world bank document · appraisal year (1978) average: us81.b0 a rd1s00i until deember 81, 1904:...

Document of

The World Bank

FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY

Repoat No. 7*i47

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

NIZAO IRRIGATION PROJECT(LOAN 1655-DO)

MAY 12, 1989

l

Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office

This document bas a resticted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfornince oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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ACRONYMs

BA Banco Agricola(Agricultural Bank)

BC Banco Control

(Central Bank)CBE Coporaci6n Dominicana de Electricidad

(Dominican Electric Corporation)CE Comislin [email protected] del Proysoto

(Project Executive Comission)CEDOPEX Centro Dcmlniano de Proooci6n do Exportciene

(Dominican C.nt.r for Promotion of Exports)lAD Instituto Agrarto Dominican*

(Dominican Agrarion Institute)UICA Inatituto Inter ame icano de Coopereci6n paro la

Agriculturr(Inter-Akerican Institute of Cooperation forAgriculture)

INDRHI Instituto Nacional de Recuraoa Hidraulicom(National Institute of Kydraulle Resources)

SEA Secretartn de Eatado de Agriculture(Secretariat of State for Agriculture)

SOP Secrtario de Eatado de Obrae PObicas(Secretariat of State lor Public Works)

CURRENCY eIVALENTS

Oaf of Curreney (Abbreviation) u Peso (RD$)Currency Exchangc RateI

Appraisal Year (1978) Average: US81.B0 a RD1S00iUntil Deember 81, 1904: USll 00 a RDS1.W

Avera9 1965C US1 .W a RD28.11Aveage 1986: US$1.66 a RD$2.88Average 1987: US$1.60 6 RD83.28

On June 1, 196: US$1.66 a RD96.20

WEIGHTS AND MEASRES

Metric Systmand

1 TAREA a 6.682 Hecutre (ha)

GOVERNMENT OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 - DOcember 81

TIE WORLD BANKWashongton. DC. 2043)

USA.

Ofta o Ivtl-ahatl

MAy 12, 1989

HEKORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completicn Reports Dominican Republic - NiscoIrritation Project (Loan 1655-DO)

Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled'Project Completion Reports Dominican Republic - Nisao IrrigaiaonProject (Loan 1655-DO)' prepared by the Latin America and the CaribbeanRegional Office. Full evaluation of this project by the OperationsEvaluation Department has not been made.

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Attachment

This dorument has a mtticted distibution and ma be =ued by recipients on in the ptfmmneof their offlcil dutioL Its contents may not othewe be disclosd whout Wodd lank auc_taion

FOIR OFFICIL US ONLY


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC


TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pea. No.

v ~~Preiace. .... .............. .. ..... .... ........ ........ ... IBasic Data . ....................... ... iiEvaluation Summary .*......,. . ... iv

I * NTRODUCTION ............................................... 1

II PROJECT FORMULATION I..................................... 1

A. Identification/Preparation and Appraisal .... 6.... . ... 1B. Pegotiations and Board Approval ... .............. . 2C. Project Object:tves and Components ...................... 2D. Project Cost and Financing ... 2

III. IMPLEMENTATION ............................................ 3

A. Implementation Schedule . ........................ ...... 3B. Implementation of Project Components ................... 3C* Cost Estimate 5.. ................ ........... 5D* Disbursements ..... ........ *................... 5E* Procurement .*..... ........ ,................... 5F. Reporting ......................... 5G. Auditing .. ........... 7H. Compliance with Loan Covenants ......... .......... .... 7

IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE ............................... 8

Vo ROLE OF THE BANK .. ................................... . 8

VI* AGRICULTURAL IMPACT . 8

VII. LESSONS LEARNED ...... ............................ ...... 10

ANNEXES

1. The Technical Services Component ................... 112Tals.............. 12

Map: IBRD No. 13748

This document has a restricted distdbution and may be ued by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwis be discosed without World Dank authorization.

PROJECT CCHPLETION REPORT

DOMIIHAN REPUBLIC

NIZUO lRRIGATION PROJECT(LOAN 1655-DO)

PREFACE

This is a Project Completion Report (PCR) for the NHsao IrrigationProject in the- Dominican Republic, for which Loan 1655-DO In the amount ofUS$27.0 million was signed on February 16, 1979. The original Closing Datewas December 31, 1984, but was extended once to December 31, 1987,following a re-appratial in Noy 1983 which set a new Closing Date forDecember 31, 1986. Final disbursements were made on June 30, 1988, whenthe Loan was fully disbursed.

This PCR was written by Bank staff on the basis of a reportprepared by the National Institute of Hydraulic Resturces of the DominicanRepublic and supplemented by Information contained in the project files; noproject completion mission was undertaken.

The PCR was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) butthe project was not audited by OED staff. The draft PCR was sent to theBorrower and Its agencies for co=ments in February 1989g no comments werereceived.

WIIAO K1111U FZCT fn1OD

POCT CLEIN MM

UASIC DATA

Actul -Remppsaiesl Aatealor a X AOtual asn a

KEY PROJECT DATA Apprast"al E.ti. Estimete Appraisal of boeppralalEsti e- (May 19") Acual Estimte Estimato

Project Cot (USta IIIon) ".S 63.6 U0.1 TO 1Lan Amount (USmililoe) 27.0 17.6 2V. la inDbte Board Approval NA - 01/28/7 - -

Dote Effectivne 6/16/79 01/10/ _ _Closing Date 12/81/04 U1/81/06 _ 2//? -Projet Implementation Petiod !/ 59.5 68.6 96.5 161 114Economic Rat of Return M 14.5 13.0 15.9 / 116 11?Finantial RNte of Return ( Satisfactory Satisfactory satisfactory -Institutins Prfor_ac Good Go tatifatory / -

Number of DirectBenictiries famiIIs 8,26 2,460 8,47US 1in 141

CUMLATIVE DISBRSEMENTF ff81 F1 fYJ FM FY85 FYW0 FY7 FY6

Appraise El atiml (USSWillon) .8 5.4 12.2 2 .4 26.8 17.0 27.9 27.0 27.0Reappraisal Eatisto (USSilioO) - - - 7.6 160. 18.6 2S.0 27.6 27.6Actul (JSImillio.) 6.1 1.4 4. 6.4 . 11.5 16.3 20.5 27.oActual as a X of appraisal estimate 6.6 44.6 33.0 26.6 81.0 43.0 66.6 76.0 1660AcWal an a V of reapralal eiMMte - - - 77.9 61.6 64.0 65.6 76.9 110.6Date of Final Diebureut 0 6"Amount Canel led NA

/ Number of menths f roe ffectiveles to Closing Date.Overal ERR for the entire project.

