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    NOTE FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

    Dear delegates,

    Welcome! Its ourpleasure to welcome you to the Historic Security Council at

    SAI MUN 2013. My name is Shazeeb M Khairul Islam and Im going to serve

    as your Chairperson for this session and Ill be joined by Sowdamini Pogaru

    who will be serving as the Vice Chairperson. We are both available at any timeto answer any queries or put to rest any concerns that you may have regarding

    the council.

    Firstly, a little about myself; for those who dont know Im currently pursuing

    a MBA Degree at University of Dhaka. I have been associated with 11 ModelUnited Nations and this is for the first time I will be chairing in an International

    Model United Nations. I am very excited to meet you all. I will make sure MUN

    is fun when it is SAIMUN.

    And our Vice Chairperson, Sowdamini Pogaru is delighted to have you all atSAIMUN 2014. She assures you, delegates, that it is a MUN that stays in your

    memory no matter what and that youve made the right choice by choosing to

    attend.

    As for council, Ill deal with certain obvious questions right now. For the sake

    of the environment, laptops will be allowed in council though Id greatly

    appreciate it if your nose wasnt buried in it the entire time. The use of internet,

    need I say it, is strictly forbidden inside council and any infringement of thisrule will have dire consequences. The proof you need to submit when it comes

    to the validity of any claim is in this order of priority: Reuters reports> UNreports> Government reports.

    Also delegates, try to broaden your minds somewhat with this council. It is true

    that we are bound by time restraints and certain occurrences but we also have

    the power of hindsight and retrospect to aid us so it would be brilliant to see you

    change the course of history. However, it is equally crucial to remember the

    setting in which you find yourself. The freeze date is June 4th, 1967. How thecouncilproceeds, well, youll see that once were in our council room. The

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    geopolitical scene was vastly different from what we see today and it will be

    important to take all of these changes into account if we are to simulate this

    council successfully.

    I hope youll all arrive well researched and excited to enter three days of

    dynamic debating, name calling and various other tantrums that well witnessbefore our time together is done. Were greatly looking forward to seeing youall in July.

    Cheers!

    Executive Board.

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    HISTORY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

    The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the organ of the UnitedNations charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. Its

    powers, outlined in the United Nations Charter, include the establishment of

    peacekeeping operations, the establishment of international sanctions regimes,

    and the authorization for military action. Its powers are exercised through

    United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

    Under Chapter Six of the Charter, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes", the SecurityCouncil "may investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to

    international friction or give rise to a dispute". The Council may "recommend

    appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment" if it determines that the

    situation might endanger international peace and security. These

    recommendations are not binding on UN members.

    Under Chapter Seven, the Council has broader power to decide what measures

    are to be taken in situations involving "threats to the peace, breaches of the

    peace, or acts of aggression". In such situations, the Council is not limited to

    recommendations but may take action, including the use of armed force "tomaintain or restore international peace and security". This was the basis for

    UN armed action in Korea in 1950 during the Korean War. Decisions taken

    under Chapter Seven, such as economic sanctions, are binding on UN members.

    The Security Council held its first session on 17 January 1946 at Church House,

    London.

    Though the council has met at many locations since its first meeting, the seat of

    the UNSC is at the UN headquarters in New York City, where the Security

    Council members are always present so they can meet at any time to deal withany crisis. The basic structure of the UNSC is set out in Chapter V of the UN

    Charter. The role of president of the Security Council involves setting the

    agenda, presiding at its meetings and overseeing any crisis. It rotates in

    alphabetical order of the Security Council member nations' names in English.

    There are two categories of membership in the UN Security Council: permanent

    members and elected members. The Council seated five permanent members

    who were originally drawn from the victorious powers after World War II:

    The Republic of China

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    The French Republic

    The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

    The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

    The United States of America

    It is significant to note that at the time of the Six Day War, Chinas interestswere represented by the Republic of China not the Peoples Republic of China,which didnt take its seat in the SCuntil 1971.

    The Russias interests, of course, were represented by the USSR, not the

    Russian Federation, which didnt take its seat in theSC until 1991.

    These were two of the three times when the SCs composition has changed, thefirst and most important one being in 1965 when amendments to articles 23 and

    27 came into effect to increase the number of elected members from six to ten.

    Under Article 27 of the UN Charter, Security Council decisions on all

    substantive matters require the affirmative votes of nine members. A negative

    vote, or veto, by a permanent member prevents adoption of a proposal, even if ithas received the required number of affirmative votes.

    Abstention is not regarded as a veto despite the wording of the Charter.

    A state that is a member of the UN, but not of the Security Council, mayparticipate in Security Council discussions in matters by which the Council

    agrees that the country's interests are particularly affected. In recent years, the

    Council has interpreted this loosely, enabling many countries to take part in its

    discussions or not depending on how they interpret the validity of the

    country's interest. Non-members are routinely invited to take part when they are

    parties to disputes being considered by the Council.

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    BACKGROUND ON THE SIX DAY WAR

    History is witness to the frequent wars that have been waged over the territory

    of Palestine whose ownership has passed from the First Jews to the Assyrians,the Babylonians, the Persians, the Romans and finally the Turks.

    However, despite all the strife in the region, the Jews never gave up their hope

    of the Promised Land, which they believed was their ancient homeland givento them by God. They continued to migrate there in small numbers. Palestine

    remained central to Jewish culture and worship even if it wasnt theirs. Thus, a

    century ago the Jews never even dreamt of actually establishing their homeland

    there. The Jewish connection was mostly messianic redemption and a vague

    notion of deliverance.

    When AntiSemitism took a violent streak (at about the end of the 19th century)a large number of Jews had left their earlier places of stay and had migratedelsewhere. It was during this time, in the year 1914, that the concept of Israel

    actually evolved. This was strongly promoted by men such as Theodor Herzel a

    leading proponent of the Zionist movement.

    Arab rights over Palestine arise from the fact that they were the last conquerors

    of Palestine (albeit under the aeges of the Turkish Empire which had absorbed

    most Arab lands). Thus by 1914, two rival groups had settled in Palestine with

    each of them beginning to view the territory as their homeland. The Arabic

    population had been estimated to be around 650,000 and the Jews at 85,000 (a

    minority that would become significant in the years to come).

