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Global Governance 6 (2000), 237-257

International Institutions, the State,and Global Civil Society in the

Age of the World Wide Web

Craig Warkentin and Karen Mingst

On 3 December 1998, the Organization for Economic Cooperation

and Development (OECD) announced that talks on the Multilat-eral Agreement on Investment (MAI)-a legal instrument in-

tended to codify and protect liberal transnational investment practices-had been halted permanently. Three months later, on 1 March 1999, aninternational treaty to ban landmines-under which signatories agree tostop using, producing, stockpiling, and transferring the antipersonnel (AP)devices--entered into effect. Each of these events, the former a failure ofmultilateralism and the latter a success, represented the culmination of apolitical process begun years earlier that was initiated and driven primar-ily by the activities of international nongovernmental organizations(NGOs). Despite their variant outcomes, both processes were character-ized by the same political context and constitutive dynamics. In bothcases, the nature and possibilities of the World Wide Web combined withthose of an emergent global civil society to create a new international po-litical environment, one in which state sovereignty was constrained andNGOs-as key actors in civil society-were able to work in novel and no-tably effective ways.

In this essay, we present a comparative case study of the protest againstthe MAI and the campaign to ban landmines, with an eye toward examin-ing some of the implications of a global civil society and the World WideWeb for NGO activity in the contemporary era. We begin by presenting ouranalytical framework, which focuses on NGOs as political actors in theirown right, agents of change whose effectualness increasingly is facilitatedby the dynamics of the Web and a global civil society. Then, through thelens of a global civil society, we briefly examine the campaigns against theMAI and for a ban on landmines. Our emphasis, in each of these two sec-tions, is on how NGO activities were facilitated by the Web and how theseorganizations interacted with key state and nonstate actors as they workedto realize their political objectives. In a final section, we expand our analy-sis and suggest avenues for further research, by suggesting some implica-tions of our findings for an enlarged multilateralism.

238 Global Civil Society in the Age of the World Wide Web

NGOs, Change, and a Global Civil Society

Analyses of NGOs conventionally have been state-centric in their orienta-tion, in that the state has provided the starting point (or point of reference)for scholarly examination. Peter Willetts's seminal work, in which he por-trays NGOs as "pressure groups" seeking to influence state behavior, pro-vides a good example of this.' Much of the subsequent work on NGOs hasfollowed Willetts's lead by maintaining-to a greater or lesser degree andmore or less explicitly-this state-referential perspective. Some scholarshave moved beyond state-centric analysis per se by adding intergovern-mental organizations (IGOs) such as the UN to the analytical mix; 2 yet de-spite their sometimes different emphases, all these studies essentially con-sign NGOs to the role of lobbying or interest groups forced to workthrough mediators (i.e., states or international institutions) in their effortsto realize organizational objectives and influence global politics.

In this essay, we take a different conceptual tack, one that focuses onNGOs as effectual political actors in their own right capable of acting in-dependently of international institutions and states. Studies addressingNGOs in this light have become increasingly prevalent since the mid-1990s, with scholars using a variety of different labels to identify the phe-nomenon. We are most interested in those works that analyze NGOs interms of their orientation toward social change and that place these organi-zations and their activities in the broader context of a global civil society.

Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco offer perhaps theclearest articulation of NGOs as agents of social change. They focus theirattention on social movement organizations (SMOs)-"formal groups ex-plicitly designed to promote specific social changes"-and, more particu-larly, on transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) that "in-corporate members from more than two countries, have some formalstructure, and coordinate strategy through an international secretariat."The "transnational membership structures" of such organizations, whichinclude those discussed in this article, "facilitate communication and ac-tion across national borders as well as in intergovernmental institutions." 3

As such, within the broader context of world politics, TSMOs help toshape global policy and influence domestic politics in significant ways. 4

Other work by international relations scholars is similar to that ofSmith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco but places greater emphasis on conceptu-alizing the nature of the international political environment within whichNGOs and other political actors increasingly operate. This analytical ori-entation has been motivated, in large part, by the end of the Cold War anddriven by a perceived need on the part of international relations scholars tomake sense of the changing dynamics and processes that characterize con-temporary world politics. In the early to mid-1990s, Chris Brown, RichardShapcott, and others revived the notion of "international society," while

Craig Warkentin & Karen Mingst 239

scholars such as M. J. Peterson, Ann Marie Clark, and Paul Ghils extendedthis discussion to include an explicit focus on NGO activities within thisbroad context. 5 More recently, scholarly attention has turned to the notionof an emergent global civil society and an examination of the implicationsof this for international politics.

