World War II: Causes of World War II: Causes of the War – Part 3the War – Part 3

Policy of Appeasement – Neville Policy of Appeasement – Neville ChamberlainChamberlain

Believed he could trust Hitler and liked Believed he could trust Hitler and liked that he was trying to make Germany a that he was trying to make Germany a better placebetter place

He didn’t like war (and the public was He didn’t like war (and the public was against it). His main focus was on the against it). His main focus was on the ills that had beset Britain’s industrial ills that had beset Britain’s industrial life, in particular unemploymentlife, in particular unemployment

He had faith in the triumph of reason He had faith in the triumph of reason and believing himself to be fighting the and believing himself to be fighting the good fight for peace, he was prepared to good fight for peace, he was prepared to be patient, stubborn, and optimisticbe patient, stubborn, and optimistic

British Foreign PolicyBritish Foreign Policy There were so many dictatorships in Europe There were so many dictatorships in Europe

that one could scarcely take issue with them that one could scarcely take issue with them allall

Austria was regarded as fascistAustria was regarded as fascist Czechoslovakia was a random collection of Czechoslovakia was a random collection of

nationalities under Czech dominationnationalities under Czech domination Poland was a military dictatorship, frequently Poland was a military dictatorship, frequently

anti-Semitic, and oppressive in its treatment of anti-Semitic, and oppressive in its treatment of national minoritiesnational minorities

British Foreign PolicyBritish Foreign Policy The discussion of whether fascism or communism The discussion of whether fascism or communism

was more dangerous to Britain was like determining was more dangerous to Britain was like determining the relative disagreeableness of mumps and measlesthe relative disagreeableness of mumps and measles

If Nazis and fascists were opposed to communism, If Nazis and fascists were opposed to communism, then there was something to be said for them (until then there was something to be said for them (until it became an obvious danger to British security)it became an obvious danger to British security)

At the last moment, the Labour Party awoke to the At the last moment, the Labour Party awoke to the realization that the greatest danger lay not in realization that the greatest danger lay not in armaments but in Britain’s lack of themarmaments but in Britain’s lack of them

French Foreign PolicyFrench Foreign Policy Policy of armaments was hard to pursue in a Policy of armaments was hard to pursue in a

country devoted to peacecountry devoted to peace Search for allies was hampered at almost every Search for allies was hampered at almost every

turn by ideological sympathies and antipathies of turn by ideological sympathies and antipathies of the Frenchthe French

Their foreign policy between the wars was in principle Their foreign policy between the wars was in principle based on a network of alliance with east European based on a network of alliance with east European states – Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and states – Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and RomaniaRomania

The hope was that these allies would help to protect The hope was that these allies would help to protect France against Germany, but in practice it was more France against Germany, but in practice it was more likely that France would have to protect themlikely that France would have to protect them

Policy of Policy of Appeasement – Appeasement –

Austrian AnschlussAustrian Anschluss In July 1934, Austrian Nazis broke into the In July 1934, Austrian Nazis broke into the

Chancellery in Vienna, shot the Chancellor, Chancellery in Vienna, shot the Chancellor, Dollfuss, and proclaimed over the radio that he Dollfuss, and proclaimed over the radio that he had resignedhad resigned

Other members of the government rallied, and the Other members of the government rallied, and the assassins had to surrenderassassins had to surrender

The Austrian army and police defeated risings in The Austrian army and police defeated risings in five of the nine provincesfive of the nine provinces

The defeat of the rising showed that determined The defeat of the rising showed that determined opposition, even in a small country, could check opposition, even in a small country, could check Nazi aggressionNazi aggression

Policy of Appeasement – Austrian Policy of Appeasement – Austrian AnschlussAnschluss

In 1936 and 1937, Mussolini diminished his support In 1936 and 1937, Mussolini diminished his support for Austria and stopped supplying arms to the for Austria and stopped supplying arms to the Austrian armyAustrian army

In Apr. 1937, Mussolini told Schuschnigg that he In Apr. 1937, Mussolini told Schuschnigg that he could no longer undertake to defend Austria by could no longer undertake to defend Austria by forceforce

The Austrian Chancellor announced a plebiscite The Austrian Chancellor announced a plebiscite whether the public wanted “a free and German, an whether the public wanted “a free and German, an independent and social, a Christian and united independent and social, a Christian and united Austria” – everything pointed to a massive “yes” Austria” – everything pointed to a massive “yes” vote. The vote was to be taken on Mar. 13, 1938vote. The vote was to be taken on Mar. 13, 1938

