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WORLD TRADE

ORGANIZATIONWT/TPR/M/118WT/TPR/M/11913 November 2003

(03-6086)

Trade Policy Review Body22 and 24 September 2003

TRADE POLICY REVIEW

NIGER AND SENEGAL

Minutes of Meeting

Chairperson: H.E. Mrs Mary Whelan (Ireland)

I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON..................................3

II. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF NIGER................4

III. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF SENEGAL..........5

IV. STATEMENT BY THE DISCUSSANT....................................................................6

V. STATEMENTS BY PARTICIPANTS.......................................................................9

VI. REPLIES BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF NIGER AND SENEGAL AND ADDITIONAL COMMENTS..................................................................................15

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON...........................................23

WT/TPR/M/118WT/TPR/M/119

I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON

1. The first Trade Policy Review of Niger and second Trade Policy Review of Senegal were held conjointly on 22 and 24 September 2003. The Chairperson welcomed the delegation of Niger, headed by Mr Amadou Soumana Gouro, Deputy General Secretary of the Ministry of Trade and Private Sector Promotion, and the delegation of Senegal, headed by Minister of Trade Aïchatou Agne Pouye, and the discussant Mr Niklas Bergström (Sweden). As usual, the discussant spoke in his personal capacity and not as a representative of his country. In accordance with established procedures, he had made available in advance an outline of the main points he intended to raise (document WT/TPR/D/97).

2. The Chairperson recalled the purpose of the Trade Policy Reviews and the main elements of the procedures of the meeting. The Reports by the Governments of Niger and Senegal were contained in documents WT/TPR/G/118 and WT/TPR/G/119 respectively, and those of the Secretariat in documents WT/TPR/S/118 and WT/TPR/S/119 respectively. The delegations of Niger and Senegal had received copies of advance written questions submitted by Japan; the European Union; Canada; Hong Kong, China; and the United States. If full replies could not be provided during the meeting, additional written replies would be given at a later date.

3. The documents prepared for the joint review of Niger and Senegal highlighted the progress in economic liberalization made by those two Least Developed Countries (LDCs) within the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Since its first Trade Policy Review in 1994, Senegal had abolished quantitative restrictions and reduced the simple average applied tariff rate from 37 per cent to 14.7 per cent and bound all the tariff lines. Foreign direct investment and privatization had also played a part in opening the market to competition, even though there were still areas of protection. Niger's first Review highlighted the abolition of quantitative restrictions in 1990 and tariff liberalization within the WAEMU. Niger relied on the regional market to diversify its exports, currently dependent on uranium, into agriculture and livestock raising. Niger and Senegal had acknowledged the difficulties met in order to participate fully in the WTO; training and technical assistance would be beneficial with that aim in mind. Fields of particular interest were notification, implementing obligations, in particular customs valuation and the Doha Agenda. Efforts in those fields would underpin further integration within the world economy, which was an objective featuring in the Poverty Reduction Programmes set up by both the Government of Niger and the Government of Senegal.


II. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF NIGER

4. The representative of Niger stressed the difficulties experienced by Niger's economy since the beginning of the 1980s, leading to domestic and external imbalances. Fundamental reforms of Niger's economy had consequently been implemented, in order to reduce State involvement in the productive sector, liberalize trade in agricultural products and prices, liberalize foreign trade and abolish monopolies.

5. The General Policy Statement made by the Head of Government outlined the following economic objectives: to draw up an orientation programme for economic and social policy for 2000-2004; to encourage the participation of the private sector in economic activity; and to organize the rural sector by developing export-oriented agro-pastoral production. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) clearly laid out the aims and strategies for different sectors and for trade.

6. The countries of the West African Monetary Union (WAMU) were aware of the challenges of globalization and had been furthering economic integration within the WAEMU since January 1994. A Common External Tariff (CET) had taken effect as from 1 January 2000 and sectoral policies (agriculture, trade, transport, taxation) had been harmonized. The WAEMU had adopted an agricultural policy for the Union (PAU), and signed a trade and investment agreement with the United States of America. Other trade agreements were being negotiated with Morocco and Tunisia.

7. Niger aimed to improved the business environment, to foster economic and social development, and to facilitate the integration of its economy within the multilateral trading system. As an LDC, Niger attached great importance to bilateral and multilateral cooperation. In order to take greater advantage of the multilateral trading system, Niger needed assistance in order: to develop the supply of its export products, in both quantitative and qualitative terms; to strengthen its institutional and human capacities with a view to better implementing the WTO Agreements; and to participate effectively in multilateral trade negotiations. A Permanent Mission would open in Geneva in the near future.

8. Regarding future prospects and orientations, the following points were to be noted: the inclusion of trade within the PRSP strategic framework; the Private Sector Promotion Policy and implementation of the results of the Round Table on the Private Sector organized in November 2000; the promotion of a partnership between public and private sectors; the improvement of Niger's participation in the activities of subregional, regional and international organizations; the benefits from expected international support for trade, and in particular the Integrated Framework (IF) for Trade-Related Technical Assistance and the JITAP programme; development of the institutional environment for the promotion of Niger's foreign trade; and effective participation in multilateral trade negotiations.


III. OPENING STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF SENEGAL

9. The representative of Senegal noted that her country's second TPR would allow her to outline the reforms implemented since the first TPR in 1994 and to underline the constraints met on the way to achieving better integration within world trade. The reforms had been undertaken in a stable political environment and involved liberalizing the economy, privatizing State enterprises and permanently withdrawing State control from the mainstream of economic activities.

10. Senegal had instigated institutional reforms within the framework of the private sector development strategy, in particular in the fields of investment, SMEs and standardization. Setting up a more efficient Export Promotion Body (OPE) was also under consideration as an essential part of the country's Export Development and Promotion Strategy (STRADEX). STRADEX was being set up with technical assistance from the UNCTAD/WTO International Trade Centre (ITC) and financial aid from Canada, and aimed to increase production and export supply capacity. The National Committee for International Trade Negotiations (CNNCI) was founded in 2001 and provided a framework to discuss and formulate positions for negotiation at the multilateral, regional and bilateral levels.

11. Senegal had abolished the prior authorization for imports and simplified and reduced customs tariffs. The maximum rate of duty actually applied under the WAEMU Common External Tariff (CET) was 20 per cent, below the 30 per cent binding level in the Schedule of Concessions. In July 2001, Senegal had introduced the Customs Valuation Agreement, covering all products with the exception of about 20, for which a reservation regarding minimum values was being examined at the WTO. Senegal was making efforts to comply with the WTO rules, and the rules of the WAEMU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It was encountering difficulties in implementing WTO requirements on notification and trade defence measures.

12. Despite all the reforms undertaken, Senegal, which had been classified as an LDC since 2001, still found it hard to record positive economic and trade results. There was a chronic balance of trade deficit and negative annual average growth of exports for 1990-2000. Senegal could not yet fully exploit the opportunities for market access offered to LDCs because of the weakness of its production and export supply capacity.

