiencies of the ancienrégime,whichweenjoyinfull;hence,Germanymustsharemoreand

more, ifnot in thereasonableness,at least in theunreasonablenessofthosestateformationswhicharebeyondtheboundsofitsstatusquo.Isthere in theworld, forexample,acountrywhichsharessonaively inall the illusions of constitutional statehood without sharing in itsrealitiesasso-calledconstitutionalGermany?Andwasitnotperforcethe notion of a German government to combine the tortures ofcensorshipwiththetorturesoftheFrenchSeptemberlaws[1835anti-presslaws]whichprovideforfreedomofthepress?AsyoucouldfindthegodsofallnationsintheRomanPantheon,soyouwillfindintheGermans’HolyRomanEmpireallthesinsofallstateforms.Thatthiseclecticismwill reach a so far unprecedented height is guaranteed inparticular by the political-aesthetic gourmanderie of a German king[FrederickWilliamIV]whointendedtoplayalltherolesofmonarchy,whetherfeudalordemocratic,ifnotinthepersonofthepeople,atleastin his own person, and if not for the people, at least for himself.Germany,asthedeficiencyofthepoliticalpresentconstitutedaworldof its own, will not be able to throw down the specific Germanlimitations without throwing down the general limitation of thepoliticalpresent.

Itisnottheradicalrevolution,notthegeneralhumanemancipationwhich is a utopian dream for Germany, but rather the partial, themerely political revolution, the revolutionwhich leaves the pillars ofthehousestanding.Onwhat isapartial,amerelypoliticalrevolutionbased? On part of civil society emancipating itself and attaininggeneraldomination;onadefiniteclass,proceedingfromitsparticularsituation;undertaking thegeneralemancipationof society.Thisclassemancipates the whole of society, but only provided the whole ofsociety is in the same situation as this class – e.g., possessesmoneyandeducationorcanacquirethematwill.

No class of civil society can play this role without arousing amomentofenthusiasminitselfandinthemasses,amomentinwhichit fraternizes and merges with society in general, becomes confusedwith it and is perceived and acknowledged as its generalrepresentative, amoment inwhich its claims and rights are truly theclaims and rights of society itself, amoment inwhich it is truly thesocialheadandthesocialheart.Onlyinthenameofthegeneralrightsofsocietycanaparticularclassvindicateforitselfgeneraldomination.For the storming of this emancipatory position, and hence for thepoliticalexploitationofallsectionsofsocietyintheinterestsofitsownsection, revolutionary energy and spiritual self-feeling alone are notsufficient. For the revolution of a nation, and the emancipation of aparticular class of civil society to coincide, for one estate to beacknowledged as the estate of the whole society, all the defects ofsocietymustconverselybeconcentrated inanotherclass,aparticularestate must be the estate of the general stumbling-block, theincorporationofthegenerallimitation,aparticularsocialspheremustbe recognizedas thenotoriouscrimeof thewholeof society, so thatliberation from that sphereappearsasgeneral self-liberation.Foroneestatetobeparexcellencetheestateofliberation,anotherestatemustconverselybe theobvious estate of oppression.Thenegativegeneralsignificance of theFrenchnobility and theFrench clergydeterminedthe positive general significance of the nearest neighboring andopposedclassofthebourgeoisie.

But no particular class in Germany has the constituency, thepenetration, thecourage,or the ruthlessness thatcouldmark itoutasthe negative representative of society. No more has any estate thebreadthofsoulthatidentifiesitself,evenforamoment,withthesoulof the nation, the geniality that inspires material might to political

violence,orthatrevolutionarydaringwhichflingsattheadversarythedefiantwords:IamnothingbutImustbeeverything.ThemainstemofGermanmoralsandhonesty,oftheclassesaswellasofindividuals,isratherthatmodestegoismwhichassertsitslimitednessandallowsittobe asserted against itself. The relation of the various sections ofGermansocietyisthereforenotdramaticbutepic.Eachofthembeginstobeawareofitselfandbeginstocampbesidetheotherswithall itsparticular claims not as soon as it is oppressed, but as soon as thecircumstances of the time, without the section’s own participation,createsasocialsubstratumonwhichitcaninturnexertpressure.Eventhemoral self-feeling of the German middle class rests only on theconsciousness that it is the common representative of the philistinemediocrityofalltheotherclasses.ItisthereforenotonlytheGermankingswhoaccedetothethronemalàpropos,itiseverysectionofcivilsociety which goes through a defeat before it celebrates victory anddevelopsitsownlimitationsbeforeitovercomesthelimitationsfacingit,assertsitsnarrow-heartedessencebeforeithasbeenabletoassertitsmagnanimous essence; thus the very opportunity of a great role haspassed awaybefore it is to hand, and every class, once it begins thestruggle against the class opposed to it, is involved in the struggleagainst the class below it. Hence, the higher nobility is strugglingagainst the monarchy, the bureaucrat against the nobility, and thebourgeoisagainstthemall,whiletheproletariatisalreadybeginningtofind itselfstrugglingagainst thebourgeoisie.Themiddleclasshardlydares to grasp the thought of emancipation from its own standpointwhen the development of the social conditions and the progress ofpolitical theory already declare that standpoint antiquated or at leastproblematic.

In France, it is enough for somebody to be something for him to

wanttobeeverything;inGermany,nobodycanbeanythingifheisnotpreparedtorenounceeverything.InFrance,partialemancipationisthebasis of universal emancipation; inGermany, universal emancipationistheconditiosinequanonofanypartialemancipation.InFrance,itisthe reality of gradual liberation that must give birth to completefreedom, in Germany, the impossibility of gradual liberation. InFrance, every class of the nation is apolitical idealist and becomesawareofitselfatfirstnotasaparticularclassbutasarepresentativeofsocial requirements generally. The role of emancipator thereforepasses indramaticmotion to thevariousclassesof theFrenchnationoneaftertheotheruntilitfinallycomestotheclasswhichimplementssocialfreedomnolongerwiththeprovisionofcertainconditionslyingoutsidemanandyetcreatedbyhumansociety,butratherorganizesallconditionsofhumanexistenceonthepremisesofsocialfreedom.Onthe contrary, in Germany, where practical life is as spiritless asspiritual life is unpractical, no class in civil society has any need orcapacity for general emancipation until it is forced by its immediatecondition,bymaterialnecessity,byitsverychains.

Where,then,isthepositivepossibilityofaGermanemancipation?

Answer:Intheformulationofaclasswithradical chains,aclassofcivilsocietywhichisnotaclassofcivilsociety,anestatewhichisthedissolutionofallestates,aspherewhichhasauniversalcharacterbyits universal suffering and claims no particular right because noparticularwrong,butwronggenerally,isperpetuatedagainstit;whichcaninvokenohistorical,butonlyhuman,title;whichdoesnotstandinanyone-sidedantithesistotheconsequencesbutinall-roundantithesisto thepremisesofGermanstatehood;a sphere, finally,whichcannotemancipateitselfwithoutemancipatingitselffromallotherspheresof

societyandtherebyemancipatingallotherspheresofsociety,which,ina word, is the complete loss of man and hence can win itself onlythroughthecompletere-winningofman.Thisdissolutionofsocietyasaparticularestateistheproletariat.

TheproletariatisbeginningtoappearinGermanyasaresultoftherisingindustrialmovement.For,itisnotthenaturallyarisingpoorbutthe artificially impoverished, not the human masses mechanicallyoppressedbythegravityofsociety,butthemassesresultingfromthedrastic dissolution of society,mainly of themiddle estate, that formtheproletariat, although,as is easilyunderstood, thenaturallyarisingpoorandtheChristian-Germanicserfsgraduallyjoinitsranks.

Byheraldingthedissolutionoftheheretoexistingworldorder, theproletariatmerelyproclaimsthesecretofitsownexistence,foritisthefactualdissolutionofthatworldorder.Bydemandingthenegationofprivateproperty,theproletariatmerelyraisestotherankofaprincipleofsocietywhatsocietyhasraised to therankof itsprinciple,what isalready incorporated in it as thenegative resultof societywithout itsown participation. The proletarian then finds himself possessing thesame right in regard to theworldwhich is coming into being as theGermanking inregardtotheworldwhichhascomeintobeingwhenhe calls the people his people, as he calls the horse his horse. Bydeclaring the people his private property, the kingmerely proclaimsthattheownerofpropertyisking.

As philosophy finds its material weapon in the proletariat, so theproletariat finds its spiritual weapon in philosophy. And once thelightning of thought has squarely struck this ingenuous soil of thepeople, the emancipation of the Germans into men will beaccomplished.

Letussumuptheresult:

The only liberation of Germany which is practically possible isliberationfromthepointofviewofthattheorywhichdeclaresmantobethesupremebeingforman.GermanycanemancipateitselffromtheMiddleAges only if it emancipates itself at the same time from thepartial victories over the Middle Ages. In Germany, no form ofbondage can be broken without breaking all forms of bondage.Germany, which is renowned for its thoroughness, cannot make arevolution unless it is a thorough one. The emancipation of theGermanistheemancipationofman.Theheadofthisemancipationisphilosophy, its heart the proletariat. Philosophy cannot realize itselfwithout the transcendence [Aufhebung] of the proletariat, and theproletariat cannot transcend itself without the realization[Verwirklichung]ofphilosophy.

When all the inner conditions are met, the day of the GermanresurrectionwillbeheraldedbythecrowingofthecockofGaul.

(Marx’scommentaryon§257-60havebeenlost)

§ 261. In contrast with the spheres of private rights andprivate welfare (the family and civil society), the state isfromonepointofviewanexternalnecessityandtheirhigherauthority; its nature is such that their laws and interests aresubordinate to it and dependent on it. On the other hand,however,itistheendimmanentwithinthem,anditsstrengthlies in the unity of its own universal end and aimwith theparticular interest of individuals, in the fact that individualshave duties to the state in proportion as they have rightsagainstit(see§155).

Theforegoingparagraphadvisesus thatconcrete freedomconsists inthe identity (as it is supposed to be, two-sided) of the system ofparticular interest (the family and civil society) with the system ofgeneralinterest(thestate).Therelationofthesespheresmustnowbedeterminedmoreprecisely.

From one point of view the state is contrasted with the spheres offamilyandcivilsocietyasanexternalnecessity,anauthority,relativeto which the laws and interests of family and civil society aresubordinateanddependent.That thestate, incontrastwith thefamilyand civil society, is an external necessity was implied partly in thecategory of ‘transition’ (Übergangs) and partly in the consciousrelationship of the family and civil society to the state. Further,subordinationunderthestatecorrespondsperfectlywiththerelationofexternal necessity. But what Hegel understands by ‘dependence’ isshownbythefollowingsentencefromtheRemarktothisparagraph:

§ 261.... It wasMontesquieu above all who, in his famousworkL’Esprit des Lois, keptinsightandtriedtoworkoutin detail both the thought of the dependence of laws in

particular, laws concerning the rights of persons - on thespecificcharacterofthestate,andalsothephilosophicnotionofalwaystreatingthepartinitsrelationtothewhole.

ThusHegel is speaking here of internal dependence, or the essentialdetermination of private rights, etc., by the state. At the same time,however, he subsumes this dependence under the relationship ofexternalnecessityandopposesit,asanotheraspect,tothatrelationshipwhereinfamilyandcivilsocietyrelatetothestateastotheirimmanentend.

‘Externalnecessity’canonlybeunderstoodtomeanthatthelawsandinterests of the family and civil society must give way in case ofcollision with the laws and interests of the state, that they aresubordinatetoit,thattheirexistenceisdependentonit,oragainthatitswillanditslawappeartotheirwillandtheirlawsasanecessity!

But Hegel is not speaking here about empirical collisions; he isspeaking about the relationship of the ‘spheres of private rights andprivate welfare, of the family and civil society,’ to the state; it is aquestionoftheessentialrelationship ofthesespheresthemselves.Notonly their interests but also their laws and their essentialdeterminations are dependent on the state and subordinate to it. It isrelated to their laws and interests as higher authority, while theirinterest and law are related to it as its ‘subordinates’. They exist intheir dependence on it. Precisely because subordination anddependence are external relations, limiting and contrary to anautonomous being, the relationship of family and civil society to thestate is that of external necessity, a necessity which relates byoppositiontotheinnerbeingofthething.Theveryfactthatthelawsconcerning the private rights of persons depend on the specific

character of the state and are modified according to it is therebysubsumed under the relationship of external necessity’, preciselybecause civil society and family in their true, that is in theirindependent andcompletedevelopment, arepresupposedby the stateas particular spheres. ‘Subordination’ and ‘dependence’ are theexpressionsforanexternal,artificial,apparentidentity,forthelogicalexpression of which Hegel quite rightly uses the phrase ‘externalnecessity’. With the notions of ‘subordination’ and ‘dependence’Hegel has further developed the one aspect of the divided identity,namelythatofthealienationwithintheunity.

On the other hand, however, it is the end immanentwithinthem, and its strength lies in the unity of its own universalendandaimwiththeparticularinterestofindividuals,inthefactthatindividualshavedutiestothestateinproportionastheyhaverightsagainstit.

HereHegelsetsupanunresolvedantinomy:ontheonehandexternalnecessity,ontheotherhandimmanentend.Theunityoftheuniversalendandaimofthestateandtheparticularinterestofindividualsmustconsistinthis,thatthedutiesofindividualstothestateandtheirrightsagainstitareidentical(thus,forexample,thedutytorespectpropertycoincideswiththerighttoproperty).

ThisidentityisexplainedinthiswayintheRemark[to§261]:

Duty is primarily a relation to something which from mypointofviewissubstantive,absolutelyuniversal.Aright,onthe other hand, is simply the embodiment of this substanceand thus is the particular aspect of it and enshrines myparticular freedom.Hence at abstract levels, right and dutyappearparcelledoutondifferentsidesorindifferentpersons.In the state, as something ethical, as the interpenetration of

the substantive and the particular,my obligation towhat issubstantive is at the same time the embodiment of myparticularfreedom.Thismeansthatinthestatedutyandrightareunitedinoneandthesamerelation.

§262.Theactual Idea ismind,which, sundering itself intothetwoidealspheresofitsconcept,familyandcivilsociety,entersuponitsfinitephase,butitdoessoonlyinordertoriseaboveitsidealityandbecomeexplicitasinfiniteactualmind.It is therefore to these ideal spheres that the actual Ideaassigns the material of this its finite actuality, viz., humanbeingsasamass,insuchawaythatthefunctionassignedtoany given individual is visibly mediated by circumstances,hiscapriceandhispersonalchoiceofhisstationinlife.

Letustranslatethisintoproseasfollows:

Themanner andmeans of the state’smediationwith the family andcivilsocietyare‘circumstance,caprice,andpersonalchoiceofstationin life’. Accordingly, the rationality of the state [Staatsvernunft] hasnothingtodowiththedivisionofthematerialofthestateintofamilyandcivilsociety.

The state results from them in an unconscious and arbitrary way.Familyandcivilsocietyappearasthedarknaturalgroundfromwhichthe light of the state emerges. Bymaterial of the state is meant thebusiness of the state, i.e., family and civil society, in so far as theyconstitutecomponentsofthestateand,assuch,participateinthestate.

Thisdevelopmentispeculiarintworespects.

1.Familyandcivilsocietyareconceivedofasspheresoftheconceptofthestate,specificallyasspheresofitsfiniteness,asitsfinitephase.It is the state which sunders itself into the two, which presupposes

them,andindeeddoesthis‘onlyinordertoriseaboveitsidealityandbecomeexplicitasinfiniteactualmind’.‘Itsundersitselfinorderto...’It ‘therefore assigns to these ideal spheres the material of its finiteactuality in such a way that the function assigned to any givenindividual isvisiblymediated,etc’.Theso-called ‘actual idea’ (mindas infinite and actual) is described as though it acted according to adetermined principle and toward a determined end. It sunders itselfintofinitespheres,anddoesthis‘inordertoreturntoitself, tobeforitself’;moreoveritdoesthispreciselyinsuchawaythatitisjustasitactuallyis.

Inthispassagethelogical,pantheisticmysticismappearsveryclearly.

Theactualsituationisthattheassignmentofthematerialofthestatetothe individual is mediated by circumstances, caprice, and personalchoiceofhisstationinlife.Thisfact,thisactualsituationisexpressedby speculative philosophy [der Spekulation] as appearance, asphenomenon.Thesecircumstances,thiscaprice,thispersonalchoiceofvocation, this actual mediation are merely the appearance of amediationwhichtheactualIdeaundertakeswithitselfandwhichgoesonbehindthescenes.Actualityisnotexpressedasitselfbutasanotherreality. Ordinary empirical existence does not have its own mind[Geist]butratheranalienmindasitslaw,whileontheotherhandtheactualIdeadoesnothaveanactualitywhichisdevelopedoutofitself,butratherhasordinaryempiricalexistenceasitsexistence[Dasein].

TheIdeaisgiventhestatusofasubject,andtheactualrelationshipoffamily and civil society to the state is conceived to be its innerimaginaryactivity.Familyandcivilsocietyarethepresuppositionsofthe state; they are the really active things; but in speculativephilosophyitisreversed.ButiftheIdeaismadesubject,thenthereal

subjects - civil society, family, circumstances, caprice, etc. - becomeunreal,andtakeonthedifferentmeaningofobjectivemomentsoftheIdea.

2. The circumstance, caprice, and personal choice of station in life,throughwhichthematerialofthestateisassignedtotheindividual,arenotsaiddirectlytobethingswhicharereal,necessary,andjustifiedinand for themselves; qua circumstances, caprice, and personal choicetheyarenotdeclaredtoberational.Yetontheotherhandtheyagainare,butonlysoastobepresentedforthephenomenaofamediation,tobe leftas theyarewhileat thesametimeacquiring themeaningofadetermination of the idea, a result and product of the Idea. Thedifferenceliesnotinthecontent,butinthewayofconsideringit,orinthemannerofspeaking.There isa two-foldhistory,oneesotericandoneexoteric.Thecontent lies in theexotericpart.The interestof theesoteric isalways torecover thehistoryof the logicalConcept in thestate.Buttherealdevelopmentproceedsontheexotericside.

Reasonably,Hegel’ssentencesmeanonlythefollowing:

Thefamilyandcivilsocietyareelementsofthestate.Thematerialofthestateisdividedamongstthemthroughcircumstances,caprice,andpersonalchoiceofvocation.Thecitizensof thestatearemembersoffamiliesandofcivilsociety.

‘The actual Idea is mind which, sundering itself into the two idealspheres of its concept, family and civil society, enters upon its finitephase’-thusthedivisionofthestateintothefamilyandcivilsocietyisideal,i.e.,necessary,belongingtotheessenceofthestate.Familyandcivil society are actual components of the state, actual spiritualexistencesofwill;theyarethemodesofexistenceofthestate;family

and civil societymake themselves into the state.They are the activeforce.AccordingtoHegeltheyare,onthecontrary,madebytheactualIdea.Itisnottheirownlife’scoursewhichunitesthemintothestate,but rather the life’scourseof the Idea,whichhasdistinguished themfromitself;andtheyarepreciselythefinitenessofthisidea;theyowetheir existence to a mind [Geist] other than their own; they aredeterminationsestablishedbyathirdparty,notself-determinations;forthat very reason they are alsodetermined as finiteness, as theproperfinitenessofthe‘actualidea’.Thepurposeoftheirexistenceisnotthisexistenceitself,butrathertheIdeaseparatesthesepresuppositionsofffrom itself in order to rise above its ideality and become explicit asinfiniteactualmind.This is tosaythat thepoliticalstatecannotexistwithout thenaturalbasisof the familyand theartificialbasisofcivilsociety; they are its conditio sine qua non; but the conditions areestablishedas theconditioned, thedeterminingas thedetermined, theproducingastheproductofitsproduct.Theactualideareducesitselfintothefinitenessofthefamilyandcivilsocietyonlyinordertoenjoyandtobringforthitsinfinitythroughtheirtranscendence[Aufhebung].Itthereforeassigns(inordertoattainitsend)totheseidealspheresthematerialofthisitsfiniteactuality(ofthis?ofwhat?thesespheresarereallyitsfiniteactuality, itsmaterial) tohumanbeingsasamass(thematerial of the state here is human beings, the mass, the state iscomposed of them, and this, its composition is expressed here as anactionoftheIdea,asaparcellingoutwhichitundertakeswithitsownmaterial.Thefactisthatthestateissuesfromthemassofmenexistingasmembersoffamiliesandofcivilsociety;butspeculativephilosophyexpresses this fact as anachievementof the Idea,not the ideaof themass,butratherasthedeedofanIdea-Subjectwhichisdifferentiatedfrom the fact itself) in such a way that the function assigned to theindividual (earlier the discussion was only of the assignment of

individuals to the spheres of family and civil society) is visiblymediated by circumstances, caprice, etc. Thus empirical actuality isadmitted just as it is and is also said to be rational; but not rationalbecause of its own reason, but because the empirical fact in itsempiricalexistencehasasignificancewhichisotherthanititself.Thefact,whichisthestartingpoint,isnotconceivedtobesuchbutratherto be the mystical result. The actual becomes phenomenon, but theIdea has no other content than this phenomenon.Moreover, the ideahas no other than the logical aim, namely, ‘to become explicit asinfinite actualmind’.The entiremysteryof thePhilosophy of RightandofHegelianphilosophyingeneraliscontainedintheseparagraphs.

§ 263. In these spheres inwhich itsmoments, particularityandindividuality,havetheirimmediateandreflectedreality,mindispresentastheirobjectiveuniversalityglimmeringinthemasthepowerofreasoninnecessity(see§184),i.e.,astheinstitutionsconsideredabove.

§ 264.Mind is the nature of human beings en masse andtheirnature is therefore twofold: (i)atoneextreme,explicitindividualityofconsciousnessandwill,and (ii)at theotherextreme, universality which knows and wills what issubstantive. Hence they attain their right in both theserespectsonlyinsofarasboththeirprivatepersonalityanditssubstantivebasisareactualised.Nowinthefamilyandcivilsociety they acquire their right in the first of these respectsdirectlyandinthesecondindirectly,inthat(i)theyfindtheirsubstantiveself-consciousnessinsocialinstitutionswhicharetheuniversalimplicitintheirparticularinterests,and(ii)theCorporationsuppliesthemwithanoccupationandanactivitydirectedonauniversalend.

§ 265. These institutions are the components of theconstitution (i.e., of rationalitydevelopedandactualised) inthe sphere of particularity. They are, therefore, the firm

foundationnotonlyofthestatebutalsoofthecitizen’strustinitandsentiment towardsit.Theyarethepillarsofpublicfreedom since in them particular freedom is realised andrational, and therefore there is implicitly present even inthemtheunionoffreedomandnecessity.

§266.Butmindisobjectiveandactualtoitselfnotmerelyasthis(which?),necessity....butalsoastheidealityandtheheartof this necessity. Only in this way is this substantiveuniversalityaware of itselfas itsownobjectandend,withthe result that thenecessityappears to itself in theshapeoffreedomaswell.

Thusthetransitionofthefamilyandcivilsocietyintothepoliticalstateisthis:themindofthosespheres,whichisthemindofthestateinitsimplicitmoment,isnowalsorelatedtoitselfassuch,andisactualtoitself as their inner reality.Accordingly, the transition is not derivedfromthespecificessenceofthefamily,etc.,andthespecificessenceofthe state, but rather from the universal relation of necessity andfreedom.ExactlythesametransitioniseffectedintheLogic fromthesphereofEssence to thesphereofConcept,andin thePhilosophyofNaturefromInorganicNaturetoLife.Itisalwaysthesamecategoriesofferedastheanimatingprinciplenowofonesphere,nowofanother,and the only thing of importance is to discover, for the particularconcretedeterminations,thecorrespondingabstractones.

§267.Thisnecessityinidealityistheinnerself-developmentof the Idea.As the substanceof the individual subject, it ishis political sentiment [patriotism] in distinction therefrom,asthesubstanceoftheobjectiveworld,itistheorganismofthe state, i.e., it is the strictly political state and itsconstitution.

Here the subject is ‘the necessity in ideality’, the ‘Ideawithin itself"

and the predicate is political sentiment and the political constitution.Saidincommonlanguage,politicalsentimentisthesubjective,andthepolitical constitution the objective substance of the state.The logicaldevelopmentfromthefamilyandcivilsocietytothestateisthuspureappearance, forwhat isnotclarified is thewayinwhichfamilialandcivil sentiment, the institution of the family and those of society, assuch, stand related to thepolitical sentiment andpolitical institutionsandcoherewiththem.

Thetransition involvedinmindexisting‘notmerelyasnecessityandrealm of appearance’ but as actual for itself and particular as ‘theideality of this necessity’ and the soul of this realm is no transitionwhatever,because the soulof the familyexists for itselfas love,etc.[see§§161ff.]Thepureidealityofanactualsphere,however,couldexistonlyasknowledge[Wissenschaft].

The important thing is that Hegel at all times makes the Idea thesubject and makes the proper and actual subject, like ‘politicalsentiment’,thepredicate.Butthedevelopmentproceedsatalltimesonthesideofthepredicate.

§ 268. contains a nice exposition concerning political sentiment, orpatriotism, which has nothing to do with the logical developmentexcept that Hegel defines it as ‘simply a product of the institutionssubsistinginthe state sincerationalityisactuallypresentinthestate’,whileontheotherhandtheseinstitutionsareequallyanobjectificationofthepoliticalsentiment.Cf.theRemarktothisparagraph.

§ 269. The patriotic sentiment acquires its specificallydetermined content from the various members of theorganismof the state. This organism is the development oftheIdeatoitsdifferencesandtheirobjectiveactuality.Hence

these differentmembers are the various powers of the statewith their functions and spheres of action, by means ofwhich. the universal continually engenders itself, andengenders itself in a necessary way because their specificcharacter is fixed by the nature of the concept. Throughoutthis process the universal maintains its identity, since it isitselfthepresuppositionofitsownproduction.Thisorganismistheconstitutionofthestate.

The constitution of the state is the organism of the state, or theorganism of the state is the constitution of the state. To say that thedifferent parts of an organism stand in a necessary relation whicharisesoutofthenatureoftheorganismispuretautology.Tosaythatwhen the political constitution is determined as an organism thedifferentpartsof theconstitution, thedifferentpowers, are relatedasorganicdeterminationsandhavearationalrelationshiptooneanotherislikewisetautology.Itisagreatadvancetoconsiderthepoliticalstateas an organism, and hence no longer to consider the diversity ofpowersas[in]organic,butratheraslivingandrationaldifferences.ButhowdoesHegelpresentthisdiscovery?

1. ‘This organism is the development of the Idea to itsdifferences and their objective actuality.’ It is not said thatthis organism of the state is its development to differencesand their objective actuality. The proper conception is thatthedevelopmentofthestateorofthepoliticalconstitutiontodifferences and their actuality is an organic development.Theactualdifferences,or thedifferentpartsof thepoliticalconstitutionarethepresupposition,thesubject.Thepredicateis theirdeterminationasorganic. Insteadof that, theIdea ismade subject, and the differences and their actuality areconceived tobe itsdevelopmentand its result,whileon the

other hand the Idea must be developed out of the actualdifference. What is organic is precisely the idea of thedifferences,theiridealdetermination.

2. But here the Idea is spoken of as a subject which isdevelopedtoitsdifferences.Fromthisreversalofsubjectandpredicate comes the appearance that an idea other than theorganism is under discussion. The point of departure is theabstract Ideawhosedevelopment in thestate is thepoliticalconstitution.Thusitisaquestionnotofthepoliticalidea,butrather of the abstract Idea in the political element. WhenHegel says, ‘this organism (namely, the state, or theconstitutionofthestate)isthedevelopmentoftheIdeatoitsdifferences, etc.’, he tells us absolutely nothing about thespecificideaofthepoliticalconstitution.Thesamethingcanbesaidwithequal truthabouttheanimalorganismasaboutthe political organism. By what means then is the animalorganism distinguished from the political? No differenceresults from this general determination; and an explanationwhich does not give the differentia specifica is noexplanation.The sole interest here is that of recovering theIdeasimply,thelogicalIdeaineachelement,beitthatofthestate or of nature; and the real subjects, as in this case thepolitical constitution, become their mere names.Consequently, there is only the appearance of a realunderstanding,whileinfactthesedeterminatethingsareandremainuncomprehendedbecause theyarenotunderstood intheirspecificessence.

‘Hence these different members are the various powers of the state

with their functions and spheres of action.’ By reason of this smallword ‘hence’ [‘so’] this statement assumes the appearance of aconsequence, a deduction and development. Rather, one must ask‘Howisit’[‘Wie so?’]thatwhentheempiricalfactisthatthevariousmembersoftheorganismofthestatearethevariouspowers(and)theirfunctionsandspheresofaction,thephilosophicalpredicateisthattheyaremembersofanorganism[?]Herewedrawattention toastylisticpeculiarity of Hegel, one which recurs often and is a product ofmysticism.Theentireparagraphreads:

Thepatrioticsentimentacquiresitsspecificallydeterminedcontentfromthevariousmembersoftheorganismofthestate.ThisorganismisthedevelopmentoftheIdeatoitsdifferencesandtheirobjectiveactuality.Hencethesedifferentmembersarethevariouspowersofthestatewiththeirfunctionsandspheresofaction,bymeansofwhichtheuniversalcontinuallyengendersitself,andengendersitselfinanecessarywaybecausetheirspecificcharacterisfixedbythenatureoftheconcept.Throughoutthisprocesstheuniversalmaintainsitsidentity,sinceitisitselfthepresuppositionofitsown

1.Thepatrioticsentimentacquiresitsspecifically determined content fromthevariousmembersoftheorganismof the state ... These differentmembers are the various powers ofthe state with their functions andspheresofaction.2.Thepatrioticsentimentacquiresitsspecifically determined content fromthevariousmembersoftheorganismof the state. This organism is thedevelopment of the Idea to itsdifferences and their objectiveactuality ... by means of which theuniversal continually engendersitself, and engenders itself in anecessaryway because their specificcharacterisfixedbythenatureoftheconcept.Throughout thisprocess the

production.Thisorganismistheconstitutionofthestate.

universalmaintainsits identity,sinceit is itself the presupposition of itsownproduction.Thisorganismistheconstitutionofthestate.

As can be seen, Hegel links the two subjects, namely, the ‘variousmembers of the organism’ and the ‘organism’, to furtherdeterminations.Inthethirdsentencethevariousmembersaredefinedas the various powers. By inserting the word ‘hence’ it is made toappear as if these various powerswere deduced from the interposedstatementconcerningtheorganismasthedevelopmentoftheIdea.

Hethengoesontodiscussthevariouspowers.Thestatementthattheuniversal continually engenders itself while maintaining its identitythroughout the process, is nothing new, having been implied in thedefinition of the various powers as members of the organism, asorganic members; or rather, this definition of the various powers isnothing but a paraphrase of the statement about the organism being‘thedevelopmentoftheIdeatoitsdifferences,etc.’

Thesetwosentencesareidentical:

1. This organism is ‘the development of the idea to itsdifferencesandtheirobjectiveactuality’ortodifferencesbymeansofwhichtheuniversal(theuniversalhereisthesameastheidea)continuallyengendersitself,andengendersitselfin a necessaryway because their specific character is fixedbythenatureoftheconcept;and

2.‘Throughoutthisprocesstheuniversalmaintainsitsidentity,

since it is itself the presupposition of its own production.’The second is merely a more concise explication of ‘thedevelopment of the Idea to its differences’.Thereby,HegelhasadvancednotasinglestepbeyondtheuniversalconceptoftheIdeaoratmostoftheorganismingeneral(forstrictlyspeakingitisaquestiononlyofthisspecificidea).Whythenis he entitled to conclude that ‘this organism is theconstitutionofthestate’?Whynot‘thisorganismisthesolarsystem’? The reason is that he later defined the variousmembers of the state as the various powers. Now thestatement that ‘the various members of the state are thevariouspowers’isanempiricaltruthandcannotbepresentedasaphilosophicaldiscovery,norhasit inanywayemergedas a result of an earlier development. But by defining theorganismasthedevelopmentoftheidea,byspeakingofthedifferences of the Idea, then by interpolating the concretedata of the various powers the development assumes theappearance of having arrived at a determinate content.Followingthestatementthatthepatrioticsentimentacquiresitsspecificallydeterminedcontentfromthevariousmembersof the organism of the state’ Hegel was not justified incontinuing with the expression, ‘This organism. . .,’ butratherwith‘theorganismisthedevelopmentoftheidea,etc.’Atleastwhathesaysappliestoeveryorganism,andthereisno predicate which justifies the subject, ‘this organism’.WhatHegel reallywants to achieve is the determination oftheorganismastheconstitutionof thestate.But thereisnobridgebywhichonecanpassfromtheuniversalideaoftheorganismtotheparticularideaoftheorganismofthestateorthe constitution of the state, nor will there ever be. The

opening statement speaks of the various members of theorganismof the statewhichare laterdefinedas thevariouspowers.Thustheonlythingsaidisthatthevariouspowersoftheorganismofthestate,orthestateorganismofthevariouspowers,isthepoliticalconstitutionofthestate.Accordingly,thebridge to thepolitical constitutiondoesnotgo from theorganism of the Idea and its differences, etc., but from thepresupposedconceptof thevariouspowersor theorganismofthestate.

In truth, Hegel has done nothing but resolve the constitution of thestate into the universal, abstract idea of the organism; but inappearanceand inhisownopinionhehasdeveloped thedeterminaterealityoutof theuniversal Idea.Hehasmade thesubjectof the ideainto a product and predicate of the Idea. He does not develop histhought out ofwhat is objective [aus dem Gegenstand], butwhat isobjectiveinaccordancewithaready-madethoughtwhichhasitsoriginin the abstract sphere of logic. It is not a question of developing thedeterminateideaofthepoliticalconstitution,butofgivingthepoliticalconstitutionarelationtotheabstractIdea,ofclassifyingitasamemberofits(theidea’s)lifehistory.Thisisanobviousmystification.

Another determination is that the specific character of the variouspowers is fixed by the nature of the concept, and for that reason theuniversal engenders them in a necessary way. Therefore the variouspowers do not have their specific character by reason of their ownnature,butbyreasonofanalienone.Andjustasthenecessityisnotderivedfromtheirownnaturestilllessisitcriticallydemonstrated.Onthe contrary, their realisation is predestined by the nature of theconcept,sealedintheholyregisteroftheSantaCasa(theLogic).The

soul of objects, in this case that of the state, is complete andpredestined before its body, which ‘ is, properly speaking, mereappearance.The‘concept’istheSonwithinthe‘Idea’,withinGodtheFather, the agens, the determining, differentiating principle. Here‘Idea’and‘Concept’areabstractionsrenderedindependent.

§270. (1)The abstract actuality or the substantiality of thestateconsists iii thefact that itsendis theuniversal interestas such and the conservation therein of particular interestssincetheuniversalinterestisthesubstanceofthese.(2)Butthis substantiality of the state is also itsnecessity, since itssubstantiality is divided into the distinct spheres of itsactivitywhichcorrespondtothemomentsofitsconcept,andthese spheres, owing to this substantiality, are thus actuallyfixeddeterminatecharacteristicsofthestate,i.e.,its powers.(3)But thisverysubstantialityof thestate ismindknowingandwilling itself after passing through the forming processof education. The state, therefore, knows what it wills andknowsitinitsuniversality,i.e.,assomethingthought.Henceitworksandactsby reference toconsciouslyadoptedends,knownprinciples,andlawswhicharenotmerelyimplicitbutareactuallypresenttoconsciousness;andfurther,itactswithpreciseknowledgeofexistingconditionsandcircumstances,inasmuchasitsactionshaveabearingonthese.

(We will look at the Remark to this paragraph, which treats therelationshipofstateandchurch,later.)

Theemploymentoftheselogicalcategoriesdeservesaltogetherspecialattention.

(1) The abstract actuality or the substantiality of the stateconsists in the fact that its end is the universal interest assuchandtheconservationthereinofparticularinterestssincetheuniversalinterestisthesubstanceofthese.

Thattheuniversalinterestassuchandasthesubsistenceofparticularinterests is the end of the state is precisely the abstractly definedactuality and subsistence of the state. The state is not actualwithoutthisend.Thisistheessentialobjectofitswill,butatthesametimeitismerelyaverygeneraldefinitionofthisobject.Thisendqua Beingistheprincipleofsubsistenceforthestate.

(2)But this (abstract actuality or) substantialityof thestate is itsnecessity, since its substantiality is divided into the distinctspheresofitsactivitywhichcorrespondtothemomentsofitsconcept,andthesespheres,owingtotheirsubstantiality,arethus actually fixed’ determinate characteristics of the state,i.e.,itspowers.

This abstract actuality or substantiality is its (the state’s) necessity,since its actuality is divided into distinct spheres of activity, sphereswhose distinction is rationally determined and which are, for thatreason, fixeddeterminatecharacteristics.Theabstractactualityof thestate,itssubstantiality,isnecessityinasmuchasthegenuineendofthestateand thegenuine subsistenceof thewhole is realisedonly in thesubsistenceofthedistinctspheresofthestate’sactivity.

Obviously the first definition of the state’s actuality was abstract; itcannot be regarded as a simple actuality; it must be regarded asactivity,andasadifferentiatedactivity.

Theabstractactualityorthesubstantialityofthestate...is...itsnecessity, since its substantiality is divided into the distinctspheresofitsactivitywhichcorrespondtothemomentsofitsconcept, and these spheres, owing to this substantiality, arethus actually fixed determinate characteristics of the state,i.e.,itspowers.

The condition of substantiality is the condition of necessity; i.e., the

substance appears to be divided into independent but essentiallydeterminedactualitiesor activities.Theseabstractionscanbeappliedtoanyactualthing.Insofarasthestateisfirstconsideredaccordingtothemodel of the abstract it will subsequently have to be consideredaccording to the model of concrete actuality, necessity, and realiseddifference.

(3)But thisverysubstantialityof thestate ismindknowingandwilling itself after passing through the forming processof education. The state, therefore, knows what it wills andknowsitinitsuniversality,i.e.,assomethingthought.Henceitworksandactsby reference toconsciouslyadoptedends,knownprinciples,andlawswhicharenotmerelyimplicitbutareactuallypresenttoconsciousness;andfurther,itactswithPreciseknowledgeofexistingconditionsandcircumstances,inasmuchasitsactionshaveabearingonthese.

Now let’s translate this entire paragraph into common language asfollows:

1.The self-knowing and self-willingmind is the substance ofthe state; (theeducated self-assuredmind is the subject andthefoundation,theautonomyofthestate).

2.Theuniversal interest, andwithin it theconservationof theparticular interests, is the universal end and content of thismind,theexistingsubstanceofthestate,thenaturequastateoftheself-knowingandwillingmind.

3. The self-knowing and willing mind, the self-assured,educated mind attains the actualisation of this abstractcontent only as a differentiated activity, as the existence ofvariouspowers,asanorganicallystructuredpower.