    In the sunny year of 1915, a series of letters were exchanged between the then

    Sharif of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner inEgypt. The subject of the letters was the future division of the Ottoman Empire

    territories with regard to the Arab land. These were later known as the

    HusseinMcMahoncorrespondences. The Turks had just allied with Germany in

    the First World War and the British were looking for help from the Arabs to

    topple them. Hussein demanded land for the Arabs where they could form theirown independent nations. McMahon responded in kind stating that, after the

    War would get over, their demands would be met, subject to certain conditions.It is this that forms the basis of Arabic argument for Palestine.

    However, when through the Balfour Declaration Britain supported the

    establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, the Arabs cried foul. The

    British countered by saying that they had not included the territory of Palestinein the correspondence. The Arabs had no choice but to accept the rising influx

    of Jewish people into Palestine (this was the time when the idea of Israel was

    gaining popularity among Jews).

    Earlier in 1916, the French and the British had made secret plans for dividing

    the Ottoman Empire after the First World War for their own benefit. This wasknown as the SykesPicotAgreement. When this came to light, it further

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    deteriorated the image of Britain. The Arabs were particularly angered with this

    because they considered this in direct violation of the Hussein McMahon

    correspondence. Many historians consider this the turning point of ArabWestern

    relations.

    The Palestine problem became an international issue towards the end of theFirst World War with the disintegration of the Turkish Ottoman Empire. TheLeague of Nations was established at a historic meeting in the French suburb of

    Versailles. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations established the

    Mandates system and the area of Palestine, promised to both the Jews and the

    Arabs by the British were eventually returned to the British.

    The primary aim of the Mandates system was to facilitate the movementtowards freedom of the Mandatory Territories, and, as expected all but one

    achieved their goal. The exception was Palestine. Instead of being limited to

    "the rendering of administrative assistance and advice" the Mandate had as a

    primary objective the implementation of the "Balfour Declaration" issued by the

    British Government in 1917, expressing support for "the establishment in

    Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people".

    The period between the two World Wars was one of unrest, violence and

    hostility. Arabic and Jewish communities openly fought against each other and

    between the years of 193639 a massive Arabic rebellion took place against the

    British. The extremist Jews too were frustrated with Britains doublestandards

    and targeted the British. Inter communal fighting broke out with Arabs targeting

    Jews and the Jews forming a Jewish Defense Force. Despite the upheavals and

    increasingly fragile political situation, the British continued to try to find asolution.

    However each of their proposed solutions either managed to anger one or other

    of the conflicting sides or made no difference at all. Adding to all this was the

    everincreasing influx of Jewish immigrants trying to escape Nazi persecution ina war-torn Europe, which only worsened the situation.

    By 1947, Britain decided it had had enough. It abruptly decided to hand over the

    problem to the newly formed United Nations. The UNO decided to partition the

    land of Palestine into two nations, one Jewish and the other Arabic. The Arabs

    rejected the idea because they were given lesser territory despite being themajority. On the last day of the mandate, that fateful day of May 15, 1948,

    Israel declared its independence.

    ISRAELI INDEPENDENCEImmediately after this proclamation, Israel was attacked by five Arab

    countriesLebanon, Syria, Transjordan, Egypt and Iraq. Despite the nascent

    nature of the State of Israel, it managed to win a resounding victory against all

    five nations and captured more territory than what was originally allocated tothem. The Arabs were humiliated.

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    The Israeli victory and the establishment of a Jewish state did not put a rest to

    the Palestinian issue. A colossal amount of Arab Palestinians (estimated at

    about 726,000) fled Israel to form refugee camps in the neighboring countries.

    The refugee crisis exists to the present day. Further, these camps became centers

    for antiIsraeli movements and recruitment of fighters.Egypt, Jordan and Syria, as well as Iraq and other Arab states (for the most partthe same as those who fought in the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948) were

    however not willing to give up on Palestine so easily.

    Rhetoric in the days leading up to the Six-Day War echoed that from 1948. For

    example, on May 15, 1948, the day Arab states launched their attack on Israel,

    Arab League Secretary General Azzam Pasha announced that "[t]his will be awar of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like

    the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades." Almost exactly nineteen years

    later, on May 18, 1967, Egypts government-controlled Voice of the Arabs

    radio station mimicked this language, announcing that "the sole method we shall

    apply against Israel is total war, which will result in the extermination of Zionist

    existence." Two days later, Syrian Defense Minister Hafez Assad declared: "I,

    as a military man, believe that the time has come to enter into a battle of

    annihilation."

    Another of the central factors that pushed the region to war other than the

    animosity over the territory of Palestine, the status of international waterways

    leading to Israel also had its roots in the decades before 1967. In the late 1940s

    and early 1950s, Egypt blockaded the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran to

    shipping destined for Israel. These restrictions not only harmed the nascentJewish state, but were considered a violation of the 1949 armistice resolution

    signed by Egypt and Israel, the Constantinople Convention of 1888, Security

    Council Resolution 95, and, in the words of historian Howard Sachar,

    "international legal precedents for gulfs and bays flanked by the territories ofmore than one littoral state".

    It wasnt until 1956 after Israel, France and the United Kingdom invaded and

    then quickly withdrew from Egypts Sinai peninsula that passage through the

    Straits of Tiran (but not the Suez Canal) was opened to Israeli shipping. The

    presence of a United Nations Emergency Force stationed in the Sinai between1956 and 1967 helped deter Egypt from re-imposing its blockade.

    By the summer of 1967, however, the UN troops would be gone, old threats and

    blockades would reappear, and the drift to war would reach its climax.

    Yet, though the antagonism of earlier fighting remained firmly in the

    background, war was hardly expected or pre-planned. Before 1964 there was, in

    the words of Mideast scholar Nadav Safran, "eight years of nearly perfect

    quiescence of the Arab-Israeli conflict"despite the unwavering Arab positionthat Israel must be destroyed. Even after 1964, when attacks against Israel by

    the Palestinian Fatah organization and skirmishes along the Israeli-Syrian

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    border occurred with increasing regularity, neither Israel nor its neighbors

    (excepting maybe Syria) were itching to rush to war.

    But this all changed in May 1967. The deterioration was rooted in several

    factors, not the least of which was geopolitics of the Cold War. As American

    relations with Egypt soured, the Soviet Union stepped up its influence in theArab world, working to build (pro-Soviet) Arab unity by focusing Arabattention on their common enemy, Israel. The prospect of fighting against

    America had a deterrent effect on Egyptian President Gamal Nasser, just as fear

    of the Soviet Union weighed on Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol.

