World Politics Final Project The Politics of Benghazi

Madelyn Haulotte December 5, 2016

Dr. Morris

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Table of Contents

World Politics Final Project 1 Episode 1 3 Episode 2 4 Episode 3 6 Episode 4 8 Episode 5 10 Episode 6 13 Episode 7 14 Appendix 17 Citations for Appendix 20 Reflection 22 Works Cited 23

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Episode 1 Benghazi Background

On November 11, 2012, a group of Libyans attacked the U.S. facility in Benghazi, Libya killing Ambassador Christopher Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone S. Woods, and Glen Doherty, as well as wounding an additional 4 Americans and 7 Libyans. Immediately, the American media attributed the attacks to the terrorist group Ansar al-Sharia. As more information has emerged surrounding the attack, it has become increasingly clear how very complicated the situation is. Over the past four years, Benghazi has remained a political issue driving debates as to who is really to blame for the deaths of the four Americans. While it is impossible to remove politics from the attack, it is my hope to present different angles that challenge general assumptions about what happened on November 11, 2012.

When it comes to motivating factors for the attack, the New York Times has pinpointed two main theories. The first theory is that the youtube video Innocence 1

of Muslims led to protests that got out of hand, culminating in the attack on the U.S. facility. The second is that it was a carefully planned terrorist attack orchestrated by Al Qaeda on the 11- year anniversary of the 9-11 attack on the World Trade Center. David Kirkpatrick of The New York Times makes the argument that neither one of these theories is complete in its analysis of what happened. This is the approach that I will take throughout this podcast. There 2

were so many factors at play that it is difficult, if not impossible to pinpoint one and claim it was solely responsible.

The BBC reports that the attack began at 10pm with the attackers opening fire on the facility. The article claims that many people trapped inside the building 3

were able to escape, except for Ambassador Stevens, Sean Smith, and regional

Kirkpatrick, D. D. (2013, December 28). A Deadly Mix in Benghazi - The New York Times. Retrieved November 1

29, 2016, from http://http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi/#/?chapt=0

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News, B. (2012, November 16). Benghazi US consulate attack: Timeline. Retrieved November 29, 2016, from 3

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-19587068

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security. A security guard who escaped returns to find Stevens and Smith, but he finds Mr. Smith dead and is unable to find Mr. Stevens. By midnight, the fighting in the annex of the building has been happening for 2 hours and two more Americans are dead. At 1:15 Ambassador Stevens arrives at a nearby hospital and dies from smoke inhalation. At 2:30 am the US security forces regain control of the annex.

The intent of my podcasts is to not lay out the events that happened and assign blame, rather it is my goal to dive deeper into the social, political and economic factors that have and continue to shape Libya. I strongly believe in the importance of studying culture in order to gain a better understanding of world events. Paulo Cohelo once said, “Culture makes people understand each other better. And if they understand each other better in their soul, it is easier to overcome the economic and political barriers. But first they have to understand that their neighbor is, in the end, just like them, with the same problems, the same questions.” While Paulo Cohelo’s quote seems a bit romantic when considering the harsh reality of what happened in Benghazi, I find the message to still be applicable. Cohelo shows us that in order to overcome our political and economic barriers we have to first understand cultures different from our own. Therefore, for the purposes of this podcast it is essential to step outside of what we know to be true or right in American culture and approach Libyan culture with a blank and open perspective. With that being said, let’s dive into the political system in Libya.

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Episode 2 A Political Power Vacuum

In 2011, protests erupted throughout the Middle East as well as Africa, and Libya was no exception. Wolfman Lacher states, “four weeks after the eruption of protests the Libyan uprising evolved from spontaneous unrest to a full-blown civil

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war.” Protests in Libya began on February 15, 2011, in Benghazi by citizens 4

angered by the arrest of Fethi Tarbel, a human rights lawyer. Protesters called for the release of political prisoners and for Qaddafi to step down. The protesters were met with the use of lethal force by the government. Conflict continued to escalate, and then in March NATO officially took command of military operations in Libya. What started off as a campaign based on humanitarian relief, soon became focused on toppling Qaddafi. Within a year of the NATO operation starting the Qaddafi regime fell.

