young, james o. (1991) coherence, anti-realism and the vienna circle

7/29/2019 Young, James O. (1991) Coherence, Anti-Realism and the Vienna Circle

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JAMES O. YOUNG

C O H E R E N C E , A N T I - R E A L I S M A N D T H E

V I E N N A C I R C L E

ABSTRACT: Some members of the Vienna Circle argued for a coherence theory of

truth. Their coherentism is immune to standard objections. Most versions of coherentism

are unable to show why a sentence cannot be true even though it fails to cohere with a

system of beliefs. That is, it seems that truth may transcend what we can be warranted

in believing. If so, tru th cannot consist in coherence with a system of beliefs. The Vienna

Circle's coherentists held, first, that sentences are warranted by coherence with a system

of beliefs. Next they drew upon their verification theory of meaning, a consequence of

which is that truth cannot transcend what can be warranted. The coherence theory of

knowledge and verificationism together entail that truth cannot transcend what can be

warranted by coherence with a system of beliefs. The Vienna Circle's argument for

coherentism is strong and anticipates contemporary anti-realism.

.

The history of the Vienna Circle contains, as in a microcosm, the

history of much of analytic philosophy. An examination of the writings

of the Circle may, therefore, be expected to illuminate philosophical

problems of continuing interest. Recently, the disagreements between

Schlick on the one side, and Neurath and Carnap on the other, have

attracted some attention, i Their disputes have been seen as anticipating

subsequent debates between epistemological foundationalists and advo-

cates of a coherence theory of knowledge. More than epistemological

issues were, however, at stake in the internecine struggles of the logical

positivists. Neurath, Carnap, and their allies also argued for a coherencetheory of truth. Their adherence to such a theory of truth has been

ignored, or dismissed as the result of a confusion between truth and

warrant or verification. In fact, however, they had good reasons for

subscribing to a coherence theory of truth. Their defence of coherentism

anticipates the arguments of contemporary anti-realists. Indeed, several

positivists adopted a coherence theory of truth which amounts to a

global anti-realism. Reflection on the debates of the Vienna Circle

lends credence to this radical theory of truth.

The coherence theory of truth is standardly characterised as the

Synthese 86: 467-482, 1991.

© 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.



468 J A M E S O . Y O U N G

t h e o r y a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h a s e n t e n c e is t r u e i f a n d o n l y i f i t c o h e r e sw i t h a s y s t e m o f s e n t e n c e s . T h i s is n o t , h o w e v e r , a t e r r i b l y s a t i s fa c t o r y

a c c o u n t o f th e t h e o r y . T h e k e y c o n c e p t , t h a t o f c o h e r e n c e , is le f t v a g u e

a n d u n d e f i n e d . M o r e o v e r , t h e s y s t e m w i th w h i c h tr u e s e n t e n c e s c o h e r e

i s n o t s p e c i f i e d . C o h e r e n t i s m i s b e t t e r c h a r a c t e r i s e d a s t h e t h e o r y a c -

c o r d i n g t o w h i c h t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f s e n t e n c e s a r e i n t e r n a l t o t h e

s y s t e m ( c a l l i t t h e ' s p e c i f i e d s y s t e m ' ) o f s e n t e n c e s s p e a k e r s c a n b e

w a r r a n t e d i n a s se r t in g . ( F o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h is e s sa y , ' c o h e r e n t i s m '

r e fe r s t o a c o h e r e n c e t h e o r y o f t r u t h a n d n o t t o a c o h e r e n c e t h e o r y o f

k n o w l e d g e . ) A c c o r d i n g t o c o h e r e n t i s m , t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f a se n -

t e n c e a r e o t h e r s e n t e n c e s s p e a k e r s c a n h o l d t o b e t r u e . S o a s e n t e n c e

i s t r u e i f a n d o n l y i f i ts t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a r e i n c l u d e d i n a s p e c i fi e d

s y s t em . T h e s e n t e n c e m a y t h e n b e s a id t o c o h e r e w i t h th i s s y s t e m . T h e

c o h e r e n c e t h e o r y i s t o b e c o n t r a s t e d w i t h c o r r e s p o n d e n c e t h e o r i e s o f

t r u t h . A c c o r d i n g t o a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e t h e o r y , t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f

s e n t e n c e s a r e e x t e r n a l t o a n y s y s t e m o f s e n t e n c e s , o r " o b j e c t i v e " . I f

t h e o b j e c t i v e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f a s e n t e n c e a r e s a t i s fi e d , it m a y b e s a id

t o " c o r r e s p o n d t o r e a l i t y " .

T h e a c c o u n t o f c o h e r e n t i s m j u s t g iv e n l ea v e s a n i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n

u n a d d r e s s e d . C o h e r e n t i s t s n e e d t o s p e c if y t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f a n yg i v e n s e n t e n c e . T h e y m a y b e t e m p t e d , a t t h is p o i n t , t o fa l l b a c k o n a

c o h e r e n c e t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e . I t i s t e m p t i n g t o s a y t h a t t h e t r u t h

c o n d i t i o n s o f a s e n t e n c e a r e t h e s e n t e n c e s w h i c h , i f h e l d t o b e t r u e ,

w a r r a n t i t s a s s er t i o n . A n d t h is is j u s t w h a t t h e V i e n n a C i r c le c o h e r -

e n t i s t s d i d s a y . H o w e v e r , w h e n c o h e r e n t i s t s s u c c u m b t o t h i s n a t u r a l

t e m p t a t i o n , t h e y m u s t c o n t e n d w i t h t h e c l a s s i c o b j e c t i o n t o c o h e r e n c e

t h e o r i e s o f t r u t h . T h i s c la s si c o b j e c t i o n p r e s e n t s w h a t m a y b e c a l l ed t h e

' t ra n s c e n d e n c e p r o b l e m ' . T h e p r o b l e m is t h a t e v e n i f c o h e r e n c e w i th a

s y s t e m i s a g o o d , o r e v e n t h e o n l y , t e s t o f t r u t h , i t m a y n o t b e a n

i n f a l l ib l e t e s t . T h e r e i s, a f t e r a l l, a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n w h a t i s t r u e a n d

w h a t i s w a r r a n t e d . S i n c e t h e r e i s s u c h a d i s t in c t i o n , p r o p o n e n t s o f th e

t r a n s c e n d e n c e p r o b l e m r e a s o n , a s e n t e n c e c o u l d b e w a r r a n t e d b u t n o t

t r u e , o r t r u e b u t n o t w a r r a n t e d o r e v e n n o t w a r r a n t a b l e . I n o t h e r

w o r d s , t r u t h c a n t ra n s c e n d w h a t c a n b e w a r r a n t e d . T h e u p s h o t o f t h e

t r a n s c e n d e n c e p r o b l e m is th a t t r u t h c a n n o t b e i d e n t i fi e d w i t h w a r r a n t

b y c o h e r e n c e w i t h t h e s p e c i f i e d s y s t e m .