    But as the weight of the Soviets shifted more firmly behind the Arabs' anti-

    Israel positions, an emboldened Nasser moved to reclaim Egypt's position asleader of the Arab worlda position that had eroded in part because of the

    Nasser's stance that the Arabs should hold off on outright confrontation with

    Israel until the Arab world could successfully marshal its collective resources

    against the Jewish state. Any show of military strength against Israel, then,

    would help the Egyptian president regain his lost stature. The atmosphere in the

    spring of 1967 convinced Nasser that the time was ripe to flex his muscles.

    In the spring of 1967, tensions between Syria and Israel ran high, with

    flashpoints including terrorist raids against Israel originating from Syria and the

    Syrian diversion of water from the Jordan River. Following an attack on the

    water pump at Kibbutz Misgav Am, Israeli Prime Minister and Defense

    Minister Levi Eshkol resolved that after the next act of belligerence, Israel

    would position armored tractors deep into the demilitarized zones, wait to be

    hit, and then fire back. The plan went into effect accordingly and resulted in alarge-scale dogfight on April 7 over Syrian skies, in which the Israeli Air Force

    shot down several Syrian planes. In the next month, Fatah, the Palestinian

    terrorist organization, launched more than a dozen attacks on Israel and planted

    mines and explosives on Israel's borders with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. OnMay 5, violence escalated as Palestinian fighters shelled Kibbutz Manara. All

    the while, Israel continued with its forays into the demilitarized zones and Israel

    launched a diplomatic campaign to set the groundwork for retaliation.

    An Israeli appeal to United Nations Secretary General U Thant led to

    unprecedented UN censure of the Arabs. On May 11, U Thant condemned theArab attacks; but a proposed Security Council debate on the matter was derailed

    by Soviet obstructionism. The United States, meanwhile, refused Israel's request

    for tanks and jets and suggested that its naval fleet in the region would remain

    neutral in case of war. Israeli statements about answering Syrian aggression

    were reported in the international press and goaded additional Syrian backing of

    Fatah operations.

    SOVIET MEDDLING

    In mid-May, Soviet meddling severely escalated the brewing conflict. On May15, Israel Independence Day, plans for a parade involving large numbers of

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    Israeli troops in western Jerusalem drew outrage in Arab countries. Wishing to

    defuse the situation, Eshkol forbade bringing heavy weapons into the capital.

    This decision was used by the Soviets to stoke tensions; on May 15, Anwar al-

    Sadat, then speaker of the National Assembly, visited Moscow, where he was

    warned (falsely) by the Soviets that Israel was planning to invade Syriasometime between the dates of May 16 and May 22. The Soviets cited theabsence of weapons in the Jerusalem parade as proof that the Israelis were

    preparing for war and falsely claimed that Israel was massing brigades along its

    northern border with Syria.

    Syria also quickly passed the disinformation to Egypt's President Nasser, who

    on May 14 declared a state of emergency and made a show of parading histroops through Cairo on their way to Sinai. During this period, Arab leaders and

    the media spoke daily of eliminating Israel.

    CLAIMS OF ISRAELI TROOP BUILDUP DEBUNKED BUT

    EVIDENCE IGNOREDOn May 14, Gen. Muhammad Fawzi, the Egyptian chief of the general staff,

    visited Damascus and toured the Syrian border with Israel, where he saw no

    Israeli troop buildup. Fawzi's findings, which were confirmed by the chief of

    Egypt's military intelligence, the U.S. embassy in Cairo, and the CIA, wereshared with Nasser, who nevertheless decided to proceed in his menacing troop

    buildups.

    In response to the Egyptian troop buildup, Eshkol put the army on a first-levelalert and authorized the placement of several tank companies in the south.

    Reluctant to send a message that Israel was eager for war, he did not call up the

    reservists. Israeli diplomats went into service on all frontsinviting UNObserver Odd Bull to the north to confirm troops were not gathered there,

    seeking to relay to Egypt that Israel was not interested in war, and sending

    international warnings about the gravity of Egypt's actions.

    Between the nights of May 15 and 16, the Egyptian and Palestinian troop

    presence in the Sinai tripled. On May 17, Egyptian planes entered Israeliairspace to carry out an unprecedented reconnaissance of Israel's nuclear reactor

    in Dimona, prompting the Israelis to heighten the alert of their army and air

    force. Syria announced that its forces were deployed in the Golan Heights.

    Israeli Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin called up 18,000 troops and ordered the

    laying of mines along parts of the Egyptian border. General Murtagi, the

    Egyptian Commander of forces in the Sinai, declared an Order of the Day,which was broadcasted on Cairo Radio May 18: "The Egyptian forces have

    taken up positions in accordance with our predetermined plans. The morale of

    our armed forces is very high, for this is the day they have so long been waiting

    for, for this holy war."

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    EGYPT EVICTS UN FORCESIn the evening of May 16, Egypt presented the United Nations EmergencyForce, which had been deployed in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip to

    discourage hostilities between Egypt and Israel, with a demand to withdraw

    from key locations. Without consulting with the General Assembly, as requiredby a commitment made in the UN in 1957, UN Secretary General U Thant

    decided to withdraw all of the UN forces. By May 19, UNEF officersrelinquished their posts to the Egyptians and the Palestine Liberation Army.

    The Americans again rebuffed Israeli diplomatic appeals, refusing to approve

    any preemptive actions, provide assurances regarding Israeli security or transfer

    tanks and jets Israel had requested. Efforts to obtain from France and the United

    Kingdom expressions of support for Israel's security similarly failed. By May20, Israel had called up 80,000 reservists.

    STRAITS OF TIRAN CLOSEDOn May 22, Egypt blocked the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping for the first

    time since the 1956 war, an act of war under international law. (Israel had long

    made clear that blocking the Israeli port of Eilat was cause for war.) Nasser's

    decision to close the strait set off activity across the Arab world. Lebanon,

    Kuwait and Saudi Arabia all activated their militaries. Iraqi troopsreportedly approached the Syrian and Jordanian borders while Jordan moved

    tanks towards the West Bank.

    U.S. REJECTS ISRAELI APPEALSUp north, the Syrians blocked UN observers from reaching a critical road and

    began pouring troops into Golan Heights. At that point, the Israelis received a

    message from President Lyndon Johnson stating that they should not initiate fireor take any action without first consulting with the United States. Eshkol

    therefore argued against entering into war at that time, and on May 23 the

    government agreed to accept an American proposal in which the U.S. would

    weigh the possibility a multinational escort of Israeli ships through Tiran (in the

    wake of the 1956 war, the United States had committed itself to guaranteeingIsrael's access to the Straits of Tiran).