Although widely used, the notion of a global civil society has yet to besystematically examined or clearly articulated. Among the most usefultreatments in this regard is Ronnie Lipschutz's. Firmly grounding his dis-cussion in a critique of state-centered approaches to the study of interna-tional relations, Lipschutz argues that there is emerging a global civil so-ciety-that is, "a parallel arrangement of political interaction, one thatdoes not take anarchy or self-help as central organising principles but isfocused on the self-conscious constructions of networks of knowledge andaction, by decentred, local actors, that cross the reified boundaries of spaceas though they were not there." 6 According to Lipschutz, of the actors thatplay pivotal roles in the construction of a global civil society's constitutivenetworks, NGOs are among the most important.

Lipschutz's conceptualization of global civil society is helpful but re-mains ambiguous; and little scholarly effort has been dedicated to reme-dying this problem. In this essay, we use a conceptualization of globalcivil society forwarded by Craig Warkentin. He builds on Lipschutz's ideaby arguing that a global civil society can be understood, at the most fun-damental level, as a transnationally defined "set of ideologically variablemechanisms or channels of opportunity for political involvement" and,more broadly, as an ongoing phenomenon that exhibits certain (elemental)characteristics.

7

Warkentin's definition of a global civil society carries a number ofimportant implications for the nature and conduct of international politics,three of which are particularly relevant to the cases discussed in this essay.First, the notion of a global civil society, so defined, shifts the analyticalfocus from formal, state-based institutions to social and political relations.This move highlights the nature and political significance of NGOs' (net-worked) relationships with each other, as well as their interactions withother actors. Second, within this conceptual scheme of a global civil soci-ety, NGOs become significant and effectual political actors. This changein focus helps to demonstrate the ways in which NGOs play increasinglycrucial roles in particular multilateral endeavors or transnationally definedissue areas. Third, based on Warkentin's articulation of its elemental char-acteristics (which include "inclusivity"), a global civil society inherentlyfacilitates a more "people-centered" politics and, concomitantly, a con-ceptual shift toward more democratically oriented transnational politicalprocesses. This analytical focus carries with it not only the idea that peo-ple, either individually or collectively organized, "matter"; it also impliesthat states will find their "sovereignty" increasingly constrained and that


multilateral endeavors and transnational politics will be characterized byincreasingly participatory processes.

Developing alongside a global civil society has been the World WideWeb, an inherently dynamic medium of international communication. Al-though there is not yet sufficient empirical evidence to prove causal con-nections between a global civil society and the Web, there are sufficientgrounds to argue that the dynamics of both phenomena often play off ofand reinforce one another in important ways. 8 In the present context, theWeb's multimedia capabilities, interactivity, and immediacy have provento be invaluable tools in facilitating the transnational communication, net-worked social relationships, and participatory politics that characterize aglobal civil society. Thus, to the three implications of a global civil soci-ety mentioned above, we add a related fourth point: that, in the context ofa global civil society and its constitutive actors, the World Wide Web isbecoming an increasingly important political tool. Specifically, the Webfacilitates networked sociopolitical relationships in important new ways, it(potentially) increases NGOs' organizational effectiveness and politicalsignificance, and it helps to foster more broadly participatory (transna-tional) political processes.

The dynamics of a global civil society and the World Wide Webproved particularly instrumental in both of the cases we discuss later. Ineach, NGOs used the channels of opportunity provided by a global civilsociety, the sociopolitical dynamics that ensue from these, and the com-municative potential of the World Wide Web to help them accomplishtheir particular political objectives. With this in mind, we present eachcase-the campaign against the MAI and the campaign to ban land-mines-in terms of the implications mentioned earlier, illustrating specificways in which each of these four theoretical points was realized in prac-tice. We also suggest that certain aspects of the MAI and landmine casespoint to the development of an enlarged multilateralism.