CertainthingsshouldbenotedconcerningHegel’spresentation.

1. Abstract actuality, necessity (or substantial difference),substantiality,thusthecategoriesofabstractlogic,aremadesubjects. Indeed, abstract actuality and necessity are called‘its’, the state’s, actuality and necessity; however (1) ‘it’ -i.e., abstract actuality or substantiality - is the state’snecessity; (2) abstract actuality or substantiality is what isdivided into the distinct spheres of its activity whichcorrespond to themoments of its concept.Themoments ofitsconceptare, ‘owing to this substantiality ... thusactuallyfixeddeterminations,powers.(3)Substantiality isno longertaken to be an abstract characteristic of the state, as itssubstantiality;rather,assuchit ismadesubject,andtheninconclusionitissaid,‘butthisverysubstantialityofthestateismindknowingandwillingitselfafterpassingthroughtheformingprocessofeducation’.

2.Alsoitisnotsaidinconclusionthattheeducated,etc.,mindissubstantiality,butonthecontrarythatsubstantialityistheeducated,etc.,mind.Thusmindbecomesthepredicateofitspredicate.

3.Substantiality,afterhavingbeendefined(1)astheuniversalendofthestate,then(2)asthevariouspowers,isdefined(3)as theeducated,self-knowingandwilling,actualmind.Thereal point of departure, the self-knowing andwillingmind,withoutwhichtheendofthestateandthepowersofthestatewouldbeillusionsdevoidofprincipleorsupport,inessentialand even impossible existents, appears to be only the finalpredicate of substantiality,whichhad itself previously been

definedastheuniversalendandasthevariouspowersofthestate.Had the actualmind been taken as the starting point,with the universal end its content, then the various powerswouldbe itsmodesof self-actualisation, its realormaterialexistence, whose determinate character would have had todevelopoutofthenatureofitsend.ButbecausethepointofdepartureistheIdea,orSubstanceassubjectandrealbeing,theactualsubjectappearstobeonlythefinalpredicateoftheabstractpredicate.Theendofthestateandthepowersofthestatearemystifiedinthattheytaketheappearanceofmodesofexistenceofthesubstance, drawn out of and divorced from their realexistence, the self-knowing andwillingmind, the educatedmind.

4.Theconcretecontent,theactualdeterminationappearstobeformal,andthewhollyabstractformaldeterminationappearsto be the concrete content.What is essential to determinatepolitical realities is not that they canbe considered as suchbutratherthattheycanbeconsidered,intheirmostabstractconfiguration, as logical-metaphysical determinations.Hegel’strueinterestisnotthephilosophyofrightbutlogic.Thephilosophical task isnot the embodimentof thought indeterminate political realities, but the evaporation of theserealitiesinabstractthought.Thephilosophicalmomentisnotthe logic of fact but the fact of logic. Logic is not used toprovethenatureofthestate,butthestateisusedtoprovethelogic.

Therearethreeconcretedeterminations:

1. the universal interest and the conservation therein of theparticularinterestsastheendofthestate;

2. the various powers as the actualisation of this end of thestate;

3. the educated, self-assured, willing and acting mind as thesubjectofthisendanditsactualisation.

These concrete determinations are considered to be extrinsic, to behors d’oeuvres. Their importance to philosophy is that in them thestatetakesonthefollowinglogicalsignificance:

1.abstractactualityorsubstantiality;

2.theconditionofsubstantialitypassesoverintotheconditionofnecessityorsubstantialactuality;

3.substantialactualityisinfactconcept,orsubjectivity.

Withtheexclusionoftheseconcretedeterminations,whichcanjustaswellbeexchangedfor thoseofanotherspheresuchasphysicswhichhas other concrete determinations, and which are accordinglyunessential,wehavebeforeusachapteroftheLogic.

Thesubstancemustbe‘dividedintothedistinctspheresofitsactivitywhich correspond to themoments of its concept, and these spheres,owing to this substantiality, are thus actually fixed determinatecharacteristicsof thestate’.Thegistof thissentencebelongs to logicandisready-madepriortothephilosophyofright.Thatthesemomentsof theconceptare, in thepresent instance,distinct spheresof its (thestate’s)activityandthefixeddeterminatecharacteristicsofthestate,or

powers of the state, is a parenthesis belonging to the philosophy ofright,totheorderofpoliticalfact.Inthiswaytheentirephilosophyofright is only a parenthesis to logic. It goes without saying that theparenthesis isonlyanhors d’oeuvreof therealdevelopment.Cf. forexampletheAdditionto§270.:

Necessityconsistsinthis,thatthewholeissunderedintothedifferencesoftheconceptandthatthisdividedwholeyieldsafixedandpermanentdeterminacy,thoughonewhichisnotfossilisedbutperpetuallyrecreatesitselfinitsdissolution.CfalsotheLogic.

§271.Theconstitutionof thestate is, in thefirstplace, theorganisation of the state and the self-related process of itsorganic life,aprocesswhereby itdifferentiates itsmomentswithinitselfanddevelopsthemtoself-subsistence.

Secondly, the state is an individual, unique and exclusive,and therefore related to others. Thus it turns itsdifferentiating activity outward and accordingly establisheswithin itself the ideality of its subsisting inwarddifferentiations.

Addition: The inner side of the state as such is the civilpower while its outward tendency is the military power,althoughthishasafixedplaceinsidethestateitself

I.THECONSTITUTION(onitsinternalsideonly)§272.Theconstitutionisrationalinsofarasthestateinwardlydifferentiatesanddeterminesitsactivityinaccordancewiththenatureoftheconcept.Theresultofthisisthateachofthesepowersisinitselfthetotalityoftheconstitution,becauseeachcontainstheothermomentsandhasthemeffectiveinitself,andbecausethemoments,beingexpressionsofthedifferentiationoftheconcept,simplyabideintheiridealityandconstitutenothingbutasingleindividualwhole.

Thus the constitution is rational in so far as its moments can bereducedtoabstractlogicalmoments.Thestatehastodifferentiateanddetermineitsactivitynotinaccordancewithitsspecificnature,butinaccordance with the nature of the Concept, which is the mystifiedmobile of abstract thought. The reason of the constitution is thusabstractlogicandnottheconceptofthestate.Inplaceoftheconceptof theconstitutionweget theconstitutionof theConcept.Thought isnotconformedtothenatureofthestate,butthestatetoareadymadesystemofthought.

§ 273.The state as a political entity is thus (how 'thus'?) cleftintothreesubstantivedivisions:

(a) thepower todetermine and establish theuniversal - theLegislature;(b) the power to subsume single cases and the spheres ofparticularity(c) the power of subjectivity, as thewillwith the power ofultimate decision the Crown. In the crown, the differentpowers are bound into an individual unitywhich is thus atonce the apex andbasis of thewhole, i.e., of constitutionalmonarchy.

Wewill return to this division after examining the particulars of itsexplanation.

§274.Mindisactualonlyasthatwhichitknowsitselftobe,and the state, as the mind of a nation, is both the law

permeatingall relationshipswithin the stateandalso, at thesame time themanners and consciousness of its citizens. Itfollows, therefore, that the constitution of any given nationdepends in general on the character and development of itsself-consciousness. In its self-consciousness its subjectivefreedom is rooted and so, therefore, is the actuality of itsconstitution ... Hence every nation has the constitutionappropriatetoitandsuitableforit.

The only thing that follows fromHegel's reasoning is that a state nwhich the character and development of self-consciousness and theconstitution contradict one another is no real state. That theconstitutionwhichwastheproductofabygoneself-consciousnesscanbecomeanoppressive fetter for anadvanced self-consciousness, etc.,etc.,arecertainlytrivialities.However,whatwouldfollowisonlythedemand for a constitution having within itself the characteristic andprinciple of advancing in step with consciousness, with actual man,which is possible only when man has become the principle of theconstitution.HereHegelisasophist.

(a)TheCrown§ 275. The power of the crown contains in itself the threemomentsofthewhole(see5:272)viz.[a]theuniversality ofthe constitution and the laws; [b] counsel,which refers theparticular to theuniversal; and [c] themomentof ultimatedecision,as theself-determination towhicheverythingelserevertsandfromwhicheverythingelsederivesthebeginningof its actuality. This absolute self-determination constitutesthedistinctiveprinciple of thepowerof the crownas such,andwiththisprincipleourexpositionistobegin.

Allthefirstpartofthisparagraphsaysisthatboththeuniversalityofthe constitution and the laws and counsel, or the reference of theparticular to the universal, are the crown. The crown does not stand

outsidetheuniversalityoftheconstitutionandthelawsoncethecrownisunderstoodtobethecrownofthe(constitutional)monarch.

What Hegel really wants, however, is nothing other than that theuniversality of the constitution and the laws is the crown, thesovereigntyofthestate.Soitiswrongtomakethecrownthesubjectand,inasmuchasthepowerofthesovereigncanalsobeunderstoodbythecrown,tomakeitappearasif thesovereign,werethemasterandsubjectof thismoment.Letusfirst turntowhatHegeldeclares tobethedistinctiveprincipleofthepowerofthecrownassuch,andwefindthatitis'themomentofultimatedecision,astheself-determinationtowhicheverythingelserevertsandfromwhicheverythingelsederivesthe beginning of its actuality', in other words this 'absolute self-determination'.

HereHegel is really saying that theactual, i.e., individualwill is thepowerofthecrown.§12saysitthisway:

When...thewillgivesitselftheformofindividuality...,thisconstitutestheresolutionofthewill,anditisonlyinsofarasitresolvesthatthewillisanactualwillatall.

In so far as this moment of ultimate decision or absolute self-determination is divorced from the universality of content [i.e., theconstitutionandlaws,]andtheparticularityofcounselitisactualwillas arbitrary choice [Willkür]. In other words: arbitrary choice's thepowerofthecrown,orthepowerofthecrownisarbitrarychoice.

§ 276. The fundamental characteristic of the state as apoliticalentityisthesubstantialunity,i.e.,theideality,ofitsmoments. [a] In this unity, the particular powers and theiractivities are dissolved and yet retained. They are retained,however, only in the sense that their authority is no

independent one but only one of the order and breadthdetermined by the Idea of the whole; from its might theyoriginate, and they are its flexible limbs while it is theirsingleself.

Addition: Much the same thing as this ideality of themoments in the state occurs with life in the physicalorganism.

ItisevidentthatHegelspeaksonlyoftheideaoftheparticularpowersand their activities.They are to have authority only of the order andbreadthdeterminedbytheideaofthewhole;theyaretooriginatefromitsmight.That itshouldbesolies in theideaof theorganism.But itwould have to be shownhow this is to be achieved. For in the stateconscious reason must prevail; [and] substantial, bare internal andtherefore bare external necessity, the accidental entangling of thepowersandactivitiescannotbepresentedassomethingrational.

§277. [b]Theparticularactivitiesandagenciesof thestateareitsessentialmomentsandthereforearepropertoit. Theindividual functionaries and agents are attached to theirofficenotonthestrengthoftheirimmediatepersonality,butonlyonthestrengthoftheiruniversalandobjectivequalities.Hence it is in an external and contingent way that theseoffices are linkedwith particular persons, and therefore thefunctionsandpowersofthestatecannotbeprivateproperty.

Itisself-evidentthatifparticularactivitiesandagenciesaredesignatedas activities and agencies of the state, as state functions and statepowers,thentheyarenotprivatebutstateproperty.Thatisatautology.

Theactivitiesandagenciesofthestateareattachedtoindividuals(thestate is only active through individuals), but not to the individual asphysicalbutpolitical; theyare attached to thepolitical qualityof the

individual.Henceitisridiculoustosay,asHegeldoes,that'itisinanexternal and contingent way that these offices are linked withparticular persons'. On the contrary, they are linked with them by avinculum substantiale, byreasonofanessentialqualityofparticularpersons.These offices are the natural action of this essential quality.Hence theabsurdityofHegel'sconceiving theactivitiesandagenciesofthestateintheabstract,andparticularindividualityinoppositiontoit.He forgets that particular individuality is a human individual, andthat the activities and agencies of the state are human activities. Heforgets that the nature of the particular person is not his beard, hisblood, his abstractPhysis, but rather his social quality, and that theactivitiesofthestate,etc.,arenothingbutthemodesofexistenceandoperation of the social qualities of men. Thus it is evident thatindividuals,insofarastheyarethebearersofthestate'sactivitiesandpowers, are to be considered according to their social and not theirprivatequality.

§278.Thesetwopoints[a]and[b]constitutethesovereigntyof the state.That is to say, sovereigntydependson the factthat theparticular functions andpowersof the state arenotself-subsistent or firmly grounded either on their ownaccount or in the particular will of the individualfunctionaries,buthave their rootsultimately in theunityofthestateastheirsingleself.

Remark to § 278.: Despotism means any state of affairswhere lawhas disappeared andwhere the particularwill assuch, whether of a monarch or a mob ... counts as law, orrather takes the place of law;while it is precisely in legal,constitutionalgovernment thatsovereignty is tobefoundasthemomentofideality-theidealityoftheparticularspheresandfunctions.Thatistosay,sovereigntybringsitaboutthateach of these spheres is not something independent, self-

subsistent in its aims and modes of working, somethingimmersedsolelyinitself,butthatinstead,evenintheseaimsandmodesofworking,eachisdeterminedbyanddependenton the aim of the whole (the aim which has beendenominatedingeneraltermsbytherathervagueexpression'welfareofthestate').Thisidealitymanifestsitselfinatwofoldway:(i) In times of peace, the particular spheres and functionspursue the path of satisfying their particular aims andmindingtheirownbusiness,anditisinpartonlybywayoftheunconsciousnecessityofthethingthattheirself-seekingisturnedintoacontributiontoreciprocalsupportandtothesupport of thewhole ... In part, however, it is by the directinfluence of higher authority that they are not onlycontinually brought back to the aims of the whole andrestrictedaccordingly ....butarealsoconstrained toperformdirectservicesforthesupportofthewhole.(ii)Inasituationofexigency,however,whetherinhomeorforeign affairs, the organism of which these particularspheres are members fuses into the single concept ofsovereignty.Thesovereignisentrustedwiththesalvationofthestateatthesacrificeoftheseparticularauthoritieswhosepowersarevalidatothertimes,anditisthenthatthatidealitycomesintoitsproperactuality.

Thus this ideality is not developed into a comprehended, rationalsystem. In times of peace it appears either as merely an externalconstraint effected by the ruling power on private life through directinfluenceofhigherauthority,orablinduncomprehendedresultofself-seeking. This ideality has its proper actuality only in the state'ssituationofwarorexigency,suchthathereitsessenceisexpressedasthe actual, existent state's situation of war and exigency, while its'peaceful'situationispreciselythewarandexigencyofself-seeking.

Accordingly, sovereignty, the ideality of the state, exists merely as

internalnecessity,asidea.AndHegelissatisfiedwiththatbecauseitisaquestionmerelyoftheidea.Sovereigntythusexistsontheonehandonly as unconscious, blind substance.We will become equally wellacquaintedwithitsotheractuality.

§279.Sovereignty, at first simply theuniversal thought ofthisideality,comesintoexistence onlyassubjectivitysureofitself, as the will's abstract and to that extent ungroundedself-determination in which finality of decision is rooted.Thisisthestrictlyindividualaspectofthestate,andinvirtueof this alone is the state one. The truth of subjectivity,however, is attained only in a subject, and the truth ofpersonalityonlyinaperson;andinaconstitutionwhichhasbecome mature as a realisation of rationality, each of thethree moments of the concept has its explicitly actual andseparate formation. Hence this absolutely decisive momentof the whole is not individuality in general, but a singleindividual,themonarch.

1. Sovereignty, at first simply the universal thought of this ideality,comes into existence only as subjectivity sure of itself.. The truth ofsubjectivity is attained only in a subject, and the truth of personalityonly in a person. In a constitution which has become mature as arealisationofrationality,eachofthethreemomentsoftheconcepthas...explicitlyactualandseparateformation.

2.Sovereigntycomesintoexistenceonly...asthewill'sabstractandtothatextentungroundedself-determinationinwhichfinalityofdecisionisrooted.Thisisthestrictlyindividualaspectofthestate,andinvirtueofthisaloneisthestateone...(andinaconstitutionwhichhasbecomematureasarealisationofrationality,eachofthethreemomentsoftheconcept has its explicitly actual and separate formation). Hence thisabsolutely decisive moment of the whole is not individuality in

general,butasingleindividual,themonarch.

Thefirstsentencesaysonlythattheuniversalthoughtofthisideality,whose sorry existencewe have just seen,would have to be the self-consciousworkofsubjectsand,assuch,existforandinthem.

Had Hegel started with the real subjects as the bases of the state itwould not have been necessary for him to let the state becomesubjectifiedinamysticalway.'However,thetruthofsubjectivity',saysHegel,'isattainedonlyinasubject,andthetruthofpersonalityonlyinaperson.'Thistooisamystification.Subjectivityisacharacteristicofsubjects and personality a characteristic of the person. Instead ofconsidering them to be predicates of their subjects,Hegelmakes thepredicates independent and then lets them be subsequently andmysteriouslyconvertedintotheirsubjects.

The existence of the predicate is the subject; thus the subject is theexistence of subjectivity, etc.Hegelmakes the predicates, the objectindependent, but independent as separated from their realindependence,theirsubject.Subsequently,andbecauseofthis,therealsubjectappearstobetheresult;whereasonehastostartfromtherealsubject and examine its objectification. The mystical substancebecomestherealsubjectandtherealsubjectappearstobesomethingelse, namely amoment of themystical substance. Precisely becauseHegelstarts fromthepredicatesofuniversaldetermination insteadoffromtherealEns(hypokimenou,subject),andbecausetheremustbeabearer of this determination, the mystical idea becomes this bearer.This is the dualism:Hegel does not consider the universal to be theactualessenceoftheactual,finitething,i.e.oftheexistingdeterminatething,northerealEns tobethetruesubjectoftheinfinite.

Accordingly, sovereignty, the essence of the state, is here firstconceivedtobeanindependentbeing;itisobjectified.Then,ofcourse,this object must again become subject. However the subject thenappears to be a self-incarnation of sovereignty,which is nothing buttheobjectifiedspiritofthestate'ssubjects.

This basic defect of the development aside, let us consider the firstsentenceof theparagraph.Asitstandsitsaysnothingmorethanthatsovereignty, the ideality of the state as person, as subject, existsevidently as many persons, many subjects, since no single personabsorbsinhimselfthesphereofpersonality,noranysinglesubjectthesphereofsubjectivity.Whatkindofidealityofthestatewouldithaveto be which, instead of being the actual self-consciousness of thecitizens and the communal soul of the state, were one person, onesubject[?]NorhasHegeldevelopedanymorewiththissentence.Butconsidernowthesecondsentencewhichisjoinedwiththisone.WhatisimportanttoHegelisrepresentingthemonarchastheactual, 'God-man',theactualincarnationoftheIdea.

§279.Sovereignty...comesintoexistenceonly...asthewill'sabstract and to that extentungrounded self-determination inwhich finality of decision is rooted. This is the strictlyindividualaspectofthestate,andinvirtueofthisaloneisthestate one... In a constitutionwhichhasbecomemature as arealisation of rationality, each of the threemoments of theconcept has its explicitly actual and separate formation.Hence this absolutely decisivemoment of thewhole is notindividualityingeneral,butasingleindividual,themonarch.

We previously called attention to this sentence. The moment ofdeciding,ofarbitraryyetdeterminatedecisionis thesovereignpowerofwillingeneral.Theideaofsovereignpower,asHegeldevelopsit,is

nothingotherthantheideaofthearbitrary,ofthewill'sdecision.

Butevenwhileconceivingof sovereigntyas the idealityof the state,the actual determination of the part through the idea of the whole,Hegelnowmakes it 'thewill'sabstractand to thatextentungroundedself-determination inwhich finality of decision is rooted.This is thestrictlyindividualaspectofthestate'.Before,thediscussionwasaboutsubjectivity,now it'sabout individuality.Thestateas sovereignmustbeone,one individual, itmustpossess individuality.Thestate isonenotstayinthisindividuality;individualityisonlythenaturalmomentof itsoneness, thestate'sdeterminationasnature [Naturbestimmung].'Hence this absolutely decisive moment of the whole is notindividualityingeneral,butasingleindividual,themonarch.'Howso?Because 'each of the threemoments of the concept has its explicitlyactualandseparateformation'.Onemomentoftheconceptisoneness,or unity; alone this is not yet one individual. And what kind ofconstitution would it have to be in which universality, particularity,and unity each had its explicitly actual and separate formation?Becauseitisaltogetheraquestionofnoabstractionbutofthestate,ofsociety, Hegel's classification can be accepted. What follows fromthat?Thecitizenasdetermining theuniversal is lawgiver, andas theone deciding, as actually willing, is sovereign. Is that supposed tomean that the individuality of the state's will is one individual, aparticular individual distinct from all others? Universality too,legislation,hasanexplicitlyactualandseparateformation.Couldoneconcludefromthatthatlegislationistheseparticularindividuals[?]

TheCommonMan: Hegel:

2. The monarch has thesovereign power, orsovereignty.3.Sovereigntydoeswhatitwills.

2. The sovereignty of thestateisthemonarch.3.Sovereignty is 'thewill'sabstract and to that extentungrounded self-determination in whichfinality of decision isrooted'.

Hegel makes all the attributes of the contemporary Europeanconstitutionalmonarchintoabsoluteself-determinationsofthewill.Hedoesnotsaythewillofthemonarchisthefinaldecision,butratherthefinal decision of the will is the monarch. The first statement isempirical, the second twists the empirical fact into a metaphysicalaxiom. Hegel joins together the two subjects, sovereignty assubjectivity sure of itself and sovereignty as ungrounded self-determinationof thewill,as theindividualWill, inordertoconstructoutofthattheIdeaas'oneindividual'.

Itisevidentthatself-assuredsubjectivityalsomustactuallywill,mustwillasunity,asanindividual.Butwhoeverdoubtedthatthestateactsthroughindividuals?IfHegelwantedtodeveloptheideathatthestatemust have one individual as representative of its individual oneness,then he did not establish the monarch as this individual. The onlypositiveresultofthisparagraphisthatinthestatethemonarchisthemoment of individual will, of ungrounded self-determination, ofcapriceorarbitrariness.

Hegel'sRemarktothisparagraphissopeculiarthatwemustexamineitclosely:

Remarkto§279.Theimmanentdevelopmentofascience,the derivation of its entire content from the concept in itssimplicity ... exhibits this peculiarity, that one and the sameconcept - thewill in this instance -which begins by beingabstract(becauseitisatthebeginning),maintainsitsidentityeven while it consolidates its specific determinations, andthat too solely by its own activity, and in thisway gains aconcretecontent.Henceitisthebasicmomentofpersonality,abstract at the start in immediate rights,whichhasmatureditself throughitsvariousformsofsubjectivity,andnow-atthe stage of absolute rights, of the state, of the completelyconcreteobjectivityofthewill-hasbecomethepersonalityof the state, its certainty of itself. This last reabsorbs allparticularity into its single self, cuts short the weighing ofpros and cons between which it lets itself oscillateperpetuallynowthiswayandnowthat,andbysaying'Iwill',makes its decision and so inaugurates all activity andactuality.

To beginwith it is not a peculiarity of science that the fundamentalconceptofthethingalwaysreappears.

Butalsonoadvancehasthentakenplace.Abstractpersonalitywasthesubject of abstract right; there has been no progress, because aspersonality of the state it remains abstract personality. Hegel shouldnothavebeensurprisedattherealperson-andpersonsmakethestate- reappearing everywhere as his essence. He should have beensurprisedatthereverse,andyetstillmoreatthepersonaspersonalityof thestatereappearing in thesameimpoverishedabstractionasdoesthepersonofprivateright.

Hegel here defines the monarch as the personality of the state, itscertaintyofitself.Themonarchispersonifiedsovereignty,sovereigntybecomeman,incarnatestate-[orpolitical-]consciousness,whereby

all other persons are thus excluded from this sovereignty, frompersonality,andfromstate-[orpolitical-]consciousness.AtthesametimehoweverHegelcangivethis 'Souverainété - Personne'nomorecontentthan'Iwill',themomentofarbitrarinessinthewill.Thestate-reason and state-consciousness is a unique empirical person to theexclusion of all others, but this personified Reason has no contentexcepttheabstracton,'Iwill'.L'Etat c'est moi.

Further,however,personality likesubjectivity ingeneral,asinfinitely self-related, has its truth (to be precise, its mostelementary, immediate truth) only in a person, in a subjectexisting'for'himself,andwhatexists'for'itselfisjustsimplyaunit.

Itisobviousthatpersonalityandsubjectivity,beingonlypredicatesofthepersonandthesubject,existonlyaspersonandsubject;andindeedthatthepersonisone.ButHegelneededtogofurther,forclearlytheone has truth only as many one's. The predicate, the essence, neverexhauststhespheresofitsexistenceinasingleonebutinmanyone's.

InsteadofthisHegelconcludes: 'Thepersonalityofthestateisactualonlyasoneperson,themonarch.'

Thus, because subjectivity is actual only as subject, and the subjectactual only as one, the personality of the state is actual only as oneperson.Abeautifulconclusion.Hegelcouldjustaswellconcludethatbecause the individualman isone thehumanspecies isonlyasingleman.

Personality expresses the concept as such; but at the sametime the person enshrines the actuality of the concept, andonlywhentheconceptisdeterminedasapersonisittheIdeaortruth.

Tobesure,personalityismerelyanabstractionwithouttheperson,butonly in its species-existence as persons is person the actual idea ofpersonality.

Aso-called 'artificial [moralische]person',be itasociety,acommunity,orafamily,howeverinherentlyconcreteitmaybe, contains personality only abstractly, as one moment ofitselfInan'artificialperson',personalityhasnotyetachievedits truemode of existence. The state, however, is preciselythis totality in which the moments of the concept haveattainedtheactualitycorrespondenttotheirdegreeoftruth.

Agreatconfusionprevailshere.Theartificialperson,society,etc., iscalled abstract, precisely those species-forms [Gattutigsgestaltungen]in which the actual person brings his actual content to existence,objectifieshimself,andleavesbehindtheabstractionof'personquandmême'. Instead of recognising this actualisation of the person as themost concrete thing, the state is tohave thepriority inorder that themoments of the concept, individuality, attain a mystical existence.Rationality does not consist in the reason of the actual personachieving actuality, but in the moments of the abstract conceptachievingit.

Theconceptof themonarch is thereforeof all concepts thehardest for ratiocination, i.e., for the method of reflectionemployed by the Understanding. This method refuses tomovebeyondisolatedcategoriesandhencehereagainknowsonly raisonnenient, finite points of view, and deductiveargumentation. Consequently it exhibits the dignity of themonarchassomethingdeduced,notonlyinitsformbutinitsessence. The truth is, however, that to be something notdeduced but purely self-originating is precisely the conceptofmonarchy.Akinthentothisreasoning(tobesure!)istheideaoftreatingthemonarch'srightasgroundedintheauthorityof

God,sinceitisinitsdivinitythatitsunconditionalcharacteriscontained.[Remarkto§279]

Inacertainsenseeveryinevitableexistentispurelyself-originating;inthis respect the monarch's louse as well as the monarch. Hegel, insaying that, has not said something special about the monarch. Butshouldsomethingspecificallydistinctfromallotherobjectsofscienceand of the philosophy of right be said about the monarch, then thiswould be real foolishness, correct only in so far as the 'one Person-idea' is something derived only from the imagination and not theintellect.

Wemayspeakofthe'sovereigntyofthepeople'inthesensethat any people whatever is self-subsistent vis-a-vis otherpeoples,andconstitutesastateofitsown,etc.[Remarkto§279]

Thatisatriviality.Ifthesovereignistheactualsovereigntyofthestatethenthesovereigncouldnecessarilybeconsideredvis-a-visothersasaself-subsistentstate,evenwithoutthepeople.Butheissovereigninsofar as he represents the unity of the people, and thus he is himselfmerelyarepresentative,asymbolofthesovereigntyofthepeople.Thesovereigntyof thepeople isnotdue tohimbuton thecontraryhe isduetoit.

Wemayalsospeakofsovereigntyinhomeaffairsresidinginthepeople,providedthatwearespeakinggenerallyaboutthewholestateandmeaningonlywhatwasshownabove(see§§277-8),namelythatitistothestatethatsovereigntybelongs.

Asthoughthepeople[das Volk]werenottherealstate.Thestateisanabstraction;thepeoplealoneistheconcrete.AnditisnoteworthythatHegel, who without hesitation ascribes living qualities to the

abstraction, ascribes a living quality like that of sovereignty to theconcrete[-i.e.tothepeople-]onlywithhesitationandconditions.

Theusualsense,however,inwhichmenhaverecentlybegunto speak of the sovereignty of the people is that it issomething opposed to the sovereignty existent in themonarch.Soopposedtothesovereigntyofthemonarch,thesovereignty of the people is one of the confused notionsbasedonthewildideaofthe'people'.

TheconfusednotionsandthewildideaareonlyhereonHegel'spages.Certainlyifsovereigntyexistsinthemonarchthenitisfoolishnesstospeakofanopposedsovereigntyinthepeople,foritliesintheconceptof sovereignty that it can have no double and absolutely opposedexistence.But:

1. the question is exactly: Is not the sovereignty existent in themonarchan1 illusion?Sovereigntyof themonarchorsovereigntyofthepeople,thatisthequestion;

2. a sovereignty of the people in opposition to that existent in themonarchcanalsobespokenof.Butthenitisnotaquestionofoneandthe same sovereignty taking form on two sides but rather of twocompletelyopposedconceptsofsovereignty,onesuchthatitcancometoexistenceinamonarch,theothersuchthatitcancometoexistenceonlyinapeople.Thisis likeasking, isGodthesovereignorisman?Oneof thetwoisafiction[eine Unwarheit]eventhoughanexistingfiction.

Takenwithoutitsmonarchandthearticulationofthewholewhich is the indispensable and direct concomitant ofmonarchy, the people is a formless mass and no longer astate.Itlackseveryoneofthosedeterminatecharacteristics-

sovereignty,government,judges,magistrates,class-divisions[Stände],etc.,-whicharetobefoundonlyinawholewhichisinwardlyorganised.Bytheveryemergenceintoapeople'slife of moments of this kind which have a bearing on anorganisation, on political life, a people ceases to be thatindeterminateabstractionwhich,whenrepresentedinaquitegeneralway,iscalledthe'people'.

This whole thing is a tautology. If a people has a monarch and anarticulationwhichisitsindispensableanddirectconcomitant,i.e.,ifitisarticulatedasamonarchy,thenextractedfromthisarticulationitiscertainlyaformlessmassandaquitegeneralnotion.

If by 'sovereignty of the people' is understood a republicanform of government, or to speak more specifically ... ademocratic form, then... 1 such a notion cannot be furtherdiscussed in face of the Idea of the state in its fulldevelopment.

Thatiscertainlycorrectifonehasonlysuchanotionandnodevelopedideaofdemocracy.

Democracy is the truth of monarchy, monarchy is not the truth ofdemocracy.Monarchy isnecessarilydemocracy incontradictionwithitself, whereas the monarchial moment is no contradiction withindemocracy.Monarchycannot,whiledemocracycanbeunderstood interms of itself In democracy none of the moments obtains asignificanceotherthanwhatbefitsit.EachisreallyonlyamomentofthewholeDemos. Inmonarchyone part determines the character ofthewhole; the entire constitutionmust bemodified according to theimmutablehead.Democracyisthegenericconstitution;monarchyisaspecies, and indeed a poor one. Democracy is content and form;monarchyshould beonlyform,butitadulteratesthecontent.

In monarchy the whole, the people, is subsumed under one of itsmodes of existence,. the political constitution; in democracy theconstitutionitselfappearsonlyasonedetermination,andindeedastheself-determinationof thepeople. Inmonarchywehave thepeopleofthe constitution, in democracy the constitution of the people.Democracy is the resolved mystery of all constitutions. Here theconstitution not only in itself, according to essence, but according toexistence and actuality is returned to its real ground, actualman, theactual people, and established as its own work. The constitutionappearsaswhatitis,thefreeproductofmen.Onecouldsaythatthisalso applies in a certain respect to constitutionalmonarchy; only thespecific difference of democracy is that here the constitution is ingeneralonlyonemomentof thepeople's existence, that is to say thepoliticalconstitutiondoesnotformthestateforitself.

Hegel proceeds from the state and makes man into the subjectifiedstate;democracystartswithmanandmakesthestateobjectifiedman.justasitisnotreligionthatcreatesmanbutmanwhocreatesreligion,soitisnottheconstitutionthatcreatesthepeoplebutthepeoplewhichcreates theconstitution. Inacertain respectdemocracy is toallotherformsofthestatewhatChristianityistoallotherreligions.Christianityis the religionkat exohin, the essenceof religion,deifiedmanunderthe form of a particular religion. In the sameway democracy is theessenceofeverypoliticalconstitution,socialisedmanunder theformof a particular constitution of the state. It stands related to otherconstitutions as the genus to its species; only here the genus itselfappearsasanexistent,andthereforeopposedasaparticularspeciestothose existents which do not conform to the essence. DemocracyrelatestoallotherformsofthestateastheirOldTestament.Mandoesnotexistbecauseof the lawbut rather the lawexists for thegoodof

man. Democracy is human existence, while in the other politicalformsmanhasonlylegal existence.Thatisthefundamentaldifferenceofdemocracy.

All remaining forms of the state are certain, determined, particularformsofthestate.Indemocracytheformalprincipleissimultaneouslythematerial principle. For that reason it is the first true unity of theuniversal and the particular. In monarchy for example, or in therepublicasmerelyaparticularformofthestate,politicalmanhashisparticular and separate existence beside the unpolitical, privateman.Property, contract,marriage, civil society appear here (just as Hegelquiterightlydevelopsthemforabstractformsofthestate,exceptthathe means to develop the Idea of the state) as particular modes ofexistence alongside the political state; that is, they appear as thecontenttowhichthepoliticalstaterelatesasorganisingform,orreallyonlyasthedetermining,limitingintelligencewhichsaysnow'yes'now'no'withoutanycontentofitsown.Indemocracythepoliticalstate,asplacedalongsidethiscontentanddifferentiatedfromit,isitselfmerelyaparticularcontent,likeaparticularformofexistenceofthepeople.Inmonarchy,forexample,thisparticularentity,thepoliticalconstitution,hasthemeaningoftheuniversalwhichgovernsanddeterminesalltheparticulars.Indemocracythestateasparticularisonlyparticular,andas universal it is the real universal, i.e., it is nothing definite indistinctionfromtheothercontent.ThemodernFrenchhaveconceivedit thus: In true democracy the political state disappears [derpolitische Staat untergehe].Thisiscorrectinasmuchasqua politicalstate,quaconstitutionitisnolongerequivalenttothewhole.

Inallstatesdistinctfromdemocracythestate,thelaw,theconstitutionisdominantwithoutreallygoverning,thatis,materiallypermeatingthe

content of the remaining non-political spheres. In democracy theconstitution, the law, the state, so far as it is political constitution, isitselfonlyaself-determinationofthepeople,andadeterminatecontentofthepeople.

Furthermoreitisevidentthatallformsofthestatehavedemocracyfortheirtruth,andforthatreasonarefalsetotheextentthattheyarenotdemocracy.

In the ancient state thepolitical state shaped the contentof the state,with the other spheres being excluded; the modern state is anaccommodationbetweenthepoliticalandthenon-politicalstate.

In democracy the abstract state has ceased to be the governingmoment.The strugglebetweenmonarchyand republic is itself still astrugglewithintheabstractformofthestate.Thepoliticalrepublic[-that is, the republicmerely as political constitution - ] is democracywithin theabstract formof thestate.Hence theabstractstate-formofdemocracyistherepublic;buthere[intruedemocracy]itceasestobemerepoliticalconstitution.

Property,etc., inbrief theentirecontentof lawand the state is,withsmallmodification, the same inNorthAmerica as in Prussia. There,accordingly, therepublic isamerestateformjustas themonarchyishere. The content of the state lies outside these constitutions.HenceHegel is rightwhenhesays that thepoliticalstate is theconstitution,i.e.,thatthematerialstateisnotpolitical.Merelyanexternalidentity,amutual determination, obtains here. Itwasmost difficult to form thepoliticalstate, theconstitution,outof thevariousmomentsof thelifeofthepeople.Itwasdevelopedastheuniversalreasoninoppositiontothe other spheres i.e., as something opposed to them. The historical

taskthenconsistedintheirrevindication.Buttheparticularspheres,indoing that, are not conscious of the fact that their private essencedeclines in relation to the opposite essence of the constitution, orpolitical state, and that its opposite existence is nothing but theaffirmationoftheirownalienation.Thepoliticalconstitutionwasuntilnowthereligioussphere,thereligionofpopularlife,theheavenofitsuniversalityinoppositiontotheearthlyexistenceofitsactuality.Thepolitical spherewas the sole sphere of the statewithin the state, thesole sphere inwhich the content, like the form,was species-content,thetrueuniversal,butatthesametimeinsuchawaythat,becausethissphere opposed the others, its content also became formal andparticular. Political life in the modern sense is the Scholasticism ofpopularlife.Monarchyisthefullestexpressionofthisalienation.Therepublic is thenegationof this alienationwithin itsown sphere. It isobviousthatthepoliticalconstitutionassuchisperfectedforthefirsttime when the private spheres have attained independent existence.Where commerce and property in land are not free, not yetautonomous,thereisalsonotyetthepoliticalconstitution.TheMiddleAgeswasthedemocracyofnonfreedom.

The abstraction of the state as such belongs only to modern timesbecause the abstractionof private life belongsonly tomodern times.Theabstractionofthepoliticalstateisamodernproduct.

IntheMiddleAgestherewasserf,feudalproperty,tradecorporation,corporation of scholars, etc., that is, in the Middle Ages property,trade,society,manwaspolitical;thematerialcontentofthestatewasfixed by reason of its form; every private sphere had a politicalcharacter or was a political sphere, or again, politics was also thecharacter of the private spheres. In the Middle Ages the political

constitutionwastheconstitutionofprivateproperty,butonlybecausetheconstitutionofprivatepropertywasapoliticalone.In theMiddleAgespopularlifeandstate[i.e.,political]lifewereidentical.Manwasthe actual principle of the state, but he was unfree man. It wastherefore the democracy of unfreedom, accomplished alienation. Theabstract, reflected opposition [between popular life and state-, orpolitical-life]belongonlytomoderntimes.TheMiddleAgeswastherealdualism;moderntimesistheabstractdualism.