A n a p p e a l t o a c o h e r e n c e t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e s e em s m e r e l y to

c o m p o u n d t h e c o h e r e n t i s t s ' d i f f i c u l t i e s . T h e c o h e r e n t i s t s i n t h e V i e n n a



C O H E R E N C E , A N T I - R E A L I S M A N D T H E V I E N N A C I R C L E 469

Circle had, however, arguments to meet the challenge they faced. Theirarguments had two essential stages. First, they maintained that the

coherence theory of knowledge provides the correct account of warrant.

Next, they argued that their verification theory of meaning showed that

truth cannot transcend what can be warranted. From these premisses

they concluded that the truth conditions of sentences consist in the

conditions which must obtain if they are to be warranted by coherence

with the specified system. Their case for this conclusion remains strong.

Their arguments for coherentism, if sound, also entail an anti-realist

account of truth. Realism is the thesis that the truth values of sentences

- either true or false - are dete rmined by objective truth conditions.

According to realists, truth conditions may determine the truth values

of sentences even when these cannot be known to speakers. If realism

is correct, therefore, truth may transcend what can be warranted. Anti-

realism, on the other hand, holds that the truth conditions of the

sentences of a language are recognisable by the speakers of the lan-

guage. Truth, then, cannot transcend what speakers can be warranted

in asserting. To maintain, as the Vienna Circle coherentists did, that a

true sentence is one warranted by coherence with speakers' beliefs is,

in effect, to hold the anti-realist view that truth cannot be warrant-transcendent. But not only were some members of the Vienna Circle

anti-realists. Their anti-realism was of a more radical form than any

Michael Dummet t has considered adopting. 2 Dummett has primarily

been concerned with anti-realist treatments of restricted classes of sen-

tences -sentences about remote regions of space and time, for example,

or sentences about other minds. The anti-realists of the Vienna Circle,

in contrast, were global anti-realists, or anti-realists with regard to all

classes of sentences. 3

It is important to note that coherentism, even if it has anti-realist

consequences, does not entail that truth is ineffable. Coherentism does

not state that truth cannot be expressed. It is simply a view about the

truth that is to be expressed. Jaakko Hintikka has shown, however,

that members of the Vienna Circle, particularly Carnap, adopted the

Wittgensteinian doctrine of the inexpressibility of truth. 4 It is impor tant

to note the independence of coherentism and the inexpressibility doc-

trine since, as we shall see, when the logical positivists began to have

doubts about the latter doctrine they quite unnecessarily discarded the

coherentist baby with the ineffability bathwater.




.

The first step in the argument for a coherence theory of truth is a

defence of a coherence theory of knowledge. This step involved break-

ing with firmly-held epistemological doctrines. As the names 'logical

positivism' and 'logical empiricism' suggest, the Vienna Circle was, at

first, very far from accepting a coherence theory of knowledge. On the

contrary, all members of the Circle tended to pursue the traditional

empiricist project of finding for knowledge a secure foundation in ex-

perience. They believed this project involved discovering sentences that

faithfully report what is observed and reducing all other (meaningful)sentences to this foundational class. Some logical positivists began to

lose their faith in orthodox empiricism when they recognised that no

hypothesis is entailed by any number of reports of experience. That is,

their reductionist programme ran afoul of inductive uncertainty as had

every other. The realisation that this was so, however, left the Vienna

Circle very far from accepting a coherence theory of knowledge.

The next step in the direction of a coherence theory of knowledge

came when the positivists recognised that no sentences are beyond

doubt or absolutely immune to revision. Reductionism had been one

element of the original logical positivist position; belief in the existenceof an indubitable class of foundational sentences was another. Begin-

ning with Neurath, however, several members of the Circle came to

believe that even protocol sentences - the direct record of an observer's

experience - can be abandoned as false. Under certain conditions, a

protocol sentence may conflict with a system of beliefs. According to

Schlick, von Juhos, Carnap (prior to his defection to the coherentist

camp), and other strict empiricists within the Circle, under such con-

ditions a speaker's only option is to reject or modify non-protocol

sentences to which assent has been given. Neurath held, however, that

speakers may withdraw assent from protocol sentences. His reasonwas not merely that speakers, when recording the protocol of their

experience, may make mistakes. Even Schlick eventually conceded this.

Neurath pointed out that two protocol sentences may conflict. In such

a case, speakers have no choice but to withdraw assent from one.

Moreover, a protocol sentence which conflicts with well-supported and

firmly-held beliefs is, in practice, rejected. It is far more likely that a

single protocol sentence is mistaken than tha t an entire body of beliefs

is mistaken. In general, any sentence may be revised or rejected in

light of other sentences held to be true. 5



C O H E R E N C E ~ A N T I - R E A L I S M A N D T H E V I E N N A C I R C L E 471

T h e l o g i c a l p o s i ti v i st s w e r e l e f t w i t h t w o c h o i c e s w h e n t h e y r e c o g n i s e dt h a t p r o t o c o l s e n t e n c e s m a y b e r e j e ct e d a s f al s e. T h e y c o u l d l o o k f o r

s e n t e n c e s e v e n m o r e b a si c. O r t h e y c o u l d a b a n d o n t h e s e a rc h f o r a s et

o f f o u n d a t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s . S c h l i ck o p t e d f o r t h e f ir s t c o u r s e a n d b e -

l i ev e d t h a t h e h a d f o u n d a s e c u r e f o u n d a t i o n i n w h a t h e c a l le d "Konstat-

ierungen" o r " a f f i r m a t i o n s " .6 T h e p r o b l e m , f r o m S c h l i ck ' s p e r s p e c t i v e ,

w i t h p r o t o c o l s e n t e n c e s w a s t h a t , o n c e t h e y a r e f o r m u l a t e d ( w r i t t e n

d o w n , u t t e r e d o r m e r e l y c o n c e i v e d ) , t h e y a re r e m o v e d f r o m t h e e x p e r i-

e n c e s t h a t c o n f i r m t h e m . A s a r e s u l t , t h e y a r e o n a l l f o u r s w i t h o t h e r

s e n t e n c e s a n d c a n b e r e j e c t e d o n t h e b a s is o f a c o n fl ic t w i t h s p e a k e r s '

b e l ie f s . I n s e e k i n g a c la s s o f s e n t e n c e s i m m u n e t o r e v i s i o n , S c h l i ck

