I

The first form of regional integration is one that has emerged as an alternative to the

pursuit of a global harmony of interest, sought almost exclusively through the use of

supranational unions that include most, if not all regions and states of the world. This alternative

is the formation and consolidation of regional IGOs acting almost as a form of multi-layered

governance (Choi & Caporaso). The reasons for this can be attributed to the perceived failure of

20th

century IGOs such as the United Nations (UN), The International Monetary Fund (IMF),

domestic public opinion’s influence on foreign policy (see Inglehart), or any other possible

reason. This, however, is not the concern of this paper. The concern is what were the regional

prompts that led states on an unusual, albeit similar, foreign policy trajectory and how do these

newly formed organizations manifest themselves in the realm of international politics.

The political development of non-power or rising power states in the latter half of the

twentieth century provided the foundation for the future creation of contemporary regional IGOs.

As Hedley writes, “The colonial and quasi-colonial relationships linking Europe and North

America with Asia, Africa and Latin America have largely disappeared, with the result that

sovereign states are vastly more numerous and more various in character. A revolution has taken

place in the means of conducting warfare. The phenomenon of mass participation in political life

has extended itself around the world” (630). The extent to which these states viewed themselves

and, most importantly, in relation to other states, as well as how power states viewed and

responded to them, created sound reasoning for increased international participation. This

however, does not change the fact that there still exist dominant powers and spheres of influence

among these regions, such as China in Southeast Asia and Russia in the former Soviet republics.

The rise of regions did not divest power from the superpowers of the twentieth century, but in

some cases consolidated their influence and made them regional hegemons who, despite still

seeking the regional harmony of interests, can lead the discourse in some ways.

The history of the rise and development of regional integration can be traced, ironically,

to the formation and consolidation of the European Union. Its progression from being founded as

a customs union in 1957 by six states (European Commission), to a system of regional

supranational institutions that operate with their own degrees of autonomy can be regarded as the

first modern regional IGO. Other IGOs soon followed the same path, such as the Arab League

and the Organization of American States (which would be replaced by more regionalized IGOs

in the future). What we have seen in the last three decades, is the advent of a new era of regional

IGOs among more integrated local areas of the world, all formed in the name of pursuing the

harmony of interests. This pursuit of harmony can be seen in the charters and behaviors of

regional IGOs, where their behavior consists of “shared international tasks (like ‘development’),

[creating] and [defining] new categories of actors (like ‘refugee’), [creating] new interests for

actors (like ‘promoting human rights’), and [transferring] models of political organization around

the world (like markets and democracy)” (Barnett and Finnemore, 699). These IGOs have been

seen to be more effective and more rapid in response, or refusing to respond, to issues than

dissimilar IGOs such as the UN. This can be seen, for example, in the Arab League’s 2011

suspension of Syria and Libya during the Arab Spring as well as its current dealings with ISIL

(see Chowdhury).

II

The second method of regional integration is that of the manner in which the state of

international affairs is conducted among nations at the regional or global level. Some authors

argue that IGOs influence the behavior and can guide the national interests of states (see Abbot

& Snidal), however I am of the opinion that IGOs, specifically regional IGOs, are shaped by the

behaviors and beliefs of their member states and, more importantly, that state interests are

autonomous from IGO influence. Modern day foreign policy is almost exclusively conducted in

a manner that is aligned with regional interests instead of alien ones that occur halfway across

the world. A notable example is how China has conducted its foreign policy over the last two

decades in an attempt to solidify regional interests and influence over the region of Southeast

Asia, including its influence in the formation of the ASEAN Plus Three, challenging Japanese

influence and U.S. authority in the area as well as expanding its military presence in the region.

Among these examples is the continued territorial dispute over the Senkaku islands between

China and Japan. Historically, such disputes are issues that Fravel describes as “prone to

violence” (144). However, the absence of violence as well as resolution, he says, can be

attributed to a number of possible reasons (149-159), but all essentially stem from the intent to

preserve other interests and influence in the region that would be damaged if armed conflict were

to result from the dispute. The behavior of China in this regard demonstrates the inherent

characteristic of their foreign policy which follows the doctrine of regional integration.

Because regional integration is a perpetual and constantly developing facet of foreign

policy, some states are required to acclimate in order to pursue the regional harmony of interests.

This can be evidenced by the way in which Russian foreign policy has been conducted since the

breakup of the Soviet Union. Sakwa argues “There is a pragmatic Eurasianism, which simply

reflects the fact that Russia is both a European and an Asian power; a neo-Eurasianism, with a

more imperialist and at times semi-fascist inflection that stresses geopolitical competition” (244).

He also states that, in regards to Russian foreign policy, “Particular attention was paid to the

preservation of Russia’s leadership role in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); but

how perceptions of Russian hegemony in the region were to be avoided was not addressed”

(245). This has been an especially targeted region of influence with Vladimir Putin and Dmitry

Medvedev as Russian heads of state. Russia’s conduct since the Color Revolutions, including the

2008 South Ossetia War and 2014 Russian military intervention in Ukraine has been one of

restoring regional influence in the former Soviet republics and promoting a regional integration.

The theory of regional integration can then, in this way, explain the reason for military conflicts

over the last decade in Georgia and Ukraine.

III

Due to the fractionalization of the harmony of interests, the rise of regional IGOs and

states with a perceived regional interest, conflicts have not necessarily increased or decreased in

quantity, but are more easily explainable. The fact that there now exist several regions of the

world with a perceived interest leads to the rise of competing interests among regions, as

opposed to the “divergence of interests” (Carr, 42) that populate a majority of the realist’s

critique of the previous harmony of interests. This competition of interests can manifest itself in

the most benign forms, such as economic incentives for trading within one’s region, as far up to

military conflict, which can be seen in modern-day conflicts such as the Ukraine-Russia military

conflict of 2014. The Ukrainian overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych and its subsequent

decision to distance itself from the former Soviet republics and sphere of Russian influence

towards the West fomented discontent and conflict between two regions of the world with

conflicting interest. On the one hand, the community of the EU had no interest in seeing Russian

influence increase among the region and also saw in their best interest to welcome Ukraine into

their region of the world, whereas Russia saw in their best interest to expand influence and

maintain the regional status quo. Ukraine, acting as a rational actor in seeking its own interest,

perceived itself to be more of the region of the European community and not that of the former

Soviet bloc. In this recent development we see a textbook example of the zero-sum game, and

the effectiveness of regional integration in explaining the formation of disputes and the resulting

escalating of conflicts. The resolution is reached when one state no longer sees it in their national

interest, and therefore the regional interest, to continue to pursue any conflict, but that interests

would be furthered if peace were to be implemented. Sakwa describes this prescription of

regional foreign policy as an attempt to “…match ambitions to resources, accompanied by

modifications to the type of influence that the country sought” (245).