00 compiled crimpro digests [arrest]

CrimPro [Arrest]

Amin | AJ | Cha | Janz | Vien

SANCHEZ V. DEMETRIOU

November 3, 1993

Cruz, J.

FACTS:

The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the

filing of appropriate charges against several persons,

including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay

of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.

Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of

the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary

investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was

not present but was represented by his counsel, Atty.

Marciano Brion, Jr.

On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an

"invitation" to the petitioner requesting him to appear

for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang,

Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the morning of

August 13,1993, and he was immediately taken to the

said camp.

At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively

identified by Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III Vivencio

Malabanan, who both executed confessions implicating

him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the

killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on

"arrest status" and taken to the Department of Justice in

Manila.

The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an

inquest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo as

his counsel.

After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on

Sanchez. This warrant was issued in connection with

Criminal Cases for violation of Section 8, in relation to

Section 1, of R.A. No. 6713. Sanchez was forthwith taken

to the CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he

remains confined.

The respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial

Court of Calamba, Laguna, seven informations charging

Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon,

Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and

Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen

Sarmenta.

Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court issued a

warrant for the arrest of all the accused, including the

petitioner, in connection with the said crime.

The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently

expressed his apprehension that the trial of the said

cases might result in a miscarriage of justice. SC

thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven

cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled to

respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou.

On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were

amended to include the killing of Allan Gomez as an

aggravating circumstance.

On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash

the informations substantially on the grounds now

raised in this petition. On September 13, 1993, after oral

arguments, the respondent judge denied the motion.

Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant petition for

certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary

restraining order/writ of injunction.

ISSUES/HELD:

WON Sanchez was unlawfully withheld of his right to

Preliminary Investigation- NO

WON the arrest of Sanchez was legal- YES (by virtue of

the jurisdiction subsequently acquired)

The Preliminary Investigation.

The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13,

1993, belie the petitioner's contention that he was not

accorded the right to present counter-affidavits.

On the other hand, there is no support for the

petitioner's subsequent manifestation that his counsel,

Atty. Brion, was not notified of the inquest held on

August 13, 1993, and that he was not furnished with the

affidavits sworn to on that date by Vivencio Malabanan

and Aurelio Centeno, or with their supplemental

affidavits

The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never

disowned Atty. Panelo as his counsel. During the entire

proceedings, he remained quiet and let this counsel

speak and argue on his behalf. It was only in his tardy

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Reply that he has suddenly bestirred himself and would

now question his representation by this lawyer as

unauthorized and inofficious.

Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,

provides that if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed

or, if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits, the

investigating officer shall base his resolution on the

evidence presented by the complainant.

Just as the accused may renounce the right to be present

at the preliminary investigation 5, so may he waive the

right to present counter-affidavits or any other evidence

in his defense.

At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary

investigation does not impair the validity of the

information or otherwise render the same defective and

neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over

the case or constitute a ground for quashing the

information. 6

If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is

flawed, the trial court may, on motion of the accused,

order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the

proceedings in the criminal case in abeyance. 7 In the

case at bar, however, the respondent judge saw no

reason or need for such a step. Finding no arbitrariness

in her factual conclusions, we shall defer to her

judgment.

The Arrest

"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules

of Court as the taking of a person into custody in order

that he may be bound to answer for the commission of

an offense. Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest is

effected by an actual restraint of the person to be

arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody

of the person making the arrest.

Application of actual force, manual touching of the body,

physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not,

required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part

of one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent

onthe part of the other to submit, under the belief and

impression that submission is necessary. 12

The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim,

Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a letter-invitation issued

by PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear

at the said camp for investigation.

In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-

ranking military official and the investigation of Sanchez

was to be made at a military camp. Although in the guise

of a request, it was obviously a command or an order of

arrest that the petitioner could hardly he expected to

defy. In fact, apparently cowed by the "invitation," he

went without protest (and in informal clothes and

slippers only) with the officers who had come to fetch

him.

It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438,

the requisites of a "custodial investigation" are

applicable even to a person not formally arrested but

merely "invited" for questioning.

It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the

petitioner was placed on "arrest status" after he was

pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan as the person who

first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Respondent Zuño

himself acknowledged during the August 13, 1993

hearing that, on the basis of the sworn statements of the

two state witnesses, petitioner had been "arrested."

His arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of the

Rules of Court,

It is not denied that the arresting officers were not

present when the petitioner allegedly participated in the

killing of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen

Sarmenta. Neither did they have any personal

knowledge that the petitioner was responsible therefor

because the basis of the arrest was the sworn statements

of Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as the rape and

killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on June 28-June

29, 1993, or forty-six days before the date of the arrest,

it cannot be said that the offense had "in fact just been

committed" when the petitioner was arrested.

The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was

doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court

lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the

petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on

August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in

connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be

sure, but it was nonetheless legal.

Applicable by analogy to the case at bar is Rule 102

Section 4 of the Rules of Court that:

Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized.

— If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained

of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process

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issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or

order of a court of record, and that the court or judge

had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the

judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be

allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is

allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of

any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or

order. Nor shall, anything in this rule be held to

authorize the discharge of a person charged with or

convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person

suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

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PEOPLE V. SEQUINO

November 13, 1996

Davide, Jr., J.

FACTS:

The witnesses present by the prosecution in its evidence

in chief were Eugenio Godinez, Jimmy Serafin, police

officers Elpidio Luna, Alfredo Mondigo and Mario

Remulta, Dr. Arturo Sormillon, Lt. Myrna Areola, Emilio

Daclan, Atty. Perpetua Socorro Belarmino, and

Presentacion vda. de Broniola, while Olympio Lozano

was presented as rebuttal witness.

Only the accused testified in their defense.

PEOPLE: Eugenio Godinez, overseer since 1952 of

Hacienda Jose Ancajas in Medellin, Cebu, and Pedro

Broniola, the hacienda's bookkeeper, went to the

Medellin Rural Bank to withdraw P50,557.17 The bank's

cashier instructed Jimmy Serafin, janitor and motorcycle

driver of the bank, to drive Godinez and Broniola back to

the hacienda on one of the bank's motorcycles. Serafin

drove the motorcycle with Godinez behind him and

Broniola behind Godinez. Godinez carried the money in a

money bag which he hung over his left shoulder.

As the three were in nearing the hacienda, the accused,

armed with guns, tried to block their path and ordered

them to stop. Godinez heard a gunshot. Broniola had

fallen off the motorcycle. Serafin leapt from the

motorcycle and ran away. The motorcycle toppled over

Godinez, pinning him to the ground. Accused Tumangan,

with gun in hand, approached Godinez, took the money

from the money bag, and fled on foot with his co-

accused. With the assailants gone, Godinez ran home,

leaving Broniola behind. 8 Meanwhile, Serafin had

proceeded to the house of the Broniolas, which was near

the crime scene, and informed Broniola's wife of the

incident. 9

SPO Elpidio Luna, Luna went to the crime scene where

he found an abandoned motorcycle. People who by then

had milled around the site informed Luna "that the

culprit had already fled." Luna noticed that the "bushes

were compressed" and found "a piece of paper utilized

as toilet paper with a stool on it [which] was somewhat

newly delivered." The paper was a bio-data sheet 1with

the name " Melvida, Nenito" and the entry for the

father's name filled in with "Elpidio Melvida."

(EEEEWWW)

After finding Nenito Melvida,Luna asked Melvida to go

with him to the barangay captain's house. Melvida

hesitated at first, but his companions prevailed upon

him to go with Luna.

The barangay captain was not home, so Luna took

Melvida to the police station instead. Melvida was kept

at the station the whole evening of 24 April 1991 for

investigation conducted, first, by Luna, then, by his

fellow policemen Sgt. Pablo Ygot, Cpl. Alfredo Mondigo

and Eliseo Tepait, as Luna had to take his supper.

Melvida was allowed to go home the next day, but only

after the police had filed criminal charges against him he

had posted bail. Melvida was not assisted by counsel

during the police investigation, although Luna assured

the trial judge that the Municipal Mayor of Medellin, who

is a lawyer, was present, While Luna claimed he asked

the Mayor to act as Melvida's counsel, he admitted that

this request did not appear in the record of the

investigation. Luna's investigation of Melvida was not

reduced into writing.

In the course of Luna's investigation, Melvida admitted

that he kept "his share from the loot" in his house.

Melvida then was brought to his house where he got

P9,000.00, in one hundred peso bills, placed inside a

shoe which he delivered to the policemen.

During the investigation conducted by SPO3 Alfredo

Mondigo, Melvida admitted that his (Melvida's)

companions during the robbery were Vicente Tumangan

and Ermelindo Sequiño, Immediately, Mondigo and

policeman Proniely Artiquela proceeded to the house of

Hones where they saw Tumangan and Sequiño on the

porch. Noticing something bulging on the waist of

Tumangan, Mondigo and Artiquela approached

Tumangan and asked him what was that bulging at his

waist. Tumangan did not answer. So, Mondigo patted the

bulge which turned out to be a .38 caliber Squires

Bingham revolver with holster and four bullets. When

ask if he had a license for the firearm, Tumangan

answered in the negative. Mondigo and Artiquela then

brought Tumangan and Sequiño to the police station.

Tumangan was then investigated in the presence of the

Municipal Mayor. Tumangan admitted that he was one of

the

holdupppers.

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Mondigo further declared that the police recovered

P22,526.00, but could not explain any further how the

recovery was made and from whom. As to this amount,

SPO1 Mariano Remulta, property custodian of the

Medellin PNP station, merely declared that he was

entrusted with the P22,526.00 which, according to the

station commander, was "recovered in connection with

the highway robbery case."

The defense interposed alibi and denial and suggested a

frame-up for their exculpation.

The trial court gave weight to the prosecution's evidence

and in its decision it found the accuseds guilty of robbery

with homicide

ISSUES:

Was there an arrest of the accused? YES;

Is it valid? NO

Are the admissions during the investigations valid? NO

Regardless of Luna's claim to the contrary, accused

Nenito Melvida was arrested. An arrest "is the taking of a

person into custody in order that he may be bound to

answer for the commission of an offense," 44 and it is

made "by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested,

or by his submission to the custody of the person making

the arrest." 4Melvida's voluntarily going with Luna upon

the latter's "invitation" was a submission to Luna's

custody, and Luna believed that Melvida was a suspect in

the robbery charged herein, hence, Melvida was being

held to answer for the commission of the said offense.

Since he was arrested without a warrant, the inquiry

must now be whether a valid warrantless arrest was

effected. Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure .

There was NO valid warrantless arrest in this case.

Luna had no personal knowledge of facts indicating

Melvida's guilt; at best, he had an unreasonable

suspicion. Melvida's arrest was thus illegal.

After his unlawful arrest, Melvida underwent custodial

investigation. The custodial investigation commenced

when the police pinpointed Melvida as one of the

authors of the crime or had focused on him as a suspect

thereof. his brought into operation paragraph (1) of

Section 12, Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing

the accused's rights to remain silent and to counsel, and

his right to be informed of these rights.

There was no showing that Melvida was ever informed

of these rights, and Luna admitted that Melvida was not

assisted by counsel during the investigation.

Indisputably, the police officers concerned flouted these

constitutional rights of Melvida and Tumangan and

deliberately disregarded the rule regarding an

investigator's duties prior to and during custodial

interrogation laid down in Morales vs. Enrile and

reiterated in a catena of subsequent cases.

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DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v. VASQUEZ

January 27, 1993

REGALADO, J.

An information dated May 9, 1991 and docketed as

Criminal Case No. 16698 was filed against petitioner

with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section

3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

An order of arrest was issued in said case against herein

petitioner by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of

the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the

accused fixed at P15,000.00. 1

On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion

for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in Behalf of Dr.

Miriam Defensor-Santiago," which pertinently states in

part:

“As a result of the vehicular collision, she suffered

extensive physical injuries which required surgical

intervention. As of this time, her injuries, specifically in

the jaw or gum area of the mouth, prevents her to speak

(sic) because of extreme pain. Further, she cannot for an

extended period be on her feet because she is still in

physical pain. . . . .

On the other hand, the accused Miriam Defensor

Santiago seeks leave of this Honorable Court that she be

considered as having placed herself under the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, for purposes of the

required trial and other proceedings and further seeks

leave of this Honorable Court that the recommended bail

bond of P15,000.00 that she is posting in cash be

accepted.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable

Court that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of

P15,000.00 be duly accepted, and that by this motion,

she be considered as having placed herself under the

custody of this Honorable Court and dispensing of her

personal appearance for now until such time she will

(sic) have recovered sufficiently from her recent near

fatal accident.

Further, on the above basis, it is also respectfully prayed

that the warrant for her arrest be immediately recalled.”

Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a

resolution 3 authorizing petitioner to post a cash bond

for her provisional liberty without need for her physical

appearance

On May 21, 1991, respondent Ombudsman Conrado M.

Vasquez filed with the Sandiganbayan a manifestation

"that accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago appeared in his

office in the second floor of the Old NAWASA Building

located in Arroceros Street, Ermita, Manila at around

3:30 o'clock in the afternoon of May 20, 1991. She was

accompanied by a brother who represented himself to

be Atty. Arthur Defensor and a lady who is said to be a

physician. She came and left unaided, after staying for

about fifteen minutes. "

Acting on said manifestation, the Sandiganbayan issued

a resolution, setting the arraignment of the accused and

setting aside the court's resolution which ordered her

appearance before the deputy clerk of the First Division

of said court on or before June 5, 1991.

In a motion dated May 22, 1991, petitioner asked that

her cash bond be cancelled and that she be allowed

provisional liberty upon a recognizance. She contended

that for her to continue remaining under bail bond may

imply to other people that she has intentions of fleeing,

an intention she would like to prove as baseless. 7

Likewise on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this

Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with

preliminary injunction, and a subsequent addendum

thereto, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the

Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with

Criminal Cases for violations of RA 3019 and libel.

Consequently, a temporary restraining order was issued

by this Court on May 24, 1991, enjoining the

Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila,

Branch 3, from proceeding with the criminal cases

pending before them. This Court, in issuing said order,

took into consideration the fact that according to

petitioner, her arraignment, originally set for June 5,

1991, was inexplicably advanced to May 27, 1991, hence

the advisability of conserving and affording her the

opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right to meet

said contingency.

The Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring: (a) the

arraignment of petitioner until further advice from the

Supreme Court; and (b) the consideration of herein

petitioner's motion to cancel her cash bond until further

initiative from her through counsel. 8

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On January 18, 1992, this Court rendered a decision

dismissing the petition for certiorari and lifting and

setting aside the temporary restraining order previously

issued. The motion for reconsideration filed by

petitioner was eventually denied with finality in this

Court's resolution dated September 10, 1992.

Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992, the

Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against

petitioner which reads as follows:

The hold departure order was issued by reason of the

announcement made by petitioner, which was widely

publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she

would be leaving for the United States to accept a

fellowship supposedly offered by the John F. Kennedy

School of Government at Harvard University. Petitioner

likewise disclosed that she would be addressing Filipino

communities in the United States in line with her

crusade against election fraud and other aspects of graft

and corruption.(IRONIC)

ISSUES:

WON respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the

person of herein petitioner - YES

WON there was a valid posting of bail bond.- YES

** WON the hold departure order deprived her of her

due process rights- NO

We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have

voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of

respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted

"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail

Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago"

wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be

considered as having placed herself under the

jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the

required trial and other proceedings," and categorically

prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount

of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion

"she be considered as having placed herself under the

custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to

claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is

effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after

she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court

and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the

aforestated pleadings she filed therein.

It cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash bail

bond of P15,000.00 for her provisional release as

evidenced by Official Receipt No. 4292925 dated May 15,

1991 and which is even attached as Annex C-2 to her

own motion now under consideration. This is further

buttressed by the fact that petitioner thereafter also filed

a motion for the cancellation of said cash bond and for

the court to allow her provisional liberty upon the

security of a recognizance.

With the filing of the foregoing motions, petitioner

should accordingly and necessarily admit her

acquiescence to and acknowledgment of the propriety of

the cash bond she posted, instead of adopting a stance

which ignores the injunction for candor and sincerity in

dealing with the courts of justice.

Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that

she did not personally appear before respondent court

to file her cash bond, thereby rendering the same

ineffectual. Suffice it to say that in this case, it was

petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of

the cash bond, who requested respondent court to

dispense with her personal appearance until she shall

have recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident.

It is distressing that petitioner should now turn around

and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate

stand on the matter and accommodating her own

request for acceptance of the cash bond posted in her

absence.

It is further submitted by petitioner that the hold

departure order violates her right to due process, right

to travel and freedom of speech.Petitioner is in error.

Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be

said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in

addition to those expressly conferred on them.

Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the

incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction,

a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive

legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental

powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing

laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly

constituted court has the power to do all things that are

reasonably necessary for the administration of justice

within the scope of its jurisdiction. Hence, demands,

matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or

growing out of, the main action, and coming within the

above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the

court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of

its authority over the principal matter, even though the

court may thus be called on to consider and decide

matters which, as original causes of action, would not be

within its cognizance.

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Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make

interlocutory orders necessary to protect its jurisdiction.

Such being the case, with more reason may a party

litigant be subjected to proper coercive measures where

he disobeys a proper order, or commits a fraud on the

court or the opposing party, the result of which is that

the jurisdiction of the court would be ineffectual. What

ought to be done depends upon the particular

circumstances.

To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an exercise

of respondent court's inherent power to preserve and to

maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the

case and the person of the accused.

It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which

we have declared legally valid and complete despite the

absence of petitioner at the time of filing thereof, by

reason of the peculiar circumstances and grounds

hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a relaxation

of the aforecited doctrine in Feliciano. Perforce, since

under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail

bond she holds herself amenable at all times to the

orders and processes of the court, she may legally be

prohibited from leaving the country during the

pendency of the case. This was the ruling we handed

down in Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 32 to the

effect that:

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to

bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary

consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.

Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as

the security required and given for the release of a

person who is in custody of the law, that he will appear

before any court in which his appearance may be

required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.

Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and

the state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial,

and at the same time, to put the accused as much under

the power of the court as if he were in custody of the

proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the

accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what

the law may require of him.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by

no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power

of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their

orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them.

When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or

judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other

means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed

by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of

Court).(recent case daw ito sinabi)

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PLACER V. VILLANUEVA

December 29, 1983

ESCOLIN, J.

During the period from March 30 to April 14, 1982,

petitioners, The City Fiscal of Butuan City and his

assistants filed in the City Court of Butuan 13

informations(see case for complete list).

These informations, except the last four, were certified

to by the respective investigating Fiscals as Follows:

"that a preliminary examination has been conducted by

me in this case, having examined 'the complainant and

his witnesses; that on the basis of the sworn statements,

and other evidence submitted before this Official there is

reasonable ground to believe that the crime charged has

been commited and that herein accussed is probably

guilty thereof " The informations in Criminal Cases Nos.

12219 and 12220 bore the certification of 3rd Assistant

Fiscal Felixberto Guiritan that I am filing this

information upon directive of the Minister of Justice,

who upon review of this resolution of the undersigned

investigating fiscal has found prima facie case against

herein accused, 1 while the informations in Criminal

Cases Nos. 12221 and 12222 were certified to by 2nd

Assistant Fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy in this wise: "I am

filing this information upon directive of the City Fiscal

pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 911, who, upon

review of the resolution of the investigating fiscal now

on temporary detail with the office of the Provincial

Fiscal of Surigao del Sur, has found prima facie case

against the herein accused."

Following receipt of said informations, respondent judge

issued an order setting on April 5, 1982 the hearing of

said criminal cases for the purpose of determining the

propriety of issuing the corresponding warrants of

arrest. After said hearing, respondent issued the

questioned orders, requiring petitioners to submit to the

court the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and

other documentary evidence in support of the

informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of

judicial review of the findings of probable cause by

petitioners.

Petitioners filed two separate motions for

reconsideration of said orders, contending that under

P.D. Nos. 77 and 911, they are authorized to determine

the existence of a probable cause in a preliminary

examination/investigation, and that their findings as to

the existence thereof constitute sufficient basis for the

issuance of warrants of arrest by the court. On April 28,

1982, respondent judge denied said motions and

reiterated his order to petitioners to submit the

supporting affidavits and other documents within five

(5) days from notice.

Hence, petitioners filed this petition for certiorari and

mandamus to set aside the aforesaid orders and to

compel respondent to issue the warrants of arrest in

Criminal Cases Nos. 12209-12222.

Meanwhile, the respondent, in addition to his duties as

presiding judge of Branch I of the City Court of Butuan,

was also assigned to preside over Branch II of said court,

as Judge Jesus Ruiz, presiding judge of said sala, had

retired from the service. The informations filed by

petitioners in Branch II likewise remained dormant

because of respondent's firm refusal to issue the

corresponding warrants of arrest for want of affidavits

of the witnesses. Thus, as disclosed by petitioner's

urgent motion, 6no warrants had been issued in 113

informations as of July 15, 1982.

On July 12, 1982, respondent judge received Our May 19,

1982 Resolution requiring him to comment on the

petition. However, interpreting the same as a denial of

the petition itself, respondent issued on the following

day, July 13, and Omnibus Order directing petitioners to

submit immediately the supporting affidavits and other

evidence in Criminal Cases Nos. 12209-12222. Having

failed to secure a reconsideration of said Omnibus Order,

petitioners finally submitted the required affidavits and

documents on July 15, 1982 in order to avoid further

delay in the prosecution of these cases.

This move on the part of the petitioners would have

rendered the instant petition moot and academic. But

while respondent gave due course to some of said cases

either by issuing the warrants of arrest or taking some

other appropriate action, he refused to issue the

warrants in Criminal Cases Nos. 12417, 12418, 12419,

12420 and 12422, and instead ordered the records

thereof remanded to the City Fiscal "for further

preliminary investigation or reinvestigation," for on the

bases of said affidavits, respondent found no prima facie

case against the accused.

Petitioners therefore filed a motion with this Court to

restrain respondent from enforcing the orders subject of

the main petition and to compel him to accept, and take

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cognizance of, all the informations filed in his court.

They contend that the fiscal's certification in the

information of the existence of probable cause

constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to issue a

warrant of arrest; and that such certification binds the

judge, it being supported by the presumption that the

investigating fiscal had performed his duties regularly

and completely.

Upon the other hand, respondent justifies his order as an

exercise of his judicial power to review the fiscal's

findings of probable cause. He further maintains that the

failure of petitioners to file the required affidavits

destroys the presumption of regularity in the

performance of petitioners' official duties, particularly in

the light of the long standing practice of the Office of the

City Fiscal of Butuan of attaching to the informations

filed with the court the affidavits of prosecution

witnesses and other documentary evidence presented

during the preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:

WON the certification of the investigating fiscal in the

information as to the existence of probable cause

obligates respondent City Judge to issue a warrant of

arrest. – NO

The primary requirement for the issuance of a warrant

of arrest is the existence of probable cause. Section 3,

Article IV of the 1973 Constitution

P.D. No. 911 authorizes the fiscal or state prosecutor to

determine the existence of probable cause. Thus: If on

the basis of complainant's sworn statements and

documents submitted, the investigating dismiss the

raise. If probable cause is established by complainant's

evidence, he shall notify the respondent by issuing a

subpoena .... (Sec. 1 [b], RA 5180, as amended by P.D.

Nos. 77 and 911).

The fiscal or state prosecutor shall certify under oath in

the information to be filed by him that he has examined

the complainant and his witnesses; that on the basis of

the sworn Statements and other evidence submitted

before him there is reasonable ground to believe that a

crime has been committed and that the accused is

probably guilty thereof

There is thus no dispute that the judge may rely upon

the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable

cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest,

But does such certification bind the judge to come out

with the warrant? We answer this query in the negative.

The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial

function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on

the part of the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the

following provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules

of Court:

Warrant of arrest, when issued. If the judge be satisfied

from the preliminary examination conducted by him or

by the investigating officer that the offense complained

of has been committed and that there is reasonable

ground to believe that the accused has committed it, he

must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.

Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the

existence of probable cause before issuing , a warrant or

order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge

finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals

certification and require the submission of the affidavits

of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to

the existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule

since U.S. vs. Ocampo and Amarga vs. Abbas. And this

evidently is the reason for the issuance by respondent of

the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and

July 13, 1982. Without the affidavits of the prosecution

witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter of long-

standing practice had been attached to the informations

filed in his sala, respondent found the informations

inadequate bases for the determination of probable

cause. For as the ensuing events would show, after

petitioners had submitted the required affidavits,

respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of

arrest in the cases where he was satisfied that probable

cause existed.

German to the issue at hand is the Rule on Summary

Procedure in Special Cases applicable to the following,

to wit:

“B. Criminal Cases:

Violation of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

Violations of the rental laws;

Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by

law for the offense charged does not exceed six (6)

months imprisonment, or a fine of One Thousand Pesos

[1,000.00], or both irrespective of other imposable

penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability

arising therefrom; Provided, however, that in offenses

involving damage to property through reckless

negligence, this Rule shall govern where the imposable

fine does not exceed Ten Thousand Pesos [10,000.00].”

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In said cases, the filing of the affidavits of witnesses with

the court is mandatory. Section 9, par. 2 of said Rule

prescribes that "the complaint or information must be

accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and of

his witnesses in such number of copies as there are

defendants plus two (2) copies for the court's files.

Section 10 of the Summary Rule provides:On the basis of

the complaint or information and the affidavits

accompanying the same, the court shall make a

preliminary determination whether to dismiss the case

outright for being patently without basis or merit, or to

require further proceedings to be taken. In the latter

case, the court may set the case for immediate

arraignment of an accused under custody, and if he

pleads guilty, may render judgment forthwith. If he

pleads not guilty, and in all other cases, the court shall

issue an order, accompanied by copies of all the

affidavits submitted by the complainant, directing the

defendants to appear and submit his counter-affidavit

and those of his witnesses at a specified date not later

than ten (10) days from receipt thereof.

Failure on the part of the defendant to appear whenever

required, shall cause the issuance of a warrant for his

arrest if the court shall find that a probable cause exists

after an examination in writing and under oath or

affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses.

The obvious purpose of requiring the submission of

affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses is to

enable the court to determine whether to dismiss the

case outright or to require further proceedings.

One last point. It appears that after petitioners had

submitted the required affidavits of witnesses, the

respondent judge ordered Criminal Cases Nos. 12417,

12418, 12419, 12420 and 12422 remanded to the City

Fiscal for further preliminary investigation or

reinvestigation. We hold that respondent did not abuse

his discretion in doing so. From the informations and

affidavits presented to him, he found the charges

patently without basis or merit. For respondent to issue

the warrants of arrest and try the accused would only

expose the latter to unnecessary harrassment, anxiety

and expense. And as already pointed out, under the Rule

on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, the respondent

judge has the power to order the outright dismissal of

the charge if, from the information and the affidavits

attached thereto, he finds the same to be patently

without basis or merit.

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PEOPLE V. INTING

July 25, 1990

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-

Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental

with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), for

allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant,

Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very

remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission

or clearance from COMELEC as required by law.

Acting on the complaint, COMELEC directed Atty. Gerardo

Lituanas, Provincial Election Supervisor of Dumaguete

City: (1) to conduct the preliminary investigation of the

case; (2) to prepare and file the necessary information in

court; (3) to handle the prosecution if the evidence

submitted shows a prima facie case and (3) to issue a

resolution of prosecution or dismissal as the case may be.

The directive to conduct the preliminary investigation was

pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 1752 dated January

14, 1986. The resolution, in turn, is based on the

constitutional mandate that the COMELEC is charged with

the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to

the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free,

orderly and honest elections (sec. 2, Article XII-C of the

1973 Constitution) and on the Omnibus Election Code

which implements the constitutional provision.

After a preliminary investigation of Barba's complaint,

Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, he filed

with the respondent trial court a criminal case for

violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code

against the OIC-Mayor.

In an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent

court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC

Mayor. It also fixed the bail at five thousand pesos

(P5,000.00) as recommended by the Provincial Election

Supervisor.

However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the

accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its

September 30, 1988 order on the ground that Atty.

Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause

pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

The court stated that it "will give due course to the

information filed in this case if the same has the written

approval of the Provincial Fiscal after which the

prosecution of the case shall be under the supervision and

control of the latter."

In another order, the court gave Atty. Lituanas fifteen (15)

days from receipt to file another information charging the

same offense with the written approval of the Provincial

Fiscal.

Atty. Lituanas failed to comply with the order. Hence, in an

order dated December 8, 1988, the trial court quashed the

information. A motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a

Provincial Election Supervisor involving election

offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial

Fiscal now Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional

Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation

and determine whether or not probable cause exists?

NO

We emphasize important features of the constitutional

mandate that " ... no search warrant or warrant of arrest

shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined

personally by the judge ... " (Article III, Section 2,

Constitution)

Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the

preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for

the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary

investigation proper which ascertains whether the

offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the

two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the

same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the

objectives. The determination of probable cause for the

warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary

investigation proper-whether or not there is reasonable

ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense

charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be

subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of

trial is the function of the Prosecutor.

The Court made this clear in the case of Castillo v. Villaluz

(171 SCRA 39 [1989]): “Judges of Regional Trial Courts

(formerly Courts of First Instance) no longer have

authority to conduct preliminary investigations. That

authority, at one time reposed in them under Sections 13,

14 and 16 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court of 1964, was

removed from them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal

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Procedure, effective on January 1, 1985, which deleted all

provisions granting that power to said Judges. “

We had occasion to point this out in Salta v. Court of

Appeals, 143 SCRA 228, and to stress as well certain other

basic propositions, namely: (1) that the conduct of a

preliminary investigation is "not a judicial function ... (but)

part of the prosecution's job, a function of the executive,"

(2) that wherever "there are enough fiscals or prosecutors

to conduct preliminary investigations, courts are

counseled to leave this job which is essentially executive to

them," and the fact "that a certain power is granted does

not necessarily mean that it should be indiscriminately

exercised."

The distinction must, therefore, be made clear while an

RTC Judge may no longer conduct preliminary

investigations to ascertain whether there is sufficient

ground for the filing of a criminal complaint or

information, he retains the authority, when such a

pleading is filed with his court, to determine whether there

is probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant of

arrest. It might be added that this distinction accords,

rather than conflicts, with the rationale of Salta because

both law and rule, in restricting to judges the authority to

order arrest, recognize that function to be judicial in

nature.

The first kind of preliminary investigation is executive in

nature. It is part of the prosecution's job. The second kind

of preliminary investigation which is more properly called

preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged

with the judge. It is in this context that we address the

issue raised in the instant petition so as to give meaning to

the constitutional power vested in the COMELEC regarding

election offenses.

Article IX C Section 2 of the Constitution mandates the

COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute

cases of violation of election laws. This means that the

COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary

investigations in cases involving election offenses for the

purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause

and for filing an information in court. This power is

exclusive with COMELEC.

The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to

enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of

election and the concomittant authority to investigate and

prosecute election offenses is not without compelling

reason. The evident constitutional intendment in

bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free,

orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which

would result in the frustration of the true will of the people

and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and

duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the

COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute

offenses committed by public officials in relation to their

office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in

achieving this clear constitutional mandate.

From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions

relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, We perceived neither

explicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the

Tanodbayan, of the authority to investigate, prosecute and

hear election offenses committed by public officers in

relation to their office as contradistinguished from the

clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and

jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of first

instance under Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of the

Election Code of 1978.

It is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the

offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election

offense jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with

the COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power over the

conduct of elections. (Corpus v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA

281 [1987])

Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the

prosecution of election offenses.

It is only after a preliminary examination conducted by the

COMELEC through its officials or its deputies that section

2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution comes in. This is so,

because, when the application for a warrant of arrest is

made and the information is filed with the court, the judge

will then determine whether or not a probable cause exists

for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

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SOLIVEN V. MAKASIAR

November 14, 1988

PER CURIAM

Background (NOT IN THE CASE): Beltran and Soliven

broadcasted over the radio that President Aquino hid

under her bed during the coup d’etat and were charged

with libel. Soliven invokes Pres. Aquino’s immunity from

suit to get off the hook. (Soliven:”I can’t sue her therefore

she can’t sue me.”)

ISSUE:

WON the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated

when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his

arrest without personally examining the complainant

and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable

searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any

purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or

warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to

be determined personally by the judge after examination

nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the

witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the

place to be searched and the persons or things to be

seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word

"determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by

the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other

responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has

apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the

Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine

the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of

probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This

is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and

personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy

himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying

himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance

of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to

personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.

Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)

personally evaluate the report and the supporting

documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence

of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant

of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable

cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the

submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him

in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable

cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges

would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination

and investigation of criminal complaints instead of

concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before

their courts.

On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously

adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the

issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein

provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution.

It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated

from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the

issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

cannot be sustained.

