Document ofThe World Bank

Report No: 25576

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(SCL-43230)

ONA

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$5 MILLION

TO THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

FOR A

TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT SUPPORT PROJECT

03/14/2003

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective October 31, 2002)

Currency Unit = Jordanian DinarJD I = US$ 1.41

US$ 1.00 = JD 0.71

FISCAL YEARJuly 1 June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CC Community Colleges NTP National Training ProgramGOJ Government of Jordan OED Operations Evaluation DepartmentIBRD International Bank for OM Operations Manual

Reconstruction and DevelopmentICR Implementation Completion PAD Project Appraisal Document

Report-

IP : Implementation Progress PCSU :Project Coordination and Support UnitJOD . Jordanian Dinars PIU .J Project Implementation UnitLA Loan Agreement PSR . Project Status ReportLC Local Committees RFP Request for ProposalLMIS _ Labor Market Informnation System ISA . Special AccountM&E Monitoring and Evaluation SOE . Statement of ExpendituresMIS Management Information SPP : Social Productivity Progran

_ System __ _

MOL . Ministry of Labor QIZ . Qualified Industrial ZoneMOP Ministry of Planning TA Technical AssistanceMOU Memorandum of Understanding TESP Training and Employment Support

_______ _ _____________________________ _ ProjectMSE Monitoring, Studies and Evaluation TFC . Training Fund ComponentNA . Not applicable or Not Available _ TFEC . Training Fund Executive ConmmitteeNAF National Aid Fund TOR : Terms of ReferenceNCHRD National Center for Human TVET : Technical Vocational Education and

Resources Development TrainingNIC National Information Center UNDP . United Nations Development ProgramNGO . Nongovernmental Organizations VTC I Vocational Training CorporationNSC National Steering Committee WA Withdrawal Application

Vice President: Jean-Louis SarbibCountry Manager/Director: Joseph P. Saba

Sector Manager/Director: Jacques BaudouyTask Team Leader/Task Manager: Bassam Ramadan

JORDANTRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT SUPPORT PROJECT

CONTENTS

Page No.1. Project Data 12. Principal Performance Ratings 13. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 24. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 55. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 86. Sustainability 11

7. Bank and Borrower Performance 128. Lessons Learned 149. Partner Comments 1610. Additional Information 34Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 35Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 36Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 38Annex 4. Bank Inputs 39Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 41

Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 42Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 43

Project ID: P052297 Project Name: TRAINING & EMPL.

Team Leader: Bassam Ramadan TL Unit: MNSHD

ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: March 14, 2003

1. Project Data

Name: TRAINING & EMPL. LIC/TFNumber: SCL-43230

Country/Department: JORDAN Region: Middle East and NorthAfrica Region

Sector/subsector: Central government administration (17%);Vocational training (62%); General industry andtrade sector (21%)

KEY DATESOriginal Revised/Actual

PCD: 03/03/1997 Effective: 08/31/1998 07/07/1998Appraisal: 09/12/1997 MTR: 08/15/2000 09/27/2001

Approval: 05/19/1998 Closing: 02/28/2002 09/30/2002

Borrower/lImplementing Agency: HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN/MINISTRY OF LABOR

Other Partners:

STAFF Current At Appraisal

Vice President: Jean-Louis Sarbib Kemal DervisCountry Manager: Joseph P. Saba Inder SudSector Manager: Jacques Baudouy Jacques F. BaudouyTeam Leader at ICR: Bassam Ramadan Zafiris TzannatosICR Primary Author: John Cameron; Roger Pearson

and Bassam Ramadan

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=HighlyUnlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome: S

Sustainability: UN

Institutional Development Impact: N

Bank Performance: S

Borrower Performance: S

QAG (if available) ICR

Quality at Entry: SProject at Risk at Any Time: No

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:

By early 1995, the Government of Jordan (GOJ) had identified the role of macro factors for growthand employment creation. These included reform programs which were expected to increase investment,contain the size of the public sector, and increase private sector activity. The Country Assistance Strategy(CAS) objectives in support of the forgoing priorities included:

(a) Strengthen private sector development by improving linkages between training and employers'needs which will contribute to the growth of private sector training and private employmentservices.

(b) Remove human capital constraints to growth by reducing the effective cost of training andtargeting the poor, the project was designed to increase the skills base and help reduce constraintsto growth.

(c) Reduce unemployment and poverty in a substantial way by targeting the poor among theunemployed and inducing Jordanians to undertake work currently performed by non-Jordanians.

In order to address the above objectives, and stem the country's rising levels of poverty andunemployment, GOJ embarked upon the formulation of the donor-assisted Social Productivity Program(SPP). This program comprised four major components designed to better target the poor and unemployed,namely:

(i) providing demand-driven training targeted to the poor;(ii) improving targeting and social assistance programs by the National Aid Fund (NAF);(iii) providing essential infrastructure to improve the living conditions of the poor; and(iv) providing credit facilities to promote micro-enterprise development to create productive jobs.

Component (i) resulted in the preparation of the Training and Employment Support Project(TESP). The Development Objective (DO) of TESP was to pilot test the demand for, and the effectivenessand efficiency of, employer based training supported by a Training Fund. This objective is clear andstraightforward, and provides an appropriate foundation upon which to build the project components,design delivery mechanisms, and allocate the required resources. Achievement of the project objective wasto be measured by participation rates and socio-economic profile of trainees, participation rates byemployers, training cost, retention rates of trainees following completion of training, and the relativeefficiency of employer-based training vs. training delivered by public institutions.

The project design concept was based on working with individual companies or employer groupsto:

(i) identify specific skills required in their workforce;(ii) collaborate in the definition of training initiatives that would address the required skill

development;(iii) identify training providers, either in house or externally;(iv) select candidates from the poorest sectors of society who demonstrated an aptitude for, and

willingness to undertake training; and(v) provide financial resources to cover the cost of training.

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The elements of the design concept are considered to have a logical progression and to be holisticin nature.

As a component of the SPP that was administered by the Ministry of Planning, MOP was assigneda policy oversight mandate, while the Ministry of Labor (MOL) was assigned the role of executing agency.A Project Steering Committee was established, including representatives from chambers of commerce andindustry, unions and relevant government departments. A Project Implementation Unit (PIU) wasestablished to implement the project, and a Training Fund Executive Committee (TFEC) established toprovide transparency of implementation by reviewing and approving training activities above a designatedvalue. All roles and responsibilities of the relevant parties were documented in a Project OperationsManual (OM) prior to commencement of project activities.

The design of the foregoing structure is considered to be satisfactory in terms of achieving thedevelopment objectives. At various stages during implementation, the mandates assigned to the respectiveparties were not fully respected, resulting in inappropriate decision making. This should not reflect,however, on Quality at Entry.

Three project risks were noted in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD), all of which were ratedlow. Two of these refer to employer responses to the project and the other suggests that the project'stargeting mechanisms may be too restrictive. Political opposition to the granting of public funds to theprivate sector is also identified in the PAD as an area of "possible controversy". It is clear that this "flag"was not adequate to prevent the impasse occurring between the MOL and the Bank which eventuallyresulted in closure of the project prior to the revised closing date and prior to the disbursement of all projectfunds (see Section 5.3). This issue should have been rated as a risk.

3.2 Revised Objective:

The project's original development objective was not revised during implementation.

3.3 Original Components:

Three components were designed for the project.

(a) Training Fund Component (TFC) (US$5.0 million). In-service training of short duration (upto six months) and related services (such as occupational needs analysis and employmentintermediation) that are necessary for the unemployed to fill new vacancies were supported bythe component. The training was: (i) identified by employers; (ii) in-service though notnecessarily on-the-job; (iii) provided by the employers themselves or by public and privatetraining organizations; and (iv) undertaken by new recruits (incremental employment) drawnfrom the unemployed.

(b) Monitoring. Studies and Evaluation (MSE) Component (US$0.3 million). This componentwas designed to fund surveys, assessments and studies to evaluate the wage and employmentimpact of the intervention of the project.

(c) Proiect Implementation Unit (PIU) Component (US$0.7 million). PIU operational expenditurewas funded by this component.

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The ICR assesses the three components to be directly related to the achievement of the developmentobjective, and to be generally within the capacity of a well resourced PIU and MOL to implementsatisfactorily.

Because this project was essentially a pilot project, there were few prior lessons which could bedrawn upon by its designers. However, one key lesson from Bank experience was that more effective andcheaper employer specific training can be provided in the workplace than that provided by the publicsector. This project clearly built on this lesson.