13. Trade had a central role to play in order to reach the PRSP objective of 7 to 8 per cent growth for 2003-2005. The IF approach had been acclaimed and its projects and programmes were included in the PRSP. Efforts made by participants and development partners were welcomed, but it was vital to rationalize them. There still remained the challenge of setting up an appropriate multilateral mechanism to finance development in order to ensure a significant increase in production and export supply capacity, enabling companies to become more competitive on export markets. That viewpoint was upheld by the initiators of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), for whom one of the main objectives was access to the markets of developed countries. It was an issue of key importance both for Senegal and for all the LDCs.


IV. STATEMENT BY THE DISCUSSANT

14. The discussant noted that Sweden was one of the major donors of development aid and among WTO Members was also one of the main donors in terms of technical assistance and capacity-building, for which about 50 million Swedish krona had been earmarked for 2004. Although Sweden's bilateral cooperation with the countries under review was modest, a strategy for the West African region was being considered for the end of 2003. Setting up a focal point in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was being envisaged in order to facilitate developing countries' exports, which would be complementary with the "help desk" initiative introduced by the European Commission in Cancún.

15. With regard to the overall economic outlook, the discussant wished to have the two delegations' views on the impact of the crisis that had affected Côte d'Ivoire and the coup d'état in Guinea-Bissau. The discussant observed that a considerable part of economic activity and trade went through informal channels, and requested information on the two Governments' plans to integrate the informal sector in order to improve State revenue. He also wished to know what benefit the "income loss" as a result of incentives for investment brought to the two countries' economies. An update on the Round Table and the investors' meeting in Niger would also be appreciated.

16. Niger's aim was to diversify its products and export markets by developing agricultural and livestock exports to the subregional and regional markets. The discussant requested an update on the improvement of the institutional trade environment and on the establishment of standards for the main export products. The discussant wanted to know why intra-community (intra-WAEMU) trade was so weak and the measures envisaged.

17. With regard to Niger's participation in the multilateral system, the country's authorities had noted that it was insufficient because of Niger's weak human and financial resources; setting up a mission in Geneva was being considered. However, Niger could benefit greatly from the services of the Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation (AITIC). Few notifications had been made within the WTO framework and there were gaps in Members' understanding of their obligations. The discussant asked what progress had been made and what plans to improve the situation were under consideration.

18. Niger's tariff had been entirely based on the WAEMU CET since 1 January 2000. The simple average of MFN customs duties had fallen from 20 per cent in 1997 to 12.1 per cent in 2000. Over and above the CET, Niger and other WAEMU members applied additional duties. Outside the WAEMU framework, Niger had an import verification programme resulting in a 1 per cent ad valorem tax for certain transactions. There was a substantial gap between the bound and applied levels, theoretically leading to a degree of unpredictability, and the discussant asked for details of ongoing plans to improve the situation.

19. Despite the implementation of the Customs Valuation Agreement, the authorities used administrative values for 868 products, which should be replaced by the WAEMU reference values, for which Niger intended to enter a request for reservation from WTO Members. The discussant requested details on developments in that field.

20. The discussant asked for confirmation about the preparation of standards in 2003 for Niger's food products (rice, oil, milk), building materials (cement, reinforcing steel), water and the environment. He also asked for details on the standards programme within the WAEMU.

21. Niger was not party to the WTO Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement but was considering becoming an observer. Despite the adoption of a new Government Procurement Code in May 2002, which was not yet in force, preference was still given to domestic enterprises with the


exclusion of foreign enterprises for contracts financed by the National Treasury. The discussant asked for clarifications on the usefulness of such preferences.

22. With regard to export-related measures, the discussant asked if there were plans concerning the 3 per cent ad valorem statistical export charge and the special re-export tax. He also requested information on export subsidies; the main subsidies were those provided under the Investment Code or sectoral codes (exemptions from import duties, VAT or company tax).

23. As an LDC, Niger had benefited from an additional time-period until 2006 for full implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. The discussant wondered whether the technical assistance given was sufficient. In that context, he asked for the opinion of the Government of Niger concerning the decision taken on 30 August 2003 at the WTO that allowed the poorest countries to import more easily cheaper generic drugs, produced under compulsory licensing, provided that they could not manufacture the drugs themselves.

24. The Report of the Government of Niger laid down liberalization and sectoral promotion objectives and strategies in order to help the agriculture, handicrafts, mining, energy, industry, tourism, telecommunications and transport sectors to reduce poverty by creating conditions for sustainable economic and social development. The discussant asked for more details on the subject from the delegation of Niger.

25. With regard to agriculture, the Government intended to support the development of promising subsectors (cowpeas, cattle on the hoof, meat, hides and skins), by providing public assets (infrastructure, coverage of social and health needs, support/advice). The discussant asked both delegations to give more details on the plan for a WAEMU agricultural policy.

26. With regard to services, Niger had undertaken commitments under the GATS on tourism, but had not taken part in negotiations since the end of the Uruguay Round. However, Niger had liberalized the telecommunications sector, and the discussant asked if Niger was ready to submit its conditional offer in the new GATS negotiation round.

27. Coming to the overview of the economic situation in Senegal, the discussant asked why the share of primary products in exports (cotton, fisheries products, groundnut oil, horticultural products) had increased since 1994.

28. The investment climate was undermined by a number of problems relating to administrative procedures, labour regulations, high energy supply costs and a lack of infrastructure. The discussant asked about plans to address these problems, and about the impact of the free export enterprise regime on Senegal's economy.

29. Senegal's participation in the multilateral trading system seemed to be below the authorities' expectations, particularly with regard to the level of notifications and understanding of Members' obligations and the benefits which Senegal could derive from the system. The discussant asked for details of the Government's plans in this respect. The Report by the Secretariat contained a draft technical assistance programme which would be the WTO's contribution to the pilot programme of the revised IF (a diagnostic trade integration study of Senegal had already been carried out). Senegal was eligible for JITAP II; the diagnostic study for JITAP II would be made jointly by the ITC, UNCTAD and the WTO, and would be submitted to the donor community in order to set up a cooperation and technical assistance programme.

30. Constraints on the exercise of professions together with quantitative restrictions had been abolished in 1994. Regular consultations were organized with the private sector when trade policy was drawn up. With the introduction of the WAEMU Common External Tariff (CET), the simple


average of customs duties actually applied had been lowered, even though supplementary duties were applied. All tariff lines were bound; the ceiling rate had been fixed at 30 per cent for customs duties and at 150 per cent for other duties and taxes. Although the duties actually applied on some agricultural tariff lines exceeded the 30 per cent bound rate for some products, the Senegalese authorities considered that that extra amount was within the margin permitted by the bound rate for "other duties and taxes".

31. Senegal had requested a waiver in order to maintain "reference values" for over 29 products of non-WAEMU origin. The Senegalese authorities justified that request by the need to protect domestic production and the absence of operational mechanisms for anti-dumping, countervailing and safeguard measures.

32. The new Government Procurement Code maintained a policy of preference for domestic enterprises. The discussant requested information on the usefulness of those preferences up to the present time. The discussant wanted to know if the Government was considering becoming an observer to the Plurilateral WTO Agreement on Government Procurement.

33. As an LDC, Senegal could defer full application of the TRIPS Agreement until 2006. The discussant wished to know whether the technical assistance provided by the WTO was sufficient for its implementation.