p r o p o s e d t o r e d u c e t o n o t h i n g t h e g a p b e t w e e n s e n t e n c e s a n d e x p e r i -

e n c e . A n a f f i r m a t i o n i s f o r m e d a s s o o n a s a n e x p e r i e n c e o c c u r s . I t h a s

n o d u r a t i o n s o i t is n e v e r r e m o v e d f r o m i t s c o n f i r m i n g e x p e r i e n c e . T h e

o c c u r r e n c e o f a n a f f ir m a t i o n s u p p o r t s s o m e p r o t o c o l s e n t e n c e . S c h l ic k

d i d n o t e x p l a i n h o w a n a f f i r m a t i o n , w h i c h i s w i t h o u t d u r a t i o n a n d

w h i c h , h e s a y s , h a s n o c o n s e q u e n c e s , c a n s e r v e t o s u p p o r t p r o t o c o l

s e n t e n c e s . M o r e o v e r , s i n c e i t t a k e s t i m e t o f o r m u l a t e a s e n t e n c e , t h e

v e r y i d e a o f a j u d g e m e n t w h i c h i s w i t h o u t d u r a t i o n i s s u s p i c i o u s a n d

t h e a t t e m p t t o e l i m i n a t e t h e g a p b e t w e e n a s e n t e n c e a n d i t s c o n f i r m i n ge x p e r i e n c e i s f u t i l e . B u t t h e p r o b l e m w i t h S c h l i c k ' s p o s i t i o n , f r o m t h e

p e r s p e c t i v e o f h is c o h e r e n t i s t c o l l e a g u e s , w a s e v e n m o r e s e r i o u s t h a n

t h e s e p o in t s i n d ic a t e. O n c e a n y s e n t e n c e h a s b e e n f o r m u l a t e d , w h e t h e r

o r n o t i t s h o u l d b e a c c o r d e d a s s e n t d e p e n d s o n w h a t e l s e i t s u t t e r e r s

b e l i e v e .

S e v e r al m e m b e r s o f th e C i r c le a d o p t e d t h e s e c o n d c o u r s e o f a c t io n ,

t h e o n e r e j e c t e d b y S c h li c k. T h a t i s , t h e y d e s p a i r e d o f th e s e a r c h f o r a

c la s s o f s e n t e n c e s c o n f i r m e d b y e x p e r i e n c e a n d n o t s u b j e c t t o r e v i s io n .

A b a n d o n i n g t h i s q u e s t i s , h o w e v e r , t h e f in a l s t e p i n t h e V i e n n a C i r c le ' s

e v o l u t i o n t o w a r d s a d o p t i n g a c o h e r e n c e t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e . S e n -t e n c e s , e v e n r e p o r t s o f e x p e r i e n c e , a r e w a r r a n t e d n o t b y s o m e e x p e r i -

e n c e b u t b y s p e a k e r s ' b e l i e f s . T h e c o h e r e n t i s t s i n t h e V i e n n a C i r c le

e x p r e s s e d t h is v ie w b y s a y i n g t h a t i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o c o m p a r e s e n t e n c e s

w i t h e x p e r ie n c e o r r e a l it y . S e n t e n c e s , t h e y h e l d , c a n o n l y b e c o m p a r e d

w i t h o t h e r s e n t e n ce s . 7 S c h li ck d e n o u n c e d t h is c o h e r e n c e t h e o r y o f

k n o w l e d g e i n a w e l l - k n o w n e x c h a n g e w i t h H e m p e l , w h o a r g u e d o n

b e h a l f o f t h e c o h e r e n t i s t s . N o t h i n g c o u l d b e e a s i e r , S c h l ic k c la i m e d ,

t h a n c o m p a r i n g s e n t e n c e s w i t h r e a l i t y . I n h i s g u i d e b o o k S c h l i c k f o u n d

t h e s e n t e n c e ' T h i s c a t h e d r a l h a s t w o s p i re s '. 8 H e l o o k e d a t th e c a t h e d r a l



47 2 J A ME S O . Y O U N G

a n d t h e e n s u i n g e x p e r i e n c e o f sp i r es c o n v i n c e d h i m t h a t t h e s e n t e n c ew a s tr u e . S u r e l y , S c h l i c k b e l i e v e d , t h i s w a s a c o m p a r i s o n o f a s e n t e n c e

a n d a n e x p e r i e n c e . H e m p e l r e p l i e d t h a t S c h l i c k h a d n o t c o m p a r e d a

s e n t e n c e w i t h e x p e r i e n c e b u t , r a t h e r , w i t h th e r e s u l t o f a n e x p e r i e n c e .

T h a t i s, S ch l ic k h a d c o m p a r e d t h e s e n t e n c e w i t h t h e b e l ie f t h a t h e w a s

s e e i n g t h e c a t h e d r a l a n d i ts t w o s p i r e s . ~ I t w a s t h is b e l i e f , H e m p e l

b e l i e v e d , t h a t w a r r a n t e d t h e s e n t e n c e a t i s s u e .

I n t h u s c r it i ci s in g S c h l ic k , H e m p e l c a p t u r e d t h e e s s e n c e o f t h e c a s e

f o r a c o h e r e n c e t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e . S c h l ic k c o u l d h a v e h a d t h e e x p e r i -

e n c e o f t h e c a t h e d r a l w i t h o u t t h e s e n t e n c e a b o u t it b e i n g w a r r a n t e d . I f

t h e s e n t e n c e w a s to b e w a r r a n t e d , h e h a d t o b e l i e v e th a t h e w a s h a v i n g

a n e x p e r i e n c e o f a c e r t a in s o r t , t h a t it w a s a n e x p e r i e n c e o f th e c a t h e d r a l

a t i s su e , t h a t s p i re s h a v e a g i v e n a p p e a r a n c e , t h a t c o n d i t i o n s o f o b s e r -

v a t i o n w e r e s a t i s f a c t o r y , a n d s o o n . I n g e n e r a l , e v e n i n t h e c a s e o f

s e n t e n c e s a b o u t e x p e r i e n c e - p r o t o c o l s e n t e n c e s , i f y o u w ill - t h e h a v i n g

o f a n e x p e r i e n c e i s n o t s u f f i c ie n t to w a r r a n t a s e n t e n c e . I t is n e c e s s a r y

t h a t a n o b s e r v e r h a v e c e r t a in b e l ie f s . O f c o u r s e , i n th e c a s e s o f s e n -

t e n c e s n o t a b o u t i m m e d i a t e e x p e r i e n c e , i t is e v e n m o r e p l a in t h a t

b e l i ef s p r o v i d e e v i d e n c e a n d n o t e x p e r i e n c e s . T o m a i n t a i n t h a t b e l ie f s ,

n o t e x p e r i e n c e s , p r o v i d e e v i d e n c e i s , h o w e v e r , t o a d o p t a c o h e r e n c et h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e .

