wwii 5th army history

8/9/2019 WWII 5th Army History

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THE COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGELIBRARY

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FIFTH ARMYHISTORY* * #* * #

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OCT 211947

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Lt. Gen. L, K. Truscott, Jr.} Army Commander (16 December 1944 on)


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CONTENTS * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

pageCHAPTER I. INTO THE WINTER POSITIONS iA. Geo graphy of the Ape nnine Region 2B. Allied Dispositions 5C. Enem y Activities 7

1. Germ an Comm itments 72. Germ an Defensive Lines 83. Enemy Rea r Areas 10

D. Action in Dece mber 121. Plans for Atta ck 122. Clashes in the Cen ter 143. Atta ck in the Serchio Valley 164. Positions at the Ye ar's En d 19

CHAPTER II. SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE 21A. Th e Cha in of Supply 22B. Winterizing the Army 23C. Op erating the Road s 25D. Rehab ilitation of Or dnan ce Items 29E. Class I and II I Supplies 32

C H A P T E R III. TRAINING, MORALE, A N D HEALTH .... 35A. Improv emen t of Troops and Weapons 36

1. Reo rganiz ation, Reinforcements, and Rep lacem ents 362. New Techniques and Weapons 38

B. M aintenan ce of M orale 421. Rest Centers and Recre ation 422. Th e Education Program 46

C. Guarding the Army Health 48

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pageCHAPTER IV. ARMY STAFF OPERATIONS 53A. Operation of the G-3 Section 54B. Functioning of the Intelligence Section 58C. Personnel, Supply, and Government 64

1. The G-i Section 642. The G-4 Section 65.3. The G-5 Section 66

D. Special Staff Sections 68

C H A P T E R V . P R E P A R A T I O N S FOR THE OFFENSIVE . . . . 7 1A. The Decision to Wait 72B. Attacks of the 920! Division, 4-11 February 74 'C. Gains along Highway 64, 18 February-5 March 78 '1. The Belvedere Operation 80

2. The Second Phase 85D. Summary of Late Winter Actions 89

Annexes * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * $ * Number One. Operations Instructions 95

A. AAI Operations Order No. 4, 28 November 1944 97B. Operations Instruction No. 36, 29 November 1944 99C. Operations Instruction No. 37, 23 December 1944 101D. Operations Instruction No. 38, 28 December 1944 103E. Operations Instruction No. 1, 5 January 1945 105F. Operations Instruction No. 2, 9 January 1945 107G. Letter Order, 22 January 1945 109H. Operations Instruction No. 3, 26 January 1945 111/ . Operations Instruction No. 4, 16 February 1945 n 2

llbumber Two. StatisticsA. Casualties, U. S. Forces, 16 December 1944-31 March 1945 . . 117B. Total Casualties, Strength, and Prisoners of War 120

I 22. Medical StatisticsD. Major Ordnance Losses, 26 November 1944-3 March 1945 . 125E. Quartermaster Supply, December 1944-March 1945 129

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pageNumber Three. Fifth Army Staff 131

A. General O rder N o. 183, 16 December 1944 133B. General O rder N o. 184, 16 December 1944 134C. General O rder No. 186, 18 December 1944 135D. Fifth Army Staff, 15 M arch 1945 136

Number Four. Examples of Staff Reports 137A. G - i Daily Casualty Report, 23 February 1945 139B. G-2 R eport No. 537, 22-23 February 1945 141C. G -3 Report No. 54, 22-23 February 1945 146D. G -3 Sitrep No. 67, 1 M arch 1945 149E. IV Corps, G -3 Sitrep N o. 107, 23 February 1945 150F. Eighth Army, Cositrep No. 727, 23 February 1945 151G. II Corps, G-2 Isum No. 631, 23 February 1945 152H. G3 Section Chiefs' Conference, 23 Fe brua ry 1945 153/ . Ta rge t Dia ry, 23 Feb ruar y 1945 157

Number Five. Air-Ground Support 165Number Six. Troop List of Fifth A rmy, 26 M arch 1945 173IVLCLpS

opposite page1. T h e A p e n n in e L in e , 16 D ec e m b e r 1944 72. T h e S erch io V a lley A ttack , 26 -31 D e c e m be r 1944 193. P r in c ip a l S u p p ly In s ta l la t ions , W in te r 1944-45 274. A ttacks of 92d D iv ision , 4 -1 1 F e b r u a r y 1945 785. T h e B e lv e de re T o r ra cc ia O p e r a ti o n , 1 9 -2 5 F e b r u a r y 1945 . . . 8 56. S econd P hase of I V C orps A t tac k , 3 -9 M a r c h 1945 89

Illustrations * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *opposite page

Lieutenant General L. K. Truscott, Jr. , Arm y Com man der I l lPrep aring a Serchio bridge for demo lition 10A m orta r crew on the slopes above the Idice River valley 11Infan try come out of the front lines on M t. G ran de , past trucks and Weasels 20

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opposite pageA G erm an shell hits a target in the town of Loiano on Highw ay 65 . . 20

