yousef, caballes & papa.docx

7/27/2019 Yousef, caballes & papa.docx

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149 Yousef Al-Ghoul vs. Court of Appeals [GR 126859, 4 September 2001]Second Division, Quisumbing (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 31 March 1995, Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the Regional TrialCourt, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 125, Kalookan City, issued search warrants 54-95and 55-95 for the search and seizure of certain items in Apartment 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound,Deparo Road, Kalookan City. On 1 April 1995, the police searched Apartment 8, in the same

compound and found one (1) .45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment 2 were 2 M-16 rifles with 2magazines and 20 live M-16 ammunitions, 1 Bar of demolition charge, 1 Caliber Pistol with no. 634and other nos. were placed with magazine of Caliber .45 and 3 live 45 ammunitions, 1 22 Caliberhandgun with 5 live ammunitions in its cylinder, 1 Box containing 40 pieces of .25 caliberammunitions, 2 pieces of fragmentation grenade, 1 roll of detonating cord color yellow, 2 big bagsof ammonium nitrate suspected to be explosives substance, 22 detonating cords with blasting

caps, 12 and 14 pound of high explosives TNT, 1 timer alarm clock, 2 bags of suspected gun

powder, 2 small plastic bag of suspected explosive substance, 1 small box of plastic bag ofsuspected dynamites, One weighing scale, and 2 batteries 9 volts with blasting caps anddetonating cord. The firearms, ammunitions, explosives and other incendiary devices seized at theapartments were acknowledged in the receipt signed by SPO2 Melanio de la Cruz. Yousef Al

Ghoul, Isam Mohammad Abdulhadi, Wail Rashid Al-Khatib, Nabeel Nasser Al-Riyami, AshrafHassam Al-Yazori, and Mohammad Abushendi were charged before the Regional Trial Court ofKalookan City, Branch 123, in informations (Criminal Cases C-48666-67) accusing them with illegalpossession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree 1866.Thereafter, they were arrested and detained. They filed a motion for bail on 24 May 1995, theresolution of which was held in abeyance by the RTC pending the presentation of evidence fromthe prosecution to determine whether or not the evidence presented is strong. On 7 February1996, at the hearing for bail, the RTC "admitted all exhibits being offered for whatever purpose thatthey maybe worth" after the prosecution had finished adducing its evidence despite the objectionby the petitioners on the admissibility of said evidence. On 19 February 1996, the RTC denied theirmotion for bail earlier filed. As their action before appellate court also proved futile, with theappellate court dismissing their special civil action for certiorari, they filed the petition for review

before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the search and seizure orders are valid, and the objects seized admissible inevidence.

Held: As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged noramplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but indoing so, care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded.Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutionalinjunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, the search made at Apartment No.8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against Al-Ghoul, et.

al. In contrast, the search conducted at Apartment 2 could not be similarly faulted. The searchwarrants specifically mentioned Apartment 2. The search was done in the presence of itsoccupants, in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court. The articles seizedduring the search of Apartment 2 are of the same kind and nature as those items enumerated inthe search warrant. The items seized from Apartment 2 were described with specificity in thewarrants in question. The nature of the items ordered to be seized did not require a technicaldescription. Moreover, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described inprecise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities,otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as theywould not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Once described, however, thearticles subject of the search and seizure need not be so invariant as to require absoluteconcordance between those seized and those described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of

those articles described as a class or species would suffice.

Caballes vs CA


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Facts: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on aroutine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusuallycovered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two

police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes y Taino. When

asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but he appeared pale and nervous. With

Caballes' consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mmaluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation(NAOCOR). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at P55,244.45. Noceja askedCaballes where the wires came from and Caballes answered that they came from Cavinti, a townapproximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and the vehicle with thehigh- voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures ofCaballes and the jeep loaded with the wires which were turned over to the Police StationCommander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Caballes was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.Caballes was charged with the crime of theft in an information dated 16 October 1989. During thearraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the merits ensued. On 27 April 1993,Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment, finding Caballes, guilty beyondreasonable doubt of the crime of theft. In a resolution dated 9 November 1998, the trial court

denied Caballes' motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decisionon 15 September 1998. Caballes appealed the decision by certiorari.