T h e e m p i r i c is t s w i t h in t h e V i e n n a C i r c le w e r e a p p a l l e d b y th e c o h e r -

e n c e t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e l a r g el y b e c a u s e it s e e m e d t o b e t r a y t h e i r

f i r m e s t c o n v i c t i o n s . L o g i c a l p o s i t i v i s m w a s , t o a g r e a t e x t e n t , t h e r e s u l t

o f a d e s i r e t o e n d u n f o u n d e d ( m e t a p h y s i c a l ) s p e c u l a t i o n b y in s is ti n g

t h a t a ll k n o w l e d g e h a v e a f o u n d a t i o n in e x p e r i e n c e . B u t n o w it s e e m e d

a s t h o u g h s o m e o f t h e l o g ic a l p o si ti v is t s t h e m s e l v e s b e l i e v e d t h a t e s t a b -

l is h in g a k n o w l e d g e c l a i m w a s s im p l y a m a t t e r o f d e v e l o p i n g a c o n s i st e n t

s t o r y . I t i s u n f a i r t o t h e c o h e r e n t i s t s t o l e v e l t h i s c h a r g e a g a i n s t t h e m .

H o w e v e r , t h e c h a r g e i s o n e t h a t h a s p e r s is t e d a n d s till a p p e a r s i n

r e c e n t l it e r a t u r e . I ° N e u r a t h a n d o t h e r s p l a in l y b e l i e v e d t h a t k n o w l e d g e

i n v o l v e d m o r e t h a n t e ll i n g a c o n s i s t e n t s t o r y . R a t h e r , t h e j u s t i fi c a t i o n

o f a s e n t e n c e i n v o l v e s i n c o r p o r a t i n g i t in a s y s t e m o f s e n t e n c e s s p e a k e r s

a c t u a ll y b e li e v e . I t is n o t c o h e r e n c e w i t h j u s t a n y c o h e r e n t s y s t e m t h a t

w a r r a n t s a s e n t e n c e . R a t h e r , s e n t e n c e s a r e w a r r a n t e d b y c o h e r e n c e w i t h

s e n t e n c e s c a u s e d b y e x p e r i e n t i a l i n p u t . A s b e h a v i o u r i s t s, t h e p o s i ti v is t s

o f t e n s p o k e o f b e l i e fs a s re s u l t o f c o n d i t i o n i n g . 1~ T h e y w o u l d n o t d e n y

t h a t t h e b e l i e f t h a t s o m e c a t h e d r a l h a s t w o s p i r e s is c a u s e d b y t h e



C O H E R E N C E , A N T I - R E A L I S M A N D T H E V I E N N A C I R C L E 473

experience of a cathedral with two spires. The coherentists would denythat the causes of a belief warrant it. Almost half a century before

Richard Rorty stressed the distinction, members of the Vienna Circle

recognised that there is a distinction between the cause and the justifi-

cation of a belief.

.

Although far from uncontroversial, the arguments for a coherence

theory of knowledge adduced by the members of the Vienna Circle

have gained wide acceptance. The trick is to get from a coherence

theory of knowledge to a coherence theory of truth. Most coherentists

have attempted to make this transition by maintaining that coherence

is an infallible test of truth. 12 If it were such a test, a warranted sentence

would be a true sentence and a coherence theory of knowledge would

straightforwardly entail coherentism. Correspondence theorists have

always objected, however, that sentences can be warranted but not

true, or true but not warrantable. In other words, they suggest that

truth can transcend what can be warranted. The coherentists in theVienna Circle had a way to defeat this objection. They used the logical

positivists' verification theory of meaning to show that truth is not

warrant-transcendent. If they are right, and if a coherence theory of

knowledge is correct, truth does not transcend what can cohere with

speakers' beliefs.

Any position which depends on a verification theory of meaning may

seem rather ill-founded. Such a theory of meaning is, after all, still

widely regarded as one of the discredited aspects of logical positivism.

The verification theory of meaning was, however, not so much refuted

as the victim of changes in philosophical fashion. The positivists hadtwo arguments for their theory of meaning. They maintained that

speakers can neither acquire nor manifest an understanding, or a grasp

of meaning, which consists in anything but a knowledge of the con-

ditions which verify or warrant sentences. These arguments have re-

gained attention as a result of Dummett's discussions of meaning. Al-

though the arguments are quite controversial, far from having been

decisively refuted, they are rather compelling. Reflection on these argu-

ments indicates that the Vienna Ci]'cle's theory of meaning is a plausible

step in the argument for coherentism.




The Vienna Circle had a clear conception of the relationship betweenmeaning and understanding. They recognised that the meaning of a

sentence is what speakers know when they understand it. An inquiry

into the nature of meaning is, then, an inquiry into the sort of under-

standing speakers can possess. According to the members of the Circle

(both coherentists and their opponents), the only sort of understanding

that speakers can acquire consists in a grasp of the conditions that

speakers can recognise as establishing the truth of sentences. At first

the members of the Circle believed that speakers can only acquire an

understanding that consists in a knowledge of the experiences which

verify sentences. 13 Subsequently, the coherentists in the Circle believed

that understanding consists in a grasp of the conditions under which

sentences cohere with speakers' beliefs. In either case, however, the

argument is similar. The logical positivists believed that speakers can

only learn to assert sentences under conditions they can recognise as

obtaining. That is to say, speakers can only learn that certain sentences

are to be asserted under recognisable conditions. Their understanding

of sentences consists in a knowledge of these conditions. The conclusion

of the acquisition argument, as it is known, is that the meanings of

sentences - what speakers know when they understand the sentences- consist in recognisable conditions.

The Vienna Circle also advanced a version of the argument known,

in the wake of Dummett's work, as the manifestation argument. Ac-

cording to this argument, speakers must be able to manifest, in their

linguistic activities, any understanding they possess. Underlying the

argument is the positivists' principle that any claim to knowledge must

be publically communicable and have some practical consequences.

Typically this principle was used to debunk the claims of metaphys-

icians. But the members of the Circle also believed that the capacity

to understand a language is a practical ability. They insisted that speak-ers who know the meaning of a sentence are able to indicate the

conditions under which it is true and distinguish these from the con-

ditions under which it is false.~4 Speakers who possess this knowledge

must do more than simply lay claim to it. They must manifest the

knowledge by asserting the sentence under the first sort of condition

and dissenting from it under the second. If speakers are to so manifest

their knowledge of meaning, they must be able to recognise the con-

ditions under which the sentences are true or false. Understanding,

therefore, consists in a knowledge of recognisable conditions.