Policy of Appeasement – Austrian Policy of Appeasement – Austrian AnschlussAnschluss

Hitler had secret news of the plebiscite before it was Hitler had secret news of the plebiscite before it was announced in Austriaannounced in Austria

On Mar. 11, Hitler called for the plebiscite be postponed. On Mar. 11, Hitler called for the plebiscite be postponed. Goering telephoned Vienna with the demand that Goering telephoned Vienna with the demand that Schuschnigg must resign and be replaced as Chancellor Schuschnigg must resign and be replaced as Chancellor by Seyss-Inquartby Seyss-Inquart

This was resisted for a time, until Schuschnigg announced This was resisted for a time, until Schuschnigg announced the resignation of his whole Cabinet except Seyss-Inquartthe resignation of his whole Cabinet except Seyss-Inquart

German forces entered Austria early on Mar. 12, in a German forces entered Austria early on Mar. 12, in a seemingly friendly mannerseemingly friendly manner

Behind the army with its bands and flags there came the Behind the army with its bands and flags there came the Gestapo. 10-20,000 arrests, ranging from Schuschnigg Gestapo. 10-20,000 arrests, ranging from Schuschnigg himself to Socialist Party members and Jewshimself to Socialist Party members and Jews

Policy of Appeasement – Austrian Policy of Appeasement – Austrian AnschlussAnschluss

France and Britain’s ReactionFrance and Britain’s Reaction Had long expected the Anschluss, Had long expected the Anschluss,

which was thought to be inevitable which was thought to be inevitable and in principle rightand in principle right

In Britain in particular, there was a In Britain in particular, there was a widespread belief that the enforced widespread belief that the enforced separation of Germany and Austria separation of Germany and Austria had been among the errors of had been among the errors of VersaillesVersailles

Austrians were in no real position Austrians were in no real position to sacrifice themselves to awaken to sacrifice themselves to awaken the rest of Europethe rest of Europe

Policy of Appeasement – Sudeten Policy of Appeasement – Sudeten Crisis/CzechoslovakiaCrisis/Czechoslovakia

The bulk of the German population lived in a horseshoe-The bulk of the German population lived in a horseshoe-shaped area along the frontiers with Germany and Austriashaped area along the frontiers with Germany and Austria

The main problem was that the Germans, who in 1919 The main problem was that the Germans, who in 1919 had abruptly lost a position of predominance and became had abruptly lost a position of predominance and became a subordinate minority, were discriminated against in a subordinate minority, were discriminated against in education, jobs, and the distribution of public fundseducation, jobs, and the distribution of public funds

German industrial areas tended to blame the government German industrial areas tended to blame the government in Prague for their misfortunes, and by the growth of in Prague for their misfortunes, and by the growth of ideological conflictideological conflict

A quasi-Nazi party in Czechoslovakia, called A quasi-Nazi party in Czechoslovakia, called Heimatsfront, polled nearly 1.25 million votes in May Heimatsfront, polled nearly 1.25 million votes in May 1935, more than any other party (the Nazi Party provided 1935, more than any other party (the Nazi Party provided a large amount of funds)a large amount of funds)

Policy of Appeasement – Sudeten Policy of Appeasement – Sudeten Crisis/CzechoslovakiaCrisis/Czechoslovakia

The government held that a democratic state could not The government held that a democratic state could not entrust its administration to representatives of a entrust its administration to representatives of a totalitarian partytotalitarian party

Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Nazi party in Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Nazi party in Czechoslovakia, demanded the removal of all Czechoslovakia, demanded the removal of all discrimination against the German populationdiscrimination against the German population

Early in 1937, Henlein began to demand autonomy for the Early in 1937, Henlein began to demand autonomy for the German areas, which the government refused because any German areas, which the government refused because any concessions made to the Germans would be demanded by concessions made to the Germans would be demanded by the Slovaks, Magyars, and Poles, and would end in the the Slovaks, Magyars, and Poles, and would end in the disintegration of the statedisintegration of the state

The Anschluss in Austria sharpened the conflictThe Anschluss in Austria sharpened the conflict