3/ During projct implemntation IDORH did not have sufficient counterpart tfud and v"s a wak intlttion due to:mnagrlal problems; trequwnt ¢hange of Exocutiv Directors and tochnical stafft cciA of oranization andfinancial autonom of the Project Unit; ad lack of coordination sith otbor Institutions In the are of theproject.The number of beneficiary families lncrosed due to a division of project farm. As a sult, n familiesentered a* owners, renters and shmreroppers.

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MMIM DATA ar PZTOFGBAIC DTA (eetdZUIU DATA Dat lb.. n '~:" upaoie S izalelll Fefra Type ofuleele (Ne/Y) P .rusma Roatn Trend rbl

Identification * ~~-/73 NA NA NApretie. 1 a. -/74 "A NA NA

Prepartion 2 es 3/75 NA NA NAPrepratle. 1 FAA/U 5/M I o b,dPreparatlon I FAO/CF m 8 a J *.b,dAppraisal 4/7 f to ,bc.d.ePoetAppralil 9/73 1 7eSupeleilZon 1 111 1 * 1 2 M,F

2 4/11 1 5 * 1 2 Ha 6/1 1 11 * 2 2 H,F4 11/6 1 0 * 2 2 I,Ff 4/61 2 16 a, 2 2 P,FO lf/e1 1 11 2 M,F,T7 1/ 1 11 * 2 A I,F0 ?J IU/12 1 4 - - _9 1/63 1 7 * A A l,F,T

is!, 5/68 2 14 b,. * 1 MI,,T1 126 1 lo * 2 U,F,T12 7/4 1 s * * 2 1is 11/34 2 a e,- I 114 2/6 1 7 * 2 1 1is ?I 25-12/6 2 is a.a - V,P16 4/0S 1 11 -

17 U16 1 i * A -

16 4/67 1 is 2 - -

10 10/67 1 14 * 2 - -

TOTAL SIUPFVISS 46

01 SwERISION DATA

Sor_oe - Govenarat of tIh Donicn RepublicExecuting Agency - Natlonal Institute of Nydraulic _eurca_ (DIM)

STAFF MS f/

FY7 FY73 FV7 FTSI3 FY61 FY61 "F6 6 f6 "S3 FTY7 FY8 TotalPreparation TI W1 - - -__ - U-1Appraisal 42.1 19.7 61.8Neptiatiaon 13.3 16.0Superviolon 2.J 11.9 29.9 14.5 18.9 19.3 11.5 16.1 18.9 A.6 126.0

Totsl (St.aff-waeh) 9.3 63.9 39.7 11.9 21.9 14.6 13.9 19.8 11.6 15.1 18.1 3.6 261.5

FOUOOUR POJCT: r.8d Fera ng Deologmat Projec

Statue: Under Prepartien

* INRI Identified th. projt around 1676.e A coneertium of a Spln ahnd o Dolnican Repubile Fire prepared the pr_-feaeibillty etudy In 1974. The ae*

coneortium prepared In 195 a deta led study of the project beet alternative elecetd by INDRH!.

*/ a - agriculturist; b a econ_ iet or agricultural ecenelet c a a financial analyst; d a mi*elon leader;* *Ieto tlon engine_er.I 1: probl_ free or Inor problems; 2 a moderte proble; _ * major problems.I/ 1 * Improving; 2 a etati.&ery A woreaini.v diseriel;F a fin ncl;?. technical:

/1 Limited Supervicon Hission;sno form S9W filled.The project e l .

9, Source: 735 dt Infeton from ACCA.

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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC


EVALUATION SUMMARY

Introduction

1. This project was identified in 1970 by the National Institute ofHydraulic Resources (INDRHI) of the Daw'_ can Republic. After a pre-feasibility study by a consulting firm in 1974 and a second study thefollowing year (both of them judged inadequate), a final study prepared in1975 by a team led by INDRHI and staffed by representatives of four otherrelevant national agencies served as the basis for project preparationwhich was undertaken jointly by Bank and FAOtCP staff in late 1977/early1978. Project appraisal took place in April/May 1978, and the Loan waspresented to the Board in January 1979. Project implementation lastedeight years instead of five, during which it became necessary to re-appraise the project (in May 1983). After a one-year extension of the newClosing Date to December 31, 1987, the loan of US$27 million was fullydisbursed and the account closed on June 30, 1988.

Proiect Obiectives and Content

2. The purpose of the projectl/ was to rehabilitate an irrigationsystem of about 14,000 ha, improve water supply to about 4,000 ha andextend irrigation to another 2,000 ha. In addition, a strengthening of theextension services was to lead to improved water management andagricultural practices.

Project components included (i) concrete-lining of the two maincanals (about 126 km in length) And of about 67 km of laterals andimprovement of existing structures (flumes, drains and other control anddiversion structures); (ii) on-farm development on the more than 2,000 hato be added to the irrigated area; (iii) about 25 km of secondary roads;(iv) project faci'Aties; (v) equipment for force account construction; (vi)incremental local staff and other recurrent inputs; and (viii) specialistservices.

Total project costs were estimated at US$50.6 million of whichUS$27.0 million (53X) were to be financed by the Bank Loan and theremainder by the Government. Project implementation was expected to lastabout five years.

1/ The SAR did not contain a specific statement concerning objectives.

i ~~~~~~~~~~v

Implementation txperience

3. Project effectiveness was delayed by almost one year. From thestart, project implementation was hampered by a lack of counterpart fundswhich in May 1983 led to a re-appraisal of the project. The project'sszope (in terms of total cost and numbers of beneficiaries) was reduced byabout one quarter. Since the Loan amount remained unchanged, the Bank'sshare in project financing Increased to 71Z.

Even after this restructuring of the project, however, delayscontinued, mainly because of a persistent shortage of counterpart funds.At the Closing Date (December 31, 1987), 852 of the civil works had beencompleted.

At project completion total project costs were estimated atUS$39.8 million, about 52 above the reappraisal estimate.