NOTES on non-arrest issues: On issue of presidential immunity The privilege form immunity from suit (which is aimed to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction considering that President’s job requires all of her time and attention) pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused. Moreover, the President has the right to waive such privilege but it is only him/her that could decide to do so. On WON petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President Moot and academic SOJ denied the motion and found prima facie case; SOJ denied the appeal, Executive Secretary denied the appeal. Beltran impliedly waived right to refute by filing “Motion to Decalre Proceedings Closed”.

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Lim, Sr. vs. Felix

February 19, 1991

Gutierrez, Jr., J.

Quick Summary:

The petitioners were accused to have been responsible for

the death of CCOng. Moises Espinosa and his security

escorts and the injury caused to another one. The Judge,

relying solely on the Prosecutor’s certification issued

warrants of arrest against the accused. It was help that this

is grave abuse of discretion. The jusge may rely on the

Prosecutor’s certification but it has to be supported by

reports, affidavits, etc.

Facts:

-March 17, 1989 - An assassin attacked and killed Cong.

Moises Espinosa and his security escorts Antonio Cortes,

Gaspar Amaro and Artemio Fuentes around the Masbate

Domestic Airport. Dante Siblante survived but was injured.

-For the purpose of a preliminary investigation, an

amended complaint was filed by the investigator from the

PC Criminal Investigation Service accusing Vicente Lim, Sr.,

Mayor Susana Lim, Jolly Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez,

Jr., Nonilon Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor Lim and Mayor

Antonio Kho for multiple murder and frustrated

murder.

-The court issued an order stating that after weighing the

affidavits and answers given by the witnesses, a probable

cause has been established for the issuance of a

warrant of arrest.

-The same Order ordered the arrest of petitioners and

recommended bail in the amount of P200,000 which was

reduced to P150,000 for Jolly Fernandez and Nonilon

Bagalihog.

-The records were transmitted to the Provincial

Prosecutor, and Fiscal Alfane who was designated to

review the case affirmed the finding of prima facie case

against the petitioners but ruled that the crime should

have been murder for the killing of the 4 victims and

physical injuries for inflicting gunshot wound on the

buttocks of Siblante.

-Fiscal Alfane filed 4 informations of murder and

recommended no bail.

-Vicente Lim and Susana Lim filed for change of venue but

was denied.

-Vicente Lim and Susana Lim filed several motions and

manifestations praying that (1) the records of the

preliminary inquiry be transmitted to the Court for its

personal determination of the existence of probable cause

as well as its determination of guilt, (2) movants be given

ample opportunity to file their motion for PI as a matter of

right and (3) they be allowed to file for reduction of bail or

for admission of bail in case the Court may be convinced of

the existence of probable cause.

-The Lims reiterated in another manifestation that the

court conduct a hearing to determine if there really exists

probable cause in light of the recantations of witnesses in

the preliminary investigation. These were opposed by the

prosecution.

-The court denied the motions and manifestations and

issued warrants of arrest against the accused stating

that it is just and proper to rely on the prosecutor’s

certification since each information is complete in

form and substance and there is no visible defect on its

face. Both the MTC and the provincial prosecutor

found probable cause.

-The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order ordering

the judge or his duly authorized representatives or agents

to cease and desist from implementing the warrant of

arrest.

-The Court issued in another Resolution a preliminary

mandatory injunction ordering and directing the

respondent judge to recall/set aside and/or annul the legal

effects of the warrant of arrest without bail against Jolly

Fernandez, Florencio Fernandez and Nonilon Bagalihog,

and release them from detention. It also issued a TRO

ordering the judge to cease and desist from implementing

the warrants against Nestor Lim and Kho.

ISSUE: WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without

bail by simply relying on the prosecution’s certification

and recommendation that a probable cause exists.

HELD: YES.

-The addition of the word ‘personally’ after the word

‘determined’ and the deletion of the grant of authority by

the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to ‘other

respondent officers as may be authorized by law’ does not

mean that it is required that the judge personally examine

the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of

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probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. What

the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal

responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the

existence of probable cause. What the judge has to do is to

personally evaluate the report and the supporting

documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence

of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant

of arrest, or, if on the basis thereof he finds no probable

cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the

submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him

in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable

cause.

Interpretation of Article III, Sec 2

-Only the Judge and the Judge alone determines the

existence of probable cause.

-The certification of the Prosecutor does not bind the

judge. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of

stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting

documents behind the Prosecutor’s certification which are

material in assisting the Judge to make his determination.

-There is a difference between the preliminary inquiry

which determines probable cause for the issuance of a

warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation

proper which ascertains whether the offender should be

held for trial or released. The first is made by the Judge;

the second is made by the Prosecutor.

-Grave abuse of discretion is committed when the Judge

relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor. This

would mean that it is the Prosecutor who determined

probable cause.

IN THIS CASE, the judge committed grave abuse of

discretion when he relied solely on the Prosecutor’s

certification. Petition is Granted.

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PANGANDAMAN VS CASAR

April 14, 1988

Narvasa, j.

Quick summary:

Shooting incident. Complaint filed before the Judge who

determined probable cause for issuance of warrats of

arrest without investigation by the Fiscal.

Court held that there’s no need to complete the two stages

in order to issue the warrant. The completion applies only

to the filing of an Information.

Facts:

-July 27, 1985 – shooting incident occurred in Lanao del

Sur in which at least five people died and two others were

wounded.

-The following day, Atty. Batuampar who claimed to be the

counsel for the widow of one of the victims filed a letter-

complaint with the Provincial Fiscal and asked for a “full

blast preliminary investigation” of the incident. The letter

adverted to the possibility of innocent persons being

implicated by the parties but none was identified. Fiscal

requested that all cases related to the incicdent be

forwarded to his office which had taken cognizance of the

said cases.

-Aug 10 – a criminal complaint for multiple murder was

filed before the respondent Judge by PC Sgt Jose Laru-an.

Respondent Judge examined personally all three witnesses

under oath thru close and direct supervision. The Judge

approved the complaint and issued the corresponding

warrant of arrest against the 14 petitioners and 50 John

Does.

-The petitioners and the SolGen argue that the prelim

investigation was not done in accordance with the

procedure prescribed in Sec 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of

Court and that the failure constituted a denial to

petitioners of due process which nullified the proceedings

leading to the issuance of the warrants of arrests. They

contend that it would have been impossible for the Judge

to determine probable cause for 64 persons in a matter of

hours and issue the warrants in the same day. The Judge

allegedly relied mainly on the supporting affidavits which

were obviously prepared already when presented to him

by an enlisted PC personnel as investigator.

-The petitioners assert that the Judge disregarded the

Fiscal who had already taken cognizance of the case.

-Discussion of Section 3 of Rule 112 (pls see previous case

on the two stages of prelim investigation)

ISSUE: WON the respondent Judge had the power to issue

the warrant of arrest without completing the entire

prescribed procedure for PI. [is the completion of the

procedure in Section 3 of Rule 112 a condition sine qua

non for the issuance of a warrant of arrest?]

HELD: No. The PI has been completed as far as the Judge is

concerned. After receiving the complaint and examining

the witnesses, he determined that there was probable

cause.

There is no requirement that the entire procedure for PI

must be completed. What the Rule provides is that no

complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the

RTC may be filed without completing that procedure. But

nowhere is it provided that the procedure must be

completed before a warrant of arrest may issue. Section 6

allows that the warrant be issued even before the opening

of the second phase.

-Modification introduced by RA 3838: The judge must

examine the witnesses to the complaint, the examination

under oath and reduce to writing in the form of searching

questions and answers.

-The rule is that such issuance need only await a finding of

probable cause, not the completion of the entire procedure

of PI.

-The questions asked by the Judge satisfied the Court that

the determination of probable cause was not arbitrary.

-The time it took the Judge to determine probable cause is

not an issue.

-The Court is not prepared to question the propriety of the

respondent Judge’s finding of probable cause or substitute

it judgment for his in the matter of what questions to put

to the witnesses during the preliminary examination.

-The warrant of arrest in question validly issued against

the petitioners, such issuance having been ordered after

proceedings, to which no irregularity has been shown to

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attach, in which the respondent Judge found sufficient

cause to commit the petitioners to answer for the crime

complained of.

-HOWEVER, warrant issued against 50 John Does, not one

of whom is identified, is in the nature of general warrants.

Void.

-Fiscal’s declaration of intent to investigate did not legally

inhibit Judge. Complaint was legally brought to the Judge,

not the Fiscal.

FINAL JUDGMENT: valid as it orders the arrest of

petitioners.

Voided to the extent that it is issued against 50 John Does.

Notes:

Searching questions and answers:

..only, taking into consideration the purpose of the

preliminary examination which is to determine "whether

there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense has

been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof

so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused

held for trial," such questions as have tendency to show

the commission of a crime and the perpetuator thereof.

What would be searching questions would depend on what

is sought to be inquired into, such as: the nature of the

offense, the date, time, and place of its commission, the

possible motives for its commission; the subject, his age,

education, status, financial and social circumstances, his

attitude toward the investigation, social attitudes,

opportunities to commit the offense; the victim, his age,

status, family responsibilities, financial and social

circumstances, characteristics, etc. The points that are the

subject of inquiry may differ from case to case. The

questions, therefore must to a great degree depend upon

the Judge making the investigation. ...

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PEOPLE VS CA

January 21, 1999

Panganiban, J.

Quick summary:

Rosalinda Dy was shot at pointblank range by Jonathan

Cerbo in the presence of Billy Crespo. Judge ordered that

the case against Billy Crespo be dismissed and that the

warrant be recalled.

Facts:

-Aug 30, 1993 – Rosalinda Dy was allegedly shot at

pointblank range by Jonathan Cerbo in the presence of his

father Billy Crespo.

-Sept 2 – eyewitness Elsa Gumban executed an affidavit

positively identifying private respondent Jonathan Cerbo

as the assailant.

-Sept 30 – Jonathan executed a counter affidavit claiming

that the shooting was accidental.

-Oct 6 – MTC found probable cause for the crime of murder

after PI and resolved to forward the records of the case to

the Provincial Prosecutor.

-Info for murder filed. Daughter of the victim executed an

affidavit-complaint charging Billy Cerbo of conspiracy in

the crime. Billy Cerbo denied.

-Prosecution filed an amended Info including Billy Cerbo.

Warrant of arrest later issued.

-Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash warrant because of

lack of probable cause.

-Judge ordered that the case against Billy Cerbo be

dismissed and that the warrant be recalled.

-CA affirmed the Trial Court’s decision finding no grave

abuse of discretion in the act of the Judge.

ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the the Information against

Billy Cerbo for want of evidence is proper.

HELD: NO.

-The determination of probable cause is an executive

function. The Trial Court does not and may not be

compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise of

such function.

-The public prosecutor has broad discretion to determine

whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom

he or she believes to have committed the crime as defined

by law.

-The determination of probable cause in the issuance of

arrest warrants is a judicial function.

-The objectives of the two officers are different, which is

why the jusge cannot rely solely on the prosecutor’s

certification.

-It is not required that the complete or entire records of

the case during the PI be submitted to the judge. What is

required is that the judge must have sufficient supporting

documents upon which to make his independent judgment

or to verify the findings of the prosecutor.

-a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if

he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing

so

Allado and Salonga inapplicable

Allado: evidence presented did not meet the standard of

probable cause

Salonga: no prima facie case against a person sought to be

charged with a crime.

Main witness in this case is not a conspirator of the crime.

-The motion to quash the warrant of arrest in the present

case being pro forma, inasmuch as the requisite copy and

notice were not duly served upon the adverse party, the

trial court had no authority to act on it.

CrimPro [Arrest]


People vs. Lumayok

October 1, 1985

Alampay, J.

*The confession was acquired by torturing and maltreating

the accused.

Facts: Lumayok was charged with the crime or Rape with

Murder for allegedly raping Gloria Belmos and killing her

to conceal the commission of the crime.

(denied by the accused)

Mansueto Bemos went to the house of Edwin Rico and told

him that his daughter was missing. The handbag of the

victim was found and some 100 meters away from it, a

black comb belonging to accused Lumayok was also found.

Eventually, the body of the victim was found. The accused

admitted to the police officer that he raped the victim and

that he killed her after. He said that he did so because his

bride-to-be (another girl) left him.

(version of the accused)

-he was playing basketball with Edwin Rico and other

companions. Edwin Rico borrowed his black comb and

never returned it (the comb found near the victim’s

handbag). He said that he went home right after and that

Edwin Rico went to his house in the evening and asked

him to help in the search for Gloria Bemos. Edwin Rico’s

group found the body of the victim.

-The policemen on a pretext that they needed Lucio

Lumayok to accompany them in buying petroleum, invited

him. He readily went with them.

-He denied the accusation regarding the rape and murder

of Gloria Bemos but he was maltreated and tortured.

-The investigating policemen burned his penis and his

pubic hair. They shaved his head and threatened that they

would get the skin off his head if he wouldn’t tell them that

he did that. They told him that they would help him in

court if he signs.

-He put his thumbmark on the paper without knowing the

contents as he was illiterate.

ISSUE: WON the admission of the accused may be used as

evidence and establishes his guilt.

HELD: No.

-The accused was not informed of his constitutional rights

against self-incrimination or that he was afforded

opportunity to avail himself of assistance of a counsel.

-The purported confession is in English and there is no

mention that the question answered by the accused had

been translated by anyone.

-The confession was not submitted to the Municipal Judge.

-The following requisites were not observed:

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, ... . He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means-by telephone if possible- or by letter of messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be inadmissible in evidence.

- It was a mistake for the trial court to accept the testimony of Sanciano Satorre saying that he burned the accused’s pubic hair and that the accused allowed him to do so. Such is beyond basic human instincts and the ordinary normal behavior of persons.

-The initial reaction of the accused was to deny having committed the crime. HE signed the confession with a thumbmark, but denied again during trial. It goes to show that he did not understand the confession.

CrimPro [Arrest]


PEOPLE VS ALBIOR

June 30, 1988

Cortes, J.

Facts: The accused, together with other men, was charged

with Robbery with Homicide with Rape. They allegedly

robbed the house of Florencio Garces in Project 8, Quezon

City and raped Dana Garces.

-Albior pleaded not guilty. After trial, the trial court found

Albior guilty and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of

reclusion perpetua.

-Agent Teofilo Jamela of the CIS Investigation Section

testified that Albior and Vasquez (his co-accused) admitted

that they served as lookouts while Bernardo Reyes entered

the victim’s room. Vasquez stated that Manansalang and

Reyes related to him that earlier that day they robbed the

house of the victim, and in the course of the robbery, Reyes

raped and killed the victim.

-Agent Dayco stated that he interrogated the persons to

whom the typewriter stolen from the Garces residence was

sold and that the first buyer pointed to Manalangsang and

Vasquez as the persons who sold it to him.

-Sgt Prado testified that the panty of the victim and the

stolen Adidas shoes were found in Vasquez’s house.

-Albior testified that he was at the house of his cousin in

Baesa, Quezon City when the crime was being committed.

He said that he did not understand Tagalog, the dialect

tin which the confession was written, and signed it

only because he was told he’d be released if he signed

it.

-Vasquez testified that during a drinking spree where

accused Manalangsang and Albior were also present,

Bernardo Reyes recounted how he and Manalangsang

robbed the house of the victim, and how he hit her with a

baluster when she awoke. Reyes brought out the panty of

the victim. Vasquez denied having sold the stolen

typewriter and said that it was Manalangsang who sold it.

He said that he signed the extra-judicial confession

because he was threatened at the CIS headquarters

with physical violence.

-The trial court held that the extrajudicial confession of

Albior was voluntarily and freely given.

ISSUE: WON the extra-judicial confession of Albior was

valid.

Held: No.

-7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, ... . He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means-by telephone if possible- or by letter of messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part shall be inadmissible in evidence.

-lack of assistance of counsel in Albior’s waiver of his right

-It must also be noted that although Albior hardly speaks Tagalog, Cebuano being his native dialect, the sworn statement is in Tagalog (Exh. "N"]. It does not suffice that an interpreter, an agent of the CIS, was present during the interrogation (as stated in the sworn statement) because by virtue of its being written in Tagalog, Albior was deprived of the opportunity to comprehend through his own reading what he was signing.

Finally, the testimony of Albior that he agreed to sign the sworn statement because he was promised that he would be released adds to the conclusion that he did not understand what he was signing. No reasonable person would believe the promise that he would be re leased if he knows that he had just signed a statement admitting his participation in the commission of a very serious offense.