The Campaign Against theMultilateral Agreement on Investment

Among the effects of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement onTariffs and Trade (GATT) were participants' increased realization of thetruly globalized nature of the contemporary international economy and thefurther institutionalization of liberal economic principles. Thus, as part ofthe Uruguay Round negotiations in the early 1990s, the United States andthe European Union (EU) jointly proposed that member countries use thenewly created World Trade Organization (WTO) to negotiate a muchbroader, enforceable multilateral investment agreement. Strong objectionsfrom a number of developing countries squelched further action on such an


agreement within the WTO; but in May 1995, formal discussions on theMultilateral Agreement on Investment began in the OECD. The delegates'plan was to make the MAI a free-standing agreement open to accessiononce completed. For nearly two years after the talks were initiated, nego-tiations on the MAI were conducted behind closed doors at the OECD andbeyond public scrutiny. 9 The MAI Negotiating Group, chaired by a Dutchofficial, met twenty-three times between September 1995 and April 1998.By January 1997, a first draft of the MAI text was concluded. Althoughthe negotiating group deftly borrowed texts from other agreements indrafting the MAI, it did not directly address the hard issues. 10

Everything changed in February 1997, however, when "an early draftof the treaty, replete with numerous contradictions, was leaked to PublicCitizen, a Washington-based public interest group founded by RalphNader, and then immediately published on the Web.... Suddenly, whathad been a working document among 29 parties became available to any-one with a computer and a modem." What ensued appropriately has beendescribed as an "ambush," in which "more than 600 organizations in 70countries [began] expressing vehement opposition to the treaty, often inapocalyptic terms."' Among the strange bedfellows that opposed the MAIwere the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Orga-nizations (AFL-CIO), Amnesty International, the Australian ConservationFoundation, the Council of Canadians, Friends of the Earth, Oxfam, Pub-lic Citizen, the Sierra Club, Third World Network, the United Steelwork-ers of America, the Western Governors' Association, and the World De-velopment Movement. The battle was waged primarily on the World WideWeb, where not only successive drafts of the MAI but also accompanyinganalyses, position papers, fact sheets, and calls to action were posted onwebsites. But protesting NGOs also supplemented these "new media" toolswith tactics from their standard repertoire, including letter-writing cam-paigns, petitions, and public demonstrations. 12

It was the MAI's key provisions that elicited such broad-based andpassionate opposition. These included, but were not limited to, broad im-plementation of the nondiscrimination principles of "national treatment"and "most favored nation" for investors; prohibitions of performance re-quirements (e.g., local content or employment stipulations); "rollback" and"standstill" measures forcing states to reduce or eliminate national lawsthat failed to conform to MAI standards; bans on the uncompensated ex-propriation of assets, restrictions on the repatriation of profits, and otherrestraints on the movement of capital; an investor-state dispute mechanismparticularly favorable to investors; and the absence of any legally bindingmeasures to ensure investor responsibility or accountability. 13

In defense of the MAI, proponents cited the conventional wisdom onthe benefits of trade liberalization, arguing that the agreement was neededto reduce obstacles to overseas investment and economic inefficiencies


caused by regulation, to increase exports, and to spur economic growth inboth host and home countries. To this, opponents countered that, amongother things, the lack of environmental standards in the MAI would en-courage a "race to the bottom," as countries lowered living standards andweakened regulations in an effort to attract capital; that the MAI's rollbackand standstill measures, as well as its dispute resolution mechanisms,would undermine state sovereignty; and that the MAI's legal protectionsfor the rights of investors were not balanced by corresponding safeguardsfor the interests of host states and citizens.' 4

Negotiations for the MAI went well at first but increasingly encoun-tered problems as the discussions moved from broad principles to specificprovisions. By January 1997, delegates had reached a rough consensus onthe MAI and, given their working draft, had set May 1997 as the targetdate for completing the agreement. However, in April 1997, the OECD an-nounced a six-month halt to the negotiations to allow participants a "pe-riod of assessment" and moved the target completion date to May 1998.By the time negotiations resumed in October 1997, prospects for a suc-cessfully completed agreement had dimmed considerably. An OECD min-isters' meeting in April 1998 produced a second one-year extension andanother new target date (May 1999), but an October 1998 consultation didlittle more than shore up skepticism that the MAI would reach fruition.Perhaps not surprisingly, then, December 1998 marked the end of theOECD's negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment.

NGOs played an important role in the OECD's failure to successfullynegotiate the MAI. In the following paragraphs, we evaluate NGOs' in-volvement in this regard, presenting our analysis in terms of the four broadassertions presented above. First, the nature of a global civil society-within which the MAI negotiations took place-encourages an analyticalshift in focus from formal institutions to social and political relationshipsamong actors. In the case of the MAI, NGOs' networking relationshipswith each other were relatively weak and loosely defined at best. However,although each organization essentially pursued its own "MAI agenda" andengaged the agreement on its own terms, implicit cross-pollination ofideas did occur. This was evidenced particularly by the way in which in-formation and analysis produced by the various protesting NGOs was ex-tensively linked via their websites.