At the stage at which constitutions are divided, as abovementioned, into democracy, aristocracy, andmonarchy, thepointofviewtakenisthatofastillsubstantialunity,abidingin itself, without having yet embarked on its infinitedifferentiation and the plumbing of its own depths. At thatstage, themomentof the filial, self-determiningdecisionofthe will does not come on the scene explicitly in its owl)properactualityasanorganicmomentimmanentinthestate.[Remarkto§279]

In immediate monarchy, democracy, aristocracy there is yet nopolitical constitution in distinction from the actual material state orfromtheremainingcontentofpopularlife.Thepoliticalstatedoesnotyetappearas the formof thematerial state.Either, as inGreece, theres publica was the real private concern, the real content of thecitizens and the privatemanwas slave, that is, the political state aspoliticalwasthetrueandsolecontentofthecitizen'slifeandwill;or,asinAsiaticdespotism,thepoliticalstatewasnothingbuttheprivatewill of a single individual, and the political state, like the materialstate,wasslave.Whatdistinguishesthemodernstatefromthesestatesinwhicha substantialunitybetweenpeopleandstateobtained isnotthatthevariousmomentsoftheconstitutionareformedintoparticularactuality,asHegelwouldhaveit,butratherthattheconstitutionitself

hasbeenformedintoaparticularactualityalongsidethereallifeofthepeople,thepoliticalstatehasbecometheconstitutionoftherestofthestate.

§ 280. This ultimate self in which the will of the state isconcentratedis,whenthustakeninabstraction,asingleselfand therefore is immediate individuality. Hence its naturalcharacter is implied in its very conception. The monarch,therefore, is essentially characterised as this individual, inabstraction from all his other characteristics, and thisindividual is raised to the dignity of monarchy in animmediate, natural fashion, i.e., through his birth in thecourseofnature.

Wehavealreadyheardthatsubjectivityissubjectandthatthesubjectisnecessarilyanempiricalindividual,aone. Nowwearetoldthattheconcept of naturality, of corporeality, is implied in the concept ofimmediate individuality. Hegel has proven nothing but what is self-evident,namely,thatsubjectivityexistsonlyasacorporealindividual,and what is obvious, namely, that natural birth appertains to thecorporealindividual.

Hegel thinks he has proven that the subjectivity of the state,sovereignty, the monarch, is 'essentially characterised as thisindividual, in abstraction from all his other characteristics, and thisindividualisraisedtothedignityofmonarchinanimmediate,naturalfashion, i.e., through his birth in the course of nature'. Sovereignty,monarchial dignity, would thus be born. The body of the monarchdetermines his dignity. Thus at the highest point of the state barePhysis ratherthanreasonwouldbethedeterminingfactor.Birthwoulddetermine the quality of themonarch as it determines the quality ofcattle.

Hegelhasdemonstratedthatthemonarchmustbeborn,whichnoonequestions,butnotthatbirthmakesoneamonarch.

That man becomes monarch by birth can as little be made into ametaphysical truth as can the Immaculate Conception ofMary. Thelatternotion,afactofconsciousness,justaswellastheempiricalfactof the birth ofman to themonarchy, can be understood as rooted inhumanillusionandconditions.

IntheRemark,whichweexaminemoreclosely,Hegeltakespleasureinhavingdemonstratedtheirrationaltobeabsolutelyrational.

Thistransitionoftheconceptofpureself-determinationintotheimmediacyof'beingandsointotherealmofnatureisofa purely speculative character, and apprehension of itthereforebelongstologic.

Indeeditispurelyspeculative.Butwhatispurelyspeculativeisnotthetransition from pure self-determination, from an abstraction, to purenaturality (to the contingencyofbirth), to theother extreme,car lesextrêmes se touchent. What is speculative is that this is called a'transitionoftheconcept',andthatabsolutecontradictionispresentedasidentity,andultimateinconsistencypresentedasconsistency.

ThiscanbeconsideredasHegel'spositiveacknowledgment:with thehereditary monarch in the place of self-determining reason, abstractnatural determinacy appears not as what it is, not as naturaldeterminacy, but as the highest determinationof the state; this is thepositive point at which the monarchy can no longer preserve theappearanceofbeingtheorganisationoftherationalwill.

Moreover,thistransitionisonthewholethesame(?)asthatfamiliartousinthenatureofwillingingeneral,andtherethe

processistotranslatesomethingfromsubjectivity(i.e.,somepurpose held before the mind) into existence. ... But theproper form of the Idea and of the transition here underconsideration is the immediate conversion of the pure self-determination of thewill (i.e., of the simple concept itself)intoasingleandnaturalexistentwithout themediationofaparticular content (like a purpose in the case of action).[Remarkto§280]

Hegelsaysthattheconversionofthesovereigntyofthestate(ofaself-determination of the will) into the body of the born monarch (intoexistence) is on the whole the transition of the content in general,whichthewillmakesinordertoactualiseanendwhichisthoughtof,that is, to translate it into an existent.ButHegel says 'on thewhole'.And the proper differencewhich he specifies [ - namely, immediateconversionofthepureself-determinationofthewillintoasingleandnaturalexistentwithout themediationofaparticularcontent - ] issoproperthatiteliminatesallanalogyandputsmagic intheplaceofthe'natureofwillingingeneral'.

Firstofall,theconversionofthepurposeheldbeforethemindintotheexistent is here immediate, magical. Second, the subject here is thepureself-determinationof thewill, thesimpleconcept itself; it is theessence of will which, as a mystical subject, decides. It is no real,individual, conscious will; it is the abstraction of the will whichchangesintoanaturalexistent;itisthepureIdeawhichembodiesitselfasoneindividual.

Third,sincetheactualisationofthevolitioninanaturalexistenttakesplaceimmediately,i.e.,withoutamedium-whichthewillrequiresasa rule inorder toobjectify itself - thenevenaparticular,determinateendis lacking;nomediationofaparticularcontent, likeapurposein

the case of action, takes place, which is evident because no actin gsubjectispresent,andtheabstraction,thepureideaofwill,inordertoactmustactmystically.Nowanendwhichisnotparticularisnoend,andanactwithoutanendisanendless,senselessact.Thusthiswholeparallelwiththeteleologicalactofthewillshowsitselffinallytobeamystification,anemptyactionoftheIdea.Infact,themediumhereistheabsolutewillandthewordofthephilosopher;theparticularendisthe end of the philosophising subject, namely, constructing thehereditarymonarch out of the pure Idea; and the actualisation of theendisHegel'ssimpleaffirmation.

In the so-called 'ontological' proof of the existence ofGod,we have the same conversion of the absolute concept intoexistence (the same mystification),' which conversion hasconstituted the depth of the Idea in the modern world,although recently (and rightly), it has been declaredinconceivable.

Butsincetheideaofthemonarchisregardedasbeingquitefamiliar toordinary (i.e., understanding), consciousness, theUnderstanding clings here all the more tenaciously to itsseparationand theconclusionswhich itsastute ratiocinationdeducestherefrom.Asaresult, itdeniesthatthemomentofultimate decision in the state is linked implicitly andactually (i.e. in the rational concept) with the immediatebirthrightofthemonarch.[Remarkto§280]

Itisdeniedthatultimatedecisionisabirthright,andHegelassertsthatthemonarch is theultimatedecision throughbirth.Butwhohaseverdoubtedthattheultimatedecisioninthestateisjoinedtoarealbodilyindividualandislinkedwiththeimmediatebirthright?

§281.Bothmomentsintheirundividedunity-(a)thewill'sultimate ungrounded self, and (b) therefore its similarly

ungroundedobjectiveexistence(existencebeingthecategorywhichisathomeinnature)-constitutetheIdeaofsomethingagainst which caprice is powerless, the 'majesty' of themonarch.Inthisunityliestheactualunityofthestate,anditisonlythroughthis,itsinwardandoutwardimmediacy,thattheunityof the state is saved from the riskofbeingdrawndown into the sphere of particularity and its caprices, endsandopinions,andsaved too from thewarof factions roundthe throne and from the enfeeblement andoverthrowof thepowerofthestate.

Thetwomomentsare[a]thecontingencyofthewill,caprice,and[b]the contingency of nature, birth; thus, His Majesty: Contingency.Contingencyisthustheactualunityofthestate.

The way in which, according to Hegel, an inward and outwardimmediacy[ofthestate]istobesavedfromcollision,[duetocaprice,factions,]etc., is incredible,sincecollision ispreciselywhat itmakespossible.

WhatHegelassertsof theelectivemonarchappliesevenmore to thehereditarymonarchy:

Inanelectivemonarchy...thenatureoftherelationbetweenkingandpeopleimpliesthattheultimatedecisionisleftwiththe particular will, and hence the constitution becomes aCompact of Election, i.e., a surrender of the power of thestateatthediscretionoftheparticularwill.Theresultofthisisthattheparticularofficesofstateturnintoprivateproperty,etc.[Remarkto§281]

§ 282. The right to pardon criminals arises from thesovereignty of the monarch, since it is this alone which isempowered to actualise mind's power of making undonewhathasbeendoneandwipingoutacrimebyforgivingandforgettingit.

The right to pardon is the right to exercise clemency, the ultimateexpressionofcontingentandarbitrarychoice.SignificantlythisiswhatHegelmakestheessentialattributeofthemonarch.IntheAdditiontothisveryparagraphhedefinesthesourceofpardonas'self-determined[or.groundless]decision'[die grundlose Entscheidung].

§283.Thesecondmomentinthepowerofthecrownisthemoment of particularity, or the moment of a determinatecontent and its subsumptionunder the universal.When thisacquires a special objective existence, it becomes thesupreme council and the individualswho compose it. Theybring before the monarch for his decision the content ofcurrentaffairsofstateorthelegalprovisionrequiredtomeetexistingneeds,togetherwiththeirobjectiveaspects,i.e.,thegroundsonwhichdecision is tobebased, therelative laws,circumstances, etc. The individuals who discharge theseduties are in direct contactwith the person of themonarchand therefore the choice and dismissal alike of theseindividualsrestwithhisunrestrictedcaprice.

§ 284. It is only for theobjective side of decision, i.e., forknowledge of the problem and the attendant circumstances,and for the legal and other reasons which determine itssolution,thatmenareanswerable;inotherwords,itisthesealone which are capable of objective proof. It is for thisreason that thesemay fallwithin the province of a councilwhich is distinct from the personal will of themonarch assuch.Hence it is only councils or their individualmembersthat are made answerable. The personal majesty of themonarch, on the other hand, as the final subjectivity ofdecision,isaboveallanswerabilityforactsofgovernment.

HereHegeldescribesinawhollyempiricalwaytheministerialpoweras it is usually defined in constitutional states. The only thingphilosophydoeswiththisempiricalfactistomakeittheexistenceand

thepredicateofthemomentofparticularityinthepowerofthecrown.

(The ministers represent the rational objective side of the sovereignwill.Hencealsothehonor ofbeinganswerablefallstothem,whilethemonarch is compensatedwith the imaginary coin of 'Majesty'.) Thusthe speculative moment is quite poor. But then the development isbased particularly on wholly empirical grounds, and indeed veryabstractandbadempiricalgrounds.

Thus,forexample,thechoiceofministersisplacedintheunrestrictedcaprice of the monarch because they are in direct contact with theperson of themonarch, i.e., because they areministers. In the samewaytheunrestrictedchoiceofthemonarch'spersonalservantscanbedevelopedoutoftheabsoluteIdea.

Thebasisfortheanswerabilityoftheministersiscertainlybetter:'Itisonly for the objective side of decision, i.e., for knowledge of theproblemand the attendant circumstances, and for the legal andotherreasonswhichdetermineitssolution,thatmenareanswerable:inotherwords,itisthesealonewhicharecapableofobjectiveproof'Evidently'thefinalsubjectivityofdecision',puresubjectivity,purecaprice,isnotobjective, hence also capable of no objective proof nor therefore ofresponsibility, once an individual is theblessed, sanctionedexistenceofcaprice.Hegel'sproof isconclusive if theconstitutionalprovisionsaretakenasthepointofdeparture;buttheseprovisionsthemselvesarenotprovensimplybyanalysingthem,andthisisallHegelhasdone.

ThewholeuncriticalcharacterofHegel'sphilosophyofrightisrootedinthisconfusion.

§285.Thethirdmomentinthepowerofthecrownconcernsthe absolute universality which subsists subjectively in the

conscience of themonarch and objectively in thewhole oftheconstitutionandthelaws.Hencethepowerofthecrownpresupposes the other moments in the state just as it ispresupposedbyeachofthem.

§286.Theobjective guaranteeofthepowerofthecrown,ofthehereditaryrightofsuccessiontothethrone,andsoforth,consistsinthefactthatjustasmonarchyhasitsownactualityin distinction from that of the other rationally determinedmoments in the state, so these others explicitly possess therights and duties appropriate to their own character. In therationalorganismofthestate,eachmember,bymaintainingitself in its own position, eo ipso maintains the others intheirs.

Hegel does not see that with this third moment, the 'absoluteuniversality',heobliterates thefirst two,orviceversa. 'Thepowerofthe crown presupposes the other moments in the state just as it ispresupposedbyeachof them.' If thissupposition is takenas realandnot mystical, then the crown is established not through birth butthroughtheothermoments,andaccordinglyisnothereditarybutfluid,i.e.,determinedbythestateandassignedbyturnstoindividualsofthestate in accordancewith the organisation of the othermoments. In arationalorganismtheheadcannotbeironandthebodyflesh.Inordertopreservethemselvesthemembersmustbeequallyofonefleshandblood. But the hereditarymonarch is not equal, he is of other stuff.Heretheprosaiccharacteroftherationalisticwilloftheothermembersof the state faces the magic of nature. Moreover, members canmutuallymaintainthemselvesonlyinsofarasthewholeorganismisfluidandeachofthemistakenup[aufgehoben]inthisfluidity, insofarasnooneofthem,asinthiscasetheheadofthestate,isunmovedand inalterable.Thusbymeansof thisdeterminationHegelabolishessovereigntybybirth.

A second point has to dowith the question of irresponsibility. if theprince violates the whole of the constitution, and the laws, hisirresponsibilityceasesbecausehisconstitutionalexistenceceases.Butpreciselytheselawsandthisconstitutionmakehimirresponsible.Thustheycontradict themselves,andthisonestipulationabolisheslawandconstitution. The constitution of constitutional monarchy isirresponsibility.

Hegel, however, is contentwith saying that just asmonarchy has itsownactualityindistinctionfromthatoftheotherrationallydeterminedmoments in thestate,sotheseothersexplicitlypossess therightsandduties appropriate to their own character. Therefore hemust call theconstitutionoftheMiddleAgesanorganisation.ThusHegelhasonlyamassofparticularspheresunitedinarelationofexternalnecessity,andindeedanindividualmonarchbelongsonlytothissituation.Inastatewherein each determination exists explicitly, the sovereignty of thestatemustalsobeestablishedasaparticularindividual.

Résumé of Hegel's development of the Crownor the Idea of State Sovereignty

TheRemarkto§279says:

Wemayspeakofthesovereigntyofthepeopleinthesensethat any people whatever is self-subsistent vis-a-vis otherpeoples, and constitutes a state of its own, like the Britishpeopleforinstance.ButthepeoplesofEngland,Scotland,orIreland,orthepeoplesofVenice,Genoa,Ceylon,etc.arenotsovereign peoples at all now that they have ceased to haverulersorsupremegovernmentsoftheirown.

Thusheresovereigntyofthepeopleisnationality,andthesovereigntyof the prince is nationality; or in other words the principle of

principality is nationality,which explicitly and exclusively forms thesovereigntyofapeople.Apeoplewhosesovereigntyconsistsonly innationalityhasamonarch.Thedifferentnationalityofpeoplescannotbe better established and expressed than by means of differentmonarchs. The cleft between one .absolute individual and another isthecleftbetweenthesenationalities.

TheGreeks(andRomans)werenationalbecauseandinsofarastheywerethesovereignpeople.TheGermansaresovereignbecauseandinsofarastheyarenational.(Vid. p. xxxiv.)

(adxii)Aso-called'artificialperson',thesameRemarksaysfurther, be it a society, a community, or a family, howeverinherently concrete it may be, contains personality onlyabstractly, as one moment of itself In an artificial person',personalityhasnotachieveditstruemodeofexistence.Thestate,however,ispreciselythistotalityinwhichthemomentsof the concept have attained the actuality correspondent totheirdegreeoftruth.

This artificial person, society, family, etc., has personality within itonlyabstractly;againstthat,inthemonarch,thepersonhasthestateinhim.

In fact, theabstractpersonbringshispersonality to its real existenceonlyintheartificialperson,society,family,etc.ButHegelconceivesof society, family, etc., the artificial person in general, not as therealisationoftheactual,empiricalpersonbutasthereal personwhich,however,hasthemomentofpersonalityinitonlyabstractly.Whencealso comeshis notion that it is not actual personswhocome tobe astatebutthestatewhichmustfirstcometobeanactualperson.Insteadofthestatebeingbroughtforth,therefore,astheultimaterealityofthe

person,astheultimatesocialrealityofman,asingleempiricalman,anempiricalperson,isbroughtforthastheultimateactualityofthestate.This inversion of subject into object and object into subject is aconsequenceofHegel'swantingtowritethebiographyoftheabstractSubstance,oftheIdea,withhumanactivity,etc.,havingconsequentlytoappearastheactivityandresultofsomethingotherthanman;itisaconsequenceofHegel'swantingtoallowtheessenceofmantoactforitselfasanimaginaryindividualinsteadofactinginitsactual,humanexistence,anditnecessarilyhasasitsresultthatanempiricalexistentistakeninanuncriticalmannertobetherealtruthoftheIdea,becauseit is not aquestionofbringing empirical existence to its truthbut ofbringingthetruthtoempiricalexistence,andthereupontheobviousisdeveloped as a realmoment of the idea. (More later concerning thisinevitablechangeof theempirical intospeculationandofspeculationintotheempirical.)

Inthiswaytheimpressionofsomethingmysticalandprofoundisalsocreated. That man has been born is quite vulgar, so too that thisexistence established through physical birth comes to be socialman,etc.,andcitizen;manbecomeseverythingthathebecomesthroughhisbirth.But it isveryprofoundandstriking that the ideaof thestate isdirectlyborn,thatithasbroughtitselfforthintoempiricalexistenceinthebirthof the sovereign. In thiswayno content is gained, only theformoftheoldcontentaltered.Ithasreceivedaphilosophicalform,aphilosophicalcertification.

Another consequence of thismystical speculation is that a particularempirical existent, a single empirical existent in distinction from theothersisconceivedtobetheexistenceoftheIdea.Itmakesonceagaina deep mystical impression to see a particular empirical existent

established by the Idea, and hence to encounter at all levels anincarnationofGod.

If themodes of man's social existence, as found for example in thedevelopment of family, civil society, state, etc., are regarded as theactualisation and objectification of man's essence, then family, civilsociety,etc.,appearasqualitiesinheringinsubjects.Manthenremainswhat isessentialwithin these realities,while these thenappearashisactualised universality, and hence also as something common to allmen. But if, on the contrary, family, civil society, state, etc., aredeterminations of the idea, of Substance as subject, then they mustreceiveanempiricalactuality,andthemassofmeninwhichtheideaof civil society is developed takes on the identity of citizen of civilsociety, and that inwhich the ideaof the state isdeveloped takesonthatofcitizenofthestate.Inthiscasethesoleconcerniswithallegory,i.e.,withascribingtoanyempiricalexistentthemeaningofactualisedIdea; and thus it is evident that these receptacles have fulfilled theirdestiny once they have become a determinate incarnation of a life-momentoftheIdea.Consequentlytheuniversalappearseverywhereasadeterminateparticularthing,whiletheindividualnowherearrivesathistrueuniversality.

At the most profound and speculative level it therefore appearsnecessary when the most abstract determinations which in no wayreally ripen to true social actuality, thenaturalbasesof the state likebirth (in the case of the prince) or private property (as inprimogeniture),appeartobethehighest,immediateIdea-become-man.

Itisevidentthatthetruemethodisturnedupsidedown.Whatismostsimpleismademostcomplexandviceversa.Whatshouldbethepointof departure becomes the mystical result, and what should be the

rationalresultbecomesthemysticalpointofdeparture.

Ifhowevertheprinceis theabstractpersonwhohasthestate inhim,then this can only mean that the essence of the state is the abstractprivate person. It utters its secret only when at the peak of itsdevelopment.Heistheloneprivatepersoninwhomtherelationoftheprivatepersoningeneraltothestateisactualised.

Theprince'shereditarycharacterresultsfromhisconcept.Heistobethe person who is specified from the entire race of men, who isdistinguished from all other persons. But then what is the ultimatefixed difference of one person from all others? The body. And thehighest function of the body is sexual activity. Hence the highestconstitutionalactofthekingishissexualactivity,becausethroughthishemakes akingandcarriesonhisbody.Thebodyofhis son is thereproductionofhisownbody,thecreationofaroyalbody.

(b)TheExecutive§287.Thereisadistinctionbetweenthemonarch'sdecisionsandtheirexecutionandapplication,oringeneralbetweenhisdecisionsandthecontinuedexecutionormaintenanceofpastdecisions, existing laws, regulations, organisations for thesecuring of common ends, and so forth. This task of ...subsumingtheparticularundertheuniversaliscomprisedinthe executivepower,which also includes thepowersof thejudiciary and the police. The latter have amore immediatebearing on the particular concerns of civil society and theymake the universal interest authoritative over its particularaims.

Thisistheusualinterpretationoftheexecutive.Theonlythingwhichcan be mentioned as original with Hegel is that he coordinatesexecutive,police,andjudiciary,whereasaruletheadministrativeandjudiciarypowersaretreatedasopposed.

§288.Particularinterestswhicharecommontoeveryonefallwithin civil society and lie outside the absolutely universalinterestofthestateproper(see§256).TheadministrationoftheseisinthehandsofCorporations(see§251),commercialand professional as well as municipal, and their officials,directors,managers, and the like. It is thebusinessof theseofficialstomanagetheprivatepropertyandinterestsoftheseparticular spheres and, from that point of view, theirauthority restson theconfidenceof their commonalties andprofessional equals. On the other hand, however, thesecircles of particular interests must be subordinated to thehigherinterestsofthestate,andhencethefillingofpositionsof responsibility in Corporations, etc., will generally beeffectedbyamixtureofpopularelectionbythoseinterestedwithappointmentandratificationbyhigherauthority.

This is a simple description of the empirical situation in some

countries.

§289.Themaintenanceof thestate'suniversal interest,andoflegality,inthissphereofparticularrights,andtheworkofbringing these rights back to the universal, require to besuperintendedbyholdersof theexecutivepower,by (a) theexecutivecivilservantsand(b) thehigheradvisoryofficials(whoareorganisedintocommittees).Theseconvergeintheirsupremeheadswhoareindirectcontactwiththemonarch.

Hegel has not developed the executive. But given this, he has notdemonstratedthatitisanythingmorethanafunction,adeterminationof the citizen in general. By viewing the particular interests of civilsocietyassuch,asinterestswhichlieoutsidetheabsolutelyuniversalinterestofthestate,hehasonlydeducedtheexecutiveasaparticular,separatepower.

[Remark to § 289:] Just as civil society is the battlefieldwhere everyone's individual private interestmeets everyoneelse's, so here we have the struggle (a) of private interestsagainstparticularmattersofcommonconcernand(b)ofbothofthesetogetheragainsttheorganisationofthestateanditshigher outlook. At the same time the corporation mind,engendered when the particular spheres gain their title torights,isnowinwardlyconvertedintothemindofthestate,since it finds in the state the means of maintaining itsparticular ends. This is the secret of the patriotism of thecitizens in the sense that they know the state as theirsubstance, because it is the state that maintains theirparticularspheresofinteresttogetherwiththetitle,authority,andwelfareof these. In thecorporationmindtherootingoftheparticularintheuniversalisdirectlyentailed,andforthisreasonitisinthatmindthatthedepthandstrengthwhichthestatepossessesinsentimentisseated.

Thisisespeciallyworthnoting:

1. because of the definition of civil society as the bellumomnium contra omnes;

2. because private egoism is revealed to be the secret of thepatriotism of the citizens and the depth and strengthwhichthestatepossessesinsentiment;

3. because the 'burgher', the man of particular interest asopposed to the universal, the member of civil society, isconsideredtobeafixedindividualwhereasthestatelikewiseinfixedindividualsopposesthe'burghers'.

Onewouldsuppose thatHegelwouldhave todefine 'civil society'aswellasthe'family'asadeterminationofeachpoliticalindividual,andsotoothelaterstatequalitiesasequallyadeterminationofthepoliticalindividual.ButwithHegel it isnotoneand thesame individualwhodevelopsanewdeterminationofhissocialessence.Itistheessenceofthewill,whichallegedlydevelopsitsdeterminationsoutofitself.Thesubsisting,distinctandseparated,empiricalexistencesofthestateareconceivedtobeimmediateincarnationsofoneofthesedeterminations.

Justastheuniversalassuchisrenderedindependentitisimmediatelymixedinwithwhatempiricallyexists,andthenthislimitedexistentisimmediatelyanduncriticallytakenfortheexpressionoftheIdea.

HereHegelcomesintocontradictionwithhimselfonlyinsofarashedoesnotconceiveofthe'family'maninthesamewayheconceivedofthememberofcivilsociety,I.e.,asafixedbreedexcludedfromotherqualities.

§ 290. Division of labor... occurs in the business of theexecutive also. For this reason, the organisation of officials

hastheabstractthoughdifficulttaskofsoarrangingthat(a)civillifeshallbegovernedinaconcretemannerfrombelowwhereitisconcrete,butthat(b)nonethelessthebusinessofgovernmentshallbedividedintoitsabstractbranches-armedbyspecialofficialsasdifferentcentersofadministration,andfurther that (c) the operations of these various departmentsshallconvergeagainwhentheyaredirectedoncivillifefromabove, in the same way as they converge into a generalsupervisioninthesupremeexecutive.

TheAdditiontothisparagraphistobeconsideredlater.

§291.Thenatureoftheexecutivefunctionsisthattheyareobjectiveandthatintheirsubstancetheyhavebeenexplicitlyfixed by previous decisions (see Paragraph 287); thesefunctionshavetobefulfilledandcarriedoutbyindividuals.Betweenall individual andhisoffice there isno immediatenaturallink.Henceindividualsarenotappointedtoofficeonaccountof theirbirthornativepersonalgifts.Theobjectivefactorintheirappointmentisknowledgeandproofofability.Suchproofguaranteesthatthestatewillgetwhatitrequires;and since it is the sole condition of appointment, it alsoguaranteestoeverycitizenthechanceofjoiningtheclassofcivilservants[dem allgemeinen Stande].

§292.Sincetheobjectivequalificationforthecivilserviceisnotgenius(asitisforworkasanartist,forexample),thereisof necessity an indefinite plurality of eligible candidateswhose relative excellence is not determinablewith absoluteprecision. The selection of one of the candidates, hisnominationtooffice,andthegranttohimoffullauthoritytotransactpublicbusiness-allthis,asthelinkingoftwothings,aman and his office, which in relation to each othermustalwaysbefortuitous,inthestatewhichissovereignandhasthe lastword, is the subjective aspect of election to office,anditmustliewiththecrownasthepower.

§ 293. The particular public functions which the monarch

entruststoofficialsconstituteonepartoftheobjectiveaspectof the sovereignty residing in the crown. Their specificdiscrimination is therefore given in the nature of the thing.Andwhile the actions of the officials are the fulfilment oftheir duty, their office is also a right exempt fromcontingency.

Noteonlytheobjectiveaspectofthesovereigntyresidinginthecrown.

§294.Onceanindividualhasbeenappointedtohisofficialpositionbythesovereign'sact(see§292), thetenureofhispostisconditionalonhisfulfillinghisduties.Suchfulfilmentis the very essence of his appointment, and it is onlyconsequentialthathefindsinhisofficehislivelihoodandtheassuredsatisfactionofhisparticularinterests(see§294),andfurther thathisexternalcircumstancesandhisofficialworkare freed from other kinds of subjective dependence andinfluence.

Whattheserviceofthestate ...requires, it says in theRemark,isthatmenshallforgotheselfishandcapricioussatisfactionoftheirsubjectiveends;bythisverysacrifice,theyacquiretheright to find their satisfaction in, but only in, the dutifuldischarge of their public functions. In this fact, so far aspublic business is concerned, there lies the link betweenuniversal and particular interestswhich constitutes both theconceptofthestateanditsinnerstability(see§260) ...Theassuredsatisfactionofparticularneedsremovestheexternalcompulsionwhichmaytemptamantoseekwaysandmeansofsatisfyingthemattheexpenseofhisofficialduties.Thosewho are entrustedwith affairs of state find in its universalpower the protection they need against another subjectivephenomenon,namelythepersonalpassionsofthegoverned,whoseprimitive interests,etc., suffer injuryas theuniversalinterestofthestateismadetoprevailagainstthem.

§ 295.The security of the state and its subjects against themisuseofpowerbyministersandtheirofficialsliesdirectly

intheirhierarchicalorganisationandtheiranswerability;butitliestoointheauthoritygiventosocietiesandCorporations,because in itself this is a barrier against the intrusion ofsubjectivecapriceintothepowerentrustedtoacivilservant,anditcompletesfrombelowthestatecontrolwhichdoesnotreachdownasfarastheconductofindividuals.

§ 296.But the fact that a dispassionate, upright, and politedemeanour becomes customary [in civil servants], is (i)partly a result of direct education in thought and ethicalconduct. Such an education is amental counterpoise to themechanical and semi-mechanical activity involved inacquiring the so-called 'sciences' ofmatters connectedwithadministration,intherequisitebusinesstraining,intheactualwork done, etc. (ii) The size of the state, however, is animportant factor inproducing this result, since itdiminishesthe stressof family andotherpersonal ties, andalsomakeslesspotentandsolesskeensuchpassionsashatred,revenge,etc. In those who are busy with the important questionsarising in a great state, these subjective interestsautomatically disappear, and the habit is generated ofadoptinguniversalinterests,pointsofview,andactivities.

§ 297. Civil servants and the members of the executiveconstitute the greater part of the middle class, the class inwhich the consciousness of right and the developedintelligenceofthemassofthepeopleisfound.Thesovereignworking on the middle class at the top, and Corporation-rightsworkingonitatthebottom,aretheinstitutionswhicheffectivelyprevent it fromacquiring the isolatedpositionofanaristocracyandusing itseducationandskill asmeans toanarbitrarytyranny.

Additionto§297.Themiddleclass,towhichcivilservantsbelong, is politically conscious and the one in whicheducation ismostprominent. ... It is aprimeconcernof thestatethatamiddleclassshouldbedeveloped,butthiscanbedone only if the state is an organic unity like the one

describedhere,i.e.,itcanbedoneonlybygivingauthoritytospheres of particular interests, which are relativelyindependent, and by appointing an army of officialswhosepersonal arbitrariness is broken against such authorisedbodies.Actioninaccordancewitheveryone'srights,andthehabitofsuchaction,isaconsequenceofthecounterpoisetoofficialdom which independent and self-subsistent bodiescreate.

WhatHegel says about 'theExecutive' does notmerit the name of aphilosophical development. Most of the paragraphs could be foundverbatim in thePrussianLandrecht. Yet the administrationproper isthemostdifficultpointofthedevelopment.

BecauseHegelhasalreadyclaimed thepoliceand the judiciary tobespheresofcivilsociety,theexecutiveisnothingbuttheadministration,whichhedevelopsasthebureaucracy.

Firstofall, the 'Corporations',astheself-governmentofcivilsociety,presuppose thebureaucracy.The soledeterminationarrivedat is thatthe choice of the administrators and their officials, etc., is a mixedchoiceoriginatingfromthemembersofcivilsocietyandratifiedbytheproperauthority(orasHegelsays,'higherauthority').

Over this sphere, for themaintenance of the state's universal interestand of legality, stand holders of the executive power, the executivecivil servants and the advisory officials, which converge into themonarch.

A division of labour occurs in the business of the executive.Individuals must prove their capability for executive functions, i.e.,they must sit for examinations. The choice of the determinateindividualforcivilserviceappointmentistheprerogativeoftheroyal

authority.Thedistributionof thesefunctionsisgivenin thenatureofthe thing.The official function is the duty and the life'swork of thecivil servants. Accordingly they must be paid by the state. Theguaranteeagainstmalpracticebythebureaucracyispartlyitshierarchyandanswerability,andontheotherhandtheauthorityofthesocietiesandCorporations;itshumanenessisaresultpartlyofdirecteducationinthoughtandethicalconductandpartlyof thesizeof thestate.Thecivilservantsformthegreaterpartofthemiddleclass.Thesafeguardagainst its becoming like an aristocracy and tyranny is partly thesovereignat the top andpartlyCorporation-rights at thebottom.Themiddleclass is theclassofeducation.Voila tout! Hegelgivesusanempirical description of the bureaucracy, partly as it actually is, andpartlyaccordingtotheopinionwhichithasofitselfAndwiththatthedifficultchapteron'theExecutive'isbroughttoaclose.

Hegelproceeds from the separationof the stateandcivil society, theseparationof theparticular interestsand theabsolutelyuniversal;andindeed thebureaucracy is foundedon thisseparation.Hegelproceedsfrom the presuppositon of the Corporations; and indeed thebureaucracy presupposes the Corporations, in any event the'corporationmind'.Hegeldevelopsnocontentofthebureaucracy,butmerelysomegeneralindicationsofitsformalorganisation;andindeedthebureaucracyismerelytheformalismofacontentwhichliesoutsidethebureaucracyitself.

The Corporations are the materialism of the bureaucracy, and thebureaucracyisthespiritualismofthecorporations.TheCorporationisthebureaucracyofcivilsociety,andthebureaucracyistheCorporationofthestate.Inactuality,thebureaucracyascivilsocietyofthestateisopposed to the state of civil society, the Corporations. Where the

bureaucracyistobecomeanewprinciple,wheretheuniversalinterestof the statebegins tobecomeexplicitly a singular and therebya realinterest, it struggles against the Corporations as every consequencestrugglesagainsttheexistenceofitspremises.OntheotherhandoncethereallifeofthestateawakensandcivilsocietyfreesitselffromtheCorporationsoutofitsinherentrationalimpulse,thebureaucracyseekstorestorethem;forassoonasthestateofcivilsocietyfallssotoodoesthecivilsocietyofthestate.Thespiritualismvanisheswithitsoppositematerialism. The consequence struggles for the existence of itspremisesassoonasanewprinciplestrugglesnotagainsttheexistenceof thepremisesbutagainst theprincipleof theirexistence.ThesamemindthatcreatestheCorporationinsocietycreatesthebureaucracyinthestate.Thusassoonasthecorporationmindisattackedsotooisthemindof thebureaucracy; andwhereas thebureaucracy earlier foughttheexistenceof theCorporations inorder to create room for itsownexistence, now it seeks vigorously to sustain the existence of theCorporations inorder tosave theCorporationmind,which is itsownmind.

Thebureaucracyisthestateformalismofcivilsociety.Itisthestate'sconsciousness,thestate'swill,thestate'spower,asaCorporation.(Theuniversal interest can behave vis-a-vis the particular only as aparticularsolongastheparticularbehavesvis-a vis theuniversalasauniversal. The bureaucracy must thus defend the imaginaryuniversalityofparticularinterest,i.e.,theCorporationmind,inordertodefend the imaginary particularity of the universal interests, i.e., itsownmind.ThestatemustbeCorporationso longas theCorporationwishestobestate.)Beingthestate'sconsciousness,will,andpowerasa Corporation, the bureaucracy is thus a particular, closed societywithin the state. The bureaucracy wills the Corporation as an

imaginarypower.Tobesure,theindividualCorporationalsohasthiswill for its particular interest in opposition to the bureaucracy, but itwills thebureaucracyagainst theotherCorporation, against theotherparticular interest. The bureaucracy as the completed Corporationthereforewins thedayover theCorporationwhich is like incompletebureaucracy.ItreducestheCorporationtoanappearance,orwishestodo so, but wishes this appearance to exist and to believe in its ownexistence.TheCorporation is civil society's attempt to become state;butthebureaucracyisthestatewhichhasreallymadeitselfintocivilsociety.

The state formalism, which the bureaucracy is, is the state asformalism,andHegelhasdescribed itpreciselyas sucha formalism.Because this state formalism constitutes itself as a real power andbecomes itself its own material content, it is evident that thebureaucracyisatissueofpracticalillusion,ortheillusionofthestate.ThebureaucraticmindisthroughandthroughaJesuitical,theologicalmind.ThebureaucratsaretheJesuitsandtheologiansofthestate.Thebureaucracyisla république prêtre.

Since the bureaucracy according to its essence is the state asformalism, so too it is according to its end.The real endof the statethus appears to the bureaucracy as an end opposed to the state. Themind of the bureaucracy is the formalmind of the state. It thereforemakes the formal mind of the state, or the real mindlessness of thestate,acategoricalimperative.Thebureaucracyassertsitselftobethefinalendofthestate.Becausethebureaucracymakesitsformalaimsitscontent,itcomesintoconflicteverywherewiththerealaims.Henceit isobliged topresentwhat is formalfor thecontentand thecontentforwhatisformal.Theaimsofthestatearetransformedintoaimsof

bureaus, or the aims of bureaus into the aims of the state. Thebureaucracyisacirclefromwhichnoonecanescape.Itshierarchyisahierarchyofknowledge.Thehighestpointentrusts theunderstandingofparticularstothelowerechelons,whereasthese,ontheotherhand,creditthehighestwithanunderstandinginregardtotheuniversal;andthustheydeceiveoneanother.

Thebureaucracyistheimaginarystatealongsidetherealstate;itisthespiritualismofthestate.Asaresulteverythinghasadoublemeaning,one real and one bureaucratic, just as knowledge is double, one realand one bureaucratic (and the same with the will). A real thing,however,istreatedaccordingtoitsbureaucraticessence,accordingtoits otherworldly, spiritual essence. The bureaucracy has the being ofthestate,thespiritualbeingofsociety,initspossession;itisitsprivateproperty. The general spirit of the bureaucracy is the secret, themystery,preservedinwardlybymeansofthehierarchyandexternallyasaclosedcorporation.Tomakepublic-themindandthedispositionof the state appears therefore to the bureaucracy as a betrayal of itsmystery.Accordingly authority is the principle of its knowledge andbeing,andthedeificationofauthorityisitsmentality.Butattheveryheartofthebureaucracythisspiritualismturnsintoacrassmaterialism,the materialism of passive obedience, of trust in authority, themechanism of an ossified and formalistic behaviour, of fixedprinciples, conceptions, and traditions. As far as the individualbureaucratisconcerned,theendofthestatebecomeshisprivateend:apursuitofhigherposts, thebuildingofacareer. In the firstplace,heconsidersreallifetobepurelymaterial,forthespiritofthislifehasitsseparateexistenceinthebureaucracy.Thusthebureaucratmustmakelifeasmaterialistic aspossible.Secondly, real life ismaterial for thebureaucrat,i.e.insofarasitbecomesanobjectofbureaucraticaction,

becausehisspiritisprescribedforhim,hisendliesoutsideofhim,hisexistenceistheexistenceofthebureau.Thestate,then,existsonlyasvariousbureau-mindswhoseconnectionconsistsofsubordinationanddumbobedience.Realknowledgeappearstobedevoidofcontentjustas real lifeappears tobedead, for this imaginaryknowledgeand lifepass forwhat is real and essential.Thus the bureaucratmust use therealstateJesuitically,nomatterwhetherthisJesuitismbeconsciousorunconscious.Butgiventhathisantithesisisknowledge,itisinevitablethat he likewise attain to self-consciousness and, at that moment,deliberate Jesuitism.While thebureaucracy isononehand this crassmaterialism, it manifests its crass spiritualism in its will to doeverything, i.e., in itsmaking thewill thecausa prima, for it ispureactive existencewhich receives its content fromwithout; thus it canmanifestitsexistenceonlythroughformingandrestrictingthiscontent.Thebureaucrathastheworldasamereobjectofhisaction.

