G.R. No. 199324 January 7, 2013EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, Port of Aparri, Cagayan, DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, Port of San Fernando, La Union, and HEAD OF THE LAND TRANSFORTATION OFFICE,Petitioners,vs.FORERUNNER MULTI RESOURCES, INC.,Respondent.D E C I S I O NCARPIO,J.:The CaseWe review1a ruling2of the Court of Appeals enjoining the government from enforcing, litispendentia, a ban on the importation of used motor vehicles.The FactsExecutive Order No. 156 (EO 156)3, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo) on 12 December 2002, imposes a partial ban on the importation of used motor vehicles.4The ban is part of several measures EO 156 adopts to "accelerate the sound development of the motor vehicle industry in the Philippines."5In Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc. and two related petitions6(collectively, Southwing), we found EO 156 a valid executive issuance enforceable throughout the Philippine customs territory, except in the Subic Special Economic and Freeport Zone in Zambales (Subic Freeport) by virtue of its status as a "separate customs territory" under Republic Act No. 7227.7Respondent Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc. (respondent), a corporation engaged in the importation of used motor vehicles via the ports of Aparri, Cagayan and San Fernando, La Union, sued the government in the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan (trial court) to declare invalid EO 156, impleading petitioner public officials as respondents.8Respondent attacked EO 156 for (1) having been issued by President Arroyo ultra vires; (2) trenching the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution; and (3) having been superseded by Executive Order No. 418 (EO 418),9issued by President Arroyo on 4 April 2005, modifying the tariff rates of imported used motor vehicles. Respondent sought a preliminary injunctive writ to enjoin, litispendentia, the enforcement of EO 156.The Ruling of the Trial CourtActing on respondents application for preliminary injunctive remedy, the trial court granted relief, initially by issuing a temporary restraining order followed by a writ of preliminary injunction granted in its Order of 27 November 2008.10On petitioners motion, however, the trial court reconsidered its Order and lifted the injunctive writ on 7 July 2010. The trial court grounded its ruling on Southwing which it considered as negating any "clear and unmistakable legal right" on the part of respondent to receive the "protection of a writ of preliminary injunction."11Respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals in a certiorari petition.The Ruling of the Court of AppealsThe Court of Appeals granted certiorari, set aside the trial courts Order of 7 July 2010 and reinstated its Order of 27 November 2008. In the appellate courts estimation, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in lifting the preliminary injunctive writ it earlier issued. The appellate court held that the implementation of EO 156 "would put petitioner in a financial crisis."12As authority, the appellate court invoked by analogy this Courts ruling in Filipino Metals Corporation v. Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry.13Petitioners are now before this Court charging the Court of Appeals with having committed an error of law in reinstating the preliminary injunctive writ for respondent. They argue that Southwing controls the case, precluding the Court of Appeals from recognizing a clear legal right of respondent to import used motor vehicles.Respondent counters that the doctrinal import of Southwing was weakened by the subsequent issuance of EO 418, allegedly repealing EO 156. Respondent invokes our minute Resolution of 15 November 2010 denying the petition in G.R. No. 187475 (Executive Secretary v. Feniz [CEZA] International, Inc.) as judicial confirmation of the supposed repeal.As prayed for by petitioners, we issued a temporary restraining order on 16 January 2012 against the Court of Appeals ruling.The IssueThe question is whether the Court of Appeals erred in granting preliminary injunctive relief to respondent to enjoin enforcement of EO 156.The Courts RulingWe hold that it was error for the Court of Appeals to grant preliminary injunctive relief to respondent. We set aside the Court of Appeals ruling and reinstate the trial courts Order of 7 July 2010.Respondent Without Clear Legal Right toImport Used Motor VehiclesIt is a deeply ingrained doctrine in Philippine remedial law that a preliminary injunctive writ under Rule 5814issues only upon a showing of the applicants "clear legal right"15being violated or under threat of violation by the defendant.16"Clear legal right," within the meaning of Rule 58, contemplates a right "clearly founded in or granted by law."17Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief.18For suits attacking the validity of laws or issuances with the force and effect of law, as here, the applicant for preliminary injunctive relief bears the added burden of overcoming the presumption of validity inhering in such laws or issuances.19These procedural barriers to the issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on the equitable nature of such relief, preserving the status quo while, at the same time, restricting the course of action of the defendants even before adverse judgment is rendered against them.Respondent sought preliminary injunctive relief as ancillary to its principal cause of action to invalidate EO 156. Respondents attack on EO 156, however, comes on the heels of Southwing where we passed upon and found EO 156 legally sound, albeit overextended in application. We found EO 156 a valid police power measure addressing an "urgent national concern":There is no doubt that the issuance of the ban to protect the domestic industry is a reasonable exercise of police power. The deterioration of the local motor manufacturing firms due to the influx of imported used motor vehicles is an urgent national concern that needs to be swiftly addressed by the President. In the exercise of delegated police power, the executive can therefore validly proscribe the importation of these vehicles. x x x20The narrow ambit of this review precludes us from passing upon the merits of the constitutional and administrative issues respondent raised to attack EO 156. Nevertheless, we have no hesitation in holding that whatever legal right respondent may possess vis vis the operation of EO 156, we find such legal right to be doubtful by force of the Southwing precedent. Until reversed or modified by this Court, Southwing makes conclusive the presumption of EO 156s validity. Our holding is bolstered by respondents failure to remove its case from the confines of such ruling.In arriving at a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals dwelt on the "grave and irremediable" financial losses respondent was poised to sustain as a result of EO 156s enforcement, finding such prejudice "inequitable."21No doubt, by importing used motor vehicles in contravention of the ban under EO 156, respondent risked sustaining losses. Such risk, however, was self-imposed. Having miscalculated its chances, respondent cannot look to courts for injunctive relief against self-inflicted losses which are in the nature of damnumabsqueinjuria. Injunction will not issue on the mere possibility that a litigant will sustain damage, without proof of a clear legal right entitling the litigant to protection.22Nor does our ruling in Filipino Metals furnish doctrinal support for respondent.1wphi1We sustained the trial courts issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ in that case to enjoin the enforcement of Republic Act No. 8800 (RA 8800) delegating to a cabinet member the power to adopt measures to address prejudicial importations in contravention of relevant international agreements. We grounded our ruling on the fact that the petitioners, which principally argued that RA 8800 violates Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution (limiting Congress delegation of the power to fix trade quotas to the President), "have established a strong case for the unconstitutionality of RA 8800."23In short, the petitioners in Filipino Metals discharged the burden of overcoming the presumption of validity accorded to RA 8800, warranting the issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ in their favor. Southwing forecloses a similar finding for respondent.Lastly, we find no merit in respondents submission that EO 418 repealed EO 156, removing the legal bar to its importation of used motor vehicles. The question of whether EO 418 repealed EO 156 was already settled in our Resolution dated 22 August 2006 denying reconsideration of our ruling in Southwing. The respondents in those cases, importers of used motor vehicles via the Subic Freeport, had espoused the theory presently advanced by respondent. We rejected the proffered construction of the two issuances:The subsequent issuance of E.O. No. 418 increasing the import duties on used motor vehicles did not alter the policy of the executive department to prohibit the importation of said vehicle. x xx There is nothing in the text of E.O. No. 418 which expressly repeals E.O. No. 156. The Congress, or the Office of the President in this case, is presumed to know the existing laws, such that whenever it intends to repeal a particular or specific provision of law, it does so expressly. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal previous administrative issuances. x xxE.O. No. 156 is very explicit in its prohibition on the importation of used motor vehicles. On the other hand, E.O. No. 418 merely modifies the tariff and nomenclature rates of import duty on used motor vehicles. Nothing therein expressly revokes the importation ban. (Italicization supplied)Contrary to respondent's claim, our minute Resolution dated 15 November 2010 denying the petition in Feniz did not have the effect of modifying much less reversing our holding in Southwing. The petition in Feniz sought a review of the ruling of the trial court striking down Section 2 of EO 418. The trial court found such provision, which imposed additional specific duty ofP500,000 on each imported used motor vehicle, void for having been issued by President Arroyo ultra vires. Neither the validity of EO 156 nor the alleged repeal by EO 418 of EO 156 was the lismota in Feniz.WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision dated 27 June 2011 and the Resolution dated 14 November 2011 of the Court of Appeals. The Order dated 7 July 201 0 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 10, is REINSTATED. The temporary restraining order issued on 16 January 2012 is made PERMANENT.SO ORDERED.AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL REALTY, INC., JESUS GARCIA, and LYDIA MARCIANO,Petitioners,- versus -MUNICIPALITY OF PADRE GARCIA BATANGAS PROVINCE,Respondent.G. R. No. 183367Present:CARPIO,J., Chairperson,BRION,PEREZ,SERENO, andREYES,JJ.Promulgated:March 14, 2012

