www.lirneasia.net role of benchmarks in the regulation of partially competitive markets rohan...
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Role of benchmarks in the regulation of partially competitive markets
Rohan SamarajivaBenchmarking and regulation Workshop, Malé6 December 2007
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Agenda
Why regulate? Special case of micro states
Allocating limited regulatory resources Possible solutions to problems of tariff,
access and termination rate setting Competition for the market Banded forbearance
Foundation is benchmarking
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What are the conditions for optimally functioning markets? No barriers to entry and exit
Multiple buyers & sellers No market power
Homogenous products Perfect information Rational participants (homo
economicus)
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Conditions for workable markets
Markets that do not satisfy information and rationality conditions
Are telecom markets workable? But telecom markets do not satisfy even the
remaining conditions Barriers to entry and exit
Scarce resources
Increasing returns; essential facilities Potential to extend market power from one
market to another Peculiarities of call termination: “market of one”
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Special case of micro states (< 1 m population)
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
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1 operator
2 operators
3 op
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4 op
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5 op
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Conundrum of regulation in micro states Unlikely to achieve even the conditions of
workable competition Though evidence does not support claim that
micro states have to be monopoly duopoly markets
Therefore, less space to apply asymmetric regulation/forbearance
Applying conventional monopoly regulation requires lots of resources for regulatory agency Simple constraints of a micro state preclude a
large regulatory agency
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Allocating limited regulatory resources
To achieve good performance, every regulator must prioritize tasks Micro-state regulators must prioritize even
more and be highly disciplined in allocating limited regulatory resources to the most important tasks
What are the priorities for the Maldives?
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Ranking regulatory tasks . . .
Market entry/licensing
Spectrum management, including refarming
Access and interconnection
Tariff regulation
Quality of service regulation
Regulation of anti-competitive practices
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Ranking regulatory tasks . . .
Universal service
Mobile number portability
Rights of way
Consumer protection
Internet governance
Type approval of equipment
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Two that will be highly ranked in any list
Access and interconnection Fundamental to competition Enables sharing of essential facilities,
which is even more important in micro states E.g., inter-island links and international
cables
End-user tariffs Integrally related to QOS
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Key problems in tariff, access and termination rate setting
How to set access and termination prices?
How to determine if a tariff is reasonable?
Discussion of tariff determination in monopoly conditions Most elements overlap with determination
of access and termination prices
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Tariff regulation
In a fully competitive market, prices will be set by interaction of supply and demand India has highest levels of competition in
the region Forborne tariff regulation, except in limited
cases Highest TRE scores for tariff regulation Widely perceived as having the lowest prices
(actually not so)
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Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka & India mobile tariff baskets compared (USD), December 2007
Cheapest prepaid Cheapest postpaid
2.914.22 3.92 4.44 4.04 3.72
6.82
8.86
7.01 7.28
9.4210.91
9.89
7.00
16.46 16.5214.84
13.07
19.47
23.12
21.28
13.42
34.01
30.22
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
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BD PK LK IN BD PK LK IN BD PK LK IN
Low User Medium User High User
US
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“Per minute” USD Bangladesh Pakistan India Sri Lanka