CrimPro [Arrest]


People v. Tudtud

J. Tinga (2003)

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes once declared: “it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.” Hence, given a choice between letting suspected criminals escape or letting the government play an ignoble part, to this Court, it should be the former1 Sometime during July and August 1999, the Toril Police

Station (Davao) received a report from a “civilian asset” named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud

Solier related that his neighbor Tudtud was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area

Reacting to the report, the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station conducted “surveillance” on Solier’s neighborhood

For 5 days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in selling marijuana, according to his neighbors

On August 1, 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana

Solier described Tudtud to the police as big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat

Version of the Police: That same day, a police team (wearing civilian clothes)

posted themselves near Toril bus stop to await Tudtud’s arrival

At about 8:00 pm, two men disembarked from a bus carrying a carton box and one of the men fit Tudtud’s description

The police thereafter approached the suspects and identified themselves as police officers

They informed Tudtud and companion (Dindo Bolong) that they had information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night

Tudtud denied that he was carrying any drugs The police then asked him if they could see the contents

of the box; Tudtud obliged, saying, “it was alright” and opened the box himself

The box contained pieces of dried fish, but beneath it were two bundles, wrapped in a plastic bag and newspapers

Tudtud was then told to unwrap the packages and they contained what seemed to the policemen as marijuana leaves

1 J. Tinga used the abovequoted as backdrop in discussing the merits of the case–arte lang ito. For more quotable quotes.

The police thus arrested Tudtud and Bulong, informed them of their rights and brought them to the police station

Tudtud’s Version: He testified that he did not know co-accused Bolong

and that on the day of the arrest, he just came from Cotabato where he sold pairs of Levi’s pants (his sideline)

He testified, further, that upon alighting from the bus, a man who identified himself as a police officer, approached and pointed a gun at him

Said police officer inspected the bag Tudtud was carrying but found nothing except for pairs of Levi’s pants

Then, the same police officer ordered him to open a carton box some 2 meters away. Tudtud claims that the box was already there when he disembarked from the bus

Out of fear and intimidation, he proceeded to open said box and inside were pieces of dried fish and underneath was something wrapped in cellophane

Without even unwrapping the cellophane, the police officer declared that it contained marijuana and thereafter abruptly handcuffed Tudtud

Meanwhile, the confiscated items were turned over to

the PNP Crime Lab for examination and tests confirmed that the same was marijuana

Tudtud and Bulong were subsequently charged before the Davao RTC with illegal possession of prohibited drugs; Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty

The defense, however, reserved their right to question the validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them

On trial, prosecution presented as witnesses, among others, the arresting officers and Solier

Defense, on the other hand, denied the charges and cried frame-up

RTC found against Tudtud and convicted him together with Bolong

On appeal, the defendants raised the following issue: WoN the confiscated marijuana is admissible as evidence, it having been seized in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures? – Otherwise stated (and for our purposes), WoN they were validly arrested and searched HELD: NO WAY! The Decision of the Davao RTC is REVERSED. Appellants Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong are hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence

CrimPro [Arrest]


RATIO: Application/Construction of Const. and Rules of Court on Warrantless Arrests and Searches According to Sec 2, Art III (Const.), the rule is that a

search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes “unreasonable”

In conjunction with Sec 3(2), Art III (Const.), any evidence secured in violation of Sec 2 will be inadmissible in evidence “for any purpose in any proceeding”

The proscription in Sec 2, Art III, however, covers only “unreasonable” searches and seizures. The following instances are NOT “unreasonable” searches even in the absence of a warrant thru Sec 5(a), Rule 113:2

1) Search incidental to a lawful arrest (Sec 12, Rule 126)3

2) Search of evidence in “plain view” 3) Search of a moving vehicle 4) Consented warrantless search 5) Customs search 6) Stop and Frisk 7) Exigent and emergency circumstances

Under Sec 5, Rule 113, “reliable information” alone is not enough to constitute probable cause, much less is it sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest4

In addition, the same rule requires that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he “has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense” (in flagrante delicto)

Further, in conjunction with Sec 6(a), Rule 113, the officer arresting a person in flagrante delicto must have personal knowledge of that fact (i.e. the act must be committed in his presence or within his view)

THEREFOR, for the exception in Sec 5(a), Rule 113 to apply, two elements must concur:5

2 Rule 113, Sec 5: A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense x x x

3 Sec 12, Rule 126: Search incident to lawful arrest. – A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant 4 The reason is obvious (People v. Montilla and People v. Doria): Any one an informant points out to a police officer as a possible violator of the law could be subject to search and possible arrest. This would clearly be a circumvention of the legal requisites for validly effecting an arrest or conducting a search and seizure. 5 People v. Burgos (cited in People v. Aminnudin) note that J. Tinga actually listed jurisprudence that deviated significantly from Burgos and Aminnudin where

1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime

2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer (personal knowledge or probable cause); reliable information alone is insufficient

Simply stated, all the above rules require personal knowledge on the part of the officers making the in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest and the subsequent warrantless search

IMPORTANT: A statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest/search warrant is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations where securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary

The Rules as Applied to the Facts of this Case: In the instant case, RTC justified the warrantless search

of appellants’ belongings under the first exception, namely: a search incidental to a lawful arrest THIS IS UNTENABLE

It is significant to note that the search in the case at bar preceded the arrest. Jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed

CAVEAT: a search may precede an arrest as long as such a search is substantially contemporaneous with an arrest AND that the searching/arresting authority have probable cause6 to make the arrest at the outset of the search

The question, therefore, is whether the police had probable cause to arrest appellants without a judicial warrant NO!

Absence of Personal Knowledge, ergo, No Probable Cause To repeat, mere “reliable information” or tip from a

“civilian asset” is not enough to constitute probable cause. The same “tip” also does not translate into “personal knowledge” on the part of arresting/searching officer of facts constituting a belief

warrantless arrests based on mere “reliable information” or where the arrested persons did not perform overt acts which indicated that they have committed, is committing or will commit a crime were upheld. He did not go into details about these cases but simply declared that the rule in Burgos and Aminnudin “more faithfully adheres to the letter of Sec 5(a), Rule 113. 6 Probable Cause is an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.

CrimPro [Arrest]


that person to be arrested/searched is in flagrante delicto as to justify the warrantless arrest and search

Appellants in this case were neither performing any overt act or acting in a suspicious manner that would hint that a crime has been, was being, or was about to be, committed even if the police’s version is to be believed, carrying a carton box out of a bus is not at all suspicious

More importantly, the knowledge of the herein arresting/searching officers that appellant Tudtud was in possession of marijuana cannot be described as “personal,” having learned the same only from their unreliable informant Solier

Solier in his testimony said that he obtained his information only from his neighbors (ergo, hearsay)

Even the police officers were not fully convinced of the reliability of Solier’s information as they felt it necessary to conduct their own surveillance

But even if we take into account the “surveillance” information, it still does not constitute “personal knowledge” on the part of the police officers as they did not actually stalk out Tudtud to catch him in the act of selling drugs. Instead, the police merely collected information from Tudtud’s neighbors, which again is hearsay, not personal knowledge

No Urgency to Justify Not Applying for Proper Warrant Moreover, the records of the case suggest that the

policemen need not have resorted to warrantless arrest/search because they actually had ample opportunity to apply for the proper warrant they received Solier’s info at 9am and Tudtud was expected to arrive still at 6pm; Toril RTC was merely 16 km away from the Police Station

Procedural dispatch in procuring warrants under certain circumstances7 as in this case are sanctioned by the Supreme Court even after office hours, weekends and legal holidays;8 hence there was no reason for the police officer’s omission to secure the proper judicial warrant

At the trial, one of the arresting police officers intimated that the real reason why they did not procure the proper warrant was that they were not too confident that they could establish probable cause

7 Memorandum Circular No. 19 (1987): All applications for search warrants relating to violation of x x x Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, shall no longer be raffled and shall immediately be taken cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judge x x x under whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located 8 Memorandum Circular No. 13 (1985): x x x an application for search warrant may be filed directly with any judge whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located, after office hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, in which case the applicant is required to certify under oath the urgency of the issuance thereof

And although in the process of approving or denying an application for a warrant, the determination of probable cause by the law enforcers is not binding to the judge, such apprehension on the part of the police raises serious question on and further erodes the existence of “personal knowledge” on their part of appellant’s culpability

No Consented Warrantless Search The requisites for the valid waiver of the right against

unreasonable searches (consent to warrantless search) are:

1) It must appear that the right exists 2) The person concerned had knowledge (actual or

constructive) of the existence of such a right 3) Said person had actual intention to relinquish the

right In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to establish

requisites 2 and 3 Although the records disclose that Tudtud said “it was

alright” for the police to search his belongings and that he did not resist the same, the Constitution and jurisprudence require a lot more than the presence of such circumstances to constitute a valid waiver of a constitutional right

Acquiescence to a loss of a fundamental right is not to be presumed, hence, the fact that a person failed to object to a warrantless search does not amount to a permission thereto

Too, considering that the search came after the men who approached Tudtud had identified themselves as police officers (and allegedly pointed a gun at him), the above rule is applied more strictly

The courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; thus, a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law

Also, because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions and shift to the accused the burden of proving that the search was without consent

All told, the police officers were unable to meet the exacting requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Court to justify the warrantless arrest of Tudtud’s person and the subsequent warrantless search of his belongings. Evidence taken therefrom is inadmissible. And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of appellants cannot be sustained

CrimPro [Arrest]


People v. Chua

J. Ynares-Santiago (2003)

On Sept 21, 1996, police officers of PNP Angeles

received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant Chua was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City

On the basis of this lead, a team of police operatives was formed to accost Chua. They positioned themselves across the street fronting Thunder Inn Hotel

At around 11:45pm, a car driven by Chua arrived and parked near the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel

After Chua alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box walking towards the entrance of the Hotel, police officers hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers

In the course of said arrest, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from Chua’s pocket. Forthwith, police officers subjected him to a “body search” which yielded 20 pieces of live .22 caliber bullets; same officer also peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, and saw that it contained a crystalline substance (arrest preceded the search)

The police confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the bullets, and Chua’s car; said items were brought to the PNP Headquarters in Angeles City

Initial field test conducted at the PNP Headquarters (not at the crime scene) revealed that the seized items were methamphetamine hydrochloride/shabu

Thereafter, these items were subjected to further examination at the PNP Crime Lab where, after due testing, it was concluded that the crystalline substances yielded positive results for shabu

Appellant Binad Sy Chua was then charged with violation of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of ammunitions in two separate Informations

He pleaded “not guilty” on arraignment and the cases were jointly tried

The defense presented an entirely different version of the facts9 which, in sum, intimated frame-up

RTC of Angeles City rendered judgment acquitting Chua for Illegal Possession of ammunition but convicting him for Illegal Possession of Prohibited Drugs, hence, this appeal

ISSUE: WoN warrantless arrest of Chua and the subsequent search of his person which yielded material evidence against him (shabu) were conducted in a lawful and valid manner HELD: NO. The decision of the RTC of Angeles City convicting accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is REVERSED

9 This, however, was not passed upon in the discussion of the merits, thus, it might not be relevant. Tanong niyo na lang sa akin if you’re interested

and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt RATIO: RTC, in convicting Chua, ruled that the warrantless

arrest was valid as Chua was accordingly arrested in flagrante delicto while then carrying prohibited drugs, hence, the subsequent search of his person was also valid, being incidental to a lawful arrest and akin to “stop-and-frisk” this is UNTENABLE

The RTC confused two principles on warrantless searches, i.e. search incidental to a lawful arrest (in flagrante delicto) and “stop-and-frisk”

These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of (1) the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and (2) in their allowable scope

Searches in flagrante delicto Stop-and-frisk Searches

Arrest precedes search Probable cause (personal

knowledge) is required arresting officer may

search the person of the arrestee and the surrounding area where evidence may be located; he may also seize any property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence

Search precedes arrest Probable cause is not

required; well-grounded suspicion is enough, provided that according to the surrounding conditions and the officer’s experience, a person of suspect behavior may be reasonably believed to be potentially dangerous

limited search of outer clothing of a person for weapons or contraband

A warrantless search incidental to an arrest in flagrante

delicto is necessary because the suspect has already been caught red-handed while committing, has just committed or will commit a crime at the presence/within the view of the arresting officer

“Stop-and-frisk,” on the other hand, is defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapons or contraband

Common elements of a stop-and-frisk are: (1) the police officer firstly introduces himself properly and make initial inquiries; (2) then approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct; and (3) check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons

It serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection;10 and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation11

10 That a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a

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Inapplicability of in flagrante delicto and stop-and-frisk In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto

nor the “stop and frisk” principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on Chua

For a valid arrest in flagrante delicto, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer both elements are not present in this case

The records of the case reveal that there was no overt manifestation that Chua has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime (he was merely entering a hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O box which is not a suspicious activity)

Also, it has been held that “reliable information” alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest leading to the only conclusion that there could have been no in flagrante delicto arrest preceding the search of Chua

Further militating the case of the prosecution is the fact established by the arresting officer’s testimony on trial to the effect that they have already known and investigated Chua’s drug-dealing activities for two years prior to his actual arrest this only means that whatever information the civilian asset relayed to the police on the night of the arrest was not an “on-the-spot” tip which may excuse them from obtaining the proper warrant of arrest

All circumstances considered, there was also no valid “stop-and-frisk” in the case of Chua

For one, he was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession (contrary to established stop-and-frisk principle that requires the search to precede the arrest)

Also, the fact reveals that the police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into Chua’s business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying; they merely identified themselves as policemen but this was when they have already arrested Chua

Further, Chua was not exhibiting any unusual and suspicious conduct reasonable enough to dispense with

person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause 11 to permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals with is not armed with a deadly weapon that could be used against him

the procedure outlined by jurisprudence and the law on stop-and-frisk

Inapplicability of Other Valid Means of Warrantless Searches Search (of evidence) In Plain View – (1) there was no

valid intrusion; (2) the evidence, i.e., the plastic bag, the Zest-O box which contained shabu and the pieces of .22 caliber ammunition, were not inadvertently discovered (the police intentionally searched for these items and were not “in plain view”)

In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, or a customs search. It cannot also fall under exigent and emergency circumstances

CrimPro [Arrest]


People v. Mendez

J. Mendoza (2002)

Appellants Renante Mendez and Rene “Baby”

Cabagtong were charged with the crime of rape with homicide of one Candy Dolim

Upon arraignment, they pleaded “not guilty” and then trial ensued

The prosecution’s theory (supported by its witnesses’ testimonies): On the morning of Dec 8, 1996, Candy was asked by her father to go out and collect bets for the PBA endings game from the local residents. She never returned that evening and her relatives looked for her in vain. She was to be found only on Dec 12, brutally molested and lifeless

Later, the victim’s father heard reports that a certain Ronnie Cabagtong was involved in the killing of his daughter, hence, he filed a complaint against Ronnie

This caused Ronnie’s warrantless arrest (and detention) together with appellant Mendez; but while Ronnie was being investigated at the police station, his mother Aurea arrived and declared that she knew what really happened to Candy and offered to be a witness. She pointed to appellants Mendez and Baby Cabagtong as the perpetrators

Aurea testified that on the night of Dec 8, appellants went to her house looking for Ronnie and that her son asked her to let the two inside. She testified that she saw appellants washing their clothes to remove bloodstains on them when the two spent the night in her house

Ronnie Cabagtong, for his part, claimed to be an eyewitness to the crime. He testified that on the evening of Dec 8, he was in a local Betamax screening place where the victim and the appellants were also present. He said that Candy left early and that appellants followed her. He himself left the place 5 minutes later and on the way home, he allegedly saw from 3 meters away appellants raping Candy. It was raining and there was no moonlight, but Ronnie said he recognized appellants because of a lantern which illuminated the place. After witnessing the crime, he casually proceeded home and went to sleep only to be awakened by appellants coming to his house (and the rest in Aurea’s story)

Ronnie’s statement, however, was never put into writing, but he was released from custody as a result thereof. And by the strength of his and Aurea’s testimonies, appellant Mendez was kept in custody, supposedly for “further investigation” while a manhunt for Baby Cabagtong was ordered

Baby Cabagtong was subsequently arrested, but not by the police but by a civilian (barangay tanod). His arrest, like Mendez’s was without warrant

Investigating officer SPO2 Cernio testified that the arrest of appellant Mendez without a warrant was based on their knowledge of his guilt

The tanod who arrested Baby Cabagtong, also without warrant, testified that his conduct was sanctioned by the citizens’ arrest law and that he based his arrest of Baby from the statement of Aurea Cabagtong

The defense, on the other hand, presented a theory diametrically opposed to that of the prosecution’s – that the crime was committed by one Randy Gomba, and not by appellants

This is supported by their own “eyewitness,” one Josefina Bernas who testified that on the night of the crime, while she and her husband were making copra, they heard a woman crying. When Josefina went to see what it was, she saw a girl being raped by a man. Josefina recognized the assailant to be Randy Gomba

The RTC was swayed by the prosecution’s case (giving particular weight to Ronnie and Aurea Cabagtong’s testimonies) and convicted appellants of the crime and sentenced them accordingly

Upon appeal, the appellants raise the following issues:

1.) WoN RTC erred in finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime

2.) WoN their warrantless arrests were valid HELD: YES, the RTC committed an error in finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged; and NO, the warrantless arrests made against appellants were NOT VALID. The decision of the RTC Loaogan, Northern Samar is REVERSED and accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Rene “Baby” Cabagtong are ACQUITTED of the crime of rape with homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt RATIO: Issue #1: Error in the Finding of Guilt The RTC favored the prosecution by giving credence to

Ronnie and Aurea Cabagtong’s testimonies. It should not have, because certain circumstances make these testimonies suspect! For one, it is highly doubtful how Ronnie could have witnessed the rape considering that it was raining and there was no moonlight. His contention that there was a lamp illuminating the area is belied by the testimony of another prosecution witness who described the crime scene as uninhabited and surrounded by thick foliage. Thus, there could not have been any lamps in the area. Also, Ronnie’s behavior after he allegedly witnessed the crime, if he is to be believed, is contrary to normal human reaction (he casually proceeded home and went to sleep as if nothing happened). The police also took at face value Ronnie’s and Aurea’s testimony against appellants without considering (or overlooking) the ulterior motive that the former has in pointing to appellants as the culprits (heck, it resulted to Ronnie’s release from custody, for crying out loud!)