When Hegel calls the Executive power the objective aspect of thesovereigntyresidingInthecrown,itispreciselyinthesamesensethattheCatholicChurchwastherealexistenceofthesovereignty,content,andspiritoftheBlessedTrinity.Inthebureaucracytheidentityofthestate'sinterestandtheparticularprivateaimisestablishedsuchthatthestate's interest becomes a particular private aimopposed to the otherprivateaims.

Theabolition [Aufhebung]of thebureaucracycanconsistonly in theuniversalinterestbecomingreally-andnot,aswithHegel,becomingpurely in thought, in abstraction - particular interest; and this ispossibleonlythroughtheparticularinterestreallybecominguniversal.Hegelstartsfromanunrealoppositionandtherebybringsittoamerelyimaginary identitywhich, in fact, is itself all themore contradictory.

Suchanidentityisthebureaucracy.

Nowlet'sfollowhisdevelopmentinitsparticulars.

The sole philosophical statementwhichHegelmakes concerning theExecutive is that of the 'subsuming' of the individual and particularundertheuniversal,etc.

Hegelissatisfiedwiththat.Ononehand,thecategoryof'subsumption'oftheparticular,etc.Thiscategorymustbeactualised.Now,hepicksanyone of the empirical existences of the Prussian or Modern state(justas it is),whichamongother thingsactualises thiscategoryeventhough this category does not express its specific nature. Appliedmathematics is also a subsumingof the particular, etc.Hegel doesn'tenquirewhetherthisistherational,theadequatemodeofsubsumption.Heholds fastonly to theonecategoryand is satisfiedwith findingacorrespondingexistence for it.Hegelgiveshis logicapoliticalbody;hedoesnotgivethelogicofthepoliticalbody(§287).

Ontherelationshipof theCorporationsandsocieties to theexecutiveweare toldfirstofall that it is required that theiradministration(thenominationof theirmagistracy)generallybeeffectedbyamixtureofpopularelectionby those interestedwithappointmentandratificationby higher authority. The mixed choice of administrators of thesocietiesandCorporationswouldthusbethefirstrelationshipbetweencivil society and state or executive, their first identity (§ 288). Thisidentity, according to Hegel himself, is quite superficial, a mixtumcompositum, amixture.To thedegree that this identity is superficial,opposition is sharp. It is the business of these officials (namely theofficials of the Corporations, societies, etc.) to manage the privatepropertyand interestsof theseparticularspheresand, fromthatPoint

ofview, theirauthorityrestsontheconfidenceof theircommonaltiesandprofessionalequals.On theotherhand,however, thesecirclesofparticular interestsmustbesubordinated to thehigher interestsof thestate.Fromthisresultstheso-called'mixedchoice'.

TheadministrationoftheCorporationthushaswithinittheoppositionof private property and interest of the particular spheres against thehigher interest of the state: opposition between private property andstate.

We need not emphasise that the resolution of this opposition in themixed choice is a simple accommodation, a treaty, an avowal of theunresolveddualismwhichisitselfadualism,amixture.TheparticularinterestsoftheCorporationsandsocietieshaveadualismwithintheirown sphere, which likewise shapes the character of theiradministration.

However, thecrucialoppositionstandsout first in the relationshipofthese 'particular interestswhicharecommontoeveryone',etc.,which'lieoutsidetheabsolutelyuniversalinterestofthestateproper',andthis'absolutelyuniversalinterestofthestateproper'.Butthefirstinstanceonceagain,itiswithinthissphere.

The maintenance of the state's universal interest, and oflegality, in this sphere of particular rights, and thework ofbringing these rights back to the universal, require to besuperintendedbyholdersof theexecutivepower,by (a) theexecutivecivilservants,and(b)thehigheradvisoryofficials(whoareorganisedintocommittees).Theseconvergeintheirsupremeheadswhoareindirectcontactwiththemonarch.(§289)

Incidentally, letusdrawattentiontotheconstructionoftheexecutive

committees,whichareunknown,forexample,inFrance.Tothesameextent that Hegel adduces these officials as advisory it is certainlyobviousthattheyareorganisedintocommittees.

Hegelhas thestateproper, theexecutive,move into themanagementofthestate'suniversalinterestandoflegality,etc.withincivilsocietyvia holders [of the executive power]; and according to him theseexecutiveofficeholders, theexecutivecivilservantsareinrealitythetrue representationof thestate,not 'of'but 'against'civil society.Theoppositionbetweenstateandcivilsocietyisthusfixed;thestatedoesnot reside within but outside of civil society; it affects civil societymerelythroughofficeholderstowhomisentrustedthemanagementofthestatewithinthissphere.Theoppositionisnotovercomebymeansof these office holders but has become a legal and fixed opposition.The state becomes something alien to the nature of civil society; itbecomes this nature's otherworldly realm of deputies which makesclaims against civil society. The police, the judiciary, and theadministration are not deputies of civil society itself,whichmanagesits own general interest in and through them.Rather, they are officeholdersofthestatewhosepurposeistomanagethestateinoppositionto civil society. Hegel clarifies this opposition further in the candidRemarkto§289whichweexaminedearlier.

The nature of the executive functions is that they areobjective and ... have been explicitly fixed by previousdecisions.(§291)

DoesHegel conclude from this that [the executive functions] all themore easily require no hierarchy of knowledge, that they could beexecutedperfectlybycivilsocietyitself?Onthecontrary.

Hemakes the profound observation that they are to be executed byindividuals, and that between them and these individuals there is noimmediate natural link. This is an allusion to the crown, which isnothingbutthenaturalpowerofarbitrarychoice,andthuscanbeborn.Thecrownisnothingbut therepresentativeof thenaturalmoment inthewill,thedominionofphysicalnatureinthestate.

Theexecutivecivilservantsaredistinguishedbythefactthattheyearntheir appointments; hence they are distinguished essentially from thesovereign.

The objective factor in their appointment (namely, to the State'sbusiness)isknowledge(subjectivecapricelacksthisfactor)andproofofability.Suchproofguarantees that the statewillgetwhat itrequires;andsinceitisthesoleconditionofappointment,italso guarantees to every citizen the chance of joining theclassofcivilservants[dem allgemeinen Stande].

Thechancewhicheverycitizenhas tobecomeacivil servant is thusthesecondaffirmativerelationshipbetweencivilsocietyandstate,thesecond identity. Like the first it is also of a quite superficial anddualisticnature.EveryCatholichasthechancetobecomeapriest(i.e.,toseparatehimselffromthelaityaswellastheworld).DoestheclergyonthataccountfacetheCatholicanylessasanoppositepower?Thateach has the possibility of gaining the privilege of another sphereprovesonlythathisownsphereisnottheactualityofthisprivilege.

Inatruestateitisnotaquestionofthepossibilityofeverycitizentodedicatehimselftotheuniversalintheformofaparticularclass,butofthecapabilityoftheuniversalclasstobereallyuniversal,i.e.,tobetheclass of every citizen. But Hegel proceeds from the postulate of thepseudo-universal,theillusoryuniversalclass,universalityfixedinthe

formofaparticularclass.

The identitywhich he has constructed between civil society and thestateistheidentityoftwohostilearmiesinwhicheachsoldierhasthe'chance' to become through desertion a member of the other hostilearmy; and in this Hegel indeed correctly describes the presentempiricalstateofaffairs.

It is thesamewithhisconstructionof theexaminations. Ina rationalstate, taking an examination belongs more properly to becoming ashoe-maker than an executive civil servant because shoemaking is askillwithoutwhichonecanbeagoodcitizenofthestate,asocialman;but the necessary state knowledge is a condition without which aperson in the state lives outside the state, is cut off from himself,deprivedofair.Theexaminationisnothingotherthanamasonicrite,thelegalrecognitionoftheprivilegedknowledgeofstatecitizenship.

Thelinkofstateofficeandindividual,thisobjectivebondbetweentheknowledge of civil society and the knowledge of the state, in otherwords the examination, is nothing but the bureaucratic baptism ofknowledge,theofficialrecognitionofthetransubstantiationofprofaneintoholyknowledge(itgoeswithoutsaying that in thecaseofeveryexaminationtheexaminerknowsall).NooneeverheardoftheGreekorRomanstatesmentakinganexamination.ButthenwhatisaRomanstatesmenevenasagainstaPrussianofficial!

Inadditiontotheobjectivebondoftheindividualwiththestateoffice,in addition, that is, to the examination, there is another bond - royalcaprice:

Since the objective qualification for the civil service is notgenius (as it is forwork, anartist, for example), there isof

necessityanindefinitepluralityofeligiblecandidateswhoserelative excellence is not determinable with absoluteprecision. The selection of one of the candidates, hisnominationtooffice,andthegranttohimoffullauthoritytotransactpublicbusiness-allthis,asthelinkingoftwothings,aman and his office, which in relation to each othermustalways be fortuitous, is the subjective aspect of election tooffice,anditmustliewiththecrownasthepowerinthestatewhichissovereignandhasthelastword.[§292.]

Theprinceisatalltimestherepresentativeofchanceorcontingency.

Besides the objectivemoment of the bureaucratic confessionof faith(theexamination)therebelongsinadditionthesubjective[moment]oftheroyalfavour,inorderthatthefaithyieldfruit.

Theparticularpublicfunctionswhichthemonarchentruststoofficialsconstituteonepartoftheobjectiveaspectofthesovereigntyresidinginthe crown. (Themonarch distributes and entrusts the particular stateactivities as functions to the officials, i.e., he distributes the stateamongthebureaucrats,entrustsitliketheholyRomanChurchentrustsconsecrationsMonarchyisasystemofemanation;themonarchleasesout the functions of the state.)HereHegel distinguishes for the firsttimetheobjectiveaspectfrontthesubjectiveaspectofthesovereigntyresiding in the Crown. Prior to this hemixed the two together. Thesovereignty residing in the crown is taken here in a clearlymysticalway,justastheologiansfindthepersonalGodinnature.Earlieritstillmeant that the crown is the subjective aspect of the sovereigntyresidinginthestate(§293).

In§294HegeldevelopsthesalaryofthecivilservantsoutoftheIdea.Heretherealidentityofcivilsocietyandthestateisestablishedinthesalary of the civil servants, or in the fact that civil service also

guarantees security in empirical existence. The wage of the civilservant is the highest identitywhichHegel constructs out of all this.The transformation of the activities of the state into ministriespresupposestheseparationofthestatefromsociety.

WhenHegelsaysintheRemarkto§294:

What the service of the state. . . requires is thatmen shallforgo the selfish and capricious satisfaction of theirsubjectiveends,(thisisrequiredinthecaseofeverypostofservice) and by this very sacrifice they acquire the right tofindtheirsatisfactionin,butonlyin,thedutifuldischargeoftheirpublicfunctions.Inthisfact,sofaraspublicbusinessisconcerned, there lies the link between universal andparticularinterestswhichconstitutesboththeconceptofthestateanditsinnerstability,

this holds good (1.) of every servant, and (2.) it is correct that thesalary of the civil servants constitutes the inner stability of themostmodernmonarchies.Incontrasttothememberofcivilsocietyonlythecivilservantsexistenceisguaranteed.

At this point Hegel cannot fail to see that he has constructed theexecutive as an antithesis to civil society, and indeed as a dominantextreme.HowdoeshenowestablishaconditionofIdentity?

Accordingto§295thesecurityofthestateanditssubjectsagainstthemisuse[den Missbrauch]ofpowerbyministersandtheirofficialsliespartlyintheirhierarchicalorganisation(asifthehierarchyitselfwerenot the principal abuse [der Hauptmissbrauch], and the matchingpersonalsinsofthecivilservantswerenotitall tobecomparedwiththeir inevitable hierarchical sins; the hierarchy punishes the civilservanttotheextentthathesinsagainstthehierarchyorcommitsasin

inexcessof thehierarchy;but it takeshimunder itsprotectionwhenthe hierarchy sins through him;moreover the hierarchy is onlywithgreat difficulty convinced of the sins of its member) and in theauthoritygiventosocietiesandCorporations,becauseinitselfthisisabarrier against the intrusion of subjective caprice into the powerentrusted to a civil servant, and it completes front below the statecontrol (as if this controlwere not exercisedwith the outlook of thebureaucratic hierarchy) winch does not reach down as far as theconductofindividuals.

Thus thesecondguaranteeagainst thecapriceof thebureaucracyliesintheprivilegesoftheCorporations.

Thus if we ask Hegel what is civil society's protection against thebureaucracy,heanswers:

1. The hierarchal organisation of the bureaucracy. Control.This,thattheadversaryishimselfboundhandandfoot,andif he is like a hammer vis-a-vis those below he is like allanvilinrelationtothoseabove.Now,whereistheprotectionagainstthehierarchy?Thelesserevilwillsurelybeabolishedthrough the greater inasmuch as it vanishes in comparisonwithit.

2.Conflict, the unresolved conflict between bureaucracy andCorporation. Struggle, the possibility of struggle, is theguaranteeagainstbeingovercome.Later(§297) inadditionto this Hegel adds as guarantee the 'institutions [of] thesovereign working ... at the top', by which is to beunderstood,onceagain,thehierarchy.

HoweverHegelfurtheradducestwomoments(§296):

Inthecivilservanthimself,somethingwhichissupposedtohumanisehimandmakedispassionate,upright,andpolitedemeanourcustomary,namely,directeducationinthoughtandethicalconduct,whichissaidto hold 'the mental counterpoise' to the mechanical character of hisknowledge and actual work. As if the mechanical character of hisbureaucratic knowledge and his actual work did not hold the'counterpoise'tohiseducationinthoughtandethicalconduct.Andwillnothisactualmindandhisactualworkassubstancetriumphovertheaccident of his prior endowment?Hisoffice is indeedhis substantialsituationandhisbreadandbutter.Fine, except thatHegel setsdirecteducation in thought and ethical conduct against the mechanism ofbureaucraticknowledgeandwork!Themanwithinthecivilservantissupposed to secure the civil servant against himself. What a unity!Mentalcounterpoise.Whatadualisticcategory!

Hegel furtheradduces the sizeof the state,which inRussiacertainlydoesn't guarantee against the caprice of the executive civil servants,andinanycaseisacircumstancewhichliesoutsidethe'essence'ofthebureaucracy.

Hegel has developed the 'Executive' as bureaucratic officialdom[Staatsbediententum].

Here in the sphere of the 'absolutely universal interest of the stateproper' we find nothing but unresolved conflict. The civil servants'examinationandlivelihoodconstitutethefinalsynthesis.

Hegeladducestheimpotencyofthebureaucracy,itsconflictwiththeCorporation,asitsfinalconsecration.

In§297an identity is established in so far as 'civil servants and themembers of the executive constitute the greater part of the middleclass'.Hegelpraisesthis'middleclass'asthepillarofthestatesofarashonesty and intelligence are concerned (in the Addition to thisparagraph).

Itisaprimeconcernofthestatethatamiddleclassshouldbedeveloped,butthiscanbedoneonlyifthestateisanorganicunityliketheonedescribedhere,i.e.,itcanbedoneonlybygivingauthority tospheresofparticular interests,whicharerelatively independent, and by appointing an army ofofficialswhosepersonalarbitrariness isbrokenagainstsuchauthorisedbodies.

Tobesurethepeoplecanappearasoneclass,themiddleclass,onlyinsuch an organic unity; but is something that keeps itself going bymeans of the counterbalancing of privileges an organic unity? Theexecutive power is the onemost difficult to develop; it, muchmorethanthelegislature,belongstotheentirepeople.

Later(intheRemarkto§308)Hegelexpressestheproperspiritofthebureaucracy when he characterises it as 'business routine' and the'horizonofarestrictedsphere'.

(c)TheLegislature§298.Thelegislatureisconcerned(a)withthelawsassuchin so far as they require fresh and extended determination;and(b)with thecontentofhomeaffairsaffecting theentirestate (a very general expression). The legislature is itself apartoftheconstitutionwhichispresupposedbyitandtothatextent liesabsolutelyoutside thespheredirectlydeterminedby it; nonetheless, the constitution becomes progressivelymoremature in the course of the further elaboration of thelawsandtheadvancingcharacteroftheuniversalbusinessofgovernment.

AboveallitisnoteworthythatHegelemphasisesthewayinwhichthelegislatureisitselfapartoftheconstitutionwhichispresupposedbyitand liesabsolutelyoutside thespheredirectlydeterminedby it, sincehehadmadethisstatementneitheroftheCrownnoroftheExecutive,forbothofwhichitisequallytrue.ButonlywiththeLegislaturedoesHegelconstructtheconstitutioninitsentirety,andthusheisunabletopresuppose it.However,we recognise his profundity precisely in thewayhealwaysbeginswithandaccentuatestheantitheticalcharacterofthedeterminateelements(astheyexistinourstates).

Thelegislatureisitselfapartoftheconstitutionwhichliesabsolutelyoutside the sphere directly determined by it. But the constitution iscertainly not self-generating. The laws which 'require fresh andextendeddetermination'musthavereceivedformulation.Alegislaturemustexistorhaveexistedbeforeandoutsideoftheconstitution.Theremust exist a legislature outside of the actual empirical, establishedlegislature. But, Hegelwill answer,we presuppose an existing state.Hegel, however, is a philosopher of right, and develops the genericideaofthestate[die Staatsgattung].Heisnotallowedtomeasuretheideabywhatexists;hemustmeasurewhatexistsbytheidea.

The collision is simple. The legislature is the power which is toorganise the universal. it is the power of the constitution. It extendsbeyondtheconstitution.

On theotherhand,however, the legislature isaconstitutionalpower.Thusitissubsumedundertheconstitution.Theconstitutionislawforthelegislature.Ithasgivenlawstothelegislatureandcontinuestodoso.The legislature is only legislaturewithin the constitution, and theconstitutionwouldstandhors de loi ifitstoodoutsidethelegislature.Voilà la collision! In recent French historymuch nibbling away [attheconstitution]hasoccurred.

HowdoesHegelresolvethisantinomy?

First of all it is said that the constitution is presupposed by thelegislature and to that extent it lies absolutely outside the spheredirectlydeterminedby it. 'Nonetheless' -nonetheless in thecourseofthefurtherelaborationof the lawsandtheadvancingcharacterof theuniversal business of government it becomes progressively moremature.

Thatistosay,then:directly,theconstitutionliesoutsidethesphereofthe legislature; indirectly, however, the legislature modifies theconstitution.Thelegislaturedoesinanindirectwaywhatitneithercannormaydoinadirectway.Itpickstheconstitutionapartenti détail,sinceitcannotalteriten gros. Itdoesbyvirtueofthenatureofthingsand circumstances what according to the constitution it was notsupposed to do. it does materially and in fact what it does not doformally,legally,orconstitutionally.

With that, Hegel has not resolved the antinomy; he has simply

transformedit intoanotherantinomy.Hehasplacedtherealeffectofthe legislature, its constitutional effect, in contradiction with itsconstitutionally determined character. The opposition betweenconstitutionandlegislatureremains.Hegelhasdefinedthefactualandthelegalactionofthelegislatureasacontradiction-thecontradictionbetweenwhat the legislatureshouldbeandwhat it really is,betweenwhatitbelievesitselftobedoingandwhatitreallydoes.

HowcanHegelpresentthiscontradictionasthetruth?'Theadvancingcharacterofthe'universalbusinessofgovernment'enlightensusjustaslittle, for it is precisely this advancing character which needsexplanation.

In theAddition [to thisparagraph]Hegelcontributeshardlyanythingtothesolutionoftheseproblems.Hedoes,however,bringthemmoreintofocus:

The constitution must in and by itself be the fixed andrecognised ground on which the legislature stands, and forthis reason it must not first be constructed. Thus theconstitution is, but just as essentially it becomes, i.e., itadvancesandmatures.Thisadvanceisanalterationwhichisimperceptibleandwhichlackstheformofalteration.

That is to say, according to the law (illusion) the constitution is, butaccording to reality (truth) it becomes. According to its determinatecharacter theconstitution isunalterable;but it really ischanged,onlythis change is unconscious and lacks the form of alteration. Theappearance contradicts the essence. The appearance is the consciouslawoftheconstitution,andtheessenceis itsunconsciouslaw,whichcontradictstheother.Whatisinthenatureofthethingisnotfoundinthelaw.Rather,theoppositeisinthelaw.

Isitthefact,then,thatinthestate-which,accordingtoHegel,isthehighestexistenceof freedom, theexistenceofself-consciousreason-not law, the existence of freedom, but rather blind natural necessitygoverns?Andifthelawofthethingisrecognisedascontradictingthelegaldefinition,whynotacknowledgethelawofthething,inthiscasereason, ,is the lawof thestate?Andhowthenconsciously retain thisdualism?Hegelwantsalwaystopresentthestateastheactualisationoffreemind;however,re vera heresolvesalldifficultconflictsthrougha natural necessity which is the antithesis of freedom. Thus, thetransitionofparticularinterestintouniversalinterestisnotaconsciouslawofthestate,butismediatedthroughchanceandratifiedcontraryto consciousness. And in the state Hegel wants everywhere therealisationoffreewill!(HereweseeHegel'ssubstantialviewpoint.)

Hegel uses as examples to illustrate the gradual alteration of theconstitutiontheconversionoftheprivatewealthoftheGermanprincesandtheirfamiliesintostateproperty,andtheconversionoftheGermanemperors' personal administration of justice into an administrationthroughdelegates.His choice of examples is unfortunate. in the firstcase,for instance, the transitionhappenedonlyinsuchawaythatallstatepropertywastransformedintoroyalprivateproperty.

Moreover, these changes are particular. Certainly, entire stateconstitutions have changed such that as new requirements graduallyarosetheoldbrokedown;butforthenewconstitutionarealrevolutionwasalwaysnecessity.

Hencetheadvancefromonestateofaffairstoanother,Hegelconcluded [in the Addition], is tranquil in appearance andunnoticed. In this way a constitution changes over a longperiod of time into something quite different from what itwasoriginally.

Thecategoryofgradualtransitionis,firstofall,historicallyfalse;andsecondly,itexplainsnothing.

Inordernotonlythattheconstitutionbealtered,thusthatthisillusoryappearancenotbeintheendforcefullyshattered,butalsothatmandoconsciously what he is otherwise forced to do unconsciously by thenature of the thing, it is necessary that the movement of theconstitution, that progress, bemade the principle of the constitution,thusthattherealcornerstoneoftheconstitution,thepeople,bemadetheprincipleoftheconstitution.Progressitselfisthentheconstitution.

Should the constitution itself, therefore, belongwithin the domainofthelegislature?Thisquestioncanbeposedonly(1)ifthepoliticalstateexistsasthepureformalismoftheactualstate,ifthepoliticalstateisadomain apart, if the political state exists as constitution; (2) if thelegislatureisofasourcedifferentthantheexecutiveetc.

The legislature produced the French Revolution. In general, when ithas appeared in its special capacity as the ruling element, thelegislaturehasproducedthegreatorganic,universalrevolutions.Ithasnot attacked the constitution, but a particular antiquated constitution,preciselybecause the legislaturewas therepresentativeof thepeople,i.e., of the species-will [des Gattungswillens]. The executive, on theotherhand,producedthesmall,retrograderevolutions,thereactions.Itrevolted not against an old constitution in favour of a new one, butagainst the constitution as such, precisely because the executivewastherepresentativeoftheparticularwill,subjectivecaprice,themagicalpartofthewill.

Posed correctly, the question is simply this: Does a people have the

right to give itself a new constitution? The answer must be anunqualified'yes!'becausetheconstitutionbecomesapracticalillusionthemomentitceasestobeatrueexpressionofthepeople'swill.

The collision between the constitution and the legislature is nothingmore thana conflictof the constitutionwith itself, a contradiction intheconceptoftheconstitution.

Theconstitutionisnothingmorethananaccommodationbetweenthepoliticalandnon-politicalstate;henceitisnecessarilyinitselfatreatybetweenessentiallyheterogeneouspowers.Here,then,itisimpossibleforthelawtodeclarethatoneofthesepowers,whichisapartoftheconstitution,istohavetherighttomodifytheconstitutionitself,whichisthewhole.

Insofaraswespeakoftheconstitutionasaparticularthing,however,itmustbeconsideredapartofthewhole.

In so far as the constitution is understood to be the universal andfundamental determinations of the rational will, then clearly everypeople(state)presupposesthisandmustformit to itspoliticalcredo.Actually,thisisamatterofknowledgeratherthanofwill.Thewillofapeoplecannomoreexceedthelawsofreasonthancanthewillofanindividual.Inthecaseofanirrationalpeopleonecannotspeakatallofarationalorganisationofthestate.Inanycase,hereinthephilosophyofrightweareconcernedwiththespecies-will.

The legislature does not make the law, it merely discovers andformulatesit.

The resolution of this conflict has been attempted by differentiatingbetweenassemblée constituante and assemblée constituée.

§299.Legislativebusiness(theconcernsofthelegislature)ismorepreciselydetermined in relation toprivate individuals,under these two heads: (a) provision by the state for theirwell being and happiness, and [b] the exaction of servicesfrom them.The former comprises the laws dealingwith allsorts of private rights, the rights of communities,Corporations,andorganisationsaffectingtheentirestate,andfurther it indirectly (see § 298) comprises thewhole of theconstitution.As for the services to be exacted, it is only ifthesearereducedtotermsofmoney, thereallyexistentanduniversalvalueofboththingsandservices, thattheycanbefixed justly and at the same time in such a way that anyparticular tasks and services which an individual mayperformcometobemediatedthroughhisownarbitrarywill.

Concerning this determination of the legislature's business, Hegelhimselfnotes,intheRemarktothisparagraph:

The proper object of universal legislation may bedistinguished in a generalway from the proper function ofadministrativeofficialsorofsomekindofstateregulation,inthat the content of the former is wholly universal, i.e.,determinate laws, while it is what is particular in contentwhich falls to the latter, together with ways and means ofenforcing the law. This distinction, however, is not a hardand fast one, because a law, by being a law, is ab initiosomethingmorethanamerecommandingeneralterms(suchas'Thoushaltnotkill'...).Alawmustinitselfbesomethingdeterminate,butthemoredeterminateitis,themorereadilyareitstermscapableofbeingcarriedoutastheystand.Atthesame time, however, to give to laws such a fully detaileddeterminacy would give them empirical features subjectinevitably to alteration in the course of their being actuallycarried out, and this would contravene their character aslaws. The organic unity of the powers of the state itselfimplies that it is one single mind which both firmly

establishes the universal and also brings it into itsdeterminateactualityandcarriesitout.

But it is precisely this organic unity which Hegel has failed toconstruct.Thevariouspowerseachhaveadifferentprinciple,althoughatthesametimetheyareallequallyreal.Totakerefugefromtheirrealconflict in an imaginary organic unity, instead of developing thevariouspowersasmomentsofanorganicunity,isthereforeanempty,mysticalevasion.

The first unresolved collisionwas that between the constitution as awhole and the legislature. The second is that between the legislatureandtheexecutive,i.e.,betweenthelawanditsexecution.

The seconddetermination found in this paragraph [§299] is that theonlyservicethestateexactsfromindividualsismoney.

ThereasonsHegelgivesforthisare:

1. money is the really existent and universal value of boththingsandservices;

2.theservicestobeexactedcanbefixedjustlyonlybymeansofthisreduction;

3.onlyinthiswaycantheservicesbefixedinsuchawaythatthe particular tasks and services which an individual mayperformconictobemediatedthroughhisownarbitrarywill.HegelnotesintheRemark[tothisparagraph]:

ad. 1. In the state it may happen, to begin with, that thenumerous aptitudes, possessions, pursuits, and talents of itsmembers, togetherwith the infinitelyvaried richnessof life

intrinsic to these - all ofwhich are at the same time linkedwiththeirowner'smentality-arenotsubjecttodirectlevybythestate.Itlaysclaimonlytoasingleformofriches,namelymoney.(Servicesrequisitionedforthedefenceofthestateinwar arise for the first time in connection with the dutyconsidered in the next sub-division of this book.) We shallconsiderpersonaldutywithregardtothemilitaryonlylater-notbecauseofthefollowingsub-division,butforotherreasons.Infact,however,moneyisnot one particular type of wealth amongst others, but theuniversalformofalltypessofarastheyareexpressedinanexternalembodimentandsocanbetakenas'things'.

Inourday, it continues in theAddition, thestatepurchaseswhat itrequires.

ad 2. Only by being translated into terms of this extremeculminationof externality (sc. wherein riches are transformed into theexternality of existence, in which they can be grasped as an object) canservices exacted by the state be fixed quantitatively and sojustlyandequitably.

TheAddition reads:Bymeansofmoney,however, thejusticeofequality canbe achievedmuchmore efficiently.Otherwise,if assessment depended on concrete ability, a talentedmanwouldbemoreheavilytaxedthananuntalentedone.

ad 3. In Plato's Republic, the Guardians are left to allotindividuals to their particular classes and impose on themtheir particular tasks ... Under the feudal monarchies theservices required from vassals were equally indeterminate,buttheyhadalsotoserveintheirparticularcapacity,e.g.asjudges. The same particular character pertains to tasksimposedintheEastandinEgyptinconnectionwithcolossalarchitectural undertakings, and so forth. In thesecircumstancestheprincipleofsubjectivefreedomislacking,i.e., the principle that the individual's substantive activity -whichinanycasebecomessomethingparticularincontentinserviceslikethosementioned-shallbemediatedthroughhisparticularvolition.Thisisarightwhichcanbesecuredonly

whenthedemandforservicetakestheformofademandforsomething of universal value, and it is this rightwhich hasbrought with it this conversion of the state's demands intodemandsforcash.

TheAdditionreads:

Inourday,thestatepurchaseswhatitrequires.Thismayatfirst sight seem ail abstract, heartless, and dead state ofaffairs,andforthestatetobesatisfiedwithindirectservicesmayalsolooklikedecadenceinthestate.Buttheprincipleofthe modern state requires that the whole of an individual'sactivityshallbemediatedthroughhisWill...Butnowadaysrespect for subjective freedom is publicly recognisedpreciselyinthefactthatthestatelaysholdofamanonlybythatwhichiscapableofbeingheld.

Dowhatyouwant,paywhatyoumust.

ThebeginningoftheAdditionreads:

The two sides of the constitution bear respectively on therights and the services of individuals. Services are nowalmost entirely reduced to money payments, and militaryserviceisnowalmosttheonlypersonaloneexacted.

§300. In the legislatureasawhole theotherpowersare thefirst twomomentswhich are effective, (i) themonarchy asthattowhichultimatedecisionsbelong:(ii)theexecutiveastheadvisorybodysince it is themomentpossessedof [a]aconcrete knowledge and oversight of the whole state in itsnumerous facetsand theactualprinciples firmlyestablishedwithinit,and[b]aknowledgeinparticularofwhatthestate'spower needs. The last moment in the legislature is theEstates.

Themonarchyandtheexecutiveare...thelegislature.If,however,the

legislature is the whole, then the monarchy and the executive mustaccordinglybemomentsofthelegislature.ThesuperveningEstatesarethe legislature merely, or the legislature in distinction from themonarchyandtheexecutive.

§ 301. The Estates have the function of bringing publicaffairs into existence not only implicitly, but also actually,i.e., of bringing into existence the moment of subjectiveformal freedom, the public consciousness as an empiricaluniversal, ofwhich the thoughts and opinions of theManyareparticulars.

TheEstatesarecivilsociety'sdeputationtothestate,towhichit[i.e.,civilsociety]isopposedasthe 'Many'.TheManymustforamomentdeal consciouslywith universal affairs as if theywere their own, asobjectsofpublicconsciousness,which,accordingtoHegel,isnothingotherthantheempiricaluniversal,ofwhichthethoughtsandopinionsoftheManyareparticulars.(Andinfact,itisnodifferentinmodernorconstitutionalmonarchies.)ItissignificantthatHegel,whoshowssuchgreat respect for the state-mind [dem Staatsgeist] - the ethical spirit,state-consciousness-absolutelydisdainsitwhenitfaceshiminactualempiricalform.

This is the enigma ofmysticism. The same fantastic abstraction thatrediscoversstate-consciousnessinthedegenerateformofbureaucracy,ahierarchyofknowledge,andthatuncriticallyacceptsthisincompleteexistence as the actual and full-valued existence - the samemysticalabstraction admits with equanimity that the actual empirical state-mind, public consciousness, is amere potpourri of the 'thoughts andopinions of theMany'. As it imputes to the bureaucracy an essencewhichisforeigntoit,soitgrantstotheactualityofthatessenceonlythe inferior form of appearance.Hegel idealises the bureaucracy and

empiricises public consciousness. He can treat actual publicconsciousnessverymuchà partpreciselybecausehehastreatedtheàpart consciousness as the public consciousness. He need concernhimselfallthelesswiththeactualexistenceofthestate-mindinthathebelieveshehassufficiently realised it in itssoi-disant existences.Solong is the state-mind mystically haunted the forecourt it receivedmany plaudits. Now that we have caught it in persona it is barelyrespected.

'TheEstateshavethefunctionofbringingpublicaffairsintoexistencenotonlyimplicitly[an sich],butalsoactually[für sich].'Andindeedit comes into existence actually as the public consciousness, as 'anempiricaluniversal, ofwhich the thoughts andopinionsof theManyarcparticulars'.

Theprocess inwhich 'publicaffairs'becomes subject, and thusgainsautonomy,isherepresentedasamomentofthelife-processofpublicaffairs. Instead of having subjects objectifying themselves in publicaffairsHegelhaspublicaffairsbecomingthesubject.Subjectsdonotneedpublicaffairsastheirtrueaffairs,butpublicaffairsneedssubjectsforitsformalexistence.Itisanaffairofpublicaffairsthatitexistalsoassubject.

Here the difference between the 'being-in-itself' [Ansichsein] and the'being-for-itself' [Fürsichsein] of public affairs must be especiallyconsidered.

Publicaffairsalreadyexists'in-itself'[i.e.,implicitly]asthebusinessofthe executive etc. Thus, public affairs exists without actually beingpublicaffairs;nothingless,foritisnottheaffairofcivilsociety.Ithasalready found its essential existence, its being-in-itself. The fact that

publicaffairsnowactuallybecomespublicconsciousness,orempiricaluniversal,ispurelyformaland,asitwere,onlyasymboliccomingtoactuality. The formal or empirical existence of public affairs isseparatedfromitssubstantialexistence.Thetruthofthematteristhatpublic affairs as being-in-itself is not actually public, and actualempiricalpublicaffairsisonlyformal.

Hegel separates content and form,being-in-itself andbeing-for-itself,and allows the latter the superficial status of formal moment. Thecontentiscompleteandexistsinmanyformswhicharenottheformsof this content;while, clearly, the formwhich is supposed to be theactual form of the content doesn't have the actual content for itscontent.

Publicaffairsiscompletewithoutbeingtheactualaffairsofthepeople.The actual affairs of the people have been established without theactivity of the people. The Estates are the illusory existence of theaffairsofthestateasbeinganaffairofthepeople.Theillusionisthatpublicaffairsarepublicaffairs,orthattrulypublicaffairsaretheaffairof thepeople. Ithascome to thepoint inour statesaswell as in theHegelian philosophy of right where the tautological sentence, 'Thepublicaffairsare thepublicaffairs',canappearonlyasan illusionofpractical consciousness. TheEstates are the political illusion of civilsociety.SubjectivefreedomappearsinHegelasformalfreedom(it isimportant, however, that what is free be done freely, that freedomdoesn'tprevailasanunconsciousnaturalinstinctofsociety),preciselybecauseHegelhasnotpresentedobjectivefreedomastheactualisation,theactivity,ofsubjectivefreedom.Becausehehasgiventhepresumedor actual content of freedom amystical bearer, the actual subject offreedomtakesonaformalmeaning.Theseparationofthein-itselfand

thefor-itself,ofsubstanceandsubject,isabstractmysticism.

Hegel, in hisRemark to § 301 presents the Estates quite rightly assomething'formal'and'illusory'.

Both the knowledge and thewill of the Estates are treated partly asunimportantandpartlyassuspect; that is tosay, theEstatesmakenosignificantcontribution.

1.Theideauppermostinmen'smindswhentheyspeakaboutthenecessityortheexpediencyof'summoningtheEstates'isgenerally something of this sort: (i) The deputies of thepeople,oreventhepeoplethemselves,mustknowbestwhatisintheirbestinterest,-.and(ii)theirwillforitspromotionis undoubtedly themost disinterested. So far as the first ofthesepointsisconcerned,however,thetruthisthatif'people'means a particular section of the citizens, then it meanspreciselythatsectionwhichdoesnotknowwhatitwills.Toknow what one wills, and still more to know what theabsolute will, Reason, wills, is the fruit of profoundapprehension (which is found, no doubt, in the bureaus) and insight,preciselythethingswhicharenotpopular.

FurtheralongintheparagraphwereadthefollowingabouttheEstatesthemselves:

Thehighestcivilservantsnecessarilyhaveadeeperandmorecomprehensive insight into the nature of the state'sorganisation and requirements. They arc also morehabituated to the business of government and have greaterskillinit,sothatevenwithouttheEstatestheyareabletodowhatisbest,justastheyalsocontinuallyhavetodowhiletheEstatesareinsession.

AnditgoeswithoutsayingthatthisisperfectlytrueintheorganisationdescribedbyHegel.

2.Asfortheconspicuouslygoodwillforthegeneralwelfarewhich the Estates are supposed to possess, it has beenpointedoutalready...thattoregardthewilloftheexecutiveas bad, or as less good [than that of the ruled] is apresuppositioncharacteristicoftherabbleorofthenegativeoutlook generally. This presupposition might at once beanswered on its own ground by the countercharge that theEstatesstartfromisolatedindividuals,fromaprivatepointofview,fromparticularinterests,andsoareinclinedtodevotetheiractivitiestotheseattheexpenseofthegeneralinterests,whileper contra theothermomentsinthepowerofthestateexplicitly take up the standpoint of the state from the startanddevotethemselvestotheuniversalend.