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NSERENO,J.:This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules ofCourt, seeking to annul the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 102540 dated 26 March 2008[1]and 16 June 2008, which denied petitioners Motion for the issuance of a status quo order and Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.Statement of the Facts and the CaseIn 1993, fire razed to the ground the old public market of respondent Municipality of Padre Garcia, Batangas. The municipal government, through its then Municipal Mayor Eugenio Gutierrez, invited petitioner Australian Professional Realty, Inc. (APRI) to rebuild the public market and construct a shopping center.On 19 January 1995, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)[2]was executed between petitioner APRI and respondent, represented by Mayor Gutierrez and the members of theSangguniang Bayan. Under the MOA, APRI undertook to construct a shopping complex in the 5,000-square-meter area. In return, APRI acquired the exclusive right to operate, manage, and lease stall spaces for a period of 25 years.In May 1995, Victor Reyes was elected as municipal mayor of respondent. On 6 February 2003, respondent, through Mayor Reyes, initiated a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Memorandum of Agreement with Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 87. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-004.On 12 February 2003, the RTC issued summons to petitioners, requiring them to file their Answer to the Complaint. However, the summons was returned unserved, as petitioners were no longer holding office in the given address.On 2 April 2003, a Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Service by Publication was filed by respondent before the RTC and subsequently granted by the trial court.On 24 November 2003, the RTC issued an Order declaring petitioners in default and allowing respondent to present evidence ex parte.On 6 October 2004, a Decision was rendered by the RTC, which, after narrating the testimonial evidence for respondent, stated:After the completion of the testimony of Victor M. Reyes, counsel for the petitioner manifested that he will file the formal offer of evidence in writing.On July 19, 2004, counsel for the petitioner filed before this Court his Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits consisting of Exhibits A to H, inclusive of submarkings.On August 18, 2004 an order was issued by the Court admitting all the exhibits formally offered by the petitioner thru counsel and this case was ordered submitted for resolution of the Court.There is no opposition in the instant petition.WHEREFORE, in view thereof, and finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, it being supported by sufficient evidence, judgement (sic) is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff as against the respondents as follows:(a)The Memorandum of Agreement is hereby declared null and void for being contrary to law and public policy, particularly R.A. 6957 and R.A. 7718;(b)The respondents are hereby ordered to pay the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS (5,000,000.00) in favor of the plaintiff for damages caused to the latter;(c)The structures found within the unfinished PADRE GARCIA SHOPPING CENTER are hereby declared forfeited in favor of the Municipality of Padre Garcia.SO ORDERED.[3]There having been no timely appeal made, respondent filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment, which was granted by the RTC. A Writ of Execution was thus issued on 15 July 2005.After learning of the adverse judgment, petitioners filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment dated 18 July 2005. This Petition was denied by the RTC in an Order dated 15 June 2006. In another Order dated 14 February 2008, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration.Petitioners later filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition dated 28 February 2008, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 102540. On 7 March 2008, petitioners filed before the CA a Motion for the Issuance of Status Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.[4]The motion prayed for an order to restrain the RTC from further proceeding and issuing any further Order, Resolution, Writ of Execution, and any other court processes[5]in the case before it.On 26 March 2008, the CA issued a Resolution denying the said motion, stating thus:After a careful evaluation of petitioners Motion for Issuance of Status Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, We find that the matter is not of extreme urgency and that there is no clear and irreparable injury that would be suffered by the petitioners if the prayer for the issuance of a Status Quo Order, Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is not granted. In Ong Ching Kian Chuan v. Court of Appeals, it was held that, to be entitled to injunctive relief, the petitioner must show,inter alia, the existence of a clear and unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.WHEREFORE, petitioners prayer for the issuance of a Status Quo Order, Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.[6]On 17 June 2008, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration of the 26 March 2008 Resolution, stating that the mere preservation of thestatus quois not sufficient to justify the issuance of an injunction.On 8 July 2008, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 6 July 2008.Petitioners claim that the amount of APRIs investment in the Padre Garcia Shopping Center is estimated at 30,000,000, the entirety of which the RTC declared forfeited to respondent without just compensation. At the time of the filing of the Petition, APRI had 47 existing tenants and lessees and was deriving an average monthly rental income of 100,000. The Decision of the RTC was allegedly arrived at without first obtaining jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners. The execution of the allegedly void judgment of the RTC during the pendency of the Petition before the CA would probably work injustice to the applicant, as the execution would result in an arbitrary declaration of nullity of the MOA without due process of law.Petitioners further allege that respondent did not exercise reasonable diligence in inquiring into the formers address in the case before the RTC. The Process Server Return, with respect to the unserved summons, did not indicate the impossibility of a service of summons within a reasonable time, the efforts exerted to locate APRI, or any inquiry as to the whereabouts of the said petitioner.On 6 August 2008, this Court required respondent to file its Comment. On 13 February 2009, the Comment was filed, alleging among others that despite the RTCs issuance of a Writ of Execution, respondent did not move to implement the said writ out of administrative comity and fair play. Even if the writ were implemented, petitioners failed to state in categorical terms the serious injury they would sustain.Respondent further argues that it is now in possession of the contracts that the lessees of the Padre Garcia Shopping Center executed with APRI. Thus, there are actions [that militate] against the preservation of the present state of things,[7]as sought to be achieved with the issuance of a status quo order.On 2 June 2009, petitioners filed their Reply to respondents Comment.On 3 March 2010, this Court issued a Resolution requiring the parties to inform the Court of the present status of CA-G.R. SP No. 102540. On 15 April 2010, respondent manifested that after the parties filed their respective Memoranda, the CA considered the case submitted for decision. On 12 May 2010, petitioners filed their Compliance, stating that the appellate court, per its Resolution dated 7 August 2008, held in abeyance the resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 102540, pending resolution of the instant Petition.The Courts RulingThe Petition is denied for failure to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.Procedural Issue: Propriety of a Petition for Review under Rule 45Before proceeding to the substantive issues raised, we note that petitioners resorted to an improper remedy before this Court. They filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to question the denial of their Motion for the issuance of an injunctive relief.Under Section 1 (c) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, no appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order. An interlocutory order is one that does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon.[8]An order granting or denying an application for preliminary injunction is interlocutory in nature and, hence, not appealable.[9]Instead, the proper remedy is to file a Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition under Rule 65.[10]While the Court may dismiss a petition outright for being an improper remedy, it may in certain instances proceed to review the substance of the petition.[11]Thus, this Court will treat this Petition as if it were filed under Rule 65.Substantive Issue: Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CAThe issue that must be resolved by this Court is whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Motion for the Issuance of Status Quo Order and Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (Motion for Injunction).A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights and interests.