科技革命与美国的现代化科技革命与美国的现代化20112011年夏年夏Session 3Session 3

美国科技与冷战美国科技与冷战

原子弹的建造原子弹的建造• Fission

• Chain Reactions

• Uranium Bomb

• Plutonium Bomb– Implosion

• Physics and Bomb

• Scientists’ Social Responsibilities

Jokes for PhysicistsJokes for Physicists

• “George W. Goes to Heaven”

• “Suitcase Bomb”

• “Ed’s Got a Bomb”

• “Less Edible Americans”

• “Top Twenty”

• “Garwin at the Guillotine”

Main ArgumentsMain Arguments

• “Science in Policy” and “Policy for Science” Were Connected

• Rationale for Federal Support of Science Shifted during the Cold War

• American Science Advisers Most Valuable for Government due to Their Technological Skepticism

• The Goal of the President’s Science Advisory Committee Was to Control the Nuclear Arms Race and Promote Federal Support of Basic Research

• Technological Dissent Key to the Working of a Democratic Society

Background on American ScienceBackground on American Science

• Leaders of American Revolution, Newtonian Science, and Enlightenment

• Debate over the Role of Federal Government in Science

• John Quincy Adams’ “Lighthouse of the Sky”

• Technological Leap in Late 19th Century• Scientific Buildup in Early Twentieth

Century

Coming of Age of American Coming of Age of American ScienceScience

• 1920s: Institutional Strength, the Quantum Generation, and the Coming of Refugees

• World War II: Radar, Proximity Fuse, Cryptology, and Atomic Bomb

• Dominance of Federal Government in American Science and Technology

• Americanization of International Science and Internationalization of American Scientific Community: e.g., T. D. Lee and C. N. Yang

Impact of the Cold War on Impact of the Cold War on Science Policy Science Policy

• Science Policy: “Science in Policy” and “Policy for Science”

• Dual Allegiance: Science or the Government?• Science in Policy

– Scientists’ Movement– The Nuclear Arms Race– H-bomb Debate of 1950– The Oppenheimer Case of 1954– The TCP Study of 1954

• Policy for Science– ONR– NSF Debate of 1950– AEC and High Energy Physics– Who’s Using Whom?

Shifting Rationales Shifting Rationales for Science Fundingfor Science Funding

• Bush Report of 1945: Assembly-line Model

• DuBridge-Rabi: Technological Evaluations

• PSAC: Technological Skepticism

• Sputnik: National Prestige

• 1960s: Education

• 1990s-present: American Competitiveness

The Sputnik ShockThe Sputnik Shock

• Rhetoric of American Technological Superiority

• Psychological Impact of Sputnik 10/4/57 • Opinion Leaders vs. Average Citizens• White House Not Concerned• Sputnik “Has Done US a Good Turn”• Political and Public Pressure• “Missile Gap”

Ike, Sputnik, and PSACIke, Sputnik, and PSAC• Soviet launching of Sputnik, Oct. 4, 1957• Eisenhower meeting with the Science

Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM-SAC) in the Executive Office of the President, Oct. 15, 1957

• Eisenhower announced James Killian, President of MIT, as science advisor, Nov. 7, 1957

• White House announced the upgrading of the ODM-SAC as the President’s Science Advisory Committee

Traditional AccountTraditional Account

• Launching of Sputnik made Eisenhower realize the deficiency in the use of science in policy and led him to establish the PSAC system of presidential science advising.

• It was a natural and logical sequence of events that linked Sputnik with a reform in American science advising and science policy.

A New PerspectiveA New Perspective

• Eisenhower’s response to Sputnik and establishment of the PSAC system of science advising were not pre-ordained, but shaped by a profound rethinking about nuclear war, a debate over science policy, and intense negotiations by rival scientists and politicians over the meaning of the Sputnik challenge.

Eisenhower’s Rethinking on Eisenhower’s Rethinking on Nuclear WarNuclear War

• At a March 1957 meeting with ODM-SAC: “re-evaluating war as an instrument of policy,

• Had focused on “how to deter war—which has now become so destructive.”

• June 1957: “There will be no such thing as a victorious side in any global war of the future.”

A Major Pre-Sputnik Debate on A Major Pre-Sputnik Debate on Science PolicyScience Policy

• Spring 1957, Eisenhower grew concerned over the rise of federal R&D, including basic research funding

• ODM-SAC scientists defended basic research

• Eisenhower agreed to protect basic research but DOD, in cutting R&D, went after basic research first

• Scientists, including ODM-SAC, demoralized

Public Negotiation of Sputnik’s Public Negotiation of Sputnik’s MeaningMeaning

• Rival scientists put different spins on Sputnik• Edward Teller in media and Congress:

– Saw it as a military-technological threat “worse than Pearl Harbor”

– Called for a military-technological response: “We must win the H-war before It Starts!”

– “we must overcome the popular notion that nuclear weapons are more immoral than conventional weapons”

– “we must revamp our military planning to fight and win a limited nuclear war.”

– Werner von Braun also saw space as battle ground

Moderate ScientistsModerate Scientists

• I.I. Rabi in a meeting with Eisenhower:– Saw it as a challenge to American science

and education: Soviets might overtake Americans in science just as Americans overtook the western Europeans a generation ago.