34. The Report by the Government indicated that five sectors had been targeted in an action plan to implement a technical assistance programme aiming to increase export capacity: agriculture (the horticultural sector, edible peanuts and cotton, all activities with a competitive advantage); tourism (a source of currency and whose potential was under-exploited); textiles and clothing (to take greater advantage of opportunities offered by the opening up of American and European markets; fishing (the exploitation of which had been rationalized to conserve this resource); and handicrafts. The discussant wished to know what concrete measures had been taken up to the present time.

35. With regard to agriculture, the discussant wanted to know the reason for the existence of the Special Import Tax (TCI) on imports of sugar, wheat flour and refined vegetable oil from countries outside the WAEMU. He also wanted to know the authorities' plans for the "temporary surcharges" on imports of onions, cigarettes, potatoes, bananas, millet and sorghum of any origin, and for the excise duties on refined oils and cigarettes. He requested an update on the National Agricultural Framework Law and the WAEMU agricultural policy. Moreover, he wished to have the Senegalese Government's opinion on the lack of result in Cancún with regard to the cotton initiative, which had been the subject of a presentation by one of the WAEMU countries at the Ministerial Conference (WT/L/539, 19 August 2003).

36. With regard to services, the Report by the Secretariat indicated that Senegal had made no commitments on the supply of services through the presence of natural persons (mode 4). The discussant wished to know whether the Government was ready to make a commitment on mode 4 in the revised version of its offer presented on 14 April 2003 in the negotiation round under the GATS.


V. STATEMENTS BY PARTICIPANTS

37. The Representative of Japan underlined the good bilateral relations that his country maintained with Senegal, with the economic and technical cooperation between the two countries. There was also "Japan's Initiative for Cooperation for Africa" and the forthcoming Tokyo International Conference on African Development

38. Japan welcomed the reforms undertaken by Senegal since the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994. However, Senegal had to take a certain number of measures in order to ensure its development in the face of increasing unemployment, overpopulation in urban areas and the increasing gap between rich and poor.

39. Progress had been made in increasing copyright protection. Tourism was the second export sector, and Japan hoped that Senegal would take additional measures to facilitate procedures for tourists or their guides in order to promote tourism.

40. Japan had a privileged relationship with Niger through uranium exports. As there had been a drop in this market, the economy had suffered badly. International payment deficits had been bridged by economic aid from foreign countries. Japan had also granted aid to Niger.

41. Japan recognized the efforts made by Niger to stabilize domestic politics, nonetheless ongoing instability was a major barrier to trade. Japan hoped that adequate measures would be taken to stabilize the domestic situation. With regard to sectoral questions, it was important for both Niger and Senegal to increase protection of intellectual property rights and to promote the tourism sector.

42. The Representative of the European Union noted that Niger and Senegal were closely linked through economic and monetary integration within the WAEMU and through the ECOWAS. Those two regional organizations had different strong points but the same aim of converging towards an integration process that would cover all the countries of West Africa. The aim of the ECOWAS was a free-trade area before the end of 2004 and the adoption of a CET before the end of 2007.

43. Despite the differences between Niger and Senegal, the overall challenges they faced were very similar. Both countries were LDCs and encountered real difficulties in integrating their trade within the global economy. Their participation in the multilateral trading system was still weak and both countries would have to continue making great efforts in order to adapt to the demands of national, regional and international markets.

44. The EU's answer to those challenges consisted in a series of measures of cooperation on the basis of "development is the objective, trade is the instrument". The Cotonou Agreement and the "Everything but Arms" initiative were points of reference as they allowed duty-free imports into the EC's market. Negotiations on an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between West Africa and the European Commission (EC) would be launched on 6 October in Cotonou. The EPA was to be implemented as from 1 January 2008. It was above all an agreement aiming to ensure that the regional market was created. The EPA would be compatible with WTO rules, applying all the current flexibility in order to take into account the economic and social constraints of the countries in the region.

45. The IF was a pertinent tool, when considered in the wider context of support from the international community for the LDCs' integration within the world economy. The European Commission was Senegal's facilitator within the IF. The process was well underway and different stages had been passed. There remained to implement the Action Plan and to set a timetable with definite deadlines.


46. Cambodia was often referred to as an example, and the Commission wished that the same be true for Senegal in Africa. The key factor in Cambodia was the authorities' determination to give a key role to trade. And as for Cambodia, where development partners had followed by backing the process, the same could happen in Senegal.

47. Niger and Senegal were encouraged to make further progress in the effective implementation of reforms, and to continue respecting and implementing their engagements at the regional and multilateral levels. The EC's backing would boost that momentum.

48. The Representative of Canada congratulated Senegal on its structural and sectoral reforms undertaken since 1995, which had already brought tangible progress. Senegal had made substantial resources available during the recent consultative Group to finance the implementation of its Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). The PRS, like the Export Promotion and Development Strategy (STRADEX) and the IF, provided the elements Senegal needed to meet the challenges of globalization.

49. Senegal was going to update its production systems and set up structures to advise and help investors and developers. Such measures were unavoidable if the country wanted to free itself from the rents arising from protective measures, and if it wanted to maintain and draw maximum benefit from the technologies that had already been transferred.

50. The project of reforming the administration of public finances and government procurement systems would create a climate conducive to investment and socio-economic development. However, the obstacles to private investment in Senegal had to be underlined, as administrative procedures remained both long and costly. It was also important to keep open options to liberalize the telecommunications sector, which was planned for 2004.

51. Senegal had to speed up its efforts to improve expertise of operators in buoyant sectors that had been identified in the STRADEX, while opening up its sectors to competition by lowering tariff protection. Senegal should also rapidly rationalize its export support and promotion instruments and mechanisms. The Senegalese authorities were invited to give a substantial role to the private sector in the implementation of the IF.

52. Senegal was a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and should continue adhering to certain intellectual property protection treaties currently in force that were administered by the WIPO, in accordance with the revised Bangui Agreement (1999).

53. With regard to Niger, Canada praised the remarkable efforts made to strengthen domestic political stability, stabilize the macroeconomic framework, improve trade policies and practices, and promote private investment. Despite the efforts made in the field of trade, there were risks of fraud arising from the existence of informal trade channels.

54. Niger had ratified the revised Bangui Agreement (1999) and also should adhere to certain intellectual property protection treaties administered by the WIPO, of which Niger was a member. Niger was encouraged to actively pursue the simplification of its regulatory framework and the improvement of its legal and judicial system.

55. Canada was in agreement with the Secretariat's view concerning the importance of enhancing the knowledge and expertise of the administration, but wished to widen that objective to other public bodies and Niger's private sector.

56. Canada had made a substantial financial commitment in order to help countries, such as Senegal and Niger, to participate fully and efficiently in the current round of negotiations. Niger and


Senegal also benefited from the initiative of access to Canadian markets for LDCs, which gave duty-free and quota-free access to all imports from the 48 LDCs, with the exception of dairy products, poultry and eggs. Canada, however, wished to underline the importance of the progress and objectives of the Doha Agenda, for which Canada was going to work much harder in the wake of Cancún. Strong African leadership could play an important role, and Canada urged Niger and Senegal to remain actively engaged.