[12]An application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO may be granted upon the filing of a verified application showing facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded.Essential to granting the injunctive relief is the existence of an urgent necessity for the writ in order to prevent serious damage. A TRO issues only if the matter is of such extreme urgency that grave injustice and irreparable injury would arise unless it is issued immediately.[13]Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rule of Court,[14]a TRO may be issued only if it appears from the facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would be inflicted on the applicant before the writ of preliminary injunction could be heard.Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, petitioners must show that (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.[15]The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involves findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive determination.[16]Hence, the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of discretion.[17]Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[18]The burden is thus on petitioner to show in his application that there is meritorious ground for the issuance of a TRO in his favor.[19]In this case, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the CA. It did not exercise judgment in a capricious and whimsical manner or exercise power in an arbitrary or despotic manner.No clear legal rightA clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.[20]In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion.[21]The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for injunction.[22]A perusal of the Motion for Injunction and its accompanying Affidavit filed before the CA shows that petitioners rely on their alleged right to the full and faithful execution of the MOA. However, while the enforcement of the Writ of Execution, which would nullify the implementation of the MOA, is manifestly prejudicial to petitioners interests, they have failed to establish in their Petition that they possess a clear legal right that merits the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Their rights under the MOA have already been declared inferior or inexistent in relation to respondent in the RTC case, under a judgment that has become final and executory.[23]At the very least, their rights under the MOA are precisely disputed by respondent. Hence, there can be no clear and unmistakable right in favor of petitioners to warrant the issuance of a writ of injunction. Where the complainants right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper.[24]The general rule is that after a judgment has gained finality, it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution. No court should interfere, by injunction or otherwise, to restrain such execution.[25]The rule, however, admits of exceptions, such as the following: (1) when facts and circumstances later transpire that would render execution inequitable or unjust; or (2) when there is a change in the situation of the parties that may warrant an injunctive relief.[26]In this case, after the finality of the RTC Decision, there were no supervening events or changes in the situation of the parties that would entail the injunction of the Writ of Execution.No irreparable injuryDamages are irreparable where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy.[27]In this case, petitioners have alleged that the loss of the public market entails costs of about 30,000,000 in investments, 100,000 monthly revenue in rentals, and amounts as yet unquantified but not unquantifiable in terms of the alleged loss of jobs of APRIs employees and potential suits that may be filed by the leaseholders of the public market for breach of contract. Clearly, the injuries alleged by petitioners are capable of pecuniary estimation. Any loss petitioners may suffer is easily subject to mathematical computation and, if proven, is fully compensable by damages. Thus, a preliminary injunction is not warranted.[28]With respect to the allegations of loss of employment and potential suits, these are speculative at best, with no proof adduced to substantiate them.The foregoing considered, the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion for Injunction. In any case, petitioners may still seek recourse in their pending Petition before the Court of Appeals.WHEREFORE, the Petition isDENIED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated 26 March 2008 and 16 June 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 102540 areAFFIRMED. The Court of Appeals is directed to proceed with dispatch to dispose of the case before it.SO ORDERED.

THE INCORPORATORS OF MINDANAO INSTITUTE INC. and THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MINDANAO INSTITUTE INC., represented by ENGR. VICTORIOSO D. UDARBE,Petitioners,- versus -THE UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES, acting through AGUSAN DISTRICT CONFERENCE UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES, represented by REV. RODOLFO BASLOT,Respondent.G.R. No.171765Present:VELASCO, JR.,J.,Chairperson,PERALTA,ABAD,MENDOZA, andPERLAS-BERNABE,JJ.Promulgated:March 21, 2012

X ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- XD E C I S I O NMENDOZA, J.:Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the September 30, 2005 Decision[1]and the March 1, 2006 Resolution[2]of the Court of Appeals(CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 79156, which dissolved the Writ of Preliminary Injunction[3]dated July 9, 2003 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, Branch 34(RTC).The Factual and Procedural AntecedentsOn April 29, 2003, Gregorio D. Calo, Zoilito L. Cepeda, Victorioso D. Udarbe, Tita B. Udarbe, Edgar B. Palarca, Louie Libarios, Anna Mae Pelegrino, Cirilia A. Sanchez, Anita V. Carloto and Eduardo Andit, the incorporators of Mindanao Institute Inc.(MI Incorporators), represented by Engineer Victorioso D. Udarbe(Engr. Udarbe),[4]filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order(TRO)and Preliminary Injunction[5]against theUnited Church of Christ in the Philippines(UCCP), acting through the Agusan District Conference of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and represented by Reverend Rodolfo Baslot(Rev. Baslot), before the RTC, which was docketed as Special Civil Action Case No.03-02.The incorporators prayed that Mindanao Institute, Inc.(MI)be declared the sole owner of the assets and properties of MI and to prevent the impending takeover by UCCP of MIs properties. They averred that UCCP was unlawfully claiming ownership of MIs properties.OnJune 5, 2003, UCCP filed its Answer with Counterclaim,[6]asserting its ownership of MIs properties based on certain documents.[7]It claimed that the question of ownership in this case was a settled issue and required no further discourse because they constitute a majority of the Board of Trustees and, therefore, in complete control thereof x x x.[8]OnJune 10, 2003, the RTC issued a TRO[9]against UCCP reasoning out that MI would suffer grave and irreparable damages if the ownership and possession of its assets and properties would be transferred to UCCP.The RTC disposed:WHEREFORE, it appearing that petitioners will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, let a temporary restraining order against respondents be issued restraining respondents, their representatives, attorneys, agents or any other person acting in their behalf from seizing control and management of the assets and properties of Mindanao Institute.IT IS ORDERED.[10]Meanwhile, UCCP received copies of MIs Amended Articles of Incorporation[11](2003 Amended AOI)which was adopted by the MI Incorporators on May 9, 2003 and approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC)on May 26, 2003.On June 11, 2003, UCCP, represented by Rev. Baslot, and MI, represented by its President Dr. Edgardo R. Batitang(Dr.Batitang), lodged a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the 2003 Amended Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws of Mindanao Institute with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and/or Damages[12]before the RTC, which was docketed as Civil Case No.09-2003.UCCP and MI asserted that the Amendment of MIs Articles of Incorporation effected bysignatoriesin a reckless and hasty fashion was accomplished without the required majority vote in clear violation of Section 16[13]of Corporation Code.[14]Of the ten (10) signatures appearing in the2003 Amended AOI constituting 2/3 of the Board of Trustees of MI, five (5) were affixed by mere representatives who were not duly authorized to vote. Further, UCCP and MI, as represented by Dr.Batitang, stressed that the procedure in the acceptance of corporate members as embodied in the Amended By-Laws contains discriminatory provisions, wherein certain members maybe subjected to confirmation and acceptance or rejection, but aimed specifically at members to be nominated by UCCP.OnJune 17, 2003,the signatoriesmoved to dismiss[15]the complaint for declaration of nullity of the 2003 Amended AOI. They contended that the SEC, in approving the amendments to the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, was exercising its quasi-judicial function and, therefore, a co-equal body of the RTC. Thus, the RTC could not grant any of the reliefs prayed for by UCCP.At the scheduled joint hearing of Special Civil Action Case No. 03-02 and Civil Case No. 09-2003 to determine the propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the Law Office of Bernabe, Doyon, Bringas and Partners entered its appearance[16]as collaborating counsel for UCCP. Incidentally, Atty. Roy Doyon(Atty. Doyon), the son of Executive Judge Orlando F. Doyon(Judge Doyon),was one of the partners in the said law firm. This prompted Atty. Nelbert T. Poculan, UCCPs lead counsel, to move for the inhibition of Judge Doyon from the case. On the other hand, Atty. Rolando F. Carlota,MI Incorporatorscounsel, expressed no objection to the continued participation of Judge Doyon in the proceedings of the case despite the said development.Subsequently, Judge Doyon proceeded with the joint hearing. Thereafter, the RTC granted the MI incorporators prayer for preliminary injunction against UCCP in its Omnibus Order[17]datedJuly 4, 2003, the decretal portion of