Policy of Appeasement – Sudeten Policy of Appeasement – Sudeten Crisis/CzechoslovakiaCrisis/Czechoslovakia

On May 19-21, there were widespread rumors of German On May 19-21, there were widespread rumors of German troop movements in areas to the north of the Czech bordertroop movements in areas to the north of the Czech border

Two Sudeten Germans were shot by a Czech officer, so Two Sudeten Germans were shot by a Czech officer, so on May 21 Ribbentrop told the British Ambassador in on May 21 Ribbentrop told the British Ambassador in Berlin that there had been 100 German casualties in the Berlin that there had been 100 German casualties in the Sudetenland, and that if such provocation continued the Sudetenland, and that if such provocation continued the German people would intervene as one manGerman people would intervene as one man

Germany had no intention of launching an attack, but the Germany had no intention of launching an attack, but the danger of war appeared to be realdanger of war appeared to be real

Britain and France increased their pressure on the Czechs Britain and France increased their pressure on the Czechs to make concessionsto make concessions

Policy of Appeasement – Sudeten Policy of Appeasement – Sudeten Crisis/CzechoslovakiaCrisis/Czechoslovakia

Hitler proclaimed that he would “protect” the Sudeten Hitler proclaimed that he would “protect” the Sudeten Germans, who were unable to protect themselvesGermans, who were unable to protect themselves

The Czechs made far-reaching attempts to satisfy the The Czechs made far-reaching attempts to satisfy the German minority, but as Hitler instructed, Ribbentrop was German minority, but as Hitler instructed, Ribbentrop was to always ask for more than the Czechs would accede toto always ask for more than the Czechs would accede to

After much criticism of German officials against Hitler’s After much criticism of German officials against Hitler’s policy with Czechoslovakia, they appealed to Britain for policy with Czechoslovakia, they appealed to Britain for support if they tried to overthrow Hitlersupport if they tried to overthrow Hitler

Chamberlain was not prepared to risk the issue of war on Chamberlain was not prepared to risk the issue of war on the success of a few conspirators in Germany who were the success of a few conspirators in Germany who were trying to remove their powerful and popular dictatortrying to remove their powerful and popular dictator

Policy of Appeasement – Policy of Appeasement – Czechoslovakia/Munich ConferenceCzechoslovakia/Munich Conference

A conference was called at Munich A conference was called at Munich and Hitler, Mussolini, Daladier (PM and Hitler, Mussolini, Daladier (PM of France), and Chamberlain of France), and Chamberlain assembled on September 29assembled on September 29thth

German occupation of the Sudeten German occupation of the Sudeten area was agreed to. Chamberlain area was agreed to. Chamberlain even got Hitler to sign the a paper even got Hitler to sign the a paper promising to settle all future Anglo-promising to settle all future Anglo-German differences by diplomacyGerman differences by diplomacy

The Czechs were not allowed to The Czechs were not allowed to participate nor the Russians, who participate nor the Russians, who were still enemies of Nazi Germanywere still enemies of Nazi Germany

Policy of Policy of Appeasement - Appeasement - CzechoslovakiaCzechoslovakia

In March 1939, Hitler got the Czech President to sign In March 1939, Hitler got the Czech President to sign away what was left of the independent countryaway what was left of the independent country

Goering threatened that he would obliterate Prague Goering threatened that he would obliterate Prague with bombs. The Czech will to resist was brokenwith bombs. The Czech will to resist was broken

On March 15, 1939, the Wehrmacht moved. However, On March 15, 1939, the Wehrmacht moved. However, Hitler’s breach of the Munich settlement caused the Hitler’s breach of the Munich settlement caused the West to want to do something to stop HitlerWest to want to do something to stop Hitler

People in Britain started to move towards a People in Britain started to move towards a determination to resist a German attempt to dominate determination to resist a German attempt to dominate Europe by force Europe by force

Policy of Appeasement - Policy of Appeasement - CzechoslovakiaCzechoslovakia

Britain doubled the strength Britain doubled the strength of the armyof the army

Chamberlain accused Hitler Chamberlain accused Hitler of breaking his word and of breaking his word and taking the law into his own taking the law into his own handshands

Hitler signed the Nazi-Hitler signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact Soviet Non-Aggression Pact on August 23, 1939, but on August 23, 1939, but nothing was done about itnothing was done about it