C OHE R E NC E , ANT I -R E AL I S M AND T HE VIE NNA C IR C L E 475

.

Both of the arguments the logical positivists presented for their theory

of meaning are presently the subject of much controversy. But the

members of the Vienna Circle were not without good reasons for

supposing that the meanings of sentences consist in recognisable con-

ditions. This conclusion entails, first, that t ruth does not transcend what

can be recognised. For if a sentence means that certain recognisable

conditions are satisfied, then if the conditions are recognised, the sen-

tence is true. It makes no sense to say that the sentence might still be

false. Similarly, if the conditions are not and cannot be recognised,then there is no chance that the sentence might be true. In other words,

truth cannot transcend what can be recognised or warranted. It was

precisely on these grounds that the coherentists in the Vienna Circle

rejected the correspondence theory of truth as 'metaphysical'. Unlike

their coherentist theory of truth, it involved the rejected notion of

warrant-transcendent truth.

The conclusion that t ruth does not transcend what can be recognised,

combined with a coherence theory of knowledge, entails the Vienna

Circle's version of the coherence theory of truth. If a coherence theory

of knowledge is correct, speakers are only able to recognise whether

sentences cohere with their beliefs. They are not able to recognise

whether supposed objective truth conditions are satisfied. Since speak-

ers can only recognise the conditions under which sentences are war-

ranted by coherence with their beliefs, and since truth cannot transcend

what can be recognised, truth cannot transcend what may be warranted

by coherence with speakers' beliefs. In other words, a sentence is true

if and only if it coheres with the specified system. If this argument is

sound, the Vienna Circle's version of coherentism is correct. Moreover,

the transcendence problem, long the bane of coherence theories oftruth, presents no threat to the Circle's coherentism. The positivists'

method of argument for their position explicitly rules out the possibility

of warrant-transcendent truth, the very possibility upon which the prob-

lem depends. Since truth cannot transcend what is warranted, an anti-

realist account of truth is also entailed by this argument for coherentism.

This account of truth is globally anti-realist. That is, there are no classes

of sentences for which truth can transcend what can be warranted, for

all classes of sentences depend on the system of speakers' beliefs for

their warrant.




.

The Vienna Circle argument for coherentism faces, of course, a number

of possible objections. It is worth considering the two objections which

seem to have caused the theory to be returned to store. The first

argument to be considered is one some of the Circle's coherentists gave

as their reason for foresaking coherentism. While coherentism was

being developed by some logical positivists, Tarski's writings on truth

were available only in Polish and were unknown to the Circle. Once

Tarski's work became available in German translation, Carnap and

others believed that the error of their coherentist ways was exposed.15They believed that Tarski's method of defining truth made it possible

to resurrect the correspondence theory of truth in a non-metaphysical

form. Tarski certainly claimed that his method of defining truth cap-

tured the content of correspondence theory of truth. Since his method

of defining truth is apparently unobjectionable, it seems as though the

coherence theory of truth is mistaken.

In retrospect it is difficult to understand how Tarski's writings could

have persuaded anyone to abandon coherentism. Tarski's method of

defining truth has no bearing whatsoever on the debate between corre-

spondence theorists and coherentists. Nor does it have consequencesfor the dispute between realists and anti-realists. Tarski simply provided

a method for defining the predicate ' true' for some language, a method

which uses only notions from the object language and from pure logic.

Carnap should have been tipped off when Tarski said he was offering

a definition of truth. Tarski's method of defining truth does not answer

questions about the sort of truth conditions sentences have. If Tarski

believed that his method of defining truth resolved this problem, he

was under some illusions about its efficacy. In fact, however, it is likely

that he understood by the correspondence theory something differentthan is meant here.

Jaakko Hintikka's writings provide a clue as to why Carnap aban-

doned coherentism after reading Tarski's work on truth. 16 Hint ikka

argues that Carnap adopted the view of language as a universal medium.

According to this view, speakers are wholly dependent upon their

present language. There is no way for them to say anything except what

may be said in their language. The ineffability of truth is, Hintikka

argues, a consequence of the universality of language. A language

always presupposes a given set of semantic relations, relations between



C OHE R E NC E , ANT I -R E AL IS M AND T HE VIE NNA C IR C L E 477

s en t en ce s an d t h e i r t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s . I f l an g u ag e is a u n i v e r s a l m ed i u m ,t h e r e f o r e , i t c an n o t b e u s ed t o ex p l i ca t e t h e s e s eman t i c r e l a t i o n s f o r

t h ey a r e a l w ay s p r e s u p p o s ed b y t h e ex p li ca t io n . S em an t i c s an d , i n

p a r t i cu la r , t r u t h b ec o m e i n e f f ab l e .

H i n t i k k a ca ll s t h e a l t e r n a t iv e co n c ep t i o n o f lan g u ag e t h e v i ew o f

l an g u ag e a s a ca l cu l u s . ( Th e w o r d ' c a l cu l u s ' i s u s ed t o i n d i ca t e t h a t , o n

t h is v iew , l an g u ag e is r e i n t e r p r e t ab l e . ) A c co r d i n g t o t h i s v i ew , s p eak e r s

a r e n o t l i m i t ed b y t h e i r p r e s e n t l an g u ag e : i t c an b e r e i n t e r p r e t ed o r

ev en r ep l ace d . A co n s eq u en c e o f t h is v iew is t h a t s p eak e r s a r e ab l e to

t a l k a b o u t t h e s e m a n t i c r e l a t i o n s u p o n w h i c h s o m e l a n g u a g e d e p e n d s

an d t r u t h i s n o t i n e f f ab l e . Ta r s k i ' s w o r k , w i t h it s u s e o f m e t a l an g u a g es

an d i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t r u th - d e f i n it i o n s , w as a mi l e s t o n e i n t h e d e v e l o p -

m en t o f th e v i ew o f l an g u ag e a s a ca lcu l us .

C o n v i n ced b y Ta r s k i ' s w r i ti n g s , C a r n a p r e j ec t ed t h e v i ew th a t l an -

g u ag e i s a u n i v e r s a l med i u m an d , w i t h i t, t h e v i ew t h a t t r u t h is i n e f f ab l e .