3.4 Revised Components:

None of the three components were revised during project implementation but it is clear that thesecond component, Monitoring, Studies and Evaluation, was refined and developed during implementation.The component was effectively broken down into three subcomponents. These sub-components were notedin the Loan Agreement to be: (i) carrying out surveys, assessments, and studies to evaluate the productivityand employment impact of Training Fund sub-projects; (ii) the creation of a national database for trainingproviders; and (iii) carrying out a nationwide study to compare the productivity and employment outcomeof the project with existing vocational training programs. The refinements that did occur during projectimplementation did not amount to a restructuring and, accordingly, were not reported to the ExecutiveDirectors.

3.5 Quality at Entry:

The project objective was consistent with the CAS and it was in line with the GOJ's priorities atthe time. The PAD identified a number of "low" operational risks that did not transpire and it noted thatone controversial aspect of the project was the use of public funds to train people for the private sector.This problem may have been better addressed by a closer evaluation of the cost of other training programsand the cost of any social programs for the unemployed.

TESP became effective less than two months after Board approval. This indicates that projectpreparation successfully covered key implementation issues as is evidenced by the fact that: (i) the PIUwas operational and largely staffed at the time the project became effective; (ii) the Training FundExecutive Committee (TFEC) was operative; (iii) the Local Committees (LCs) had been established in allgovernorates; (iv) the Program Coordination and Support Unit (PCSU) had been formed at the MOP; and(v) the project's operational manual was complete.

As a result, some aspects of the project design were not implemented as intended. During the earlystages of project implementation, the PCSU that was established by the MOP with a mandate to undertakepolicy oversight and coordination of all SPP components, attempted to extend its mandate into directionand approval of project implementation activities. This situation ultimately lead to the resignation of thefirst PIU Project Director. In the intermediate phase, the project was implemented as designed and, duringthis period, made strong progress towards achieving the project objectives. This experience would tend tovalidate the administrative aspects of the project design in terms of operational efficiency. During the lastphase of implementation, all project decisions were taken at the ministerial level within the MOL. Thissituation arose attendant upon the introduction of a new National Training Program (NTP) that, whileincorporating a number of the principles of the TESP project, was founded upon financial flows, traineerecruitment, and selection of training provider that could not be reconciled with those of TESP. Inability toreconcile these factors ultimately resulted in the cancellation of the project.

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At a lower level of project implementation, LCs housed in the govemorate offices of the MOL wereassigned a mandate to provide a significant measure of support at the local level. This nature of thissupport was to be seen in promotion of the project with potential employers, identification of trainees, andscreening of applications. During implementation, Local Committees only partially fulfilled their assignedfunction. Due to lack of incentives being provided to these public sector employees, tasks were rarelycompleted on schedule and little value was added through their inclusion. The gap was however closed bythe efforts of the PIU with no major impact on the achievement of project objectives.

Key performance indicators included in Annex I of the PAD are deemed to be both general andsubjective in nature. These indicators did, however, provide a basis for the development of more specificindicators by the PIU Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) staff of the PIU and reported in the quarterlyProject Progress Reports. A comprehensive set of performance indicators was subsequently developed forinclusion in the TOR's for a project impact assessment study.

In spite of the weaknesses outlined, quality at entry is rated by the ICR as satisfactorv because: (i)the project objective was in line with the GOJ and Bank policies; (ii) the project became effective withintwo months of Board approval and all fundamental project procedures were in place at that time; and (iii)the administrative arrangements incorporated into the project design were able to deliver a satisfactoryresult.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:

Proiect outcome is assessed to be satisfactorv because the project achieved its developmentobjective. That is, it successfully pilot tested the demand for, and the effectiveness and efficiency of,employer-based training supported by a training fund. As noted in Section 4.2, major planned projectoutputs were achieved, project costs were substantially below those envisaged during project preparation,the methodology employed by TESP was successful despite some weaknesses, and a number of importantlessons have been leamed which should greatly enhance any future demand driven training program.

4.2 Outputs by components:

Component 1: Pilot Training Fund

This component was the cornerstone of the project. Its purpose was to support in-service trainingof short duration (up to six months) and related support services (such as occupational needs analysis andemployment mediation) that were necessary for the unemployed to fill new vacancies. Data from the PADnotes that the project was to fund approximately 7,000 job seekers.

During the mid-term review (September 2001), the GOJ requested the Bank to consider extendingthe loan for a further two years to February 28, 2004, on the basis that the extension would serve to furtherrealize the project's development objective. This request was made six months before the end of theproject. At that time, the target of assisting 7,000 job seekers had effectively been met but because thecost of providing training had been lower than originally anticipated, funds were available to continue theprogram for a further two years. At the time of the decision to extend the project, the Tracer Study had notbeen completed so project records were the data used to evaluate progress at that stage. The Banksupported this request because of policy directions taken by the GOJ which underlie the TESP philosophy

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and because the GOJ had demonstrated a high level of commitment to the project and the part it plays inSPP.

Component objectives were met. Full details of the impact of the component may be found in theTracer Study and Impact Assessment Report. Key data includes: (i) 6,143 trainees were employed underTESP of whom 99.5 percent were unemployed prior to training; (ii) 64 percent of trainees were female;(iii) 84.7 percent of trainees were in employment at the time of the Tracer Study (1 to 3 years after thecompletion of their training); (iv) average trainee earnings before training (and employmnent) was JD 34 permonth and JD 114 after training; (v) average family income before training was JD 92 per month and JD189 per month after training; (vi) 82 percent of training took place on the job and 35 percent wasundertaken partially in training centers; (vii) 810 employers participated in the project; (viii) 75 percent ofemployers were satisfied with the training provided by the program; (ix) 57 percent of companiesparticipating in the project had fewer than 10 employees; and (x) about 66 percent of trainees wereconcentrated in the country's two main governorates, Irbid in the north and Amman in the center.

Overall, the component is rated satisfactory because its objectives were met and a large number ofpoor people were assisted into sustainable employment.

Component 2: Monitoring, Studies, and Evaluation

Component 2 was designed to provide surveys, assessments and studies to evaluate the wage andemployment irnpact of the project and to develop project databases. The three sub-components arediscussed separately.

(a) Surveys, assessments and studies to evaluate the impact of Training Fund Sub-projects. Themajor work to be undertaken in this sub-component was the Tracer Study and Impact Assessment. In1999, a contract was awarded to undertake the Tracer Study. This contract was sole sourced to anindividual consultant based on TORs that were subsequently deemed to be lacking in specificity. Thisstudy was to have been completed prior to the mid-term review. The resultant report was assessed tobe unsatisfactory and it was decided that the work should be undertaken again with some Bankassistance. This assistance comprised the preparation of a new set of TORs and the development of acomprehensive set of indicators, extending beyond those locally measured in a tracer study, into thosethat would assess the overall impact of the project. Initiation of the second study was delayed due to arequirement to follow both Bank and local govemment procurement regulations. Work on the secondreport (Tracer Study and Impact Assessment) started in February 2002 and was completed by anindependent local consulting firm in July 2002. This survey, covering a random sample of 1000trainees and 80 employers, explored the social, economic and education profiles of trainees;employment and retention rates; earnings; and, employer/employee satisfaction levels; through the lensof some 43 indicators. Data sets to serve these indicators were drawn from a combination of projectmonitoring and evaluation records and field surveys. This document provides an excellent assessmentof the impact of the TESP intervention.

As part of its project monitoring function, the PIU developed a comprehensive set of recordingprocedures and an electronic project database. Procedures were rigorously adopted and the in-housesystem enabled the status of any training contract to be readily accessed. The database was wellmaintained and it provided invaluable data to the consultants who prepared the Tracer Study. Thedatabase was made available to the Vocational Training Corporation (VTC) at project closure andthey advised that it was their intention to review the system with the view to adapting it to theirrequirements if it were suitable.

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(b) Creation of national database of training providers. This sub-component was completed. Itprovides a comprehensive database of public and private training providers offering programs of lessthan six months duration which employers can access when evaluating their training requirements. Thedatabase is hosted at the National Information Center and it can be accessed over the intemet. Theproject recommended that the database be embodied within the National Labor Market InformationSystem and it has been pointed out that funding for the maintenance of the database will be critical forits continued utility.

(c) Nationwide comparative study. This study was not started.

Even though the nationwide comparative study was not started and the first tracer study wasunsatisfactory the component is rated satisfactorg. The reasons for this determination are: (i) the excellentwork undertaken by the PIU with the overall monitoring and evaluation system which it developed; (ii) thenational database of training providers; and (iii) the comprehensive analysis provided by the second Tracerand Impact Assessment Study. It is apparent that the completed Tracer Study does go part of the way inproviding the information that would have been provided by the nationwide comparative study.

Component 3: Project Implementation Unit

The PIU, which was located in the MOL, was responsible for the day-to-day administration andimplementation of the project. The TFEC was designed to: (i) assist the Minister; (ii) provide policyadvice; and (iii) approve training proposals over a certain monetary threshold. On a local level, LocalCommittees (LCs) were charged with assisting the PIU in the promotion of TESP message, evaluation, andsubmission of proposals to the PIU.