    That night, Chief of Staff Rabin, suffering from anxiety, pressure, exhaustion,

    depression and perhaps nicotine poisoning, secretly withdrew from his duties

    for a two day period. His operations chief, Ezer Weizman, filled in for him and

    expanded upon Rabin's limited war plan with a more aggressive plan called

    Operation Axe.

    However, Eshkol did not approve the operation, as foreign minister Abba Eban

    was in the middle of what proved to be an unsuccessful diplomatic campaign in

    France, Britain and the United States, where he asked for an American

    commitment that any attack on Israel would be equivalent to an attack on the

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    U.S. Although Johnson had condemned the blocking of Tiran as "illegal" and

    "potentially disastrous to the cause of peace," and sent word to Egypt that its

    aggression would meet "gravest international consequences," he nevertheless

    held firm in his opposition to unilateral Israeli action. The French and Soviets

    also warned Israel against starting a war.

    OPERATION DAWNEgyptian Field Marshal Abd al-Hakim Amer, a onetime close confidant of

    Nasser whose growing power eventually came to threaten the president, was

    largely able to wrest control of the country's armed forces from the Supreme

    Headquarters. He developed a war plan, called "Dawn," whose goal

    capturing the whole Negev desertfar exceeded the more limited plan toisolate Eilat and bomb specified targets. Nasser didn't intervene with Amer's

    orders, despite the fact that they wrought chaos among the poorly-equippedtroops pouring into Sinai, and contradicted Egypt's longstanding three-pronged

    defense strategy, dubbed "Conqueror."

    In a tense meeting of Israeli leadership, Eshkol agreed to call up the remaining

    reservists, though he and Rabin again decided against going to war in favor of

    waiting for positive results to Eban's ongoing diplomacy trip. In France, Ebanreceived a stern warning from Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle to refrain from

    attacking Egypt. Britain's response was less hostile and included promises to try

    to bring an end to the blockade.

    THE AMERICAN ROLEStarting on May 24, the U.S., for its part, attempted to sell the Israelis on the

    "Regatta" plan, which involved an international convoy affirming free passagethrough the Straits of Tiran. Within two days, international enthusiasm for the

    plan waned, but the Americans withheld this discouraging information from the

    Israelis.

    Furthermore, the plan to ensure free passage seemed irrelevant by May 25,

    when Eban, then in Washington, received a cable from Jerusalem emphasizingthat Israel faced an existential danger. "An all-out Egyptian-Syrian attack is

    imminent and could occur at any moment," it read. Eban, however, at times

    downplayed the Egyptian threat in discussions with American statesmen, much

    to the consternation of his colleagues in Israel.

    Perhaps soothed by Eban, Washington initially stalled on providing any direct

    guarantees or commitments, and continued to promise progress regarding aninternational convoy. Johnson appears to have hoped that, by stringing the

    Israelis along, he could buy time to either solve the situation via the United

    Nations or possibly convince the Israelis to agree to the placement of UNEF on

    their territory, an unthinkable option to Israel. On May 26, Eban met with

    Johnson, who said the U.S. "will support a plan to use any or all measures to

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    open the straits." At the same time, Johnson continued to warn against Israel

    taking preemptive action.

    Eban returned to Israel and joined a strongly polarized Cabinet debate about

    whether or not to strike preemptively. During the meeting, communications

    from Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk reiterated the Americancommitment to opening the Straits as well as U.S. opposition to an Israeliattack. The Israelis decided to keep their army mobilized but to hold off on war

    so as to give the Americans an opportunity to work their diplomacy.

    The strain on the Israeli leadership was tremendous. A May 28 radio address, in

    which an exhausted Eshkol bumbled through a speech about the choice to rely

    on American diplomacy, left the nation in a state of panic. The army had beenbiding time until Eban's return, developing various contingency plans, but

    keeping everything on hold, resulting in confused troop movements in the

    Negev desert. Concerned about the deteriorating situation, army commanders

    were furious at the government's decision to withhold from war. The public

    responded similarly, expressing impatience for formation of a national unity

    government and preparing itself for war.

    THE SOVIET POSITIONIn Moscow, the Egyptians sought to clarify the Soviet position in case of war,

    and like the Israelis vis-a-vis the United States, received an ambiguous

    response. The Soviet ambassador in Cairo informed Nasser about a cable sent

    from Washington containing a warning of an imminent Egyptian attack and

    urged Nasser not to strike. As a result, Operation Dawn was called off.Although some in the Soviet Union had urged caution, Shams Badran, the

    Egyptian defense minister, returned from Moscow with the message that the

    Soviets would stand by the Egyptians in battle.

    THE DEFENSE PACTOn May 30, King Hussein of Jordan and Nasser signed a mutual defense pact in

    which Egypt gained joint command of the Jordanian army. Iraq joined amilitary alliance with Syria, Egypt and Jordan. In the context of the pact, Jordan

    permitted the reopening of PLO offices in Amman and essentially relinquished

    control of its army to the Egyptians, who transferred two Egyptian battalions to

    Jordanian territory. By this point, Israel was surrounded by some 500,000

    troops, more than 5,000 tanks, and almost 1,000 fighter planes.

    Alarmed by this development and succumbing to public pressure, Eshkolstepped down as defense minister on June 1 and named popular war hero Moshe

    Dayan as a replacement, which buoyed public spirit. Eshkol also formed a

    national unity government, appointing Menachem Begin minister without

    portfolio.

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    In the first several of days of June, the Israeli government began to receive

    signals from the Americans that the U.S. no longer opposed a preemptive strike,

    and Dayan oversaw final preparations of Israel's war plan.

    ARAB PREPARATIONSAs for the Egyptians, their troops continued to pour into Sinai. Despite some

    disorganization, shortages and exhaustion among his forces, Nasser was sure ofvictory. On the Jordanian front, battalions from the Arab Legion, under the

    control of Egyptian General 'Abd al-Mun'im Riyad, were largely spread out

    across West Bank Palestinian villages instead of being concentrated in more

    strategically important locales.

    Confident of victory, the Jordanians resolved to cut off western Jerusalem byattacking Israeli positions in the north and south of the city at the start of the

    fighting. As for Syria, it failed to coordinate with Egypt despite their defensepact. Like the Jordanians, the Syrians adopted ambitious war plans, opting for

    an offensive operation as opposed to a more limited plan to fend off Israeli

    attacks on the Golan Heights. Morocco, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia all

    sent troops to the Sinai. With the Arab nations united like never before, Arab oil

    companies pledged to boycott any country that supported Israel and Nasserthreatened to close the Suez Canal. The Soviets, too, lent a hand of support by

    way of 10 warships which arrived in the eastern Mediterranean.