Several covenants in the Loan Agreement were not, or not fully,coi.plied with. In most cases, these shortfalls came about because theGover.nent did not have sufficient funds to cover associated expenses. Inone case, the failure to implement a covenant is bound to have 4vr.ousrepercussions for the operation and maintenance of the system and (paz-_-al)investment cost recovery: by 1987 no adequate raise in user charges tooffset the effects of inflation had taken place yet (PCR, para. 3.20).

During most of the project implementation period, the performanceof INDRHI, the implementing agency, was less than satisfactory. In largepart, this was due to the agency's underfunding and understaffing; frequentmanagement changes, lack of organizational and financial autonomy and weaklinks with other agencies in the project area were additional handicaps.Since 1986, however, an improvement is taking place, and the projectappears to enjoy greater political support (PCR, para. 4.01).

The Bank generally was very supportive, as evidenced by itswillingness to reappraise the project and to increase the disbursementpercentage to compensate for the deArth of counterpart funds (PCR, para.5.01).

Results

At appraisal it was expected that the project would lead to a moreintensive cropping pattern and to increased productivity. These hopes didnot fully materialize. While there were shifts towards higher value crops,these were a response to changes in the price structure of agriculturalproducts rather than induced by the project. The fallow area stillaccounts for 15% to 302 of the total area, cropping intensity has notvaried significantly since appraisal, and per-ha yields in most cases haveremAined below appraisal projections (PCR, para. 6.01 and Annex 2, Tables 2and 3).

! vi -

The failure to bring water charges to an appropriate level meansthat there are no strong incentives to move into more officient modes ofcultivation; this shortcming goes hand in hand with a lack of local wateruser associations and weaknesses in the agricultural support structure,particularly in extension (PCR, paras. 6.01-6.02).

Nevertheless, a recalculation of the economic rate of return hasyielded a higher value (15.91) than the one estimated at appraisal (14.52),even over a shorter reference period, 20 vs. 50 years (PCR, pars. 6.05).

Sustainability

While the project has improved farmers' incomes, the expectedupgrading of the entire production system has not yet taken place. A morerealistic pricing for irrigation water would be essential for improving O&Mand coupled with an upgrading of support services and local institutionaldevelopment, create conditions conducive to enhancing agriculturalproductivity. These aspecta are to be addressed in a follow-up projectunder preparation.

Findings and Lessons

The project experience re-emphasizes:

(i) the importance of adequate institutional support and effectivelocal inter-agency cooperation;

(ii) the need for adequate and appropriate project staffing and formanagerial continuity;

(iii) the significance of having a well thought-out O&M system(including its financing) in place early on; and

(iv) in the case of project changes during implementation, theobligation to keep a project's scope and composition commensuratewith its original objectives or alternatively to modify thelatter.

PROJECT CGIPLETION REPORT

DOMINICA' REPUBLIC

NIZAO IRRIGATION PROJECT(LOAN .1655-DO)

I. INTRODUCTION

1.01 Agriculture was the most important sector in the DominicanRepublic and in 1977 it contributed about 17X to the GDP. In the someyear, exports of agricultural origin comprised about 74X of the total valueof commodity exports. The total population was estimated at 5 million.Sugar, coffee, cocoa and tobacco were the traditional agricultural exports,amounting to US$558.0 million (1.5 million tons) in 1977. Exports ofvegetables and fruits, fresh and processed, reached US$17.0 million in1977. Imports of foodstuffs totalled US$85.0 million in 1976. Rice,wheat, soybean oil, peanut oil, and corn were the main imported products.The Government's agricultural development strategy was to generate employ-ment; improve the nutritional levels of the population; and accelerateagricultural production and export growth. The project supported thisstrategy.

1.02 Over the past ten years, agriculture is still the most importantsector in the economy, accounting for about 16Z of GDP. The total popula-tion was estimated at 6.6 million in 1986. Sugar, coffee, cocoa andtobacco continue to be the major sources of agricultural exports, amountingto US$359.0 million (0.7 million tons) in 1986. These figures represent642 and 50X respectively of the 1977 exports of these four commodities. Bycontrast, vegetable and fruit exports, fresh and processed, have beengradually increasing over the past ten years and it is estimated that theyamounted to US$39.0 million in 1987 (2302 over the 1977 figure). Althoughthe country is going through sever-, economic difficulties, the NizaoIrrigation Project will contribute to increase vegetable and fruit exports.The Bank approved two subsequent projects, the Sugar Rehabilitation Project(Loan 1760-DO) approved in September 1979, and the Cocoa and CoffeeDevelopment Project (Loan 2023-DO) approved in June 1981. In addition, anAgricultural Sector Study was issued in June 1986.

II. PROJECT FORMULATION

A. Identification. Preparation and Appraisal

2.01 The project was identified in early 1970 by the National Instituteof Hydraulic Resources (INDRHI). A prefeasibility study was prepared by aconsulting firm (Spanish/Dominican joint venture) in 1974. The same con-sulting firm prepared a second study in 1975 but it did not present afeasibility study meeting Bank standards. The final study was prepared bya team led by INDRHI and consisted of representatives of the StateSecretariat for Agriculture (SEA), Dominican Agrarian Institute (lAD),Agricultural Bank (BA), and the Dominican Center for Promotion of Exports(CEDOPEX). The FAO/Bank Cooperative Program and Bank staff assisted inproject preparat$on. It was appraised by the Bank in April-May 1978.

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B. Negotiations and Board Approval

2.02 Loan negotiations took place in Washington, D.C., during theperiod November 20-23, 1978. The loan was approved by the Board, withoutdiscussion, on January 23, 1979.

C. Prolect Obiectives and Components

2.03 Obiectives. The objectives of the project were to increase agri-cultural productivity and exports by: (a) rehabilitating and expanding theMarcos A. Cabral (MAC) and Nizao-Najayo (NN) irrigation systems to cover13,700 ha, and improving water supply to about 4,200 ha; (b) extending theirrigation system t.o 2,330 ha of new lands; (c) settlement of landlessfarmers In the newly irrigated areas and on-farm development; and(d) building of 24.5 km of rural secondary roads and 146.6 km of serviceroads along the main canals. The project was, to directly benefit 3,200farm families.

2.04 When the project was reappraisedlI In May 1983, the scope of theobjectives were reduced as followss (a) the canal rehabilitation was14m4ted to 12,200 ha; and (b) the components of irrigating new lands and ofconstructing secondary roads were eliminated. The main reason for elimi-nating new irrigation development was the high cost of on-farm development(mainly land clearing and leveling). The Secretariat of Public Works (SOP)found an alternative source of financing to satisfactorily complete thesecondary roads. The revised project was to directly benefit 2,450 farmfamilies.