Implementation arrangements of the project worked well but there were a number of clearweaknesses. First, due to the number of bureaucratic layers, the LCs did not have the incentives orresources to do the job which was intended of them, and the PIU did not have the outreach to supplement orreplace the LCs function, particularly as the project was implemented nationwide. Second, TFEC assumedresponsibility for operational decision making outside its assigned mandate period. These responsibilitiesshould have been undertaken by the PIU, thus enhancing the efficiency of decision making. This wouldhave resulted in more efficient implementation but the MOL resisted the notion. Third, the PIU did nothave professional training expertise on staff and as a consequence it was not able to assist small (or other)employers in the design of their training plans. It was difficult for untrained PIU staff to evaluate proposedtraining plans. Competent trainers employed by the PIU could have developed training templates aroundwhich employers could have worked.

In addition to the contractual audit requirements, the PIU received technical assistance from itsauditors on many aspects of its day to day and developmental operations. It is clear that the servicesprovided by the auditors contributed significantly to the operation of the PIU and the development of itscomputer systems.

This component is rated satisfactory in view of the fact that it successfully administered theimplementation of a satisfactory project and because there were significant geographic, institutional andfinancial issues and restrictions which it was able to successfully negotiate.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:

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The projected economic rate of return was not calculated in the PAD. It is not appropriate toattempt to include it in the ICR. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that the economic rate of returnfrom the project is positive because most personnel trained by the project (84.7 percent) were still employedat the time the Tracer Study was completed and it is reasonable to assume that the economic (and financial)benefits from this employment exceeded the economic (and financial) costs. It is highly unlikely that arational employer would retain the services of an employee if there were not an economic (and financial)benefit from doing so.

4.4 Financial rate of return:

As with the economic rate of return, the financial rate of return was not included in the PAD and itis not included in the ICR.

Even though a financial analysis was not undertaken, the cost of training under the project shouldbe noted. The PAD anticipated training costs of approximately JD500 per trainee but actual costs weresubstantially below this amount. The gap between estimated and actual training costs is attributable to alow level of utilization of intermediation services accessed by employers. Had these services been morewidely used it is reasonable to anticipate that the result would have been an increase in the scope of trainingprovided, with a resultant broadening of the overall employability of trainees. The Tracer Study hasestimated that the average training cost subsidized by TESP is 40 percent lower than other trainingprograms for the same duration. By way of example, the cost of sewing (clothes) trainees was JD200 pertrainee under TESP compared to JD300 per trainee outside the TESP system. The cost of training throughVocational Training Corporation (VTC) and the National Training Program (NTP) is understood to besubstantially higher again than the cost estimates included in the Tracer Study.

4.5 Institutional development impact:

The project's PIU was established within the MOL and the Project Director was hired from outsidethe MOL. When the project was closed, the PIU office was closed and the staff were disbanded. It is clearthat the current administration within the MOL is not in favor of the approach taken by TESP or itsphilosophy; therefore, it is unlikely that the Ministry will obtain any benefits from the TESP experiences inthe short term. Project activities in the country's governorates were largely undertaken by part timepersonnel from other government agencies who have simply returned to their full time positions. It wouldbe incorrect to say that there would be no institutional and personal development resulting from the projectsimply because many people were involved in the project. Nevertheless, overall institutional developmentimpact could be expected to be negligible.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and (Outcome

5.1 Factors outside the control ofgovernment or implementing agency:

Poverty levels in Jordan increased rapidly from about 3 percent in the late 1980s to around 14percent in 1992 as a result of the Gulf War when remittances from abroad declined and Jordanian workersreturned home. Poverty levels declined to around 12 percent in 1997 but again increased to around 13.5percent in 2001 as a consequence of ongoing political conflict in the region with resulting regional tradeconstraints and low rates of investment. Unemployment rates are high in Jordan and the problem isexacerbated for Jordanians by the influx of workers from other countries in the region. Despite thedownturn in regional trade some industrial sectors (garment manufacture for example) have successfully

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tapped into European and North American markets and this has resulted in demand for unskilled andsemiskilled labor in some sectors. TESP was able to manage within this difficult environment by providingtraining assistance to unskilled, unemployed Jordanian workers. Whilst training does not create jobs, it isclear that the training provided to unemployed Jordanians by the project boosted their competitiveness withworkers from the region. Nevertheless, it is probable that other (trained) workers would have filled the jobsfilled by the TESP trainees had TESP not been implemented.

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:

As noted in Section 3.1, the project design assigned a policy oversight mandate to MOP and aproject management and implementation mandate to MOL. In the early stages of project implementation,these mandates were not fully respected. This had a significant impact on the project as the SocialProductivity Program (SPP) Unit staff at the MOP became involved in day-to-day management issuesoriginally within the mandate of the MOL. This confusion in interpreting mandates at times resulted inslow processing of project transactions. The need to balance the MOP's overall control and monitoring ofthe SPP with delegating more autonomy to the MOL in the day-to-day execution of the project proved to bea challenging task to Bank supervision staff. The GOJ should have acted swiftly to overcome impedimentsresulting from confusion in mandates when it became evident that some key administrative arrangementswere problematic.

The single most important action which impacted on the project was the decision to close downTESP some seventeen months prior to the revised closing date. The MOL advised the Bank some sixmonths after the loan was extended (see Section 4.2) for a further two years that it wished to adapt theimplementation of the project to ensure consistency of operation with other programs. After a carefulreview, the Bank concluded that the changes requested by the MOL would not be consistent with the LoanAgreement and because the MOL no longer supported the TESP approach, there was little alternative otherthan to mutually agree to close the project. This impasse was communicated to-MOP who without the datacontained in the Impact Assessment Study that had yet to be completed, did not feel that they had thepolicy-linked evidence to intervene. The impact of this decision was major and it resulted in significantlyreducing the number of unemployed people that could be assisted by the extended project. The ICRestimates that if the project had been allowed to run until the revised closing date (February 2004) it wouldhave likely assisted ten to twelve thousand unemployed people rather than the seven thousand it assistedwithin the existing project budget.

There is little doubt that the project had a positive impact on a significant number of poor andunemployed Jordanians. It is clear that without continuing support from the MOL, the project could not beconcluded as originally planned and as revised. Because TESP was being effective and achieving itsdevelopment objective in areas not covered by other GOJ's programs, the GOJ should have activelymediated in the perceived problem areas in an attempt to ensure continuing implementation. This is amajor issue, particularly in view of the fact that the GOJ assured the Bank of its commitment to the projectprior to effectiveness and affirmed its intention to continue the operation of the principles developed by theproject once the pilot phase was concluded and results from the Tracer Study were shown to be positive.The delay in the preparation of the Tracer Study turned out to be a major problem because the GOJ'sdecision to close the project prior to the extended closing date was taken before the positive impact ofTESP was documented.

It should be noted that the decision to close the project was made without reference to the primarystakeholders i.e. employers and beneficiary trainees/employees. This identifies an important lesson learnedregarding the inclusion of mechanisms in the design of innovative experimental projects that ensure

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consultation and participation in decision making of primary stakeholders when the interests of thesestakeholders are under consideration.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:

The mandate of the executing agency covered facilitating the establishment of Local Committees,ensuring efficient staffing, management and operation of the Project Implementation Unit and supportingthe implementation of project activities. As has been noted previously, LC were found not to addsignificant value to the achievement of project outcomes as the duties they were assigned were incrementalto their existing duties, and were expected to be undertaken without incremental compensation. MOLhowever, continued to support their participation in the project. The fact that the LC's were less thaneffective, did not ultimately affect project outcomes. Tasks such as project promotion, employeridentification, and identification of trainees that were assigned to LCs in the project design weresubsequently covered off by the PIU where necessary. In terms of staffing the PIU, MOL identified andretained competent and dedicated personnel for all positions. Staff retention was high which contributed tothe progressive development of project management systems and their effectiveness. One change occurredduring the course of the project at the PIU Director level. Both Project Directors however providedcommitted effort towards achieving the project design outcome as evidenced through the Project ImpactAssessment Study.

During the course of project implementation, it became apparent that many of the smalleremployers did not have the capacity to design the required training interventions with any clarity. Whilethey were assisted in this task by the PIU to the extent possible, the PIU also did not have depth of skills intraining program design. This issue was foreseen at the time of project design, and resources wereprovided for the PIU and beneficiaries to access intermediation services. This facility was either notunderstood or not used by the PIU and in consequence the training delivered in small companies tended tobe informal in nature. The retention rate after training however shows no significant variance betweensmall and large companies which suggests that all employers understood the intent of the program andprovided relevant training within their means.