B u t h e s h o u l d n o t h a v e r e j e c t e d c o h e r e n ti s m . T h e V i e n n a C i rc le a s k e d

t w o q u es t i o n s ab o u t t ru t h . Th e f ir st i s t h e q u es t i o n a b o u t w h e t h e r t r u t h

i s ex p r e s s i b l e . Th e s eco n d is t h e q u es t i o n ab o u t t h e n a t u r e o f th e t r u t h

whose express ib i l i t y i s a t i s sue . In i t i a l l y , Carnap answered the f i r s t by

s ay i n g t h a t t r u t h i s i n e f f ab l e an d an s w e r ed t h e s eco n d b y s ay in g t r u thc a n n o t t r a n s c e n d w h a t c a n b e w a r r a n t e d b y c o h e r e n c e w i th s p e a k e r s '

b e l i e f s . Ta r s k i f o r ced C a r n ap t o r eco n s i d e r h i s v e r d i c t o n t h e f i r s t

q u es t i o n . B u t Ta r s k i ' s w o r k d o es n o t d i c t a t e an an s w er t o t h e s eco n d .

I t is e a s y t o s ee , h o w ev e r , w h y t h e ch an g e i n v e r d i c t o n t h e f i rs t q u es t i o n

m i g h t s e e m t o r e q u i r e a c h a n g e o n t h e s e c o n d .

Th e an s w er t h a t t h e V i en n a C i r c l e g av e t o t h e s eco n d q u es t i o n , t h e

q u es t i o n o f w h a t t r u t h co n s i st s i n, w as o f t en co u ch ed i n u n h ap p i l y

ch o s en t e r ms . Th e p o s i ti v is t s o b j e c t ed t o a p a r t i cu la r c o n ce p t i o n o f

t r u th b u t o f t e n s o u n d e d a s t h o u g h t h e y h a d d o u b t s a b o u t t h e u s e f u ln e s s

o f t h e c o n c e p t a s s uc h . T h e y s o m e t i m e s u s e d t h e w o r d ' tr u t h ' t o d e n o t et h e o b j e c t i o n a b l e c o n c e p t i o n o f t ru t h . N e u r a t h , f o r e x a m p l e , s p o k e o f

t r u t h a s a ' me t ap h y s i ca l ' co n cep t an d i n c l u d ed i t o n h i s i n d e x v e r b o r u m

p r o h i b i t o r u m . 17 H e w a s w i l l i n g t o u s e s o m e o t h e r t e r m t o d e n o t e h i s

o w n c o n c e p t i o n o f t ru t h . H o w e v e r , N e u r a t h a n d t h e o t h e r C i r c le m e m -

b e r s r e a l ly o b j e c t e d t o t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f tr u t h a s w a r r a n t -t r a n s c e n d e n t.

B y s o u n d i n g a s i f t h ey o b j ec t e d to t h e co n cep t o f tr u t h h av i n g a r o le

i n s eman t i c s , s o m e t h i n g t h ey ce r t a i n l y d i d n o t b e l i ev e , 18 t h e m em b er s

o f t h e C i rc l e , an d i n p a r t icu l a r t h e co h e r en t i s ts , co u l d b e co n f u s ed w i t h

t h o s e w h o s e v i ew s w e r e r e f u t ed b y Ta r s k i . C a r n ap mi g h t ea s i ly t h i n k



478 JAMES O. YOUNG

that he was committed to rejecting the Circle's views on truth as apackage.

Certainly, if coherentism is correct, semantic relations are very differ-

ent from what correspondence theorists take them to be. Semantic

relations obtain between sentences and the conditions under which they

are warranted by coherence with speakers' beliefs rather than between

sentences and objective conditions. But there is no reason why coher-

entists need adopt the view that language is a universal medium. There

is no reason why they cannot accept Tarski's and Hintikka's view that

truth is expressible.

The Vienna Circle's coherentists faced an objection more trouble-some than that derived from Tarski's writings. Their opponents within

the logical positivist movement presented an old objection to coherence

theories, one still seen in the literature , which poses what may be called

the 'specification problem'. The specification problem challenges both

a coherence theory of knowledge and a coherence theory of truth.

Consider how it threatens the latter theory. Schlick, Ayer and others

believed that there must be more to truth than coherence with a coher-

ent system. 19 After all, they reasoned, there is any number of coherent

systems. If truth is simply a matter of coherence, a sentence which

coheres with a coherent fiction has as much claim to being true as has

a sentence which coheres with the best available science. But this is

absurd, Schlick and his allies believed, so coherentism must be incor-

rect. Correspondence theorists have good grounds for preferring science

to fiction. Science, they believe, consists of sentences which correspond

to reality while fiction does not. But this simple expedient is not open

to coherentists. The challenge to coherentists is to specify the system

with which true sentences cohere and to do so without compromising

their position.

It is a mistake to respond to the specification problem by attemptingto find some internal feature possessed by one system and no other. F.

H. Bradley and other early coherentists made such an attempt. The

system with which true sentences cohere is more comprehensive or

coherent than others, they held. It is unlikely that some fictional system

could be as comprehensive and coherent as accepted science. However,

there is no principled reason for ruling out the possibility of equally

coherent and comprehensive systems. Nor can coherentists favour one

system on the grounds that it is the result of causal interaction between

speakers and the world. If coherentism is correct, this would simply be



C OHE R E NC E , ANT I -R E AL IS M AND T HE VIE NNA C IR C L E 479

t o s ay t h a t a s e n t en ce s t a ti n g t h a t t h e s y s t em i s t h e r e s u l t o f c au s a li n te r a c t io n is p a r t o f t h e s y s t e m . B u t a n y n u m b e r o f sy s t e m s c o u ld

i n c l u d e s imi l a r s en t en ces . Th e s y s t em w i t h w h i ch t r u e s en t en ces co h e r e

h as n o u n i q u e i n t e r n a l f e a t u r e . I t is d i s ti n g u i s ed b y an ex t e r n a l f ea t u r e ,

it s b e i n g c o m p o s e d o f t h e s e n t e n c e s s p e a k e r s c a n b e w a r r a n t e d i n

asser t i ng .

H e m p e l p r o v i d e d t h e c o h e r e n t is t s ' a n s w e r t o t h e s p e c if ic a ti o n p r o b -

l e m . H e p r o p o s e d t h a t t h e s y s t e m w i th w h i c h tr u e s e n t e n c e s c o h e r e is

t h e o n e a d o p t e d b y t h e s c i e n t i f i c a l l y i n f o r m e d m e m b e r s o f a c o m -

mu n i t y . 2 ° Th i s r e s p o n s e t o t h e s p ec i fi c a ti o n p r o b l em h as t h e d i s ad v an -

t age o f r a i s ing the ques t ion o f who i s t o qua l i fy as sc i en t i f i ca l ly i n fo r -

m e d . T o d a y w e a r e le s s s a n g u in e a b o u t r e a c h in g a g r e e m e n t o n s u c h a

q u e s t i o n t h a n w e r e t h e a d v o c a t e s o f un if ie d s c ie n c e . B u t H e m p e l ' s

r e s p o n s e i s u n q u es t i o n ab l y o n t h e r i g h t t r ack . Th e s y s t em w i t h w h i ch

t r u e s en t en ces co h e r e i s n o t m er e l y a co h e r en t co l l ec t io n o f s en t en ces .