    ISRAEL DECIDESIn the weeks leading up to the Six Day War, Arab leaders repeatedly threatenedIsrael with annihilation. Together with Egypt's ejection of United Nations

    forces, the closing of the Straits of Tiran, and the massing of troops on Israel'snorthern and southern borders, the fiery rhetoric created a state of existential

    fear in Israel.

    In addition, Israel received word from France, the nation's major arms supplier,

    that De Gaulle had issued a complete ban on weapons sales and transfers to

    Israel. And in a June 4 meeting, the newly formed Cabinet, received a cablefrom President Johnson seeming to contradict the earlier

    American softening on the issue of pre-emption. It warned that "Israel will not

    be alone unless it decides to go it alone." Nevertheless, the Cabinet, in a 12-to-2

    vote, opted for war, scheduled to begin early the next morning, Monday, June 5,

    1967.

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    DETAILED TIMELINE

    Jan - March 1967

    In the first quarter of 1967 there were over 270 border "incidents", mainly

    emanating from Syria, which caused rising concern in Israel.

    April 7th 1967

    Syrian gunners fired from their Golan Heights position on an Israeli tractor

    farming in the demilitarised zone. Artillery fire was exchanged and the fight

    escalated. Israel sent airplanes against the Syrian gun positions and severalSyrian villages. The Syrians sent up MiG jets and an all-out dogfight ensued

    Israel downed six Syrian MiG 21 fighters and chased the remainder all the way

    back to Damascus.

    May 13th 1967

    Anwar Sadat arrives back from Moscow, primed with misinformation he gives

    to Nasser that Israel is massing 10-12 brigades in preparation for an attack on

    Syria, supposedly to take place May 17.

    May 14th 1967Israel learns that Egyptian troops have been put on alert and begun reinforcing

    units in the Sinai .

    May 15th 1967

    Israel responds by ordering some regular armoured units to reinforce the Sinai

    front and drafted a message to ensure Egypt understood that Israel wasresponding to Egyptian actions and not massing troops on its own initiative:

    Israel wants to make it clear to the government of Egypt that it has no

    aggressive intentions whatsoever against any Arab state at all

    May 16th 1967

    Nasser demands withdrawal of 3,400 man UN Emergency Force (UNEF).

    Egypt now has a further 30,000 troops to the 30-35 thousand permanently

    stationed on the peninsula, plus 200 tanks, and it was continuing to pour in more

    troops all the time.

    May 17th 1967A series of emergency meetings was held by the Cabinet in Israel. There was

    great apprehension when head of Israeli military intelligence, Major General

    Aharon Yariv, reported to army headquarters, apparently mistakenly, that the

    Egyptian army was equipped with poison gas (Israel was unprepared for

    chemical warfare).

    All Egypt is now prepared to plunge into total war which will put an end to

    Israel - Cairo Radio

    May 18th 1967

    The Zionist barrack in Palestine is about to collapse and be destroyed. Everyone of the hundred million Arabs has been living for the past nineteen years on

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    one hopeto live to see the day Israel is liquidatedThere is no life, no peace

    nor hope for the gangs of Zionism to remain in the occupied land.

    As of today, there no longer exists an international emergency force to protect

    Israel.The sole method we shall apply against Israel is a total war which will

    result in the extermination of Zionist existence. - Cairo Radios Voice of theArabs broadcastUN Secretary General U Thant sent cable to Cairo advising that UNEF would

    be withdrawn. He added the rider: Irrespective of the reasons for the actions

    you have taken, in all frankness, may I advise you that I have serious misgivings

    about it forI believe that this Force has been an important factor in

    maintaining the relative quiet in the area of its deployment during the past tenyears and that its withdrawal may have grave implications for peace.- Charles

    W Yost "How it Began", Foreign Affairs, Winter 1968

    The UK were deeply upset at the U Thant caving in without bringing the matter

    to the UN General Assembly: It really makes a mockery of the peacekeeping

    work of the United Nations if, as soon as the tension rises, the United Nations

    force it told to leave. Indeed the collapse of UNEF might well have

    repercussions on other United Nations peacekeeping forces, and the credibility

    of the United Nations in this field are thrown into question.

    UNEF was established with the full concurrence of the United Nationsany

    decision to withdraw the force should be taken in the United Nations after full

    consultation with all the countries involvedit should not be taken as the result

    of some unilateral decision. -

    George Brown (British Foreign Secretary), speaking at United NationsAssociation annual dinner in London

    May 19th 1967

    I do not want to cause alarm but it is difficult for me not to warn the Council

    that, as I see it, the position in the Middle East is more disturbingindeed more

    menacing than at any time since the fall of 1956. - UN Secretary General U

    Thant, Security Council meeting. - U.N. S/7906 26th May 1967Now there are an estimated 40 thousand Egyptian troops and 500 tanks in the

    Sinai. Israel ordered an immediate large-scale mobilization of reserves.

    May 20th 1967Our forces are now entirely ready not only to repulse the aggression, but to

    initiate the act of liberation itself, and to explode the Zionist presence in the

    Arab homeland. - Syrias Defence Minister Hafez Assad (later to be Syrias

    President).

    Egypt and Israel faced each other directly tonight as the United Nations

    Emergency Force, which had stood between them for more than ten years,began its official withdrawal.

    May 22nd 1967

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    Egypts President Nasser announced: The Israeli flag shall not go through the

    Gulf of Aqaba. Our sovereignty over the entrance to the Gulf cannot be

    disputed.

    "We want a full scale, popular war of liberation to destroy the Zionist enemy"

    - Syrian president Dr. Nureddin al-Attasi speech to troops"Israel today proposed a mutual reduction in troop concentrations in the MiddleEast, while its Arab neighbours laid plans to strengthen still further their forces

    round her borders" - The Times

    May 23rd 1967

    Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran (Gulf of Aqaba) to Israeli shipping, thereby

    cutting off Israels only supply route with Asia and stopping the flow of oil

    from its main supplier, Iran. By international law, this was an act of war.