– Called for increased federal funding for science and education

• Test ban: – Rabi: Despite Sputnik US had advantage and

should enter into test ban with Soviets– Teller: US needed to catch up; Soviets could

always cheat

Eisenhower Chose ODM-SAC’s Eisenhower Chose ODM-SAC’s Interpretation of SputnikInterpretation of Sputnik

• Nov. 7, 1957 Speech to Nation:– Announced ODM-SAC member Killian as science

advisor– “My scientific friends told me”: We are ahead but

could fall behind if we do not increase support for science education and basic research

• Nov. 14, 1957, 2nd “chin-up” Speech:– “My scientific advisers place this problem [science

education] above all other immediate tasks of producing missiles, of developing new techniques in the Armed Services.”

Eisenhower Grew Critical of TellerEisenhower Grew Critical of Teller

• July 1957: When asked about science advising, mentioned Waterman (NSF) and Bronk (NAS) as well as AEC and DOD scientists

• Pre-Sputnik (Summer 1957): Teller and Lawrence made it “look like a crime to ban [nuclear] tests.”

• “The scientists today in this field seemed to be running the Government rather than acting as servants for the Government.”

• Nov. 1957, Eisenhower complained about Teller's Pearl Harbor analogy: “Scientists have suddenly become military and political experts” and vice versa .

Funding SLACFunding SLAC

• Project “M”• Rhetoric Shifted from Scientists to Politicians• National Prestige• Republican Accelerator• Politics of Big Science• Zuoyue Wang, “Politics of Big Science in the

Cold War,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 25, pt. 2 (1995).

Eisenhower, Sputnik, and PSACEisenhower, Sputnik, and PSAC• Dec. 1960, Eisenhower to PSAC:

– “A deep sense of obligation.”– “noted that more and more he has tended to put

science advice into more and more subjects of national policy.”

• Why?– Because they agreed on the meaning of Sputnik– PSAC was valuable to Eisenhower as an independent

voice of science speaking on not just the potentials but, even more importantly, the limits of technological solutions to social and political problems that became fashionable in the wake of Sputnik.

• Sputnik’s Shadow: – Our own new age of technological enthusiasm– Operation “Shock and Awe”– We still need independent and expert voices of

technological skepticism

Eisenhower’s Thinking on Science, Eisenhower’s Thinking on Science, Defense, and SpaceDefense, and Space

• First Concern over National Security• Deterrence: Sufficiency, Not Excess• Against Glamorous Space Projects• No Enemy on the Moon• Genuine Interest in Space Exploration and Basic

Research• Saw Danger of Intensified Inter-Service Rivalry• Concerned with Garrison State, Big

Government, and Momentum of Military Industrial Complex

Eisenhower’s Legacy in Space and Eisenhower’s Legacy in Space and Public PolicyPublic Policy

• Space Program Should Be Guided by “Reason, Fact and Logic”

• Priorities Should Go to Scientific Exploration and National Security but Not Propaganda Stunts

• Policy Makers Should Try to Understand the Scientific and Technical Aspects of Public Policy such as in Space

• Policy Makers Should Be Aware of Unwarranted Influence of Interested Parties in Pushing Space Program in One Direction or Another

• Public Understanding and Support Are Key to Successful Public Policy

• Foreign Policy Should Be Made on the Basis of Accurate Intelligence and Understanding of the Limit of Am. Power

• Scientists Represent an Important, Independent Voice in Public Policy, including Space and Defense Policy

Post-Eisenhower Post-Eisenhower Space DevelopmentSpace Development

• Kennedy Launched Apollo against PSAC Advice• American Scientists Ambivalent toward Apollo• Excited about Landing but Misgiving about

Illusion of Technological Fixes and Impact on Subsequent Direction of American Space Program

• JPL Mars Rovers Punctured Myth that Only Man-in-Space Can Stir Public Interest

• After Apollo Decision, PSAC Scientists Helped to Ensure Its Success

• New Members also Supported Manned Space for Institutional Benefits

Current Debate over Science, Current Debate over Science, Defense, and Space PolicyDefense, and Space Policy

• George W. Bush: No Science Advisor until after 9/11• Jack Marburg (physicist): “Invisible Science Advisor” (Bob Park,

“What’s New,” 2/22/2008)• Ambitious Human Return to the Moon and Landing on Mars in View

of China’s and India’s Feats• But Budget Cuts on Scientific Exploration of Space• Political Benefits to Southern (Red?) States?• Hilary Clinton: Reorient Space Program to Focus on Scientific

Exploration and Environmental Problems on Earth • Attacks on Scientific Integrity in Bush Administration:

– “Do You Support the President Politically?”– Censorship over Global Warming– Stem Cell Research– Support for Intelligent Design

• Union of Concerned Scientists campaign for the integrity of science in the federal government: www.ucsusa.org

• We Still Need “Voice of Sense and Moderation” and Dissent of Independent Scientists in the White House—an Important Part of Eisenhower’s Legacy

How to Improve Your English?How to Improve Your English?

• Try to pay attention not only to the information but also to the grammar and style when you read English articles;

• Try to read English publications regularly;

• Try to write a three-sentence summary of an article after you read it without looking at it, and then read it again

More Tips on English WritingMore Tips on English Writing

• Five-paragraph Essay– First paragraph: start with an interesting story

or quote related to the topic; then tell the reader the main point you are going to make.

– Second, third, and fourth paragraphs: support your main point from three different aspects or with three different examples.

– Fifth paragraph: summarize your main point again and tell the reader how your examples have supported your main point.

For ExampleFor Example

• Topic: Atomic Bomb as a Technological System• First paragraph: Start with the fact (I believe) that the

atomic bomb project used more electricity than the auto industry at Detroit, then state your argument that the Manhattan Project was, like the auto industry, a technological system

• 2nd, 3rd, and 4th paragraph: network of installations, management structure/role of government, science and technology working together

• 5th paragraph: Manhattan was not only a technological system, but represented a new kind of technological system.