After Qaddafi fell from power, the National Transition Council (NTC) became the main political structure, yet the state was left in a power vacuum. Brian McQuinn discusses insecurity in Libya after the Revolution in terms of security and governance. In regards to security, McQuinn states, “unchecked by community - based governance, extremist groups, such as Ansar al- Sharia have installed themselves after the uprising.” The structural disarray, therefore, lent itself to the 5

installation of groups such as Ansar al-Sharia. I will talk more about Ansar al- Sharia specifically in another episode, but this group has a massive influence on Libya and has reached in to numerous aspects of life. Moreover, McQuinn argues that the 2011 uprising, “left Libya’s state security apparatus in organizational disarray.” Such organizational problems made it difficult for the state to attend to 6

the needs of its citizens, as the government needed to remain focused internally.

The thing about instability on a political level is that it starts to trickle down to impact the everyday life of its citizens. This is primarily evident when observing the political, economic and social isolation between the center and periphery in Libya. The term “core” refers to that which is developed, while the “periphery” describes that which is developing. In Libya, the distinction between core and periphery has deep historic roots dating back to the Ottoman empire in 1835. The periphery in Libya is described as, “consisting of non urban tribesmen and urbanities with rural

Lacher, W. (2011, Winter). Families, Tribe and Cities in the Libyan Revolution. Middle East Policy Council, 4

XVIII(4). Retrieved October 22, 2016, from http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/families-tribes-and-cities-libyan-revolution

McQuinn, B. (2013, October). Assessing In(Security) after the Arab Spring: The Case of Libya. Cambridge 5

University Press, 46(4). Retrieved November 8, 2016, from https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ps-political-science-and-politics/article/assessing-insecurity-after-the-arab-spring-the-case-of-libya/07D6A2263601379C0B33E9B0C5BEA253.

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background.” Jean Gottmann states, “peripheral location means (nominal) subordination would obviously lead to (continual) conflict and instability.” 7

Therefore, one could look at political instability and directly trace it back to power differences based on social and economic factors between the core and the periphery.

The NTC was formed on February 27, 2011, days after protests began in Benghazi. The NTC has, “been highly effective in its quest to become the sole legitimate national authority in Libya.” Even with the clear presence of the NTC, 8

there has been disorganization, as mentioned earlier. Jason Pack and Barak Barfi would attribute the presence of NTC and disorganization to the fact that the NTC has, “not effectively cemented its ties to the periphery….the NTC was late to understand the periphery’s significance." W. Lacher argues that there was 9

disorganization within the NTC because Qaddafi had no constitution when he was in power. Therefore, in order for Libya to move forward after the revolution, 10

fundamental questions about the state had to be answered. These fundamental questions about what the political structure should look like in Libya were controversial and took a significant amount of time to answer.

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Episode 3 Tribes, Cities, and Stratification

Tribes have historically had a central role in social structure in Libya. W. Lacher states, “Since the outbreak of the February 17th revolution, Libya’s political map

Pack, J., & Barfi, B. (2012, February). In War's Wake. The Washington Institute For Near East Policy, Policy Focus 77

#118. Retrieved November 15, 2016, from http://www.shabablibya.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/PolicyFocus118.pdf

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has changed beyond recognition.” Throughout the Civil War in 2011, tribes 11

played an essential role for both sides. Lacher discusses tribal leaders who publicly withdrew their allegiance from Qadhafi. He mentions Sheikh Faraj al-Zwy who, “went on TV threatening to cut off oil production from tribe’s area unless regime repression ended.” Dozens of other tribes issued similar statements denouncing 12

Qaddafi and expressing support for the revolution.