More important in the MAI case than NGOs' relationships with eachother were their relationships with states and with the public. We furtherexplore both of these later. But at this point, it should be noted that NGOsgenerally played "traditional" roles in their dealings with states and withthe public. For example, the protesting organizations lobbied states tochange their positions and held them accountable for their actions by dis-seminating information about their activities with regard to the MAI.Somewhat less conventionally, NGOs worked to defend the interests of


states they felt would be affected negatively by the agreement and, later inthe process, were able to secure a consultation with OECD negotiators thatproved instrumental to the MAI's demise. What was different aboutNGOs' relationships with each other and with states were the methods theorganizations employed in realizing their objectives. Most significantly,NGOs used the Web extensively to network with each other, provide in-formation, and mobilize the public. Given the inherent nature of the WorldWide Web, NGOs were able to do this with unprecedented speed and on aglobal scale.

States' relationships with each other were also an important factor inthe MAI's failure. As Stephen J. Kobrin notes, "the anti-MAI forces couldnot take all the credit for tabling the talks; the participants' inability toagree also played an important role. The short preamble to the treaty, forexample, contains 17 footnotes expressing the concerns of one or moredelegations. The [April 1998] draft contains almost 50 pages of country-specific exceptions."' 5 State positions beyond the OECD's formal negoti-ating circles also proved significant. A number of Southern states werehighly critical of the MAI, and even some Northern states opposed it. NewZealand pledged not to sign the MAI, France withdrew its support under anew government, and the U.K. rethought its position under similar insti-tutional circumstances. Eventually, these state positions and the relation-ships they spawned took their toll on the MAI negotiating process.

Second, in the context of a global civil society, NGOs increasingly aresignificant, effectual, and often key players in political processes. Thiscertainly was the case with the MAI negotiating process (although not inthe same way or to the extent that it was true in the landmine case). Per-haps most obviously, and as acknowledged by participating governments,pressure from civil society was an important factor in stalling, and even-tually halting, the negotiations. Less noticeable but more important, NGOsplayed a key role in framing the MAI discourse on two levels. In thebroader sense, NGOs shaped the way the debate played out in the publicarena. Whereas the MAI was discussed within the OECD and other state-based institutional forums in "economic" or "financial investment" terms,NGOs switched the focus of the language to highlight the implications ofthe agreement for the environment, global development, human rights, anddemocratic governance. By speaking about the MAI in terms of a loss ofstate sovereignty and democratic control and as a purveyor of environ-mental degradation and a form of neocolonialism, NGOs effectively "setthe rules" for how the MAI would be presented to the public. As a "sideeffect," framing the MAI discourse in this particular way also promptedshifts in the attitudes and positions of some countries.

NGOs also were involved in framing on another level-that is, as theterm is used by social movement theorists. Certain of these scholars havearticulated what they call "frame theory," a construct that is intended to


explain why individuals with different normative orientations and experi-ences become involved in collective action or social movement organiza-tions. According to David Snow and his colleagues, the first to articulatethe idea of "frame alignment," individuals' "participation in SMO activi-ties is contingent in part on alignment of individual and SMO interpretiveframes. 'u 6 That is, individuals will not participate in an SMO (or TSMO)unless their own experientially based perspective corresponds to the inter-pretive orientation of the organization. In the present context, this meansthat individuals will not become involved in a campaign against the MAIor for a ban on landmines unless, based on their personal experiences andvalues, the language and activities of the participating NGOs "ring true" tothem. In the MAI case, NGOs successfully framed the MAI discourse in away that made sense to large numbers of the public. The intentional ero-sion of democratic processes and sovereignty are not taken lightly bymost, and multinational corporations' disdain for environmental andhuman rights standards are popular targets in the media and public discus-sion. Thus, by framing the MAI in such terms, NGOs were able to "makereal" to the public the agreement's potential threat.