Unit trucks draw their rations at a forward ration dump hidden in a pine

The snow-capped peaks of the Apennines rise steeply above the Serchio

Engineers working on a trail, while an Ind ian mu le train passes by . . 21Am mu nition for the pack howitzers, at the end of the supply line . . 21Supplies for Fifth Arm y unload at Legho rn 22Highw ay 65 winds past Loiano and out into the Po Valley 23Christma s at a first aid station near Livergnano 24A winter hom e in the Idice River valley (85th Division) 25A signal construction crew erects a new open wire telephone line . . 30T h e winter overha ul on equipm ent field repairs on an M -1 8 tank destroyer 30A forward amm unition du m p in the snow and mud of the Apennine M ountains 31An M P controls traffic on the m ud dy roads in the 34th Division sector . . 31I talian soldiers pile up scrap metal in a salvage collection dum p . . . 32Sorting and loading salvage clothing at a quarterm aster railhead compan y . 32T h e Ar my 's br ead , always fresh, cam e from mobile bakeries such as this . 33

grove 33Co m bat soldiers relax in a M onte catini square 50Ti red soldiers scrub off the m ud of the Apennines 51W hite tents an d guns hu dd le on the snowy slopes 68A win ter patr ol in the Belvedere sector 69

Valley 74T he coastal plain jus t no rth of Cinq uale Ca nal; High way 1 on the right . 74Infantry of the g2d Division move up on tanks throug h Forte dei M arm i . 75T he 701st Ta nk Destroyer Battalion passes a ruined church in Qu erceta . 75Lo ng, thin ly covered slopes lead up to the crest of M ou nt Belvedere . . 80Behind the front litter bearers, pack mules, and infantry moving up . . 80T h e enem y is ah ea d; on the left smoke rises from fighter-bomber targets . 81An autom atic rifleman covers a Germ an-held house as his squad crawls up 81Soldiers pick their way cautiously on a mine-swept pa th throug h Corona . 86Litte r bearers brin g back the wou nded in the attack on M t. Belvedere . . 86General Trusco tt confers with his comm anders near Castel d'Aiano . . 87A tank destroyer moves u p ; below, engineers work on a Bailey bridge . . 87


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C H A P T E R L * *Into the Winter Positions

I 6 December 1944, while it was in the process of resting and refitting itsforces for the final, all-out drive to liberate the Po Valley and to free all of northernItaly, Fifth Army was assigned a new commanding general, Lieutenant GeneralLucian K . Truscott, Jr . (See Annex No. 3A.) General Truscott was well acquaintedwith Fifth Army, having for many months been a part of it, first as commander ofthe 3d Infantry Division and later as com man ding general of V I Corps. W ith his3d Division General Truscott had fought across Sicily, through lower Italy, in themountains of southern Italy in the Winter Line battles of 1943-44, and at the Anziobeac hhe ad. D urin g the most critical period at the beachhead General Trusco ttassumed com ma nd of V I Corps on 23 Feb ruary . Un der his direction the Corpshurled back the last of the fanatical German attempts to drive our forces into thesea and built up strength for the final breakout attack, which began 23 May andculm inated in the cap ture of Ro m e. He continued to lead V I Corps in the pursuit of the fleeing enemy as far n orth as Piombino where on 25 Ju ne the Corps wasrelieved to joi n Seven th Army for the invasion of southern Franc e. It was fromsuccessful operations there that General Truscott was recalled to take his new postas commander of Fifth Army.

The shift in high commands in Italy was the last in a series of changes in thecontrol of American and Allied operations in the Mediterranean area which hadbegun on 1 Novem ber when the North African T heater of Operations (NAT OU SA)was redesignated the M editerran ean The ater of Operations (M TO US A) . Control and supply of Seventh Army in southern France were taken over by the EuropeanT he at er of O pera tion s. Thi s shift altered adm inistrative and operational functionsof high A merican hea dqua rters in the theater. Th e next step was the change incommand of all the Allied forces when Field Marshal Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander


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took charge of Allied Force Headquarters, and Field Marshal Sir Henry MaitlandWilson relinquished command of it to become head of the British military missionin the U nit ed States. At 1200, 16 Dec em ber, wh en Ge neral Tru scot t assumed comm and of Fifth Army, Lieutenan t General Mark W . Clark, previous Arm y c om ma nder,stepped in as hea d of Allied Armies in Italy (A AI). At the same ho ur AA I, whichembraced both Fifth and Eighth Armies, was redesignated 15th Army Group, a titlewhich had previously been in effect until changed in the spring of 1944.Numerous changes in the staff of Fifth Army were made coincident with theassumption of comm and by General Truscott. Brig. Gen. Don E. Carleton becamethe chief of staff, and three new heads of general staff sections were appointed.(See Annexes No. 3B and 3C.) Col. Edward M. Daniels became assistant chief ofstaff, G - i ; Col. Ben H arrell beca me assistant chief of staff, G-3; and Col. Edward J.O'Neill took over as assistant chief of staff, G-4 .