57. The Representative of Hong Kong, China congratulated Niger and Senegal on their substantial liberalization efforts. Quantitative restrictions on imports had been abolished and tariff barriers reduced and simplified by the adoption of the WAEMU CET. It should, however, be pointed out that Niger and Senegal applied additional taxes on goods imported from third countries. Senegal also applied surcharges on certain imported goods. All these additional taxes were a burden which was added on to the MFN tariff, and Niger and Senegal were invited to abolish them, or to reduce them as soon as possible.

58. The fact that an Import-Export Card was demanded of people involved in international trade in Senegal seemed to be an obstacle to trade. The delegation encouraged the Senegalese authorities to carry out their planned abolishment of the Card.

59. Niger had liberalized its telecommunications services without commitments under the GATS, but could consolidate such liberalization by commitments in the current round of negotiations.

60. The Representative of Mauritania noted the signification of the joint TPR of two West African countries linked by several integration agreements, which bore witness to the importance of regional integration as a factor strengthening the multilateral trading system. The progress registered within the framework of the WAEMU or of other subregional organizations illustrated the useful and positive contribution of integration.

61. Senegal had made appreciable progress since its first TPR in 1994. The Government had made trade an instrument devoted to growth and economic and social development under the PRSP. The promotion of investment, control of public finances, the implementation of the tariff reform within the WAEMU, the improvement of procedures facilitating trade, the binding of all tariff lines, and the effective application of the provisions of the Customs Valuation Agreement since July 2001, together with the commitments made covering several sectors within the GATS framework, were proof of Senegal's untertaking to better integrate into the multilateral trading system.

62. The Senegalese Government had made considerable efforts to reinforce the regional and multilateral dimensions of foreign trade and to derive greater benefit from trade liberalization, in particular the efforts made within the framework of the WAEMU and of the ECOWAS, together with the signing of several bilateral or regional agreements.

63. Mauritania enjoyed good bilateral relations with Senegal. The programmes carried out under the auspices of the Organization for Development of the Senegal River (OMVS) in the fields of irrigated agriculture, electrification and river transport laid the foundation stone for a strategic partnership between Senegal, Mali and Mauritania, generating a substantial flow of trade and partnerships in different fields such as fishing, livestock raising, tourism, education or small and medium-size processing industries.

64. Niger had made considerable progress since the 5th Republic came into being in 1999. The resolute commitment to implement the obligations arising from the WTO Agreements had led to the binding of all tariff lines covering agricultural products and most lines concerning non-agricultural products, the submission of a schedule of specific commitments under the GATS, the implementation of the Customs Valuation Agreement in 2001, together with the setting up in 2002 of a national


standardization, accreditation and certification system, and the revision of the Government Procurement Code.

65. Mauritania also enjoyed excellent relations with Niger, both on the subregional level and within the framework of the African Union and the ACP Group of States. There was a substantial community of people from Niger in Mauritania, and of Mauritanians in Niger.

66. The WTO Members, and the international community more generally speaking, should be aware of the efforts made by Niger and Senegal and consequently step up their aid in order to help these two countries to pursue the reforms undertaken and to create the conditions for complete success of their export promotion and development strategies, and their PRSs.

67. The Representative of the United States noted that his country gave substantial preferential access to exports from Niger and Senegal, in particular through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and by identifying the fields where technical assistance would be strengthened. The governments were encouraged to use that assistance and to take on a stronger leadership role in the region as defenders of free trade and the multilateral trading system; their efforts would be backed by the United States.

68. The United States congratulated Senegal for renewing its efforts to attract investments and diversify the basis of the economy. The groundnut crop was on the decline and the subsector was being liberalized. Sizeable participation by the private sector in the framework of a competitive economy was another means of stimulating growth, and it was thus encouraging that the Government was pursuing its privatization and restructuring programme. The Senegalese economy had made the transition from a State-dominated economy to a market-based economy. The Government had abolished price controls, export subsidies, quantitative restrictions on imports and exports, and monopolies, and had modernized the regulatory framework and begun a privatization programme. Senegal was encouraged to stimulate the development of the private sector and to pursue structural reforms, the latter being a subject about which the delegation would like to have further information.

69. The United States expressed concern over the fact Senegal that had not enacted legislation to apply its WTO obligations. The representative asked for more details on the delay and plans about implementing the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation.

70. The United States backed the efforts made by the Government of Niger to promote the market economy, to expand investments and trade, stimulate growth and facilitate the integration of Niger's economy in the world economy. It recognized the difficulties met in introducing economic, social and cultural reforms. The United States would continue to encourage trade and development in Niger by offering preferential access to its exports and identifying the fields where technical assistance would be strengthened.

71. The Government of Niger had made rapid progress towards a market economy, even though the country had limited financial resources. State enterprises had been privatized, particularly in the key sectors of energy and telecommunications, and the privatization of other enterprises was in the pipeline. It was vital to make energetic efforts in the fields of economic management, privatization and public finances in order to promote trade, investment and economic development. Efforts to impose fiscal discipline and macroeconomic stability should be pursued, as should those concerning the strengthening of the banking and financial system, and diversification of the economy, which was dependent on uranium.

72. Even though vast progress had been made, the Governments of Niger and Senegal still had much work in front of them in order to attain the objective of a greater opening up of both trade and


the economy, which would be the basis for increased productivity, diversified exports and, perhaps the key objective, the arrival of investments. The United States intended to back those efforts.

73. The Representative of India noted the importance of the change in Senegal's status (LDC since 2001). Even though Senegal had managed to reach a higher level of economic growth during the period 1995-2002 thanks to its major structural reforms, poverty had not declined. In spite of those difficulties, the Senegalese Government's commitments to pursue the reform process remained a firm one.

74. Niger had confronted economic problems since the beginning of the 1980s. Since 1994, the Government had firmly set off down the path to reform and macroeconomic stabilization, but there could not be real benefits because of political uncertainty up to 1999. There was currently hope for a rise in the growth rate and stabilization. The delegation of India backed the efforts aiming at diversifying the economy of Niger.

75. Niger and Senegal had begun to reform their trade policies within the WAEMU, and had bound almost all their tariff lines. Both countries had recently taken measures to implement the WTO Agreements on Customs Valuation, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Technical Barriers to Trade, and TRIPS. Those were considerable achievements. However, Niger and Senegal were not yet in a position to be able to participate fully in the multilateral trading system, and needed substantial and targeted technical assistance. WTO Members should consider what means were available to better integrate Niger and Senegal into the multilateral trading system. India had offered technical assistance and training support, as far as its resources allowed.

76. The Representative of Morocco noted that the difficult situation of Niger had thus far limited all attempts for it to become integrated in the multilateral trading system. As a landlocked country, Niger was economically highly dependent on agriculture, which had suffered from the vagaries of unfavourable rainfall. Government initiatives had run up against political instability. The economy had not been able to take advantage of devaluation, as had been the case in other countries in the region, because of insufficient supply and lack of accompanying measures.

77. Niger had nonetheless made praiseworthy efforts with regard to its commitments under the WTO Agreements. Even though, despite its wishes, Niger was not included in the redefined IF pilot programme, there was hope that the country would be eligible for the WTO technical assistance programme.