2.05 Components. The revised project includeds (a) civil works forrehabilitation of the irrigation system to be carried out simultaneously bycontracting firms and by Force~ Account; (b) acquisition of vehicles andconstruction equipment to INDRHI for works under Force Account; and(c) technical services of local and foreign individual consultants toassist INDRHI in project implementation. The appraisal project includedcomponents of productivity increase but in the revised project there was noreal component of productivity increase: essentially, it was expected thatthe Government would provide the necessary technical support to promoteproductivity increases. However, some specific agronomic studies were doneto develop appropriate technology (Annex 1).

D. Project Cost and Finsncina

2.06 At appraisal, total project cost was estimated at US$50.6 million,of which the Bank was to finance US$27.0 million (53Z), covering theforeign exchange cost. The Government was to contribute the balance ofUS$23.6 million (472).

2.07 At reappraisal (May 1983), total project cost was reduced toUS$38.0 million, of which the Bank agreed to finance US$27.0 million (712),

11 The project was reappraised based on the Government's request for theBank to reduce the project scope and bring total costs in line with thelimited counterpart funds available.

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covering all foreign exchange costs (53Z) and additionally 381 of the localcurrency costs. The Government's share was US$11.0 million (29Z).

III. IMPLEMENTATION

3.01 Introduction. This chapter compares actual performance with the. targets established at reappraisal, including an analysis of implementation

of the different components (civil works for rehabilitation of the irri-gation system, acquisition of vehicles and equipment, and technicalservices), assessment of project cost, disbursements, procurement,reporting, auditing, and compliance with loan covenants.

A. Implementation Schedule

3.02 Effectiveness. The loan became effective on January 16, 1980, oneyear after it was approved by the Board and after four extensions of theoriginal effectiveness date of May 16, 1979. Extensions were requiredbecause Government delayed the ratification of the legal documents untilSeptember 1979, and the creation of the Regional Project CoordinatingCommittee took more time than anticipated due to the difficulties ofselecting the farmers' representative.

3.03 Implementation Period. According to appraisal projections, theproject was expected to be completed by June 30, 1984 and the Closing Datewas to be December 31, 1984. Completion was delayed by three years duemainly to a shortage of counterpart funds. Additionally, project Imple-mentation was delayed in the early years of the project due to organiza-tional and managerial problems.

B. Implementation of Project Components

3.04 Civil Works. It was decided at appraisal that the rehabilitationof the main canals would be best executed by contractors with experience Inmaintaining water services throughout the construction period. It was feltINDRHI was best suited to execute civil works relating to the constructionof lateral and tertiary canals which required the consent of the farmers

* settled in the area. The civil works included works of canal rehabilita-tion made by: (a) contracting firms for Phase A and Phase B; and(b) INDRHI's Force Account. INDRHI was to be responsible for the construc-

. tion of offices and houses for headquarters' staff of the project area,including the acquisition of vehicles and heavy equipment, operationalexpenses, and incremental local staff needed to carry out constructionworks by Force Account and to supervise construction. Phase A of theConstruction Program by contract covered the works of an emergency recon-struction program that was carr:ad out in a small section (1.7 km) of themain MAC canal after Hurricane David and Storm Frederick hit the countryand damaged the canal in August and September 1979. INDRHI requested andthe Bank approved use of project funds. This need was not foreseen atBoard Presentation. Phase B covered the project rehabilitation works thatwere to be contracted out.

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3.05 Rehabilitation of the Irrigation System by Contractint Firms.Phase A started in March 1980 after INDRHI chose a private contracting firm(a joint venture between a Spanish and a local firm) to do the work andanother local consulting firm to supervise the work (this firm had pre-viously prepared the project construction designs but its performance wasunsatisfactory because of design errors) (para. 3.12 and Annex 1). Inretrospect, the use of the same consulting firm for design and supervisionof works may have prevented acceptable check and balance between design andexecution of the works. As a result of INDRHI's bad experience with thelocal consulting firm, Bank approval was obtained to change the legal docu-ments from use of local consultants to use of foreign consultants (Annex1). Construction took 38 weeks instesd of the 13 anticipated mainly due toINDRHI's critical financial condition and delays in making monthly paymentsto the contractor. The actual cost of Phase A was US$0.9 million, aboutUS$27,OOC less than estimated. The cost of the supervision was aboutUS$40,000 (Annex 2, Table 1).

3.06 Phase B included: (a) rehabilitation of 35.4 km of mair MAC canal;construction of the Bani Siphon of 0.6 km and 36.8 km of service roads;(b) rehabilitation of 11.3 km of the main NN canal and 19.0 km of secondaryNN canals; the construction of two siphons (Nizao of 0.5 km and La Cabriaof 1.1 km); and 13.0 km of service roads along the main canal; and(c) building of the central camp. INDRHI selected one construction firm,out of ten pre-qualified firms, to carry out Phase B of the project. Aforeign consulting firm was selected to provide INDRHI technical assistanceto supervise construction work. At project closing (December 31, 1987),approximately 852 of the works had been completed. It was originally esti-mated that works would be carried out in 34 months. The actual time was 91months.

3.07 Delays occurred during the construction period due mainly to alack of sufficient and timely counterpart funds, and also because:(a) construction designs had to be revised and the consulting firm, con-tracted to provide technical assistance in the supervision of constructionand in the revision of construction designs, had difficulties in producingfinal designs for construction due to insufficient INDRHI counterpart staffand their lack of experience (Annex 1); and (b) INDRHI's failure to resolveclaims presented by the contractor for stoppage of works produced unavoid-able delays in construction works.

3.08 The original amount of the contract for Phase B between INDRPI andthe Spanish contracting firm was US$24.9 million. The actual cost wasUS$27.6 million (Annex 2, Table 1).