A. GEOGRAPHY OF THE APENNINE REGIONSee Map No. 1

O n 16 December Fifth Arm y units were spread along the Apennine M oun tains,mostly north of the divide, with IV Corps on the left, II Corps in the center, and theBritish 13 Corps on the right. This mou ntain b arrier, 50 miles wide, stretchesacross Italy, separating the continental Po Valley from the comparatively narrowpeninsula up which we had ba ttled from the south. Fro m the Ligu rian Sea on thewest to the Adriatic Sea on the east, with only narrow coastal plains on each extremity, extends the almost unbroken line of ridges and peaks, some of which reachwell over 6,000 feet in elevation. T he m oun tain mass is pierced by only a few roadssufficiently improv ed to provide passage for a mo dern mech anized arm y. T heFifth Army battles to enter the valley were fought largely along these roads: Highway 1, Highway 12, Highway 64, Highway 65, and Highway 67, and three otherless improved routes angling across the ridges generally in a slightly northeastwarddire ction . Most of these road s follow the line of stream s, vary ing in size bu t almostall at high water stage during the greater part of the winter months.The great port of Leghorn acted as the funnel through which men and materiel pou red in to feed the Arm y. Th ree Arno Valley cities, Lucc a, Pistoia, andFlorence, contained the dumps from which the principal mountain advances weresupp lied. Bases an d depots in the vicinity of Pisa serviced the drive up the nar rowwest coast. Hig hw ay 1, traversing the coastal plain, continues on u p the Ligu riancoast line from Pisa toward the town of Massa and the former Italian naval base at


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iL a Spezia. Both these places were in Ge rm an hands . Well north of the battle lines,in German-held territory, two highways branch northeastward from Highwayto form possible approache s to the Po Valley. A short distance southeast of LaSpezia Highway 63 begins to thread its way across the mountains toward the city ofRegg io Emili a; just no rth of La Spezia Hig hw ay 62 turns inland to lead eventuallyto Parma.

Pistoia, about 30 miles inland, was the hub of the road net feeding the easternpa rt of the I V Corps sector. Fro m this city High way 64 winds its crooked way acrossthe Apennines to Bologna, passing through the mountain towns of Porretta andVe rgato . Highw ay 66 runs northwest to connect with Highway 12 at San M ar-cello. T he latte r road, originating at Pisa, enters the mo untains at Lucca, 20 mileswest of Pistoia, and runs through rough country; the villages of Pievepelago andPavullo are the only sizable communities encountered until it breaks out onto thevalley floor again at the city of Modena.

Roads serving II and 13 Corps and forming the axes of advance for the mainFifth Arm y effort radia ted out of the Florence area. Ru nnin g north through Fu taan d R adicosa passes to Bologna, nearly 70 road miles from Florence, was Highw ay65 in the I I C orps zone. This ma in route passes through num erous small villages,no ne of wh ich is a com munity of any grea t size. It is paved b ut, like all the otherAp enn ine roads, contains ma ny heavy grades and sharp curves. Th e principal highway serving 13 Corps was Highway 67, which runs in a more northeasterly directionth an H igh way 65 . It leaves the Arn o Valley at Pontassieve, 10 miles east of Florence, immediately climbs into the mountains, then passes through Dicomano andRo cca, a nd finally enters the nor thern valley at the town of Forli. Th ree other lessimp roved roads served II Corps. Paralleling Highw ay 65 abou t 6 miles to the westis the PratoCastiglioneBologna (Highway 6620) route, which connects withHi ghw ay 64 abo ut 10 miles south of Bologna. East of Highw ay 65 is the road whichformed the principal attack route through the Gothic Line, the FirenzuolaImola(Hig hw ay 6528) roa d. This road leaves Highw ay 65 abou t 15 miles north of Florence, strikes northeast through Firenzuola down the rocky gorge of the SanternoRiv er, an d reaches level country again nor th of the mou ntains at Imo la. Yet another northeast-southwest usable road runs from Florence through Borgo SanLorenzo to Faenza (Highway 6521).

Although this road net afforded a number of routes over the mountains, itfailed utter ly to provide adeq uate lateral communications. Except for one secondary road running west from Firenzuola to Highway 65, the country is devoidof east-west roa ds. As a result Allied units were forced to utilize poor trails and tocons truct m an y routes themselves. M an y of these hastily hacked out or improvedtrails became practically impassable in rainy weather, and mule pack trains and


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human carrying parties were necessary to reach the troops in otherwise inaccessiblemountain positions.

Forming the principal route through the southeastern part of the Po Valleyand connecting most of the large towns and cities south of the river is Highway 9.This road, on level ground and with many long straight stretches of pavement,skirts the valley along the norther n foot of the Ape nnines. Between the Adriaticseacoast, where it leaves Highway 16, and Bologna, it passes through Forli, Faenza,and Im ola. From Bologna Highw ay 9 continues northwest through Mod ena, Reggio Em ilia, Pa rm a, and Piacenza. Bologna's popu lation of over 260,000 peoplem ad e it the largest city south of the Po River in the zone of the Allied Arm ies. N ort hof Piacenza and the river lies the great m anufa cturing city of M ilan. Twenty-fivemiles northeast of Bologna is the city of Ferrara on Highway 64 4 miles south of theriver.