ThereforetheknowledgeandwilloftheEstatesarepartlysuperfluousand partly suspect. The people do not knowwhat theywant. III thepossession of political knowledge [Staatswssenschaft] theEstates arenotequaltotheofficials,whohaveamonopolyonit.TheEstatesaresuperfluousfortheexecutionofpublicaffairs.TheofficialscancarryoutthisexecutionwithouttheEstates;moreovertheymust,inspiteofthe Estates, do what is best. Thus the Estates, with regard to theircontent, are pure superfluity. Their existence, therefore, is a pureformalityinthemostliteralsense.

Furthermore, the sentiment of the Estates, their will, is suspect, fortheystartfromtheprivatepointofviewandprivateinterests.Intruth,private interest is their public affairs, not public affairs their privateinterest. But what a way for public affairs to obtain form as publicaffairs-i.e.,throughawillwhichdoesn'tknowwhatitwills,oratleastlacks any special knowledge of t he universal, a will, furthermore,whoseactualcontentisanopposinginterest!

Inmodern states, as inHegel'sPhilosophy of Right, the conscious,trueactualityofpublicaffairsismerelyformal,oronlywhatisformalconstitutesactualpublicaffairs.

Hegelisnottobeblamedfordepictingthenatureofthemodernstateasitis,butratherforpresentingwhatisastheessenceofthestate.Theclaim that the rational is actual is contradicted precisely by anirrationalactuality,whicheverywhereisthecontraryofwhatitassertsandassertsthecontraryofwhatitis.

Instead of showing how public affairs exists for-itself, 'subjectively,and thus actually as such', and that it also has the form of publicaffairs,Hegelmerelyshowsthatformlessnessisitssubjectivity;andaformwithoutcontentmustbeformless.Theformwhichpublicaffairsobtainsinastatewhichisnotthestateofpublicaffairscanbenothingbutanon-form,aself-deceiving,self-contradictingform,aformwhichis pure appearance [eine Scheinform] andwhichwill betray itself asthisappearance.

Onlyfor thesakeof logicdoesHegelwant the luxuryof theEstates.Thebeing-for-itselfofpublicaffairsasempiricaluniversalmusthavean existence [ein Dasein]. Hegel does not search for an adequateactualisation of the being-for-itself of public affairs, but contentshimselfwithfindinganempiricalexistentwhichcanbedissolvedintothis logicalcategory.This is theEstates.AndHegelhimselfdoesnotfailtonotehowpitifulandfullofcontradictionthisexistentis.Yethestill reproaches ordinary consciousness for beingdiscontentwith thissatisfactionoflogic,forbeingunwillingtoseeactualitydissolvedintologic by this arbitrary abstraction, for wanting logic, rather, to betransformedintoconcreteobjectivity.

Isayarbitraryabstraction,forsincetheexecutivepowerwills,knows,andactualisespublicaffairs,arisesfromthepeople,andisanempiricalplurality(Hegelhimselftellsusthatitisnotatotality),whyshouldwenot be able to characterise the executive as the 'being-for-itself ofpublicaffairs'?Or,again,whynot theEstatesas theirbeing-in-itself,since it is only in the executive that [public affairs] receivesillumination,determinacy,execution,andindependence?

Thetrueantithesis,however,isthis:publicaffairsmustsomewhereberepresentedinthestateasactual,andthusasempiricalpublicaffairs;itmust appear somewhere in the crown and robes of the universal,wherebytheuniversalautomaticallybecomesafiction,anillusion.

Hereitisaquestionoftheoppositionoftheuniversalas'form',intheformofuniversality,andtheuniversalas'content'.

Inscience,forexample,anindividualcanfullyperformpublicaffairs,and it is always individuals who do so. But public affairs becomeactuallypubliconlywhentheyarenolongertheaffairofanindividualbutofsociety.Thischangesnotonlytheformbutalsothecontent.Inthis case, however, it is a question of the state in which the peopleitselfconstitutesthepublicaffairs,aquestionofthewillwhichhasitstrue existence as species-will only in the self-conscious will of thepeople,and,moreover,aquestionoftheideaofthestate.

The modern state, in which public affairs and their pursuit is amonopolywhilemonopoliesaretheactualpublicaffairs,haseffectedthepeculiardeviceofappropriatingpublicaffairsasapure form. (infact, only the form ispublic affairs.)With that, themodern statehasfound the appropriate form for its content,which only appears to beactualpublicaffairs.

Theconstitutional state is the state inwhich the state-interest is onlyformallytheactualinterestofthepeople,butisneverthelesspresentasadistinctformalongsideoftheactualstate.Herethestate-interesthasagainreceivedformalactualityasthepeople'sinterest;butitistohaveonlythisformalactuality.Ithasbecome)formality,thehaut gout ofthe life of the people - a ceremony. The Estates are the sanctioned,legal lie of constitutional states, the lie that the state is the people'sinterestorthepeopletheinterestofthestate.Thisliewillbetrayitselfinitscontent.Theliehasestablisheditselfasthelegislaturepreciselybecausethelegislaturehastheuniversalasitscontentand,beingmoreanaffairofknowledge thanofwill, is themetaphysicalpowerof thestate;whereashadthesamelieestablisheditselfastheexecutiveetc.,it would have had either immediately to dissolve itself or betransformedintoatruth.Themetaphysicalpowerofthestatewasthemostlikelyseatforthemetaphysical,universalillusionofthestate.

[Remark to § 301.] The Estates are a guarantee of thegeneral welfare and public freedom. A little reflection willshowthatthisguaranteedoesnotlieintheirparticularpowerof insight ... the guarantee lies on the contrary [a] in theadditional(!!)insightofthedeputies,insightinthefirstplaceinto the activity of such officials as are not immediatelyunder the eye of the higher functionaries of state, and inparticularintothemorepressingandmorespecialisedneedsanddeficiencieswhich aredirectly in their view; [b] in thefact that the anticipation of criticism from the Many,particularly of public criticism, has the effect of inducingofficials to devote their best attention beforehand to theirdutiesandtheschemesunderconsideration,andtodealwiththeseonlyinaccordancewiththepurestmotives.Thissamecompulsion is effective also on themembers of theEstatesthemselves.

As for the general guarantee which is supposed to lie

peculiarly in the Estates, each of the other politicalinstitutions shares with the Estates in being a guarantee ofpublic welfare and rational freedom, and some of theseinstitutions, as for instance the sovereignty of themonarch,hereditary succession to the throne, the judicial systemetc.,guarantee these things farmore effectively than theEstatescan.Hencethespecificfunctionwhichtheconceptassignstothe Estates is to be sought in the fact that in them thesubjective moment in universal freedom - the privatejudgmentandprivatewillof thespherecalled 'civilsociety'in this book - comes into existence integrally related to thestate. Thismoment is a determination of the Idea once theIdeahasdevelopedtototality,amomentarisingasaresultofan inner necessity not to be confused with externalnecessitiesandexpediencies.Theproofof this follows, likeall the rest of our account of the state, from adopting thephilosophicalpointofview.

Public, universal freedom is allegedly guaranteed in the otherinstitutions of the state, while the Estates constitute its alleged self-guarantee. [But the fact is] that the people relymore heavily on theEstates, inwhichtheself-assuranceof theirfreedomis thoughttobe,than on the institutions which are supposed to assure their freedomindependentoftheirownparticipation,institutionswhicharesupposedtobeverificationsoftheirfreedomwithoutbeingmanifestationsofit.Thecoordinating functionHegelassigns to theEstates, alongside theotherinstitutions,contradictstheessenceoftheEstates.

Hegel solves the problemby finding the 'specific functionwhich theconcept assigns to the Estates' in the fact that in them 'the privatejudgment and private will ... of civil society... comes into existenceintegrallyrelatedtothestate'.Itisthereflectionofcivilsocietyonthestate.justasthebureaucratsaredelegatesofthestatetocivilsociety,sotheEstatesaredelegatesofcivilsocietytothestate.Consequently,

itisalwaysacaseoftransactionsoftwoopposingwills.

WhatissaidintheAdditiontothisparagraph,namely:

The attitude of the executive to the Estates should not beessentially hostile, and a belief in the necessity of suchhostilityisasadmistake.

isasadtruth.

'Theexecutiveisnotapartystandingoveragainstanotherparty.'Justthecontrary.

The taxes voted by the Estates, moreover, are not to beregardedasapresentgiventothestate.Onthecontrarytheyarevotedinthebestinterestsofthevotersthemselves.

Voting for taxes in a constitutional state is, by the very idea of it,necessarilyapresent.

The real significanceof theEstates lies in the fact that it isthrough them that the state enters the subjectiveconsciousness of the people and that the people begins toparticipateinthestate.

Thislaststatementisquitecorrect.IntheEstatesthepeoplebeginstoparticipate in the state, just as the state enters thepeople's subjectiveconsciousnessassomethingopposed.ButhowcanHegelpossiblypassoffthis beginning asthefullreality!

§ 302. Regarded as a mediating organ, the Estates standbetweenthegovernmentingeneralontheonehandandthenationbrokenupintoparticulars(peopleandassociations)ontheother.Theirfunctionrequiresthemtopossessapoliticalandadministrativesenseandtemper,nolessthanasensefortheinterestsofindividualsandparticulargroups.Atthesame

timethesignificanceoftheirpositionisthat,incommonwiththe organised executive, they are amiddle term preventingboththeextremeisolationofthepowerofthecrown,whichotherwisemightseemamerearbitrarytyranny,andalsotheisolation of particular interests of persons, societies, andCorporations. Further, and more important, they preventindividuals from having the appearance of a mass or anaggregateandsofromacquiringanunorganisedopinionandvolition and from crystallising into a powerful bloc inoppositiontotheorganisedstate.

Ontheonehandwehavethestateandtheexecutive,alwaystakenasidentical,andontheotherthenationbrokenupintoparticulars(peopleandassociations).TheEstatesstandasamediatingorganbetweenthetwo. The Estates are the middle term wherein political andadministrative sense and temper meet and are to be united with thesenseandtemperofindividualsandparticulargroups.Theidentityofthesetwoopposedsensesandtempers,inwhichidentitythestatewassupposed to actually lie, acquires . a symbolic appearance in theEstates. The transaction between state and civil society appears as aparticularsphere.TheEstatesarethesynthesisbetweenstateandcivilsociety.But how theEstates are to begin to unite in themselves twocontradictorytempersisnotindicated.TheEstatesaretheestablishedcontradictionofthestateandcivilsocietywithinthestate.Atthesametimetheyarethedemandforthedissolutionofthiscontradiction.

Atthesametimethesignificanceoftheirpositionisthat,incommon with the organised executive they are the middletermetc.

TheEstatesnotonlymediatebetweenthepeopleandtheexecutive,butthey also prevent the extreme isolation of the power of the crown,whereby it would appear as mere arbitrary tyranny, and also the

isolation of the particular interests etc. Furthermore they preventindividualsfromhavingtheappearanceofamassoranaggregate.Thismediating function is what the Estates have in common with theorganised executive power. In a state in which the position of theEstatesprevents individualsfromhavingtheappearanceofamassoran aggregate, and so from acquiring an unorganised opinion andvolitionandfromcrystallisingintoapowerfulblocinoppositiontotheorganised state, the organised state exists outside the mass and theaggregate; or, in other words, themass and aggregate belong to theorganisationofthestate.Butitsunorganisedopinionandvolitionistobe prevented from crystallising into an opinion and volition inoppositiontothestate,throughwhichdeterminateorientationitwouldbecome an organised opinion and volition. At the same time thispowerful bloc is to remain powerful only in such a way thatunderstandingremainsforeigntoit,sothatthemassisunabletomakeamoveonitsownandcanonlybemovedbythemonopolistsof theorganisedstateandbeexploitedasapowerfulbloc.Whereitisnotamatteroftheparticularinterestsofpersons,societiesandCorporationsisolatingthemselvesfromthestate,butratheroftheindividualsbeingprevented fromhaving theappearanceofamassoranaggregateandfrom acquiring an unorganised opinion and volition and fromcrystallising into apowerfulbloc inopposition to the state, preciselythen it becomes evident not that a particular interest contradicts thestate,butratherthattheactualorganiseduniversalthoughtofthemassandaggregateisnotthethoughtoftheorganisedstateandcannotfinditsrealisationinthestate.WhatisitthenthatmakestheEstatesappeartobe themediationagainst thisextreme?It ismerely the isolationofthe particular interests of persons, societies and Corporations; or thefact that their isolated interests balance their account with the statethrough theEstateswhile, at the same time, the unorganised opinion

andvolitionofamassoraggregateemployeditsvolition(itsactivity)in creating the Estates and its opinion in judging their activity, andenjoyedtheillusionofitsownobjectification.TheEstatespreservethestatefromtheunorganisedaggregateonlythroughthedisorganisationofthisveryaggregate.

Atthesametime,however, themediationof theEstatesis topreventthe isolation of the particular interests of persons, societies andCorporations.This theyachieve,first,bycomingtoanunderstandingwith the interest of the state and, second, by being themselves thepoliticalisolationoftheseparticularinterests,thisisolationaspoliticalact,inthatthroughthemtheseisolatedinterestsachievetherankoftheuniversal.

Finally,theEstatesaretomediateagainsttheisolationofthepowerofthecrownasanextreme(whichotherwisemightseemamerearbitrarytyranny).This iscorrect insofaras theprincipleof thepowerof thecrown (arbitrarywill) is limitedbymeansof theEstates, at leastcanoperateonlyinfetters,andinsofarastheEstatesthemselvesbecomeapartakerandaccessoryofthepowerofthecrown.

In thisway, either the power of the crown ceases to be actually theextremeofthepowerofthecrown(andthepowerofthecrownexistsonly as an extreme, a one-sidedness, because it is not an organicprinciple) and becomes a mere appearance of power [eineScheingewalt], a symbol, or else it loses only the appearance ofarbitrary tyranny. The Estates mediate against the isolation ofparticularinterestsbypresentingthisisolationasapoliticalact.Theymediateagainsttheisolationofthepowerofthecrownasanextremepartlybybecomingthemselvesapartofthatpower,partlybymakingtheexecutivepoweranextreme.

All the contradictions of modern state-organisations converge in theEstates.Theymediateineverydirectionbecausetheyare,fromeverydirection,themiddleterm.

It should be noted that Hegel develops the content of the Estates'essentialpoliticalactivity,viz., the legislature, less thanhedoes theirposition,orpoliticalrank.

Itshouldbefurthernoted that,while theEstates,according toHegel,stand between the government in general on the one hand and thenation broken up into particulars (people and associations) on theother, thesignificanceof theirpositionasdevelopedabove is that, incommonwiththeorganisedexecutive,theyareamiddleterm.

Regarding the first position, the Estates represent the nation overagainst the executive, but the nation en miniature. This is theiroppositionalposition.

Regarding the second, they represent the executive over against thenation,buttheamplifiedexecutive.Thisistheirconservativeposition.They are themselves a part of the executive over against the people,but in such a way that they simultaneously have the significance ofrepresentingthepeopleoveragainsttheexecutive.

Above, Hegel called the legislature a 'totality' (§ 300). In fact,however,theEstatesarethistotality,thestatewithinthestate;butitispreciselyinthemthatitbecomesapparentthatthestateisnotatotalitybut a duality. The Estates represent the state in a society that is nostate.Thestateisamere representation [eine blosse Vorstellung].

IntheRemarkHegelsays:

It is one of the most important discoveries of logic that aspecific moment, which, by standing in an opposition, hasthepositionofailextreme,ceasestobesuchandisamomentinanorganicwholebybeingatthesametimeamean.

(ThustheEstatesareatoneandthesametime(1)theextremeofthenationoveragainsttheexecutive,but(2)themeanbetweennationandexecutive; or, in other words, the opposition within the nation itselfThe opposition between the executive and the nation is mediatedthrough the opposition between theEstates and the nation. From thepoint of view of the executive the Estates have the position of thenation,butfromthepointofviewofthenationtheyhavethepositionof the executive. The nation in its occurrence as image, fantasy,illusion,representation-i.e.,theimaginednation,ortheEstates,whichareimmediatelysituatedasaparticularpowerindissociationfromtheactualnation-abolishes[hebt auf] theactualoppositionbetweenthenation and the executive. Here the nation is already dressed out,exactly as required in this particular organism, so as to have nodeterminatecharacter.)

TheRemarkcontinues:

In connection with our present topic it is all the moreimportant to emphasise this aspectof thematterbecauseofthepopular,butmostdangerous,prejudicewhichregardstheEstatesprincipallyfromthepointofviewoftheiroppositiontotheexecutive,asifthatweretheiressentialattitude.IftheEstatesbecomeanorganinthewholebybeingtakenupintothe state, they evince themselves solely through theirmediating function. In this way their opposition to theexecutive is reduced to a show. There may indeed be anappearance of opposition between them, but if they wereopposed, not merely superficially, but actually and insubstance, then the state would be in the throes of

destruction.Thattheclashisnotofthiskindisevidentinthenatureofthething,becausetheEstateshavetodeal,notwiththeessentialelements in theorganismof thestate,butonlywithratherspecialisedandtriflingmatters,whilethepassionwhich even these arouse spends itself in party cravings inconnection with purely subjective interests such asappointmentstohigherofficesofstate.

In the Addition it says: 'The constitution is essentially a system ofmediation.'

§ 303. The universal class, or,more precisely, the class ofcivil servants, must, purely in virtue of its character asuniversal, have the universal as the end of its essentialactivity.IntheEstates,asanelementinthelegislativepower,the unofficial class acquires its political significance andefficacy;itappears,therefore,intheEstatesneitherasamereindiscriminatemultitude nor as an aggregate dispersed intoitsatoms,butaswhatitalreadyis,namelyaclasssubdividedintotwo,onesubclass[theagriculturalclass]beingbasedona tic of substance between itsmembers, and the other [thebusiness class] on particular needs and the work wherebythesearemet. . .Itisonlyinthiswaythatthereisagenuinelinkbetweentheparticularwhichiseffectiveinthestateandtheuniversal.

Herewehavethesolutionoftheriddle. 'IntheEstates,asanelementin the legislative power, the unofficial class acquires its politicalsignificance.' acquires It is understood that the unofficial, or privateclass[der Privatstand]thissignificanceinaccordancewithwhatitis,withitsarticulationwithincivilsociety;(Hegelhasalreadydesignatedtheuniversalclassastheclassdedicatedtotheexecutive;theuniversalclass,therefore,isrepresentedinthelegislaturebytheexecutive.)

TheEstatesarethepoliticalsignificanceoftheunofficialclass,i.e.,of

theunpolitical class,which is acontradictio in adjecto; or toput itanotherway, in class as described byHegel the unofficial class (or,morecorrectly,unofficialclassdifference)hasapoliticalsignificance.Theunofficialclassbelongstotheessence,totheverypoliticalreality[zur Politik] of this state, which thus gives it also a politicalsignificance,thatis,onethatdiffersfromitsactualsignificance.

IntheRemarkitsays:

This runs counter to another prevalent idea, the idea thatsince it is in the legislature that theunofficial class rises tothe level of participating inmatters of state, itmust appearthere in the form of individuals,whether individuals are tochoose representatives for this purpose, or whether everysingleindividualistohaveavoteinthelegislaturehimself.This atomistic and abstract point of view vanishes at thestageofthefamily,aswellasthatofcivilsocietywheretheindividual is in evidence only as a member of a generalgroup.Thestate,however,isessentiallyanorganisationeachofwhosemembersisinitselfagroupofthiskind,andhenceno one of its moments should appear as an unorganisedaggregate.TheMany,asunits-acongenialinterpretationof'people', are of course something connected, but they areconnected only as an aggregate, a formless mass whosecommotionandactivitycould thereforeonlybeelementary,irrational,barbarous,andfrightful.

Thecirclesofassociationincivilsocietyarealreadycommunities.Topicture these communities as once more breaking up into a mereconglomeration of individuals as soon as they enter the field ofpolitics,i.e.,thefieldofthehighestconcreteuniversality,iseo ipso tohold civil and political life apart from one another and as itwere tohang the latter in the air, because its basis could then only be theabstract individuality of caprice and opinion, and hence it would be

groundedonchanceandnotonwhatisabsolutelystableandjustified.

So-called 'theories' of this kind involve the idea that the classes[Stände] of civil society and the Estates [Stände], which are the'classes' given a political significance, stand wide apart from eachother.ButtheGermanlanguage,bycallingthembothStände hasstillmaintained the unity which in any case they actually possessed informertimes.

'The universal class, or, more precisely, the class of civil servants.Hegelproceedsfromthehypothesisthattheuniversalclassistheclassof civil servants. For him, universal intelligence is attachedpermanentlytoaclass.

'In theEstates as anelement etc.'Here, thepolitical significanceandefficacy of the unofficial class is precisely its particular significanceandefficacy.Theunofficialclassisnotchangedintoapoliticalclass,but appears as the unofficial class in its political significance andefficacy.Itdoesnothavepoliticalsignificanceandefficacysimply;itspolitical efficacy and significance are those of the unofficial class asunofficialorprivate.Accordingly,theunofficialclasscanappearinthepoliticalsphereonlyinkeepingwiththeclassdifferencefoundincivilsociety. The class differencewithin civil society becomes a politicaldifference.

Even theGerman language, saysHegel, expresses the identityof theclassesofcivilsocietywiththeclassesgivenapoliticalsignificance;itexpressesaunitywhichinanycasetheyactuallypossessedinformertimes-aunity,oneshouldthusconclude,whichnolongerexists.

Hegel finds that, in this way there is a genuine link between the

particularwhichiseffectiveinthestateandtheuniversal.Inthiswaythe separation of civil and political life is to be abolished and theiridentityestablished.

Hegel finds support in the following: 'The circles of association(familyandcivilsociety)arealreadycommunities.'Howcanonewantthesetobreakupintoamereconglomerationofindividualsassoonasthey enter the field of politics, i.e., the field of the highest concreteuniversality?

Itisimportanttofollowthisdevelopmentverycarefully.

The peak of Hegelian identity, as Hegel himself admits, was theMiddle Ages. There, the classes of civil society in general and theEstates, or classes given political significance, were identical. Thespirit of theMiddleAges can be expressed thus: the classes of civilsociety and the political classes were identical because civil societywaspoliticalsociety,becausetheorganicprincipleofcivilsocietywastheprincipleofthestate.

But Hegel proceeds from the separation of civil society and thepoliticalstateastwoactuallydifferentspheres,firmlyopposedtooneanother.Andindeed thisseparationdoesactuallyexist in themodernstate.TheidentityofthecivilandpoliticalclassesintheMiddleAgeswas the expression of the identity of civil and political society. Thisidentity has disappeared; and Hegel presupposes it as havingdisappeared. The identity of the civil and political classes, if itexpressedthetruth,couldbenowonlyanexpressionoftheseparationofcivilandpoliticalsociety!Orrather,onlytheseparationofthecivilandpoliticalclassesexpressesthetruerelationshipofmoderncivilandpoliticalsociety.

Secondly: the political classes Hegel deals with here have a whollydifferent meaning than those political classes of the Middle Ages,whicharesaidtobeidenticalwiththeclassesofcivilsociety.

The whole existence of the medieval classes was political; theirexistencewastheexistenceofthestate.Theirlegislativeactivity,theirgrant of taxes for the realm was merely a particular issue of theiruniversalpoliticalsignificanceandefficacy.Theirclasswastheirstate.The relationship to the realmwasmerelyoneof transactionbetweenthese various states and the nationality, because the political state indistinction from civil society was nothing but the representation ofnationality. Nationality was the point d'honneur, the kat exhinpolitical sense of these various Corporations etc., and taxes etc.,pertained only to them. That was the relationship of the legislativeclassesto therealm.Theclasseswererelatedinasimilarwaywithinthe particular principalities. There, the principality, the sovereigntywasaparticularclasswhichenjoyedcertainprivilegesbutwasequallyinconvenienced by the privileges of the other classes. (With theGreeks, civil society was a slave to political society.) The universallegislative efficacy of the classes of civil societywas in noway theacquisition of political significance and efficacy by the unofficial, orprivateclass,butwasratherasimpleissueof itsactualanduniversalpoliticalsignificanceandefficacy.Theappearanceoftheprivateclassas legislative power was simply a complement of its sovereign andgoverning (executive) power; or rather it was its appropriation ofwholly public affairs as a private affair, its acquisition, qua privateclass,of sovereignty. In theMiddleAges, theclassesofcivil societywereassuchsimultaneouslylegislativebecausetheywerenotprivateclasses,orbecauseprivateclasseswerepoliticalclasses.Themedievalclassesdidnot,aspoliticalEstates,acquireanewcharacter.Theydid

not become political classes because they participated in legislation;rather they participated in legislation because they were politicalclasses. But what does that have in commonwithHegel's unofficialclass which, as a legislative element, acquires political bravura, anecstatic condition, a remarkable, stunning, extraordinary politicalsignificanceandefficacy?

All thecontradictionsof theHegelianpresentationarefoundtogetherinthisdevelopment.

1.He has presupposed the separation of civil society and thepoliticalstate(whichisamodernsituation),anddevelopeditas a necessarymoment of the Idea, as an absolute truth ofReason. He has presented the political state in its modernformoftheseparationofthevariouspowers.Foritsbodyhehas given the actual acting state the bureaucracy,which heordains to be the knowing spirit over and above thematerialismofcivilsociety.Hehasopposedthestate,astheactual universal, to the particular interest and need of civilsociety.inshort,hepresentseverywheretheconflictbetweencivilsocietyandthestate.

2.Heopposescivilsocietyasunofficial,orprivateclasstothepoliticalstate.

3.HecallstheEstates,aselementofthelegislativepower,thepure political formalism of civil society. He calls them arelationshipofcivilsocietytothestatewhichisareflectionof theformeron the latter,a reflectionwhichdoesnotalterthe essence of the state.A relationship of reflection is alsothehighestidentitybetweenessentiallydifferentthings.

Ontheotherhand:

1. Hegel wants civil society, in its self-establishment aslegislative clement, to appear neither as a mereindiscriminatemultitude nor as an aggregate dispersed intoitsatoms.Hewantsnoseparationofcivilandpoliticallife.

2.Heforgetsthatheisdealingwitharelationshipofreflection,and makes the civil classes as such political classes; butagain only with reference to the legislative power, so thattheirefficacyitselfisproofoftheseparation.

He makes the Estates the expression of the separation [of civil andpolitical life]; but at the same time they are supposed to be therepresentativeofanidentity-anidentitywhichdoesnotexist.Hegelisawareof the separationof civil societyand thepolitical state,buthewantstheunityofthestateexpressedwithinthestate;andthisistobeachievedbyhavingtheclassesofcivilsociety,whileremainingsuch,formtheEstatesasanelementoflegislativesociety.(cf.xiv,x)'

§304.TheEstates,asanelementinpoliticallife,stillretainintheirownfunctiontheclassdistinctionsalreadypresentinthelowerspheresofcivil life.Thepositionof theclassesisabstract to begin with, i.e., in contrast with the wholeprincipleofmonarchyor thecrown, theirposition is thatofan extreme — empirical universality. This extremeopposition implies the possibility, though no more, ofharmonisation, and the equally likely possibility of sethostility. This abstract position changes into a rationalrelation(intoasyllogism,seeRemarkto§302)onlyifthemiddle term between the opposites comes into existence.From thepointofviewof the crown, the executive alreadyhasthischaracter(see§300).So,fromthepointofviewoftheclasses,onemomentinthemmustbeadaptedtothetaskofexistingasinessencethemomentofmediation.

§305.Theprincipleofoneoftheclassesofcivilsocietyisinitself capable of adaptation to this political position. Theclass in question is the one whose ethical life is natural,whose basis is family life, and, so far as its livelihood isconcerned, the possession of land. Its particular membersattain theirpositionbybirth, justas themonarchdoes,and,incommonwithhim,theypossessawillwhichrestsonitselfal6ne.

§ 306. This class is more particularly fitted for politicalposition and significance in that its capital is independentalike of the state's capital, the uncertainty of business, thequestforprofit,andanysortoffluctuationinpossessions.Itis likewise independent of favour, whether from theexecutive or the mob. It is even fortified against its ownwilfulness, because those members of this class who arecalled to political life are not entitled, as other citizens are,either to dispose of their entire property at will, or to theassurancethat itwillpass to theirchildren,whomtheyloveequally, in similarly equal divisions. Hence their wealthbecomes inalienable, entailed, and burdened by

primogeniture.

Addition:This class has a volition of a more independentcharacter.Onthewhole,theclassoflanded-propertyownersisdividedintoaneducatedsectionandasectionoffarmers.Butoveragainstbothofthesesortsofpeopletherestandsthebusinessclass,whichisdependentonneedsandconcentratedon their satisfaction, and the civil servant class, which isessentiallydependentonthestate.Thesecurityandstabilityoftheagriculturalclassmaybestillfurtherincreasedbytheinstitution of primogeniture, though this institution isdesirable only from the point of view of politics, since itentailsasacrificeforthepoliticalendofgivingtheeldestsonalifeofindependence.Primogenitureisgroundedonthefactthat the state should be able to reckon not on the barepossibility of political inclinations, but on somethingnecessary. Now an inclination for politics is of course notbound up with wealth, but there is a relatively necessaryconnectionbetweenthetwo,becauseamanwithindependentmeans is not hemmed in by external circumstances and sothere is nothing to prevent him from entering politics andworkingforthestate.WherePoliticalinstitutionsarelacking,however, the foundation and encouragement ofprimogeniture is nothing but a chain on the freedom ofprivaterights,andeitherpoliticalmeaningmustbegiventoit,orelseitwillinduecoursedisappear.

§307.Therightofthissectionoftheagricultureclassisthusbasedinawayonthenaturalprincipleofthefamily.Butthisprinciple is at the same time reversed owing to hardsacrificesmadeforpoliticalends,andtherebytheactivityofthis class is essentially directed to those ends. As aconsequence of this, this class is summoned and entitled toitspoliticalvocationbybirthwithoutthehazardsofelection.It therefore has the fixed substantive position between thesubjective wilfulness or contingency of both extremes; andwhileitmirrorsinitself...1themomentofthemonarchicalpower,italsosharesinotherrespectstheneedsandrightsof

theotherextreme[i.e.,civilsociety],andhenceitbecomesasupportatonceofthethroneandsociety.

Hegelhasaccomplishedthemasterpiece:hehasdevelopedpeeragebybirthright, wealth by inheritance, etc. etc., this support of the throneandsociety,ontopoftheabsoluteIdea.

Hegel's keenest insight lies in his sensing the separation of civil andpoliticalsocietytobeacontradiction.Buthiserroristhathecontentshimselfwiththeappearanceofitsdissolution,andpassesitoffastherealthing;whilethe'so-calledtheories'whichhedespisesdemandtheseparation of the civil and political classes, and rightly, for theyexpress a consequence of modern society, in that here the politicalEstates are precisely nothing but the factual expression of the actualrelationshipofstateandcivilsociety—theirseparation.

Hegelhasfailedtoidentifytheissueinquestionhere.Itistheissueofrepresentative versus Estate constitution. The representativeconstitution is agreat advance, for it is theopen,genuine, consistentexpressionof theconditionof themodernstate. It is theunconcealedcontradiction.

Before we take up this matter itself, let's take another look at thisHegelianpresentation.

In the Estates as an element in the legislative power, theunofficialclassacquiresitspoliticalsignificance.

Earlier(intheRemarkto§301)itwassaid:

HencethespecificfunctionwhichtheconceptassignstotheEstatesistobesoughtinthefactthatinthem...theprivatejudgmentandprivatewillof thespherecalled 'civilsociety'

in this book come into existence integrally related to thestate.

Themeaningof these two, taken incombination, is as follows:Civilsocietyistheunofficialclass,or,theunofficialclassistheimmediate,essential,concreteclassofcivilsociety.OnlywithintheEstatesasanelementof the legislativepowerdoes it acquirepolitical significanceand efficacy. This is a new endowment, a particular function, forprecisely its character as unofficial class expresses its opposition topoliticalsignificanceandefficacy, theprivationofpoliticalcharacter,and the fact thatcivil societyactually lackspolitical significanceandefficacy. The unofficial class is the class of civil society, or civilsociety is the unofficial class. Thus, in consequence, Hegel alsoexcludes the universal class from the Estates as an element of thelegislativepower:

The universal class, or, more precisely, the class of civilservants,must purely in virtue of its character as universal,havetheuniversalastheendofitsessentialactivity.

Invirtueofitscharacter,civilsociety,ortheunofficialclass,doesnothave the universal as the end of its essential activity. Its essentialactivity is not a determination of the universal; it has no universalcharacter.Theunofficialclassistheclassofcivilsocietyasopposedtothe[political]class.'Theclassofcivilsocietyisnotapoliticalclass.

Indeclaringcivilsocietytobetheunofficialclass,Hegelhasdeclaredtheclassdifferencesofcivilsocietytobenon-politicaldifferencesandcivilandpoliticallifetobeheterogeneousincharacter,evenantitheses.Howthendoesheproceed?

[The unofficial class] appears, therefore, in the Estatesneither as a mere indiscriminate multitude nor as an

aggregatedispersedinto itsatoms,butaswhat italreadyis,namely a class subdivided into two, one sub-class [theagriculturalclass]beingbasedonatieofsubstancebetweenitsmembers,andtheother[thebusinessclass]onparticularneedsandtheworkwherebythesearemet(see§201ff.).Itis only in thisway that there is a genuine linkbetween theparticularwhichiseffectiveinthestateandtheuniversal.

Tobesure,civilsociety(theunofficialclass),initslegislativeactivityin the Estates, cannot appear as a mere indiscriminate multitudebecause themere indiscriminatemultitude exists only in imaginationorfantasy,butnotinactuality.Whatactuallyexistsisonlyaccidentalmultitudesofvarioussizes(cities,villages,etc.).Thesemultitudes,orthisaggregatenotonlyappears buteverywherereallyis anaggregatedispersed into its atoms; and when it appears in its political-classactivity itmust appear as this atomistic thing. The unofficial class,civil society, cannot appear here aswhat it already is. Forwhat is italready? Unofficial class, i.e., opposition to and separation from thestate. In order to achieve political significance and efficacy it mustrather renounce itself as what it already is, as unofficial class. Onlythroughthisdoesitacquireitspoliticalsignificanceandefficacy.Thispoliticalact isacomplete transubstantiation. In thispoliticalactcivilsociety must completely renounce itself as such, as unofficial class,andassertapartofitsessencewhichnotonlyhasnothingincommonwiththeactualcivilexistenceofitsessence,butdirectlyopposesit.

Whattheuniversallawisappearshereintheindividual.Civilsocietyand the state are separated.Consequently the citizenof the state andthe member of civil society are also separated. The individual mustthusundertakeanessentialschismwithinhimselfAsactualcitizenhefindshimselfinatwo-foldorganisation:[a]thebureaucratic,whichisan external formal determination of the otherworldly state, of the

executive power, which does not touch him and his independentactuality;[b]thesocial,theorganisationofcivilsociety,withinwhichhestandsoutsidethestateasaprivateman,forcivilsocietydoesnottouchuponthepoliticalstateassuch.Theformer[thebureaucratic]isan organisation of the state to which he continually contributes thematerial.Thelatter[thesocial]isacivilorganisationwhosematerialisnotthestate.Intheformerthestaterelatestohimasformalopposition;inthelatterhehimselfrelatestothestateasmaterialopposition.Thus,in order to behave as actual citizen of the state, to acquire politicalsignificanceandefficacy,hemustabandonhiscivilactuality,abstractfrom it, and retire from thisentireorganisation intohis individuality.Hemustdothisbecausetheonlyexistencethathefindsforhisstate-citizenshipishispure,bareindividuality,fortheexistenceofthestateasexecutiveiscompletewithouthim,andhisexistenceincivilsocietyiscompletewithout thestate.Only inopposition to theseexclusivelyexistingcommunities,onlyasanindividual,canhebeacitizenofthestate.Hisexistenceascitizenisanexistencelyingoutsidetherealmofhis communal existences, and is hence purely individual. Thelegislature as a power is precisely the organisation, the communalembodiment,whichhispoliticalexistenceissupposedtoreceive.Priortothelegislature,civilsociety,ortheunofficialclass,doesnotexistaspolitical organisation. In order that it come to existence as such, itsactual organisation, actual civil life, must be established as non-existing, for the Estates as an element of the legislative power haveprecisely thecharacterof rendering theunofficial class, civil society,non-existent. The separation of civil society and the political stateappears necessarily to be a separation of the political citizen, thecitizen of the state, from civil society, i.e., from his own actual,empiricalreality;forasastate-idealistheisabeingwhoiscompletelyother,distinct,different fromandopposed tohisownactuality.Here

civilsocietyeffectswithinitself therelationshipof thestateandcivilsociety, a relationship which already exists on the other side [i.e.,within the state] as the bureaucracy. in the Estates the universalbecomesactually,explicitly [für sich]what it is implicitly [an sich],namely, opposition to the particular. The citizen must renounce hisclass, civil society, the unofficial class, in order to achieve politicalsignificance and efficacy; for it is precisely this class which standsbetweentheindividualandthepoliticalstate.

IfHegelalreadycontraststhewholeofcivilsocietyasunofficialclasstothepoliticalstate, thenit isself-evidentthat thedistinctionswithinthe unofficial class, i.e., the various civil classes, have only anunofficial significance with regard to the state; in other words, theyhavenopoliticalsignificance.Forthevariouscivilclassesaresimplytheactualisation, theexistence,of theprinciple, i.e.,of theunofficialclassasoftheprincipleofcivilsociety.If,however,theprinciplemustbeabandoned,thenitisself-evidentthatstillmoretheschismswithinthisprinciplearenon-existentforthepoliticalstate.

'It is only in thisway', saysHegel in concluding the paragraph, 'thatthereisagenuinelinkbetweentheparticularwhichiseffectiveinthestateandtheuniversal.'ButhereHegelconfusesthestateasthewholeofapeople'sexistencewiththepoliticalstate.Thatparticularisnottheparticularin,butratheroutside thestate,namely,thepoliticalstate.Itisnotonlynottheparticularwhichiseffectiveinthestate,butalsotheineffectiveness [Unwirklichkeit] of the state. What Hegel wants toestablishisthattheclassesofcivilsocietyarepoliticalclasses;andinorder to prove this he asserts that the classes of civil society are theparticularity of the political state, that is to say, that civil society ispoliticalsociety.Theexpression, 'Theparticularinthestate',canhere

onlymeantheparticularityofthestate.AbadconsciencecausesHegeltochoosethevagueexpression.Notonlyhashehimselfdevelopedjusttheopposite,butheevenratifiesitinthisparagraphbycharacterisingcivilsocietyasthe'unofficialclass'.Hisstatementthattheparticularis'linked'totheuniversalisverycautious.Themostdissimilarthingscanbe linked. But herewe are not dealingwith a gradual transition butwith a transubstantiation, and it is useless to ignore deliberately thiscleftwhichhasbeenjumpedoverandyetmanifestedbytheveryjump.