Tribes were also a centering factor throughout Qaddafi’s reign. Lacher states, “Qaddafi established alliances with major tribes through family marriages and appointments of senior officials.” Qhadafi’s family belongs to 1 of 5 branches of 13

the Qhadafa tribe. Tribal alliances and loyalties went all the way up to the top of the Libyan political system. Chris Blanchard asserts, “tribal relationships have remained important, particularly with regard to the distribution of leadership roles in government ministries and in political-military relations.” Therefore, to understand the nature of Libya, one has to take into account the role of tribes in shaping and maintaining the structure of society because the people in high ranking positions in the government had tribal loyalties. Ronald Bruce St. John states, “even today the primary allegiance in Libya is to the family and the tribe,” therefore arguing that tribes remain central to the social context of Libya. It would be insincere to claim that tribes were the only factor at work shaping the revolution from a cultural standpoint. Cities also had an essential role in this movement. Lacher states, “mobilization for revolution militias largely occurred on the basis of towns and cities, rather than tribes.” Even with the importance of cities, tribes 14

were and continued to be crucial to the political structure of Libya.

The African Development Bank states, “Libya has a record of high social inequality, high rates of youth unemployment and regional economic disparities,

Lacher, W. (2011, Winter). Families, Tribe and Cities in the Libyan Revolution. Middle East Policy Council, 11 11

XVIII(4). Retrieved October 22, 2016, from http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/families-tribes-and-cities-libyan-revolution

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not to mention years of poor governance and corruption.” The statement goes on 15

to assert that once the state temporarily stopped exporting oil after Qaddafi fell from power the economy severely suffered. The United Nations Development Programme reports that Libya is in a good position to meet the Millennial Development Goals for 2015. While the data has not been presented yet to affirm this claim, the United Nations is pointing to progress in eliminating, or lowering the economic stratification in Libya. Economic inequality is a crucial piece to look at when analyzing the structure of society in Libya beyond simply tribes and cities. The economic inequality as outlined by the United Nations directly ties back to the previous episode on the periphery in Libya. Stratification between the core and the periphery in Libya effects both the political and economic systems.

Mohamed El-Katiri, a Senior Research Analyst at the Conflict Studies Research Centre claims, “The socioeconomic and political factors that led people to revolt against the regime are equally pertinent to post-conflict stabilization and require early attention.” El-Katiri discusses the significance of unemployment during 16

Qaddafi’s reign. The case of unemployment in Libya illustrates the concept of insecurity that became increasingly prevalent in the post-Qaddafi era when considering the political disorganization.

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Episode 4 Driving Factors: Ansar al-Sharia, “Innocence of Muslims,” and

Ahmed Abu - Khattla

Now after looking at the political, social and economic structures in Libya I want to return back to the attack in Benghazi. This episode will focus on what are believed to be the various factors involved in the attack. The terrorist group Ansar

Libya 2012. (2012). African Economic Outlook. Retrieved November 7, 2016, from http://www.afdb.org/15

fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/Libya Full PDF Country Note.pdf

El-Katriri, M. (n.d.). State Building Challenges In A Post - Revolution Libya. Strategic Studies Institute. Retrieved 16

November 3, 2016, from http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1127.pdf

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al-Sharia, the film Innocence of Muslims, and Ahmed Abu-Khattla are generally considered to be the three main factors that motivated and or perpetrated the attack on the US facility in Benghazi.

Ansar al-Sharia is an extremist group located in Eastern Libya that uses social service outreach as a way to promote their ideology in creating an Islamic society ruled by Sharia law. Aaron Zelin claims, “ASL (Ansar al-Sharia in Libya) has a number of identities - charity, security service, health service, religious education provider, a terrorist organization, a training base for foreign jihadists.” From an 17

ideological standpoint, the group has a “deep aversion to democracy.” This strong 18

feeling is based on how the perceive American intervention in Libya. ASL sees the structural disorganization in Libya directly caused by American intervention in the state. The New York Times reports that witnesses to the attack claim that Ansar al-Sharia members played a role in the attack on the U.S. diplomatic operations. 19

The next factor that impacted the Benghazi attack is the film Innocence of Muslims. The film was produced by an unknown Israeli-American, Sam Bacile, who claimed he created the film in order to, “reveal truths about Muhammad that are possibly not widely known.” Much of the information that is known about 20