    (Reported that day in every newspaper in the world - see report in The Times)

    President Johnson tonight condemned the Arab blockade of Israel shipping in

    the Gulf of Aqaba as "illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace"

    "The purported closing of the Gulf of Aqaba has brought a new and grave

    dimension to the crisis. The United States considers the gulf to be an

    international waterway." Mr Johnson condemned the "hurried withdrawal" of

    the United Nations emergency force from Gaza and Sinai, and the "recent build-

    up of military forces in the area". - Times May 24th 1967

    May 24th 1967

    Israels foreign minister Abba Eban met with UK Prime Minister HaroldWilson at 10 Downing Street. Wilson revealed that the Cabinet had met that

    morning and concluded that Egypts blockade must not be allowed to triumph;

    Britain would join with others in an effort to open the Straits.

    May 26th 1967

    Taking over Sharm el Sheikh meantconfrontation with Israel (and) also meant

    that we were ready to enter a general war with Israel. The battle will be ageneral one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel - Gamal Abdel

    Nasser speech to the General Council of the International Confederation of Arab

    Trade Unions -broadcast in Arabic by Cairo Radios Voice of the Arabs, GamalAbdel Nasser, 19.35 GMT, 26th May 1967 (the speech made front page news in

    The Times May 27th)

    May 27th 1967

    Nasser cancels a planned Egyptian attack on Israel (Operation Fajr - Dawn),

    planned for following day, after it became obvious that the Israelis knew about

    the plan.The NY Times reported that Jordan would admit Saudi and Iraqi forces into its

    country to do battle with Israel

    May 28th 1967

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    The existence of Israel is in itself an aggressionwhat happened in 1948 was

    an aggressionan aggression against the Palestinian people (the crisis had

    developed because) Eshkol threatened to march on Damascus, occupy Syria and

    overthrow the Syrian regime. It was our duty to come to the aid of our Arab

    brother. It was our duty to ask for the withdrawal of UNEF. When UNEF went,we had to go to the Gulf of Aqaba and restore things to what they were whenwe were in Aqaba in 1956 - Gamel Abdel Nasser at a press conference for

    several hundred of the Worlds press.

    We will not accept anycoexistence with Israel.Today the issue is not theestablishment of peace between the Arab states and Israel.The war with Israel

    is in effect since 1948. - Gamel Abdel Nasser press conference

    May 29th 1967Now, eleven years after 1956 we are restoring things to what they were in1956The issue now at hand is not the Gulf of Aqaba, the Straits of Tiran or

    the withdrawal of UNEF, but the rights of the Palestinian people. - Nasser

    speech to General Assembly in Cairo: - Vance, Vick, and Pierre Lauer: Hussein

    of Jordan. London: Peter Owen, 1968

    May 30th 1967

    Jordan signed a mutual defense treaty with Egypt, thereby joining the military

    alliance already in place between Egypt and Syria. Jordanian forces were given

    to the command of an Egyptian General."The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are poised on the borders of

    Israel ... to face the challenge, while standing behind us are the armies of Iraq,

    Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and the whole Arab nation. This act will astound the

    world. Today they will know that the Arabs are arranged for battle, the criticalhour has arrived. We have reached the stage of serious action and not of more

    declarations." - Gamal Abdel Nasser speech

    Israel called upon Jordan numerous times to refrain from hostilities. Hussein,

    however, was caught on the horns of a galling dilemma: allow Jordan to be

    dragged into war and face the brunt of the Israeli response, or remain neutraland risk full-scale insurrection among his own people. Army Commander-in-

    Chief General Sharif Zaid Ben Shaker warned in a press conference that "If

    Jordan does not join the war a civil war will erupt in Jordan".

    May 31st 1967The existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified. This is our

    opportunity to wipe out the ignominy which has been with us since 1948. Our

    goal is clear - to wipe Israel off the map - President Aref of Iraq

    June 1st 1967

    Brethren and sons, this is the day of the battle to avenge our martyred brethrenwho fell in 1948. It is the day to wash away the stigma. We shall, God willing,

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    meet in Tel Aviv and Haifa - Radio broadcast by Iraqi President Abdel

    Rahman Aref - 11.00 GMT June 1st 1967, Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic

    , Foreign Broadcast Information Service

    Those who survive will remain in Palestine. I estimate that none of them willsurvive. - Ahmed Shukairy, chairman of PLO in Jordanian Jerusalem, asked innews interview what will happen to the Israelis if there is a war.

    Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister of Israel, sent message to Russian Premiere

    Kosygin: "... I invited your Ambassador in Israel to visit the frontier to find out

    for himself that there was no truth in this allegation. To my regret, the

    Ambassador did not respond to our invitation. The Chief of Staff of the UNTSOchecked these claims and informed the Secretary-General of the UN and the

    capitals of the region that there were no Israel concentrations on the Syrian

    border."

    June 3rd 1967

    MILITARY BUILD-UP: By this time Egypt had 210,000 troops ready for

    deployment, with 100,000 of them with 930 tanks ready in the Sinai. They had

    30 Tu-16 Russian-made bombers, which were a threat to Israels cities. Overall

    the Egyptian Air Force, by far the largest and the most modern of all the Arab

    air forces, consisting of about 450 combat aircraft, all Soviet-built and relatively

    new.

    Syria had 63,000 troops and Jordan 55,000totalling 328,000 troops ready to

    fight Israel. The Arabs had twice the number of tanks compared to Israel (2,330

    against 1000) and far more combat aircraft too (682 compared to Israels 286);

    They had 1,845 armoured personnel carriers compared to Israels 1,500.However, by fully mobilizing Israel could muster 250,000 men. Israel would

    need to rely on the training and motivation of this largely civilian army to

    counter the numeric superiority of the Arabs in manpower and weaponry.

    Israels newly-appointed Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, wishing to confine

    hostilities if possible to the imminent battles against Egypt, ordered the IsraeliArmy not to open a second front with Jordan in the West Bank in the event of

    war. He instructed the head of the Israeli Army Central Command: You must

    not do anything to entangle Israel with the Jordanians...

    June 4th 1967Secret resolution passed by the Israeli Cabinet:

    After hearing a report on the military and political situation from the Prime

    Minister, the Foreign minister, the Defence Minister, the Chief of Staff and the

    head of military intelligence the Government ascertained that the armies of

    Egypt, Syria and Jordan are deployed for immediate multi-front aggression,threatening the very existence of the State. The Government resolves to take

    military action in order to liberate Israel from the strangle hold of aggression

    which is progressively being tightened around Israel.

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    The Government authorizes the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister to

    confirm to the General Staff of the IDF the time for action.

    Members of the Cabinet will receive as soon as possible the information

    concerning the military operation to be carried out.