78. Niger benefited from Morocco's initiative to allow duty-free imports of products from African LDCs. The two countries had bilateral cooperation programmes in several fields.

79. Senegal had managed to face the challenges on the horizon when it submitted to its first TPR in 1994. The authorities had launched a programme of structural reforms and macroeconomic stabilization, with encouraging results. Senegal had made much progress in terms of regional integration and was very well placed among WAEMU members for its financial discipline.

80. Despite Senegal's commendable efforts to meet its commitments under the WTO Agreements, macroeconomic results remained weak and socio-economic indicators had continued to deteriorate, resulting in Senegal being classified among the LDCs since 2001. However, it was a status that gave the country new perspectives as it allowed increased support from its development partners in the fields of debt relief, market access, and other initiatives resulting from the Uruguay Round and the Doha Agenda, in particular through technical cooperation in the context of the IF.

81. The Senegalese authorities were encouraged to continue the efforts already made since the first TPR with regard to structural reforms and the development of human capital in the framework of


the PRS, with the hope that the strategy would bear fruit in the medium term and help redress imbalances in favour of the rural population.

82. Morocco brought its whole-hearted support to the Governments of Niger and Senegal for the fulfilment of their economic and trade objectives.

83. The Representative of Mauritius underlined the strong links between his country and Senegal, which were strengthened by their belonging to regional and international organizations, in particular the African Union, NEPAD, the ACP Group and the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF).

84. Despite a programme of structural reforms and macroeconomic stabilization since Senegal's first TPR, the country's economic growth had been variable. Like Mauritius, Senegal was vulnerable to external shocks, the vagaries of the climate and its debt burden. According to the Report by the Secretariat, 65 per cent of the population was poor, with per capita income below US$545, and with a low percentage of literacy and short life expectancy. Senegal was faced with a long struggle.

85. Several noteworthy initiatives had been taken by the Senegalese authorities to redress the situation, in particular the STRADEX, participation in the IF and the JITAP II programme, and institutional reforms. It was vital for Senegal to adopt an Agricultural Orientation Law, in order to lessen the poverty of the rural population, to increase the level of food security and the quality and diversity of foodstuffs, and to manage the country's natural heritage.

86. The Mauritian delegation had noted the Senegalese Government's determination to reverse the major macroeconomic trends, in particular by drawing up the PRSP, the 10th Social and Economic Development Plan 2002-2007 and commitment to the NEPAD. The PRSP deserved the support of the international community as a whole in terms of resources mobilization and bilateral initiatives. Trade was a key instrument to bridge the gap separating Africa from the developed countries.

87. Given the affinities between Mauritius and Senegal, several avenues for cooperation were to be developed, in particular in tourism, handicrafts, the textiles and clothing sector, SMEs, fisheries and questions relating to the over-exploitation of fisheries resources, education and experiences of regional integration. Such cooperation was all the more necessary as the Mauritian private sector had shown keen interest in Senegal.

88. The Representative of Malaysia noted the substantial efforts made by Senegal to liberalize the investment, trade and services regimes. Niger had taken on considerable multilateral commitments, in particular the binding of most tariff lines and the implementation of the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation and the GATS, and was considering becoming an observer to the Plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement. Niger had shown that stronger economic growth was possible in favourable climatic conditions.

89. Niger and Senegal had many points in common, in particular the key role of agriculture in their development and the significant efforts already made in order to stimulate growth and development. However, substantial progress remained to be made, in particular with regard to the promotion of trade and investments. The international community had an important part to play in providing technical assistance and plans to raise standards. Coordination of efforts would enhance the efficiency of ongoing programmes.


VI. REPLIES BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF NIGER AND SENEGAL AND ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

90. The Chairperson noted that the discussion was centred on three major themes: the economic environment; trade policy; and sectoral policy. The remarks by the delegations of Niger and Senegal on each theme would be followed by those of other participants.

91. The representative of Niger stated that some replies would be given jointly and others would be provided later, in particular those concerning the United States.

92. With regard to the overall economic environment and the stabilization of the country's domestic affairs, constitutional life was back to normal in Niger following the elections of 1999, thanks to the establishment of democratic institutions and better management of the socio-economic concerns of civil and military personnel working for the State.

93. Concerning the economic impact of the crisis that had affected Côte d'Ivoire, the representative indicated that as Côte d'Ivoire was Niger's second largest partner in imports, there had been negative consequences on the quality and price of goods, supplies of industrial inputs and budget receipts. Since Burkina Faso had closed its border with Côte d'Ivoire, transit traffic bound for Niger had been interrupted. Credit institutions in Niger had recorded a slowdown in transactions with their correspondents in Côte d'Ivoire.

94. Concerning the consequences of the coup d'état in Guinea Bissau, he underlined that the WAEMU and the ECOWAS condemned changes of government by means of force. Niger supported that principle and that of the peaceful resolution of conflicts in a member State.

95. With regard to the Round Table on the private sector and meetings with investors, he explained that the Round Table had taken place in November 2000 as an outcome of the private sector promotion policy adopted in March 1997. A Follow-Up Unit under the direct control of the Ministry for Promotion of the Private Sector had taken over responsibility.

96. The Government of Niger was taking the following measures to reduce the size of the informal sector and to improve revenue for the State: adopting the law on competition and prices which governed trade activities; applying measures to encourage investment (the Investment Code), which incited the informal sector to join the formal sector; establishing an Investment Promotion Centre; setting up a Centre to deal with formalities for enterprises, such as the Single Window; restructuring the Consular Chamber; and the Labour Code, obliging enterprises to comply with regulatory provisions. Those provisions appeared to be inadequate and other provisions were currently being studied.

97. Concerning the benefit on Niger's economy of the income loss as a result of incentives for investment, he confirmed that there had been a loss of revenue, but that the Government was hoping to attract investors with a view to increasing added value and employment.

98. The technical assistance and capacity-building programmes had insufficient resources and were not able to cover needs. The Cotonou Agreement was binding, as it was an Agreement that Niger had signed and ratified.

99. Concerning Niger's view on its regional priorities, the authorities had the following plans: reducing informalization; using internal taxation to make up for the loss of customs revenue resulting from the setting up of the free-trade zone, as 35 per cent of trade was with Nigeria and 30 per cent with the other WAEMU countries, with Côte d'Ivoire at the top; implementing territorial planning in such a way as to reduce transport costs and improve competitiveness, and thus overcome the


disadvantages of being landlocked. Those regional priorities also allowed a single currency to be established, and enabled Niger to benefit from the ECOWAS compensation mechanism and to achieve compatibility in trade policies within the region.

100. With regard to the reasons for the low level of intra-community trade within the WEAMU, the explanation could be found in the frailty of the industrial fabric and the weak production of local products destined for intra-community trade.

101. The representative of Senegal noted that an IMF study had shown that the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire had had a negative impact on the economies of the countries in the subregion. The growth figures of the seven WAEMU member countries plus Guinea and Ghana had dropped to an average of 2.5 per cent in 1999-2000, compared with the average rate of 5 per cent enjoyed by the region over the period 1994-2000. However, the impact on Senegal had been less hard compared to other countries. With regard to the crisis in Guinea Bissau, there was hope of democratic elections in the near future.