Third, a global civil society inherently facilitates a more "people-centered" politics and, more specifically, increasingly democratized andparticipatory political processes. This dynamic also is played out in theMAI case. Here, as noted above, hundreds of NGOs-presumably repre-senting thousands of individual citizens in a variety of countries-becameinvolved in the anti-MAI campaign. Each organization became a partici-pant, in some sense, in the MAI deliberations, prompting increased publicparticipation by encouraging its members to take action. This increased par-ticipation, in turn, strengthened calls for a more "democratically oriented"MAI. On these grounds, not only the principles and provisions of the MAIbut also the manner in which it was being negotiated came under fire. Inthis regard, Oxfam's criticisms were representative of many NGOs' chargesagainst the agreement. In addition to criticizing the MAI's provisions-the"undemocratic nature of the standstill and roll-back clauses," the potentialthreats to "legitimate national legislation on the environment, taxation,health and safety, consumer and labour rights," and the "secret tribunals"that would ensue from the agreement's investor-state dispute settlementmechanism-Oxfam also denounced the negotiation process as undemo-cratic. Specifically, the organization cited the "lack of transparency and in-volvement of all relevant actors (including NGOs) and agencies at inter-governmental and governmental levels"; the "exclusion of developingcountries from the negotiations even though they were key targets of theeventual treaty"; the "top-down negotiating model, instead of a bottom-upsector-by-sector ('positive list') approach"; and the "lack of adequate,timely and transparent independent reviews of the social and environmen-tal implications of the draft MAI for OECD and developing countries."' 7


The increased public participation was duly noted by MAI negotiatorsand their respective governments. Belgium's Foreign Trade Ministry ob-served that "the growing pressure from civil society further exacerbatedthe differences of opinion within the OECD"; and another "European of-ficial observed [that] the wave of protest elevated the question of the MAIfrom the 'level of civil servants' to the 'ministerial level."" 8 The reportjustifying France's withdrawal of support for the MAI went even furtherby asserting that "more than any other international economic agreement,the MAI has created opposition and tension within civil society. The ex-tent and strength of the opposition and the speed with which it developedwere surprising." Citing some of the particular forms taken by this oppo-sition, the report concluded that "the organizations representing civil so-ciety have become aware of the stakes involved in international economicnegotiations and are determined to leave their mark on them."' 9

Finally, as we noted at the beginning of this essay, the campaign ofprotest against the MAI was facilitated by-and arguably would not havebeen possible without-the World Wide Web. The Web provided a newtool for anti-MAI activists, with which they could disseminate informationquickly and effectively as well as communicate with each other and withthe broader public. As Kobrin observes, "The reason that opposition to theMAI has been so successful is that the treaty has been presented on the In-ternet in terms that are immediate, meaningful, and threatening to a verylarge number of disparate individuals and groups .... The Internet allowsanti-MAI activists to reach large numbers of people, at little or no cost,who normally would never hear of an investment treaty negotiated in a faraway place and would never think that it might affect them directly." 20

It should also be noted, at this point, that the Web can play a "de-structive" role as well. Writing shortly before the OECD halted the MAInegotiations in December 1998, Kobrin contended: "Much of the anti-MAIsentiment on the Internet presents barely credible worst-case scenarios asfact. As the OECD discovered, much to its chagrin, there are no controlson the Net over who can 'publish' or what they can say. Although some ofthe arguments ... are balanced and reasoned, most of the rest are neither.The MAI deals with difficult and often technical issues, and considerabledisagreement remains among the parties to the treaty. The Internet is amedium where the most extreme statements attract attention; where an ar-gument scrolling down a computer screen may garner authority it does notdeserve." 2

I

Despite such drawbacks, we argue that the Web can be not only a con-structive but also a powerful political tool. In the case of the MAI, theOECD was "forced" to establish an "official" MAI site in an effort tocounter the plethora of anti-MAI sites that populated the Web.22 The Frenchalso noted the power of the Internet when explaining their withdrawal ofsupport for the MAI: "The development of the Internet is shaking up the


world of negotiation. It allows for the instantaneous distribution of textsunder discussion, the confidentiality of which is increasingly theoretical,and for the sharing of knowledge and expertise across borders." In a com-ment that may belie Kobrin's contention about the negative aspects of theMAI debate on the Web, they observed that "on a subject that is very tech-nical, representatives of civil society appear to be fully informed, with cri-tiques that are legally well-argued." 23

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines

The campaign to ban landmines represents a "victory" of global civil so-ciety in favor of a multilateral approach. The December 1997 Treaty Sign-ing Conference and Mine Action Forum in Ottawa joined representativesof 156 states and the NGO community. By 1 March 1999, the Conventionon the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer ofAnti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction had been signed by 131states and ratified by 65 (25 more than the 40 states required). What ex-plains this rapid turn of events?