    The Government charges the Foreign Minister with the task of exhausting allpossibilities of political action in order to explain Israels stand and to obtain thesupport of the powers.

    King Husain of Jordan today warned Britain and the United States that they

    stood to lose their friends in the Arab world for ever if they fell into the Zionist

    trap of supporting Israel in the present crisis.

    "There are no words I can use to express my disappointment at the attitude thatthe British Government has taken with regard to the Gulf of Aqaba", he told a

    crowded press conference at his palace in Amman. - The Times, June 5th 1967

    p4, Nicholas Herbert, Amman "WARNING TO BRITAIN BY KING HUSAIN:

    Danger of losing Arab friends"

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    RECOMMENDED READING

    http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/19%20Statement%20to%20the%20Security%20Council%20by%20Foreign%20Mi.aspx

    http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE700686136

    http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/1967-

    40yearsofoccupation/2007/06/2008526113146572296.html

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    Sample Position Paper

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    Country:The United States of AmericaCommittee:United Nations Human Rights Council

    Agenda 1:Ensuring ethical working environment in the RMG sector of Bangladesh

    Promoting freedom and democracy and protecting human rights around the world are central

    to U.S. foreign policy. The values captured in theUniversal Declaration of Human

    Rights and in other global and regional commitments are consistent with the values upon

    which the United States was founded centuries ago. The United States supports those who

    long to live in freedom and under democratic governments that protect universally acceptedhuman rights. The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor leads the U.S. efforts to

    promote democracy, protecthuman rights and international religious freedom and advance

    labor rights globally.

    In a country like Bangladesh where the Ready Made Garments sector contributes around 76

    percent to the total export earnings, it is truly disappointing to see Human Rights being

    violated on such a large scale - the severity of which were exemplified in the tragedies of the

    November 2012 Tazreen Fashions factory fire and the April 2013 Rana Plaza building

    collapse. The United States being the largest importer of the RMG sector of Bangladesh and

    as Bangladesh is the 4th largest apparel exporter in USA, the States has always been deeply

    concerned about the issue.

    On June 27, 2013, President Obama announced his decision to suspend Bangladeshs tradebenefits under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in view of insufficient progress

    by the Government of Bangladesh in affording Bangladeshi workers internationally

    recognized worker rights. The suspension of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)

    facilities for Bangladesh by the USA is not any stand by the US government against

    Bangladesh but to press the country to address workers safety.

    24 September 2013 Nearly 3.5 million garment workers in Bangladesh recently beset by

    industrial accidents and a staggering loss of life got essential support to improve working

    conditions, strengthen labor inspection and upgrade building and fire safety at their

    workplaces, thanks to a new program in partnership with the United Nations. The Plan is

    http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2008/108544.htmhttp://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2008/108544.htmhttp://www.state.gov/j/drl/democ/http://www.state.gov/j/drl/hr/http://www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/http://www.state.gov/j/drl/ila/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/j/drl/ila/index.htmhttp://www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/http://www.state.gov/j/drl/hr/http://www.state.gov/j/drl/democ/http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2008/108544.htmhttp://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2008/108544.htm
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    supported by other parallel initiatives focused on the RMG sector in Bangladesh, namely the

    Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh signed by over 80 leading clothing

    brands and retailers and the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety, a binding five-year

    initiative undertaken by North American apparel companies and retailers to improve safety in

    more than 500 factories.

    On 14 May 2013 The United Nations labor agency welcomed an agreement signed byInternational fashion brands and retailers, and trade unions to prevent workplace disasters.

    The signatories to the Accord on Building and Fire Safety commit to the goal of a safe and

    sustainable Bangladeshi Ready Made Garment (RMG) industry in which no worker needs to

    fear fires, building collapses, or other accidents that could be prevented with reasonable

    health and safety measures according to the ILO website. The companies that sign on, such as

    Zara and H&M, have 45 days from the signing to develop and agree on an implementation

    plan to monitor their textile production in Bangladesh. ILO stands ready to provide

    appropriate support to this initiative in response to the requests of the signatory parties, to

    help ensure effective implementation and coordination with national organizations.

    The United States is also pleased to associate itself with the July 8, 2013 European Union

    (EU)-Bangladesh-International Labor Organization (ILO) Sustainability Compact for

    Continuous Improvements in Labor Rights and Factory Safety in the Ready-made Garment

    and Knitwear Industry in Bangladesh. The United States Government encourages the

    Government of Bangladesh to take significant actions to provide a basis for reinstating

    Bangladeshs Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits, by implementing

    commitments under the "National Tripartite Plan of Action on Fire Safety and Structural

    Integrity."

    The US and Bangladesh have a common interest in ensuring growth of the exports from

    Bangladesh, but not at the expense of safe and healthy working conditions or fundamental

    labor rights.

    References:

    www.reuters.com

    www.bbc.com

    www.wikipedia.org

    www.cnn.com

    www.cia.gov

    www.ilo.org

    http://www.reuters.com/http://www.reuters.com/http://www.bbc.com/http://www.bbc.com/http://www.wikipedia.org/http://www.wikipedia.org/http://www.cnn.com/http://www.cnn.com/http://www.cia.gov/http://www.cia.gov/http://www.ilo.org/http://www.ilo.org/http://www.ilo.org/http://www.cia.gov/http://www.cnn.com/http://www.wikipedia.org/http://www.bbc.com/http://www.reuters.com/
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    Sample Working Paper

    The purpose of the Working Paper is to clearly communicate the interests of one or more countries.Please note that there is no set format for working papers; the following is just one example of apossible working paper. To facilitate the process, working papers should include the name and topic

    of the committee and should list the countries which wrote the paper. Pending the approval of theDirector, working papers may be copied and distributed to the committee.

    Committee: UN Conference on Trade and Development

    Topic A: Generalized System of Preferences

    Submitted by Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador believe that a GSP should be setup so that lesser-Developed Countries (LDCs) receive preferential treatment from

    Developed Countries (DCs). To that end we propose:

    1. Each DC reduce their tariffs to the lowest level possible. This level will be determined by the belowcreated subcommittee,

    2. Bilateral trade agreements should be pursued for further reductions in tariffs.

    3. Trade preferences should be granted in the following areas:

    AgricultureManufacturesSemi-manufacturesRaw materials

    4. Decisions on product coverage by preference giving nations be made in consultation with theaffected LDC. Annual reevaluation of coverage shall take place with the LDC with disputed going tothe below-created subcommittee.