5.4 Costs andfinancing:

Total project costs are estimated to be US$2.26 million or about 38 percent of the appraisalestimate of US$6 million. Expenditure in both the Training Fund and PIU Components was below theappraisal estimate (29 percent and 69 percent of the appraisal estimate, respectively) but expenditure on theMonitoring, Studies and Evaluation Component was 13 percent above the Appraisal estimate. The majorreason why total project costs are below appraisal estimates is the cost of the training provided by theproject. The PAD estimated that training costs would be about JD500 per trainee but the Tracer Studyshows that actual costs were substantially below this estimate. Costs shown in the Tracer Study variedfrom JD50 per trainee for men's hairdressing and security guards to JD200 per trainee for sewing trainees.The total number of people trained by TESP was approximately equal to the 7,000 planned by the projectand the project was implemented over a period approximately seven months longer than originally planned.

Even though total project expenditure was below the PAD estimate, the Bank's percentage share oftotal expenditure (82 percent) is in line with the PAD estimate. The GOJ percentage share of actual totalproject expenditure (14 percent) is slightly up on the appraisal estimate largely because UNDP funding forPIU staff salaries and operating expenses was withdrawn and this was taken up by the GOJ. Actualfunding by UNDP was approximately US$0.08 million compared to an estimated US$0.3 million atappraisal.

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6. Sustainability

6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:

Sustainability of this project may be assessed in three ways. First, sustainability of benefitsaccruing to people trained under TESP; second, the sustainability of the mechanism trialled by TESP; andthird, the sustainability of the TESP initiative per se and the data and systems generated by the initiative.

Data collected by the Tracer Study and the PIU shows quite clearly that people trained by theTESP program have, in general terms, remained employed once training was completed. The Tracer Studyshows that 84.7 percent of the trainees that benefited from TESP were still employed at the time of theTESP survey (May and June 2002). The retention rate was 86.6 percent and 78.9 percent for females andmales, respectively. Data collected by the PIU is consistent with the Tracer Study finding, although theretention rate is slightly lower. The reason for this is that the PIU survey only covered the trainees' firstemployers and data was collected at the end of the six month contract period while the Tracer Studytracked employees' movements up to the time of the survey. The data shows that some trainees havemoved to other employers; presumably to better jobs. The Tracer Study also found that 99.5 percent of alltrainees were unemployed before the TESP training. It is clear that the unemployed who benefited from theprogram have been provided with prerequisite employment skills and that these skills are being used inincome generation employment. The ICR finds that this aspect of the sustainability issue is highly likely.

Sustainability of the mechanism tested by TESP is also rated as highly likely if there weresufficient political will and adequate financial support. It is clear from the TESP initiative that employersand trainers support the TESP concept, that training to achieve acceptable vocational skills can bedelivered relatively inexpensively when compared to other training programs, that the administration of theprogram could be refined to be more efficient, and that skills leamed by the trainees are retained and doresult in sustained employment. Clearly though, without political will and financial support from either theGovernment or employers the program cannot be sustained.

Because of the decision to close TESP, to disband the training delivery mechanism developed bythe project, and to revert to a supply driven training approach, the immediate benefits from the deliverymechanism developed by TESP will not be sustained. Accordingly, the sustainability of the project fromthis perspective can only be assessed as unlikely. During project implementation, two systems wereestablished by TESP: the trainer database and the monitoring and evaluation system. Both these systemswere implemented successfully and during the ICR mission they were made available to the GOJ's VTC toconsider incorporating them into its management system. It is also important to recognize that the TESPmechanism has been tested, and that the key lessons from the project will always be available should theGovernment wish to reintroduce a similar program on a more permanent basis.

Overall, the sustainabilitv of the benefits achieved by the proiect is rated unlikely.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:

Transition arrangements to regular operations are not a consideration because the project has beenterminated and the mechanism used for the delivery services provided by the project closed down. TheGOJ's vocational training program is now centered on the NTP which does not support the TESP demanddriven approach.

7. Bank and Borrower Peirfoirmance

Bank7. 1 Lending:

The GOJ development priorities and the CAS were supported by the implementation of TESPparticularly because it supported an intervention that helped stem Jordan's rising levels of poverty andunemployment amongst the poor, albeit on a trial basis.

One of TESP's greatest attributes was its relatively simple development objective. This enabledthe preparation and implementation team to focus project activities so that an effective evaluation of thedemand driven approach to training could be made. As is noted in Section 3.5 (Quality at Entry), TESPbecame effective less than two months after Board approval. At this time most, if not all, majoroperational procedures were in place. This demonstrates that preparation had covered key implementationissues successfully.

TESP was relatively small in terms of total budget (US$6 million) but large in terms of theinnovations it was trying to introduce into the sector. Discussion in the ICR has noted some points ofvulnerability in the project design including: (i) implementation arrangements involving multiple GOJministries; (ii) convoluted administrative and approval arrangements; (iii) gaps in PIU staffing in thefundamental area of training; and (iv) weak project monitoring indicators. The project may have benefitedfrom more resources during project preparation, particularly in view of the fact that it was attempting todemonstrate a significantly different approach to an important GOJ service. Clearly, preparation inputs areinfluenced by budget constraints.

Despite the apparent shortcomings in some aspects of project design, Bank lending is ratedsatisfactory because: (i) of the confonnity of the project to the Borrower's development priorities and theCAS; (ii) the readiness of the project for implementation; (iii) the focus of the project on one specificoutcome; and (iv) the fact that the project as designed readily achieved its development objective wellwithin budget.

7.2 Supervision:

Supervision missions occurred frequently but team composition could have been more appropriate,particularly in the early stages of implementation. A total of eight supervision missions took place betweenJune 1998 and April 2002, and during this time there were two task team leaders. It is difficult to beunequivocal with comments on the task team's skills mix because specialty descriptions can be misleadingand because people can have dual roles, but it appears that the supervision team lacked a training specialistduring the first two years of project implementation. This problem was overcome in 2000 and it seems thatthe quality of supervision improved in the latter part of the project implementation period. During thisperiod, the task team provided substantial technical support on a range of issues during missions andduring frequent communications with the World Bank Field Office in Beirut. Additionally, andimportantly, the last task team leader was field based and this greatly enhanced the Bank's response to theclient. This task team conducted workshops on a range of topics and visited the field during every mission.

The ICR reviewed fourteen PSRs from June 1998 to July 2002. This review shows that the taskteam has been rigorous in recording project progress but there are a number of weaknesses mainly: (i) onlyone of the PSRs contains managers' comments; (ii) none of the PSRs contain actual versus target

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performance indicators; and (iii) the only entry in the Summary of Key Issues and Actions section of all thePSRs concerns the preparation of the Tracer Study. This lack of key information and comment makeproject review difficult.

Two further problems should be noted. First, the mid term review took place in September 2001,some three years and two months into project implementation and only five months before the originalproject closing date. The extension of closing date was recommended by this mid term review. The projectwould likely have benefited from an earlier review and it is noted that it was originally planned for May2000. Second, the first tracer study was reported in a PSR dated July 2001 to be of limited value. Thisstudy was contracted to the Department of Statistics and to a local consultant in 1999 yet it took overeighteen months to determine that the outcome was unsatisfactory. More focused supervision should haveidentified this problem for this major study which may have provided the evidence needed to convince theMOL to continue with the project.

Project implementation did not involve any significant deviations from Bank policies andprocedures. Supervision performance has, at best, been mixed. It is clear though that it improvedsubstantially in the later part of the project's life and that this contributed to the project's positive outcome.It is for this reason that Bank supervision is rated satisfactorv.

7.3 Overall Bank performance:

While there are aspects of the Bank's lending and supervision performance that could have beenimproved, the overall lending and supervision performance of the Bank is rated satisfactory. The basis ofthis evaluation is: (i) the identification of a project consistent with the GOJ and Bank developmentstrategies; (ii) the assistance provided to the Borrower during project preparation; (iii) the Bank's responseto the Borrower's request for the extension of the project and its attempt to resolve the issues associatedwith the project's closure; and (iv) the intensity and skills mix of supervision missions and the tasks team'sreadiness to assist the Borrower with day to day project management matters, particularly in the latter partof the implementation period.

Borrower7.4 Preparation:

Stakeholder commitment during project preparation was excellent. The GOJ should, perhaps, havemade a greater effort to ensure that implementation arrangements involving the MOL and MOP were morestraightforward and that the disbursement approval mechanism was less complex. Nevertheless, the GOJpersonnel were diligent during project preparation as is evidenced by the speed with which the projectbecame effective after Board presentation. Borrower performance during preparation is rated satisfactory.