It is well documented that members of civil society, particularly non-governmental organizations, played a key role in advocating the delegit-imization and delegalization of landmines. 24 In the early stages, the leadrole was played by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),an organization uniquely positioned because of its special responsibility inenforcing international humanitarian law. Released from the constraints ofthe Cold War, during which its neutrality was tested constantly, the ICRCplayed an advocacy role critical to the initial 1993 meetings. For the firsttime in its history, the ICRC developed a public advertising campaign anddisseminated both specialist and nonspecialist literature, framing the issueof landmines in humanitarian terms.2 5

By 1993, the umbrella network known as the International Campaignto Ban Landmines (ICBL) had assumed leadership under a closely knitsteering committee of NGOs. The ICBL comprised organizations from anumber of different countries, including France's Handicap International,Germany's Medico International, and the Mines Advisory Group in theU.K.; and Human Rights Watch, Physicians for Human Rights, and Viet-nam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) in the United States. JodyWilliams, of VVAF, served as coordinator. With no staff and no centraloffice, this loosely structured group's early approach was to encourageeach respective NGO to pursue its own particular strategy appropriate tobanning landmines. By 1996, 600 NGOs from more than forty countrieshad signed on, the beginning of a coalition that eventually would see morethan a thousand NGOs participate in more than sixty countries. 26 These ac-tors functioned as "norm entrepreneurs," focusing attention on the issueby appropriately shaping the public discourse on landmines. 27


Among the plethora of NGOs-some forming for this specific purposeand many others grafting the landmine issue to their traditional focus onchildren, health and safety, human rights, social welfare, or disarma-ment-one NGO was particularly unique and correspondingly effective:the Landmine Survivors Network. That group was established to ensurethat relief, monetary and otherwise, was provided to those maimed bylandmines. Beginning in 1995, these victims' voices, each a living re-minder of the devastation of landmines, pushed the agenda ahead, provid-ing an emotive appeal not often seen in international political circles. 28

NGOs, however, did not act alone. U.S. senator Patrick Leahy, him-self a key participant, stated the reality: "Never before have representa-tives of civil society collaborated with governments so closely, and so ef-fectively, to produce a treaty to outlaw a weapon. '29 NGOs were able towork closely and effectively with a core group of supportive states. Virtu-ally all of these major supporters were small or medium-sized states thattook a progressive stance on international aid and related security issuesand were secure from threats to their borders. The group included Den-mark, Norway, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Canada. In each ofthese countries, relevant NGOs were highly influential in pushing the na-tional government to stake a position that largely was consistent with thestate's own political and social posture. (For example, with the exceptionof Belgium, in no case were the states producers or users of landmines.)Since these states were not obligated to change their behavior, this was arelatively easy case of NGO influence.

More critical was the process that brought the larger states to supportthe ban. Garnering support from Germany, and from especially key UNSecurity Council members France and Great Britain, proved essential. Inboth cases, NGOs were well organized and highly influential. For exam-ple, the French campaign to ban landmines was organized around Handi-cap International, Mddecins sans Fronti~res, UNICEF, Greenpeace, theCatholic Committee Against Hunger and for Development, and Agir Ici. Aturning point proved to be the appointment of a new French secretary ofstate for humanitarian affairs, Xavier Emmanuelli, well known in human-itarian circles and a friend of many of these NGO leaders. He declared thelandmine ban one of his top priorities and, for the first time, a representa-tive of an NGO actually was invited to join the delegation to the 1996 Ot-tawa conference. But a strong French position against landmines was notforthcoming until a new government took power and, seeing the Canadianand British commitment, came out in favor of a total ban. The new primeminister, an announced ban advocate, appointed several other pro-ban in-dividuals to positions such as minister for defense and minister for coop-eration and development. 30 The support of France and Great Britain wasviewed as crucial since both states were members of the prestigious Secu-rity Council and, more important, producers and users of landmines.