    5. A subcommittee of UNCTAD should be created with equal membership of developed anddeveloping countries. This subcommittee would have the following powers:

    To mediate disputes between preference givers and receivers

    Make recommendations which all countries should follow

    Serve as a forum for airing grievances relating to the GSP

    Report regularly to the Secretary-General

    Membership should be as follows: Five permanent nations from the DCs

    Five permanent nations from the LDCs and LLDCs

    Ten members elected annually by UNCTAD

    Voting rights will have to be worked out, but the UN format for subcommittees seems best. Of course,we are amenable to change.

    Resolution Format Guide Heading

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    The title should be in capital letters, above the main body of the resolution. The title consists

    of a number (signifying the first or second topic area being discussed), followed by another

    number (identifying the individual resolution). For example, the first draft resolution on the

    first topic area discussed would be titled Draft Resolution 1.1 accordingly. The committee

    Director will assign the number once the resolution has been approved.

    On the left margin and two lines below the title should be:

    (1) The committee name

    (2) The topic addressed by the resolution, and

    (3) The signatories of the resolution.

    NOTE: There are no sponsors of a resolution.

    Body

    The resolution is written in the format of a long sentence. Just as grammatical rules make a

    language more uniform in its usage, so is the resolution in its format. The resolution begins

    with The General Assembly, for all GA committees and with The Economic and SocialCouncil,for all ECOSOC committees. The Regional Bodies and the Security Council use

    their own names as the introductory line. The rest of the resolution consists of phrases and

    clauses with the first word of each phrase/clause underlined. The next section, consisting of

    Perambulatory Phrases, describes the problem being addressed, recalls past actions taken,

    explains the purpose of the resolution, and offers support for the operative clauses that

    follow. Each clause in the preamble begins with an underlined word and ends with a comma.

    Operative Clauses are numbered and state the action to be taken by the body. These clauses

    all begin with present tense active verbs, which are generally stronger words than those used

    in the Preamble. Each operative clause is followed by a semi-colon except the last, which

    ends with a period. Any sub-operative clauses (or sub-sub-clauses, etc,) also should end with

    a semi-colon. There should be no periods in the body of the resolution.

    Content

    Of course, the most important characteristic of the final resolution is the content, which will

    be carefully scrutinized by the Director before approval. A well-written resolution

    demonstrates:

    Familiarity with the problem. Relevant background information and previous United

    Nations actions are included.

    Recognition of the issues. Arguments on the topic are specified early. At a minimum, theresolution should address in some form all the issues listed in the Questions a Resolution

    Must Answer section of the Study guide.

    A clear and concise style. Every clause and phrase should have a purpose.

    Good form. Each phrase and clause should follow the exact format described above.

    Perambulatory PhrasesAffirmingAlarmed by

    ApprovingAware of

    Guided byHaving adoptedHaving consideredHaving considered furtherHaving devoted attentionHaving examined

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    BelievingBearing in mindCognizant ofConfident

    ContemplatingConvinced

    DeclaringDeeply concernedDeeply conscious

    Deeply convincedDeeply disturbed

    Deeply regrettingDesiringEmphasizingExpectingExpressing its appreciation

    Expressing its satisfaction

    FulfillingFully awareFully alarmedFully believingFurther deploringFurther recalling

    Having heardHaving receivedHaving studiedKeeping in mind

    Noting furtherNoting with regret

    Noting with satisfactionNoting with deep concernNoting further

    Noting with approvalObserving

    RealizingReaffirmingRecallingRecognizingReferring

    Seeking

    Taking into accountTaking noteViewing with appreciationWelcoming

    Operative Clauses

    AcceptsAffirmsApproves

    Authorizes

    Calls forCalls uponConfirmsConsiders

    Declares accordinglyDeplores

    Draws attentionDesignatesEmphasizesEncouragesEndorses

    Expresses its appreciation

    Expresses its hopeFurther invitesFurther proclaims

    Further remindsFurther recommendsFurther requestsFurther resolvesHas resolved

    Notes

    ProclaimsReaffirmsRecommendsReminds

    RegretsRequests

    ResolvesSolemnly affirmsStrongly condemnsSupportsTakes note of

    Trusts

    Urges

    Sample Resolution

    DRAFT RESOLUTION 1.1

    Committee: Commission on Information Regulation

    Topic: International News flow Imbalance

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    The Economic and Social Council,

    Recalling its Resolution A/36/89 of 16 December 1981, The Declaration on Fundamental PrinciplesConcerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and InternationalUnderstanding,

    Further recalling Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Everyone has the rightto...receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers,

    Recognizing that the problem of news flow imbalance is that two-way information among countriesof a region is either nonexistent or insufficient and information exchanged between regions of theworld is inadequate,

    Realizing the need for all sovereign nations to maintain their integrity and still play an active role inthe international system,

    1. Recommends that a three-level information interchange system be established on the national,regional, and international levels to ameliorate the current problems of news flow imbalance, to

    operate as follows:

    Each regions member nations will report their national information and receive the

    information of other nations in their region from the regional level of this interchange system;

    Nations will decide the character of the news flow media best suited to the need of theirsovereign territory, be this printed, audio, or audio-visual;

    Regional News Gathering Agencies will serve to gather information from the nations in theirregion, and these boards will have no editorial discretion and will serve to forward allinformation to the International Board;

    Each regional agency will be composed of representatives from every member nation of thenation of the region;

    The primary function of the International Board will be to translate information accumulatedfrom the regional news gathering agencies;

    The secondary purpose will be to transmit all information gathered back to the member

    nations via the regional news gathering agencies;

    In order to expedite the transfer of information from the international to regional level the

    international board will utilize a UN frequency on a European Economic Communitysatellite;

    2. Urges the establishment of the University of International Communications, which will be based inGeneva, Switzerland, with the following aims:

    The University and branches will be established with the express purpose of bringing together

    world views and facilitating the transfer of technology; All member nations of the United Nations will be equally represented at the University;

    Incentives will be offered to students of journalism and communications at the University to

    return to their countries to teach upon completion of instruction;

    The instructors of the regional education centers will be comprised of a multi-partisancoalition of educators from throughout the world;

    3. Calls for the continued use of funds from the International Program for the Development ofCommunications, Special Account, The United National Educational, Scientific and CulturalOrganization (UNESCO), the UN Development Programme, and other sources of funding includingnational governments and private donors;4. Recommends that the distribution of funds be decided by the International Programme for the

    development of Communication (IPDC).

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