3.09 Rehabilitation of the Irrigation System by INDRHI's Force Account.They includeds (a) in the MAC system; 11.4 km of main canal and 49.3 km oflaterals, 18 structures, 5.1 km of drains and 17.8 km of service roads; and(b) in the NN systems 7 km of laterals and 2.8 km of drains. The actualcost was US$2.9 million compared with US$5.9 million when the project Wasre-appraised (Annex 2, Table 2). Works started in July 1980 at a very slowpace and construction works were frequently stopped becsuse the ProjectUnit was understaffed and underfunded most of the time. Starting in 1984,

when the project W88 put under the SAP and there was equipment and person-nel in place, works were intensified until they were finished in September1985. INDRHI's performance under Force Account was satisfactory because itused small sub contractors from the project area and finished the works asanticipated.

3.10 Equipment. The project provided equipment fors Force Accountconstruction; supervision of construction; and operation and maintenance(O&M) of the irrigation system. Actual total cost of the equipmert wasapproximately the same as estimated at reappraisal: US$1.16 million (Annex2, Table 2).

3.11 Technical Services. The project was to provide up to 250 man-months of both local (142 man-months) and expatriate (108 man-month) con-sultant services. Local consultant services were to be used to assistINDRHI in the preparation of final designs, plans, specifications, tenderdocuments for civil works, evaluation of bids and supervision of construc-tion. Expatriates would be used to organize the O&M of the irrigationsystems during the rehabilitation period; to develop a system of watercharges; to inspect the safety of the Valdesia and Barias dams and carryout the study for the operation of the Valdesia dam; and train extensionagents and farmers in improved soil and water management practices. Theproject was also to provide the aerial photography of the project area forpreparation of the cadastral map.

3.12 The implementatiOn of the technical services component was notcarried out as anticipated. Some of the services were contracted withdele*ys and the consultant's recommendations came too close to projectcompletion to be implemented or were not implemented for lack of funds.Two of these studies (Organization of the Ozama-Nizao Irrigation Districtand Agricultural Development of the Project) have not been criticallyanalyzed by INDRHI and it remains to be seen if the recommendations (withwhich we agree) will be carried out. Ten consulting services, for supervi-sion of Phases A and B, aerial photography and studies, were contracted byINDRHI including three with the Inter-American Institute of Cooperation forAgriculture (IICA). In general terms, performance of the consulting firmswas satisfactory with one exceptions the local firm that provided technicalassistance for supervision of construction works of Phase A performedunsatisfactorily due to errors in its designs (para. 3.05 and Annex 1).

3.13 At closing, the total technical services component cost wasUS$7.2 million, almost double that estimated at reappraisal. This figureincludes about US$2.0 million of INDRHI's counterpart funds. INDRHI wassupposed to contribute only US$0.4 million when the project wasre-appraised (Annex 2, Table 2).

3.14 The higher cost of this component is mainly due to: (a) longertime required than anticipated (between two and four additional years) tocontract some services; (b) technical assistance for supervision of con-tracted works was awarded to a foreign consulting firm not anticipated atappraisal (para. 3.06); (c) the scope of the rural development study wasenlarged when the project was re-evaluated; and (d) foreign consultingfirms or joint ventures between foreign and local firms, not anticipated atappraisal, were contracted. The higher costs for this component are

justified because of the unanticipated costs and increase in the scope ofthe study undertaken. Some of the resultant recommendations are beingimplemented and about 20 of INDRHI's technical staf' have been trained inservice during project execution and about 150 professionals of localinstitutions have attended short training courses mainly organized by IICA.

C. Cost Estimate

3.15 The total cost of the four components at completion was aboutUS$39.8 million equivalent, compared to a re-appraisal estimate ofUS$38.0 million (Annex 2, Table 2). With the reallocation of unallocatedfunds in 1987, resultant actual costs by category are approximately thesame as the reappraisal plan.

D. Disbursements

3.16 Disbursements during the whole implementation period were veryslow primarily due to the lack of counterpart funds. On four occasions(November 1980, April 1981, May 1984, and May 1987) the Bank agreed toamend the Loan Agreement in order to increase the disbursement percentageof local expenditures for civil works financed by the Bank frcm 53% atappraisal to 90%. This was primarily because of the negative effect of thedevaluation of the local currency, combined vith the lag between the datesof expenditures and the dates of disbursements. Also, in 1984 theDominican Republic was made eligible for a Bank Special Action Programwhich dramatically increased the pace of disbursements during the periodFY85-88.

E. Procurement

3.17 ICB procurement of equipment and vehicles for the project wascarried out satisfactorily. ICB to contract construction of civil workswas also carried out satisfactorily. Other minor acquisition of goods wasdone by local procedures and no problems were encountered.

F. Reporting

3.18 INDRHI was to establish and maintain a system of monitoring theprogress of the project and evaluating the impact of the investment andtechnical services. INDRHI was also to submit to the Bank consolidatedquarterly progress reports and a draft of the PCR. INDRHI fulfilled thetask of organizing the M&E unit in February 1987 with adequate technicalstaff and electronic equipment. The delay in establishing this unit wasbecause the previous INDRHI Executive Directors did not support the unitboth in staff and funds. In the short time that the unit has been operat-ing, it has produced valuable statistical information that helped toupgrade the presentation of progress reports. The unit also prepared anagricultural base line survey in the project area which was published inAugust 1987. The unit staff has been trained and they are gradually under-taking new and more complex tasks. They also participated in the prepara-tion of the project PCR. The M & E unit is expected to continue to play animportant role in the implementation of future projects. In general, proj-ect reporting was satisfactory.

- 7 -

G. Auditing

3.19 At the end of each fiscal year, INDRHI was to send to the Bankaudits of the project and INDRRI accounts, prepared by independentauditors, satisfactory to the Bank. INDRHI fulfilled this requirementalthough with consistent delays of up to two months. Since the firstaudit, auditors have found the same deficiencies year after year: weakaccounting and financial control system and weak administrative proceduresin the inventory system. In addition, INDRHI did not keep separateaccounts for the control of cash for each project. INDRHI's maintenance ofonly one bank account, into which the Government disburses coumterpartfunds for a number of externally financed projects, led to the use of fundsacross projects and to difficulties in reconciliation of subsidiaryaccounts.

H. Compliance with Loan Covenants

3.20 The Borrower did not fully comply with the following sections ofthe Loan Agreement:

- Section 3.01(a) requiring of Dominican Agrarian Institute (IAD)to carry out an agrarian reform program consisting of preparation of a newcadastral map for the Project Area and selection of landless and theirsettlement in the newly irrigated lands (Part F of the project): IAD didnot have the funds to carry out this work.