Ita ly's largest river, th e P o, flows in a series of grea t be nds across its broa d alluvialplain 10 to 30 miles no rth of the moun tains. From its source in the Alps to its m ou thon the Adriatic Sea the rambling stream forms a natural obstacle for approximately420 miles across almost all of nort hern Italy . For m uch of the distance it flows between high, thick levees, which in some instances raise the bed of the river as muchas 60 feet above the level of the surroun ding land . Between Piacenza and Fe rrar athe river was spanned by 12 bridges, which for many months had been the target ofAllied bombers and were almost entirely destroyed. T he length of these bridgesranged from 1,000 to 3,700 feet, and the majority were over 2,000 feet long.

Numerous small rivers and streams course down the northern side of the Apennines toward the Po and the Adriatic Sea, and virtually every road through themo untain s follows a small valley or canyon cut out by these streams. Th e largest ofthese water courses in the area of the main Army effort were the Montone, paralleling Highway 67; the Lamone, which flows alongside the FlorenceFaenza road;the Senio, 6 miles west of the Lamone; the Santerno, along the FlorenceImolaroad ; the Ren o, along whose banks Highw ay 64 is built; and the Panaro. Similarly, numerous unimportant creeks and rivers tumble down the southern slopestoward the Arno Valley; but the only large stream in the Fifth Army area was theSerchio River, which bisected the IV Corps zone. Rising in the mo untain s nor thwest of Lucca, it runs a rocky course past Castelnuovo, Barga, Bagni di Lucca, andLucca before it enters the valley and turns west to reach the sea 6 miles north of themouth of the Arno.

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B. ALLIED DISPOSITIONS

Fifth Army troops had stormed decisively through the heavy defenses of the German Gothic Line in the Apennine Mountains before a combination of bad weather,he avy losses, an d increasingly stiff enem y opposition h ad forced a suspension of the offensive late in the previous Octobe r. Battering their way north from the Arno Valley, ou r forces ha d smashed th rou gh p repa red mo unta in defensesofBcially described asthe strongest Germ an works ever encountered in Italy up to that time. Th e campaignto break the Gothic Line continued until lack of sufficient fresh troops to continueexploitation of the break-through, difficulty of supply, and the unexpectedly swiftmassing of enemy reserves before Bologna forced us to desist from the attack at a timewh en th e Allies app eared to be on the verge of reaching the level Po Valley. Th estalemate in the mountains occurred slightly more than 13 mon ths after the b eginningof th e Italian cam paig n on 9 Septem ber 1943. From the first landings at the Salernobeachh ead the Army had battled northw ard through the valleys and mountains forming the rough terrain of the peninsula.

When Fifth Army swung from the attack to the defense, American and Alliedtroops which composed the Army were holding the longest front they had ever maintaine d in Italy . T h e positions were practically unch anged during Nov ember; on1 December the line ran from a point on the Ligurian coast about 6 miles south ofMassa east and northeast for nearly 130 tortuous miles through the mountains to thebo un da ry w ith Eig hth A rmy ne ar High way 67, 15 miles to the southwest of the PoValley town of Forli. O n the extreme left, opera ting under direct Arm y control, the92d In fan try D ivision was thinly spread along a front of over 20 miles. It exten dedinland from the sea, across the narrow strip of coastal plain about 4 miles wide, andalmost due east into the mo untain s and across the Serchio River valley. He re thefront bulged northward as far as the town of Barga on the east side of the river andthen swung sharply south almost to Bagni di Lucca on Highway 12.

The main Fifth Army push to the north had been made in the center; on the leftflank th e line ha d b een adv anced only abou t 12 miles into the mountains and roughly25 miles no rth of the Arno River. Un der com mand of M aj. Gen. Willis D . Grittenberger, IV Corps, composed of Task Force 45, the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division,and the 6 South African Armoured Division, occupied the left center portion of theArm y front. T he Corps line threaded its way through the mou ntains, runnin gsharply north wa rd on the west of the II Corps penetration tow ard Bologna. Th eleft boundary, between IV Corps and the g2d Division, was a short distance east ofBagni di Lucca; the Corps right flank rested on Setta Creek, which marked the beginn ing of the I I Co rps sector. Task Force 45 occupied the left of the IV Corps


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front. Th is force, und er comm and of the 45th Antiaircraft A rtillery Brigade , wasmade up principally of former antiaircraft troops functioning as infantry, includingthe American 434th, 435th, and 900th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic WeaponsBattalions and the British 39 Light Antiaircraft Regim ent (b attal ion) . T he 2dBattalion, 370th Infantry (92d Division), was also attac hed . Elem ents of the Britishunit were stationed in the Cutigliano Valley; the bulk of the force was concentratedin the area northwest of Pistoia. M uc h of the almost trackless m ou nta in mass in thewestern part of the task force sector was ungarrisoned.