102. Concerning the measures taken by the Government of Senegal to reduce the size of the informal sector and improve State revenue, it was significant that the sector already made a substantial contribution to State revenue. Institutional reforms had been carried out in order to control the informal sector. One such measure encouraging formalization was the creation of a synthetic tax, applicable from January 2004. An Approved Management Centre had also been set up, whose function was to help SMEs in the informal sector in their integration into the formal sector. The two measures were linked, since a stamp from the Management Centre was necessary in order to benefit from the synthetic tax. The setting up of a Ministry of Female Entrepreneurship and of Micro-credits was also being studied, as women were important players in the informal sector. In 2003, an international forum on SMEs had been organized. Regular meetings with the informal sector had also been arranged by the Government over the last three years.

103. With regard to the usefulness of the policy of preference for domestic enterprises in government procurement, such a policy helped to expand Senegal's network of SMEs and was a measure encouraging the formalization of the informal sector. It involved domestic enterprises and industries and enterprises established in Niger, whether foreign or not. The question of Senegal becoming an observer to the Plurilateral WTO Agreement on Government Procurement was not currently under consideration.

104. With regard to the weakness of intra-community trade within the WAEMU, the main reasons, apart from those mentioned by the delegation of Niger, were: the lack of communication and transport infrastructure, the constraints on treasuries' budget receipts, and insufficient industrial production. The customs union had not been totally put in place, but the objective was to improve intra-community trade, in particular through free circulation of products imported from a member country and the relaxing of community rules.

105. With regard to the proposed plans to reduce electricity supply costs, the authorities were intending to pursue the privatization of SENELEC, and there were also subregional plans. Concerning the impact of the free export enterprise regime on the Senegalese economy, an evaluation was being carried out. With regard to the increase in the share of the primary sector in exports, the reasons were: good levels of rainfall in 2000 and 2001; the record production of groundnuts (1 million tons in 2001); the increase in cotton production; erratic variations in fisheries products (octopus); and the increase in horticultural products for export thanks to the Agricultural Export Promotion Project (PPEA).

106. The representative of Rwanda underlined the efforts made by Niger and Senegal in order to strengthen their participation in the multilateral trading system. Given their status as LDCs, some of


the WTO Agreements should be implemented with flexibility by including certain waivers, in accordance with the Doha development mandate. LDCs could only be integrated into a rules-based multilateral trade system if they benefited from effective special and differential treatment.

107. The representative of the European Commission noted the concern expressed by the delegation of Niger concerning the harmful effects resulting from the setting up of the ECOWAS customs union on tax revenues. However, greater regional integration would boost the economies of member countries. His delegation requested more details from the delegation of Senegal on the privatization of SONACOS, planned for 2003.

108. The representative of Chinese Taipei underlined the interest of his Government in a deepening of bilateral relations with the countries of West Africa and in particular with Senegal. A considerable effort to implement the reforms of the Uruguay Round had been made, and opening the telecommunications sector to competition under the GATS would help Senegal to benefit from that sector with its high added value.

109. The experience of Chinese Taipei confirmed that price and trade liberalization together with the privatization of State enterprises, which were processes currently under way in Senegal, and the emergence of SMEs would result in a more stable and transparent economic environment, which in turn would attract foreign direct investment and consequently generate export capacity. Senegal was to be congratulated for being on the path to sustained economic growth.

110. On the topic of trade policies, the representative of Niger noted that with regard to approval under the Investment Code, dossiers were approved provided that they were within the Code's field of application and respected the conditions. Before taking the decision to approve, a technical commission made observations which enabled applicants to make the necessary corrections before the full examination of their applications. Decisions were final, but dossiers could be reconsidered if there were modifications.

111. Concerning the question of whether the specific benefits under the Investment Code were similar to tax and customs concessions, he pointed out that they were rather different. Special provisions had been established for certain sole proprietorship or cooperative handicrafts enterprises, namely exemption from the business licence fee, the tax on commercial and industrial profits (BIC), the minimum fiscal tax (IMF), and duties and taxes, including VAT, for five years. Such exemptions were also in place for the building of schools and clinics and for enterprises working on technological innovations.

112. With regard to the progress made on notification to the WTO and plans to improve the situation, Niger recognized its shortcomings within the WAEMU framework. Concerning the possibility of modifying bound rates in order to reduce the gap with applied rates, the representative indicated that there were currently no plans to that effect. The reply to the question about the proposed request to WTO Members for a reservation in respect of administrative values would be given later.

113. Standardization in Niger had begun with the establishment of a Department of Standardization, Quality and Metrology in November 2001, and the adoption of a law in September 2002. Standardization and accreditation were dealt with by the Ministry responsible for standardization and the National Standards Council (CNN). The CNN was responsible, inter alia, for putting forward regulatory and financial measures and for approving draft standards before their adoption by the Minister responsible for standardization. Draft standards were drawn up by technical committees for standardization.


114. As soon as the institutional apparatus had been set up, it was determined that the priority needs for domestic standards concerned agro-food products, building materials, water and the environment, and quality management. Four technical committees for standardization had thus been established. The technical committee for standardization in quality management had already adopted the ISO 9001 standard. Draft standards for water, iodized salt, cement, bricks, and hides and skins had been prepared. Standards for onions were at the draft stage. Products derived from biotechnologies had not yet undergone a standardization process. Niger was also considering fully taking over the standards of the Codex Alimentarius. In accordance with the provisions of the WTO Agreements, mandatory standards would be notified as soon as they were adopted.

115. The development of such standards could help production enterprises to satisfy environmental requirements on international markets, but that would imply strengthening capacity. Concerning technical assistance, a list of needs had recently been sent to certain partners, who were studying them. Niger did not rule out giving accreditation to foreign bodies.

116. A programme to set up a system of accreditation, standardization and quality promotion was being implemented within the WAEMU, with the help of the EU. The programme had identified the state of standardization activities in the member countries. A regional general Secretariat for accreditation had also been established within the WAEMU.

117. With regard to the usefulness of the preference given to domestic enterprises for government procurement, the representative explained that the policy concerned domestic enterprises and industries, and enterprises established in Niger, whether foreign or not. The purpose was to favour domestic entrepreneurship and the setting up of foreign enterprises in Niger.

118. In answer to the discussant's question, there were no plans concerning export measures (the statistical export charge and the special re-export tax). The discussant had also asked for more information about the scope and usefulness of export subsidies, but Niger did not use such subsidies as defined in the relevant WTO Agreement.

119. With regard to intellectual property, Niger would give its replies to the questions concerning the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and on the amount of technical assistance required to allow Niger to modernize its intellectual property regime to the Secretariat. With regard to the implementation of a new copyright regime, draft texts had been sent to the WIPO for comment. The comments had been included and the texts were currently being forwarded to the National Assembly for adoption.

120. Concerning the WTO decision on the importation of generic medicines, he indicated that Niger was one of the LDCs who had asked for such a measure, and thus approved of it. However, it was important that there be flexible conditions governing its implementation.