- Section 3.01(b) requiring the provision of sufficient and timelycounterpart funds to INDRHI: the annual Government budgetary allocationshad other priorities;

- Section 3.02 requiring the maintenance of operation of theRegional Project Coordinating Committee: the appo=ntment of committeemembers, who had to be nominated for each institution, took more time thananticipated, the committee members were often replaced, they did not attendmeetings, and they did not have incentives to meet;

- Section 3.04 requiring the establishment of a progressive systemof water charges to cover O&M expenditures and a proportion of the invest-ment cost: water charges did not keep pace with O&M expenditures. Thewater charges were updated in October 1986 but had not been implemented by1987;

- Section 4.02 requiring BA to cover the farmers' incrementalcredit demand of the projects because there was no effective technologytransfer, there were no productivity gains, and hence there was no need forcredit.

! Section 4.03 requiring SEA to furnish to the Bank, not laterthan June 30 of each year, a program to provide quality control for vege-table seeds in the project: SEA did not have funds to carry out this work.

IV. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE

4.01 The performance of INDRHI during project implementation wasunsatisfactory largely before a new administration took office in August1986 and which has since given more support to the project. INDRHI is nowin a better position to take on the responsibility for implementingprojects. The primary reasons for INDRHI's poor performance were:

(a) from the project's inception, INDRHI's centralized organizationhas been handicapped by a weak accounting and financial controlsystem (para. 3.19);

(b) decision-making lacked consistency and continuity because offrequent turnovers of INDRHI's Executive Directors (8 since 1979),most of whom did not actively support the project because ofdiffering priorities of the Government and of INDRHI, whichultimately led to lack of counterpart funds for this project;

(c) lack of organizational and financial autonomy of the Project Unitduring the early project years; and

(d) lack of coordination with other agencies in the project areaessentially because the Regional Coordinating Committee did notwork (para. 3.20).

In March 1983, in an effort to improve on INDRHI's performance, theGovernment created an Executive Commission (CE) to replace INDRHI asexecuting agency. However, there was duplication of effort and conflictsarose between INDRHT and the CE such that the Government, in December 1983,reinstated project responsibility to INDRHI.

V. Role cef the Bank

5.01 The role played by the Bank throughout the execution of theproject was satisfactory. Relations between the Bank and INDRHI werecordial at all times, and the Bank acted supportively and flexibly inresponding to the Government's requests for Bank re-evaluation of theproject and increasing the Bank's percentage of disbursements of localcurrency expenditures; reallocation of the proceeds of the loan; increaseof the project technical services; and extension of the loan closing dateto allow completion of the project. The appraisal mission was overlyoptimistic with its estimates for yields, project production, croppingintensity, and institutional capability'capacity.

VI. Agricultural Impact

6.01 At appraisal the objective was to increase the production ofvegetables and fruits with regular provision of irrigation. Essentially,the basic strategy seemc to have been to improve the infrastructure andassume productivity will follow. The adoption of more efficient irrigationtechniques and the establishment of water charges, which better reflect thecost of irrigation, were supposed to favor a further shift towards high

value crops, such as fruits, papaya, banana, plantains and casseva at theexpense of fallow, unimproved pastures, corn, peanuts, beans aid pigeonpeas. The cropping pattern was not expected to be affected by the projectalthough the crop mix might be modified in response to changes in marketdemand and crop prices. At project completion there is, however, stillbetween 15% and 30% of fallow; the cropping intensity, at farm level,remains static at the same levels as at appraisal; and the project did notachieve the production envisaged at appraisal as shown in Annex 2, Table 3.However, the project was successful in the promotion of higher value cropsin part due to better prices. This shift of production towards higher

* value crops cannot be attributed to project measures, because both thecropping intensity and the irrigation efficiency--the main indicators ofimproved irrigation water supply and management--have not changed duringproject implementation. Instead, farmers have followed their own percep-tions of price and market developments and adjusted their productionpattern accordingly, in particular as the project also did not providespecific measures to strengthen extension and credit services which cow'dhave influenced project farmers' production decisions

6.02 The lack of both local institutional coordination and water userassociations made it almost impossible to prepare and implement annualirrigation plans. More efficient irrigation techniques have not yet beenadopted and full recovery of water charges as established in 1982 have notbeen achieved. Moreover, there is still a lack of sufficient supportservices to agricultural production. For these reasons, yields did notincrease as anticipated with the exception of rice as shown in Annex 2,Table 4.

6.03 The analysis of the impact of the project was based on field workconducted by the M&E unit in 1987 (para. 3.19) and also based on prelimi-nary information from the diagnostic-survey recently carried out in theproject area by consultants in charge of the preparation of the follow-onproject.

6.04 The financial rate of return (FRR) was re-estimated for each ofthe five representative farm models envisaged at appraisal and based on thefollowing assumptions: (a) for the before project situations it was assumedthe same cropping pattern, cropping intensity and yields as originallyproposed at appraisal; (b) for the with project situations, the croppingpattern, cropping intensity and yields such as they arose from field infor-

* mation available were used; (c) farmgate prices were based on average localprices prevailing in the project area; and (d) the FRRs were calculatedover 16 years. Based on the above, the incremental net income figures ofRD$497-4670 are satisfactory compared with appraisal estimates ofRD$180-5751.

6.05 The economic rate of return (ERR) was re-estimated for the entireproject and based on the following assumptions: (a) incremental benefitswere derived from the accumulated number of farm models representing eachproject zone in 1986/87 prices; (b) farm labor was priced at the currentmarket wage; (c) the value of the foreign exchange element of costs andbenefits was adjusted to the parallel rate of US$1.00 = DR$ 6.40; (d) theprices of commodities and imported goods and services were shadow priced atRD$0.12 to 5.88 per kilogram for commodities; (e) all project costs were

- 10 -

included in the analysisl and (f) the ERR was calculated over 20 years.The ERR was estimated at 15.92, which compares to 14.51 at appraisal,although the latter was run over 50 years (Annex 2, Table 5).