The 1st Brazilian Division held a triangular-shaped sector north of Pistoia,gua rding High way 64. Its elements faced the Ge rma ns along 15 miles of roug hterrain paralleling the general line of the highway from 3 to 5 miles west of it andreachin g to a point on the road abo ut 6 miles nor th of Po rretta . T he division wasdeeply echeloned from northe ast to southwest, facing northw est. N ort h and eastof Pistoia the 6 South African Armoured Division on the right of the Corps held asector extending northeast from Highway 64 to the Corps boundary on Setta Creek.Four American divisions were crammed in Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes' narrowII Corps sector astride Hig hw ay 65 in the Army center. O n the left of this Corpsfront dismounted elements of the 1st Armored Division held a short section of theline adjoining the Sou th Africans. East of the arm ored infantry the 91st InfantryDivision occupied an even narrower front, with only two battalions in defensive positions. The center sector, which included Highway 65, was occupied by the 34thInfantry Division; east to the 13 Corps boundary the 88th Infantry Division coveredthe Idice River valley and the M ou nt Belmonte front. Th e most northerly po intreached by Fifth Army was in this right sector where troops atop Mount delle Formiche and M ou nt Belmonte could look dow n into the Po Valley. At the foot of themountains in the valley Highway 9 could be clearly seen from Mount Grande on theleft of 13 Corps; here the Army had advanced slightly more than 60 miles fromFlorence.

13 Corps held the right flank of Fifth Army with three British and one Indiandivisions on the line. O n the Corps left the 1 Infan try Division occupied the M ou ntGr and e and Mo unt Cerere positions on a narrow sector. T he 78 Infantry Divisiongarrisoned the next 4 miles of mountainous front, while the 6 Armoured Divisionheld the FirenzuolaImola road axis and ground about 3 miles on either side of thissupply artery . T he 8 Ind ian Infa ntry Division covered the longest portio n of the13 Corps line, a distance of about 12 miles into which a long salient of German-occupied ground reached toward the Senio River. Th e division stretched acrossthe Lamone River to a point just west of Highw ay 67. Eighth Arm y forward elements had been slowly advancing westward from the Adriatic side, gradually pinching out portions of the division.


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Although withdrawal of Fifth Army troops for rest had begun by i Novemberand one division at a time was being placed in reserve during the early part of December, the major part of each of the other divisions was concentrated on the line.Reassignment of heavy artillery pieces to service in France had stripped the Armyof all Am erican artillery heavier than 155-mm guns. Th e majority of the availableartillery other than divisional battalions was in position in the II Corps sector onboth sides of Highway 65.

C. ENEMY ACTIVITIES

1. German Commitments. About the middle of October, when our threat tobreak through to Bologna was strongest, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the suprem e G erm an co mm ander of Army G roup Southwest in Italy, comm itted more tha nhalf of the available enemy front-line streng th against Fifth Arm y. O n 15 Decem ber , 13 of th e 28 Ge rm an divisions in It aly w ere still blocking us, 9 of themmassed aga inst I I Co rps south and southeast of Bologna. Since these divisions werenot up to full strength, the numerical total of the opposing forces was about equal.Six German divisions were delaying the advance of Eighth Army along the Adriaticcoast and westward up Highway 9 toward Bologna, basing their defense on thevarious river lines. Fou r others were spread along the upper Ligurian coast and inthe Maritime Alps, guarding against possible sea-borne invasion of the Genoa areaand penetration of northern Italy from France. Th e i62d Turcom an G renadier(Infantry) Division was engaged in operations against Italian partisans in the northern part of the country, where action by these well organized guerrilla bands hadassumed such pro portions th at the enem y was obliged to begin a full-scale cam paignagainst them . Th ree G erm an divisions and one Cossack cavalry division were inthe Udine Trieste region of northeas t Italy. In addition to the Germ an divisions,two Fascist Republican Italian divisions were partially committed in the lines facingour troops and were also engaged in run ning down the partisans. Italian un itsequivalent to three more divisions were stationed around Turin and Milan.The boundary between the two German armies apparently ran past the right ofthe II Co rps sector. Fou rteenth Arm y's I Par ach ute Corps opposed the left andcenter of II Corps, while XIV Panzer (Armored) Corps held the sector oppositeIV Corp s. 13 Corps and I I Corps were each confronted by L I Mou ntai n Corps ofthe Germ an Tenth Army. LX X V I Panzer Corps was opposing Eighth Army.A third enemy army, composed largely of Fascist troops and known as the LigurianArm y, was und er comm and of the Italian M arshal Rodolfo Graziani. This force,


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which included the Italian Littorio, Prince Borghese, and ist SS Divisions and theGerman 34th Grenadier Division, 5th Mountain Division, and 157th Reserve Mountain Division, was spread along the Ligurian coast, around Genoa, and in the mountains on the Italo-French frontier.

The Germans, apparently appreciating that there was now no immediatethreat to Bologna, had taken advantage of the November lull to accumulate a reserve for future contingencies and to relieve tired divisions, some of which had restedlittle since the beginn ing of the Allied offensive in M ay against th e G ustav Line southof Ro m e. Th e nine divisions which M arsh al Kesselring ha d assembled pro tectingthe southern approaches to Bologna had built up a heavy defense belt in this area.He thinned this line, leaving the divisions committed in narrow sectors while at thesame time resting a large percentage of the personnel. Local reserves ha d consistedof the greater part of the ist and 4th Parachute Divisions; each enemy division begancreation of its own reserve soon after the beginning of the month of November.