Sam Bacile remains under strong skepticism, as he has remained anonymous. What does remain clear is that Bacile created this film as a way to present Islam as a hateful religion. Protests immediately began after the release of this film. The New York Times claims, “there is no doubt that anger over the video motivated many attackers.” Moreover, during Hillary Clinton’s testimony before the House 21

Zelin, A. (2015, April 6). The Rise and Decline of Ansar al-Sharia in Libya. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology. 17

Retrieved November 5, 2016, from http://www.hudson.org/research/11197-the-rise-and-decline-of-ansar-al-sharia-in-libya

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Kirkpatrick, D. D. (2013, December 28). A Deadly Mix in Benghazi - The New York Times. Retrieved November 19

29, 2016, from http://http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi/#/?chapt=0

What we know about 'Sam Bacile,' The Man Behind The Muhammad Movie. (2012, September 12). Retrieved 20

November 3, 2016, from http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2012/09/12/161003427/what-we-know-about-sam-bacile-the-man-behind-the-muhammad-movie

Kirkpatrick, D. D. (2013, December 28). A Deadly Mix in Benghazi - The New York Times. Retrieved November 21

29, 2016, from http://http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi/#/?chapt=0

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Committee on Benghazi, she stated her belief that the video played a role in the attack. 22

Ahmed Abu Khattla is the prime suspect in the Benghazi attack. The New York Times analyzed many interviews with Abu Khattla that point to him having no connections to Al-Qaeda. Although, Abu Khattla openly and frequently spoke out against the U.S. and placed the U.S., “not far behind Qaddafi on his list of infidel enemies.” Witnesses to the attack claim that Abu Khattla was back behind the 23

crowd of people, near a group of people at Veniza Road. Moreover, after the attack, many Libyans mourned over the loss of Ambassador Christopher Stevens, who was seen as an ally to the Libyan people. The New York Times described Abu Khattla as, “unmoved” by the death of Ambassador Stevens. 24

These three factors tend to be viewed as mutually exclusive. There is a lot of value in analyzing the overlap between Ansar al-Sharia, Innocence of Muslims, and Ahmed Abu Khattla.

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Episode 5 Christopher Stevens & The Question of Security

The New York Times describes Ambassador Christopher Stevens as, “(he) always saw the best in Libya…among the most influential voices in American

Full text: Clinton testifies before House committee on Benghazi. (n.d.). Retrieved October 30, 2016, from https://22

www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/10/22/transcript-clinton-testifies-before-house-committee-on-benghazi/

Kirkpatrick, D. D. (2013, December 28). A Deadly Mix in Benghazi - The New York Times. Retrieved October 23

29, 2016, from http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi/?/?chapt=0

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policy towards Libya.” Ambassador Stevens was a man who was incredibly 25

knowledgable about the state he was in. He was well respected by citizens in Libya, in fact Libyans took the streets after the attack to mourn the loss of Ambassador Stevens. They saw him as an ally and friend. In this episode, we will explore what Christopher Stevens told us about Libya.

Ambassador Stevens was not ignorant to the threats he faced in Libya. It is said, that he wrote in his diary of the, “never ending security threats…” Libya 26

was a dangerous place in 2011, and Christopher Stevens was fully aware of the risks. During her testimony before the House Committee on Benghazi, Hillary Clinton emphasizes the point that the facility in Benghazi was only temporary. The official U.S. embassy was in Tripoli. Clinton states, “Chris Stevens believed it (the facility in Benghazi) should be a formal consulate.” Secretary Clinton goes on to 27

discuss the importance of a U.S. presence in Libya. She states, “They know if America is not represented then we leave a vacuum and we lose our eye and our ears about what people are thinking and doing.” Therefore, the necessity and 28

value of an American presence in Libya outweighed the danger that accompanied it. Earlier, we discussed the complexity surrounding the political situation in Libya. While it is impossible to speculate about what would have happened if America did not have a presence in Benghazi, one can see where Secretary Clinton is coming from when she talks about the necessity of an American presence in a crucial part of Libya where the uprising against Qaddafi began.