Of all the states, Canada provided the most critical leadership inter-nationally; but leadership there was shared between the NGOs on the onehand and Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy on the other. The formation ofthe NGO coalition known as Mines Action Canada coincided with a majorforeign policy initiative in Canada that obligated the government to de-mocratize foreign policy by consulting on a more regularized basis withNGOs. Operating under this mandate, Canada hosted the internationalstrategy conference in October 1996, a conference where NGOs, notablythe ICBL, participated at the table, and governments that had not giventheir commitment were admitted as observers, sitting in the back of theroom. Although this seating provided a symbol of newfound NGO power,it was Axworthy's gambit at the end of the conference that mobilized theinternational community. He challenged governments to negotiate a treatybanning mines and return to Ottawa in just a year, stating unequivocallythat he would work closely with the ICBL to make that a reality. He ef-fectively dedicated the Canadian government to the task. 3 1 As JessicaMathews remarked at the time, "The new power of NGOs and other non-state actors gives a much larger role to small and medium-sized govern-ments that decide to seize the baton." 32 Canada and other core states,working together with the NGOs, thus were able to seize this opportunity.

IGOs played a much less critical, albeit still instrumental, role in thisongoing process. UNICEF played a key early role in legitimizing the issue,tying the landmine issue to that of the health and safety of children as in-discriminate victims. Once the process started, the UN General Assemblyserved as an arena for condemnation. Yet the speed of the process, as setin motion by the suite of ad hoc conferences, essentially left out the UN asa key player. Although Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali voicedhis support for the ban, the UN's role became much more defined after theban was established and UN demining activities were systematicallyundertaken.

Notable individuals, including Boutros-Ghali, also were important ac-tors, lending their moral authority to the movement to ban the weapons.Boutros-Ghali was joined by Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa(a key heavily mined state), Pope John Paul, and the Dalai Lama. How-ever, one not-so-notable individual became notable in the process. The or-ganizer of the ICBL, Jody Williams, and her NGO network won the NobelPeace Prize in 1997, lending another stamp of international legitimacy tonongovernmental actors. These individuals operating with NGOs createdsubstantial peer pressure, a "norm cascade" supporting the prohibitionagainst landmines. 33

The channels of opportunity that the ICBL and NGOs utilized in-cluded both traditional and newer diplomatic techniques. The NGOs wereable to take advantage of the environment spawned by an emergent globalcivil society. One of the most traditionally recognized and widely touted


strengths of NGOs is the generation and dissemination of information.With respect to landmines, NGOs unleashed the full panoply of toolsgeared toward information dispersion: radio, TV, documentary films,comic books, "stunts" at international conferences, and appeals to reasonin elite media like the Washington Post, New York Times, and TheEconomist. The information was designed to show not only the prolifera-tion of deployed landmines but also, most vividly, their indiscriminate anddevastating effects on unsuspecting civilians. The emotive images were,and continue to be, electrifying: children in wheelchairs, the devil carryingaway victims, people with missing limbs, and truckloads of crutches beingdisseminated to victims. Visual media, including the Web, substantivelyincreased NGOs' effectiveness in addressing the landmine issue. 34

NGOs also personalized the campaign, as exemplified in UNA-USA'sAdopt-a-Minefield Program. "Parents" would "adopt" an active minefieldand raise funds to return the land to local populations. 35 Alternative viewsto the conventional wisdom on the weapons were widely disseminated aswell. Most notably, the ICRC commissioned a military assessment oflandmines written by a former military officer. The study showed thatlandmines have had little effect on the outcome of conflicts, thus under-mining military arguments for their criticality to battle. The NGOs also ef-fectively were able to build influence through their traditional organizingskills, which they used to hold workshops for activists and training ses-sions for those going to inspect and report on landmines.

But NGOs and states also were able to do more by using new chan-nels of opportunity. As Robert Lawson, Mark Gwozdecky, Jill Sinclair,and Ralph Lysyshyn point out, "The middle-power/civil society coalitionforged by Canada around the AP mine issue was successful in harnessinga number of these new sources of influence-providing a dramatically ex-panded 'diplomatic tool-kit' for officials developing strategies to influencekey decision-makers at state, regional, and global levels." 36

Three of these "new sources of influence"-or, in terms of a globalcivil society, channels of opportunity-are critical. First, NGOs and stateswere able to frame the issue discourse, transforming what many have seenas a security issue to a more nuanced one of human security or humani-tarianism. The ICRC clearly made the link between landmines and inter-national humanitarian law. It pointed out that more than 80 percent of thevictims were civilians, that many were injured long after war had ceased,and that the injuries suffered were of a horrific nature. It was under thisrubric that many of the human rights organizations participated. They didnot see international humanitarian law as being exclusively the domain ofstates. 37 Axworthy provided a frame that was designed to appeal more totraditional states and realist interests by arguing that "with the end of theCold War, the threat of major conflicts between states has lessened ....Threats to human security-human rights abuses, inter-ethnic tension,


poverty, environmental degradation and terrorism-have grown, fuelingrecurring cycles of violence. Civilians are their primary victims. In thesecircumstances, to safeguard individual citizens, it is no longer enough toensure the security of the nation. Security is found in the conditions ofdaily life ... rather than primarily in the military strength of the state."38