To oppose the western flank of Fifth Army, where our mission had never beenmore than to follow up enemy withdrawals and maintain pressure all along the line,Kesselring used some Ital ian troops. T he sector between the Lig urian Sea an d theSerchio River was assigned to the German 148th Grenadier Division reinforced byelements of two Italian units, the Monte Rosa Alpine Division and the San MarcoM arin e Division. T he 233d Gre nadie r Division was spread from the Serchio Riv ereast to Highway 64, but in the rough high ground east of the Serchio it was reinforced by the 4th Indep ende nt Mou ntain Battalion. Containing our Bolognaspearhead in the center between Highway 64 and the FirenzuolaImola road werethe 94th Grenadier Division, the 16th SS Panzer Grenadier (Armored Infantry)Division "Reichsfuehrer SS ," the 4th Par ach ute Division, the 65 th Gren adier D ivision, the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, the 42d Light Division, the ist ParachuteDivision, the 98th Grenadier Division, and the 334th Grenadier Division in a seriesof nar row sectors from west to east. Th e 65th Grenad ier Division was astride High way 65. 13 Corps was being blocked by a smaller arra y of force. T he 715thGrenadier Division was in position from the FirenzuolaImola road east acrossthe Senio River, and overlapping the eastern extremity of the Fifth Army boundarywas the 305th Gre nad ier Division. Th e enemy ha d the largest conc entratio n ofartillery massed against Fifth Arm y th at ha d been encou ntered in Italy . H e outnumbered our forces in large-caliber heavy artillery and from all indications hadplenty of am mu nition available. Th e Germans were estimated to have a m inim umof 370 light guns, 125 m edium guns, 17 heavy guns, 160 heavy antiaircraft guns, an d20 Nebelwerfers capable of firing on Fifth Army positions.

2. German Defensive Lines. Evidences of the enemy's determination to hold aslong as possible were not long in appearin g. Th e German s ma intained a tight

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counterreconnaissance screen, and our patrols usually met defensive fires shortlyafter leavin g ou r own lines. Re po rts of our patrols indica ted the enemy was busilyengag ed in constructing better defenses. This information was borne out by photoreconnaissance cover, which showed a constantly expanding belt of prepared positions in dep th betwe en the front and Bologna. Diggings were protected by wire andmines and had become increasingly obvious as November passed.

Throughout December the Germans continued to work on their defensive system b oth so uth and east of the city. O n the south side the numerous ridge linesan d mo un tain peaks were organized. Pillboxes were reported under construction inenemy strongpoints, and a heavy build-up of gun emplacements 3 miles south ofBologna was shown. T he bulk of the Germ an artillery was now concentrated between Hig hw ay 64 and the FirenzuolaIm ola road. Heavy guns on the enemy leftwe re sited where they could fire on both the Fifth and Eighth Army fronts. Th etowns of Pianoro, 3 miles north of Livergnano on Highway 65, and Vergato, onH igh w ay 64, bec am e the nerve centers of the defensive system. Hig h, rock-slopedM ou nt Ad one, m idwa y between the two highways, served as an excellent observationpoint from which much of the activity behind our lines could be seen.

Several belts of field fortifications blocked the road to Bologna from the east;by the end of the year the entire area around the city had been transformed into oneof the most formidable barriers the enemy ha d ever occupied in Italy. Thr ee distin ct belts of defenses were identified southeast of the city, based o n th e numerous riverlines. The Irmgard Line ran along the Senio River, the Laura Line on the Santerno,an d th e Pau la Line on the Sillaro River. Mo st of these streams had high floodbanks into which the enemy dug machine guns, rifle pits, and antitank gun positions.Both here and in the more mountainous region to the south their system consisted ofnum ero us m utu ally suppo rting strongpoints or centers of resistance. Large dugoutswhich could house a squad or even a platoon were dug into the hillsides, and thebulk of the enemy troops remained in such shelters until outguards warned of danger; then they would emerge and rush to man the positions close by.

The main defenses facing Fifth and Eighth Armies ran south and east of Bolognaalong a line which included parts of the Mount Grande hill mass, Mount Bello, andIm ola and the n continu ed along the Santern o River. Discounting the aid offeredby the terrain in other instances, this Bologna defense line appeared stronger thanthe Gustav, Adolf Hitler, and the VelletriValmontone Lines, stronger even thanthe Gothic Line itself. By the end of December Eighth Army, slowly advancing upHighway 9, had come up generally against the Irmgard Line on its left flank adjoining Fifth Arm y. T he strength of this line quickly becam e app aren t when attem ptsof the British to push across the Senio River ran into intense resistance which ultimately brought the advance to a standstill.