which states:WHEREFORE, the prayer for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order in Civil Case No. 09-2003 is hereby denied with finality.As prayed for in Special Civil Case No. 03-02, let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction be issued, restraining, prohibiting, and enjoining respondents, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES (UCCP) acting thru AGUSAN DISTRICT CONFERENCE (ADC-UCCP), represented by Rev. Rodolfo Baslot, their agents, representatives, attorneys, and any other persons acting for and in their behalf from taking over, seizing control, managing, or administering MINDANAO INSTITUTE and preventing plaintiffs in discharging their functions and duties in the management, control and administration of the school, its premises and assets, upon plaintiffs putting up a bond in the amount of200,000.00 duly approved by the Court, which bond shall be executed in favour of the defendants to answer for whatever damages they may sustain by reason of or arising from the issuance of the writ in the event that the Court will finally rule that the plaintiffs are not entitled thereto.IT IS SO ORDERED.In issuing the preliminary injunction against UCCP, the RTC explained:The prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, hereinafter known as TRO, in Civil Case No. 09-2003, is anchored on the assumption that the Amended Articles of Incorporation and Amended By-Laws of Mindanao Institute adopted onMay 26, 2003, is null and void for being ultra vires. However, at this stage of the proceedings where the action of the Court is generally based on initial and incomplete evidence, the Court cannot just precipitately rule that the amendments were ultra vires acts of the respondents.It should be stressed that the questioned Amended Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws is duly approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission, hereinafter referred to as SEC. As such, there being no evidence thus far presented to the contrary, the presumption is that the official duty of the SEC has been regularly performed.Thus, the actuations of respondents in Civil Case No. 09-2003 based on those documents are presumptively valid unless declared void by this Court after a full-blown trial. In other words, plaintiffs at this stage, have not shown the existence of a clear legal right which has been violated warranting the issuance of a TRO, because before a TRO or injunction is issued, it is essential that there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected and that the act against which the injunction is issued is a violation of such right.On the other hand, plaintiffs in Special Civil Case No. 03-02 have shown that they have the legal right in the management and administration of Mindanao Institute because their actuations are based in an Amended Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws duly approved by the SEC. The allegation that it was approved by the SEC in record time cannot be taken as evidence that per se the approval was against any law, rule or regulation.It is precisely for this reason that the Court issued a TRO because from the amendments, plaintiffs in Special Civil Case No. 03-02 and respondents in Civil Case No. 09-2003 have clear legal rights over the management and administration of Mindanao Institute and that the acts of plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 09-2003 and respondents in Special Civil Case No. 03-02 are in violation of those rights. Pending determination, therefore, of the principal action in Special Civil Case No. 03-02, the Court is inclined to issue a preliminary injunction to protect and preserve the rights of plaintiffs.[18]UCCP moved for a reconsideration but the same was denied by the RTC in its Resolution[19]datedAugust 15, 2003.In its Omnibus Order[20]datedAugust 20, 2003, Judge Doyon inhibited himself from the cases citing the fact that his sons law firm entered its appearance as collaborating counsel for UCCP.Disappointed with the unfavorable ruling, UCCP and MI, as represented by Dr.Batitang, sought relief with the CAviaa petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing the assailed order.The CA granted the petition in itsSeptember 30, 2005Decision, thefalloof which reads:WHEREFORE,above premises considered, the instant Petition isGRANTED.The writ of preliminary injunction issued against the United Church of Christ in the Philippines (UCCP) in Special Civil Case No. 02-03 is herebyDISSOLVED.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.[21]The CA reasoned, among others, that the petition forcertiorari(Civil Case No. 09-2003) having been jointly filed by UCCP and MI, as represented by Dr.Batitang, was adequate evidence to support the conclusion that MI did not require any injunctive relief from UCCP. The CA also stated that in actions for declaratory relief, the court was only called upon to determine the parties rights and obligations. CitingRepublic v. Court of Appeals,[22]it reasoned out that the RTC could not issue injunction in an action for declaratory relief in as much as the right of the MI incorporators had not yet been violated. Moreover, it stated that the subsequent inhibition of Judge Doyon in the cases was pursuant to the rules on compulsory disqualification of a judge under Rule 3.12(d) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.[23]The MI incorporators, represented by Engr. Udarbe, moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution datedMarch 1, 2006.Hence, this petition.THE ISSUESIWHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL TWENTY THIRD DIVISION, IN AN ORIGINAL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 ERRED IN CONSIDERING AND RULING ON FACTUAL ISSUES NOT YET HEARD AND TRIED IN THE COURT OF ORIGIN AND BASED ITS DECISION THEREON.IIWHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL TWENTY THIRD DIVISION ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF RULE 3.12(D) OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THIS CASE.[24]In their Memorandum,[25]the petitioners argue that the CA went beyond the province of a writ ofcertiorariby resolving factual questions, which should appropriately be threshed out in the trial. On the inhibition, they pointed out that it was solely the law partner of Judge Doyons son, Atty. J. Ma. James L. Bringas(Atty. Bringas), who personally entered his appearance as collaborating counsel, and not the law firm. Furthermore, they claim that Atty. Doyon, Judge Doyons son, was neither present in court on the day Atty. Bringas entered his appearance nor was he present in any of the previous hearings of the subject cases. Hence, petitioners claim that Rule 3.12(d) of the Code of Judicial Conduct[26]is not applicable in this case because Atty. Doyon never represented any party in any of the subject cases being heard by Judge Doyon.In its Memorandum,[27]respondent claims that the petition for review oncertiorarifiled by the petitioners was not properly verified as to authorize Engr. Udarbe to file the same - a fatal procedural infirmity. Further, it points out that petitioners are raising questions of fact in their petition not cognizable by this Court.THE COURTS RULINGThe petition lacks merit.The Court is called upon to resolve the issue of whether or not the CA erred in dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued against UCCP. The writ of preliminary injunction enjoined UCCP from taking control and management of MI and preventing petitioners from discharging their functions in its management. Thus, the Court shall confine itself only with the concerned writ and not the merits of the cases, which are still pending with the RTC. A preliminary injunction, beinga preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights or interests,is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit.[28]A preliminary injunction is defined under Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as follows:Section 1.Preliminary injunction defined; classes. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. x xxA preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action.[29]The objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve thestatus quountil the merits of the case can be fully heard.Status quoisthe last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy.[30]Significantly,Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction:SEC. 3.Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.Based on the foregoing provision, the Court inSt. James College of Paraaque v. Equitable PCI Bank[31]ruled that the following requisites must be proved before a writ of preliminary injunction will issue:(1)The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is, a right inesse;(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.[32][Underscoring supplied]It bears stressing that to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown. A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action.[33]When the complainants right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper.[34]In the present case, the records fail to reveal any clear and unmistakable right on the part of petitioners. They posit that they are suing in behalf of MIs interestsbypreventingUCCPfrom unlawfully wresting control of MIs properties. Their claimed derivative interest, however, has been disputed by UCCP in both its Answer with Counterclaim in Special Civil Action Case No. 03-02 and its Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-2003, wherein MI itself, represented by Dr.Batitang himself, is its co-petitioner. Evidently, the conflicting claims of the parties regarding the issue of ownership over MIs property create the impression that the petitioners derivative right, used as basis for the issuance of the preliminary injunction, is far from clear. Petitioners claimed right is still indefinite, at least until it is properly threshed out in a trial, negating the presence of a rightinessethat requires the protection of an injunctive writ. Verily, petitioners cannot lay claim to aclear and positive right based on the2003 Amended AOI,the provisions of which are strongly disputed and alleged to be invalidly obtained.As regards the issue of Judge Doyons disqualification to sit as judge in the subject cases, the Court agrees with the CA. The pertinent rule on the mandatory disqualification of judicial officers is laid down in Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 thereof provides:SECTION 1.Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniary interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he isrelatedto either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, orto counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. [Underscoring supplied]x xx.Moreover, Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect fromOctober 20 1989untilMay 31, 2004, the applicable rule then, reads as follows:A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judges impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where:x xx(d) the judge isrelated by consanguinity or affinityto a party litigant within the sixth degree orto counsel within the fourth degree. [Underscoring supplied]The prohibitions under the afore-quoted provisions of the Rules are clear. The disqualification is mandatory and gives the judicial officer concerned no discretion but to inhibit himself from trying or sitting in a case. The rationale, therefore, is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary's fairness and objectivity.[35]While the Court finds it ludicrous that it was the counsel of UCCP, Atty. Poculan, who sought the inhibition of Judge Doyon, considering that the law firm of the latters son is his collaborating counsel, stillthe mandatory prohibition applies. Judge Doyon should have immediately inhibited himself from the case upon learning of the entry of appearance of his sons law firm. Where the disqualifying fact is indubitable and the parties to the case make no waiver of such disqualification, as in the case at bench, Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court forthwith completely strips the judge of authority to proceed.[36]WHEREFORE,the petition isDENIED. The assailedSeptember 30, 2005Decision andMarch 1, 2006Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 79156, are herebyAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.

HILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,Petitioner,-versus-CASTALLOY TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, ALLIED INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, ALINSU STEEL FOUNDRY CORPORATION, GLORIA C. NGO and TOMAS C. NGO, JR.,Respondents.G.R. No. 178367Present:CARPIO,J.,Chairperson,BRION,PEREZ,SERENO, andREYES,JJ.Promulgated:March 19, 2012

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xDECISIONREYES,J.:Before us is a petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to annul and set aside the Decision[1]dated February 28, 2007 and Resolution[2]dated May 24, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 02056, affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56 of Mandaue Citys issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. MAN-5081.The Factual AntecedentsOn August 26, 1996, respondent Castalloy Technology Corporation (Castalloy) was granted by petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) a credit line in the amount ofP4,000,000.00, later increased toP45,000,000.00 on October 15, 1996.Pursuant to said credit line, Castalloy borrowed from PNB the following amounts, covered by three separate promissory notes executed by Castalloy in favor of PNB, to wit: (1) Promissory Note (PN) No. 404/96 dated August 29, 1996, in the amount of US$190,910.00, (2) PN No. 451/96 dated September 24, 1996, in the amount of US$381,650.26, and (3) PN No. 473/96 dated October 8, 1996 in the amount of US$495,426.83.While the promissory notes indicate the amounts thereof in US dollars, the net proceeds of the loan were released in Philippine currency, in the following amounts: (1)P4,992,442.00 for PN No. 404/96, (2)P9,985,000.00 for PN No. 451/96, and (3)P12,980,487.10 for PN No. 473/96.To secure payment of the loans obtained by Castalloy, respondents Alinsu Steel Foundry Corporation (Alinsu) and Allied Industrial Corporation (Allied) constituted in favor of PNB a real estate mortgage over four parcels of land covered by the following land titles, all issued by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City: Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 8516, TCT No. 1676, TCT No. 30722, and TCT No. 30721.To further secure the loan, respondents Gloria C. Ngo (Gloria) and Tomas C. Ngo, Jr.[3](Tomas) executed a joint and solidary agreement in favor of PNB.In addition to the three aforementioned promissory notes, PNB claimed that Castalloy had executed two other promissory notes with the following details: (1) PN No. 539/96 dated November 27, 1996, in the amount ofP3,000,000.00, and (2) PN No. 365-9701DL-037 dated January 29, 1997 in the amount ofP2,000,000.00.These two loans were denied by Castalloy, which argued that the signature of Gloria in the two notes was forged, and that the proceeds thereof were not deposited to the corporations bank account.After Castalloy defaulted in the payment of its obligations under the promissory notes, PNB filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage against Castalloy, Allied and Alinsu.In the meantime, a complaint[4]for determination of correct obligation and injunction with application for writ of preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order was filed with the RTC by Castalloy, Allied, Alinsu, Gloria and Tomas against PNB and Sheriff Julbert E. Opada, arguing, among other matters, that:13.Because of the disagreements brought about by the allegations of this complaint, that [respondent] Castalloy never borrowed the amount of [P]5,000,000.00 and that the dollar loans of [respondent] Castalloy Technology Corp. were already converted by [petitioner] into pesos at the time of their release and should not be converted again by [petitioner] into pesos at the rate of [P]56.20 to $1.00 x xx.14.There is a need for judicial a determination as to how much is the real obligation of [respondent] Castalloy Technology Corp. to [petitioner].Converting the dollar loans of said [respondent] at the rate of [P]56.20 to $1.00 and adding interest,the [petitioner] claimsthat on the dollar loan, the total obligation of [respondent] Castalloy Technology Corp. is [P]88,642,207.64 while on the peso loan, [petitioner] claimsthat the obligation of [respondent] Castalloy Technology Corp. is [P]9,644,994.44 or a total of [P]98,287,101.94;15.On the other hand, because what were released to [respondent] Castalloy Technology Corp. at the time of the execution of the promissory notes were pesos and not dollars and [respondents] deny that Castalloy Technology Corp. borrowed [P]5,000,000.00 from [petitioner],the [respondents] claim that what is owing to [petitioner] is the amount of [P]41,037,189.86.[5](Emphasis supplied)In their application for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order, the respondents claimed that the sale at the public auction of the mortgaged properties had to be held in abeyance pending judicial determination of the correct amount of Castalloys obligation to PNB.In its opposition to the application for injunction, PNB argued that the parties dispute on the loans computation was not a valid ground to restrain the mortgages foreclosure.The Order of the RTCOn April 27, 2006, the RTC, issued an Order[6]granting the respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction, subject to the posting of a bond in the amount ofP5,000,000.00.The Court held that the difference in the outstanding loan amounts being claimed by the parties was extremely extensive such that if a foreclosure would be allowed at this point in time, the same would probably result in irreparable injury[7]to the herein respondents.PNB filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied for lack of merit in an Order[8]dated May 31, 2006.Unsatisfied, PNB questioned the RTCs orders before the CA through a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.The Ruling of the CAOn February 28, 2007, the CA rendered its decision[9]denying the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. The decisions dispositive portion then reads:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by usDENYINGthe petition filed in this case andAFFIRMINGthe assailed Orders dated April 27, 2006 and May 31, 2006, respectively, issued by the respondent judge of the RTC, Branch 56, inMandaueCityin Civil Case No. MAN-5081.SO ORDERED.[10]Citing the case ofSps. Almeda v. CA,[11]the CA ruled that when the exact amount of the loan obligation has not yet been determined, the bank cannot arbitrarily invoke its right of collection through extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.[12]PNBs motion for reconsideration was denied by the CAviaits resolution[13]dated May 24, 2007.Hence, the present petition.The IssueThe issue for this Courts determination is: Whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it granted the respondents application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.This Courts RulingThe petition is meritorious.The grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction are enumerated in Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which reads:Sec. 3.Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:(a)That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;(b)That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or(c)That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.In a line of cases, this Court has explained this rule and emphasized that a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve thestatus quo ante, upon the applicants showing of two important requisite conditions, namely:(1) the right to be protected existsprima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right.It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice.[14]In the instant case, the respondents admit that to secure the loan obligations of Castalloy, Alinsu and Allied constituted a real estate mortgage on their properties in favor of PNB.The respondents also do not dispute that they were unable to fully settle their loan obligation to the mortgagee-bank.There is an unpaid obligation to PNB, even granting that we disregard the disputed promissory notes dated November 27, 2006 and January 29, 2007, or consider the variance in the parties respective formula for the loans computation.This failure to pay has given PNB, as the mortgagee, the clear right to foreclose the mortgage constituted to secure the loan.Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of non-payment of mortgage indebtedness.In a real estate mortgage, when the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage and to have the property seized and sold with the view of applying the proceeds to the payment of the obligation.[15]Availment of said remedy cannot be deemed violative of the mortgagors right over the mortgaged properties.The respondents, as mortgagors, should be mindful of the effects and implications of a mortgage on their rights over the properties given as collaterals, especially when the loan secured thereby remains unpaid.InChina Banking Corporation v. CA,[16]where the lower court also issued an order to enjoin a foreclosure sale, we explained:On the last issue, we find that the issuance of the writ of injunction by the trial court unjustified.A writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy, may only be resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action.Butbefore a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, there must be a clear showing by the complaint that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of the said right.In the case at bench, we fail to see any reason why the foreclosure of the mortgages should be enjoined.On the face of the clear admission by private respondents that they were unable to settle their obligations which were secured by the mortgages, petitioners have a clear right to foreclose the mortgages which is a remedy provided by law.[17](Emphasis supplied and citations omitted)The ruling inAlmeda[18]cited by the CA in its decision is inapplicable in this case, considering that inAlmeda, the debtors were found to have made a valid consignation of what they, in good faith and in compliance with the loan documents, honestly believed to be the real amount of their indebtedness.Furthermore, the mortgagee in said case appeared to have unilaterally increased the loans interest rates to amounts that were excessive and unconscionable, without valid and reasonable standards upon which the increases were based.Further to this, the Courts intent to depart from the broad application of theAlmedaruling to foreclosure proceedings is clear fromits issuance on February 20, 2007 of anEn BancResolution in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0,Re: Procedure in Extrajudicial or Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgages.The resolutionembodies the additional guidelines intended to aid courts in foreclosure proceedings, specifically limiting the instances, and citing the conditions, when a writ against foreclosure of a mortgage may be issued, to wit:(1) No temporary restraining order or writ of preliminaryinjunctionagainst the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the allegation that the loan secured by the mortgage has been paid or is not delinquent unless the application is verified and supported by evidence of payment.(2) No temporary restraining order or writ of preliminaryinjunctionagainst the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the allegation that the interest on the loan is unconscionable, unless the debtor pays the mortgagee at least twelve percent per annum interest on the principal obligation as stated in the application for foreclosure sale, which shall be updated monthly while the case is pending.(3) Where a writ of preliminaryinjunctionhas been issued against aforeclosureofmortgage, the disposition of the case shall be speedily resolved.To this end, the court concerned shall submit to the Supreme Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, quarterly reports on the progress of the cases involving ten million pesos and above.(4) All requirements and restrictions prescribed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminaryinjunction, such as the posting of a bond, which shall be equal to the amount of the outstanding debt, and the time limitation for its effectivity, shall apply as well to astatus quoorder.From these guidelines, it is evident that a disagreement between the parties as to the amount of the secured loan that remains unpaid shall not, by itself, warrant the issuance of an injunctive writ to enjoin foreclosure.The guidelines speak of strict exceptions and conditions.Even an allegation of unconscionable interest being imposed on the loan by the mortgagee shall no longer suffice to support an injunction.Furthermore, if under this resolution a debtor can no longer seek an injunctive writ by the unsubstantiated claim of full payment, there is even more reason for a court not to issue an injunctive writ when the debtors or mortgagors readily admit default in the payment of the secured loan, as in this case.As regards to the element of irreparable injury which was determined by the trial court in view of the difference ofP57,249,912.08 in the parties respective computations, this Court finds the same insufficient to support the requirement of injury in the issuance of an injunctive writs.An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation.[19]The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation.[20]The injury being feared by the herein respondents is not of such nature.Ultimately, the amount to which the mortgagee-bank shall be entitled will be determined by the disposition of the trial court in the main issue of the case.We have explained inEquitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. OJ-Mark Trading, Inc.[21]that all is not lost for defaulting mortgagors whose properties were foreclosed by creditors-mortgagees.The respondents will not be deprived outrightly of their property, given the right of redemption granted to them under the law.Moreover, in extrajudicial foreclosures, mortgagors have the right to receive any surplus in the selling price.Thus, if the mortgagee is retaining more of the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the validity of the sale but will give the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus.[22]Lastly, the issues being linked to the parties differing loan computations, which difference was found by the trial court as likely to cause the irreparable injury to the respondents, can only be reasonably determined after a trial on the merits.These issues include the effect of the loan proceeds release in US dollars and the existence, authenticity or validity of the two promissory notes disputed by the respondents.InSearth Commodities Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[23]we held:The prevailing rule is that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the main case without trial.(Rivas v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 190 SCRA 295 [1990];Government Service and Insurance System v. Florendo, 178 SCRA 76 [1989]; andOrtigas& Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 165 [1988])In the case at bar, if the lower court issued the desired writ to enjoin the sale of the properties premised on the aforementioned justification of the petitioners,the issuance of the writ would be a virtual acceptance of their claim that the foreclosure sale is null and void.(SeeOrtigas and Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Court of Appeals, supra).There would in effect be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it would assume the proposition which the petitioners are inceptively bound to prove.[24](Emphasis supplied)Given these circumstances, we reverse the CAs ruling that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued the subject writ of preliminary injunction, considering that said writ was issued in the absence of sufficient factual and legal justifications, even contrary to law and established jurisprudence.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is herebyGRANTED.The Decision dated February 28, 2007 and Resolution dated May 24, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02056 are herebyREVERSEDandSET ASIDE.In lieu thereof, a new one is entered declaring null and void the Regional Trial Court, Branch 56 of Mandaue Citys Orders dated April 27, 2006 and May 31, 2006, and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued pursuant thereto, in Civil Case No. MAN-5081.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170038 July 11, 2012CHINA BANKING CORPORATION,Petitioner,vs.SPS. HARRY CIRIACO and ESTHER CIRIACO,Respondents.D E C I S I O NBRION,J.:We resolve the petition for review oncertiorari1filed by China Banking Corporation(petitioner)to challenge the April 15, 2005 decision2and the October 10, 2005 resolution3of the Court of Appeals(CA)in CA-G.R. SP No. 64349. The CA decision denied the petitioners petition forcertiorarifor lack of merit. The CA resolution denied the petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration.FACTUAL BACKGROUNDOn March 11, 1996, Spouses Harry and Esther Ciriaco (respondents) obtained a P1,500,000.00 loan4from the petitioner, secured by a real estate mortgage5over their 526-square meter land in La Trinidad, Benguet, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-21710.6When the respondents defaulted in the payment of their loan, the petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed7the mortgaged property and sold it at public auction where the petitioner emerged as the highest bidder. The Sheriff executed a Certificate of Sale8in the petitioners favor on March 11, 1998. The Register of Deeds annotated the Certificate of Sale on TCT No. T-21710 on March 24, 1998.9On March 23, 1999, a day before the expiration of the redemption period, the respondents filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 8, for Injunction to enjoin the consolidation of title in the petitioners favor, assailing the redemption price of the foreclosed property.10On July 26, 1999, the RTC dismissed the complaint for being moot due to the consolidation of title in the petitioners favor on March 31, 1999, "without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate action."11On August 17, 1999, the respondents filed a complaint with the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63, for Cancellation of Consolidation of Ownership over a Real Property, Specific Performance, and Damages.12They again