I t i s a s y s t em o f s en t en ces h e l d t o b e t r u e . I n o t h e r w o r d s , i t i s t h e

s y s t em ea r l i e r r e f e r r ed t o a s t h e s p ec i f i ed s y s t em, t h e s y s t em co mp o s ed

o f se n t e n c e s s p e a k e r s c a n b e w a r r a n t e d in b e l ie v i n g t o b e t r u e . N o

f ic ti on a l s y s te m , h o w e v e r c o m p r e h e n s i v e o r c o h e r e n t , c a n b e t h e s y s t e m

w i t h w h i c h t r u e s e n t e n c e s c o h e r e s i m p l y b e c a u s e s p e a k e r s c a n n o t b e -l iev e a ll o f t h e s en t en ces i n th e f ic t io n a l s y s tem. S p e ak e r s c an n o t

ch o o s e , a t w i ll , a w h o l e n ew s e t o f b e li e f s.

A y e r c l a i m e d t h a t H e m p e l c o n t r a d i c t e d h i m s e l f i n h i s r e p l y t o t h e

s p ec i fi ca ti o n p r o b l em . 21 H em p e l co m mi t s h i m s e l f to t h e r e b e i n g a f ac t

o f th e m a t t e r a b o u t w h i c h s y s t e m is t h e o n e c o m p o s e d o f s e n t e n c e s

s p e a k e r s c a n b e w a r r a n t e d i n a s se rt in g . A y e r c h a r g e d t h a t, i f H e m p e l

i s r i gh t i n mak ing such a c l a im, i t i s because some sys t em i s one

co m p o s ed o f s en t en ces w h i ch s p eak e r s a r e , i n fac t , w a r r an t ed i n a s -

s e r ti n g . T h a t i s, A y e r h e l d , H em p e l is ma k i n g a c l a im w h i ch , i f t r u e ,

co r r e s p o n d s t o r ea l i t y . B u t co h e r en t i s m s t a t e s t h a t n o s en t en ces co r r e -s p o n d t o r e a l i t y . S o , A y e r c o n c l u d e s , H e m p e l c o m p r o m i s e s h i s c o h e r -

en t i s m i n d e f en d i n g i t. I n th i s a r g u m en t A y e r b eg s t h e q u e s t i o n ag a i n s t

h is c o h e r e n ti s t o p p o n e n t b y p r e s u p p o s i n g a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e t h e o r y o f

t r u t h . H e c h a r g e s t h a t i n h o l d i n g s o m e s e n t e n c e t o b e t r u e , H e m p e l

h o l d s t h a t i t c o r r e s p o n d s t o re a li ty . H e m p e l w o u l d , h o w e v e r , m a i n ta i n

t h a t t h e s en t en c es i n w h i ch t h e co h e r en c e t h eo r y o f t r u t h i s s t a t ed a r e ,

l ik e an y o t h e r s en t en ce s , t r u e i f t h ey co h e r e w i th s p eak e r s ' b e l i e f s .

( Th i s c l a i m i s n o mo r e p r o b l ema t i c t h an t h e co r r e s p o n d en ce t h eo r i s t s '

c l a im t h a t t h e i r t h eo r y co r r e s p o n d s t o r ea l it y . ) I n a s s e r ti n g a c la i m ab o u t



480 JAM ES O. YO UNG

w h a t s p eak e r s a r e w a r r an t ed i n a s s e r t i n g , o r an y t h i n g e l s e , H emp e l i sma i n t a i n i n g t h a t t h e c l a i m co h e r e s w i t h h i s b e l i e f s .

.

S o m e i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s a b o u t c o h e r e n t i s m w e r e n o t a d e q u a t e l y a d -

d r e s s e d b y th e m e m b e r s o f th e V i e n n a C i r cl e. T h e r e i s s o m e d o u b t

ab o u t p r ec i s e l y h o w t h ey co n ce i v ed o f t h e s p ec i f i ed s y s t em. Th e r e i s a

v a r i e ty o f w a y s o f u n d e r s t a n d in g t h e s t a t e m e n t t h a t t r u th d o e s n o t

t r a n sc e n d w h a t c a n b e w a r r a n t e d . I t m a y b e t a k e n t o m e a n t h a t t r u th

c a n n o t t ra n s c e n d w h a t c a n b e w a r r a n t e d , g i ve n p r e s e n t k n o w l e d g e . O rt h e s t a t emen t co u l d b e i n t e r p r e t ed a s s u g g es t i n g t h a t t r u t h i s l i m i t ed

t o w h a t w i ll , i n t h e co u r s e o f h u m an h i s t o r y co m e t o b e w a r r an t ed .

A l t e r n a t i v e l y , t r u t h m a y n o t t r a n s c e n d w h a t c a n b e w a r r a n t e d a t t h e

idea l l imi t o f i nqu i ry . L ike ly t he pos i t i v i s t s wou ld have r e j ec t ed t he

i d ea o f an i d ea l l im i t a s ' me t ap h y s i ca l ' . M an y o f t h e i r p r o n o u n cem en t s

s u g g es t th a t t h ey h ad t h e f i rs t o f th e acco u n t s o f t r u th i n mi n d . T h e

s p e ci fi e d s y s te m w o u l d t h e n b e t h e p r e s e n t s y s t e m o f be l ie f s . H o w e v e r ,

t o s u g g es t t h a t t r u t h c an n o t t r an s cen d t h e p r e s e n t s y s t em o f b e l i e f s is

t o in v i te ch a r g es o f r e la t iv i s m . A n d , i n d eed , s u ch ch a r g es w e r e f o r t h -

c o m i n g f r o m t h e o p p o n e n t s o f c o h e r e n ti s m . L i k e l y se v e r a l o f t h e p o s i ti -v i s t s w e r e p r e v e n t e d f r o m a d e q u a t e l y a d d r e s s i n g t h e q u e s t i o n a b o u t

t h e s p ec i f i ed s y s t em b y t h e i r b e l i e f t h a t t h e en d o f s c ien ce w as n i g h.