7.5 Government implementation performance:

In the main, the GOJ support for the project during implementation was very good andimplementation Rerformance is rated satisfactory. The main exception to this finding is the issue relating tothe cancellation of the project prior to the revised closing date. It appears that the GOJ left this decision tothe MOL despite its earlier commitments to the project, its commitment to implement project principlesafter the project closed, and its undertakings when the project was extended. Additionally, counterpartfunds were flagged as being problematic twice during implementation. In both instances, the problemappears to have related to the complex approval and disbursement arrangement involving the MOL, MOP,the Government Auditor, and the Ministry of Finance.

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7.6 Implementing Agency:

In general, the PIU managed the project most effectively. In particular the PIU: (i) was able tosuccessfully identify its clients; (ii) identified, consulted with, and partnered with the private sector toachieve the project objective; (iii) promoted the project nationwide; (iv) conducted effective trainingworkshops; (v) developed and implemented a monitoring system; (vi) developed a trainers database; and(vii) ensured project funds were administered according to the GOJ's and the Bank's criteria. The PIU wasably assisted during the project's implementation period by its independent auditors who providedcomprehensive operational support and recommendations.

The major weakness of the PIU was its incapacity: (i) to provide advice to client employers ontraining needs and the design of training programs; and (ii) to monitor training outcomes more effectively.Both these weaknesses are largely a function of inadequate budget for qualified staff and gap in projectdesign. As far as the MOL is concerned, perhaps the fundamental weakness identified by the ICR was alack of support to change project management arrangements to improve implementation efficiency. Thishad a significant, but not insurmountable, impact on the PIU to pursue its mandate.

In view of the benefits achieved by the project from the work undertaken by the PIU and theefficiency with which it was achieved, the performance of the implementing agency is rated satisfactory.

7.7 Overall Borrower performance:

All aspects of the Borrower's performance through project preparation, appraisal andimplementation had generally been satisfactory. At the time the decision was made to close the project, thedevelopment objective of the project had been achieved. As a consequence, the overall Borrowerperformance is rated satisfactorv.

8. Lessons Learned

(a) Employment linked training, where the employer is provided with financial resources commensuratewith training costs, together with some organizational facilitation, can achieve workforcedevelopment objectives with significantly increased levels of effectiveness and efficiency whencompared to the traditional institutionally based supply driven models.

(b) Facilitating sustainable employment for the poor and female unemployed can effectively be achievedthrough the adoption of mechanisms similar to those used in the TESP project. These mechanismsinclude the dissemination of information amongst target constituencies, establishing eligibility criteriafor program participation and funding support, participatory employer/project trainee selection, andthe establishment of contractual obligations upon both the employer and employee beneficiaries.

(c) Projects that involve a multiplicity of beneficiaries such as employers, trainees, and employees, mustemploy sufficient staff to ensure that all applications and programs are compliant with projectguidelines and aspirations. These procedures, along with other intemal control measures, arerelatively inexpensive when spread across large numbers of beneficiaries and help to ensuretransparency and provide adequate evidence that project funds are being used as intended.

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(d) In all HRD projects, and particularly those exploring alternate delivery mechanisms, timely, regular,and comprehensive tracer studies are an essential project output in order to ensure relevant targetingof resources, address perception or prejudice based evaluation, and provide statistical measures ofprogress made towards the achievement of development objectives.

(e) Pilot projects are essentially learning activities. As such they need to include forums where all partiesare regularly brought together to reinforce the objectives, evaluate implementation processes vis a visachievement of those objectives, and exchange recommendations that would enhance effectiveness.This mechanism was absent in the TESP project, frequently resulting in commentary that did notreflect the reality on the ground. The Bank Learning and Innovation Loan (LIL) mechanismintroduced subsequent to TESP becoming operational, includes provision for activities such as thatdescribed above.

(f) As can be observed from the ICR and the findings of the Impact Assessment Study, the project fullymet its objective of demonstrating the potential to leverage the unemployed poor into employment,through the adoption of an employer-based demand-driven approach. The project has however lost itspotential for replication and extended benefit to critical constituencies, as a result of cancellationwithout appropriate reference to other stakeholders. The lesson to be learned from 'his experience isthe importance of formulating mechanisms at the project design stage that will guarantee equitableparticipation at the policy and decision making level for all stakeholders.

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9. Partner Commnients

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:

THE HASHEMGTE KINGDOM OF JORDANMONASTRY OF LABOUR

Training and Employment Support ProjectWorld Bank Loan No. 3423-JO

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

September 30, 2002

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Table of Contents

Preface

Evaluation Summary ............... 19

Part 1. PROJECTIMPLEMENTATIONASSESSMENT

A. Project Objectives .20B. Components of the Project .20C. Project Oversight and Coordination ........................ 21D. Project Implementation .21E. Role of the Training Fund Executive Committee and

Local Committees .22F. Analysis of Business .22G. Key Lessons Learned .23H. Overall Performance .251. Bibliography .26

Part 11. STATISTICAL TABLES

Table 1 Disbursement and Commitments Summaryby Category ............ ............................... 29

Table 2 Consolidated Statement of Expenditures ........ ........ 29Table 3 Statement of Expenditures, Training Fund ............... 30Table 4 Statement of Expenditures, Government Share ........... 30Table 5 Trainees Breakdown by Governorate ......... ............ 31Table 6 Trainees Breakdown by Sector .............. .............. 32

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XMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

HASHUMITE KINGDOM OF JORDANTRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT SUPPORT PROJECT

(LOAN No.4323-Jo)

Preface

This is the preliminary version of the Evaluation Report on Training and EmploymentSupport Project ( TESP ) for which the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, MOP requested theWorld Bank financial assistance. A loan (No. 4323-Jo) in the amount of 5.0 million dollars wasapproved by the World Bank's Executive Committee for three year's period starting February1998 and expires on February 2002. The actual amount spent during that period, however, didnot exceed $ 2.0 million.

Loan Extension, the original closing date of the loan was February, 2002. Because theProject demonstrated that it had performed satisfactorily and extending the loan would serve tofurther realize its development objectives, the Bank and Government of Jordan have decided toextend the loan two more years, thus extending the Project through February, 2004. DuringFebruary, 2002 extensive dialogue took place between the Banks mission, the Ministry of Laborand the Ministry of Planning with respect to consistency between the objectives andimplementation modalities of TESP and the human capital development priorities. Based on thatdialogue, it was agreed that, in view of current priorities for the sector, to close TESP project. Itwas further recommended that September 30, 2002 is appropriate date for that closure.

The conclusions and content of this report are based on project records and documents bythe PIU/ Ministry of Labor.

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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORTHASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT SUPPORT PROJECT(LOAN No.4323-Jo)

Evaluation Summary

Introduction

The objectives of Training and Employment Support Project ( TESP ) is to pilot test thedemand for, and efficiency of an employed-based Training Fund. It will make better use of publicfunds dedicated for skills development by demonstrating that training can be more cost-effectiveand efficient when it is demand driven, training funds are competitively awarded between publicand private providers, and employment services are also offered by private offices whoseoperations have been until recently illegal.

The project funds for training will be targeted to poor job-seekers. To achieve that, theproject was designed as three years pilot project that would: (i) finance necessary in-servicetraining and related activities for approximately 7,000 jobseekers to fill new vacancies across thelabor market, and (ii) undertake evaluations of those interventions.

Project objectives

The objective of TESP is to increase the amount and relevance of training available to theunemployed, especially the poor. The project supports in-service training of short duration andrelated support services.

It is intended that the TESP project will result in the following benefits:

I .Improving the employment impact of public training funds that have been previously

channeled towards long term supply driven pre-employment training;

2. Increasing the supply of skills through greater involvement of the private sector;

3. Reducing the overall cost of training through competition amongst public and private providers

of training;

4. Increasing the utilization of, and providing income to Jordanians unemployed workers.

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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORTHASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

TIRAaNG AND EMPLOYMENT SUPPORT PROJECT

(LOAN No.4323-Jo)

PART II

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATIEON ASSESSMENT

A. Project Objectives

In simple words, Project Objectives are:

1. To test the demand for employer based training;

2. To measure the effectiveness and efficiency of employer based training;

3. To test the cost effectiveness and efficiency of demand driven training vs. supply driven training;

and,

4. to facilitate employment opportunities for the poor and unemployed sectors of society.

As noted in the design of this project, TESP is simple in design with a limited number ofobjectives.

Consequently, it is important not to attribute, or attempt to measure, unintendedobjectives of the project. Thus the posing of evaluation questions and selection of relatedindicators to measure project outcomes, should, (i) conform to the above noted criteria and (ii) belimited in number but allow for some patterns of association.

TESP is a pilot project intended to introduce an efficient and effective linkage betweenpublic expenditures for short-term training, and the business community skill requirements. It isone component of the Government of Jordan Social Productivity Program ( SPP ), which is acomprehensive strategy to address the problems of poverty and unemployment throughproductivity improvements. TESP created a fund, which issued monetary awards to enterprises,which provided training and related services, which were necessary for the recruitment of theunemployed to fill genuine vacancy.