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3. Enemy Rear Areas. The Germans were forced to contend with a not inconsiderable amount of turmoil far behind their front lines caused by the Italian partisans, well organized and engaged in extensive sabotage operations against theenem y supply system. Activities of these partisans were encoura ged b y specialAllied units set up specifically to contact the partisans, to direct their campaignagainst German installations, and to provide them with trained military advisers.British and American agents were either smuggled through the lines or dropped byparac hute into partisan-held areas. Large amounts of small arms, amm unition, andexplosives were dro pp ed from Allied tran spo rt planes into rem ote valleys. Britishand American uniforms were sent to the patriot bands for use on the day when anorganized uprising against the Germans was to be ordered.

By December these activities had reached such proportions that the enemy wasobliged to begin a determ ined a ttem pt to clean up the situation. Eleme nts of several divisions, including the whole of the uncertain i62d Turcoman GrenadierDivisionwhich could not be trusted in battlewere engaged in this program, inwhich the Germ ans m ade considerable head wa y. Carefully planned attacks werem ad e against partisa n strongholds. T he general pat tern followed was the institutionof a blockade, followed by a policy of starving out and cutting up the various bands.Severe measures were taken . T he Ge rma ns refused to recognize the partisans assoldiers und er internatio nal law and executed m any of those capt ured . People whohad befriended or supported the guerrillas also were executed, but less frequently,and mo re often were sent as forced labor to Ge rm any. Some of the Italia n unitsemployed in the partisan hunts were of little value due to the high rate of desertions.The Monte Rosa Alpine Division, formed in Germany in March 1944 and sent toItaly in the late summer, had lost more than 6,000 deserters by the end of November.Many of these fugitives joined the partisans; others donned civilian clothes and wentinto hidin g. On ly a com paratively small nu m ber of the deserters came to the Alliedlines even though between 20 and 30 a day were apprehended by Counterintelligence Corps men and our troops, mostly along the west coast.

Taking advantage of the static lines, the Germans also greatly increased theirespiona ge activities. Soon after our invasion at Salern o they bega n tra inin g spiesand sa boteurs in Germ an schools. Activity of this type steadily increased, and bythe fall of 1944 the enemy began a full-scale espionage offensive, although most ofthe appreh end ed agents were low-grade. Nea rly all were Italians, whose missionsvaried from obtaining short-range tactical information to bringing back long-rang e political and economic intelligence. Mo st of them attem pted to enter our territor y in the guise of civilian refugees. Te n of these agents , one a wom an, were tak endu ring Novem ber while infiltrating our lines, generally along Hig hw ay 65. Thisactivity began to diminish later in the winter when an increasingly large percentage

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D . ACTION IN DECEMBER

i . Plans for Attack. All along the front offensive action, except for minorefforts to impro ve positions, ha d been halted by Fifth Ar my by i Nov em ber. Tro opsof all divisions dug themselves in for the rest period which it was believed wouldlast about i month, after which offensive operations would be resumed in conjunction with Eighth Arm y. M axi m um efforts were m ade to rest all units, with em phasis on improvement of supply and communication systems preparatory to thenew offensive. Activities of the Arm y con tinue d to be direc ted by provisions of AAIOperations Order No. 3,(x) bu t failure of Eighth Arm y to meet the expected timeschedule resulted in a change of plans on 28 November when AAI issued OperationsOrder No. 4. {See Annex No. iA.) At that time British troops were engaged inheavy battles around Faenza, 1 o miles southeast of the line of the Santerno River atImola, and were making slow, costly progress in the face of severe rain storms,flooded, ditch- and cana l-cut country, and stiff enemy resistance. It was, howev er,considered essential that the Allied Armieswhose primary mission yet remainedthe destruction of enemy forces in Italyimmediately undertake to continue suchpressure against the Germans that the enemy would be unable to transfer any troopsfrom Italy to either the western or eastern European fronts.

As a result of this directive Fifth Army issued Operations Instruction No. 36 on29 November when it was estimated that Eighth Army would reach the SanternoRiver abou t 7 Decem ber. {See Annex No. iB.) After the river was reached the twoarmies were to laun ch a coordin ated major offensive against Bologna. T he necessity for better weather was another contingency which would help determine theexact date for the new attack, and the ammunition supply was a possible limitingfactor. Shortly before 1 Decem ber an analysis of am mu nition stocks indica tedsufficient supplies were on hand to support a 13-day attack during December butthat such consumption would result in inability to carry out further offensive actionuntil after 28 Ja nu ar y 1945, by this time receipt of scheduled allocations would againboost the dump supply to a point which would allow full artillery support to anyoper ation. Allotments of am m unitio n to the corps were greatly reduc ed, and restrictions of 15 roun ds per d ay for each 105-mm howitzer, 18 roun ds per d ay per 155-mmhowitzer, and 11 round s per day per 155-mm gun were imposed initially. La terin the winter the allocations were further reduced.

Operations Instruction No. 36 envisioned a three-phase attack by Fifth Army,the first two aimed at securing key enemy-held positions in the mountains protecting

For text see Fifth Army History, Part VII.