Th e d ec l in i n g p r o s p ec t s o f u n if i ed s c ien ce ma k e i t i mp o r t an t t o b e

c l e a r e r a b o u t t h e n a t u r e o f th e s y s t e m t ru t h c a n n o t t r a n s c e n d .

Th e V i en n a C i r c l e d i d n o t , p e r h ap s , p r e s en t a co mp l e t e an d f u l l y

d e v e l o p e d c a s e f o r a c o h e r e n c e t h e o r y o f tr u th . T h e t h e o r y w a s a b a n -

d o n e d b e f o r e i t c o u l d b e c o n v i n ci n gl y e st a b li s he d . M e m b e r s o f th e

C i r c l e d i d , h o w ev e r , p r o v i d e t h e o u t l i n e s o f a v e r y s t r o n g a r g u men t f o r

co h e r en t i s m . T h i s a r g u m en t h a s b een u n j u s t l y n eg l ec t ed . S i n ce t h e

Ci rc l e ' s coheren t i sm a l so an t i c ipa t es an t i - r ea l i s t t heor i es abou t t ru th , i t

is p a r t i cu la r l y d e s e r v i n g o f a t t en t i o n . Th e t h eo r y o f m ean i n g an d t h eo r y

o f k n o w l e d g e o n w h i c h t h e C i r c le 's c o h e r e n t i s m d e p e n d s a r e b o t h t h e

s o u r ce o f co n t r o v e r s y . B u t i n ad o p t i n g s u ch t h eo r i e s t h e p o s i t iv i s ts w e r e

ah ea d o f t h e i r t ime an d n o t b eh i n d t h e t i mes . =

N O T E S

1 See, for example, Davidson (1982).

2 For the fullest statement of Dummett's views on realism see his (1982).



COHERENCE~ ANTI-REALISM AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE 481

3 For a discussion of global anti-realism see Young (1987).4 Hintikka (1989a). See also Hintikka, M. and Hintikka, J. (1986), p. 11.

5 For a discussion of these matte rs see Neurath (1983a), especially p. 95.

6 Schlick (1981a), p. 190.

7 See, for example, Hempel (1935a), p. 50.

8 Schlick (1935), p. 66.

9 Hempel (1935b), p. 94. Hempel has recently criticised Nelson Goodman for holding

views rather like those of Neurath. But Hempel neglects to mention that he had once

been an adherent of those views. See Hempel (1980), pp. 193-199.

10 Davidson (1982), pp. 480, 482.

ll Hempel (1935a), p. 57.

12 For example, Blanshard (1939), Ch. XXVI.

13 Schlick (1981b), p. 33.

14 Schlick (1981b), p. 36.

15 Carnap (1949).

16 In addition to his works cited above, see Hintikka (1989b).

17 Neurath (1983b), p. 217.

18 The Vienna Circle's theory of meaning is usually described as 'verificationist' but this

is rather misleading. In fact it is a truth-conditional theory but the truth conditions are

always recognisable by speakers. Schlick (1981b, p. 36), for example, wrote that ' . . . a

person knows the meaning of a proposition if he is able to indicate exactly the circum-

stances under which it would be t ru e. .. '.

19 Schlick (1981a), p. 184. Ayer (1958), pp. 144ff,

20 Hempel (1936), p. 39.

21 Ayer (1959), p. 243.

22 This essay was, in part, wri tten while I was a Research Fellow at Melbourne University .

In the course of writing the essay I profited from the criticisms of Allen Hazen , Jaakko

Hintikka and Barry Taylor. I am grateful to Professor Hintikka for allowing me to see

some of his work. Earlier versions of this essay were read to colloquia at the University

of Auckland and the University of Queensland.

REFERENCES

Ayer, A.: 1958, The Foundations of Emp irical Know ledge, MacMillan, London.

Ayer, A. : 1959, 'Verification and Experience', in A. Ayer (ed .), Logica l Positivism, TheFree Press, New York, pp. 228-43.

Blanshard, B.: 1939, The Nature of Thought, George Allen and Unwin, London.

Carnap, R." 1949, 'Truth and Confirmat ion', in H. Feigl (ed.), Readings in P hilosophicalAnalysis, Appleton-Century-Croft s, New York, pp. 119-27.

Davidson, D.: 1982, 'Empirical Content', Graze r Philosophische Studien 16/17, 471-89.

Dummett, M.: 1982, 'Realism', Synthese 52, 55-112.

Hempel , C.: 1935a, 'On the Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth', Analysis 2, 49-59.

Hempel, C.: 1935b, 'Some Remarks on 'Facts' and Propositions', Analysis 3, 93-96.

Hempel, C.: 1936, 'Some Remarks on Empiricism', Analysis 3, 33-40.

Hempel, C.: 1980, 'Comments on Goodman' s Ways of Wo rldmaking', Synthese 45, 193-

99.




Hi n t i kka , J . : 1989a , ' Ludwi g ' s App l e Tre e : Ev i de nc e a bou t t he P h i l o soph i c a l R e l a t i onsB e t we e n W i t t ge ns t e i n a nd t he Vi e nna C i rc l e ' , i n W . L . Gomboc z , H . R u t t e a nd

W . S a ue r ( e ds . ) , Tradition und Perspektionen der Analytischen Philosophie, H O l d e r -

P i s c h l e r -Te mpsky , Vi e nna , pp . 187 -202 .

Hin t ikka , J . : 1989b, ' I s Tru th Ine ffable? ' , in Les Formes actuelles du Vrai: Entretiens de

Palermo 1985, Enc h i r i d i on , P a l e rmo , pp . 89 -120 .

Hi n t i kka , M. a nd Hi n t i kka , J . : 1986 , Investigating Wittgenstein, Basi l Blackwel l , London.

Ne ura t h , O . : 1983a, ' P ro t oc o l S e n t e nc e s ' , i n R . C ohe n a nd M . Ne ura t h ( e ds . ), Philosoph-

ical Papers 1913-1946, D. R e i de l , Dord re c h t , pp . 91 -99 .

Ne ura t h , O . : 1983b , ' Un i ve r sa l J a rgon a nd Te rm i no l ogy ' , in R . C o he n a nd M. N e ura t h

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Schlick , M . : 1 935, 'Fac ts and Prop os i t ions ' , Analysis 2, 65-70.

Schlick , M . : 1981a, 'On th e Found a t ions of Kno wle dge ' , in O. Hanfl ing (ed . ) , EssentialReadings in Logical Positivism, Basi l Blackwel l , Oxford .

Schl ick , M. : 1981b, 'Meaning and Veri f ica t ion ' , in O. Hanfl ing (ed . ) , Essential Readings

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