B. Components of the Project

1. Training: the training component provided funds for in-service training of short duration(up to six months ) and related support services such as employment intermediation. Funds were

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given to simple enterprises or purchased from public and private providers. The beneficiaries oftraining were all unemployed and were offered employment in genuine vacancies.

2. Monitoring, Studies and Evaluation ( MSE ): this component funded surveys toevaluate the usage and employment impact of the type of training support provided by theproject in comparison to existing training programs.

3. During the past three years of the past phase of the project's life, three studies wereconducted:

a) Trainers data base- this study was conducted to carry out a country wide field surveyon licensed short term (up to 6 months) training providers in Jordan, development of aNational Training Providers data base (NTDB), entering all field survey to this data base andNTDB results available to potential users through the internet.

b) Technical Assistance for the Training Fund Audit- the purpose of this study was toconfirm the compliance of the Project funding operations with the project documents and toassure that payments received by the beneficiaries have been used for eligible expenditures.

c) A Tracer Study and Impact Assessment of the training and Employment SupportProject- this study was conducted in order to measure the extent the objectives of the projectreferred to above have been met.

C. Project Oversight and Coordination

The Government of Jordan has established a National Steering Committee (NSC ) tooversee the execution of the Social Productivity Program ( SPP ).

The NSC is an inter-ministerial committee chaired by the Minister of Planning andcomposed of key ministers ( including the Minister of Labor) each responsible for theimplementation of specific SPP components.

D. Project Implementation

The Ministry of Labor ( MOL ) is the executing agency of the project. The Minister ofLabor is a member of the NSC and is responsible before the NSC for the affairs of the TESP.

An independent Project Implementation Unit ( PIU ) was established within MOL tosupplement its capacity and to ensure effective and timely implementation of the project. The PIUconsisted of six members who were recruited competitively from the private sector. ProjectDirector, Financial Officer, Procurement Officer, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, and twoProject Assistants. To assist the PIU in Project implementation, a nine member Training FundExecutive Committee ( TFEC ) was established with equal representation from the public andprivate sector, which convened regularly to:(i) evaluate and approve/ reject training proposals submitted by the PIU; and (ii ) discuss other

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matters of relevance to the project.

To insure that all project benefits were realized by all potential beneficiaries and tosupplement the PIU's out-reach capacity to target groups five member Local Committee ( LCs)were established in the Ministry of Labor employment Offices nation-wide, one per Governorateexcept for Amman which had two ( one in Jabal Al-Hussein and one in Sahab ). The LCsconvened regularly and as needed to promote the project's objectives; assist in the identification oftarget beneficiaries and potential employers; provided interested parties with necessary applicationforms and relevant instructions, received training proposals from potential enterprises andsubmitted them to the PIU after establishing eligibility and recommending approval/ rejection;follow up the approval process and monitor the actual implementation of the Fund's activities inenterprise in their respective Governorates; and provided the PIU with the necessary fieldinfornation as needed.

E. Role of The Training Fund Executive Committee and Local Committees

"To assist the Minister of Labor and the PIIU in project implementation a nine-memberTraining Fund Executive Committee ( TFEC ) was established with equal representation from thepublic and private sectors which convened regularly to: i ) evaluate and approve/ reject trainingproposals submitted by the PIU: and ii ) discuss other matters of relevance to the project."

Recognizing that policy issues fall under mandate of the National Steering Committee: thatthese policy directions and guidelines are transmitted to the PIU through the Project Coordinationand Support Unit: and that, the PIU is charged with project implementation responsibilities, thePIU requested clarification of the role of TFEC in "discussing other matters of relevance to theproject. No response ever was presented to the PIU in that regard.

As to the role of Local Committees, under the project design, Local Committees role wasof two fold. Firstly, to act as an out reach arm of the PIU to promote awareness of the TESPprogram, and secondly, to establish eligibility of applications received. During early stages of theproject, the LCs confined their activities exclusively to eligibility of assessment. In efforts toaddress the issue, PIU has initiated a series of workshops almost in all governorates. Theseworkshops have addressed the overall project objectives, committee responsibilities, processing ofapplications, promotion, application evaluation criteria, recording of meetings, responsibilities oflabor inspectors when making trainee evaluation visits, and other issues surrounding projectmonitoring and evaluation. This action comprises a positive response to increasing the internalefficiency and effectiveness of project operations. However, the lack of monetary incentives, or atleast the availability of some funds to reimburse these members for their out-of-pocket expenseswhich they incur while conducting their duties led to diminish their services to absolute minimum.These members used their time and their private vehicles and PIU were not able to reimburse themfor their services.

F. Analysis of Business

Over the past two and half years 755 companies have participated in TESP. The Local

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Committees' and the Executive Committee have approved applications for the training of 8516trainees. Of these 6143 have satisfactorily completed their training and retained their jobs ( 92%of the target set by the World Bank of 6700 trainees).

The gender distribution showed a total of 5003 out of 8516 or 58% were female while3513 or 42% were male. This distribution is consistent with the project objectives of reachingunemployed women.

The distribution by sector showed that the predominant sector has been manufacturing (69% of all trainees ), and the rest were trained in the service sector. In geographical distribution,56% came from the north. This, of course, is due to the location of Al-Hassan Industrial city inthat region where 'most of the industrial sewing companies are located; 30% from the centralregion, 8% from the south region and 6% from the east.

PIU has launched a Tracer Study and Impact Assessment of TESP on March 2002 and thestudy was completed on July 2002. The study revealed that TESP has not only achieved most ofthe objectives set for the project but it exceeded expectations set for it. For example, the studyshowed that total number applications for the training were 8516 trainees while the target set bythe World Bank's mission was 6700, 6143 have satisfactorily completed their training. The costper trainee was less than half of what was projected for it and the rate of retention reached 84%of total workers who were trained and were able to retain their jobs.

G. Key Lessons Learned

Although the overall project performance was satisfactory, a number of lessons can belearned by all parties concerned, PIU, the World Bank and Ministries of Planning and Labor in thedesign of future similar operations. They can be drawn from key factors that were critical to thesuccess of the project, as well as those that used improvement.

There are eight lessons to be learned, these are:

1. The project benefited from its simple design, i.e. the vision that underpinned its designand implementation ( as opposed to one geared towards social needs );

2. The grass-roots "bottom-up", approach ensured flexible design, TESP allowedmodifications during implementation to reflect institutional changes, as well as on goingevaluations of project impact;

3. Generally, performance and relations with the World Bank mission who supervised theimplementation of the project is highly appreciated. However, there has been no clear cutdivision between advisory role of the Bank's experts and decision-making role of MOLleaning full responsibility of a Borrower;

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4. The requirement to follow World Bank procedures for procurement proposal andcontract award on the one hand and the requirement to obtain similar approvals on manydecision levels in Jordan on the other hand, have seriously impeded the projectimplementation process.

5. The question of standard procedures for the use of Loan proceeds and counterpartfunds has to be solved for the sake of future projects. In TESP the resources from theLoan were spent according to World Bank procedures while counterparts funds fromJordan's rules and regulations. The parallel applications of two difficult procedures createdsome problems to the Borrower which was obliged to follow Jordan regulations.

6. In order to enable TESP to operate efficiently and coherently, a series of practical stepsto improve it's management are needed. Technical and budgetary monitoring wasstrengthened, and assistance to be provided by the World Bank's mission, however, is stillneeded to ensure the economic effectiveness of TESP actions.

7. Generally, performance and relations with World Bank representative who supervisedthe implementation of the project is highly, appreciated. However, there has been noclear-cut division between advisory role of the Bank's experts and decision-making role ofthe MOP/ MOL bearing full responsibility of the Borrower.

8. The requirement to follow World Bank procedures for procurement and the need for"no objection" on every step of each procurement proposal and contract award on the onehand and the requirement to obtain similar approvals on many decision levels in Jordan onthe other hand, have impeded-the project implementation process.

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Conclusion

H. Overall Performance

Since its inception in 1998, TESP. has substantially and at a low cost fulfilled its mandateto enable the poor and low-income or unemployed individuals to participate in productive work inorder to contribute in the struggle against poverty and unemployment in Jordan.

TESP contribution to unemployment reduction has been substantial. It has created over6143 jobs in the two and a half years it was functional. The cost of these jobs was JD 120.00 perjob from the training fund and JD 45.12 per job in administrative expenses. This is highly efficientcompared to JD 500.00 per job projected by the World Bank team in their study.