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RTC also did not probe the police why there was no investigation to follow up the lead coming from the defense’s witness Josefina Bernas coursed through the Barangay Captain. Could it be that the police were keen on pinning the blame on appellants because they were easy targets due to their bad reputation in their community? this, together with the other circumstances mentioned above, constitute reasonable doubt meriting the appellants’ acquittal

Issue #2: Invalidity of Appellants’ Warrantless Arrests Contrary to his claim, SPO2 Cernio did not have

personal knowledge of the commission of the crime so as to justify the warrantless arrest he made of appellant Renante Mendez

“Personal knowledge” of facts in arrests without warrant under §5(b) of Rule 113 must be based upon “probable cause,” which means “an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.” The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when it is based on actual facts, i.e., when it is supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to

create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested

It is also important to note that the only time the police had actual evidence/information against appellant Mendez was when Aurea Cabagtong came forward and pointed to him (Mendez) and Baby Cabagtong as the perpetrators

The police clearly did not have reasonable grounds in causing Mendez’s arrest without warrant because the witnesses (Ronnie and Aurea) only surfaced when he was already arrested

Baby Cabagtong’s arrest without warrant cannot also be sustained. He was arrested by a civilian who was not a witness to the crime nor part of the investigating team. Such arresting person (barangay tanod) could not have had personal knowledge of the incident and this was proven on trial when he testified that he merely based his arrest on the information supplied by Aurea Cabagtong to the police. This does not constitute personal knowledge to constitute a valid citizens’ arrest

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People v. Doria

J. Puno (1999)

In November 1995, members of the North Metropolitan District PNP Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from two civilian informants (CI) that a certain "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City

Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation, so they arranged a meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" scheduled on Dec 5, 1995 in Mandaluyong through their CI

Members of Narcom prepared marked money worth P1,600 as payment to the supposed drug-dealer; PO3 Manlangit was to be the poseur-buyer

At 7:30 in the morning of Dec 5, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying one kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills and "Jun" instructed them to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate

An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place and took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua (back up police) rushed to help in the arrest

They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth." "Jun" led the police team to Neneth's house nearby at Daang Bakal

The buy-bust team found the door of Neneth's house open and the woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman as his associate

As SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the marked bills, PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house; and standing by the door, he noticed a carton box under the dining table

One of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper appeared similar to the wrapper of the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun"

PO3 Manlangit's suspicion was aroused, hence, he entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth."

The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama

After trial, the Pasig RTC convicted the accused-appellants. The trial court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced

both accused-appellants to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each

Upon this appeal, the appellants raised the following issues:

1. WoN the “buy-bust” operation was valid – YES 2. WoN the consequent warrantless arrest and

search of appellants were valid – as to Doria, YES, but as to Gaddao, NO.

HELD: The “buy-bust” operation was valid absent any showing of ill-motives or abuse of power on the part of the arresting officer, hence, DORIA'S warrantless arrest and search arising from such lawful exercise is UPHELD. His conviction perforce must be AFFIRMED. The warrantless arrest and subsequent search of Gaddao, on the other hand, is tainted with fatal procedural irregularities which merit her ACQUITTAL based on reasonable doubt RATIO: On Buy-Bust Operation (Entrapment v. Inducement) A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed

by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of an offense

It evolved12 from the increasing use of informers and undercover agents in the detection of crimes, particularly liquor and narcotics offenses

Unlike in the American jurisdiction, entrapment is not a defense available to an accused in our jurisdiction; instead, it is inducement/instigation that is a possible defense in cases such as this one

The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in anti-narcotics operations because recently, it has become common practice for law enforcement officers to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offender13

12 J. Puno extensively discussed the legal history, as usual, of entrapment and inducement in Common Law and how it reached our criminal law jurisdiction. The only point being, the standards/tests to be applied in construing a valid from illegal entrapment (tantamount to inducement/instigation) are both subjective and objective. It is “subjective” when the courts merely looks into the accused's predisposition towards the crime he was busted for regardless of the level of inducement the police has put in him in committing the crime. And, consequently, it is “objective” when the courts look into the conduct and procedure by the arresting officers of the buy-bust operation, i.e. whether the police may have exceeded the standards of proper investigation. 13 This is due mainly to the fact that anti-narcotics law are mala prohibita which impels government, in

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To determine whether there is entrapment or instigation, our courts have mainly examined the conduct of the apprehending officers, not the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime (objective test) → this demands, on the part of the arresting officer, that details of the buy-bust transaction be clearly and adequately shown (i.e. every detail of the process from the initial meeting, offer, acceptance, promise of payment and exchange in the sale of illegal drugs must be presented and proved in court)

However, entrapment, as it is often results to derogation of fundamental rights (against unreasonable searches and seizure, among others), the presumption as to regularity of performance on the part of the law enforcers cannot be applied → this presumption cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights of the individual

Fortunately for the prosecution, in the case at bar, the law enforcers were successfully able to show and prove in court the details of the buy-bust operation that led to the warrantless arrest of Doria; notably, Doria was not able to rebut the same

The prosecution has clearly established the fact that in consideration of P1,600.00 which he received, appellant Doria sold and delivered 970 grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer

The buy-bust/entrapment thus valid, Doria's warrantless arrest perforce falls within the exceptions contemplated in Sec 5(a) and (b) of Rule 113 → it is beyond cavil, the facts of the buy-bust now clearly established, that Doria was caught red-handed committing the crime of selling prohibited drugs (in flagrante delicto). At such a point, the police officers are not only right but actually duty-bound to arrest him without warrant

The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are entirely different matters

The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search and seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant. It is claimed, however, that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest → this is UNTENABLE

To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the 3 instances enumerated in Sec 5, Rule 113

detecting and punishing violations of these laws, to rely, not upon the voluntary action of aggrieved individuals (as in common criminal cases like murder, theft, arson, ect which are mala in se), but upon the diligence of its own officials. This means that the police must be present at the time the offenses are committed either in an undercover capacity or through informants, spies or stool pigeons

However, the records and testimonies of the arresting officers show otherwise

Unlike appellant Doria, appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground (probable cause) for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113 (in flagrante delicto).

Also, contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her

Neither could her warrantless arrest and search be justified under Sec 5(b), Rule 113 → "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under this rule must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."14

A perusal of the records show that Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused Doria → however, this is does not constitute “personal knowledge” enough to form probable cause on the minds of the arresting officers of Gaddao's culpability as Doria's associate in pushing drugs precisely because Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but merely as the person with whom he left the marked bills

Save for Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that Gaddao was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable

Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest

Finally, the Narcom agents cannot claim justification of their unwarranted search and seizure of Gaddao's person, property and house on the basis of the doctrine of “search (of evidence) in plain view”

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence

The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in

14 The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest

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search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure

It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object in question is inside a closed container (such as in the instant case)

As testified by PO3 Manlangit, while he was standing by the door of Gaddao's house, he allegedly had a view of the interior of said house and that a few meters away was the dining table and underneath it was a carton box. The box was partially open and revealed something wrapped in plastic

However, he later admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a viewer, ergo, “in plain view” doctrine does not apply

The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court

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Cadua v. Court of Appeals

J. Quisumbing (1999)

In the evening of Jan 2, 1992, members of the QC Central Police District were patrolling the vicinity of Fairview, QC when they received a radio dispatch requesting them to proceed to an address where a holdup of 2 women has just been reported

At said address, police officers found the women who stated that the alleged hold-uppers had just fled; the police officers requested the victims to board the patrol unit in order to facilitate the search for the hold-uppers

While patrolling the area in the direction where the victims pointed the hold-uppers ran toward, the policemen noticed 2 men walking alongside each other and as the officers slowed down to get a closer look, the victims identified them as the hold-uppers, one of whom is petitioner Doria

The police officers stopped, alighted from the vehicle, and called out to the suspects. As they approached the suspects, petitioner Cadua was about to pull something tucked at the right side of his waist. The officers promptly pointed their firearms at Cadua and warned him not to move

An officer thereafter frisked Cadua and found in his possession a .38 caliber "paltik" revolver while the search of Cadua's companion (Aguilar) yielded a fan knife. Cadua and companion were then arrested

Verification of the confiscated firearm revealed that Cauda was not a valid license holder thereof

Complaints for Robbery, Concealment of a Deadly Weapon and Illegal Possession of Firearms were filed by the police with the City Prosecutors Office

However, the prosecutor found only the case for Illegal Possession of Firearms warranting the filing of an Information because the case for Robbery is wanting probable cause due to the victims’ later doubts as to the identity of the respondents

The information for Illegal Possession was then filed and upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued, resulting in Cadua’s conviction

Petitioner appealed the RTC ruling to the CA, which affirmed in toto the assailed decision

The CA ruled that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was based on probable cause and that the police officers had personal knowledge of the fact which led to his arrest. The subsequent search was therefore an incident to the arrest, making the firearm found in his possession admissible in evidence

Petitioner’s Arguments Petitioner contends that his arrest is null and void,

hence, the search conducted by the police officers as an incident to his arrest is likewise defective

According to him, the police officers incorrectly premised their action to justify his warrantless arrests

(i.e. that he was the hold-upper); and that since the victims later on disclaimed petitioner's identity as the holdupper and that no case of robbery was filed against him, any probable cause or personal knowledge thereof alleged by the arresting officers had been totally negated

Thus, petitioner now posits that, absent probable cause or personal knowledge by the arresting officers, the arrest and the incidental search are illegal; hence, the "paltik" they seized is inadmissible in evidence

Petitioner also imputes ill-motives on the part of the police officer for sustaining his warrantless arrest by planting evidence of the “paltik” against him in view of the supposed “blunder” they have committed in apprehending him when he turned out not to be the hold-upper

He cites findings on record which showed that he was negative for powder burns, although the "paltik" at the time of its confiscation was positive for gun powder residue

People’s Arguments At the time that petitioner was arrested, the police

officers had probable cause to arrest him based on the information given by the hold-up victims. Petitioner Cadua and his companion, Aguilar, were positively identified by both women as the perpetrators of the robbery even before the police officers alighted from the car. When the police officers effected the arrest, they already have probable cause and personal knowledge that petitioner was a suspect in an offense just committed

As a logical consequence, the search incidental to the arrest is valid, and the revolver recovered admissible in evidence

Also, the finding that petitioner was negative for powder burns is immaterial because whether or not petitioner fired the gun is not pertinent to the charge of illegal possession of firearms. It also does not follow that just because a person is found negative for powder burns, he did not fire a gun

The People also asserts that petitioner Cadua’s warrantless arrest is valid because, in the presence of the arresting officer, he was attempting to commit an offense (he made an attempt to pull the revolver which was tucked in his waist)

ISSUES: 1.) WoN CA erred in affirming his conviction - NO 2.) WoN the search of the “paltik” was valid as an incident of a lawful arrest15 - YES

HELD: There is no cogent reason to disturb the findings by the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court. The CA

15 Only issue #2 is relevant for our purposes

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did not err in affirming Cadua’s conviction and the warrantless arrest and consequent search on him were valid. The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION (lesser sentence). However, since petitioner has already served more than 7 years, 5 months in prison, which is now beyond the maximum principal penalty now imposed for his offense (subsidiary penalty for unpaid fine is included), he is hereby ordered RELEASED immediately, unless he is being held for any other lawful cause RATIO: On Finding of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt Suffice it to say that both elements of the crime of

Illegal Possession of Firearms are present and proved in this case: (1) that such a firearm existed and (2) the accused did not have a license/permit to possess the same.

On Frame-up Petitioner’s cry of frame-up to the effect that the police

made up charges for illegal possession just so they would not go “empty-handed” because their original apprehension of him for robbery was a “blunder” is not persuasive. The uncorroborated claim of the Cadua that he had been framed is self-serving and baseless

On Warrantless Arrest There was sufficient reason to justify a warrantless

arrest of petitioner for illegal possession of firearms

The findings of the trial court, accepted by the appellate court, show the pertinence of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sec 5, Rule 11316

In the case at bar, through police dispatch to the scene of a crime report and in the presence of victims, it was ascertained that a robbery had just been committed, and the arresting officers had personal knowledge that petitioner was directly implicated as a suspect by the victims

Therefor, as to the element of personal knowledge, the officers could not be faulted. They clearly acted with reasonableness and on probable cause there was a legitimate, verified complaint by the victims and consequently, they formed a reasonable suspicion that the persons pointed out at the scene by the victims were the perpetrators of the offense

16 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; x x x

This in itself is sufficient justification for the officers to call the attention of the accused at that point in time when he was identified as a suspect by the complainants

It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts", in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion

Peace officers may pursue and arrest without warrant any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit, any crime or breach of the peace

Probable cause for an arrest without warrant is such a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing the accused to be guilty

Petitioner also failed to dispute the arresting officer’s testimony that he was attempting to draw out the unlicensed gun when the former called on and approach him. Actual possession of an unlicensed firearm, which petitioner attempted to draw out, by itself, amounts to committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officer contemplated in Sec 5(a), Rule 113

The fact that the robbery case was never brought to trial does not mean that the legality of the arrest was tainted, for such arrest does not depend upon the indubitable existence of the crime

It is not necessary that the crime should have been established as a fact; the legality of apprehending the accused would not depend on the actual commission of the crime but upon the nature of the deed, where from such characterization it may reasonably be inferred by the officer to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen

On Warrantless Search Given the warrantless arrest of Cadua has already been

established to be lawful and valid, the incidental search and subsequent seizure of the unlicensed firearm in question is likewise lawful and valid pursuant to Sec 12, Rule 12617

Clearly, it falls among the exceptions to the necessity for a search warrant, which is the warrantless search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest (in flagrante delicto)

Warrantless search incident to an arrest in flagrante delicto includes that of searching the person of one who is arrested, in order to find and seize things connected

17 Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

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with the crime as its fruits or as the means for its commission

In the instant case, when petitioner was searched contemporaneously with the arrest, the "paltik" was

found in his possession, and seized. Moreover, at that moment of search and seizure, there was in the mind of the arresting officer more than a mere suspicion that petitioner was armed

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People v. Montilla

January 30, 1998

Regalado, J.

FACTS Ruben Montilla alias "Joy," was charged for violating

Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, before the RTC. RTC convicted him and imposed the extreme penalty of death on appellant. He was further ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Evidence of the prosecution: Montilla was apprehended at around 4:00 A.M. near a waiting shed by members of the Cavite PNP Command based in Dasmariñas. Montilla, according to the two officers, was caught transporting 28 marijuana bricks contained in a travelling bag and a carton box, which marijuana bricks had a total weight of 28 kilos.

These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer in the arrest of appellant. That informer had informed them the day before arrest that a drug courier, whom said informer could recognize, would be arriving somewhere in Barangay Salitran, Dasmariñas from Baguio City with an undetermined amount of marijuana. It was the same informer who pinpointed to the arresting officers the appellant when the latter alighted from a passenger jeepney.

Montilla disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He claimed that while he indeed came all the way from Baguio City, he travelled to Dasmariñas, Cavite with only some pocket money and without any luggage. His sole purpose in going there was to look up his cousin who had earlier offered a prospective job at a garment factory in said locality, after which he would return to Baguio City. He never got around to doing so as he was accosted by the police. He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in Dasmariñas, Cavite, he was never informed of his constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed of the P500.00 which he had with him.