Postpaid Prepaid Postpaid Prepaid Postpaid Prepaid Postpaid Prepaid
Xplore1 SmileFreedo
m Plan 1Jazz
Budget
Standard 99 Plus
Regular Lite 103
KIT Standar
d
Connection Charges 11.70 2.19 8.16 8.16 6.33 2.50 9.05 7.24
Subscription (rental) fee 1.46 0 0 0 2.50 0 0.90 0
- Incoming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.036 0.054
- Outgoing (Fixed local) 0.022 0.029 0.041 0.041 0.050 0.061 0.054 0.054
- Outgoing (Fixed national) 0.022 0.029 0.041 0.041 0.050 0.070 0.054 0.054
- Outgoing (On net) 0.022 0.029 0.033 0.029 0.030 0.030 0.027 0.036
- Outgoing (Off net) 0.022 0.029 0.053 0.041 0.030 0.051 0.054 0.054
On net SMS 0.022 0.022 0.016 0.016 0.030 0.030 0.009 0.009
Off net SMS 0.029 0.029 0.016 0.024 0.030 0.030 0.018 0.018
- MMS 0 0 0.098 0.098 0.127 0.127 0.018 0.018
- Voicemail 0 0 0.065 0 0.076 0.076 0.027 0.027
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Cheapest prepaid Cheapest postpaid
14.7321.39
12.65 14.34 14.99 13.80
27.4735.64
66.26 66.51
30.4135.22
36.67
25.98
66.26 66.51
75.21
66.2362.84
74.6478.93
49.77
136.87
121.65
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
120.00
140.00
160.00
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BD PK LK IN BD PK LK IN BD PK LK IN
Low User Medium User High User
US
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Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka & India mobile tariff baskets compared (USD PPP), December 2007
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"Per minute“ PPP Bangladesh Pakistan India Sri Lanka
Postpaid
Prepaid Postpaid Prepaid Postpaid
Prepaid
Postpaid Prepaid
Xplore1 SmileFreedom Plan
1Jazz
BudgetStandard 99
PlusRegul
ar Lite 103KIT
Standard
Connection Charges 59.29 11.12 26.33 26.33 25.46 10.08 33.57 26.85
Subscription (rental) fee 7.41 0 0 0 10.08 0 3.36 0
- Incoming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.134 0.201
- Outgoing (Fixed local) 0.111 0.148 0.133 0.132 0.203 0.244 0.201 0.201
- Outgoing (Fixed national) 0.111 0.148 0.133 0.132 0.203 0.280 0.201 0.201
- Outgoing (On net) 0.111 0.148 0.105 0.095 0.122 0.122 0.101 0.134
- Outgoing (Off net) 0.111 0.148 0.171 0.132 0.122 0.204 0.201 0.201
On net SMS 0.111 0.111 0.053 0.053 0.122 0.122 0.034 0.034
Off net SMS 0.148 0.148 0.053 0.079 0.122 0.122 0.067 0.067
- MMS 0.316 0.316 0.509 0.509 0.067 0.067
- Voicemail 0.211 0.305 0.305 0.101 0.101
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If not through competition, how?
“Find out the cost; add a reasonable return; determine revenue requirement; set prices” or “Rate of return rate base regulation”
First two steps are the most troublesome Uniform reporting system of accounts Used and useful test Cost of capital
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Competition for the market
Auction the license, with a requirement that the prices are part of the bid Used in Morocco for 2nd GSM license
Price cap or similar formula for periodic adjustments Ceilings and floors (to prevent predation and price
squeeze) Difficult to implement in dynamic environment
Periodic rebidding Creates conditions for rent seeking and depresses
“patient” investment
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Banded forbearance
Concept being developed by LIRNEasia Identify peer group
E.g., other micro states But natural is adjacent countries
Define benchmark and period (once a year; once every two years . . . ) Need not be the lowest
EU uses third from the bottom Can be lowest plus x%
Define band: floor and ceiling
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Banded forbearance
Anything goes within the band Tariffs must be filed Evaluated only for
Clarity to consumer Whether within the band Default approval within x days
When tariff dips below the floor, investigate for anti-competitive impact only
If tariff goes above ceiling, no alternative but to start a cost inquiry Need to identify interim solution, while inquiry is
underway
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Merits of banded forbearance
Asymmetric regulation, which also saves regulatory resources, deregulates non-dominant operators but requires dominant operator to file tariffs Cause of great unhappiness on part of dominant
operator Regulator still has difficulty properly regulating
dominant operator’s tariffs In oligopoly conditions, non-dominant operators
may just shadow the incumbent’s prices Banded forbearance applies to all operators Deregulates incumbent, while providing
safeguards against predation