TESP however did not differentiate in offering its training opportunities between smallenterprises and large companies especially at the QIZ areas. Substantial large sums have beenmade available to the companies at the QIZ and to the voluntary society, targeting the poorest, toassist these organizations train and hire the unemployed. Over 20% of small employers at theprivate sector were not able to cope with the complexity and requirements of the Project.

Training opportunities were given to clients who were selected based on theirunemployment or poverty status, while the overriding eligibility criteria should have beenunemployment or poverty and the viability of the business.

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Bibliography:

1. Project appraisal document, training and employment support project world bank, April 21,19982. Operation manual, training and employment support project, world bank3- World bank supervision mission, aid memories, November, 1998 to April, 20024- Quarterly reports, training and employment support project, November, 1998 to April, 2002

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Ministry Observations

Project performanceDisregard of the results shown in the tracer study and impact assessment the ministry of labor

would like to present the following observations:

1 - Target Beneficiaries \ Geographical distributionStatistics shows that:56% of the trainees came from the north region.30% of the trainees came from the central region.8% of the trainees came from the south region.6% of the trainees came from the east region.Which means that the poorest regions (south and east) were the least benefited from the

project .

2- Project support54.3% of the jobs were created in the textile industry in the industrial zones, all the companies

established in qualified industrial zones (QIZ) by agreement with the government are obligated toemploy Jordanians without being subsidized.

The project support was directed and delivered to the wrong companies.

3- Training in the small companies3500 trainees have been trained in 462 small companies categorized as to employ (1 to 1O)

workers, say average (6) workers. This means that the number of trainees trained in smallcompanies exceeds the already employed workers (1.26%) of the already employed workers.

These figures means that the involved companies were not training to satisfy their needs but tobenefit from the project incentives, and they did not employ the trained people, in no case theneed for new workers can be more than the already employed workers.

4- Project achievementStatistics shows that 92% of the total trainees have been trained in three years instead of five

years, and the coast was only 19% of the estimated cost.This might also means weak design of the project, and overestimation of the project

components.

5- Employers capabilitiesThe survey indicates that the employers generally lack the skills to identifying the training

needs and to participate to the design of the training programs.Based on that the employers judgment to the project evaluation may not be reliable.

6- Trainees evaluationThe tracer study and impact assessment do not show the evaluation of the trainees performance incompanies other than those was involved in the project. Evaluation of such employers can beconsidered as a neutral evaluation of the trainees performance and the project in general.

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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLITION REPORTHASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT SUPPORT PROJECT

LOAN NO. 4323 - JO

PART IISTATISTICAL TABLES

l. Disbursement & commitment summary, by category, as of 30/9/20022. Consolidated statement of expenditures as of 30/9/20023. Statement of expenditure, training fund as of 30/9120024. Statement of expenditure, Governorate share as of 30/9/2002S. Trainees breakdown by Governorate as of 30/9/20026. Tirainees breakdown by sector as of 30/9/2002

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Table (1)Ministry Of Labor

Training and Employment Support Project - World Bank loan 4323- JOSince inception of the project till September 30,2002

Disbursement & Commitments Summary, B CategoryCategory Description Loan Disbursed to Committed Disbursed & Available % Financed By

Allocations Date to date committed Balance World BankAmount us$

Amount US$ Amount US$I Training Fund 4,000,000 1,442,539 - 1,442,539 2,557,461 100%2 Goods under part c 100,000 57,563 - 57,563 42,437 80% of local

expenditure

3 Consultants' services 400,000 307,815 - 307,815 92,185 100%and training

4 Operating Expenses 100,000 51,472 - 51,47 48,528 95%

5 Unallocated 400,000 - - 400,000Total 5,000,000 1,859,389 0 1,859,389 3,140,611

Table (2)Ministry Of Labor

Training and Employment Support ProjectConsolidated Statement of Expenditures in US$ As of 30/0912002

Financed By Expenditures1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total

World Bank (LOAN) - 236,362 624,062 622,539 376,426 1,859,389Government Share - 18,859 111,017 103,324 85,319 318,519IUNDP 79,365 - - - - 79,365Grand Total 79,365 255,221 735,079 725,863 461,745 2,257,273

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Table (3Ministry of Labor

Training and Employment Support project Loan No.4323-JOStatement of Expenditures, Training Fund In US$ ( 01/01/99-3010912002)

Govemorate 1999 2000 2001 - 2002 TotalAmman 69,183.997 93,545.198 281,779.661 199,717.514 644,226.37Irbid 78,391.003 247,895.480 160,748.588 34,887.006 521,922.08Zarka 22,655.000 10,310.734 12,711.864 20,903.955 66,581.55Balaga 2,300.000 14,399.718 1,129.944 5,720.339 23,550.00Mafarg 1,262.006 3,177.966 1,694.915 - 6,134.89Madaba 3,225.000 2,824.859 - - 6,049.86Karak 2,663.997 37,257.203 57,132.768 18,686.441 115,740.41Ma'an - 649.718 4,293.785 5,932.203 10,875.71Tafileha - 1,596.045 15,593.220 17,189.27Aqaba - 31,751.412 - 649.718 32,401.13Jarash - 282.486 211.864 - 494.35Other ( Refunds) - - - -2,626.610 -2,626.61Total USD 179,681.003 443,690.819 535,296.609 283,870.566 1,442,53 9.00

Table (4)Ministry Of Labor

Training and Employment Support Project - Government ShareStatement of Expenditures in US$ - As of 30/09/2002

Expenditures Category1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total

Training Fund L_ _ _ _ _ _

Goods - 9,412 4,485 - 13,897Consultant's services and training - - 16,541 6,367 7,720 30,628

Operating Expenses - 13,198 71,940 76,293 72,206 233,637Committees - 5,661 13,124 16,179 5,393 40,357Grand Total 0.00 18,859 111,017 103,324 85,319 318,519

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table 5

Training & Employment Support ProjectTrainees Breakdown By Governorate

From: 01/06/1998 - 30/09/2002

Governorate Total Firm total committee a roved total approved trainees total dropped traineesCount Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total

Amman 332 1495 712 2207 1187 575 1762 147 89 236Aqaba 42 25 73 98 24 70 94 1 2 3Balga' 53 58 57 115 52 62 114 1 0 1Irbid 135 1315 3333 4648 1031 2129 3160 132 400 532Jarash 3 2 3 5 2 3 5Karak 66 114 398 512 103 295 398 9 42 51Ma'an 11 27 23 50 22 18 40 2 2 4Madaba 17 100 130 230 27 147 174 _

Mafrag 3 37 0 37 35 0 35Tafeela 24 31 31 62 24 26 50 8 3 11Zarga' 69 309 243 552 181 159 340 27 40 67Total 755 3513 5003 8516 2688 3484 6172 327 578 905

Total Committee Approved Trainees: The number of trainees approved by the committeesrotal Approved Trainees: The number of trainees added to the databaserotal Actually Trained: The number of trainees finished the training courseDropped Out: The number of withdrawer trainees (failed, discontinued, etc .....

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Table (6)Training & Employment Support Project

Approved Trainee Distr. By Sector Report01/06/1998 - 30/09/2002

Sector Sub Sector Approved Trainees Count TotalMale Female

Rndustry (15 2 0) Manufacture of dairy products 2 0 2(15 3 1) Manufacture of grain mill products 9 1 10(15 4 1) Manufacture of bakery products 166 1 167(17 11) Preparation & spinning of textile fiberes;w 94 43 137(172 1) Manufacture of made-up textile articles 112 114 226(1729) Manufacture of other textiles i.e. 0 5 5(18 10) Manufacture of wearing apparel, 378 2364 2742(1912) Manufacture of luggage, handbags & the like, saddlery 252 178 430(20 10) Sawmilling and planning of wood 9 7 16(2022) Manufacture of builders' carpentry &joiner 15 0 15(2411) Manufacture of basic chemicals 2 0 2(2412) Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen comp 17 0 17(2413) Manufacture of plastics in primary forms 3 1 4(2422) Manufacture of paints, vamishes & similar coatings, 41 11 52

_(2520) Manufacture of plastic products 3 1 4(2710) Manufacture of basic iron and steel I 0 1(2811) Manufacture of structural metal products 3 0 3(28,12) Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs & containers of metal I 0 1(2892) Treatment and coating of metals, general mechanical 9 0 9,(2893) Manufacture of cutlery, hand tools and general hardware 24 3 27

(2899) Manufacture of other fabricated metal products 11 0 11(2925) Manufacture of machinery for food, beverage 29 4 33(3120) Manufacture of electricity distribution & control 5 0 5(3430) Manufacture of parts & accessories for motor vehicles 20 0 20(3691) Manufacture ofjewellery and related articles 150 73 223