questioned the redemption price of the foreclosed property.On September 23, 1999, the petitioner filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, denying the allegations of the respondents complaint.13On March 16, 2000, the respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and to Admit Attached Amended Complaint as well as Motion for Hearing on the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), with a notice of hearing on the omnibus motion scheduled on March 22, 2000.14The respondents sought to amend the complaint to allege further that fraud attended the consolidation of title in the petitioners favor and to include a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO to enjoin the petitioner from disposing of the foreclosed property or taking possession thereof.At the March 22, 2000 hearing, the RTC gave the petitioner ten (10) days within which to file its comment to the respondents omnibus motion, and set the hearing on the omnibus motion on April 24, 2000.15The petitioner subsequently filed its Opposition to the omnibus motion,16arguing that the respondents further allegation of fraud changes the theory of the case which is not allowed, and that the respondents failed to show that they have a clear right inessethat should be protected by an injunctive relief.At the April 24, 2000 hearing on the omnibus motion, the RTC gave the respondents ten (10) days to file their comment to the petitioners opposition, and gave the petitioner ten (10) days to file its reply to the respondents comment.17The respondents did not file a reply to the petitioners opposition.THE RTCs RULINGIn its August 1, 2000 order, the RTC admitted the amended complaint and directed the petitioner to file an answer. It noted that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure relaxed the rule on amendments to pleadings, subject only to the limitation that they are not dilatory. It also granted the respondents application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO, since the respondents were entitled to prove their claim of fraud, and their claim that the interests and penalty charges imposed by the bank had no factual basis.18The RTC denied19the petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration.20On August 24, 2000, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction, restraining the petitioner from disposing of the foreclosed property or taking possession thereof.21The petitioner then filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the CA, arguing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in precipitately granting the respondents application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction without any hearing.22THE CAs RULINGIn its April 15, 2005 decision, the CA denied the petition. It found that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since it gave the parties ample opportunity to present their respective positions on the propriety of an injunctive writ during the hearings on March 22, 2000 andApril 24, 2000, and that the petitioner was also heard on its motion for reconsideration of the August 1, 2000 order.23When the CA denied24the petitioners motion for reconsideration,25the latter filed the present petition.26THE PETITIONThe petitioner argues that the RTC granted the respondents application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO, despite the lack of a hearing thereon; the RTC conducted hearings on the respondents omnibus motion only, not on the respondents application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO, which has not yet been set for hearing.THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENTSThe respondents submit that the RTC gave the petitioner ample opportunity to be heard on his opposition to the respondents application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO at the March 22, 2000 and April 24, 2000 hearings, and on the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the August 1, 2000 order.THE ISSUEThe core issue boils down to whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in granting the respondents application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO.OUR RULINGWe find merit in the petition.A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts.27It is the "strong arm of equity,"28an extraordinary peremptory remedy that must be used with extreme caution,29affecting as it does the respective rights of the parties.30Sections 3 and 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on preliminary injunction, pertinent to this case, provide the requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or a TRO:SEC. 3.Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.SEC. 5.Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. - No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or persons sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issueex partea temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the twenty-day period, the court must order said party or person to show cause at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted. The court shall also determine, within the same period, whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.However, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two hours provided herein.31From the provisions, it appears clearly that before a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued, a clear showing must be made that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of an established right.32The holding of a hearing, where both parties can introduce evidence and present their side, is also required before the courts may issue a TRO or an injunctive writ.33Generally, an RTC's decision to grant or to deny injunctive relief will not be set aside on appeal, unless the trial court abused its discretion. In granting or denying injunctive relief, a court abuses its discretion when it lacks jurisdiction; fails to consider and make a record of the factors relevant to its determination; relies on clearly erroneous factual findings; considers clearly irrelevant or improper factors; clearly gives too much weight to one factor; relies on erroneous conclusions of law or equity; or misapplies its factual or legal conclusions.34In this case, we find that the RTC abbreviated the proceedings and precipitately granted the respondents application for injunctive relief. The RTC did not conduct a hearing for reception of a "sampling" of the parties respective evidence to give it an idea of the justification for its issuance pending the decision of the case on the merits.35It failed to make any factual finding to support the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction since it did not conduct any hearing on the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or TRO. The RTC conducted the March 22, 2000 and April 24, 2000 hearings on the respondents omnibus motion only whether to admit the amended complaint and whether to hold a hearing on the respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction.1wphi1In fact, a perusal of the August 1, 2000 order shows that the RTC granted the respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction based only on the respondents unsubstantiated allegations, thus:Going now to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, the plaintiffs aver that a writ should issue forbidding the defendant bank from taking possession of the subject property and disposing of the same beyond recovery by them tending to make any favorable judgment in their favor ineffective.The Complaint alleges that had defendant bank not committed fraud, plaintiffs could have redeemed the property subject matter hereof. Furthermore, considering that the redemption price of the property foreclosed appears to have been bloated, thereby making it difficult for plaintiffs to redeem their property, to deny the application would in effect be condoning the act of the defendant bank in imposing interests and penalty charges which plaintiffs claim as not having been agreed upon by them.In view of the foregoing, plaintiffs are entitled to prove their claim of fraud and their claim that the interests and penalty charges imposed by the bank have no factual basis.36Clearly, the respondents right to injunctive relief has not been clearly and unmistakably demonstrated. The respondents have not presented evidence, testimonial or documentary, other than the bare allegations contained in their pleadings, to support their claim of fraud that brings about the irreparable injury sought to be avoided by their application for injunctive relief. Thus, the RTCs grant of the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of the respondents, despite the lack of any evidence of a clear and unmistakable right on their part, constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedom of the defendants action and should not be granted lightly or precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it;37no power exists whose exercise is more delicate, which requires greater caution and deliberation, or is more dangerous in a doubtful case, that the issuance of an injunction.38WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The April 15, 2005 decision and the October 10, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64349 are REVERSED and SER ASIDE. The August 1, 2000 and March 7, 2001 orders of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63 are MODIFIED. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued in Civil Case No. 99-CV-1395 is declared VOID and is therefore SET ASIDE.Costs against the respondents.