Policy of Appeasement – Memel & Policy of Appeasement – Memel & AlbaniaAlbania

Soon afterward, Germany annexed Memel, a German city Soon afterward, Germany annexed Memel, a German city seized by Lithuania in 1923seized by Lithuania in 1923

Albania had long been under Italian political and Albania had long been under Italian political and economic influence, and in some circumstances the action economic influence, and in some circumstances the action might have been seen as little more than consolidationmight have been seen as little more than consolidation

However, three weeks after annexing Czechoslovakia and However, three weeks after annexing Czechoslovakia and a fortnight after the German occupation of Memel, with a fortnight after the German occupation of Memel, with the air full of rumors of war, the event assumed a very the air full of rumors of war, the event assumed a very different aspectdifferent aspect

It indicated a degree of coordination between Germany It indicated a degree of coordination between Germany and Italian plans far greater than was actually the caseand Italian plans far greater than was actually the case

The states created in the post-war settlement were The states created in the post-war settlement were crumbling awaycrumbling away

Danzig DisputeDanzig Dispute Was overwhelmingly German in Was overwhelmingly German in

population (96%) and after 1933 its population (96%) and after 1933 its internal administration was run by the internal administration was run by the Nazi PartyNazi Party

Danzig represented a fundamental Danzig represented a fundamental issue:issue:

For Germany, it was a matter of For Germany, it was a matter of historic right and a German historic right and a German populationpopulation

For Poland, it was a guarantee of For Poland, it was a guarantee of access to the sea and a symbol of access to the sea and a symbol of securitysecurity

Danzig DisputeDanzig Dispute Germany proposed to Poland that Danzig should Germany proposed to Poland that Danzig should

be incorporated in Germany, and a German-be incorporated in Germany, and a German-controlled road and rail link with East Prussia be controlled road and rail link with East Prussia be established. Finally, Poland should join the Anti-established. Finally, Poland should join the Anti-Comintern Pact, signed between Germany, Japan, Comintern Pact, signed between Germany, Japan, and Italyand Italy

In return, Germany would guarantee her frontier In return, Germany would guarantee her frontier with Poland, and extend the 1934 Non-Aggression with Poland, and extend the 1934 Non-Aggression Pact for 25 year…the Poles refusedPact for 25 year…the Poles refused

Invasion of Invasion of PolandPoland

Britain and France guaranteed their support to Britain and France guaranteed their support to Poland, hoping that the guarantee would act as a Poland, hoping that the guarantee would act as a deterrent so that it wouldn’t have to be carried outdeterrent so that it wouldn’t have to be carried out

Nazi S.S. troops wearing Polish uniforms staged a Nazi S.S. troops wearing Polish uniforms staged a phony invasion of Germany, damaging several phony invasion of Germany, damaging several minor installations on the German side of the minor installations on the German side of the borderborder

They also left behind a handful of dead German They also left behind a handful of dead German prisoners in Polish uniforms to serve as further prisoners in Polish uniforms to serve as further evidence of the alleged Polish attackevidence of the alleged Polish attack

War resulted on September 1War resulted on September 1stst, 1939, 1939

Failure of the League of NationsFailure of the League of Nations The U.S. didn’t accept the Versailles The U.S. didn’t accept the Versailles

Treaty/League of Nations. These factors played Treaty/League of Nations. These factors played a part:a part: Isolationism (the U.S. didn’t want to be drawn into Isolationism (the U.S. didn’t want to be drawn into

another war)another war) Disillusionment (shock, disappointment, and dismay Disillusionment (shock, disappointment, and dismay

at the war, causing the U.S. to not want to get into at the war, causing the U.S. to not want to get into another one)another one)

Partisanship (political parties voting according to Partisanship (political parties voting according to party lines)party lines)

Summary of the Causes of WWIISummary of the Causes of WWII The clash of ideologiesThe clash of ideologies Economic pressures and opportunitiesEconomic pressures and opportunities Room to cultivate food and move undesirables Room to cultivate food and move undesirables Changes in military technology and strategic thoughtChanges in military technology and strategic thought Long-standing territorial disputes, conflicts of Long-standing territorial disputes, conflicts of

interest, psychological tensions between peoplesinterest, psychological tensions between peoples Propaganda and coercionPropaganda and coercion Prestige and material interestsPrestige and material interests Appeasement and confidenceAppeasement and confidence