Throughout her testimony, Hillary Clinton emphasizes this idea that the nature of diplomacy in the 21st Century has changed and that there are dangers that accompany it. This is a profound statement worthy of much more exploration than it was given. Since 2011, 100 American facilities over seas have been

Kirkpatrick, D. D. (2013, December 28). A Deadly Mix in Benghazi - The New York Times. Retrieved October 25

29, 2016, from http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi/?/?chapt=0

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Full text: Clinton testifies before House committee on Benghazi. (n.d.). Retrieved October 30, 2016, from https://27

www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/10/22/transcript-clinton-testifies-before-house-committee-on-benghazi/

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attacked. This idea is further exemplified by Secretary Clinton’s statement, 29

“America must led in a dangerous world, and our diplomats must continue representing us in dangerous places. America can’t shrink from our position to lead.” While I think many would agree with Secretary Clinton’s statement that 30

diplomacy is still necessary in places where extreme danger persists, I believe it would be difficult to find someone willing to accept this idea that deaths of U.S. diplomats is something we should consider to be a growing trend. This presents an interesting paradigm. Is it possible to extract Hillary Clinton’s assessment on diplomacy in the 21st Century from the attack on Benghazi?

The Accountability Review Board describes the security situation in Benghazi as, “grossly inadequate.” While there were many requests for additional 31

security measures, the requests went unfilled. The question of the security requests hits at the political question of who was to blame on the American side for the attack. Hillary Clinton states in response to a question relating to the requests for additional security, “I take responsibility for what happened in Benghazi. I did not see them. I did not approve them. I did not deny them.” 32

The question of security as it relates to Benghazi remains one of the most politically divisive issues surrounding the attack. Did the U.S. knowingly place one of its diplomats in grave danger? This is a very loaded question, but one that must be considered nonetheless.

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Accountability Review Board. (n.d.). Retrieved November 15, 2016, from http://www.state.gov/documents/31

organization/202446.pdf

Full text: Clinton testifies before House committee on Benghazi. (n.d.). Retrieved October 30, 2016, from https://32

www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/10/22/transcript-clinton-testifies-before-house-committee-on-benghazi/

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Episode 6 U.S. state building in Libya

During this time of chaos and U.S. involvement in Libya, the Americans were becoming increasingly aware of their situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. For this reason, the Americans were cautious of their involvement in Libya in order to not repeat the same actions they took in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, America was still invested enough through state interests to remain involved in the post-Qaddafi transition process.

Z. Benezete Parsons of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace asserts, “The U.S. will play some role, but it will be very much a background role” 33

in response to a question on the involvement of the U.S. in state building in a post- Qaddafi Libya. This statement by Parsons exemplifies the sentiment at the time of wanting to remain involved in Libya, yet also cautious of becoming too involved. Throughout this segment, I hope to answer the question; What exactly does a background role look like when it comes to U.S. involvement in Libya?

Jason Pack and Barak Barfi state, “the U.S. played a supportive role in both the diplomacy that led to the revolution 1973 and the ensuring post-Qaddafi engagement.” Pack and Barfi go on to claim that the official U.S. policy in Libya 34

is to, “help the center in its quest to consolidate its authority and incorporate the periphery.” A panel of individuals from the Carnegie Endowment for 35

International Peace list the following as ways to secure the periphery; addressing the history of manufactured conflict, solving the tribal problem (meaning integrating tribes into society), solving the Salafi problem, solving the security

Syria Files: Building A New Libya. (n.d.). Retrieved November 15, 2016, from https://wikileaks.org/syria-files/33

docs/1738490_building-a-new-libya.html

Pack, J., & Barfi, B. (2012, February). In War's Wake. The Washington Institute For Near East Policy, Policy Focus 34

#118. Retrieved November 15, 2016, from http://www.shabablibya.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/PolicyFocus118.pdf

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problem, and solving the bureaucratic problem. Therefore, the problems 36

involving the periphery reach out to all areas of social and political structure in Libya.