Melita Adaci, the cousin, corroborated Montilla's testimony about the job offer in the garment factory where she reportedly worked as a supervisor, although, as the trial court observed, she never presented any document to prove her alleged employment.

Montilla disputes the trial court's finding that he was legally caught in flagrante transporting the prohibited drugs.

ISSUE 1. WON the trial court erred in convicting Montilla on the

basis of insufficient evidence as no proof was produced that he wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously administered, transported, and delivered 28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves, since the police officers only testified on the alleged transporting of Marijuana.

2. WON the failure to present the informant is fatal to the case of the prosecution.

3. WON the marijuana bricks were confiscated in the course of an unlawful warrantless search and seizure.

4. WON the imposition of the death penalty is proper. RATIO 1. NO. Prosecution adduced evidence clearly establishing

that he transported marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite. By that act alone of transporting the illicit drugs, Montilla had already run afoul of that particular section of the statute.

Section 418 could be violated by the commission of any of the acts specified therein, or a combination thereof, such as selling, administering, delivering, giving away, distributing, dispatching in transit or transporting, and the like. The governing rule with respect to an offense which may be committed in any of the different modes provided by law is that an indictment would suffice if the offense is alleged to have been committed in one, two or more modes specified therein. This is so as allegations in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be considered as a description of only one offense and the information cannot be dismissed on the ground of multifariousness.

2. NO. The non-presentation of the informer in this instance was justified and cannot be faulted as error.

The testimony of said informer would have been, at best, merely corroborative of the declarations the arresting officers before the trial court, which testimonies are not hearsay as both testified upon matters in which they had personally taken part. As such, the testimony of the informer could be dispensed with by the prosecution, more so where what he would have corroborated are the narrations of law enforcers on whose performance of duties regularity

18 SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.

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is the prevailing legal presumption. Besides, informants are generally not presented in court because of the need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable services to the police. Moreover, it is up to the prosecution whom to present in court as its witnesses, and not for the defense to dictate that course. Finally, Montilla could very well have resorted to the coercive process of subpoena to compel that eyewitness to appear before the court below, but which remedy was not availed of by him.

3. NO. The search and seizure was justified as a

search incidental to a lawful arrest. Montilla contends that the marijuana bricks were

confiscated in the course of an unlawful warrantless search and seizure. The police authorities had already been apprised by their informer of his impending arrival, hence those law enforces had the opportunity to procure the requisite warrant. Their misfeasance should therefore invalidate the search for and seizure of marijuana, as well as his arrest.

Search Warrant Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the

general rule that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. Evidence secured on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. Thus, (1) customs searches; (2) searches of moving vehicles, (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consented searches; (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) "stop and frisk" measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.

In this case, the information relayed by the civilian informant to the law enforcers was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio City in the "early morning" of June 20, 1994. The informant did not know to whom the drugs would be delivered and at which particular part of the barangay there would be such delivery. Neither did this asset know the precise time of the suspect's arrival, or his means of transportation, the container or contrivance wherein the drugs were concealed and whether the same were arriving together with, or were being brought by someone separately from, the courier. The information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the police officer to obtain the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the

informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.

In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas. In fact, the police had to form a surveillance team and to lay down a dragnet at the possible entry points to Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day notwithstanding the tip regarding the "early morning" arrival of the courier. If the courts of justice are to be of understanding assistance to our law enforcement agencies, it is necessary to adopt a realistic appreciation of the physical and tactical problems of the latter, instead of critically viewing them from the placid and clinical environment of judicial chambers.

Lawful Arrest The search on his belongings and the consequent

confiscation of the illegal drugs was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Under that provision, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. On the other hand, the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a). These instances have been applied to arrests carried out on persons caught in flagrante delicto. The conventional view is that probable cause, while largely a relative term the determination of which must be resolved according to the facts of each case, is understood as having reference to such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe and conclude as to the commission of an offense, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

In the case at bar, as soon as Montilla had alighted from the passenger jeepney the informer at once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand by pointing to him from the waiting shed. SPO1 Clarin recounted that the informer told them that the marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag and carton box which appellant was carrying at the time. The officers thus realized that he was their man even if he was simply carrying a seemingly innocent looking pair of luggage for personal effects. Accordingly, they approached Montilla, introduced themselves as policemen, and requested him to open

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and show them the contents of the traveling bag, which Montilla voluntarily and readily did. Upon cursory inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag yielded the prohibited drugs, so, without bothering to further search the box, they brought appellant and his luggage to their headquarters for questioning.

There were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to the search, were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded and reasonable belief that Montilla was in the act of violating the law. With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that Montilla was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified.

Furthermore, Montilla consented to the search when he opened the bag without being forced or intimidated to do, which should properly be construed as clear waiver of his right to be secure from unreasonable search.

4. NO. Reculsion perpetua is the proper imposable penalty.

The law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. In the present case, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code consequently provides the rules to be observed in the application of said penalties. Since there were neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending Montilla's violation of the law, hence the second paragraph of Article 63must necessarily apply, in which case the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is the proper imposable penalty. Furthermore, there was neither a minor victim nor a consequent death of any victim.

DISPOSITION The judgment of the RTC is MODIFIED in the sense that Montilla shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.

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People v. Burgos

September 4, 1986

GUTIERREZ, J.

NATURE Appeal from RTC decision convicting Ruben Burgos of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion FACTS Prosecution version: Upon obtaining information from

one Cesar Masamlok, who personally and voluntarily surrendered to the Davao del Sur police HQ stating that accused Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him to join the NPA with the use of a firearm against his life, a team was dispatched the following day to arrest Burgos. Through the help of Pedro Burgos, the brother of accused, the team was able to locate Ruben Burgos, who was plowing his field at the time.

When asked about the firearm, the accused denied possession of it, but after questioning the accused’s wife, the police were able to locate and retrieve the said firearm, a .38 caliber S & W, buried in the ground below their house. The police, after accused pointed them to the location, were also able to retrieve alleged subversive documents (a notebook and a pamphlet) hidden underground a few meters away from the house.

To prove accused’s subversive activities, Masamlok testified that accused came to his house and told him to join the NPA or his family will be killed along with him. The threat to his life and family forced Masamlok to join the NPA. He later attended an NPA seminar where Burgos, the first speaker, said very distinctly that he is an NPA together with his companions, to assure the unity of the civilian. That he encouraged the group to overthrow the government. To prove illegal possession, a person in charge of firearms and explosives of the PC HQ in Davao testified that accused was not among the list of firearm holders

On the other hand, accused-appellants claims that he was taken to the PC barracks and when he denied ownership of the gun, he was beaten, tortured, mauled and subjected to physical agony. He was forced to admit possession or ownership of the gun. 2 witnesses as well as Ruben’s wife Urbana, were presented by the defense in support of the accused’s denial of the charge against him. Urbana claimed that it was Masamlok who left the firearm there.

The RTC after considering the evidences presented by both prosecution and defense convicted accused Ruben Burgos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of subversion. The RTC justified the warrantless arrest as falling under one of the circumstances when arrests may be validly made without a warrant, under Rule 113 Sec.6 of the Rules of Court. It stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact

that “the authorities received an urgent report of accused's involvement in subversive activities from a reliable source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the circumstances of his arrest, even without judicial warrant, is lawfully within the ambit of Sec. 6(a) of Rule 113 and applicable jurisprudence on the matter.” If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the alleged subversive documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule 126, Sec. 12. “A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.”

ISSUES 1. WON the arrest was lawful and WON the search of his house and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and documents conducted in a lawful manner. 2. WON there is enough evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. HELD 1. NO Art.III Sec.2 of the Constitution safeguards against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects. In this case, the arrest was made without warrant and since it does not fall within the exceptions of arrests that can be made without a warrant, it is unlawful and therefore, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies. Under Sec.6 (a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a

person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by Burgos’ wife. At the time of arrest, Burgos was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time.

The SolGen believes that the arrest may still be considered lawful under Sec.6(b) using the test of reasonableness. The SolGen submits that the info given by Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. In arrests without a warrant under Sec.6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not

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enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted. More important, We find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.

The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by Masamlok who was not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion for him to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution. Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of arrest becomes even more clear. The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to an illegal arrest. Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The fact that the accused failed to

object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein.

2. NO. Since the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents are inadmissible in evidence, the only remaining proof to sustain the charge is the testimony of Masamlok, which is inadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonable doubt. Although it is true that the trial court found

Masamlok’s testimony credible and convincing, the SC is not necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial court attaches to a particular witness. As stated in People v Cabrera (100 SCRA 424): When it comes to question of credibility the findings of the trial court are entitled to great respect upon appeal for the obvious reason that it was able to observe the demeanor, actuations and deportment of the witnesses during the trial. But We have also said that this rule is not absolute for otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal. We must reject the findings of the trial court where the record discloses circumstances of weight and substance which were not properly appreciated by the trial court. In the instant case, Masamlok’s testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering that Masamlok surrendered to the military, certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged with subversion. Masamlok may be considered as an interested witness. His testimony cannot be said to be free from the opportunity and temptation to be exaggerated and even fabricated for it was intended to secure his freedom. Moreover, despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged NPA seminar who could have corroborated Masamlok's testimony that the accused used the gun in furtherance of subversive activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution never presented any other witness.

DISPOSITION Judgment of conviction is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused Burgos is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.

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People v. Jayson

November 18, 1997

Mendoza, J.

FACTS Wenceslao Jayson was charged with violation of P.D.

No. 1866 in the RTC of Davao City. The information alleged the possession of a .38 caliber revolver without the necessary license to possess the same. In addition, the same .38 caliber revolver was used by Jasyon in killing one Nelson Jordan.

Evidence of the prosecution: Jayson, then a bouncer at the “Ihaw-Ihaw” nightclub, shot one Nelson Jordan. He was arrested after he had been pointed by eyewitnesses as the gunman. Recovered from him was a .38 caliber revolver with serial number 91955, four live bullets, and one empty shell. The firearm and ammunition were covered by a memorandum receipt and mission order issued by Major Francisco Arquillano, Deputy Commander of the Civil-Military Operation and CAFGU Affairs of the Davao Metropolitan District Command. The mission order authorized accused-appellant to carry the said firearm and twelve rounds of ammunition “to intensify intelligence coverage” and was for a three-month duration subject to several restrictions.

March 1991 - Jayson was initially charged with murder in an information RTC but after plea-bargaining, he was allowed to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide.

July 15, 1991 – Jayson was charged with illegal possession of firearm.

September 1991 – the trial court found Jayson guilty of the crime of homicide and sentenced him to imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

October 1991 – the information charging him of illegal possession was amended in order to allege that the firearm subject of the charged had been used in the killing of one Nelson Jordan.

June 1993 – he was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession by the RTC and sentenced him to 20 years of imprisonment. The RTC found that Jayson acted in good faith, believing that the mission order and memorandum receipt issued to him were valid.

CA - increased the penalty on to reclusion perpetua and, in accordance with Rule 124, §13 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure

Jayson maintains that he acted in the good faith belief that he was authorized to carry the firearm. He argues that the failure of the prosecution to present as witness the government official who had certified that he was not a holder of a firearms license is fatal to the prosecution of this case.

ISSUES 1. WON the warrantless arrest and search were valid. 2. WON Jayson is guilty of illegal possession of firearm.

3. Whether the provisions of the recently enacted R.A. No. 8294, amending P.D. No. 1866, can be applied to this case on the theory that it is more favorable to Jayson.

RATIO 1. YES. Jayson’s arrest and the seizure from him of the firearm

were made without any warrant from a court. SPO1 Tenebro testified that at around 10:00 in the

evening of March 16, 1991, while he and Patrolmen Camotes and Racolas were patrolling in their car, they received a radio message from their camp directing them to proceed to the “Ihaw-Ihaw” on Bonifacio Street where there had been a shooting. Accordingly, they proceeded to the place and there saw the victim, Nelson Jordan. Bystanders pointed to Jayson as the one who had shot Jordan. They then arrested Jayson. Seized from him was a .38 caliber revolver with serial number 91955. The firearm was covered by a mission order and memorandum receipt.

The case at bar falls under Rule 113, §5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure19: There was a shooting. The policemen summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim. Jayson was pointed to them as the assailant only moments after the shooting. In fact Jayson had not gone very far (only ten meters away from the “Ihaw-Ihaw”), although he was then fleeing. The arresting officers thus acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that Jayson was the assailant.

The subsequent search of accused-appellant’s person and the seizure from him of the firearm was likewise lawful under Rule 126, §1220.

2. YES. Jayson: the gun is covered by a memorandum receipt

and mission order issued by Major Francisco Arquillano, then Deputy Commander of the Civil-Military Operation and CAFGU Affairs of the Davao Metropolitan District Command.

Major Arquillano was not authorized to issue mission orders to civilian agents of the AFP as he was not any of the following officers mentioned in the

19 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: . . . . (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. 20 Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

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Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, §5(a). Major Arquillano claimed, however, that Colonel Franco Calida, had authorized him to exercise this function so that people would not be “swarming in Calida’s office.” Full faith and credit cannot be given to such bare assertion. Not only was there no written delegation of authority to Major Arquillano, it is even doubtful whether Col. Calida, who, as commander of the unit had authority to issue mission orders, could delegate this authority to his deputy.

Nor was accused-appellant qualified to be issued a mission order because he was a mere reserve of the Citizen Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) without regular monthly compensation. In fact he worked as a “bouncer” in a nightclub, and it was as a “bouncer” that he used the gun seized from him.

Even assuming that the issuance to Jayson of the mission order was valid, it is clear that, in carrying the firearm inside the nightclub where he was working as a “bouncer,” Jayson violated the restrictions in the mission order. These restrictions prohibited him from carrying firearms in places where people converge unless on official mission.

Nor can Jayson claim to have acted in the good faith belief that the documents issued to him sufficed as legal authority for him to carry the firearm. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses because the

offense committed is malum prohibitum punishable by special law.

3. NO Even though the penalty for illegal possession of

firearm has been reduced in the new law, the latter cannot be applied in this case so as to favor Jason in view of the proviso in §1 that the first paragraph, providing for lighter penalty, does not apply to cases where another crime has been committed. Nor can the third paragraph be applied by considering the illegal possession of firearm as a mere aggravating circumstance because, although the gun seized was used in the commission of a crime, this case concerns solely the charge of illegal possession of firearm. The criminal case for homicide is not before us for consideration.

Consequently, this case must be decided in accordance with the ruling in People v. Quijada, that a person who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm is guilty of homicide or murder as the case may be under the Revised Penal Code and aggravated illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866, §1, par. 2.

DISPOSITION The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

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Terry v. Ohio

December 12, 1967

Warren, C.J.

FACTS A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown

beat which he had been patrolling for many years, observed two strangers (petitioner and another man, Chilton) on a street corner. He saw them proceed alternately back and forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window, which they did for a total of about 24 times. Each completion of the route was followed by a conference between the two on a corner, at one of which they were joined by a third man (Katz) who left swiftly. Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stick-up," the officer followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in front of a store. The officer approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The men "mumbled something," whereupon McFadden spun petitioner around, patted down his outside clothing, and found in his overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol. The officer ordered the three into the store. He removed petitioner's overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or under petitioner's or Chilton's outer garments until he felt the guns. The three were taken to the police station.

Petitioner and Chilton were charged with carrying concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress the weapons. Though the trial court rejected the prosecution theory that the guns had been seized during a search incident to a lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to suppress and admitted the weapons into evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to believe that petitioner and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their interrogation was warranted, and that the officer, for his own protection, had the right to pat down their outer clothing having reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed. The court distinguished between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime.

Petitioner and Chilton were found guilty, an intermediate appellate court affirmed, and the State Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that "no substantial constitutional question" was involved.

ISSUES WON the search and seizure in this case violates Fourth Amendment. NO

RATIO Exclusionary Rule The Fourth Amendment provides that the right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. This inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs. The specific content and incidents of this right must be shaped by the context in which it is asserted. For what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures. Unquestionably petitioner was entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment as he walked down the street in Cleveland.

For the issue is not the abstract propriety of the police conduct, but the admissibility against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search and seizure. Ever since its inception, the rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment has been recognized as a principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct. The only effective deterrent to police misconduct in the criminal context, and that without it the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures would be a mere 'form of words serves another vital function--'the imperative of judicial integrity.'

Thus in our system evidentiary rulings provide the context in which the judicial process of inclusion and exclusion approves some conduct as comporting with constitutional guarantees and disapproves other actions by state agents. A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize, has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence, while an application of the exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur. Exclusionary rule has its limitations, however, as a tool of judicial control. It cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of legitimate police investigative techniques on the ground that much conduct which is closely similar involves unwarranted intrusions upon constitutional protections.