121. The representative of Senegal underlined that it was the law passed in 1979 that governed copyright, but that a draft law had been put before the National Assembly and would be voted before long. Senegal applied the revised Bangui Agreement, which had been harmonized with the TRIPS Agreement in 1999.

122. With regard to the amount of technical assistance required to modernize the intellectual property regime, she indicated that it was necessary: to provide logistical support to the TRIPS subcommittee of the CNNCI (National Committee for International Trade Negotiations); to finance training seminars at the national and regional levels for magistrates, customs officials, policemen, and trade inspectors, in order to promote better understanding of the TRIPS Agreement; and to support economic players, particularly in the handicrafts field, for the financing of costs incurred to register


intellectual property rights. The informal sector did not have the necessary resources to protect its intellectual property.

123. With regard to the measures taken by Senegal in order to combat piracy on the domestic market, she stated that the Senegalese Copyright Office (BSDA) was responsible for applying the 1979 law, which provided for the filing of lawsuits and the seizure of counterfeit goods. The draft legislation on copyright, once voted, would allow piracy to be combated more effectively as the penalties provided for were severer. Technical assistance was necessary to back up the work of the BSDA, even though its limited resources had not prevented it from achieving significant results in seizing counterfeit goods.

124. The protection of service marks and geographical indications was governed by the Bangui Agreement. According to the African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI), the expression "distinctiveness of the trademark" mentioned in Annex III, Article 1, of the Bangui Agreement meant what was visually distinctive, which excluded both sound and smell.

125. She explained how foreigners who were right holders could register their rights under Annex VI of the revised Bangui Agreement. Their rights had to be registered in their countries of origin before they approached the OAPI. In reply to the question of who handed down penalties on infringement of the use of geographical indications, and how damages were assessed in proceedings, she indicated that such matters fell within the competence of the courts.

126. There was no national legislation on patents, industrial designs or plant varieties, for in Senegal, only the Bangui Agreement applied. Senegal did not intend to join the Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants for the moment as the Annex of the revised Bangui Agreement dealing with the question was not yet being implemented, fundamentally for reasons of technical know-how.

127. With regard to the elimination of surcharges on imports, she explained that they had been levied on a limited number of products in the wake of the trade liberalization programme, which had abolished quantitative restrictions. Their levels did not exceed those of the other duties and taxes in Senegal's schedule. There was a link with the dossier that Senegal had submitted to the Committee on Customs Valuations in July 2002 relating to minimum values on a number of strategic products. Unfortunately, the issue had not yet been resolved because of the intransigence of certain developed countries, in particular the United States. It was desirable that a solution be quickly found so that Senegal could benefit from the waiver that had been granted to LDCs under the Doha Agenda.

128. With regard to investments, and in particular the harmful effects of the bureaucratic burdens facing investors, in the question put by Canada, it was true that there were still efforts to be made in this field. That was why a Presidential Investors' Council (CPI) had been set up, presided by the Head of State. The Council had recently identified 35 measures to simplify administrative procedures. Moreover, the establishment of the following was being considered: a code of good governance and a good governance surveillance and anti-corruption Council; performance indicators and evaluation criteria for all the agencies and departments dealing with administrative formalities and procedures (including the National Agency for the Promotion of Investment and Major Public Works (APIX)); an investment framework law defining principles of investor/government relations and establishing statutory deadlines for the handling of cases referred to public authorities. The first steps to realize these objectives had been taken during the first half of 2003.

129. With regard to standardization, Niger had replied to the question on the regional aspect. Concerning Senegal, the European Commission was asking questions on the effectiveness of the reform of the system, on the conformity of Senegalese standards adopted in 2002, and on the regular participation in international standardizing bodies. The reform was indeed effective and had led to the


setting up of the Senegalese Standards Association (ASN), which had replaced the Senegalese Standards Institute (ISN), highlighting greater implication of the private sector in the standardization process. A total of 197 standards had been developed, of which 110 were international standards. Participation in international bodies was still undermined by budgetary constraints.

130. The mandatory standard on tomatoes was not a protective measure contrary to the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade as it aimed to prevent the presence of additives and colouring that were harmful to public health.

131. Both Senegal and Niger, and the other countries in the subregion, were engaged in negotiating an EPA with the European Commission with a view to developing the subregional market.

132. The representative of the European Commission observed in relation to the representative of Senegal's remarks on reference values, that a minimum price, which was more than 50 per cent higher than that of the world market, was imposed on exports of matches from the EU to Senegal. That minimum price was apparently based on a study carried out by the Senegalese authorities, and the Commission requested additional information on the study or on the basis of the calculation of the minimum value.

133. With regard to sectoral policies, the representative of Niger confirmed that the technical assistance provided met Niger's main priorities concerning the sustainable management of natural resources. Niger confirmed that the committee responsible for evaluating the impact on the environment intended to look at the question of sustainability.

134. Regarding the terms and conditions to be met by the branches or subsidiaries of financial institutions setting up on the territory of Niger, he indicated that the market was open, and that the establishment of branches or subsidiaries of foreign financial institutions was subject to the current banking regulations. Applications for approval were submitted to the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), which then asked the opinion of the Banking Commission, on the basis of which approval was granted by decree from the Ministry of Finance. On average, a minimum of three months was necessary to deal with applications for approval, as the meetings of the Banking Commission were quarterly.

135. Prudential standards for management defined by the WAEMU Banking Commission followed the rules of the Basel Agreement. The BCEAO and the Banking Commission were represented at the annual meetings on the Basel Agreement, with the aim of harmonizing standards.

136. Up to six months were on average necessary to process applications for approval submitted by enterprises supplying credit insurance services.

137. Financial services were not included in Niger's schedule of specific commitments under the GATS. However, current banking regulations did not discriminate between foreign companies and domestic firms, once the former had been set up on the territory of Niger. Another question concerned Niger's opinion that such commitments were not consistent with those of the WAEMU, pointing to the fact that other member countries had made commitments. Niger indeed considered that a single schedule of commitments for financial services was necessary for countries in the same economic area. The schedule would be notified to the WTO, since the WAEMU could not do so.

138. The representative of Senegal noted that the WAEMU agricultural policy covered all agricultural, forestry, livestock raising and fishing activities. Its objective was to contribute in a sustainable manner to meeting the population's food needs, the economic and social development of the member States, and poverty reduction. Three strategic themes had been identified to attain that objective: adapting production systems and improving the production environment; enlarging the


common market in agriculture and management of shared resources (fishing and livestock raising); and integrating into the subregional market and the world market in order better to ensure export outlets for regional products, to limit food dependency and to secure the progressive integration of agriculture in the subregional and world markets.

139. On the institutional level, in order to facilitate the implementation of the WAEMU agricultural policy, focal points had been set up in each member country to follow up implementation at the national level. The activities required to adapt agricultural industries and improve the production environment would be conducted in a consultative framework.

140. Regarding the drafting of the Agricultural Framework Law, its main objectives were: to reduce poverty in the rural community, raise the standard of living and keep as many farmers and stock breeders as possible on the land; to increase the volume of production in order to improve food security and make Senegal independent as far as food was concerned; and to improve the ability of Senegalese agriculture to compete with imports. The Law also aimed: to diversify and increase agricultural production and exports while meeting quality standards; to manage natural resources, and particularly the soil, water and forests, on a sustainable basis; and to improve the living environment in rural areas and promote balanced land use.