VII. LESSONS LEARNED

7.01 The key lessons learned ares

(a) future agricultural projects in the Dominican Republic should givemuch more attention to ensuring that provision be made for insti-tutional support from all agencies expected to participate inproject execution, given the institutional weaknesses and bud-getary constraints. In this project IAD and SEA were both givenproject implementation responsibilities but they did not receiveproject funds (para. 3.20);

(b) for effective coordination of local institutions, the CoordinatingCommittee should have its objectives clearly defined, have suffi-cient administrative, logistic and financial Government support,and meet regularly. Lacking these requirements, the RegionalCoordinating Committee in this project did not work and hence thecoordination of local institutions became difficult to achieve(para. 4.01);

(c) for future projects of this kind in the Dominican Republic, Bankconsideration should be given for Borrower assurance of projectmanagerial continuity and the training of personnel to manage,operate and maintain the project. In this project, lack of conti-nuity at the managerial level was detrimental to the successfulimplementation of the project (para. 4.01);

(d) studies to organize the O&M of the project irrigation district andto prepare the project agricultural development should have beeninitiated in the early project years in order to be able to carryout the main recommendations during project implementation(para. 3.12);

(e) future projects of this kind in the Dominican Republic should useINDRHI as the executing agency provided it receives fullGovernment financial support, hires additional highly skilledtechnical personnel, and is allowed to train an adequate number ofits technical staff. Institutional strengthening is a long-termprocess and while INDRHI was a relatively weak institution duringmost of project implementation it has recently begun to showevidence of its learning experience;

(f) when reappraisal of a project takes place it is important toensure those components which would facilitate reaching theproject's objectives remain or the objectives should be modified.The reappraised project did not include specific components aimedat promoting productivity increase. Without components of supportservices such as credit, marketing, research, and extension, itwas not possible to reach a major objective of the project: toincrease agricultural productivity.

- 11 -

ANNAE 1Page 1 of 2


DONINICAN REPUBLIC

NIZAO IRRIGATION PROJECT (LN. 1655-DO)

Technical Services Component

1. INDRHI contracted the following ten technical services duringproject implementation (see also Annex 2, Table 1):

2. Supervision of Construction of Phase A. The same local consultingfirm that had prepared and actualized the civil work designs, specifica-tions, and procurement documentation was contracted to provide INDRHI tech-nical assistance to supervise construction of Phase A. The performance ofthe iirm was unsatisfactory because errors were found in the designs.INDRHI cancelled the contract before works were completed (para. 3.05).The cost of this service was about US$40,000.

3. Supervision of Construction of Phase B. There were three con-tracts signed by INDEHI to receive this service. The first one was with aCalifornia consulting firm which provided technical assistance to INDRHI tosupervise construction work and revise construction designs. The perfor-mance of the firm was satisfactory in spite of the fact that they had dif-ficulties in producing the final designs because of insufficient INDRHIcounterpart technical staff and their lack of experience. The need forassistance to revise construction designs was never anticipated becauseINDRHI had been sure that the local consultants hired for project workdesign in 1979 would be capable to produce appropriate designs. The totalcost of this contract was US$1.1 million and it was ccWpleted in May 1984.

4. In October 1984 INDRHI signed a new contract with a consortiumformed with the same California firm and a local consulting firm for super-vising construction work. The consortium assumed all the responsibilityfor construction supervision. The total cost of this contract wasUS$2.7 million and the performance of the consortium was satisfactory.

5. When the consortium finished its contract at the end of 1987 athird contract to supervise construction was signed by INDRHI with oneconsultant that had previously worked as supervision team leader for theconsortium and for ten months duration. The cost of this contract wasUS$O.l million and the performance of the consultant was satisfactory.

6. Study to Organize the O&M of the Nizao Irrigation District. Thesame California firm formed another consortium with another local consult-ing firm to carry out two studies for INDRHI. The first study to organizeproject O&M was signed in August 1984 (three and a half years delay) andwas completed in March 1986. As a result of this study INDRHI organized aunit to train farmers in irrigation methods using demonstration plots.Other recommendations were related to district administration, O&M of theirrigation systems and water charges. The consortium used thse aerialphotography (prepared by a Puerto Rican consulting firm w.'th project funds)

- 12 -ANNEX 1Page 2 of 2

to update the Project Water Users. The consortium granted 208 man-monthsand the total cost was US$0.7 million. INDRHI did not critically analyzethis technical service. Many of the recommendations have not been carriedout due to lack of funds and also because of the proximity of project clos-ing. The new water charges have not been fully executed. However, theperformance of the consortium was satisfactory.

7. Study of the Proiect Agricultural Development. This was thesecond study prepared by the same consortium. The contract was signed inJanuary 1985, with three years delay, and was completed in March 1986. Theconsortium prepared a diagnostic of the local institutions in the projectarea and a developmevt plan to be implemented in three years to improveproject production. Also, recommendations were given to organize farmers'support services and training of extensionists and farmers in water, soiluse and management. The consortium provided one year of technical assis-tance at field level and prepared a proposal to develop a specific area ofthe project as a pilot program. Some of the recommendations were carriedout in two demonstration farms but lack of funds prevented fully carryingout the program. This study was also completed near project closing. Theconsortium granted 189 mar.-months and the total cost was US$0.9 million.INDRHI did not critically analyze this service. The performance of theconsortium was satisfactory.

8. Aerial Photography. A contract was signed for the aerial photo-graphy of the project area in October 1984 (two years delay) with a foreignconsulting firm. The total cost was about US$0.1 million, was executed in5 months and the performance of the consulting firm was satisfactory.

9. Technical Services Granted by IICA. Three contracts were signedbetween INDRHI and IICA: the first one to carry out studies on the opera-tion and safety of the Valdesia and Barias dams was contracted with IICAand Colorado State University (CSU) in April 1984 and had the support ofCDE. Studies started in August 1984, were completed in August 1986 and thetotal cost was US$0.7 million. The consultants established methodologiesto operate the dams, to optimize their use and revise the correct operationof the control systems. One of the main issues found by the consultantswas a lack of coordination by INDRHI with the Dominican ElectricCorporation (CDE). Ninety-five local technicians were trained in serviceand in short courses. The performance of the consultants was satisfactory.

10. The second contract was signed in November 1986 and consisted oforganizing and operating a monitoring and evaluation system for theproject. Consulting services started in February 1987 and finished inJune 1988 and the total cost was about US$0.3 million. The consultantshelped to establish M&E methodologies, to carry out an agricultural base-line survey in the a ea of the project and to prepare this project comple-tion report. The performance of the consultants was satisfactory.

i 11. The third contract was signed in November 1987 and consisted ofpreparing a follow-up project of agricultural development for threepriority irrigation areas which included the irrigations systems of Nizao-Valdesia, Azua (Yaque del Sur Project) and Alto Yaque del Norte. Studiesstarted in February 1988 and are expected to be completed in December 1988.The total cost was about US$0.5 million.