IntheRemarkHegelsays:'Thisrunscountertoanotherprevalentidea'etc.Wehave just shownhow thisprevalent idea isconsequentlyandinevitably a necessary idea of the people's present development, andhow Hegel's idea, despite its also being very prevalent in certaincircles,isneverthelessuntrue.

Returning to this prevalent idea Hegel says: 'This atomistic andabstractpointofviewvanishesatthestageofthefamily'etc.etc.'Thestate,however,is'etc.Thispointofviewisundeniablyabstract,butitistheabstractionofthepoliticalstateasHegelhimselfdevelopsit.Itisatomistictoo,butitistheatomismofsocietyitself.Thepointofviewcannotbeconcretewhentheobjectofthepointofviewisabstract.Theatomism intowhich civil society is driven by its political act resultsnecessarilyfromthefactthatthecommonwealth[das Gemeinwesen],the communal being [das kommunistische Wesen],withinwhich theindividualexists,is[reducedto]civilsocietyseparatedfromthestate,or in other words, that the political state is an abstraction of civilsociety.'

Thisatomisticpointofview,althoughitalreadyvanishesinthefamily,and perhaps (??) also in civil society, recurs in the political statepreciselybecausethepoliticalstateisanabstractionofthefamilyand

civilsociety.Butthereverseisalsotrue.Byexpressingthestrangeness[das Befremdliche] of this occurrence Hegel has not eliminated theestrangement[die Entfremdung].

The circles of association in civil society,Hegel continues,are already communities. To picture these communities asonce more breaking up into a mere conglomeration ofindividualsassoonastheyenterthefieldofpolitics,i.e.,thefieldofthehighestconcreteuniversality,iseo ipso toholdcivilandpolitical lifeapartfromoneanotherandasitweretohangthelatterintheair,becauseitsbasiscouldthenonlybe the abstract individuality of caprice and opinion, andhence it would be grounded on chance and not onwhat isabsolutelystableandjustified.

This picturing [of these communities as breaking up] does not holdcivil and political life apart; it is simply the picturing of an actuallyexistingseparation.

Nordoesthispicturinghangpoliticallifeintheair;rather,politicallifeisthelifeintheair,theetherealregionofcivilsociety.

NowweturntotherepresentativeandtheEstatesystems.

Itisadevelopmentofhistorythathastransformedthepoliticalclassesintosocialclassessuchthat,justastheChristiansareequalinheavenyetunequalonearth,sotheindividualmembersofapeopleareequalin the heaven of their political world yet unequal in the earthlyexistence of society. The real transformation of the political classesinto civil classes took place under the absolute monarchy. Thebureaucracy asserted the ideaof unityover against thevarious stateswithin the state.Nevertheless, even alongside the bureaucracy of theabsolute executive, the social difference of the classes remained a

political difference, politicalwithin and alongside thebureaucracyofthe absolute executive. Only the French Revolution completed thetransformation of the political classes into social classes, in otherwords,made the class distinctions of civil society intomerely socialdistinctions,pertainingtoprivatelifebutmeaninglessinpoliticallife.With that, the separation of political life and civil society wascompleted.

At the same time the classes of civil society were likewisetransformed: civil society underwent a change by reason of itsseparationfrompoliticalsociety.Classinthemedievalsenseremainedonlywithin thebureaucracy itself,where civil andpolitical positionsare immediately identical. Over against this stands civil society asunofficialclass.Hereclassdistinctionisnolongeroneofneedandoflaborasanindependentbody.Thesolegeneral,superficialandformaldistinctionwhichremainsisthatoftownandcountry.Butwithincivilsocietyitselfthedistinctionstakeshapeinchangeable,unfixedsphereswhoseprincipleisarbitrariness.Moneyandeducationaretheprevalentcriteria. Yet it's not here, but in the critique of Hegel's treatment ofcivilsocietythatthisshouldbedeveloped.Enoughsaid.Classincivilsociety has neither need — and therefore a natural impulse — norpolitics for its principle. It is a division of the masses whosedevelopmentisunstableandwhoseverystructureisarbitraryandinnosenseanorganisation.

Thesolecharacteristicthingisthatthelackofproperty,andtheclassin need of immediate labor, of concrete labor, forms less a class ofcivilsocietythanthebasisuponwhichthespheresofcivilsocietyrestandmove.Thesoleclassinwhichpoliticalandcivilpositionscoincideisthatofthemembersoftheexecutivepower.Thepresentsocialclass

alreadymanifestsadistinctionfromtheformerclassofcivilsocietybythefactthatitdoesnot,aswasformerlythecase,regardtheindividualas a communal in individual, as a communal being [einGemeinwesen]; rather, it is partly chance, partly labor, etc., of theindividualwhichdetermineswhetherheremainsinhisclassornot,aclass which is, further, only an external determination of thisindividual;forheneitherinheresinhisworknordoestheclassrelateto him as an objective communal being organised according to firmlaws and related firmly to him. Moreover, he stands in no actualrelationtohissubstantialactivity,tohisactualclass.Themedicalman,forinstance,formsnoparticularclassincivilsociety.onebusinessmanbelongs to a classdifferent than thatof anotherbusinessman, i.e., hebelongs to another social position. Just as civil society is separatedfrom political society, so within itself civil society is separated intoclass and social position, even though some relationsobtainbetweenthe two. The principle of the civil class, or of civil society, isenjoymentand thecapacity toenjoy. Inhispolitical role thememberofcivilsocietyridshimselfofhisclass,ofhisactualprivateposition;bythisalonedoesheacquiresignificanceasman.inotherwords,hischaracterasamemberofthestate,asasocialbeing,appearstobehishuman character. For all of his other characteristics in civil societyappeartobeunessentialtotheman,theindividual;thatis,theyappearto be external characteristics which are indeed necessary to hisexistencewithinthewhole,i.e.,asbeingabondwiththewhole,butabond that he can just aswell throw off. (Present civil society is theaccomplished principle of individualism: individual existence is thefinalend,whileactivity,labor,content,etc.,aremerelymeans.)

TheEstate-constitution,whennotatraditionoftheMiddleAges,istheattempt,partlywithinthepoliticalsphereitself,tothrustmanbackinto

the limitation of his private sphere, to make his particularity hissubstantial consciousness and, bymeans of the political character ofclassdifference,alsotomakehimoncemoreintoasocialbeing.

The actual man is the private man of the present-day politicalconstitution.

In general, the significance of the estate is that it makes difference,separation,subsistence,thingspertainingtotheindividualassuch.'Hismanneroflife,activity,etc.ishisprivilege,andinsteadofmakinghima functional member of society, it makes him an exception fromsociety. The fact that this difference is not only individual but alsoestablishedascommunity,estate,corporation,notonlyfailstoabolishtheexclusivenessof itsnature,but is rather itsexpression. Insteadofthe particular function being a function of society, the particularfunctionismadeintoasocietyforitself.

Not only is the estate based on the separation of society as thegoverningprinciple,but itseparatesmanfromhisuniversalnature; itmakes him an animal whose being coincides immediately with itsdeterminatecharacter.TheMiddleAgesconstitutestheanimalhistoryofmankind,itszoology.

Moderntimes,civilisation,commitstheoppositemistake.Itseparatesmansobjectiveessencefromhim,takingittobemerelyexternalandmaterial.Man'scontentisnottakentobehistrueactuality.

Anything further regarding this is to be developed in the section on'CivilSociety'.

Nowwecometo

§304.TheEstates,asanelementinpoliticallife,stillretainin their own significance, the class distinctions alreadypresentinthelowerspheresofcivillife.

We have already shown that the class distinctions already present inthelowerspheresoflifehavenosignificanceforthepoliticalspheres,or if so, then only the significance of private, hence non-political,distinctions.Butaccording toHegelhere theydonotevenhave theiralreadypresentsignificance(theirsignificanceincivilsociety).Rather,the Estates as an element in political life affirms its essence byembodying these distinctions within itself; and, thus immersed inpolitical life, they receiveasignificanceof their 'own'whichbelongsnottothembuttothiselement.

Aslongastheorganisationofcivilsocietyremainedpolitical,andthepolitical state and civil society were one, this separation, thisduplicationoftheestates'significancewasnotpresent.Theestatesdidnot signify one thing in the civil world and something other in thepolitical world. They acquired no [additional] significance in thepolitical world, but signified only themselves. The duality of civilsocietyandthepoliticalstate,whichtheEstate-constitutionpurportstoresolvethroughareminiscence,appearswithinthatconstitutionitself,in that class difference (the differentiation within civil society)acquiresinthepoliticalsphereasignificancedifferentthaninthecivilsphere. There is apparent identity here: the same subject, but in anessentially different determination, and thus in fact a double subject.And this illusory identity (surelyan illusory identitybecause, in fact,theactualsubject,man, remainsconstantlyhimself,doesnot losehisidentityinthevariousdeterminationsofhisbeing;butheremanisnotthesubject,ratherheisidentifiedwithapredicate—theclass—andat the same time it is asserted that he exists in this definite

determinationandinanotherdetermination,thatheis,asthisdefinite,exempted and restricted thing, something other than this restrictedthing) is artificially maintained through that reflection [mentionedearlier],byatonetimehavingcivilclassdistinctionassuchassumeacharacterwhichshouldaccruetoitonlyinthepoliticalsphere,andatanother time reversing things and having the class distinction in thepoliticalsphereacquireacharacterwhichissuesnotfromthepoliticalspherebutfromthesubjectofthecivilsphere.Inordertopresenttheone limited subject, the definite class (the class distinction), as theessentialsubjectofbothpredicates,orinordertoprovetheidentityofthetwopredicates,botharemystifiedanddevelopedinanillusoryandvaguedimorphism[Doppelgestalt].

Herethesamesubjectistakenindifferentmeanings,butthemeaningisnot a self-determination [of the subject]; rather, it is an allegoricaldeterminationfoistedonthesubject.Onecouldusethesamemeaningfor a different concrete subject, or another meaning for the samesubject. The significance that civil class distinction acquires in thepoliticalsphereisnotitsown,butproceedsfromthepoliticalsphere;andevenhereitcouldhaveadifferentsignificance,aswashistoricallythe case.The reverse is also true.This is the uncritical, themysticalwayofinterpretinganoldworld-viewintermsofanewone,throughwhich it becomes nothing but an unhappy hybrid inwhich the formbetrays themeaning and themeaning the form, and neither does theform achieve significance, thus becoming actual form, nor thesignificance become form, thus becoming actual significance. Thisuncritical spirit, this mysticism, is the enigma of the modernconstitution(katexohintheEstate-constitution)aswellasthemysteryofHegelian philosophy, especially thePhilosophy of Right and thePhilosophy of Religion.

Thebestwaytoridoneselfofthisillusionistotakethesignificanceaswhat it is, i.e., as the actual determination, then as suchmake it thesubject,andconsiderwhetheritsostensiblypropersubjectisitsactualpredicate,i.e.,whetherthisostensiblypropersubjectexpressesits[theactualdetermination's]essenceandtrueactualisation.

The position of the classes (the Estates as an element inpolitical life), isabstract tobeginwith, i.e., incontrastwiththewholeprincipleofmonarchyorthecrown,theirpositionisthatofanextreme—empiricaluniversality.Thisextremeopposition implies the possibility, though no more, ofharmonisation, and the equally likely possibility of sethostility. This abstract position changes into a rationalrelation(intoasyllogism,seeRemarkto§302)onlyifthemiddletermbetweentheoppositescomesintoexistence.

WehavealreadyseenthattheEstates, incommonwiththeexecutivepower, form themiddle termbetween theprincipleofmonarchyandthepeople,between thewillof thestateexistingasoneandasmanyempirical Wills, and between empirical singularity and empiricaluniversality. Just as he had to define the will of civil society asempirical universality, so Hegel had to define the sovereign will asempiricalsingularity;buthedoesnotarticulatetheantithesisinallofitssharpness.

Hegelcontinues:

From thepointofviewof the crown, the executive alreadyhasthischaracter(see§300).So,fromthepointofviewoftheclasses,onemomentinthemmustbeadaptedtothetaskofexistingasinessencethemomentofmediation.

Thetrueantitheses,however,arethesovereignandcivilsociety.Andaswehavealreadyseen, theEstateshavethesamesignificancefrom

thepeople'spointofviewastheexecutivehasfromthepointofviewofthesovereign.Justastheexecutiveemanatesinanelaboratecircularsystem, so the people condenses into a miniature edition; for theconstitutional monarchy can get along well only with the people enminiature.TheEstates,fromthepointofviewofcivilsociety,aretheverysameabstractionofthepoliticalstateasistheexecutivefromthesovereign'spointofview.Thusitappearsthatthemediationhasbeenfully achieved. Both extremes have left their obstinacy behind, eachhasimpartedthespiritofitsparticularessenceintoafusionwiththatof theother;and the legislature,whoseelementsare theexecutiveaswellas theEstates,appearsnot tobe thatwhichmust firstallowthismediation to come to existence, but to be itself the already existingmediation. Also, Hegel has already [§ 302] declared the Estates incommonwiththeexecutivetobethemiddletermbetweenthepeopleand the sovereign (the same way the Estates are the middle termbetween civil society and the executive, etc.). Thus the rationalrelation, the syllogism, appears to be complete. The legislature, themiddleterm,isamixtum compositum ofbothextremes:thesovereign-principle and civil society, empirical singularity and empiricaluniversality,subjectandpredicate.Ingeneral,Hegelconceivesofthesyllogism asmiddle term, to be amixtum compositum. We can saythat in his development of the rational syllogism all of thetranscendence andmystical dualismofhis systembecomes apparent.The middle term is the wooden sword, the concealed oppositionbetweenuniversalityandsingularity.

Tobeginwith,wenoticeinregardtothiswholedevelopmentthatthemediation Hegel wants to establish here is not derived from theessence of the legislature, from its own character, but rather withregard to an existence lying outside its essential character. It is a

construction of reference. The legislature is chiefly developed withregardonlytoathird[party].Hence,itisprimarilytheconstructionofitsformalexistencewhichreceivesalltheattention.Thelegislatureisconstructed very diplomatically. This results from the false, illusorykatexohinpoliticalpositiongiventothelegislatureinthemodernstate(whoseinterpreterisHegelhimself).Whatfollowsimmediatelyisthatthisisnotruestate,becauseinitthedeterminatefunctionsofthestate,one of which is the legislature, must not be regarded in and forthemselves, not theoretically, but rather practically; theymust not beregarded as independent powers, but as powers bound up with anopposite, and this in accordance with the rules of convention ratherthanbythenatureofthings.

ThustheEstates,incommonwiththeexecutive,shouldactuallybethemiddle term between the will of empirical singularity, i.e., thesovereign,andthewillofempiricaluniversality,i.e.,civilsociety.Butin fact their position is really 'abstract to beginwith, i.e., in contrastwith thewhole principle ofmonarchy or the crown, their position isthat of an extreme empirical universality. This extreme oppositionimplies the possibility, though no more, of harmonisation, and theequallylikelypossibilityofsethostility.Inotherwordstheirposition,asHegelquiterightlyremarks,isanabstractposition.

Itappearsatfirstthatneithertheextremeofempiricaluniversalitynortheprincipleofmonarchyorthecrown,i.e., theextremeofempiricalsingularity,areopposedtooneanother.ForfromthepointofviewofcivilsocietytheEstatesaredelegatedjustastheexecutiveisfromthepoint of view of the sovereign. Just as the principle of the crownceases, in the delegated executive power, to be the extreme ofempirical singularity, surrendering its self-determined will and

lowering itself to the finitude of knowledge, responsibility, andthought, so civil society appears in the Estates to be no longer anempirical universality, but a very definite whole which has politicaland administrative sense and temper, and no less a sense for theinterestsofindividualsandparticulargroups(§302).Civilsociety,inits miniature edition as the Estates, has ceased to be empiricaluniversality.Rather, it hasbeen reduced to adelegatedcommitteeofverydefinitenumber. If the sovereignassumesempiricaluniversalityintheexecutivepower,thencivilsocietyassumesempiricalsingularityorparticularityintheEstates.Bothhavebecomeaparticular.

Theonlyoppositionwhichremainspossibleappearstobethatbetweenthe two emanations, between the executive- and the Estate-elementswithinthelegislature.Itappears,therefore,tobeanoppositionwithinthe legislature itself.And these elementswhichmediate 'in common'seem quite prone to get into one another's hair. In the executiveelementof thelegislaturetheinaccessibleempiricalsingularityof thesovereign has come down to earth in a number of limited, tangible,responsible personalities; and in theEstates, civil societyhas exalteditself into a number of political men. Both sides have lost theirinaccessibility. The crown — the inaccessible, exclusive, empiricalOne—has lost itsobstinacy,whilecivil society— the inaccessible,vague,empiricalAll—has lost itsfluidity.In theEstatesontheonehand,andtheexecutiveelementofthelegislatureontheother,whichtogether wouldmediate between civil society and the sovereign, theopposition thus appears to have become, first of all, a refereedopposition,butalsoanirreconcilablecontradiction.

As for thismediation, it is therefore, asHegel rightly argues, all themorenecessarythatthemiddletermbetweentheoppositescomesinto

existence;forit isitselfmuchmoretheexistenceofthecontradictionthanofthemediation.

That this mediation will be effected by the Estates seems to bemaintainedbyHegelwithoutanyfoundation.Hesays:

From thepointofviewof the crown, the executive alreadyhasthischaracter(see§300).So,fromthepointofviewoftheclasses,onemomentinthemmustbeadaptedtothetaskofexistingasinessencethemomentofmediation.

But we have already seen that Hegel arbitrarily and inconsistentlyposits the sovereign and the Estates as opposed extremes. As theexecutivehasthischaracterfromthepointofviewofthecrown,sotheEstateshaveitfromthepointofviewofcivilsociety.Notonlydo[theEstates] stand, incommonwith theexecutive,between the sovereignand civil society, but also between the executive in general and thepeople (§ 302). They do more on behalf of civil society than theexecutivedoesonbehalfofthecrown,whichisitselfinoppositiontothe people. Thus they have accomplished their full measure ofmediation.Whymake these asses bear still more?Why should theyalwaysbemadethedonkey-bridge,evenbetweenthemselvesandtheirown adversaries?Why must they always perform the self-sacrifice?Should they cut off one of their hands when both are needed towithstandtheiradversary,theexecutiveelementofthelegislature?

In addition, Hegel first has the Estates arise from the Corporations,classdistinctions,etc., lest theybeamereempiricaluniversality;andnow he reverses the process, and makes them mere empiricaluniversalityinordertohaveclassdistinctionarisefromthem!justasthesovereign ismediatedwithcivilsociety through theexecutive,sosociety is mediated with the executive through the Estates — the

executivethusactingassociety'sChrist,andtheEstatesasitspriests.

Nowitappearsallthemorethattheroleoftheextremes—thecrown(empiricalsingularity)andcivilsociety(empiricaluniversality)-mustbethatofmediatingasthemiddletermbetweentheopposites;allthemorebecause'itisoneofthemostimportantdiscoveriesoflogicthataspecificmomentwhich,bystandinginanopposition,hasthepositionofanextreme,ceasestobesuchandisamomentinanorganicwholebybeingatthesametimethemean'(Remarkto§302).Civilsocietyappears tobeunable toplaythisrole,forcivilsocietyas itself,asanextreme, occupies no seat in the legislature. The other extreme, thesovereign principle, exists as an extreme within the legislature, andthus apparently must be the mediator between the Estate- and theexecutive-elements.And it appears tohaveall thequalifications; for,ontheonehand,thewholeofthestate,andthereforealsocivilsociety,is represented within it, and, more specifically, it has empiricalsingularity of will in common with the Estates, since empiricaluniversality is actual only as empirical singularity. Furthermore, thesovereignprincipledoesnotmerelyopposecivilsocietyasakindofformula,asstate-consciousness,thewaytheexecutivedoes.Itisitselfthe state; it has the material, natural moment in common with civilsociety.Ontheotherhand,itistheheadandtherepresentativeoftheexecutive. (Hegel, who inverts everything, makes the executive therepresentative,theemanation,ofthesovereign.Whenheconsiderstheidea whose existence the sovereign is supposed to be, Hegel has inmind not the actual idea of the executive, the executive as idea, butratherthesubjectoftheAbsoluteIdeawhichexistscorporeallyinthesovereign;hencetheexecutivebecomesamysticalcontinuationofthesoulexistinginhisbody-thesovereignbody.)

The sovereign, then, had to be the middle term in the legislaturebetweentheexecutiveandtheEstates;but,ofcourse,theexecutiveisthemiddletermbetweenhimandtheEstates,andtheEstatesbetweenhimandcivilsociety.Howishetomediatebetweenwhathehimselfneedsasameanlesthisownexistencebecomeaone-sidedextreme?Nowthecompleteabsurdityoftheseextremes,whichinterchangeablyplay now the part of the extreme and now the part of the mean,becomes apparent. They are like Januswith two-faced heads, whichnow show themselves from the front andnow from the back,with adiversecharacterateitherside.Whatwasfirstintendedtobethemeanbetweentwoextremesnowitselfoccursasanextreme;andtheotherofthetwoextremes,whichhadjustbeenmediatedbyit,nowintervenesas an extreme' (because of its distinction from the other extreme)between its extreme and its mean. This is a kind of mutualreconciliationsociety.Itisasifamansteppedbetweentwoopponents,onlytohaveoneof themimmediatelystepbetweenthemediatorandthe other opponent. It is like the story of the man and wife whoquarrelled and the doctor who wished to mediate between them,whereupon the wife soon had to step between the doctor and herhusband,and then thehusbandbetweenhiswifeand thedoctor. It islikethelioninA Midsummer Night's Dream whoexclaims:'Iamthelion, and I am not the lion, but Snug.' So here each extreme issometimes the lion of opposition and sometimes the Snug ofmediation.Whentheoneextremecries:'NowIamthemean',thentheother twomaynot touchit,butratheronlyswingat theonethatwasjusttheextreme.Asonecansee,thisisasocietypugnaciousatheartbuttooafraidofbruisestoeverreallyfight.Thetwowhowanttofightarrangeitsothatthethirdwhostepsbetweenthemwillgetthebeating,butimmediatelyoneofthetwoappearsasthethird,andbecauseofallthis caution they never arrive at a decision.We find this system of

mediation in effect also where the verymanwhowishes to beat anopponent has at the same time to protect him from a beating at thehands of other opponents, and because of this double pursuit nevermanagestoexecutehisownbusiness.ItisremarkablethatHegel,whoreduces this absurdity ofmediation to its abstract logical, and hencepure and irreducible, expression, calls it at the same time thespeculative mystery of logic, the rational relationship, the rationalsyllogism. Actual extremes cannot be mediated with each otherpreciselybecausetheyareactualextremes.Butneitheraretheyinneedofmediation,becausetheyareopposedinessence.Theyhavenothingin commonwithone another; theyneither neednor complementoneanother.Theonedoesnotcarryinitswombtheyearning,theneed,theanticipation of the other. (When Hegel treats universality andsingularity,theabstractmomentsofthesyllogism,asactualopposites,thisispreciselythefundamentaldualismofhislogic.AnythingfurtherregardingthisbelongsinthecritiqueofHegelianlogic.)

This appears to be in opposition to the principle: Les extrêmes setouchent. The North and South Poles attract each other; the femaleandmalesexesalsoattracteachother,andonly throughtheunionoftheirextremedifferencesdoesmanresult.

On the other hand, each extreme is its other extreme. Abstractspiritualismisabstractmaterialism;abstractmaterialismistheabstractspiritualismofmatter.

In regard to the former, bothNorth and South Poles are poles; theiressenceisidentical.Inthesamewaybothfemaleandmalegenderareofonespecies,onenature, i.e.,humannature.NorthandSouthPolesare opposed determinations of one essence, the variation of oneessence brought to its highest degree of development. They are the

differentiated essence. They are what they are only as differentiateddeterminations;thatis,eachisthis differentiateddeterminationoftheonesameessence.TrulyinrealextremeswouldbePoleandnon-Pole,human and non-human gender. Difference here is one of existence,whereasthere[i.e.,inthecaseofPoleandnon-Pole,etc.,]differenceisoneofessence,i.e., thedifferencebetweentwoessences.inregardtothe second [i.e. where each extreme is its other extreme], the chiefcharacteristic lies in the fact that a concept (existence, etc.) is takenabstractly, and that it does not have significance as independent butrather as an abstraction from another, and only as this abstraction.Thus, for example, spirit is only the abstraction from matter. It isevident that precisely because this form is to be the content of theconcept,itsrealessenceisrathertheabstractopposite,i.e., theobjectfromwhichitabstractstakeninitsabstraction—inthiscase,abstractmaterialism.

Had the difference within the existence of one essence not beenconfused, in part, with the abstraction given independence (anabstraction not from another, of course, but from itself) and, in part,withtheactualoppositionofmutuallyexclusiveessences,thenathree-folderrorcouldhavebeenavoided,namely:

1. thatbecauseonly theextreme is true,everyabstractionandone-sidednesstakesitselftobethetruth,wherebyaprincipleappears to be only an abstraction fromanother insteadof atotalityinitself;

2.thatthedecisivenessofactualopposites,theirformationintoextremes,whichisnothingotherthantheirself-knowledgeaswellastheirinflammationtothedecisiontofight,isthoughtto be something which should be prevented if possible, in

otherwords,somethingharmful;

3. that theirmediation isattempted.Fornomatterhowfirmlybothextremesappear, in theirexistence, tobeactualand tobeextremes, itstill liesonlyintheessenceof theonetobeanextreme,anditdoesnothavefortheotherthemeaningoftrueactuality.

Theone infringesupon theother, but theydonotoccupya commonposition. For example, Christianity, or religion in general, andphilosophyareextremes.But infact religion isnota trueopposite tophilosophy, for philosophy comprehends religion in its illusoryactuality.Thus,forphilosophy—insofarasitseekstobeanactuality—religionisdissolvedinitself.Thereisnoactualdualityofessence.Moreonthislater.

Thequestionarises,whydoesHegelneedanewmediationonthesideof theEstates at all?Ordoeshe sharewith [others] 'thepopular,butnotdangerousprejudice,whichregardstheEstatesprincipallyfromthepointofviewoftheiroppositiontotheexecutive,asifthatweretheiressentialattitude'?(Remarkto§302.)

The factof thematter is simply this:On theonehandwehave seenthatitisonlyinthelegislaturethatcivilsocietyastheelementoftheEstates, and the power of the crown as the element of the executivehavetakenonthespiritofactual,immediatelypracticalopposition.

On theotherhand, the legislature is the totality. In itwe find (1) thedeputation of the sovereign principle, i.e., the executive; (2) thedeputationofcivilsociety,i.e.,theEstates;butinaddition,(3)theoneextremeassuch,i.e.,thesovereignprinciple;whiletheotherextreme,

civilsociety,doesnotexistinitassuch.ItisonlybecauseofthisthattheEstatesbecometheextremetothesovereignprinciple,whencivilsociety really shouldbe.Aswehave seen,onlyasEstatesdoescivilsociety organise itself into a political existence. The Estates are itspoliticalexistence, its transubstantiationintothepoliticalstate.Againaswehaveseen,only the legislature is, therefore, theactualpoliticalstate in its totality. Here, then, there is (1) sovereign principle, (2)executive, (3) civil society. The Estates are the civil society of thepoliticalstate,i.e.,thelegislature.Theextremetothesovereign,whichcivil society was supposed to have been, is therefore the Estates.(Because civil society is the non-actuality of political existence, thepoliticalexistenceofcivilsocietyisitsowndissolution,itsseparationfromitself.)Thereforeitalsoconstitutesanoppositiontotexecutive.

Hegel, therefore, again designates the Estates as the extreme ofempiricaluniversality,whichisactuallycivilsocietyitself.(Henceheunnecessarily allows the Estates, as an element in political life, toproceed from the Corporations and different classes. This procedurewouldmakesenseonlyifthedistinctclassesassuchwereinfactthelegislative classes, if, accordingly, the distinction of civil society—i.e.,itscivilcharacter-werere verathepoliticalcharacter.Wewouldthen not have a legislature of the state as a whole, but rather alegislature of the various estates, Corporations, and classes over thestateasawhole.Theestates[orclasses]ofcivilsocietywouldreceiveno political character, but would rather determine the political state.Theywouldmake their particularity a power determining thewhole.Theywouldbethepoweroftheparticularovertheuniversal.Andwewould not have one legislature, but several, which would come totermsamongthemselvesandwiththeexecutive.However,Hegelhasinmind theEstates in themodern sense, namely the actualisation of

state citizenship, or of the Bourgeois. He does not want the actualuniversal, the political state, to be determined by civil society, butrathercivilsocietytobedeterminedbythestate.Thuswhileheacceptsthe Estates in their medieval form, he gives them the oppositesignificance, namely, that of being determined by the political state.TheEstatesas representativesof theCorporations,etc.,wouldnotbeempirical universality, but rather empirical particularity, i.e., theparticularity of the empirical!) The legislature, therefore, needsmediationwithinitself,thatistosay,aconcealmentoftheopposition.And this mediation must come from the Estates because in thelegislature the Estates lose their significance of being therepresentation of civil society and become the primary element, theverycivilsocietyofthelegislature.Thelegislatureisthetotalityofthepolitical state and, precisely because of this, the contradiction of thepolitical state brought forcibly to appearance. Thus it is also itsestablished dissolution. Entirely different principles collidewithin it.Tobesure,itappearstobetheoppositionbetweenthetwoelements,thatofthesovereignprincipleandthatoftheEstates,andsoforth.Butin fact it is the antinomyof political state and civil society, the self-contradiction of the abstract political state. The legislature is theestablished revolt. (Hegel's chiefmistake consists in the fact that heconceives of the contradiction in appearance as being a unity inessence, i.e., in the Idea; whereas it certainly has something moreprofound in its essence, namely, an essential contradiction. Forexamplehere,thecontradictioninthelegislatureitselfisnothingotherthan the contradiction of the political state, and thus also the self-contradictionofcivilsociety.

Vulgar criticism falls into an opposite dogmatic error. Thus, forexample, it criticises the constitution, drawing attention to the

oppositionOf thepowersetc. It findscontradictionseverywhere.Butcriticismthatstruggleswithitsoppositeremainsdogmaticcriticism,asfor example in earlier times,when the dogma of theBlessedTrinitywassetasidebyappealingtothecontradictionbetween1and3.Truecriticism,however,showstheinternalgenesisoftheBlessedTrinityinthe human mind. it describes the act of its birth. Thus, truephilosophicalcriticismofthepresentstateconstitutionnotonlyshowsthecontradictionsas existing,but clarifies them,grasps their essenceandnecessity.Itcomprehendstheirownpropersignificance.However,this comprehension does not, asHegel thinks, consist in everywhererecognising the determinations of the logical concept, but rather ingraspingtheproperlogicoftheproperobject.)

AsHegel expresses it, thepositionof thepoliticalEstates relative tothe sovereign implies the possibility, though no more, ofharmonisation,andtheequallylikelypossibilityofsethostility.

The possibility of hostility is implied everywhere different volitionsmeet.Hegel himself says that the possibility of harmonisation is thepossibilityofhostility.Thus,hemustnowconstructanelementwhichisboththeimpossibilityofhostilityandtheactualityofharmonisation.For him, such an element would be the freedom of decision andthoughtinfaceofthesovereignwillandtheexecutive.Thusitwouldno longer be an element belonging to the Estates as an element inpoliticallife.Rather,itwouldbeanelementofthesovereignwillandthe executive, and would stand in the same opposition to the actualEstatesasdoestheexecutiveitself

This demand is already quite muted by the conclusion of theparagraph:

From thepointofviewof the crown, the executive alreadyhasthischaracter(see§300).So,fromthepointofviewoftheclasses,onemomentinthemmustbeadaptedtothetaskofexistingasinessencethemomentofmediation.

The moment which is dispatched from the estates [or classes] musthaveacharacter thereverseof thatwhich theexecutivehasfromthepointofviewofthesovereign,sincethesovereignandtheestatesareopposite extremes. Just as the sovereign democratises himself in theexecutive, so this estate element must monarchise itself in itsdeputation.ThuswhatHegelwantsisamomentofsovereigntyissuingfromtheestates.Justastheexecutivehasanestate-momentonbehalfofthesovereign,sothereshouldalsobeasovereign-momentonbehalfoftheestates.

The actuality of harmonisation and the impossibility of hostilityconvertsintothefollowingdemand:'So,fromthepointofviewoftheclasses,onemomentinthemmustbeadaptedtothetaskofexistingasinessence themomentofmediation.'Adapted to the task!Accordingto§302theEstatesasawholehavethistask.Itshouldnotsay 'task'butrather'certainty'.Andwhatkindoftaskisthisanywaywhichexistsasinessencethemomentofmediation—beingin'essence'Buridan'sass?

Thefactofthematterissimplythis:

TheEstatesaresupposed tobe themediationbetween thecrownandthe executive on the one hand, and the crown and the people on theother. But they are not this, but rather the organised politicalopposition to civil society. The legislature in itself is in need ofmediation, and indeed a mediation coming from the Estates, as hasbeen shown.The presupposedmoral harmonisation of the twowills,

thewill of the state as sovereignwill and thewill of the state as thewillofcivilsociety,doesnotsuffice.Indeedonlythelegislatureistheorganised,totalpoliticalstate;yet,preciselyinitappears,becauseitisin its highest degree of development, the open contradiction of thepoliticalstatewithitself.Thus,theappearanceofarealidentityofthesovereignandEstatewillsmustbeestablished.EithertheEstatesmustbeestablishedasthesovereignwillorthesovereignwillestablishedastheEstates.TheEstatesmustestablishthemselvesastheactualityofawill which is not the will of the Estates. The unity which is non-existent in essence (otherwise it would have to prove itself by theEstates' efficacy and not by theirmode of existing)must at least bepresent inexistence,orelseanexisting instanceof the legislature(oftheEstates)hasthetaskofbeingtheunityofwhatisnotunited.ThismomentoftheEstates,theChamberofPeers,theUpperHouse,etc.,isthe highest synthesis of the political state in the organisation justconsidered.Withthat,however,Hegeldoesnotachievewhathewants,namely, the actuality of harmonisation and the impossibility of sethostility;rather,thewholethingremainsatthepointofthepossibilityofharmonisation.However,itistheestablishedillusionoftheinternalunityofthepoliticalstate(ofthesovereignwillandthatoftheEstates,andfurthermoreof theprincipleof thepoliticalstateandthatofcivilsociety), the illusionof thisunityasmaterialprinciple, that is tosay,such that not only two opposed principles unite but that the unity isthatofonenatureorexistentialground.TheEstates,as thismoment,are the romanticism of the political state, the dreams of itssubstantialityorinternalharmony.Theyareanallegoricalexistence.

Whether this illusion is an effective illusion or a conscious self-deception depends now on the actual status quo of the relationshipbetweentheEstateandsovereign-elements.AslongastheEstatesand

the crown in fact harmonise, or get along together, the illusion in itsessentialunityisanactual,andthuseffectiveillusion.Butontheotherhand,shouldthetruthoftheillusionbecomemanifest,thenitbecomesaconsciouslieandaridicule.

§305.Theprincipleofoneoftheclassesofcivilsocietyisinitself capable of adaptation to this political position. Theclass in question is the one whose ethical life is natural,whose basis is family life, and, so far as its livelihood isconcerned, the possession of land. Its particular membersattain theirpositionbybirth, justas themonarchdoes,and,incommonwithhim,theypossessawillwhichrestsonitselfalone.

WehavealreadydemonstratedHegel'sinconsistencies:(1)conceivingoftheEstatesintheirmodernabstractionfromcivilsocietyetc.,afterhaving them proceed from Corporations; (2) determining them nowonce again according to the class distinction of civil society, afterhaving already determined the political Estates as such to be theextremeofempiricaluniversality.

To be consistent onewould have to examine the politicalEstates bythemselves as a new element, and then construct out of them themediationwhichwasdemandedin§304.

ButnowweseehowHegelreintroducescivilclassdistinctionand,atthesametime,makesitappearthatitisnottheactualityandparticularnatureofcivilclassdistinctionwhichdetermines thehighestpoliticalsphere,thelegislature,butratherthereverse,thatcivilclassdistinctiondeclines to a pure matter which the political sphere forms andconstructsinaccordancewithitsneed,aneedwhicharisesoutofthepoliticalsphereitself.

Theprincipleofoneoftheclassesofcivilsocietyisinitselfcapable of adaptation to this political position.The class inquestionisonewhoseethicallifeisnatural.(Theagriculturalclass.)

What,then,doesthisprinciplecapability,orcapabilityinprincipleoftheagriculturalclassconsistin?

Its basis is family life, and, so far as its livelihood isconcerned, the possession of land. Its particular membersattain theirpositionbybirth, justas themonarchdoes,and,incommonwithhim,theypossessawillwhichrestsonitselfalone.

Thewillwhichrestsonitselfaloneisrelatedtoitslivelihood,i.e.,thepossessionofland,toitspositionbybirthwhichithasincommonwiththemonarch,andtofamilylife,asitsbasis.

Livelihoodaspossessionoflandandawillwhichrestsonitselfalonearetwoquitedifferentthings.Oneshouldrathersayawillwhichrestsonground and soil.One should rather speakof awill resting on thedispositionof the state, not of one restingon itself but in thewhole.The possession of land takes the place of the disposition, or thepossessionofpoliticalspirit.

Furthermore,inregardtofamilylifeasbasis,thesocialethicallifeofcivil society appears to occupy a higher position than this naturalethicallife.Moreover,familylifeisthenaturalethicallifeoftheotherclasses,ofthecivilaswellastheagriculturalclassofcivilsociety.Butthefactthat'familylife'is,inthecaseoftheagriculturalclass,notonlythe principle of the family but also the basis of this class' socialexistence in general, seems to disqualify it for the highest politicaltask; for this class will apply patriarchal laws to a non-patriarchal

sphere, andwill thinkandact in termsof childor father,master andservant, where the real questions are the political state and politicalcitizenship.

Regardingthemonarch'spositionbybirth,Hegelhasnotdevelopedapatriarchal but rather a modern constitutional king. His position bybirthconsistsinhisbeingthebodilyrepresentativeofthestateandinbeingbornasking,orinthekingdombeinghisfamilyinheritance.Butwhat does this have in commonwith family life as the basis of theagricultural class; andwhatdoesnatural ethical-lifehave incommonwith position by birth as such?The king has this in commonwith ahorse,namely, justas thehorse isbornahorse so theking isbornaking.