When is a person seized and what constitutes a search Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures' of the person

which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime--'arrests' in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person. And it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a 'search’. It

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is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly. When the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred. In this case there can be no question, then, that Officer McFadden 'seized' petitioner and subjected him to a 'search' when he took hold of him and patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing.

What is reasonable It is necessary 'first to focus upon the governmental

interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen,' for there is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails. And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. In making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate

Whether the stop and frisk of Terry was reasonable We consider first the nature and extent of the

governmental interests involved. One general interest is of course that of effective crime prevention and detection. It was this legitimate investigative function Officer McFadden was discharging when he decided to approach petitioner and his companions He had observed Terry, Chilton, and Katz go through a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together warranted further investigation.

There is the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. We cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest. When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.

Distinction between a search incident to an arrest and a limited search for weapons

The former, although justified in part by the acknowledged necessity to protect the arresting officer from assault with a concealed weapon, also justified on other grounds and can therefore involve a relatively extensive exploration of the person. A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest, however, must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. It should be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer of others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less than a 'full' search, even though it remains a serious intrusion.

An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individual's freedom of movement, whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows.

The protective search for weapons, on the other hand, constitutes a brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the person. It does not follow that because an officer may lawfully arrest a person only when he is apprised of facts sufficient to warrant a belief that the person has committed or is committing a crime, the officer is equally unjustified, absent that kind of evidence, in making any intrusions short of an arrest.

Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck in this type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.

The actions of Terry and Chilton were consistent with McFadden's hypothesis that these men were contemplating a daylight robbery--which, it is reasonable to assume, would be likely to involve the use of weapons--and nothing in their conduct from the time he first noticed them until the time he confronted them and identified himself as a police officer gave him sufficient reason to negate that hypothesis.

The sole justification of the search in the present situation is the protection of the police officer and

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others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.

We conclude that the revolver seized from Terry was properly admitted in evidence against him. At the time he seized petitioner and searched him for weapons, Officer McFadden had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and dangerous, and it was necessary for the protection of himself and others to

take swift measures to discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized. The policeman carefully restricted his search to what was appropriate to the discovery of the particular items which he sought. Each case of this sort will, of course, have to be decided on its own facts.

DISPOSITION Affirmed.

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Padilla v. Court of Appeals

March 12, 1997

Francisco, J.

FACTS At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26,

1992, Manarang and his compadre Danny Perez were inside the Manukan sa Highway Restaurant when he noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero, running fast down the highway prompting him to remark that the vehicle might get into an accident considering the inclement weather. Manarang heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner.

The driver rolled down the window and put his head out while raising both his hands. They recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla. A gun tucked on the left side of his waist was revealed. SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate the gun but appellant held the former's hand alleging that the gun was covered by legal papers. SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the gun really was covered by legal papers, it would have to be shown in the office. After disarming appellant, SPO2 Borja told him about the hit and run incident which was angrily denied by appellant. By that time, a crowd had formed at the place. SPO Mercado took over the matter and informed appellant that he was being arrested for the hit and run incident. He pointed out to appellant the fact that the plate number of his vehicle was dangling and the railing and the hood were dented. Padilla, however, arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead, played with the crowd by holding their hands with one hand. His gesture exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in appellant's back right pocket. SPO Mercado saw this and so when appellant turned around as he was talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated the magazine from appellant. Suspecting that Padilla could also be carrying a rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2 Mercado prevented Padilla from going back to his vehicle by opening himself the door of Padilla's vehicle. He saw a baby armalite rifle lying horizontally at the front by the driver's seat. It had a long magazine filled with live bullets in a semi-automatic mode. He asked appellant for the papers covering the rifle and appellant answered angrily that they were at his home. SPO Mercado modified the arrest of Padilla by including as its ground illegal possession of firearms. SPO Mercado then read to Padilla his constitutional rights.

At the Traffic Division, Padilla voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol. He also

voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing two additional long magazines and one short magazine. During the investigation,Padilla admitted possession of the firearms stating that he used them for shooting. He was not able to produce any permit to carry or memorandum receipt to cover the three firearms

A Certification was issued which stated that the three firearms confiscated from Padilla, an M-16 Baby armalite, a .357 caliber revolver and a .380 Pietro Beretta, were not registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla. A second Certification stated that the three firearms were not also registered in the name of Robinhood C. Padilla

Padilla was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the RTC with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 1866. The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner, but granted his application for bail. During the arraignment, a plea of not guilty was entered for Padilla after he refused, to make any plea. Padilla waived in writing his right to be present in any and all stages of the case.

RTC convicted Padilla of the crime charged and sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum".

Padilla filed his notice of appeal. Pending the appeal in the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor-General, convinced that the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, a motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond. The resolution of this motion was incorporated in the now assailed respondent court's decision sustaining petitioner's conviction, the dispositive portion of which reads:

CA affirmed the decision, cancelled the bailbond and directed RTC to issue the Order of Arrest of Padilla.

After his vigorous resistance and success on the intramural of bail, the SolGen now makes a complete turnabout by praying for Padilla’s acquittal.

Padilla’s contentions: (1) that his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule; (2) that he is a confidential agent authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUES 1. WON the arrest was illegal 2. WON he is confidential agent authorized to carry the

subject firearms. 3. WON the penalty for simple illegal possession

constitutes excessive and cruel punishment

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RATIO 1. NO. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued

for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.

Warrantless arrests are sanctioned under Sec. 521. Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person. Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run - an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene."

Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension.

A suspect cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take action. The exigent circumstances of - hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime - all created a situation in which speed is essential and delay improvident. The Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammunition, petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer.

21 "Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings thereof. These formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information.

any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities and defects.

The firearms and ammunitions are admissible as evidence. The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid, are as follows: 1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest

recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence,

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:

a. a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

b. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

c. the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

d. "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

3. search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by

the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity.

4. consented warrantless search, and 5. customs search.

the authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed.

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The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within "plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat

With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any purported defect.

Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective search of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate control and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest. The products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.

2. NO In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two

requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioner's possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution.

Petitioner's purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances.

The evidence adduced indicate that the Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order were prepared and executed long after appellant had been apprehended on October 26, 1992.

If he had, in actuality, the Memorandum Receipts and Missions Order, he could have produced those documents easily, if not at the time of apprehension, at least during the preliminary investigation. But neither appellant nor his counsel inform the prosecutor that appellant is authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms under Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order. At the initial presentation of his evidence in court, appellant could have produced these documents to belie the charged against him. Appellant did not. He did not even take the witness stand to explain his possession of the subject firearms.

The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, moreover, were ably controverted. Police Supt. Durendes denied under oath his signature on the dorsal side of the Mission Order and declared further that he did not authorize anyone to sign in his behalf. His surname thereon, we note, was glaringly misspelled as "Durembes." In addition, only Unit Commanders and Chief of Offices have the authority to issue Mission Orders and Memorandum Receipts under the Guidelines on the Issuance of MOs, MRs, & PCFORs. PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang who issued petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt is neither a Unit Commander nor the Chief of Office, but a mere deputy commander. Having emanated from an unauthorized source, petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are infirm and lacking in force and effect.

3. NO It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional

prohibition goes, it is not so much the extent as the nature of the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits.

Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication, as in this case.

With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by respondent court (17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum), we reduce the same in line with the fairly recent case of People v. Lian where the Court en banc provided that the

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indeterminate penalty imposable for simple illegal possession of firearm, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, should be within the range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve years (12) of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

DISPOSITION the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner's conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to ten (10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum.

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UMIL V. RAMOS

July 9, 1990

PER CURIAM

Nature: Petitions of Habeas Corpus

Summary:

The case involves 8 petitions of habeas corpus:

(1) GR 81567, Umil v. Ramos; (2-3) GR 84581-82, Roque

and Buenaobra v. De Villa and Montano; (4-5) GR 84583-

84, Anonuevo and Casiple v. Ramos, et al.; (6) GR 83162,

Ocaya and Rivera v. Aguirre, et al.; (7) GR 85727, Espiritu

v. Lim and Reyes; (8) Nazareno v. Medina, et al.

The respondents, in their respective Returns, assert that

the privilege of the writ is not available to the petitioners

as they have been legally arrested and are detained by

virtue of valid informations filed in court against them.

The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as

their arrests were made without warrant and, that no

preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the

informations filed against them are null and void.

The Court found, in its careful review, that the detainees

have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of

their constitutional right to liberty, and that the

circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their

release on habeas corpus. It invoked Section 5, paragraphs

(a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which

justifies arrests without warrant.

“(a) When, in his presence, the person to be

arrested has committed, is actually committing,

or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just be

committed, and he has personal knowledge of

facts indicating that the person to be arrested

has committed it; x x x”

And based on the records of the case, it shows that the

detainees had freshly committed or were actually

committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their

arrests without warrant were clearly justified.

FACTS:

3. GR 81567, Umil v. Ramos

Based on a confidential information, CAPCOM found that a

member of an NPA was being treated for a gunshot wound

in a hospital. On verification, they found Rolando Dural, a

member of the NPA, and responsible for the killing of 2

CAPCOM soldiers the day before. He was positively

identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top

of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at

the 2 CAPCOM soldiers in the car.

He was charged of Double Murder with Assault Upon

Agents of Persons in Authority, docketed with no bail. A

petition for habeas corpus was filed by petitioners and a

returns were filed by respondents. With Dural were

Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva, who, the latter two,

posted bail and was released.

4. GR 84581-82, Roque and Buenaobra v. De Villa and Montano

When Wilfredo Buenaobra was apprehended, he admitted

that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to

Renato Constantino and other members of the rebel group.

Amelia Roque, on the other hand, was a member of the

National United Front Commission (NUFC) and admitted

ownership of subversive documents found in the house of

her sister. She was also in possession of ammunition and

fragmentation grenade for which she had no permit or

authority to possess.

How these two were arrested were as follows. One Rogelio

Ramos y Ibanes, a member of the NPA, who surrendered to

the military gave the latter information about his

comrades and also the location of a certain house occupied

by Renato Constantino, which is used as a safehouse of the

NUFC and CPP-NPA.

Because of this, the house was placed under surveillance

and pursuant to a search warrant, they found several items

in the house. Constantino, confronted, could not produce

any permit or authority to possess the firearms,

ammunitions, etc. Hence, he was arrested and although he

refused to give a written statement, he admitted that he

was a member of both NUFC and CPP.

Later that night, Buenaobra arrived and was accosted,

readily admitting tthat he was a regular member of the

CPP/NPA. Among other items found in his possession was

a piece of paper containing information about Amelia

Roque. From this lead, they went to the place written in

the paper, presented themselves as military, and was able

to search, even without warrant, the premises. The place

was another safehouse and Roque admitted that the

documents found belonged to her and that the other

occupants of the house had no knowledge of them.

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A petition for habeas corpus was filed on behalf of both

Buenaobra and Roque.

5. GR 84583-84, Anonuevo and Casiple v. Ramos, et al.

Both arrived at the house of Constantino, which was still

under surveillance. The military agenst noticed bulging

objects on their waist lines. When frisked, they found them

to be carrying loaded guns. They also found a bag

containing subversive materials. In both sets of items, no

permit or license to possess or carry were produced.

Hence they were arrested.

A petition for habeas corpus was filed on behalf of both

Anonuevo and Casiple, alleging that they were unlawfully

arrested without warrant and that the information filed

against them are null and void for having been filed

without prior hearing and preliminary investigation.

6. GR 83162, Ocaya and Rivera v. Aguirre, et al.

With a search warrant issued by the Judge of RTC of Pasig,

agents of the PC Intelligence and Command conducted a

search at the house of Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-

NPA. During the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived with Danny

Rivera. With them were found subversive documents and

firearms. As regards the firearms, since Ocaya could not

produce any license or permission to possess them, she,

along with Rivera, were arrested.

Petition for habeas corpus were filed on behalf of the two.

7. Ocaya, Anonuevo, Casiple, and Roque alleged that the firearms and ammunitions were “planted” by the military agents to justify the arrest.

8. GR 85727, Espiritu v. Lim and Reyes

Espiritu claims that about 5am, he was awakened by his

sister who told him that a group of men wanted to hire his

jeepney. But once he came down, he was immediatel

arrested. When he asked for a warrant of arrest, the men

bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner-type jeep.

Upon petition for habeas corpus, the respondents claim

that the detention was justified in view of the Information

filed against him. and that when he was arrested, he had in

fact just committed an offense that afternoon during the

press conference but gave the lawmen the slip when he

was about to be arrested.

9. Nazareno v. Medina, et al.

Regala, arrested for killing, pointed to Nazareno when the

former was questioned. Because of this, Nazareno was also

arrested without warrant. When Nazareno posted bail and

petition for habeas corpus, both were denied by the judge

of the RTC.

ISSUE: WoN the arrest of the petitioners without warrant

was justified.

HELD: Yes

RATIO DECIDENDI:

GR 81567, Umil v. Ramos

The writ, concerning Umil and Villanueva, is already moot

and academic and accordingly dismissed, since the writ

does not lie in favor of an accused in a criminal case who

has been released on bail.

As to Dural, although he was arrested not during the

commission of the crime but a day after, his arrest without

warrant not, as a whole, unjustified. The reason is that, as a

member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization,

his offense is considered continuing. Subversion, being a

continuing offense, his arrest without warrant is justified as

at can be said that he was committing an offense when

arrested, that of being a member.

Furthermore, with the criminal case against him for

“Double Murder, etc.” and in its conclusion he was found

guilty of the charged and sentenced accordingly, the writ

of habeas corpus is therefore no longer available to him.

GR 84581-82, Roque and Buenaobra v. De Villa and Montano

The contention of respondents that petitioners are officers

and/or members of the NUFC of CPP was not controverted

or traversed. Hence, it must be deemed admitted. For the

same reasons as (1), their arrest without warrant was

justified. Furthermore, as regards Roque, her arrest

without warrant was also additionally justified because

she was, at the time of arrest, in possession of

ammunitions without license to possess them.

GR 84583-84, Anonuevo and Casiple v. Ramos, et al.

Their arrest without warrant was justified because they

were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunitions when

they were apprehended. There is also no merit in the

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contention about the information since, under Sec 7, Rule

112 of the Rules of Court,

“Sec 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a

warrant.—When a person is lawfully arrested

without a warrant for an offense cognizable by

the RTC the complaint or information may be

filed by the offended party, peace officer, or

fiscal without a preliminary investigation x x x”

Both refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article

125 of RPC, in which case, no preliminary investigation

was conduction. After the informations had been filed

however, they also didn’t ask for such investigation. Hence,

they cannot now claim that they have been deprived of

their constitutional right to due process.

GR 83162, Ocaya and Rivera v. Aguirre, et al.

Vicky Ocaya’s arrest without warrant is justified because

at the time of the arrest, she was in flagranti delicto. (There

is no decision regarding Rivera)

No evidence was given by the petitioners regarding this and that there was no ill-motive on the part of the arresting officers that would cause the said arresting officers in this cases to accuse the petitioners falsely. The arrest was not a product of witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed to by no less than former comrades of the petitioners in the reel movements. Furthermore, the petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor innocently visiting a cap, but were arrested in such time, place, and circumstances, from which one can reasonably conclude that they were up to a sinister plot, involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.

GR 85727, Espiritu v. Lim and Reyes

Peittioner’s release upon petition of habeas corpus was

unwarranted because his arrest wan in accordance with

Rule 113, Sec 5 (b) of the RoC and that the petitioner is

detained by virtue of a valid information filed with the

competent court, he may not be released on habeas corpus,

though bail may be allowed. But the bail must be lowered

from P60k to P10k because it is much too high.

Nazareno v. Medina, et al.

Nazareno’s arrest without warrant was justified. The

judge’s decision was based on facts of the law and so this

Court will not disturb the same. For the detention to be

perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in

authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient

grounds to believe the existence of an act having the

characteristics of a crime and that the same greounds exist

to elieve that the person sougth to be detained

participated therein.

The rule barring petition for habeas corpus is this—that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any court. Every phase and aspect of the petitioner’s detention must be inquired by the court—from the moment the petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition and only after such scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied and this is exactly was the Court has done.

DECISION: The petitions are all DISMISSED except GR

85727, Espiritu v. Lim.

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Umil v. Ramos

THIS RESOLUTION (October 3, 1991) ULTIMATELY DENIED THE PETITION.

[I’ll merely be quoting the Court, no need to go to the factual

circumstances and analyses, since at the end, they’re the

same as the 1990 decision.]