Sub-Tota 1356 2806 4162Insurance (6600) Insurance 3 5 8

Sub-Tota 3 5 8Services (5 5 10) Hotels 123 23 146

(5520) Restaurants 27 4 31(7220) Software consultancy and supply 167 104 271(7411) Legal activities 1 0 1(7412) Accounting, book-keeping & auditing activities 3 0 3(7414) Business & management consultancy activities 1 0 1(742 1) Architectural and engineering activities and related 49 1 50(7492) Investigation and security activities 443 3 446(7493) Building-cleaning activities(housekeeping) 34 4 38

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Sector Sub Sector Approved Trainees Count TotalMale Female

Continue (7499) Other business activities Steward 14 3 17Services (802 1) General secondary education 24 151 175

(8511) Hospital activities 33 41 74(8512) Medical & Dental practice activities 1 0 1(8519) Other hunan health activities 19 31 50(9211) Motion picture and video production and distribution 3 0 3(9241) Sporting activities I 1 2(93 0 1) Washing and (dry) cleaning of textile 37 4 41(9302) Hairdressing and other beauty treatment 268 282 550

(9309) Other service activities n.e.c 0 7 7Sub-Total 1248 659 1907

STRAGE (6302) Storage and Warehousing 69 9 78

COMMUNICAION

Sub-Tota 69 9 78holesale & (5510) whole sale on a fee or contract basis 12 5 17

retail tradeSub-Total 12 5 17

Grand total 2688 3484 6172

(b) Cofinanciers:

(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):

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10. Additionall lEnfoirumation

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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

Outcome / Impact Indicators:

?lnIwedlcatorletlx , . $ * , ~. *} , Projected in lat PSR *, - s

1. Strong demand for the program among Not available. Over the projectfs lifetime (July 7, 1998 toemployers, together with high retention of September 30, 2002) 810 employerstrained workers by the employers. participated in the program of which 54

percent were In the clothing and textleindustry. 75 percent of participatingemployers satisfied with TESP

Demand for trainees was relatively stableover the life of the project as Indicated by thefollowing data'

1998 - 246 trainees1999 - 1,843 trainees2000 - 1,714 trainees2001 - 1,972 trainees2002 - 18 trainees

Employment and retention rates of TESPtrainees before and after TESP are asfollows:

Unemployed before TESP: 99.5%Employed after TESP 84 7 %Employed females after TESP. 866 %Employed males after TESP. 78.9 %

2 Post-training employment outcomes of Not available Data not available But, there are no similartrainees are superior to those of comparators. programs for unskilled workers in Jordan.

Training programs provided by VocationalTraining Corporation are aimed at craftsman,skilled and semi-skilled workers The newGOJ Natbonal Training Program aims at aretention rate of 30 percent.

Output Indicators:

.ndlcatbrlilatrix Projected In last PSR . Actuallgst Estmat

Strong demand by employers for available Not available. Trainers database collated and presented topilot funds Vocational Training Corporation at the

closure of the project

Effective data collecUon and analysis of the Not available. Trainers database collated and presented tosupply response from training providers, and Vocational Training Corporation at thepost-training effects on beneficiaries. closure of the prolect

Comprehensive Tracer Study prepared priorto closure but information not available unblafter the decision to prematurely dose theproject after project extension approved.

End of project

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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)

-T~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ E

X ^ .. Component U- ' {'Training Fund 5.00 1.44 28.8Monitoring, Studies and Evaluation 0.30 0.34 113.3Project Implementation Unit 0.70 0.48 68.6

Total Baseline Cost 6.00 2.26Total Project Costs 6.00 2.26

Total Financing Required 6.00 2.26

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category B ProcurmenCB Met2od . N.B.F. Total CostNCB . Other

1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

2. Goods 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.20(0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.20)

3. Services 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.40 1.10(0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) (0.30)

4. Miscellaneous (Training 0.00 0.00 4.70 0.00 4.70Fund)

(0.00) (0.00) (4.50) (0.00) (4.50)5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)Total 0.00 0.00 5.60 0.40 6.00

(0.00) (0.00) (5.00) (0.00) (5.00)

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Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equival nt)

Procurement. Mst6od. tlCs,.- Expenditure Caeory ICB NCB , ' .. F. 1- Total Cos

1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

2. Goods 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07(0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.06)

3. Services 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.75

(0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.36)4. Miscellaneous (Training 0.00 0.00 1.44 0.00 1.44Fund)

(0.00) (0.00) (1.44) (0.00) (1.44)5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)Total 0.00 0.00 2.26 0.00 2.26

(0.00) (0.00) (1.86) (0.00) (1.86)

"Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies.21Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff

of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i)managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units.

Project Financing by C mponent (in USS million equiv lent).X.'- . .:.-,Percentage of Appraisal

Componejit Appraisal Esfimate .Actal/Latest EstimateBank 'Govt CoF., BanI( 7Gov coo. Ban Govt., CoF.

Training Fund 4.50 0.50 0.00 1.44 0.00 0.00 32.0 0.0 0.0Monitoring, Studies and 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.31 0.03 0.00 206.7 20.0 0.0EvaluationProject Implementation 0.35 0.05 0.30 0.11 0.29 0.08 31.4 580.0 26.7UnitTotal Project Cost 5.00 0.70 0.30 1.86 0.32 0.08 37.2 45.7 26.7

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Annex 3. Economic Costs and B3encefits

A financial and economic analysis was not prepared for the ICR.

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Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:

Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating(e.g. 2 Economists, I FMS, etc.) Implementation Development

Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective

Identification/Preparation01/20/1997 4 Task Team Leader, Voc. &

Technical Specialist, Economist,Program Assistant.

07/16/1997 4 Task Team Leader, Voc. &Technical Specialist, Economist,Program Assistant.

Appraisal/Negotiation10/22/1997 4 Task Team Leader,

Vocational & TechnicalSpecialist, Economist,Program Assistant.

03/24/1998 11 Country Director, SectorDirector, Sector Manager, TaskTeam Leader, RegionalProcurement Adviser,Disbursement Officer, PeerReviewers, Portfolio Manager,Program Assistants.

Supervision

06/29/1998 4 Task Team Leader, Sr. S SEconomist, FinancialManagement Specialist(Consultant), ProcurementSpecialist (Consultant).

12/02/1998 4 Social Protection Sector Leader, S SOperations Analyst, FinancialManagement Specialist(Consultant), ProcurementSpecialist (Consultant).

03/31/1999 2 Sr. Economist, Procurement S SSpecialist (Consultant).

11/25/1999 2 Social Protection Manager, Sr. S SEconomist.

08/03/2000 4 Task Team Leader, VTE S SSpecialist (Consultant), FinancialManagement Specialist,Procurement Specialist.

04/12/2001 4 Sr. Information Officer (Mission S SLeader), VTE Specialist(Consultant), FinancialManagement Specialist,Procurement Specialist.

09/27/2001 4 Task Team Leader, VTE S U

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Specialist (Consultant), FinancialManagement Specialist, ProgramAssistant.

04/11/2002 4 Task Team Leader, VTE U SSpecialist (Consultant), FinancialManagement Specialist, ProgramAssistant.

ICR10/04/2002 5 Task Team Leader, S S

Development Specialist(Consultant), VTESpecialist (Consultant),Procurement Officer(Consultant), ProgramAssistant

(b) Staff:

Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate

No. Staff weeks US$ ('000)Identification/Preparation n/a 46Appraisal/Negotiation n/a 46Supervision n/a 168

ICR n/a 40Total n/a 300

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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components

(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)Rating

O Macro policies O H OSUOM O N * NAO Sector Policies O H OSUOM O N * NA0 Physical OH *SUOM ON ONAO Financial OH OSUOM ON * NA

I Institutional Development 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NAL Environmental O H OSUOM O N * NA

SocialO Poverty Reduction O H *SUOM O N O NAO Gender OH *SUOM ON ONALO Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N * NA

Ol Private sector development 0 H 0 SU 0 M 0 N 0 NAEl Public sector management 0 H O SU O M * N 0 NAEl Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N * NA

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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=UnsatisfactoTy, HU=Higly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance Rating

El Lending OHS iS OU OHUrO1 Supervision OHS OS OU OIHUn1 Overall OHS O S OU O HU

6.2 Borrowerperformance Rating

Ol Preparation OHS OS OU OHUOl Government implementation performance O HS O S 0 U 0 HUO Implementation agency performance OHS OS O U O HUE Overall OHS(S Ou O HU

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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

A. Bank Staff Assessments

- Identification, preparation, appraisal documents- Supervision packages- Loan Agreement- PAD

B. Others

- PIU Quarterly Progress Reports- Operational Manual, March 1998- Auditor's Reports- Vocational Training Corporation, Annual Report 2001- Tracer Study and Impact Assessment Report, July 2002

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- 44 -

MAP SECTION

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acceptonce of such boundaries35° 36°° 37° 38° 39°

DECEMBER I1997

Repog No.: 25576Type: R