Had Hegel made the class distinction, which he already accepted, apoliticaldistinction, then theagricultural classas suchwouldalreadybeanindependentpartoftheEstates;andifitisassuchamomentofmediationwith theprincipality,whywouldtheconstructionofanewmediation be necessary? And why separate it off from the actualmomentoftheEstates,sincethismomentachievesitsabstractpositionvis-a-vis the crown only because of this separation? After he hasdeveloped the political Estates as a specific element, as atransubstantiation of the unofficial class into state citizenship, andpreciselybecauseofthishasfoundthemediationtobeanecessity,bywhat right does Hegel dissolve this organism once more into thedistinctionoftheunofficialclass,andthusintotheunofficialclass,andthenderivefromitthepoliticalstate'smediationwithitself?

Inanycase,whatananomaly,thatthehighestsynthesisofthepoliticalstateisnothingbutthesynthesisoflandedpropertyandfamilylife!

Inaword:

Ifcivil classesas sucharepoliticalclasses, then themediation isnotneeded; and if this mediation is needed, then the civil class is notpolitical, and thus also not this mediation. The member of theagricultural class is not as such, but as state citizen, a part of thepoliticalEstates;whileintheoppositecase(i.e.,wherehe,asmemberoftheagriculturalclass,isstatecitizen,orasstatecitizenismemberofthisclass),hisstatecitizenshipismembershipintheagriculturalclass;and then he is not, asmember of this class, a state citizen, but is asstatecitizenamemberofthisclass!

Here,then,wefindoneofHegel'sinconsistencieswithinhisownwayof viewing things; and such an inconsistency is an accommodation.ThepoliticalEstatesinthemodernsense,whichisthesensedevelopedby Hegel, constitute the frilly established separation of civil societyfromitsunofficialclassanditsdistinctions.HowcanHegelmaketheunofficialclassthesolutionoftheantinomieswhichthelegislaturehaswithin itself?Hegelwants themedieval systemofEstates,but in themodernsenseof the legislature;andhewants themodern legislature,butwithin the framework of themedieval systemofEstates!This issyncretismatitsworst.

Thebeginningof§304reads:

TheEstates,asanelementinpoliticallife,stillretail).intheirown function the class distinctions already present in thelowerspheresofcivillife.

But in theirown function, theEstates, as anelement inpolitical life,retain this distinction only by annulling it, negating it withinthemselves,abstractingthemselvesfromit.

Should the agricultural class — or, as we will hear later, theempoweredagricultural class, aristocratic landedproperty—becomeassuch,andasdescribed,themediationofthetotalpoliticalstate,i.e.,ofthelegislaturewithinitself,thenitiscertainlythemediationofthepoliticalEstateswiththecrown,inthesenseofbeingthedissolutionofthepoliticalEstatesasanactualpoliticalclement.Nottheagriculturalclass, but class, the unofficial class, the analysis (reduction) of thepolitical Estates into the unofficial class, constitutes here the re-establishedunityofthepoliticalstatewithitself.(Themediationhereisnot theagriculturalclassassuch,butrather itsseparationfromthepolitical Estates in its quality as civil unofficial class; that is, itsunofficialclass[reality]givesitaseparatepositionwithinthepoliticalEstates, whereupon the other section of the political Estates is alsogiven the position of a particular unofficial class, and, therefore, itceasestorepresentthestatecitizenshipofcivilsociety.)Herethen,thepoliticalstatenolongerexistsastwoopposedwills;rather,ontheonesidestandsthepoliticalstate(theexecutiveandthesovereign),andonthe other side stands civil society in its distinction from the politicalstate (the various classes). With that, then, the political state as atotalityisabolished.

The other sense of the duplication of the political Estates withinthemselves as a mediation with the crown is, in general, this: theinternalseparationofthepoliticalEstates,theirowninneropposition,is a re-established unity with the crown. The fundamental dualismbetween thecrownand theEstatesasanelement in the legislature isneutralisedbythedualismwithintheEstatesthemselves.WithHegel,however, this neutralisation is effected by the political Estatesseparatingthemselvesfromtheirpoliticalelement.

Wewillreturnlatertothesubjectofpossessionoflandaslivelihood,which is supposed to accord with sovereignty of Will, i.e., thesovereignty of the crown, and to family life as the basis of theagricultural class, which is supposed to accord with the position bybirthofthecrown.Whatisdevelopedherein§305istheprincipleofthe agricultural class which is in itself capable of adaptation to thispoliticalposition.

§306dealswiththeadaptiontopoliticalpositionandsignificance; itreduces to the following: 'Theirwealthbecomes inalienable,entailed,and burdened by primogeniture. Thus, primogeniture would be theadaptionoftheagriculturalclasstopolitics.

Primogeniture is grounded, so it says in the Addition,on the factthat the state should be able to reckon not on the barepossibility of political inclinations, but on somethingnecessary. Now an inclination for politics is of course notbound up with wealth, but there is a relatively necessaryconnectionbetweenthetwo,becauseamanwithindependentmeans is not hemmed in by external circumstances and sothere is nothing to prevent him from entering politics andworkingforthestate.

First sentence: The state is not content with the bare possibility ofpolitical inclinations, but should be able to reckon on somethingnecessary.Secondsentence:Aninclinationforpoliticsisofcoursenotboundupwithwealth;thatis, theinclinationforpoliticsinthoseofwealthisabarepossibility.Third sentence: But there is a relatively necessary connection,namely, amanwith independentmeans etc. finds nothing to preventhim from working for the state; that is, the means provide the

possibilityofpoliticalinclinations.Butaccordingtothefirstsentence,thispossibilitypreciselydoesnotsuffice.

Inaddition,Hegelhasfailedtoshowthatpossessionoflandisthesoleindependentmeans.

The adaption of its means to independence is the adaption of theagriculturalclasstopoliticalpositionandsignificance.Inotherwords,independentmeansisitspoliticalpositionandsignificance.

Thisindependenceisfurtherdevelopedasfollows:

Its wealth is independent of the state's capital. 'State's capital' hereapparentlymeansthegovernmenttreasury.Inthisrespecttheuniversalclass,asessentiallydependentonthestate,standsinopposition.

AsitsaysinthePreface:

Apartfromanythingelsephilosophywithusisnot,asitwaswith theGreeks for instance, pursued inprivate like an art,buthasanexistence in theopen, incontactwith thepublic,andespecially,orevenonly,intheserviceofthestate.

Thus, philosophy is also essentially dependent upon the governmenttreasury.

Its['theagriculturalclass']wealthisindependentoftheuncertaintyofbusiness,thequestforprofit,andanysortoffluctuationinpossessions.Fromthisaspectitisopposedbythebusinessclassastheonewhichisdependentonneedsandconcentratedontheirsatisfaction.

Thiswealth is independent of favour,whether from the executive orthemob.

Finally, it is even fortified against its ownwilfulness, because thosemembersofthisclasswhoarecalledtopoliticallifearenotentitled,asothercitizensare,eithertodisposeoftheirentirepropertyatwill,ortothe assurance that it will pass to their children, whom they loveequally,insimilarlyequaldivisions.

Here theoppositionshave takenon an entirelynewandmaterialisticform such as we would hardly expect to find in the heaven of thepoliticalstate.

In sharpest terms, the opposition, as Hegel develops it, is theoppositionofprivatepropertyandwealth.

The possession of land is private property kat exohin true privateproperty. Its exact private nature is prominent (1) as independencefrom state capital, from favour from the executive, from propertyexistingasuniversalpropertyofthepoliticalstate,aparticularwealthwhich, alongside of other wealth, is in accordance with theconstructionofthepoliticalstate;(2)asindependencefromtheneedofsociety or the social wealth, from favour from the mob. (Equallysignificant is the fact that a share in state capital is understood asfavour from the executive just as a share in the social wealth isunderstood as favour from the mob.) Neither the wealth of theuniversal class nor that of the business class is true private property,becausesuchwealth isoccasioned, in theformercasedirectly, in thelatter case indirectly, by the connectionwith theuniversalwealth, orpropertyassocialproperty;bothareaparticipationinit,andthereforebotharemediated throughfavour, that is, through thecontingencyofwill. In opposition to that stands the possession of land as sovereignprivateproperty,whichhasnot yet acquired the formofwealth, i.e.,propertyestablishedbythesocialwill.

Thus,atitshighestpointthepoliticalconstitutionistheconstitutionofprivateproperty.Thehighestpolitical inclination is the inclinationofprivate property. Primogeniture ismerely the external appearance oftheinternalnatureofthepossessionofland.Becauseitisinalienable,itssocialnerveshavebeenseveredand-itsisolationfromcivilsocietyissecured.Bynotpassingontothechildrenwhomtheyloveequally,it is independentevenof thesmallest society, thenatural society, thefamily.Byhavingwithdrawnfromthevolitionandlawsofthefamilyit thus safeguards its rough nature of private property against thetransitionintofamilywealth.

In§305,Hegeldeclaredtheclassoflandedpropertytobecapableofadaptiontothepoliticalpositionbecausefamilylifewouldbeitsbasis.Buthehimselfhasdeclaredlovetobethebasis,theprinciple,thespiritoffamilylife.Theclasswhosebasisisfamilylifethuslacksthebasisof family life, i.e., love, as the actual and thus effective anddeterminingprinciple.Itisspiritlessfamilylife,theillusionoffamilylife. In its highest form of development, the principle of privateproperty contradicts the principle of the family. Family life in civilsocietybecomesfamilylife,thelifeoflove,onlyinoppositiontotheclassofnaturalethicallife,[whichis,accordingtoHegel]theclassoffamily life. This latter is, rather, the barbarism of private propertyagainstfamilylife.

This, then,would be the sovereign splendour of private property, ofpossessionofland,aboutwhichsomanysentimentalitieshaverecentlybeenutteredandonbehalfofwhichsomanymulti-coloredcrocodiletearshavebeenshed.ItdoesnothelpHegeltosaythatprimogeniturewould be merely a requirement of politics and would have to beunderstood in its political position and significance. Neither does it

helphimtosay:'Thesecurityandstabilityoftheagriculturalclassmaybe still further increased by the institution of primogeniture, thoughthis institution is desirable only from the point of view of politics,sinceitentailsasacrificeforthepoliticalendofgivingtheeldestsonalifeofindependence.ThereisacertaindecencyofmindinHegel.Hedoesnotwantprimogenitureinandforitself,butonlyinreferencetosomething else, not as something self-determined but as somethingdeterminedbyanother,notasanendbutasameansforjustifyingandconstructing an end. In fact, primogeniture is a consequence of theexact possession of land; it is petrified private property, privateproperty(quand même)inthehighestindependenceandsharpnessofits development. What Hegel presents as the end, the determiningfactor, the prima causa, of primogeniture is, instead, an effect, aconsequenceofthepowerofabstractprivatepropertyoverthepoliticalstate,whileHegelpresentsprimogenitureasthepowerofthepoliticalstate over private property. He makes the cause the effect and theeffect thecause, thedetermining thatwhichhasbeendeterminedandthatwhichhasbeendeterminedthedetermining.

Whatthenisthecontentofpoliticaladaption,ofthepoliticalend:whatis the end of this end, what is its substance? Primogeniture, thesuperlativeofprivateproperty,sovereignprivateproperty.Whatkindof power does the political state exercise over private property inprimogeniture? Does the state isolate it from the family and societyandbring it to its abstract autonomy?What then is the power of thepoliticalstateoverprivateproperty?Privateproperty'sownpower,itsessence brought to existence. What remains to the political state inopposition to this essence?The illusion that it determineswhen it israther determined. indeed, it breaks the will of the family and ofsociety, but merely in order to give existence to the will of private

propertylackingfamilyandsociety,andtoacknowledgethisexistenceas the highest existence of the political state, as the highest ethicalexistence.

Let us consider the various elements as they relate here in thelegislature to the total state, the state having achieved actuality,consistency, and consciousness, i.e., to the actual political state inconnectionwiththeidealorwhatoughtbe,withthelogicalcharacterandformoftheseelements.

(Primogenitureisnot,asHegelsays,achainonthefreedomofprivaterights; it is rather the freedomofprivate rightswhichhas freed itselffromallsocialandethicalchains.) (Thehighestpoliticalconstructionistheconstructionofabstractprivateproperty.)

Beforewemakethiscomparisonweshouldfirstconsidermorecloselyonestatementoftheparagraph,namely,thatbecauseofprimogeniturethe wealth of the agricultural class, possession of land, privateproperty, is even fortified against its own wilfulness, because thosemembersofthisclasswhoarecalledtopoliticallifearenotentitled,asothercitizensare,todisposeoftheirentirepropertyatwill'.

We have already indicated how the social nerves of private propertyare severed because of the inalienability of landed property. Privateproperty (landed property) is fortified against the owner's ownwilfulness by having the sphere of his wilfulness suddenly changedfromauniversalhumansphere into the specificwilfulnessofprivateproperty. In otherwords, private property has become the subject ofthe will, and the will is merely the predicate of private property.Private property is no longer a determined object of wilfulness, butratherwilfulness is the determined predicate of private property.Yet

letuscompare thiswithwhatHegelhimselfsaysabout thesphereofprivaterights:

§65.ThereasonIcanalienatemypropertyisthatitismineonlyinsofarasIputmywillintoit...providedalwaysthatthethinginquestionisathingexternalbynature.

§ 66. Therefore those goods, or rather substantivecharacteristics,whichconstitutemyownprivatepersonalityand the universal essence of my self-consciousness areinalienable and my right to them is imprescriptible. Suchcharacteristics are my personality as such, my universalfreedomofwill,myethicallife,myreligion.

Therefore in primogeniture landed property, exact private property,becomes an inalienable good, thus a substantive characteristicwhichconstitutes theveryprivatepersonality anduniversal essenceof self-consciousnessof theclassofnobleentailedestates, itspersonalityassuch,itsuniversalfreedomofwill,itsethicallife,itsreligion.Thusitisalsoconsistenttosaythatwhereprivateproperty,landedproperty,isinalienable, universal freedom of will (to which also belongs freedisposition of something alienable, like landed property) and ethicallife (towhichalsobelongs loveas theactual spiritof the family, thespirit which is also identified with the actual law of the family) arealienable. ingeneral then, the inalienabilityofprivateproperty is thealienabilityofuniversalfreedomofwillandethical life.Hereit isnolonger thecase thatproperty is in so far as Iputmywill into it, butrathermywill is inso faras it is inproperty.Heremywilldoesnotownbutisowned.Thisispreciselytheromanticitchofthenobilityofprimogeniture, namely, that here private property, and thus privatewilfulness in its most abstract form - the totally ignorant, unethical,crudewill—appearstobethehighestsynthesisofthepoliticalstate,

the highest renunciation of wilfulness, the hardest and most self-sacrificingstrugglewithhumanweakness;forwhatappearsheretobehuman weakness is actually the humanising, the humanisation ofprivateproperty.

Primogeniture is private property which has become a religion foritself, which has become absorbed in itself, enchanted with itsautonomy and nobility. Just as primogeniture is derived from directalienation, so too it is derived from the contract. Hegel presents thetransitionfrompropertytocontractinthefollowingmanner:

§71.Existenceasdeterminatebeingis inessencebeingforanother;...Oneaspectofpropertyisthatitisanexistentasanexternal thing, and in this respect property exists for otherexternal things and is connected with their necessity andcontingency.But it is alsoanexistent asanembodimentofwill,andfromthispointofviewthe'other'forwhichitexistscanonlybethewillofanotherperson.Thisrelationofwilltowill is the true and proper ground in which freedom isexistent. — The sphere of contract is made up of thismediationwherebyIholdpropertynotmerelybymeansofathing and my subjective will but by means of anotherperson's will as well and so hold it in virtue of myparticipationinacommonwill.

(Inprimogenitureithasbeenmadeastatelawtoholdpropertynotinonecommonwill,butmerelybymeansofa thingandmysubjectivewill.)WhileHegelhereperceivesinprivaterightsthealienabilityanddependenceofprivatepropertyonacommonwillasitstrueidealism,instaterights,ontheotherhand,hepraisestheimaginarynobilityofindependent property as opposed to the uncertainty of business, thequestforprofit,anysortoffluctuationinpossessions,anddependenceonthestate'scapital.Whatkindofstateisthisthatcannoteventolerate

theidealismofprivaterights?Andwhatkindofphilosophyofrightisthis in which the independence of private property has diversemeaningsinthespheresofprivateandstaterights?

Over against the crude stupidity of independent private property, theuncertainty of business is elegiac, the quest for profit solemn(dramatic), fluctuation in possessions a serious fatum (tragic),dependence on the state's capital ethical. In short, in all of thesequalitiesthehumanheartpulsesthroughouttheproperty,whichisthedependenceofmanonman.Nomatterhowitmaybeconstituteditishuman toward theslavewhobelieveshimself tobe free,because thesphere that limitshimisnotsocietybut thesoil.Thefreedomof thiswillisitsemptinessofcontentotherthanthatofprivateproperty.

To define monstrosities like primogeniture as a determination ofprivatepropertybythestateisabsolutelyunavoidableifoneinterpretsanoldworldviewintermsofanewone,ifoneattributestoathing,asinthiscasetoprivateproperty,adoublemeaning,oneinthecourtofabstractrightandanopposedoneintheheavenofthepoliticalstate.

Nowwecometothecomparisonmentionedearlier.§257says:

ThestateistheactualityoftheethicalIdea.Itisethicalmindqua thesubstantialwillmanifestandrevealedtoitself..Thestate exists immediately in custom,mediately in individualself-consciousness...whileself-consciousnessinvirtueofitssentiment towards the state finds in the state, as its essenceand the end and product of its activity, its substantivefreedom.

§268says:

The political sentiment, patriotism pure and simple, is

assured conviction with truth as its basis... and a volitionwhich has become habitual. In this sense it is simply aproduct of the institutions subsisting in the state, sincerationality is actually present in the state, while action inconformity with these institutions gives rationality itspractical proof. This sentiment is, in general, trust (whichmay pass over into a greater or lesser degree of educatedinsight), or the consciousness that my interest, bothsubstantive and particular, is contained and preserved inanother's (i.e., in the state's) interest and end, i.e., in theother'srelationtomeasanindividual.Inthisway,thisveryother is immediately not another in my eyes, and in beingconsciousofthisfactIamfree.

Here,theactualityoftheethicalIdeaappearsasthereligionofprivateproperty(becauseinprimogenitureprivatepropertyrelatestoitselfinareligiousmanner, so it happens that in ourmodern times religion ingeneralhasbecomeaqualityinherentinlandedproperty,andthatallof the writings on the nobility of primogeniture are full of religiousunction. Religion is the highest thought form of this brutality.) Thesubstantialwillmanifestandrevealedtoitselfchangesintoawilldarkand broken on the soil, a will enraptured precisely with theimpenetrability of the element to which it is attached. The assuredconvictionwith truth as its basis,which is political sentiment, is theconviction standing on 'its own ground' (in the literal sense). Thepoliticalvolitionwhichhasbecomehabitualnolongerremainssimplya product [of the institutions subsisting in the state], but rather aninstitution subsisting outside the state. The political sentiment is nolongertrustbutratherthereliance,theconsciousnessthatmyinterest,both substantive and particular, is independent of another's (i.e., thestate's) interest and end, i.e., in the other's relation to me as anindividual.Thisistheconsciousnessofmyfreedomfromthestate.

Themaintenanceof the state's universal interest etc.was (§289) thetaskof theexecutive. In it resided theconsciousnessof rightand thedeveloped intelligence of themass of the people (§ 297). It actuallymakestheEstatessuperfluous,forevenwithout theEstates they[i.e.,thehighestcivilservants]areabletodowhatisbest,justastheyalsocontinually have to dowhile theEstates are in session (Remark to §301).Theuniversalclass,or,moreprecisely,theclassofcivilservants,must,purely invirtueof itscharacterasuniversal,have theuniversalastheendofitsessentialactivity[§303].

And how does the universal class, the executive, appear now? Asessentially dependent upon the state, as wealth dependent upon thefavour of the executive. The very same transformation has occurredwithin civil society, which earlier achieved its ethical life in theCorporation.Itisawealthdependentupontheuncertaintyofbusinessetc.,uponthefavourofthemob.

What then is the quality which ostensibly specifies the owners ofentailedestates?Andwhat,inanycase,constitutestheethicalqualityofaninalienablewealth?Incorruptibility.Incorruptibilityappearstobethe highest political virtue, an abstract virtue.Yet, incorruptibility inthestateasconstructedbyHegelissomethingsouncommonthatithastobebuiltupintoaparticularpoliticalpower;whichpreciselyproves,that incorruptibility isnot the spiritof thepolitical state,not the rulebut theexception,and isconstructedassuch.Theownersofentailedestates are corruptedby their independentproperty inorder that theybepreservedfromcorruption.Whileaccordingtotheideadependenceuponthestateandthefeelingofthisdependenceissupposedtobethehighest political freedom, here the independent private person isconstructed;becausepoliticalfreedomistheprivateperson'sfeelingof

beinganabstract,dependentperson,whereashefeelsandshouldfeelindependent only as a citizen. Its capital is independent alike of thestate'scapital,theuncertaintyofbusiness,etc.Inoppositiontoitstandsthebusiness class,which is dependent onneeds and concentratedontheir satisfaction, and the civil servant class, which is essentiallydependentuponthestate.Here,therefore,independencefromthestateand civil society and this actualised abstraction of both, which inreality is the crudest dependenceon the soil, forms in the legislaturethemediation and theunityofboth. Independentprivatewealth, i.e.,abstract privatewealth and the corresponding private person, are thehighest political construction of the state. Political independence isconstructed as independent private property and the person of thisindependentprivateproperty.Weshallseeinthefollowingparagraphwhat the situation is re vera regarding this independence andincorruptibility,andthepoliticalsentimentarisingfromthem.

Thefact thatprimogeniture is inherited,orentailedwealthspeaksforitself.Moreaboutthislater.Thefactthatitaccruestothefirst-bornis,asHegelnotesintheAddition,purelyhistorical.

§ 307. The right of this section of the agricultural class isthus based in away on the natural principle of the family.Butthisprincipleisatthesametimereversedowingtohardsacrificesmadeforpoliticalends,andtherebytheactivityofthis class is essentially directed to those ends. As aconsequence of this, this class is summoned and entitled toitspoliticalvocationbybirthwithoutthehazardsofelection.

Hegel has failed to develop the way in which the right of thisagriculturalclassisbasedonthenaturalprincipleofthefamily,unlessby this he understands that landed property exists as entailed orinheritedwealth.That,however,establishesnorightofthisclassinthe

politicalsense,butonlythebirthrightoftheownersofentailedestatestolandedproperty.'This',i.e.,thenaturalprincipleofthefamily,is'atthe same time reversed owing to hard sacrifices made for politicalends'.Wehavecertainlyseenhowthenaturalprincipleofthefamilyisreversed;this,however,isnohardsacrificemadeforpoliticalends,butrather the actualised abstraction of private property. But with thisreversal of the natural principle of the family the political ends arelikewise reversed, 'thereby (?) the activity of this class is essentiallydirected to those ends' — because private property receivedindependence?-and'asaconsequenceofthis,thisclassissummonedand entitled to its political vocation by birth without the hazards ofelection'.

Herethenparticipationinthelegislatureisaninnatehumanright.Herewehavebornlegislators,i.e.,bornmediationofthepoliticalstatewithitself. innatehumanrightshavebeenmocked,especiallyonbehalfofthe owners of entailed estates. Isn't it evenmore humorous that oneparticular group of men is entrusted with the right to the highesthonour, the legislature? In Hegel's treatment of the summons to thelegislator, to the representative of state citizenship, there is nothingmore ridiculous thanhisopposing summonsbybirth to summonsbythehazardsof election.As if election, the consciousproduct of civiltrust,wouldnot stand in a completelydifferentnecessary connectionwiththepoliticalendsthandoesthephysicalaccidentofbirth.Hegeleverywhere falls from his political spiritualism into the crassestmaterialism.Atthesummitofthepoliticalstateitisalwaysbirththatmakes determinate individuals into embodiments of the highestpoliticaltasks.Thehighestpoliticalactivitiescoincidewithindividualsbyreasonofbirth,Justlikeananimal'sposition,character,wayoflife,etc.areimmediatelyinborn. initshighestfunctionsthestateacquires

ananimalactuality.NaturetakesrevengeonHegelforthedisdainheshowed it. Ifmatter is supposed to constitute no longer anything foritself over against the humanwill, the humanwill no longer retainsanythingforitselfexceptthematter.

Thefalseidentity,thefragmentaryandsporadicidentityofnatureandspirit, body and soul, appears as incarnation. Since birth gives manonly an individual existence and establishes himmerely as a naturalindividual, and since the functions of the state - as for instance thelegislature, etc. are social products, i.e., births of society and notprocreations of the natural individual, then what is striking andmiraculousispreciselytheimmediateidentity,thesuddencoincidence,oftheindividual'sbirthwiththeindividualasindividuationofacertainsocial position, function, etc. — In this system, nature immediatelycreates kings, peers, etc. Just as it creates eyes and noses. What isstrikingistoseeasimmediateproductofthephysicalspecieswhatisonly the product of the self-conscious species. I am man by birth,withouttheagreementofsociety;yetonlythroughuniversalagreementdoes thisdeterminatebirthbecomepeerorking.Only theagreementmakes the birth of this man the birth of a king. It is therefore theagreement,notbirth, thatmakestheking.Ifbirth, indistinctionfromother determinations, immediately endowsmanwith a position, thenhisbodymakeshimthisdeterminedsocialfunctionary.Hisbodyishissocialright.Inthissystem,thephysicaldignityofman,orthedignityof thehumanbody (with further elaboration,meaning: thedignityofthephysicalnaturalelementof thestate),appears insuchaformthatdeterminate dignities, specifically the highest social dignities, are thedignities of certain bodies which are determined and predestined bybirthtobesuch.Thisis,ofcourse,whywefindinthearistocracysuchprideinbloodanddescent,inshort,inthelifehistoryoftheirbody.It

isthiszoologicalpointofviewwhichhasitscorrespondingscienceinheraldry.Thesecretofaristocracyiszoology.

Twomomentsinhereditaryprimogeniturearetobestressed:

1.Thatwhichispermanentisentailedwealth,landedproperty.This is the preserving moment in the relation — thesubstance. The master of the entailed estate, the owner, isreally amere accident. Landed property anthropomorphisesitself in the various generations. Landed property alwaysinherits,asitwere,thefirstbornofthehouseasanattributelinkedtoit.Everyfirstborninthelineoflandownersistheinheritance, theproperty,of the inalienable landedproperty,which is the predestined substance of hiswill and activity.Thesubjectisthethingandthepredicateistheman.Thewillbecomesthepropertyoftheproperty.

2.Thepoliticalqualityoftheowneroftheentailedestateisthepolitical quality of his inherited wealth, a political qualityinheringinhisinheritedwealth.Here,therefore,thepoliticalqualityappearsalsoas thepropertyof landedproperty,asaqualitywhich is ascribeddirectly to the bare physical earth(nature).

Regardingthefirstpoint,itfollowsthattheowneroftheentailedestateis the serf of the landed property, and that in the serfs who aresubordinated to him there appears only the practical consequence ofthe theoretical relationshipwith landed property inwhich he himselfstands. The depth ofGerman subjectivity appears everywhere as thecrudityofamindlessobjectivity.

Here wemust analyse (1) the relation between private property andinheritance,(2)therelationbetweenprivateproperty,inheritance,and,thereby, theprivilegeof certaingenerations to participate in politicalsovereignty,(3)theactualhistoricalrelation,ortheGermanicrelation.

We have seen that primogeniture is the abstraction of independentprivate property. A second consequence follows from this.Independence,autonomy, in thepoliticalstatewhoseconstructionwehavefollowedsofar,isprivateproperty,whichatitspeakappearsasinalienable landed property. Political independence thus flows notexproprio sinu ofthepoliticalstate;itisnotagiftofthepoliticalstatetoits members, nor is it the animating spirit [of the political state].Rather, themembers of the political state receive their independencefromabeingwhichisnotthebeingofthepoliticalstate,fromabeingof abstract private right, namely, from abstract private property.Political independence is an accident of private property and not thesubstanceofthepoliticalstate.Thepoliticalstate—andwithinitthelegislature, as we have seen— is the unveiled mystery of the truevalue and essence of themoments of the state.The significance thatprivate property has in the political state is its essential, its truesignificance; thesignificance thatclassdistinctionhas in thepoliticalstateistheessentialsignificanceofclassdistinction.Inthesameway,theessenceofthesovereignandoftheexecutivecometoappearanceinthelegislature.Itishere,inthesphereofthepoliticalstate,thattheindividualmomentsofthestaterelatetothemselvesastothebeingofthespecies,the'species-being';becausethepoliticalstateisthesphereof their universal character, i.e., their religious sphere. The politicalstate is the mirror of truth for the various moments of the concretestate.

Thus, if independent private property in the political state, in thelegislature,hasthesignificanceofpoliticalindependence,thenitisthepolitical independence of the state. Independent private property, oractualprivatepropertyisthennotonlythesupportoftheconstitutionbut the constitution itself. And isn't the support of the constitutionnothing other than the constitution of constitutions, the primary, theactualconstitution?

Hegel himself was surprised about the immanent development ofscience, the derivation of its entire content from the concept in itssimplicity (Remark to § 279), when he was constructing thehereditarymonarch,andmadethefollowingremark:

Hence it is the basicmoment of personality, abstract at thestartinimmediaterights,whichhasmatureditselfthroughitsvarious forms of subjectivity, and now — at the stage ofabsolute rights, of the state, of the completely concreteobjectivityof thewill—hasbecome thepersonalityof thestate,itscertaintyofitself.

That is, in the political state it comes to appearance that abstractpersonalityisthehighestpoliticalpersonality,thepoliticalbasisoftheentire state. Likewise, in primogeniture, the right of this abstractpersonality, its objectivity, abstract private property, comes intoexistenceasthehighestobjectivityofthestate,i.e.,asitshighestright.

The state is hereditary monarch; abstract personality means nothingother than that thepersonalityof thestate isabstract,or that it is thestateofabstractpersonality,justastheRomansdevelopedtherightsofthemonarchpurelywithinthenormsofprivaterights,orprivaterightsasthehighestnormofstate,orpoliticalrights.

TheRomansaretherationalists,theGermansthemysticsofsovereignprivateproperty.

Hegelcallsprivaterightstherightsofabstractpersonality,orabstractrights.And indeed theyhave tobedeveloped as the abstraction, andthus the illusory rights, of abstract personality, just as the moraldoctrine developed by Hegel is the illusory existence of abstractsubjectivity. Hegel develops private rights and morals as suchabstractions, fromwhich itdoesnot follow, forhim, that the stateorethicallifeofwhichtheyarethepresuppositionscanbenothingbutthesociety(thesociallife)oftheseillusions;rather,heconcludesthattheyare subalternate moments of this ethical life. But what are privaterights except the rights of these subjects of the state, and what ismorality except theirmorality? In otherwords, the person of privaterightsand thesubjectofmoralsare thepersonand thesubjectof thestate.Hegelhasbeenwidelycriticisedforhisdevelopmentofmorality.Hehasdonenothingbutdevelopthemoralityofthemodernstateandmodern private rights.Amore complete separation ofmorality fromthe state, its fuller emancipation, was desired. What did that proveexcept that the separation of the present-day state from morals ismoral,thatmoralsarenon-politicalandthatthestateisnotmoral?Itisrather a great, though fromone aspect (namely, from the aspect thatHegeldeclaresthestate,whosepresuppositionissuchamorality,tobethe realistic idea of ethical life) an unconscious service of Hegel tohaveassignedtomodernmoralityitstrueposition.

In the constitution, wherein primogeniture is a guarantee, privatepropertyistheguaranteeofthepoliticalconstitution.Inprimogeniture,it appears that this guarantee is a particular kind of private property.Primogeniture is merely a particular existence of the universal

relationshipofprivatepropertyandthepoliticalstate.Primogenitureisthepolitical senseofprivateproperty,privateproperty in itspoliticalsignificance, that is to say, in its universal significance. Thus theconstitutionhereistheconstitutionofprivateproperty.

With theGermanicpeoples,whereweencounterprimogeniture in itsclassical formation,we also find the constitution of private property.Privatepropertyisauniversalcategory,theuniversalbondofthestate.EventheuniversalfunctionsappearastheprivatepropertysometimesofaCorporation,sometimesofanestate.

Trade and business in their particular nuances were the privateproperty of particular Corporations. Royal offices, jurisdiction, etc.,were theprivatepropertyofparticular estates.Thevariousprovinceswere the private property of individual princes etc. Service for therealmwastheprivatepropertyoftheruler.Thespiritwastheprivatepropertyofthespiritualauthority.'One'sloyalactivitywastheprivateproperty of another, just as one's right was, once again, a particularprivate property. Sovereignty, here nationality, was the privatepropertyoftheEmperor.

IthasoftenbeensaidthatintheMiddleAgeseveryformofright,offreedom,ofsocialexistence,appearsasaprivilege,anexceptionfromtherule.Theempiricalfactthatalltheseprivilegesappearintheformofprivatepropertycould thusnothavebeenoverlooked.What is theuniversal reasonfor thiscoincidence?Privateproperty is thespecies-existenceofprivilege,ofrightasanexception.

Where the sovereigns, as in France for instance, attacked theindependenceofprivateproperty,theydirectedtheirattentionmoretothe property of the Corporations than to that of individuals. But in

attackingtheprivatepropertyoftheCorporationstheyattackedprivatepropertyasCorporations,i.e.,asthesocialbond.

Inthefeudalreignitalmostappearsthatthepowerofthecrownisthepower of private property, and that themystery of the nature of theuniversalpower, thepowerofall spheresof thestate, isdeposited inthesovereign.

(The powerfulness of the state is expressed in the sovereign as therepresentativeof thepowerof thestate.Theconstitutionalsovereign,therefore, expresses the ideaof the constitutional state in its sharpestabstraction.Ontheonehandheis theideaofthestate, thesanctifiedmajestyofthestate,andpreciselyasthis person.Atthesametimeheisapureimagination;aspersonandassovereignhehasneitheractualpowernoractualfunction.Here,theseparationofthepoliticalandtheactual, the formal and the material, the universal and the particularperson, Of man and social man, is expressed in its highestcontradiction.)

PrivatepropertyisachildofRomanintellectandGermanicheart.Atthispoint itwill bevaluable toundertake a comparisonof these twoextreme developments. This will help solve the political problem asdiscussed.

The Romans were the first to have formulated the right of privateproperty, i.e., the abstract right, the private right, the right of theabstractperson.TheRomanconceptionofprivaterightisprivaterightinitsclassicalformulation.YetnowherewiththeRomansdowefindthat the right of private propertywasmystified as in the case of theGermans.Nowheredoesitbecomerightofthestate.

The right of private property is jus utendi et abutendi, the right ofwilfulnessindisposingofathing.ThemaininterestoftheRomanslayindevelopingtherelationships,andindeterminingwhichonesresultedin abstract relations of private property. The actual basis of privateproperty, the property, is a factum, an unexplainable factum, and noright.Only through legal determinations,which the society attributestothefactualproperty,doesitreceivethequalityofrightfulproperty,privateproperty.

RegardingtheconnectionbetweenthepoliticalconstitutionandprivatepropertywiththeRomans,itappearsthat:

1.Man(asslave),asisgenerallythecasewithancientpeoples,istheobjectofprivateproperty.Thisisnothingspecific.

2. Conquered countries are treated as private property, jusutendi et abutendi beingassertedintheircase.

3.Intheirhistoryitself,thereappearsthestrugglebetweenthepoorandtherich(PatriciansandPlebians)etc.

In other respects, private property as a whole, as with the ancientclassicalpeoplesingeneral,isassertedtobepublicproperty,eitherastherepublic'sexpenditure—as ingoodtimes—oras luxuriousanduniversalbenefaction(baths,etc.)towardsthemob.

Slavery finds its explanation in the rights of war, the rights ofoccupation:menareslavespreciselybecausetheirpoliticalexistenceisdestroyed.

WeespeciallystresstworelationshipsindistinctionfromtheGermans.

1.The imperial powerwas not the power of private property,but rather the sovereignty of the empirical will as such,whichwas far from regarding private property as the bondbetweenitselfanditssubjects;onthecontrary, itdealtwithprivate property as it did with all other social goods. Theimperial power, therefore, was nothing other than factuallyhereditary. The highest formation of the right of privateproperty, of private right, indeed belongs to the imperialepoch; however, it is a consequence of the politicaldissolution rather than the political dissolution being aconsequenceofprivateproperty.Furthermore,whenprivateright achieved full development in Rome, state right wasabolished,[or]wasintheprocessofitsdissolution,whileinGermanytheoppositewasthecase.

2. InRome, state honours are never hereditary; that is to say,privatepropertyisnotthedominantcategoryofthestate.

3. Contrary to German primogeniture etc., in Rome thewilfulness of the testator appears to be the derivative ofprivate property. In this latter antithesis lies the entiredifferencebetweentheGermanandtheRomandevelopmentofprivateproperty.

(Inprimogenitureitappearsthatprivatepropertyistherelationshiptothefunctionofthestatewhichissuchthattheexistenceofthestateissomethinginheringin,orisanaccidentof,directprivateproperty,i.e.,landed property. At its highest levels the state appears as privateproperty, whereas private property should appear as property of thestate. Insteadofmakingprivatepropertyacivilquality,Hegelmakespolitical citizenship, existence, and sentiment a quality of private

property.)

CritiqueofHegel'sPhilosophyofRightKarlMarx,1843

§ 308. The second section of the Estates comprises thefluctuating element in civil society. This element can enterpolitics only through its deputies; the multiplicity of itsmembers is an external reason for this, but the essentialreason is the specific character of this element and itsactivity.Sincethesedeputiesarethedeputiesofcivilsociety,it follows as a direct consequence that their appointment ismadebythesocietyasasociety.Thatistosay,inmakingtheappointment, society is not dispersed into atomic units,collected to perform only a single and temporary act, andkepttogetherforamomentandnolonger.Onthecontrary,itmakes the appointment as a society, articulated intoassociations,communities,andCorporations,whichalthoughconstitutedalreadyforotherpurposes,acquire in thiswayaconnection with politics. The existence of the Estates andtheirassemblyfindsaconstitutionalguaranteeof itsowninthe fact that this class is entitled to send deputies at thesummons of the crown,whilemembers of the former classare entitled to present themselves in person in the Estates(see§307).

HerewefindanewdistinctionwithincivilsocietyandtheEstates:thedistinction between a fluctuating element and an immutable element(landed property).This distinction has also been presented as that ofspaceandtime,conservativeandprogressive,etc.Onthis,seeHegel'sprevious paragraphs. Incidentally, by means of the Corporations,associations, etc., Hegel hasmade the fluctuating element of societyalsoastableelement.

TheseconddistinctionconsistsinthefactthatthefirstelementoftheEstatesasdevelopedabove,theownersofentailedestates,are,assuch,

legislators; that legislative power is an attribute of their empirical,personal existence; that they act not as deputies but as themselves;whereasinthesecondelementoftheEstateselectionandselectionofdeputiestakeplace.