141. The Agricultural Framework Law was fully consistent with the WAEMU agricultural policy. In addition, a Joint National Committee had been set up to finalize the draft, which was due to be completed at the end of December 2003 at the latest. A meeting with donors was planned for November 2003 to bring them up to date and receive their contributions.

142. With regard to the lack of data on the size of subsidies for agricultural production, the representative indicated that there was no financial aid for production in Senegal, which was a poor country. Imported products, however, were subsidized.

143. With regard to the fact that import surcharges had been maintained, they were designed to offer a lifeline to certain agro-industrial branches, and as a LDC, Senegal had the right to maintain them as a safeguard measure.

144. Concerning the Cancún initiative on cotton, a question put by the discussant, it had demonstrated the solidarity and cohesion of the developing countries. As the initiative had not been accepted, Senegal was expecting the issue to be addressed as a matter of priority.

145. Regarding the delays in the approval of applications from enterprises supplying insurance services, two months (five at the very most) were necessary for the preliminary examination by the Ministry of the Economy and Finance before applications were sent to the Regional Insurance Monitoring Commission, which met four times a year.

146. Japan had noted that Japanese tourists would be encouraged if Japanese tourist guides and interpreters were allowed to set up in Senegal without conditions. However, it was obligatory either to be a Senegalese national or to be a national of a State with a reciprocal agreement with Senegal, and to obtain a professional card from the Ministry of Tourism. To fight insecurity, Senegal, with the help of the police force, was setting up tourist brigades, which regularly patrolled tourist sites (charter on tourism).

147. Concerning the environment, the EU had asked if the trade and environment subcommittee had been able to identify the priority fields of cooperation with the EU, but such was not yet the case. Senegal was responsible for the matter in the NEPAD, and would certainly ask the Commission for technical assistance when the time came.


148. The type of technical assistance that helped Senegal to participate more effectively in the multilateral trading system was a technical assistance programme built around a financial development plan. That was a vital element, for although Senegal had access to many markets through a variety of initiatives, without national capacity, access remained potential only. The TPRB meeting was an opportunity to request technical assistance funds.

149. Given the importance of the IF and JITAP II programmes, Senegal was expecting appropriate support from its development partners in order to finance the spheres of action of the IF aiming to strengthen its production and export supply capacity. Like Cambodia, Senegal was expecting to benefit from technical assistance to make trade a growth factor in the PRS.

150. Concerning the measures to implement the IF programme, an action plan had been approved both by the Government at Cabinet level and by the donor community. The plan had been unveiled to development partners during the meeting of the Consultative Group held in Paris in June 2003. Some donors had already announced their financial backing for some of the spheres of action of the IF. A close link had been established between the IF and the PRSP thanks to collaboration between the relevant ministries.

151. With regard to the minimum value applied to imported boxes of matches, it should be noted that matches were subject to dumping and the Senegalese authorities were not yet able to combat the problem effectively in accordance with the complicated WTO procedures. The current study would be made available to the European Commission.

152. The discussant asked for additional information on the participation of Niger and Senegal in the current GATS negotiations.

153. The representative of the European Commission had a question for Senegal on the fisheries sector, and in particular on the details of the timing and procedure for the setting up of a system of controls and licences for the 10,000 strong fleet of pirogues.

154. The representative of Senegal replied that industrial fishing was already subject to licensing, and hence to access fees, whereas small-scale fishing was not. It had been observed that 80 per cent of boats were used for the latter. In order to combat the over-exploitation of resources, a scheme for the granting of access rights had been in force for six months. Its aim was to establish a system of concessions and access rights, including their applicability and implementation and monitoring procedures. The longer-term objectives were to define the tools to evaluate sectoral policies in order to set up a fisheries resource management plan within the WAEMU.

155. The revision to Senegal's initial offer in the current GATS negotiations had been held up until the signal from trading partners concerning the modalities of special treatment for LDCs was given, only just before Cancún. The question of mode 4 concerned above all the developed countries; the developing countries were awaiting market access for semi-skilled and unskilled labour.

156. The representative of Niger indicated that his Government intended to make an initial offer in the current GATS negotiations, and that the step was currently being studied.


VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRPERSON

157. The Chairperson noted that the review of the trade policies of Niger and Senegal had enabled all the participants to gain a far better understanding of the two countries' trade policies, which were shaped by the WAEMU, and of their trade-related policies and aspirations. The discussion had been both thorough and exhaustive, thanks to full and open cooperation from high-level delegations, and the discussant's judicious remarks.

158. Members had congratulated Niger and Senegal on the efforts they had made in recent years to achieve stabilization and implement economic reforms, mainly in the field of public finances and investment. Members had noted that sustainable development and the fight against poverty, together with the integration of the informal sector in the formal economy, remained difficult challenges.

159. Members had stressed that trade was an instrument of development and underlined the importance of the IF and other cooperation initiatives. Niger and Senegal were not taking full benefit from their status as WTO Members, given that their own constraints with regard to resources did not allow them to recognize and/or to exploit the possibilities on offer. Several Members had indicated that, despite their direct or indirect contribution in the shape of technical assistance and the promotion of trade with Niger and Senegal, integration of the two countries in the multilateral trading system had not advanced very rapidly.

160. Members had recognized the efforts made to simplify the tariff structure and the influence of the WAEMU regarding the reduction of the average level of MFN rates. They had noted the use of additional duties and taxes, together with administered prices agreed by the WAEMU for customs valuation purposes. Several Members had inquired about what was being done to improve the protection of intellectual property rights.

161. In light of their recent macro-economic results, Niger and Senegal had been encouraged to move forward with the implementation of structural reforms, including privatization, and in the diversification of markets and products. Budgetary reforms and new sources of revenue for the State were necessary to face up to the expected effects of further tariff liberalization and the increase in budgetary expenditure linked to health and the fight against poverty.

162. Members had also sought clarification on the following points:

Investment;

national standards;

government procurement;

intellectual property rights;

questions linked to national and regional agriculture and fisheries;

privatization;

questions linked to financial services, telecommunications and tourism;

commitments made under the GATS and negotiations.


163. Members had appreciated the thorough and complete replies given by the delegations of Niger and Senegal, and expected to receive further responses and details.

164. The TPR had allowed Members to gain a fuller appreciation of the progress made by Niger and Senegal, and of the challenges awaiting them. The highly active participation of the two delegations in the meeting, the number of questions asked and the lively debate had shown the importance that Members attached to the review. Niger and Senegal were encouraged to improve their multilateral commitments, both in the field of goods and in that of services, and to continue implementing their reform programmes in order to enhance the transparency, predictability and credibility of their trade regimes and their compliance with WTO principles. It was nonetheless necessary to put such considerations in their context. Niger and Senegal faced genuine constraints in their resources; technical assistance was required from the WTO and other relevant organizations; needs had been identified in the Reports of the Secretariat and had to be met. Moreover, trading partners should participate in the effort by guaranteeing that their markets were completely open to products from Niger and Senegal.

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