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the approaches to Bologna and the third phase the capture of the city itself. T h emain effort of Fifth Army again was to be made by II Corps while IV Corps assistedon the left and 13 Corps devoted most of its power to providing assistance for EighthAr m y. Th e first phase objectives for IV C orps were the seizure of the area aro undMarzabotto, a village on Highway 64, 6 miles west of Livergnano, and clearance ofgro un d west of Setta Creek. II Corps was to occupy high ground on both sides ofHi ghw ay 65 in the vicinity of Piano ro. In its role of supporting Eighth Arm y 13Corps was ordered to attack as soon as possible down the Castel del RioImolaroad.

It was estimated that the 28 German divisions in Italy were at approximately60 percent of their normal strength, which would make them the numerical equalof ab ou t 16 to 17 Ame rican divisions. Elem ents of the six Fascist Ital ian divisions,drastically weakened by a high rate of desertions, were believed to reach the equivalen t of not mor e than two American divisions. O n the line facing the Fifth Arm ypenetration zone the Germans now had in forward positions 21 battalions of infantryw ith 8 more in local reserve , a total force of slightly less th an 10,000 front-line effectives. IV Corp s was opposed by abou t 4,800, 13 Corps by 8,700, and the 92dDivisio n by some 1,900 front-line com bat troops. Reserves capa ble of fairly rap idintervention, coming from the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division, the 4th ParachuteDivision, and the 362d Grenadier Division, were estimated at an additional 7,000front-line infantry. T he lull du ring Nove mber had also provided oppo rtunity forthe enemy to rest his troops, and the German morale was considered to be good.Despite constant efforts by the air force to block supply routes, the extensive roadnet of the Po Valley afforded opportunity to bring in supplies, and the enemy materiel situation was satisfactory except for a severe shortage of motor transport andgasoline. Positions of the opposing armies were relatively the same as they ha dbeen at the beginning of the rest period.

O n 7 Dece mb er the ground situation had not yet changed materially. Although Eighth Army had made some progress, particularly northward towardRavenna near the Adriatic coast, the northwestward movement along Highway 9con tinue d a t a slow pace against tenacious Ge rm an delaying actions. Th e line ofthe Santern o River had not been reached, and the enemy remained in Imola. T heweather continued to deteriorate; ground conditions in the mountains, already bad,bec am e such tha t me chan ized mov eme nt off the roads was almost impossible. W ithour forces a nd those of the enem y so nearly equa l in num ber , it was considered essential that a minimum of 3 days of good flying weather must be assured to enable theuse of our gre at air superiority in suppo rt of the ground attack . W eathe r forecasterswere unable to foresee such a period with any degree of certainty; as a result the signa l to begin the assault was again delayed. T he majority of Fifth Army troops were


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plac ed on 7 2-hour aler t, and efforts were ben t tow ard im prov ing defensive positionsand g etting read y for the winter. Snow ha d already fallen several times and wasshortly due in increasing frequency.

2. Clashes in the Center. Both Fifth Army and its German opponents took advantage of the November and early December stalemate to rest, regroup, and buildu p supplies. Rest centers for Am erican and Allied troops were opened in the ArnoValley, the largest of them at the city of Montecatini west of Florence, where entiredivisions we re rot ate d throu gh for 10-day periods of rest. II Co rps units prin cipa llywere assigned to this location, while IV and 13 Corps made smaller scale reliefs oftheir troops. Fifth Arm y assimilated mo re tha n 5,000 replacements into its combatunits; despite this increase the Army remained approximately 7,000 men belowautho rized strength at the beginning of Dece mbe r. Th e Germ ans also receivedthousands of replacements, many of them surprisingly high-grade, to bring theirdivisions closer to normal size.

November passed, and December came with little change in the pattern of lifein the deadlocked m oun tain lines. Artillery exchanges and patro l clashes provide dthe principal action during m uch of the first 3 weeks of the mon th. Th e Ita lian winter held the front in its grip, heavy snows covering all the higher mountains and oftenblank eting the lower hills as well. Soldiers spent much of their time in imp rovingtheir individual living quarte rs and their defensive positions. For the greater pa rtof the month both sides were content to let things stand more or less as they were.

In several instances, however, both the Germans and the Allies attempted toimprove their tactical situation with local attacks aimed at valuable defensive features, but in all cases the net result, after sharp fighting had ended, was a return tothe positions previously held. T h e bulk of w ha t little fighting occ urred in the first3 weeks of the m onth involved units holding the flanks of the mo unt ain salient w hereeach side was sensitive to action by the oth er. O n the m ain I I Corp s front itselfthere was little activity beyond local fire fights between patrols. O n 3 Decemb erthe 91st Division, under command of Maj. Gen. William G. Livesay, returned to thelines, thereby placing four divisions abreast on the Corps front, the 1st Armored, 91st,34th, and 88th Divisions from left to right. Th e 85th Infantry Division, und er comma nd of M aj. Gen. Jo h n B. Coulter, rema ined in reserve at Gag liano. This groupingplaced the four divisions in their proper zones for the attack; all artillery and supporting elements were in position; and infantry assault units remained in rear areastra ining for the big push . But conditions deem ed necessary prerequ isites for theattack did not develop. Th e enemy at last reinforced his defense against Eig hthArm y. Th e m uddy ground froze, although not hard enough to support tanks.When the decision was made and D Day set, developments on the western flank againforced postponement.

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