13- ANNEX 2Table 1

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-14-

ANNEX 2Table 2

DOMINICAN REPt3LIC

NIZAO IRRIGATION PROJECT (1665-"0)


Total Project C99t

APPRAISAL (1978) REVISED (1963) ACTUAL (1966)Cmtegory INDRNI DBRO TOTAL INORHI IBRD TOTAL INORHI IDRD TOTAL

CivIl Works1. Rehabilitatian of

contract works 12.73 14.20 26.93 6e6 16.60 23.16 9.69 18.64 26.632. Rhaobllitation of

force account works 9.94 3.50 13.44 3.9W 2.00 5.90 1.17 1.77 2.94

EquipmentS. Acquisitton of vehicles

and equlpmn_t - 1.4 1.46 0.91 1.20 1.27 - 1.16 1.16

Technical Services4. Hiring of conultente 0.93 1.58 2.23 6.37 3.10 3.47 1.98 5.23 7.21

Unallocated - 6.e0 6.60 - 4.20 4.20 - -

Total 23.e6 27.88 60.60 11.8 27.00 38.W0 12.84 27.09 39.64

- 15 -

ANNEX 2Table 3

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

NIZAO IRRIGATION PROJECT (1655-DO}


Production

AppraisalEstimateat Full Actual at Actual as S

Development Year 7 of of Before-ProjectCommodity Before-Project (Year 5) Development Eatimate

- - - IN TONS - - - - - - - - -

Rice Paddy 5,200 4,300 4,500 87Red Beans 500 100 200 409JPigeon Peas 500 100 100 208JCassava 5,100 7,300 2,000 39Peanuts 400 -- 86 221Onions 6,600 2,400 3,600 55DjPeppers 2,500 1,900 2,400 96Okra 6,800 3,800 1,800 26Fresh Tomatoes 300 4,300 980 327Industrial Tomatoes 7,500 3,300 3,000 40&JOther Vegetables 2,800 12,400 4,200 150SJPlantain 21,000 11,800 20,400 97Banana NA NA 4,240 --

Papay. 4,500 9,300 2,900 64Othe~r Fruits 1,500 4,200 2,100 1404Sugarcane 267,000 1,000 140,000 52eJ

; a These crops are gradually disappearing from the project area.bl Onion is a cyclical crop depending on market prices.| c Other vegetables nre: eggplant, cucumber, cabbage, squash, and sweet potato.di Other fruits are: avocado, citrus, mango, coconut, melon, fig, vatermelon ande pineapple.! e The sugarcane production decreased because the International sugar price declined

sharply starting in 1981.

- 16 -

ANNEX 2Table 4

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

NIZAO IRRIGATION PROJECT (1655-DO)

PROJECT COMPLETIO?* REPORT

Yields (toniha)

Estimated at Appraisal JfctualFarmers Farmers BeneficiariesWithout of the Project

Crops Project (Average)

Annuals

Rice Paddy 3.0 - 4.0 4.0 6.4a1Corn 1.4 - 2.8 2.8 2.8Black Beans 0.8 - 1.8 1.8 1.5Red Beans NA NA 1.0Pigeon Pea 1.8 - 3.5 3.5 1.9

Perennials/Semi-Perennials

Papaya NA NA 35.9BananA 8.0 - 10.0 10.0 18.5Plantain NA NA 30.3Cassava 6.0 - .12.0 12.0 8.7

Veaetables

Onion 11.0 11.0 9.7Okra 12.0 12.0 9.5Cucumber 10.0 1C 0 9.6Fresh Tomatoes 22.0 - 32.0 32.0 20.0Industrial Tomatoes 20.0 - 30.0 30.0 25.3Eggplant NA NA 14.4

a/ The reasons for the higher yield of rice are: there are about 700 ha ofrice located in an specific area with adequate soils for rice cropping;farmers that crop rice are small-scale farmers who traditionally havecropped rice and they use improved seeds and modern chemical inputsalthough they still use oxen team for land preparation and labor forcefor harvesting.

amiuiw IFmCF111 UIIIIEI 11CUS

EcwAh1c hsit adlys (APicUItu*IPwrJ2 of bali) 130 320) 21 .v,

1 0 1 2 3 4 5 4 I 6 9 10 it 1i 13 14 s 1-2 I

I MAL OM IK 6d- 609 101 20777 UMI 21M.3 23 .4 2__. 25 .4 nM_ 23M.4.5..23..3..0.2...4..2...4.........M..... _5.II II I lOTll.EOlS 6109335 6.16 343.59 1Ue1.27 207.79 2201f 2377.45 37.4u 23735 zm.. 23773.4 237.45 2377.45 2P.4 23734 ims um..s 1165.

11 TOTAL C5W 27.36 2029.04 2160.17 2327.55 224.45 269.21 296.2 2696.26 2194.26 2696.24 269.2 2696.26 2U9.m 2*L69 269.26 269424 1 1.lIt I

III 11 tCIll 131927.92 14459.55 IS541.10 1730.24 19681.26 2107.19 210.1 21.MM 21077.19 21077.1 21077.19n 21077.1 21077.19 2177.39 217.1 21 .1 I .1I S

I IV 15I11T31 0.00 30378.30 3771.91 394.54 p2.81 412.01 412.81 412.6 412.61 412.1 412.81 412.31 41L2 42z.t 4I&#) 412.3 26. II II IUSWITS 0.00 30023.o 9 339.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0e6 4.00 0.0 0.0 0.00 I II WliATIU cuSm 0.00 349.32 S76.3 394.54 412.61 412.9L 412.91 412.91 412.01 412.11 412SI t1 412.21 432.31 412.3 412.3 31L.3 364. II tI V El P3 132.82 -15916.75 12069.19 1745.70 192.45 20664.-3 24.38 2066.W38 206644.3 204.38 20664.39 2064.31 34.3 264.3 2364.3 36.3S NM." II II IUWEEIlit FUN 0.00 -29746.57 -170.43 3U7.6 544.63 4836 636.6 6356 6.54 83 36.56 6636.5 3.5 M3.% 1365 356 194.111

I I t1 161 £5.97 .I WV 4in 7480.99

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world bank document · appraisal year (1978) average: us81.b0 a rd1s00i until deember 81, 1904:...

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