The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the decision did not rule — as many misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant. Moreover, the decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual situations obtaining in the several petitions. Among these laws are the outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is elementary, in this connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people, it is Congress as the elected representative of the people — not the Court — that should repeal, change or modify them.

In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law, would follow that the detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance with law.

There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace

officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. The law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.

In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113, which read:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and

. . . (Emphasis supplied).

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.

As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly in the light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that every arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court. will promptly look into — and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same — the legality of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered released; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made to languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.

A Final Word

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.

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People v. Mahinay

February 1, 1999

Per Curiam

Facts: Larry Mahinay accused of Rape with Homicide of a 12-

year-old girl (Ma. Victoria Chan) o RTC convicted him and sentenced him to death, hence

the automatic review Accused and victim lived in the same neighborhood. On

the day of the crime, Mahinay, who was a houseboy, asked permission from his employer (Isip) to go out with his friends. Apparently, he and his friends went on a drinking spree (in Mahinay’s version of facts, he said that they consumed, like, 3 cases of Red Horse. *idol. LOL.*).

Mahinay was seen by different people at different times that day at different places within the neighborhood. Victim, too.

Mahinay Victim 8AM: drinking spree 10 AM: already drunk, asked permission from Isip to go out with friends

Around 4PM, seen by Isip’s sister-in-law [Norgina Rivera] catching birds inside Isip’s unfinished house

Around 6-7PM, Sgt. Roberto Suni, who went to his in-law’s house, met appellant along Dian St. (their neighborhood) while on his way

Between 8-9PM, Sgt. Suni saw victim standing in front of the gate of the unfinished house

9PM showed up at Norgina’s store to buy lugaw - according to Norgina, he appeared uneasy, deep in thought - hair disarrayed, drunk, walking in a dazed manner

Meanwhile, victim’s mom noticed that her daughter was missing [around 9PM]

Isip: appellant failed to show up for supper that night

2AM the next day boarded a jeep, alighted at the top of the bridge of NLEx and then disappeared

7:30AM the next day someone found victim’s body inside septic tank

Police tried to find Mahinay, even going to Caloocan, but was futile

When they returned at the scene of the crime, found different items of clothing positively identified by victim’s mom as the victim’s Near the septic tank, items belonging to

Mahinay were also found

Police report filed + referral slip addressed to Valenzuela Prosecutor’s Office

After a series of follow-up operations, Mahinay was finally arrested in Ibaan, Batangas o Brought to Valenzuela Police Station, and with

assistance of counsel, executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he admitted to committing the crime and narrated how it happened.

o Pointed to 2 of his friends as co-conspirators. When Information was filed, he pleaded not guilty.

Issue # 1: W/N circumstancial evidence enough to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Held/Ratio # 1: Absence of any direct evidence relative to the

commission of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Absence of direct proof does not necessarily absolve him from any liability because under the Rules on evidence and pursuant to settled jurisprudence, conviction may be had on circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court.

In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to several circumstantial evidence, which upon thorough review of the Court is more than enough to prove appellant’s guilt beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt.

Issue # 2: W/N extra-judicial confession admissible Held/Ratio: Yes. No proof that Mahinay was, as alleged by him, coerced to execute EJC. CRIMPRO RELEVANT [hindi ko talaga malaman kung saan nanggaling ito. As in bigla na lang isinama ng court. adik. Although I think, it’s because at that time, the SC was still queasy with the death penalty law, and would like to sentence as few accused as possible.]

Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence against and accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as guardian of

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the rights of the people lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation in accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438: It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had become insufficient and which the Court must update in the light of new legal developments:

1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person;

2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him;

3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;

4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf;

5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;

6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means – telephone, radio, letter or

messenger – with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;

7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;

8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;

9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;

10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements;

11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

CrimPro [Arrest]


People v. Valdez

March 3, 1999

Quisumbing, J.

Facts: Crime: illegal transport of marijuana buds/leaves in

violation of Sec. 4 of RA 6245 (DDA of 1972) In the morning of September 1, 1994, SPO1 Bernardo

Mariano was in the Municipality of Banaue, Ifugao waiting for a ride to report for work in Lagawe, Ifugao.

A civilian asset approached him and intimated that an Ilocano person was ready to transport marijuana. This asset described to him the physical appearance of the suspect as thin and possessing a green bag.

Mr. Mariano invited the asset and together they proceeded to Barangay O-ong, Hingyon, Ifugao.

There they alighted and stopped an ordinary Dangwa passenger bus bound for Baguio City.

Aboard on this bus, they did not find the person concerned and reaching Barangay Pitawan, Hingyon, Ifugao, they stepped out of the vehicle and waited for the air conditioned Dangwa bus bound for Manila.

When this bus arrived, Police Officer Mariano bearded the aircon bus and looked for that person from among the passengers and noticed him holding the green bag. He immediately ordered the person to get out of the bus. This fellow followed holding the bag.

Once outside, he further ordered the suspect to open the bag and saw a water jug colored red and white and a lunch box. He told this man to open the jug and the lunch box and when opened, he saw marijuana leaves as contents.

At this time, suspect revealed his name to be Samuel Yu Valdez. With this discovery, the asset was left behind and Peace Officer Mariano escorted the accused to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Provincial Headquarters at Lagawe, Ifugao. He turned over the accused including the contents of the green bag to his superiors for further investigation

Accused’s version He came from a friend’s birthday celebration and was

only returning to Nueva Ecija. He said that he had a hang-over, fell asleep with someone else beside him, who allegedly was the one carrying the green bag. When he woke up, guy beside him was gone, green bag still there.

Issue: W/N the arrest was constitutional and legal. Held/Ratio: YES. Settled is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure can

be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. It further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

The abovementioned constitutional provisions serve as safeguards against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects. The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must be strictly construed. We cannot liberally consider arrests or seizures without warrant or extend their application beyond the cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and yet, so deserving of full protection and vindication.

Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain legal and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.

On the other hand, a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In this case, appellant was caught in flagrante since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. A crime was actually being committed by the appellant, thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (a) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to lawful arrest. While it is true that SPO1 Mariano was not armed with a search warrant when the search was conducted over the personal effects of appellant, nevertheless, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said police officer to believe that appellant was then and there committing a crime

CrimPro [Arrest]


in the instant case, police officer Mariano was tipped off by a civilian "asset" that a thin Ilocano person with a green bag was about to transport marijuana from Banaue, Ifugao. Said information was received by SPO1 Mariano the very same morning he was waiting for a ride in Banaue to report for work in Lagawe, the capital town of Ifugao province. Thus, faced with such on-the-spot information, the law enforcer had to respond quickly to the call of duty. Obviously, there was not enough time to secure a search warrant considering the time involved in the process.

Evidently, there was definite information of the identity of the person engaged in transporting prohibited drugs at a particular time and place. SPO1 Mariano had already an inkling of the identity of the person he was looking for. As a matter of fact, no search at all was conducted on the baggages of other passengers. Hence, appellant's claim that the arresting officer was only fishing for evidence of a crime has no factual basis.

CrimPro [Arrest]


People v. Veloso

October 20, 1925

Malcolm, J.

Facts: Jose Ma. Veloso was found guilty by the CFI of Manila of

the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority (A252, Penal Code).

A building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club.

The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the club and verified this fact.

As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño of the municipal court. The search warrant had “John Doe” as defendant.

Thus provided, the police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of the date abovementioned. They found the doors to the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door.

Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant.

Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe [idk if he thought that John Doe was actually a name and not an alias. If he did, ang bobo, takte.], and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe.

As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game, however Veloso insistently refused. When the police lost patience, they took hold of him, but he fought back, injuring one of the officers.

In the end, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.

In the municipal court of the City of Manila, the persons arrest in the raid were accused of gambling. All of them were eventually acquitted in the Court of First Instance for lack of proof, with the sole exception of Veloso.

Issue: W/N the search warrant was valid. Held/Ratio: YES.

Commonwealth v. Crotty, C.J. Bigelow: o It was always necessary to express the name or give

some description of a party to be arrested on a warrant; and if one was granted with the name in blank, and without other designation of the person to be arrested, it was void.

o This rule or principle does not prevent the issue and service of a warrant against a party whose name is unknown. In such case the best description possible of the person [descriptio personae] to be arrested is to be given in the warrant; but it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to be served, by stating his occupation, his personal appearance and peculiarities, the place of his residence, or other circumstances by which he can be identified.

In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the building to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched. o The police officers were accordingly authorized to

break down the door and enter the premises of the building occupied by the so-called Parliamentary Club.

o When inside, they then had the right to arrest the persons presumably engaged in a prohibited game, and to confiscate the evidence of the commission of the crime.

o It has been held that an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person, which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may furnish the person arrested with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence on the trial of the cause, but not otherwise. (Moreno vs. Ago Chi)

The affidavit and the search warrant did state that "John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building occupied by him, and which is under his control, namely, in the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, certain devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law." o As the search warrant stated that John Doe had

gambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.

o It must be remembered that No. 124 Calle Arzobispo was supposed to be used for club purposes. It was not the home of Veloso; not the place of abode of the family, which the law carefully protects in all of its sanctity. It was a club partially public in nature. It was, moreover, a camouflaged club with a high sounding name calculated to mislead the police, but

CrimPro [Arrest]


intended for nefarious practices. In a club of such a character, unlike in the home, there would commonly be varying occupancy, a number of John

Does and Richard Roes whose names would be unknown to the police.

CrimPro [Arrest]


Babst v. National Intelligence Board

September 28, 1984

Plana, J.

[I did not dwell on the merits of the libel case. Dun lang sa crimpro relevant ako nag-focus.] Facts:

Petitioners are columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various local publications.

At different dates since July, 1980, some of them have allegedly been summoned by military authorities who have subjected them to sustained interrogation on various aspects of their works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives.

Typical of the letters received by the petitioners from respondent NIB is that addressed to petitioner Arlene Babst, dated December 20,1982, which reads:

Madam:

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, you are hereby requested to appear before this Special Committee at Philippine Army Officer's Clubhouse, Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila (sketch attached), 9:00 A.M., December 22, 1982, to shed light on confidential matters being looked into by this Committee.

Your failure to appear on the specified date and place shall be considered as a waiver on your part and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law.

Petitioners’s arguments

- respondents have no jurisdiction over the proceedings which are violative of the constitutional guarantee on free expression since they have the effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media

- that they are a punitive ordeal or subsequent punishment of petitioners for lawful publications

- that they amount to a system of censorship, curtailing the "free flow of information and petition and opinion," indispensable to the right of the people to know matters of public concern guaranteed in Section 6 of Article IV of the Constitution

- that they constitute intrusions into spheres of individual liberty.

- Regarding the libel charge against Suarez and Doyo, petitioners denounce the filing as instituted with intent to intimidate and based on illegally obtained evidence, referring to the matters inquired into by respondents in previously conducted, allegedly illegal interrogations.

Respondents’s arguments

- no issue of jurisdiction exists since they do not pretend to exercise jurisdiction over the petitioners

- that what respondents have sent to petitioners were neither subpoenas nor summonses, but mere invitations to dialogues which were completely

voluntary, without any compulsion employed on petitioners

- that the dialogues themselves were designed simply to elicit information and exchange Ideas and that the expression of personal preferences and opinions by members of the respondent Board is not equivalent to the imposition of norms and guidelines to be followed by petitioners.

- Relative to the libel case, respondents contend that petitioners have no cause of action against respondent Board since respondent General Tadiar is not a member of respondent Board and has filed the libel case in his personal capacity; and the libel case is not pending before any of the respondents. Furthermore, respondents aver that this case has been rendered moot and academic because the proceedings before NIB Special Committee No. 2 (which conducted the interrogations) have already been ordered terminated by General Fabian C. Ver in his capacity as Director General and Chairman of the NIB, and said proceedings have in fact been terminated.

Issue: W/N the issuance of letters of invitation were constitutional and legal. Held/Ratio: Petition not granted, because it is already moot and academic. The acts sought to be prohibited [note that this was originally a petition for prohibition] have been abated. BUT,

“Be that as it may, it is not Idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily assume a different appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted and the designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same can easily be taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril, especially where, as in the instant case, the invitation carries the ominous seaming that "failure to appear . . . shall be considered as a waiver . . . and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law." Fortunately, the NIB director general and chairman saw the wisdom of terminating the proceedings and the unwelcome interrogation.” Dissents mainly commented on the fact that ponente should have directly ruled on the matter in light of the issue being of public interest.

CrimPro [Arrest]


People v. del Rosario

April 14, 1999

Bellosillo, J.

Facts: Crime: Robbery with Homicide of Virginia Bernas Trial Court convicted Joselito del Rosario of the crime

and sentenced him to death, hence, automatic review Trial court convicted on the basis of eyewitness Paul

Vincent Alonzo’s account that: o Parked at a distance of about one and a-half (1½)

meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by accused Joselito del Rosario.

o At that point, Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman grappling for possession of a bag.

o After taking hold of the bag one of the two men armed with a gun started chasing a man who was trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher kicked the woman sending her to the ground.

o Soon after, the armed man returned and while the woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head.

o The bag taken by the man was brought to the tricycle of accused del Rosario where someone inside received the bag.

o The armed man then sat behind the driver while his companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He also recognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest police headquarters and reported the incident

Del Rosario’s account however, goes like this: o He was hired by “Boy” Santos for P120.00. Their

original agreement was that he would drive him to cockpit at the Blas Edward Coliseum.

o However, despite their earlier arrangement boy Santos directed him to proceed to the market place to fetch “Jun” Marquez and “Dodong” Bisaya. He (del Rosario) acceded.

o Marquez and Bisaya boarded in front of the parking lot of Merced Drugstore at the public market. Subsequently, he was asked to proceed and stop at the corner of Burgos and General Luna Sts. where Bisaya alighted on the pretext of buying a cigarette.

o The latter then accosted the victim Virginia Bernas and grappled with her for the possession of her bag. Jun Marquez alighted from the tricycle to help “Dodong” Bisaya. Accused del Rosario tried to leave and seek help but “Boy Santos” who stayed inside the tricycle prevented him from leaving and threatened in fact to shoot him.

o Meanwhile, “Dodong” Bisaya succeeded in taking the victim’s bag, but before boarding the tricycle “Jun” Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head while she was lying prone on the ground.

o After the shooting, they drove for a while, then the three (3) men alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the police authorities about the incident otherwise he and his family would be harmed. Del

Rosario then went home. Because of the threat, however, he did not report the matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the police

Issue #1: W/N del Rosario can be exempted from criminal liability. Held/Ratio: YES. Basically, SC took more credence with del Rosario’s account than with Alonzo’s. Remember Crim 1 on Exempting Circumstance – uncontrollable fear. Issue # 2: W/N there was conspiracy Held/Ratio: NO. Malamang, since he’s exempted, then he did not conspire with other accused. Issue # 3 (CRIMPRO RELEVANT): W/N del Rosario’s constitutional rights as regards his right to remain silent were violated. Held/Ratio: YES. Circumstances of del Rosario’s arrest: Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle,

police proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle was summoned and who in turn revealed the driver's name and was invited for interview.

del Rosario volunteered to name his passengers on May 13, 1996. On the way to the police station, accused informed them of the bag and lunch kit's location and the place where the hold-uppers may be found and they reported these findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz.

After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15 armed men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted from 1:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. After a brief encounter, they went inside the house where they found Marquez dead holding a magazine and a gun.

While all of these were happening, accused del Rosario was at the back of the school, after which they went back to the police station. o The investigator took the statement of the accused on

May 14,1996; was only subscribed on May 22,1996. o All the while, he was detained in the police station as

ordered by the Fiscal. o His statements were only signed on May 16, 1996. He

also executed a waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera.

Also, del Rosario was handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had already gathered enough evidence against him and they were afraid that he might attempt to escape.

CrimPro [Arrest]


Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is well-settled that it encompasses any question initiated by law enforcers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.

This concept of custodial investigation has been broadened by RA 7438 to include "the Practice of issuing an 'invitation' to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed." Section 2 of the same Act further provides that -

x x x x Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known and understood by him of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.

From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation. From the time he was "invited" for questioning at the house of the barangay captain, he was already under effective custodial investigation, but he was not apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed the safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights.

Issue # 4 (CRIMPRO RELEVANT): W/N del Rosario’s arrest was lawful. Held/Ratio: NO. Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent

requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal

knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it. Hence, there must be a

large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person making the arrest must have personal knowledge of certain facts indicating that the person to be taken into custody has committed the crime. Again, the arrest of del Rosario does not comply with these requirements since, as earlier explained, the arrest came a day after the consummation of the crime and not immediately thereafter. As such, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time the accused was arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense since they were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became aware of his identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.

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