Issue: Whether Caballes passive submission to the statement of Sgt. Noceja that the latter "will

look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive" be considered as waiver on

Caballes part on warrantless search and seizure.

Held: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their personsand properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article IIIthereof. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admissionof evidence obtained in violation of such right. The constitutional proscription against warrantlesssearches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless

search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Courtand by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of movingvehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk situations (Terrysearch); and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. In cases where warrant is necessary, thesteps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. Inthe exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or whenthe latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a reasonable orunreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness ofthe circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence orabsence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place orthing searched and the character of the articles procured. It is not controverted that the search and

seizure conducted by the police officers was not authorized by a search warrant. The mere mobilityof these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to conductindiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and in theabsence of probable cause. Herein, the police officers did not merely conduct a visual search orvisual inspection of Caballes' vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leavesand look inside the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires. It thus cannot beconsidered a simple routine check. Also, Caballes' vehicle was flagged down because the policeofficers who were on routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehiclewas covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon. The factthat the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not common for such to be covered withkakawati leaves does not constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a searchwithout a warrant. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received any confidential

report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle whichcould otherwise have sustained their suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is replete with caseswhere tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless searchand seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in the present case. Further, the evidence is lacking that


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Caballes intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches. The manner by whichthe two police officers allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for them to conduct the searchleaves much to be desired. When Caballes' vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approachedCaballes and "told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive." Byuttering those words, it cannot be said the police officers were asking or requesting for permissionthat they be allowed to search the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents and purposes, they wereinforming, nay, imposing upon Caballes that they will search his vehicle. The "consent" given under

intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutionalguaranty. In addition, in cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will benoted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of theaccused to be searched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positiveproof. Neither can Caballes' passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to thewarrantless search. Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on recordare insufficient to sustain Caballes' conviction. His guilt can only be established without violatingthe constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure.

188 Papa vs. Mago [GR L-27360, 28 February 1968]En Banc, Zaldivar (J): 9 concur

Facts: Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, actingupon a reliable information received on 3 November 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment ofpersonal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day fromthe customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of RicardoPapa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conductedsurveillance at gate 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate 1 at about 4:30 p.m. of 4November 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and interceptedthem at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks, consisting of nine bales ofgoods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, aperson claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts

of Duties Collected on Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the nameof a certain Bienvenido Naguit. Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention ofthe two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of FirstInstance (CFI) of Manila a petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction(Civil Case 67496), praying for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the policeand customs authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and awrit of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual,moral and exemplary damages in their favor. On 10 November 1966, Judge Hilarion Jarencioissued an order ex parte restraining Ricardo Papa (as Chief of Police of Manila) and Juan PonceEnrile (as Commissioner of Customs) in Civil Case 67496. However, when the restraining orderwas received by Papa. et. al., some bales had already been opened by the examiners of theBureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city

fiscal and a representative of Remedios Mago. Under date of 15 November 1966, Mago filed anamended petition, including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port ofManila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. At the hearing on 9 December1966, the lower court, with the conformity of the parties, ordered that an inventory of the goods bemade by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives of the claimant of the goods, theBureau of Customs, and the Anti- Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department. On 23December 1966, Mago filed an ex parte motion to release the goods, alleging that since theinventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation, the same shouldbe released as per agreement of the parties upon her posting of the appropriate bond that may bedetermined by the court. On 7 March 1967, the Judge issued an order releasing the goods to Magoupon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00. On 13 March 1967, Papa, on his ownbehalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond,

upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector of Customsof the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings. Withoutwaiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain,


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speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Papa, et. al. filed the action forprohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.