Hegelgives tworeasonswhy this fluctuatingelementofcivil societycanenterthepoliticalstate,orlegislature,onlythroughdeputies.Hegelhimselfcallsthefirstreason-namely,themultiplicityofitsmembers-external,therebyrelievingusoftheneedofgivingthesamereply.

But the essential reason, he says, is the specific character of thiselementanditsactivity.Politicaloccupationandactivityarealientoitsspecificcharacterandactivity.

HegelreplayshisoldsongabouttheseEstatesbeingdeputiesofcivilsociety.Civilsocietymustmaketheappointmentsasasociety.Rather,civil societymust do this aswhat it isnot, because it is unpoliticalsociety, and is supposed toperformhere apolitical act as somethingessentialtoitandarisingfromit.Withthatitis'dispersedintoatomicunits', and collected to performonly a single and temporary act, andkepttogetherforamomentandnolonger'.Firstofall,itspoliticalactisasingleandtemporaryact,andcanthereforeonlyappearassuchinbeing carried out. It is an ecstasy, an act of political society whichcausesastir,andmustalsoappearassuch.Secondly,Hegelwasnotdisturbed by the fact - indeed, he argued its necessity - that civilsociety materially (merely as a second society deputised by it)separatesitselffromitscivilactualityandestablishesitselfaswhatitisnot.Howcanhenowformallydisposeofthis?

Hethinksthatsociety'sassociationsetc.,whichareconstitutedalreadyforotherpurposes,acquireaconnectionwithpoliticsbecausesociety

initsCorporationsetc.appointsthedeputies.Buteithertheyacquireasignificancewhichisnottheirsignificance,ortheirconnectionassuchispolitical,inwhichcaseitdoesnotjust'acquire'thepoliticaltinge,asdeveloped above, but rather in it politics acquires its connection.BydesignatingonlythispartoftheEstatesasthatofthedeputy,HegelhasunwittinglystatedthenatureofthetwoChambers(atthepointwherethey actually have the relationship to one another he indicated). TheChamberofDeputiesandtheChamberofPeers(orwhatevertheybecalled) are not, in the present case, different instances of the sameprinciple) but derive from two essentially different principles andsocial positions. Here the Chamber of Deputies is the politicalconstitutionofcivilsocietyinthemodernsense,whiletheChamberofPeersisthepoliticalconstitutionofcivilsocietyinthesensepropertotheEstates.TheChamber ofPeers and theChamber ofDeputies areopposed here as the Estate- and the political-representation of civilsociety. The one is the existing estate principle of civil society, theotheristheactualisationofcivilsociety'sabstractpoliticalexistence.Itisobvious,therefore,thatthelattercannotcomeintoexistenceagainastherepresentationoftheestates,Corporations,etc.,foritsimplydoesnotrepresentcivilsociety'sexistencequaestate,butratheritspoliticalexistence. It is further obvious, then, that only the estate element ofcivilsociety,i.e.,sovereignlandedpropertyorthehereditarynobility,isseatedintheformerChamber,foritisnotoneestateamongothers.Rather, the estate principle of civil society as an actually social, andthuspolitical, principlenowexistsonly in thatoneelement. It is theestate. Civil society, then, has in the Chamber of the estates therepresentative of its medieval existence, and in the Chamber ofDeputies the representative of its political (modern) existence. Theonlyadvancebeyond theMiddleAgesconsists in the fact that estatepolitics has been reduced to a particular political existence alongside

thepoliticsofcitizenship.TheempiricalpoliticalexistenceHegelhasinmind(England)has,therefore,ameaningentirelyotherthantheoneheimputestoit.

TheFrenchConstitutionalsoconstitutesanadvanceinthisregard.Tobe sure, it has reduced the Chamber of Peers to a pure nullity; butwithintheprincipleofconstitutionalkingshipasHegelhaspretendedtodevelopit,thisChambercanbyitsverynaturebemerelyanemptyvanity, the fiction of a harmony between the sovereign and civilsociety,orofthelegislatureorpoliticalstatewithitself,andafiction,moreover,whichhas the formof aparticular and therebyoncemoreopposedexistence.

The French have allowed the peers to retain life tenure in order toexpress their independence fromboth the regimeand thepeople.Butthey did away with the medieval expression - hereditariness. Theiradvanceconsists in theirno longerallowing theChamberofPeers toproceedfromactualcivilsociety,butincreatingitinabstractionfromcivilsociety.Theyhavethechoiceofpeersproceedfromtheexistingpolitical state, from the sovereign,without binding him to any othercivil quality. In this constitution the honour of being a peer actuallyconstitutes a class in civil society which is purely political, createdfrom the standpoint of the abstraction of the political state; but itappearstobemoreapoliticaldecorationthananactualclassendowedwith particular rights. During the Restoration the Chamber of Peerswas a reminiscence, while the Chamber of Peers resulting from theJulyRevolutionisanactualcreatureofconstitutionalmonarchy.

Since inmodern times the idea of the state could appear only in theabstraction of themerely political state, or in the abstraction of civilsociety from itself and its actual condition, it is to the credit of the

Frenchthattheyhavemarkedandproducedthisabstractactuality,andtherebyhaveproducedthepoliticalprincipleitself.Theabstractionforwhichtheyareblamedis,then,agenuineconsequenceandproductofa patriotism rediscovered, to be sure, only in an opposition, but in anecessaryopposition.ThemeritoftheFrenchinthisregard,then,istohave established the Chamber of Peers as the unique product of thepoliticalstate,oringeneral,tohavemadethepoliticalprincipleinitsuniquenessthedeterminingandeffectivefactor.

Hegel also remarks that in the deputation, as he constructs it, theexistence of the Estates and their assembly finds a constitutionalguaranteeofitsowninthefactthattheCorporationsetc.areentitledtosend deputies. Thus, the guarantee of the existence of the Estates'assembly,theirtrulyprimitiveexistence,becomestheprivilegeoftheCorporationsetc.Withthis,Hegelrevertscompletelytothemedievalstandpoint andhas abandoned entirely his abstractionof the politicalstateasthesphereofthestateasstate,theactuallyexistinguniversal.

In the modern sense, the existence of the Estates' assembly is thepolitical existence of civil society, the guarantee of its politicalexistence. To question the existence of the Estates' assembly is toquestiontheexistenceofthestate.Whereaspatriotism,theessenceofthe legislature, finds its guarantee in independent private propertyaccording to Hegel, so the existence of the legislature finds itsguaranteeintheprivilegesoftheCorporations.

ButtheoneelementintheEstatesismuchmorethepoliticalprivilegeof civil society, or its privilege of being political. Therefore, thatelement canneverbe theprivilegeof aparticular civilmodeof civilsociety's existence, and can still less find its guarantee in thatmode,becauseitissupposedtobe,rather,theuniversalguarantee.

Thus Hegel is everywhere reduced to giving the political state aprecarious actuality in a relationship of dependence upon another,ratherthandescribingitasthehighest,completelyexistingactualityofsocialexistence;heisreducedtohavingitfinditstrueexistenceintheothersphereratherthandescribingitasthetrueexistenceoftheothersphere.Thepolitical stateeverywhereneeds theguaranteeof sphereslyingoutsideit.Itisnotactualisedpower,butsupportedimpotence.Itisnotthepoweroverthesesupports,butthepowerofthesupport.Thesupportistheseatofpower.

What kind of lofty existent is it whose existence needs a guaranteeoutside itself, and which is supposed to be at the same time theuniversal existence - and thus the actual guarantee - of this veryguarantee. In general, in his development of the legislature Hegeleverywhere retreats from the philosophical standpoint to that otherstandpointwhichfailstoexaminethematterinitsownterms.

IftheexistenceoftheEstatesrequiresaguarantee,thentheyarenotanactual, but merely a fictitious political existence. In constitutionalstates, theguarantee for theexistenceof theEstates is the law.Thus,theirexistence isa legalexistence,dependenton theuniversalnatureof the state and not on the power or impotence of individualCorporationsorassociations;theirexistenceistheactualityofthestateas an association. (It is preciselyhere that theCorporations, etc., theparticular spheres of civil society, should receive their universalexistence for the first time. Again, Hegel anticipates this universalexistenceastheprivilegeandtheexistenceoftheseparticularspheres.)

Political rightas therightofCorporationsetc.completelycontradictspolitical right as political, i.e., as the right of the state and of

citizenship, forpolitical rightpreciselyshouldnotbe therightof thisexistenceasaparticularexistence,notrightasthisparticularexistence.

Beforewe proceed to the category of election as the political act bywhich civil society decides upon its political choice, let us examinesomeadditionalstatementsfromtheRemarktothisparagraph.

Toholdthateverysinglepersonshouldshareindeliberatingand deciding on political matters of general concern o thegroundthatall individualsaremembersof thestate, that itsconcernsaretheirconcerns,andthatitistheirrightthatwhatisdoneshouldbedonewiththeirknowledgeandvolition,istantamount to a proposal to put the democratic elementwithout any rational form into the organism of the state,althoughitisonlyinvirtueofthepossessionofsuchaformthatthestateisanorganismatall.Thisideacomesreadilytomindbecauseitdoesnotgobeyondtheabstractionof'beingamember of the state'. and it is superficial thinkingwhichclingstoabstractions.[§308]

First of all, Hegel calls being a member of the state an abstraction,althoughaccordingtotheidea,[andtherefore]theintentionofhisowndoctrinal development, it is the highest and most concrete socialdeterminationofthelegalperson,ofthememberofthestate.Tostopat theabstractionof 'beingamemberof thestate' and toconceiveofindividuals in termsof this abstractiondoesnot therefore seem tobejust superficial thinking which clings to abstractions. That theabstractionof 'beingamemberof thestate' is reallyanabstraction isnot,however,thefaultofthisthinkingbutofHegel'slineofargumentand actual modern conditions, which presuppose the separation ofactual life from political life and make the political quality anabstractionofactualparticipationinthestate.

According toHegel, thedirectparticipationofall indeliberatinganddecidingonpoliticalmattersofgeneralconcernadmitsthedemocraticelement without any rational form into the organism of the state,although it isonly invirtueof thepossessionofsucha formthat thestateisanorganismatall.That is tosay, thedemocraticelementcanbeadmittedonlyasaformalelementinastateorganismthatismerelyaformalismofthestate.Thedemocraticelementshouldbe,rather,theactualelementthatacquiresitsrationalforminthewholeorganismofthe state. If thedemocraticelemententers the stateorganismor stateformalism as a particular element, then the rational form of itsexistencemeans a drill, an accommodation, a form, inwhich it doesnot exhibit what is characteristic of its essence. In other words, itwouldenterthestateorganismmerelyasaformalprinciple.

We have already pointed out that Hegel develops merely a stateformalism. For him, the actual material principle is the Idea, theabstractthought-formofthestateasasubject,theabsoluteIdeawhichhasinitnopassiveormaterialmoment.IncontrasttotheabstractionofthisIdeathedeterminationsoftheactual,empiricalstateformalismappearascontent;andhencetheactualcontent(hereactualman,actualsociety,etc.)appearasformlessinorganicmatter.

HegelhadestablishedtheessenceoftheEstatesinthefactthatinthemempirical universality becomes the subject of the actually existinguniversal.Doesthismeananythingotherthanthatmattersofpoliticalconcern 'are theirconcerns,andthat it is theirright thatwhat isdoneshouldbedonewiththeirknowledgeandvolition'?AndshouldnottheEstatespreciselyconstitute theiractualised right?And is it surprisingthenthatallseektheactualityofwhatistheirsbyright?

Toholdthateverysinglepersonshouldshareindeliberating

anddecidingonpoliticalmattersofgeneralconcern...

In a really rational state one could answer, 'Not every single personshould share in deliberating and deciding on political matters ofgeneral concern', because the individuals share in deliberating anddecidingonmattersofgeneralconcernasthe'all',thatistosay,withinandasmembersofthesociety.Notallindividually,buttheindividualsasall.

Hegel presents himself with the dilemma: either civil society (theMany, the multitude) shares through deputies in deliberating anddecidingonpoliticalmattersofgeneralconcernorall[as]Iindividualsdothis.Thisisnooppositionofessence,asHegelsubsequentlytriestopresentit,butofexistence,andindeedofthemostexternalexistence,quantity.Thus,thebasiswhichHegelhimselfdesignatedasexternal-themultiplicityofmembers-remainsthebestreasonagainstthedirectparticipation of all. The question of whether civil society shouldparticipateinthelegislatureeitherbyenteringitthroughdeputiesorbythedirectparticipationofallas individuals is itselfaquestionwithinthe abstraction of the political state or within the abstract politicalstate;itisanabstractpoliticalquestion.

It is in both cases, asHegel himself has developed this, the politicalsignificanceof'empiricaluniversality'.

Initsproperformtheoppositionis this: theindividualsparticipateasall, or the individuals participate as a few, as not all. In both casesallness remainsmerelyanexternalpluralityor totalityof individuals.Allness isnoessential, spiritual,actualqualityof the individual. It isnot something throughwhichhewould lose the character of abstractindividuality.Rather, it ismerely the sum total of individuality.One

individuality, many individualities, all individualities. The one, themany,theall-noneofthesedeterminationschangestheessenceofthesubject,individuality.

Allasindividualsshouldshareindeliberatinganddecidingonpoliticalmattersofgeneralconcern;thatistosay,then,thatallshouldshareinthisnotasallbutasindividuals.

Thequestionappearstocontradictitselfintworespects.

Thepoliticalmatters of general concern are the concern of the state,the state as actual concern. Deliberation and decision is theeffectuationof thestateasactualconcern. It seemsobvious then thatall themembers of the state have a relationship to the state as beingtheir actual concern.Thevery notionofmember of the state impliestheirbeingamemberofthestate,apartofit,andthestatehavingthemasitspart.Butiftheyareanintegralpartofthestate,thenitisobviousthat their social existence is already their actual participation in it.They are not only integral parts of the state, but the state is theirintegral part. To be consciously an integral part of something is toparticipate consciously in it, to be consciously integral to it.Withoutthisconsciousnessthememberofthestatewouldbeananimal.

To say 'political matters of general concern' makes it appear thatmattersofgeneral concern and the state are somethingdifferent.Butthe state is thematter of general concern, thus really thematters ofgeneralconcern.

Participationinpoliticalmattersofgeneralconcernandparticipationinthe state are, therefore, identical. It is a tautology [to say] that amember of the state, a part of the state, participates in the state, and

that this participation can appear only as deliberation or decision, orrelated forms, and thus that every member of the state shares indeliberating and deciding (if these functions are taken to be thefunctions of actual participation in the state) the political matters ofgeneral concern. Ifweare talkingabout actualmembersof the state,then thisparticipationcannotbe regardedasa 'should';otherwisewewould be talking about subjects who should be and want to bemembersofthestate,butactuallyarenot.

On the other hand, if we are talking about definite concerns, aboutsinglepoliticalacts,thenitisagainobviousthatnotallasindividualsaccomplishthem.Otherwise,theindividualwouldbethetruesociety,andwouldmakesocietysuperfluous.Theindividualwouldhavetodoeverythingatonce,whilesocietywouldhavehimactforothersjustasitwouldhaveothersactforhim.

The question whether all as individuals should share in deliberatinganddecidingonpoliticalmattersofgeneralconcernisaquestionthatarisesfromtheseparationofthepoliticalstateandcivilsociety.

Aswehaveseen,thestateexistsmerelyaspoliticalstate.Thetotalityofthepoliticalstateisthelegislature.Toparticipateinthelegislatureis thus to participate in the political state and to prove and actualiseone'sexistenceasmemberofthepoliticalstate,asmemberofthestate.Thatallasindividualswanttoparticipateintegrallyinthelegislatureisnothingbutthewillofalltobeactual(active)membersofthestate,ortogivethemselvesapoliticalexistence,ortoprovetheirexistenceaspoliticalandtoeffectitassuch.WehavefurtherseenthattheEstatesarecivilsocietyaslegislature,thattheyareitspoliticalexistence.Thefact,therefore,thatcivilsocietyinvadesthesphereoflegislativepoweren masse, andwherepossibletotally, thatactualcivilsocietywishes

to substitute itself for the fictional civil society of the legislature, isnothingbut thedriveofcivilsociety togive itselfpoliticalexistence,or tomake political existence its actual existence. The drive of civilsociety to transform itself into political society, or tomake politicalsociety into the actual society, shows itself as the drive for themostfullypossibleuniversalparticipationinlegislativepower.

Here, quantity is notwithout importance. If the augmentation of theEstatesisaphysicalandintellectualaugmentationofoneofthehostileforces-andwehaveseenthat thevariouselementsof the legislatureopposeoneanotherashostileforces-thenthequestionofwhetherallas individuals aremembers of the legislature orwhether they shouldenter thelegislaturethroughdeputiesis theplacinginquestionof therepresentativeprinciplewithintherepresentativeprinciple,i.e.,withinthat fundamental conception of the political state which exists inconstitutional monarchy. (1) The notion that the legislature is thetotality of the political state is a notion of the abstraction of thepolitical state. Because this one act is the sole political act of civilsociety,allshouldparticipateandwanttoparticipateinitatonce.(2)Allasindividuals.IntheEstates,legislativeactivityisnotregardedassocial, as a function of society, but rather as the act wherein theindividuals first assume an actually and consciously social function,that is, a political function. Here the legislature is no derivative, nofunction of society, but simply its formation. This formation into alegislative power requires that all members of civil society regardthemselves as individuals, that they actually face one another asindividuals. The abstraction of 'being amember of the state' is their'abstractdefinition',adefinitionthatisnotactualisedintheactualityoftheirlife.

There are two possibilities here: either the separation of the politicalstate and civil society actually obtains, or civil society is actualpoliticalsociety.Inthefirstcase,itisimpossiblethatallasindividualsparticipateinthelegislature,forthepoliticalstateisanexistentwhichis separated fromcivil society.On the one hand, civil societywouldabandonitselfassuchifall[itsmembers]werelegislators;ontheotherhand,thepoliticalstatewhichstandsoveragainstitcantolerateitonlyifithasaformsuitabletothestandardsofthestate.Inotherwords,theparticipation of civil society in the political state through deputies ispreciselytheexpressionoftheirseparationandmerelydualisticunity.

Giventhesecondcase,i.e.,thatcivilsocietyisactualpoliticalsociety,it is nonsense to make a claim which has resulted precisely from anotionofthepoliticalstateasanexistentseparatedfromcivilsociety,from the theological notion of the political state. In this situation,legislativepoweraltogetherlosesthemeaningofrepresentativepower.Here, the legislature is a representation in the same sense in whichevery function is representative. For example, the shoemaker is myrepresentativeinsofarashefulfilsasocialneed,justaseverydefinitesocial activity, because it is a species-activity, represents only thespecies;thatistosay,itrepresentsadeterminationofmyownessencethe way every man is the representative of the other. Here, he isrepresentativenotbyvirtueofsomethingotherthanhimselfwhichherepresents,butbyvirtueofwhatheisanddoes.

Legislativepowerissoughtnotforthesakeofitscontent,butforthesakeofitsformalpoliticalsignificance.Forexample,executivepower,inandforitself,hastobetheobjectofpopulardesiremuchmorethanlegislative power, which is the metaphysical political function. Thelegislativefunctionisthewill,notinitspracticalbutinitstheoretical

energy.Here, thewill shouldnotpre-empt the law; rather, theactuallawistobediscoveredandformulated.

Outof thisdividednatureof the legislature - i.e., itsnatureasactuallawgiving function and at the same time representative, abstract-politicalfunction-stemsapeculiaritywhichisespeciallyprevalentinFrance,thelandofpoliticalculture.

(Wealways find two things in theexecutive: theactualdeedand thestate's reasonfor thisdeed,asanotheractualconsciousness,which initstotalorganisationisthebureaucracy.)

The actual content of legislative power (so long as the prevailingspecialinterestsdonotcomeintosignificantconflictwiththeobjectumquaestionis) is treated very much à part, as a matter of secondaryimportance.

Aquestionattractsparticularattentiononlywhenitbecomespolitical,thatistosay,eitherwhenitcanbetiedtoaministerialquestion,andthus becomes a question of the power of the legislature over theexecutive, or when it is a matter of rights in general, which areconnectedwith thepolitical formalism.Howcomethisphenomenon?Because the legislature isat the same time the representationofcivilsociety'spoliticalexistence;becauseingeneralthepoliticalnatureofaquestion consists in its relationship to the various powers of thepolitical state; and finally, because the legislature represents politicalconsciousness, which canmanifest itself as political only in conflictwith the executive. There is the essential demand that every socialneed,law,etc.,beinvestigatedandidentifiedpolitically,thatistosay,determined by the whole of the state in its social sense. But in theabstract political state this essential demand takes a new turn;

specifically, it isgivenaformalchangeofexpressioninthedirectionof another power (content) besides its actual content. This is noabstractionoftheFrench,butrathertheinevitableconsequenceoftheactualstate'sexistingmerelyasthepoliticalstateformalismexaminedabove. The opposition within the representative power is the katexohin political existence of the representative power. Within thisrepresentative constitution, however, the question under investigationtakes a formother than that inwhichHegel considered it. It isnot aquestion of whether civil society should exercise legislative powerthroughdeputiesor throughallas individuals.Rather, it isaquestionof the extension and greatest possible universalisation of voting, ofactiveaswellaspassivesuffrage.This is the realpointofdispute inthematterofpoliticalreform,inFranceaswellasinEngland.

Voting is not considered philosophically, that is, not in terms of itsproper nature, if it is considered in relation to the crown or theexecutive.Thevote is theactualrelationofactualcivilsocietytothecivil societyof the legislature, to the representativeelement. Inotherwords,thevoteistheimmediate,thedirect,theexistingandnotsimplyimaginedrelationofcivilsocietytothepoliticalstate.Itthereforegoeswithoutsayingthatthevoteisthechiefpoliticalinterestofactualcivilsociety.Inunrestrictedsuffrage,bothactiveandpassive,civilsocietyhasactuallyraiseditselfforthefirsttimetoanabstractionofitself,topoliticalexistenceasitstrueuniversalandessentialexistence.Butthefull achievementof this abstraction is at once also the transcendence[Aufhebung] of the abstraction. In actually establishing its politicalexistence as its true existence civil society has simultaneouslyestablisheditscivilexistence,indistinctionfromitspoliticalexistence,asinessential.Andwiththeoneseparated,theother,itsopposite,falls.Within the abstract political state the reform of voting advances the

dissolution[Auflösung]ofthispoliticalstate,butalsothedissolutionofcivilsociety.

We will encounter the question of the reform of voting later underanotheraspect,namely,fromthepointofviewoftheinterests.Wewillalso discuss later the other conflicts which arise from the two-foldcharacterofthelegislature(beingatonetimethedelegate,mandatoryofcivilsociety,atanothertimeonthecontraryprimarilythepoliticalexistence of civil society and a specific existent within the politicalformalismofthestate).

InthemeantimewereturntotheRemarkto§308.

The rational consideration of a topic, the consciousness ofthe Idea, is concrete and to that extent coincides with agenuine practical sense. The concrete state is the whole,articulatedintoitsparticulargroups.Thememberofastateisamemberofsuchagroup,i.e.,ofasocialclass,anditisonlyas characterised in this objective way that he comes underconsiderationwhenwearedealingwiththestate.

Wehavealreadysaidallthatisrequiredconcerningthis.

His (the member of a state's), mere character as universalimplies that he is at one and the same time both a privatepersonandalsoathinkingconsciousness,awillwhichwillsthe universal. This consciousness and will, however, losetheir emptiness and acquire a content and a living actualityonlywhentheyarefilledwithparticularity,andparticularitymeansdeterminacyasparticularandaparticularclassstatus;or, to put the matter otherwise, abstract individuality is ageneric essence, but has its immanentuniversal actuality asthegenericessencenexthigherinthescale.

EverythingHegelsaysiscorrect,withtherestriction

1. that he assumes particular class status and determinacy asparticulartobeidentical,

2. that this determinacy, the species, the generic essence nexthigherinthescalemustalsoactually,notonlyimplicitlybutexplicitly,beestablishedasthespeciesorspecificationoftheuniversalgenericessence.

But in the state, which he demonstrates to be the self-consciousexistence of themoral spirit,Hegel tacitly accepts thismoral spirit'sbeingthedeterminingthingonlyimplicitly,thatis,inaccordancewiththe universal Idea.Hedoes not allow society to become the actuallydeterminingthing,becauseforthatanactualsubjectisrequired,andhehasonlyanabstract,imaginarysubject.

§309.Sincedeputiesareelectedtodeliberateanddecideonpublic affairs, the point about their election is that it is achoice of individuals on the strength of confidence felt inthem, i.e., a choice of such individuals as have a betterunderstanding of these affairs than their electors have andsuch also as essentially vindicate the universal interest, notthe particular interest of a society or a Corporation inpreference to that interest. Hence their relation to theirelectors is ,,or that of agentswith a commissionor specificinstructions. A further bar to their being so is the fact thattheir assembly is meant to be a living body in which allmembersdeliberateincommonandreciprocallyinstructandconvinceeachother.

1.Thedeputiesaresupposedtobesomethingotherthanagentswith a commission or specific instructions, for they aresupposed to be such as essentially vindicate the universalinterest, not the particular interest of a society or a

Corporation in preference to that interest. Hegel hasconstructed the representatives primarily as representativesoftheCorporationsetc.,inordersubsequentlytoreintroducetheotherpoliticaldetermination,namely,thattheyarenottovindicate theparticular interestof theCorporationetc.Withthat he abolishes his own determination, for he completelyseparates[therepresentatives], intheiressentialcharacterasrepresentatives,fromtheirCorporation-existence.Insodoinghe also separates the Corporation from itself in its actualcontent, for it issupposedtovotenotfromitsownpointofview but from the state's point of view; that is to say, it issupposed tovote in itsnon-existenceasCorporation.Hegelthus acknowledges the material actuality of the thing heformallyconvertsintoitsopposite,namely,theabstractionofcivil society from itself in its political act; and its politicalexistence is nothing but this abstraction. Hegel gives asreason that the representatives are elected precisely to theactivity of public affairs; but the Corporations are notinstancesofpublicaffairs.

2.Thepoint about their election is supposed tobe that it is achoice of individuals on the strength of confidence felt inthem, i.e., a choice of such individuals as have a betterunderstandingof theseaffairs than theirelectorshave; fromwhich, once again, it is supposed to follow that therelationshipwhich the deputies have to their electors is notthatofagents.

OnlybymeansofasophismcanHegeldeclare that these individualsunderstand these affairs 'better' and not 'simply'., This conclusion

[namely,thattheyunderstandtheseaffairsbetter]couldbedrawnonlyif theelectorshad theoptionofdeliberatinganddeciding themselvesaboutpublicaffairsor ofdelegatingdefinite individuals todischargethese things, i.e., precisely if deputation, or representation, did notbelongessentiallytothecharacterofcivilsociety'slegislature.Butinthe state constructed by Hegel, deputation, or representation,constitutes precisely the legislature's specific essence, precisely asrealised.

This example is characteristic [of theway]Hegel proposes the thinghalf intentionally, and imputes to it in its narrow form the senseopposedtothisnarrowness.

Hegel gives the proper reason last. The deputies of civil societyconstitute themselves intoanassembly,andonly thisassembly is theactualpoliticalexistenceandwillofcivilsociety.Theseparationofthepolitical state from civil society appears as the separation of thedeputies from their mandators. From itself, society delegates to itspoliticalexistenceonlytheelements.

Thecontradictionappearstwo-fold:

1.Formal.Thedelegates of civil society are a societywhosemembers are connected by the form of instruction orcommission with those who commission them. They areformallycommissioned,butoncetheyareactualtheyarenolonger commissioned. They are supposed to be delegates,andtheyarenot.

2.Material. [This is] in regard to the interests.Wewillcomeback to this point later. Here, we find the opposite of the

formalcontradiction.Thedelegatesarecommissioned toberepresentatives of public affairs, but they really representparticularaffairs.

WhatissignificantisthatHegelheredesignatestrustasthesubstanceof election, as the substantial relation between electors and deputies.Trustisapersonalrelationship.Concerningthis,itsaysfurtherintheAdditionto§309:

Representation is grounded on trust, but trusting another issomethingdifferentfromgivingmyvotemyself inmyownpersonalcapacity.Hencemajorityvotingrunscountertotheprinciple that I should be personally present in anythingwhich is to be obligatory onme.We have confidence in amanwhenwe takehim tobe amanof discretionwhowillmanage our affairs conscientiously and to the best of hisknowledge,justasiftheywerehisown.

§310.Theguaranteethatdeputieswillhavethequalificationsanddispositionthataccordwiththisend-sinceindependentmeansattainsitsrightinthefirstsectionoftheEstates-istobe found so far as the second section is concerned - thesection drawn from the fluctuating and changeable elementin civil society - above all in the knowledge of theorganisation and interests of the state and civil society, thetemperament, and the skill which a deputy acquires as aresult of the actual transactionof business inmanagerial orofficialpositions,andthenevincesinhisactions.Asaresult,he also acquires and develops a managerial and politicalsense,testedbyhisexperience,andthisisafurtherguaranteeofhissuitabilityasadeputy.

First, the Upper Chamber, that of independent private property, wasconstructedforthesakeoftheCrownandtheexecutiveasaguaranteeagainstthedispositionoftheLowerChamberasthepoliticalexistence

of empirical universality; and now Hegel further requires a newguaranteewhichissupposedtoguaranteethedispositionoftheLowerChamberitself.

First, trust, the guarantee of the elector, was the guarantee of thedeputy. Now this trust itself further requires the guarantee of thedeputy'sability.

Hegel would rather have liked to make the Lower Chamber one ofpensioned civil servants.He requires of thedeputynot onlypoliticalsensebutalsomanagerial,bureaucraticsense.

Whathereallywantshereisthatthelegislaturebetherealgoverningpower.Heexpressesthissuchthathetwicerequiresthebureaucracy,onceasrepresentationoftheCrown,atanothertimeasrepresentativeofthepeople.

Evenifofficialsareallowedtobedeputiesinconstitutionalstates,thisisonlybecause there ison thewholeanabstraction fromclass, fromthecivilquality,andtheabstractionofstatecitizenshippredominates.

WiththisHegelforgetsthatheallowedrepresentationtoproceedfromtheCorporations,andthattheexecutivedirectlyopposesthese.Inthisforgetfulness, which persists likewise in the following paragraph, hegoessofarthathecreatesanessentialdistinctionbetweenthedeputiesoftheCorporationsandthoseoftheclasses.

IntheRemarktothisparagraphitsays:

Subjective opinion, naturally enough, finds superfluous andeven perhaps offensive the demand for such guarantees, ifthe demand is made with reference to what is called the'people'.The state, however, is characterisedbyobjectivity,

notbyasubjectiveopinionanditsself-confidence.Henceitcan recognise in individuals only their objectivelyrecognisableandtestedcharacter,anditmustbeallthemorecarefulonthispointinconnectionwiththesecondsectionofthe Estates, since this section is rooted in interests andactivities directed towards the particular, i.e., ill the spherewhere chance, mutability, and caprice enjoy their right offreeplay.

Here,Hegel'sthoughtlessinconsistencyandmanagerialsensebecomereally disgusting. At the close of the Addition to the precedingparagraph[i.e.,§309]itsays:

Theelectorsrequireaguaranteethattheirdeputywillfurtherand secure this general interest (the task of the deputies describedearlier).

This guarantee for the electors has underhandedly evolved into aguarantee against the electors, against their self-confidence. in theEstates,empiricaluniversalitywassupposedtocometothemomentofsubjective formal freedom. Public consciousness was supposed tocometoexistence in thatmomentas theempiricaluniversalityof theopinionsandthoughtsoftheMany.(§301.)

Now these opinions and thoughtsmust give proof beforehand to theexecutivethattheyareits opinionsandthoughts.Unfortunately,Hegelherespeaksofthestateasafinishedexistence,althoughheispreciselynowintheprocessoffinishingtheconstructionofthestatewithintheEstates.He speaks of the state as a concrete subjectwhich does nottake offence at subjective opinion and its self-confidence, and forwhich the individuals have first made themselves recognisable andtested. The only thing he still lacks is a requirement that theEstatestakeanexaminationinthepresenceofthehonourableexecutive.Here,

Hegel goes almost to the point of servility. It is evident that he isthoroughly infected with the miserable arrogance of the world ofPrussian officialdomwhich, distinguished in its bureaucratic narrow-mindedness, looks down on the self-confidence of the subjectiveopinionofthepeopleregardingitself.Here,thestateisatalltimesforHegelidenticalwiththeExecutive.

To be sure, in a real state mere trust or subjective opinion cannotsuffice.ButinthestatewhichHegelconstructsthepoliticalsentimentofcivilsocietyismereopinionpreciselybecauseitspoliticalexistenceisanabstraction fromitsactualexistence,preciselybecause thestateas a whole is not the objectification of the political sentiment. HadHegelwishedtobeconsistent,hewouldhavebadtoworkmuchhardertoconstructtheEstatesinconformitywiththeiressentialdefinition(§3oi)astheexplicitexistenceofpublicaffairsinthethoughtetc.oftheMany, and thus nothing less than fully independent of the otherpresuppositionsofthepoliticalstate.

Just as Hegel earlier called the presupposing of bad will in theexecutiveetc.theviewoftherabble,sojustasmuchandevenmoreisit theviewof the rabble topresupposebadwill in thepeople.Hegelhasnorighttofinditeithersuperfluousoroffensivewhen,among[thedoctrines of] the theorists he scorns, guarantees are demanded inreferencetowhatiscalledthestate,thesoi-disant state,theexecutive,whenguaranteesaredemanded that the sentimentof thebureaucracybethesentimentofthestate.

§311.Afurtherpointabout theelectionofdeputies is that,since civil society is the electorate, the deputies shouldthemselves be conversantwith and participate in its specialneeds, difficulties, and particular interests. Owing to thenature of civil society, its deputies are the deputies of the

various Corporations (see § 308), and this simplemode ofappointment obviates any confusion due to conceiving theelectorate abstractly and as an agglomeration of atoms.Hence the deputies eo ipso adopt the point of view ofsociety,andtheiractualelectionisthereforeeithersomethingwholly superfluous or else reduced to a trivial play ofopinionandcaprice.

Firstofall,Hegeljoinstheelectioninitsdeterminationaslegislature(§§ 309, 310) to the fact that civil society is the electorate, i. e., hejoins the legislature to its representative character, through a simple'further'. And just as thoughtlessly he expresses the enormouscontradictionswhichlieinthis'further'.

*Accordingto§309 thedeputiesshouldessentiallyvindicatetheuniversal interest,not theparticular interestofa societyoraCorporationinpreferencetothatinterest.

* According to § 311 the deputies proceed from theCorporations, represent these particular interests and needs,and avoid confusion due to abstract conceptions - as if theuniversal interest were not also such an abstraction, anabstractionpreciselyfromtheirCorporation,etc.,interests.

*Accordingto§310itisrequiredthat,asaresultoftheactualtransactionofbusinessetc.,theyhaveacquiredandevincedamanagerial and political sense. In §311 a Corporation andcivilsenseisrequired.

* In theAddition to§309 it says, representation isgroundedon trust. According to § 311 the actual election, thisrealisationoftrust,itsmanifestationandappearance,iseithersomething wholly superfluous or else reduced to a trivial

playofopinionandcaprice.

That on which representation is grounded, its essence, is thus eithersomething wholly superfluous, etc. for representation. Thus in onebreathHegelestablishestheabsolutecontradictions:Representationisgrounded on trust, on the confidence of man in man, and it is notgroundedontrust.Thisissimplyaplayingaroundwithformalities.

Theobjectoftherepresentationisnottheparticularinterest,butrathermanandhisstatecitizenship, i.e., theuniversal interest.Ontheotherhand,theparticularinterestisthematteroftherepresentation,andthespiritofthisinterestisthespiritoftherepresentative.

In the Remark to this paragraph, which we examine now, thesecontradictions are still more glaringly carried through. At one timerepresentation is representation of the man, at another time of theparticularinterestofparticularmatter.

Itisobviouslyofadvantagethatthedeputiesshouldincluderepresentativesofeachparticularmainbranchofsociety(e.g.trade, manufactures, &c., &c.) - representatives who arethoroughlyconversantwithitandwhothemselvesbelongtoit.Theideaoffreeunrestrictedelectionleavesthisimportantconsideration entirely at the mercy of chance. All suchbranches of society, however, have equal rights ofrepresentation. Deputies are sometimes regarded as'representatives'; but they are representatives in an organic,rational sense only if they are representatives not ofindividuals or a conglomeration of them, but of one of theessential spheres of society and its large-scale interests.Hence representation cannot now be taken tomean simplythe substitution of oneman for another; the point is ratherthattheinterestitselfisactuallypresentinitsrepresentative,whilehehimselfistheretorepresenttheobjectiveelementof

hisownbeing.

As for popular suffrage, it may be further remarked thatespecially in large states it leads inevitably to electoralindifference, since the casting of a single vote is of nosignificancewherethereisamultitudeofelectors.Evenifavotingqualification ishighlyvaluedandesteemedby thosewhoareentitledtoit,theystilldonotentertheporingbooth.Thustheresultofaninstitutionofthiskindismorelikelytobetheoppositeofwhatwasintended;electionactuallyfallsintothepowerofafew,ofacaucus,andsooftheparticularandcontingent interestwhich ispreciselywhatwas tohavebeenneutralised.

Both§§312and313are takencareofbyourearliercomments,andareworthnospecialdiscussion.Sowesimplyputthemdownasis:

§ 312. Each class in the Estates (see§§ 305-8) contributessomething peculiarly its own to the work of deliberation.Further,onemomentintheclass-elementhasinthesphereofpoliticsthespecialfunctionofmediation,mediationbetweentwo existing things. Hence this moment must likewiseacquire a separate existence of its own. For this reason theassemblyoftheEstatesisdividedintotwohouses.

Ojerum!

§313.Thisdivision,byprovidingchambersofthefirstandsecondinstance,isasurerguaranteeforripenessofdecisionanditobviatestheaccidentalcharacterwhichasnap-divisionhas and which a numerical majority may acquire. But theprincipal advantage of this arrangement is that there is lesschance of the Estates being in direct opposition to theexecutive; or that, if the mediating element is at the sametimeonthesideofthelowerhouse,theweightofthelowerhouse's opinion is all the stronger, because it appears lesspartisananditsoppositionappearsneutralised.

The manuscript ends. At the top of the following page, Marxwrote:

Contents

ConcerningHegel'sTransitionandExplication

Contents-[1]-[2]-[3]-[4]-[5]-[6]-‘OnJewishQuestion’-1844Introduction

Source: Joseph O'Malley's translation, Critique of Hegel'sPhilosophy of Right,OxfordUniversityPress,1970.