James Lindsay of the Council of Foreign Relations notes, “If Obama and his coalition partners really want Qaddafi gone, they will have to decide how far they are willing to go to make it happen.” This is the question that gets to the center of 37

any conflict. How far are we willing to go to protect our own interest? Answers will vary depending on who you ask. On March 18, 2011, Obama claimed relating to Qaddafi, “left unchecked, we have every reason to believe that Qaddafi would commit atrocities against his people. Many thousands could die. A humanitarian crisis wold ensure.” 38

Humanitarian reasons are often cited as driving factors for U.S. involvement in other states. The United States is often seen as the protector of democracy and human rights. From Vietnam to Afghanistan and Libya, American officials often use humanitarian justification for engaging in conflict. In many ways, humanitarian reasons can make a war or conflict seem more justifiable. Yet, it also begs the question to what extent is humanitarian efforts truly a primary reason for intervention, or is it simply a disguise for state interests? The next episode will pick up on this idea of humanitarian justification for U.S. intervention in Libya and will look at the consequences of intervention.

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Episode 7 U.S. Intervention Part II & Wrapping Things Up

Ottaway, M., Weherey, F., Lamen, F., & Cole, P. (2012, September 26). Securing Libya's Periphery. Retrieved 36

November 15, 2016, from http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/26/securing-libya-s-periphery-event-3785

Bajoria, J. (2011, April 7). The Perils of Libyan Nation Building. Retrieved November 15, 2016, from http://37

www.cfr.org/libya/perils-libyan-nation-building/p24609

Calabresi, M. (2011, March 18). Why Are We Going to War with Libya? Retrieved November 15, 2016, from 38

http://swampland.time.com/2011/03/18/why-are-we-going-to-war-with-libya/

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The United States has been involved in Libya from overthrowing Qaddafi to establishing organization after Qaddafi fell from power. After the U.S. airstrike campaign was successful in removing Qaddafi from power, the state fell into an economic and political structural situation. At face value U.S. intervention in Libya can be seen as a striking success. We did manage to accomplish our goals without putting a single boot on the ground thanks to technological advances in drone warfare. In reality, the state of Libya was left in a complete wreck after Qaddafi was removed. Obama acknowledges U.S. intervention in Libya as a mistake. In fact, on a FOX News interview when asked of his “worst mistake” he responded, “Probably failing to plan for the day after, what I think was the right thing to do, in intervening in Libya.” 39

Domic Tierney of the Atlantic makes the argument, “The Libya intervention marked the third time in a decade that Washington embraced regime change then failed to plan for the consequences.” Tierney argues that what 40

happened in Libya is part of a bigger picture on how the U.S. approaches war, “the American way of war encourages officials to fixate on removing the bad guys and neglect the post-war stabilization phase.” Tierney goes on to assert that not all 41

states approach war this way, and in fact it is a uniquely American approach. The notion of state-building is so essential to American foreign involvement and how we approach conflict. The case of Libya is not unique in this sense. Rather, it is only the latest example of how misguided American intervention can be. When it comes to looking at U.S. involvement in foreign crisis, I feel as though there is a trend in regards to a lack of knowledge on the culture of the state. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. failed to recognize the consequences to a regime overthrow. When Qaddafi fell, social stratification in the periphery increased as the state experienced a period of economic decline and insecurity paired with massive political disorganization. I personally see these consequences directly tied to cultural forces that were not understood well enough by the Americans.

Tierney, D. (2016, April 15). The Legacy of Obama's "Worst Mistake" Retrieved November 16, 2016, from http://39

www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/obamas-worst-mistake-libya/478461/

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When it comes to major take-aways from the situation in Libya, I feel as though the U.S. needs to honestly reflect on how it engages in conflict and the implications of its actions. The United States is so focused on removing bad leaders from power that implications can become a lower priority. Security and diplomacy is another crucial aspect that needs to be looked at more carefully. It is widely accepted that Ambassador Stevens did not have adequate security, which is absolutely appalling and needs to be addressed by the U.S. government. In all, the nature of the attack in Benghazi is complex and layered in political and cultural forces that shaped and defined the post-Qaddafi era.