Held: The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized inwriting by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of thecustoms and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure,among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to

forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed undercustoms and tariff laws. He could lawfully open andexamine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonablecause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contraryto law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonablysuspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. It cannot be doubted, therefore, thatPapa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods inquestion. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officerto effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. Thiswas what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the searchand seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle.He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo. Martin Alagaoand his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issuedby a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant herein. TheCode authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and CustomsCode to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not beinga dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk,package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle,beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced intothe Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. Butin the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered andsearched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace." Except in the case of thesearch of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effectsearch and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. Herein, Martin

Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make any search before they seized the twotrucks and their cargo. But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that nosearch warrant would be needed under the circumstances obtaining herein. The guaranty offreedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a necessarydifference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a searchwarrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile forcontraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can bequickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Havingdeclared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in questionwas in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdictionover the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusionof the Court of First Instance of Manila.

QUINTERO vs. NBI 162 SCRA 467FACTS: NBI raiders went to search a house by virtue of a search warrant. What the NBI did,because there were so many rooms, was they conducted the search simultaneously. One NBIsearching the room and the other in another room.HELD: That type or procedure is wrong because how can the witnesses be present everytime the

search is made when one is in the other room and the others in another room. Such a procedure,

wherein members of a raiding party can roam around the raided premises unaccompanied by anywitness, as the only witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to witness a searchconducted by the other members of the raiding party in another part of the house, is held to be

violative of both the spirit and the letter of the law, which provides that no search of a house, room,or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of at least one competent witness,

resident of the neighborhood.


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Frank Uy & Unifish Packing Corp. vs Bureau of Internal Revenue et alon November 15, 2010

Search and Seizure Requisites of a Valid Search Warrant

In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Uy Chin Ho akaFrank Uy, manager of UPC, was selling thousands of cartons of canned cartons without issuing a

report. This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. In Oct 1993, the BIRrequested before RTC Cebu to issue a search warrant. Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant onthe same day. A second warrant was issued which contains the same substance but has only onepage, the same was dated Oct 1st 2003. These warrants were issued for the alleged violation byUy of Sec 253. A third warrant was issued on the same day for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec238 in relation to sec 263. On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied bymembers of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993, searched the premises of the UPC. They seized, amongother things, the records and documents of UPC. A return of said search was duly made byLabaria with the RTC of Cebu. UPC filed a motion to quash the warrants which was denied by theRTC. They appealed before the CA via certiorari. The CA dismissed the appeal for a certiorari isnot the proper remedy.ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the return of the seized itemsbut sustained the validity of the warrant. The SC ruled that the search warrant issued has not metsome basic requisites of validity. A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of theforegoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;

(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or anyother person;

(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, thecomplainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and

(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things tobe seized.

The SC noted that there has been inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched asindicated in the said warrants. Also the thing to be seized was not clearly defined by the judge. Heused generic itineraries. The warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searched. Onewarrant was directed only against Uy and the other was against Uy and UPC. The SC howevernoted that the inconsistencies wered cured by the issuance of the latter warrant as it has revokedthe two others.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against unreasonablesearches and seizures:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects againstunreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to bedetermined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainantand the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and thepersons or things to be seized.

PEOPLE VS TEE

FACTS: Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of BaguioCity. A raid conducted by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine

National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by appellantand at his residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana.


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Appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too general and that theNBI had not complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. Thependency of said motion, however, did not stop the filing of the appropriate charges againstappellant. In an information dated July 24, 1998, the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged

Modesto Tee, alias Estoy Tee, with illegal possession of marijuana.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's contention that the description on the serach warrant whichsays an undetermined amount of marijuana, was too general and hence makes the warrant void

for vagueness.

HELD: SC held that the appellants contention, has no leg to stand on. The constitutional

requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily meantto enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seizedand thus prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with nodiscretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches andseizures. What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or generalcharacterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing

expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to an offense.However, it is not required that technical precision of description be required, particularly, where bythe nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, since therequirement of a technical description would mean that no warrant could issue.

yousef, caballes & papa.docx

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