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 153852 October 24, 2012SPOUSES HUMBERTO P. DELOSSANTOS AND CARMENCITA M. DELOS SANTOS,Petitioners,vs.METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,Respondent.D E C I S I O NBERSAMIN,J.:A writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an impending extrajudicial foreclosure sale is issued only upon a clear showing of a violation of the mortgagor's unmistakable right.1This appeal is taken by the petitioners to review and reverse the decision promulgated on February 19, 2002,2whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed their petition for certiorari that assailed the denial by the Regional Trial Court in Davao City (RTC) of their application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of their mortgaged asset initiated by their mortgagee, respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank).AntecedentsFrom December 9, 1996 until March 20, 1998, the petitioners took out several loans totaling P12,000,000.00 from Metrobank, Davao City Branch, the proceeds of which they would use in constructing a hotel on their 305-square-meter parcel of land located in Davao City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. I-218079 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City. They executed various promissory notes covering the loans, and constituted a mortgage over their parcel of land to secure the performance of their obligation. The stipulated interest rates were 15.75% per annum for the long term loans (maturing on December 9, 2006) and 22.204% per annum for a short term loan of P4,400,000.00 (maturing on March 12, 1999).3The interest rates were fixed for the first year, subject to escalation or de-escalation in certain events without advance notice to them. The loan agreements further stipulated that the entire amount of the loans would become due and demandable upon default in the payment of any installment, interest or other charges.4On December 27, 1999, Metrobank sought the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage5after the petitioners defaulted in their installment payments. The petitioners were notified of the foreclosure and of the forced sale being scheduled on March 7, 2000. The notice of the sale stated that the total amount of the obligation was P16,414,801.36 as of October 26, 1999.6On April 4, 2000, prior to the scheduled foreclosure sale (i.e., the original date of March 7, 2000 having been meanwhile reset to April 6, 2000), the petitioners filed in the RTC a complaint (later amended) for damages, fixing of interest rate, and application of excess payments (with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction). They alleged therein that Metrobank had no right to foreclose the mortgage because they were not in default of their obligations; that Metrobank had imposed interest rates (i.e., 15.75% per annum for two long-term loans and 22.204% per annum for the short term loan) on three of their loans that were different from the rate of 14.75% per annum agreed upon; that Metrobank had increased the interest rates on some of their loans without any basis by invoking the escalation clause written in the loan agreement; that they had paid P2,561,557.87 instead of only P1,802,867.00 based on the stipulated interest rates, resulting in their excess payment of P758,690.87 as interest, which should then be applied to their accrued obligation; that they had requested the reduction of the escalated interest rates on several occasions because of its damaging effect on their hotel business, but Metrobank had denied their request; and that they were not yet in default because the long-term loans would become due and demandable on December 9, 2006 yet and they had been paying interest on the short-term loan in advance.The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the scheduled foreclosure sale be issued. They further prayed for a judgment making the injunction permanent, and directing Metrobank, namely: (a) to apply the excess payment of P758,690.87 to the accrued interest; (b) to pay P150,000.00 for the losses suffered in their hotel business; (c) to fix the interest rates of the loans; and (d) to pay moral and exemplary damages plus attorneys fees.7In its answer, Metrobank stated that the increase in the interest rates had been made pursuant to the escalation clause stipulated in the loan agreements; and that not all of the payments by the petitioners had been applied to the loans covered by the real estate mortgage, because some had been applied to another loan of theirs amounting to P500,000.00 that had not been secured by the mortgage.In the meantime, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the foreclosure sale.8After hearing on notice, the RTC issued its order dated May 2, 2000,9granting the petitioners application for a writ of preliminary injunction.Metrobank moved for reconsideration.10The petitioners did not file any opposition to Metrobanks motion for reconsideration; also, they did not attend the scheduled hearing of the motion for reconsideration.On May 19, 2000, the RTC granted Metrobanks motion for reconsideration, holding in part,11as follows:xxx In the motion at bench as well as at the hearing this morning defendant Metro Bank pointed out that in all the promissory notes executed by the plaintiffs there is typewritten inside a box immediately following the first paragraph the following:"At the effective rate of 15.75% for the first year subject to upward/downward adjustments for the next year thereafter."Moreover, in the form of the same promissory notes, there is the additional stipulation which reads:"The rate of interest and/or bank charges herein-stipulated, during the term of this Promissory Note, its extension, renewals or other modifications, may be increased, decreased, or otherwise changed from time to time by the bank without advance notice to me/us in the event of changes in the interest rates prescribed by law of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank of the Philippines, in the rediscount rate of member banks with the Central Bank of the Philippines, in the interest rates on savings and time deposits, in the interest rates on the Banks borrowings, in the reserve requirements, or in the overall costs of funding or money;"There being no opposition to the motion despite receipt of a copy thereof by the plaintiffs through counsel and finding merit to the motion for reconsideration, this Court resolves to reconsider and set aside the Order of this Court dated May 2, 2000.x xxxSO ORDERED.The petitioners sought the reconsideration of the order, for which the RTC required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In their memorandum, the petitioners insisted that they had an excess payment sufficient to cover the amounts due on the principal.Nonetheless, on June 8, 2001, the RTC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration,12to wit:The record does not show that plaintiffs have updated their installment payments by depositing the same with this Court, with the interest thereon at the rate they contend to be the true and correct rate agreed upon by the parties.Hence, even if their contention with respect to the rates of interest is true and correct, they are in default just the same in the payment of their principal obligation.WHEREFORE, the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION is denied.Ruling of the CAAggrieved, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the RTC when it issued the orders dated May 19, 2000 and June 8, 2001.On February 19, 2002, the CA rendered the assailed decision dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit, and affirming the assailed orders,13stating:Petitioners aver that the respondent Court gravely abused its discretion in finding that petitioners are in default in the payment of their obligation to the private respondent.We disagree.The Court below did not excessively exercise its judicial authority not only in setting aside the May 2, 2000 Order, but also in denying petitioners motion for reconsideration due to the faults attributable to them.When private respondent Metrobank moved for the reconsideration of the Order of May 2, 2000 which granted the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, petitioners failed to oppose the same despite receipt of said motion for reconsideration. The public respondent Court said "For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the defendant Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, dated May 12, 2000, a copy of which was received by Atty. Philip Pantojan for the plaintiffs on May 16, 2000. There is no opposition nor appearance for the plaintiffs this morning at the scheduled hearing of said motion x xx".Corollarily, the issuance of the Order of June 8, 2001 was xxx based on petitioners being remiss in their obligation to update their installment payments.The Supreme Court ruled in this wise:To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion on the part of the tribunal or officer must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.Petitioners likewise discussed at length the issue of whether or not the private respondent has collected the right interest rate on the loans they obtained from the private respondent, as well as the propriety of the application of escalated interest rate which was applied to their loans by the latter. In the instant petition, questions of fact are not generally permitted, the inquiry being limited essentially to whether the public respondent acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Orders, neither is the instant petition available to correct mistakes in the judges findings and conclusions, nor to cure erroneous conclusions of law and fact, if there be any.Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court.A review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Orders of the respondent Court are AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.The petitioners moved for reconsideration of the decision, but the CA denied the motion for lack of merit on May 7, 2002.14Hence, this appeal.IssuesThe petitioners pose the following issues, namely:1. Whether or not the Presiding Judge in issuing the 08 June 2001 Order, finding the petitioners in default of their obligation with the Bank, has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction as the same run counter against the legal principle enunciated in the Almeda Case;2. Assuming that the Presiding Judge did not excessively exercise his judicial authority in the issuance of the assailed orders, notwithstanding their consistency with the legal principle enunciated in the Almeda Case, whether or not the petitioners can avail of the remedy under Rule 65, taking into consideration the sense of urgency involved in the resolution of the issue raised;3. Whether or not the Petition lodged before the Court of Appeals presented a question of fact, and hence not within the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.15The peti