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Appendix

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These two diagrams illustrate the Benghazi compound that was attacked.

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2 .

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The population and GDP graph illustrates the gap in 2011-2012 between GDP and population. This gap is the largest since 1970.

This graphic image illustrates U.S. involvement in Libya relative to other states. The image showcases that the U.S. was involved to a higher degree than other states.

3.

4.

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These two pictures showcase Libyan oil exports as compared to other states. While clearly not the primary world leader when it comes to the amount of oil exported, the commodity still remains an integral part of the Libyan economy.

5.

6.

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The picture illustrates what I discussed in the episode on tribes. The image illustrates the three main tribes that span Libya and other states. They are the Toubou, Tuareg, and Berbers. The image illustrates the vastness of cultural diversity in Libya which can showcase the difficulty in finding political and or cultural unity within the state.

This video dives into greater depth on what the image below shows. The video documents the historic and cultural aspects of the Tuareg tribe in Libya and their involvement in the

7.

8.

Citations for Appendix

1. Rogers, S. (2011). Nato operations in Libya: Data journalism breaks down which country does what. Retrieved November 28, 2016, from https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/may/22/nato-libya-data-journalism-operations-country

2. How the Benghazi Attack Unfolded - Timeline. (2012). Retrieved November 28, 2016, from http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444620104578008922056244096

3. Michael B Kelley and Geoffrey Ingersoll. (2013). Intrigue Surrounding The Secret CIA Operation In Benghazi Is Not Going Away. Retrieved November 28, 2016, from http://www.businessinsider.com/the-secret-cia-mission-in-benghazi-2013-8

4. NationStates. (n.d.). Retrieved November 28, 2016, from https://forum.nationstates.net/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=360671&p=26841234

5. Libya – energy, population and economy. (2014). Retrieved November 28, 2016, from http://euanmearns.com/libya-energy-population-and-economy/

6. (2013). Updated Treason Fact Sheet On Obama al-Qaeda (CIA) Alliance, With Questions For Congressional Investigators! Retrieved November 28, 2016, from https://politicalvelcraft.org/2013/02/20/updated-treason-fact-sheet-on-obama-al-qaeda-cia-alliance-with-questions-for-congressional-investigators/

7. V. (2016). Retrieved November 28, 2016, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4X-ps7QyBjI

8. H. (n.d.). How oil-producing countries stacked up in 2012 | ZDNet. Retrieved November 28, 2016, from http://www.zdnet.com/article/how-oil-producing-countries-stacked-up-in-2012/

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Reflection

This class has broadened and deepened my perspective on world affairs. Through class discussions, reflections on the Serial podcast, and the Benghazi project I feel as though my perspective on the world has been challenged as I have sought to look at events from different angles. For me, this project represented the culmination of all of the discussions we have had in class. While researching I was able to connect our conversations on sovereignty and the UN to what I was learning about in Libya. I was also able to connect what I have learned in my Cultural Anthropology class to this project, especially when it came to the aspect of tribes in Libyan society. I really enjoyed being able to make these cross-disciplinary connections throughout this project. For me, it made what I was learning more exciting. I believe my understanding of other cultures has been enhanced by this assignment. I went into the project with a very limited understanding on what happened in Benghazi. All I knew was the limited number of things I had read by U.S. media sources, and even this was very focused on the event of the attack. I had no background information on Libya. This project has made me more aware of the cultural complexities of Libya. While I am not sure if I can confidently say I feel more knowledgeable in global events as a whole, I can definitely state that I feel more knowledgable in this particular global event. I think this is a good place for me to start. After learning about something so foreign and outside of what I understand in the global political sphere, I feel as though it will now be easier for me to approach articles on global news and actually be able to understand what is going on. This project definitely increased my ability to find information from a wide variety of sources. I read a lot of scholarly articles, government and NGO/IGO reports, and media articles. I also became more knowledgable about the research process as a whole. As a whole, I would say that I feel more engaged in global affairs. At the very least, I can use the tools that I have learned to learn more about other global events that I don’t know about.

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