Thus, the innovation was the ability of both NGOs and state leaders likeAxworthy to frame the issue in a way so that groups with various interestswould be able to graft their interests to that of landmines and make theheretofore "inaccessible" security issue "ring true" to civil society by ar-guing for the treaty in the name of human security.

Second, NGOs were able to forge closer relationships with states thanthey ever had in the past. Rather than simply rejoicing at being able to beoutside the conference room disseminating information to governmentaldelegates, NGOs participated as active members of a global civil society.Representatives sat on official delegations, in many cases for the first time.Some, like the ICBL, were given a front seat at the Ottawa table ratherthan a back-of-the-room position. Many NGOs participated in their gov-ernment's official deliberations, helped organize the conference, or fo-cused activity at substate or municipal levels. The Italian NGOs seekinglandmine bans lobbied municipal governments where landmine manufac-turers were located and presented information to the trade unions about theharm their product brought to victims. They effectively brought the globalissue to the local level, in this case focusing at the substate level. 39 NascentNGOs in the South played key roles in organizing two conferences heldin the mine-affected countries of Cambodia and Mozambique and in mo-bilizing the new NGO community in these areas.

NGOs were able to forge such relationships partly because the prohi-bition of landmines did not challenge major economic or political inter-ests. More than 100 companies in 52 countries produce 344 different typesof landmines. For many companies, landmines are just one product amongmany. Thus, the military-industrial complex did not mount much of a cam-paign against the treaty, even though certain firms did make their positionknown. 40 Since the economic interests of most companies were not seri-ously jeopardized, states were more easily able to support the ban.

Third, NGOs were able to take advantage of new communication tech-nologies to their fullest effect. In the early days of the movement, thephone and fax machine proved most effective. The latter was a step-levelimprovement in the speed of communication that transformed the dissem-ination of information to core constituencies. But by late 1995 and early1996, e-mail and the World Wide Web had transformed information dis-semination yet again. Not only could the written word be disseminated viathe Internet, but visual images could be transmitted as well. Internet-basedtechnology also aided in the establishment of effective networks; and itprovided, and continues to relay, technical information to those in the field


doing surveillance and enforcement work. As Richard Price concluded,"'hypermedia'-the global web of electronic media, including telecom-munications, fax machines, and especially the Internet and World WideWeb-have played an unprecedented role in facilitating the growth of aglobal network of concerned individuals and groups around the landminesissue. Web sites and e-mail have proliferated around the landmines issue,providing a wealth of instantaneously available information that focusesthe spotlight on recalcitrants, whether combatants using mines or indus-tries producing them." 4 1

Most important, the Web allowed people to act on this information,sending messages to governmental leaders and supporting other NGOs' ac-tivities in faraway lands. 42 In providing a critical channel that allows indi-viduals and groups to participate in international and state relations, theWeb has expanded the "democratic space" of a global civil society. It is tothe implications of this "people-centered" development that we now turn.

An Enlarged Multilateralism?

In both the MAI and landmine cases, NGOs were able to take advantage ofa global civil society's constitutive dynamics, in combination with thecommunicative potential of the World Wide Web, to accomplish substan-tive political objectives. In each case, NGOs assumed important new rolesand adopted novel approaches in their interactions with each other, withstates, and with international institutions. These dynamics and outcomesare important, in and of themselves, but the two cases also raise broaderimplications for the future of international relations. Specifically, the land-mine and MAI cases suggest that the nature of world politics may bechanging in ways that are helping to create an enlarged multilateralism.

Five points provide the contours of an enlarged multilateralism. First,the success or failure of multilateral diplomacy in any given issue area willbe affected by how an issue is framed in the public discourse. In each ofour cases, NGOs presented and discussed their subject issue in languagethat "rang true" to key states, groups, and individuals, who then influencedthe political process in a variety of important ways. In the MAI case,NGOs were able to tap into public concerns about globalization, a loss ofdemocratic control over political processes, environmental degradation,and the mistreatment of poor individuals, groups, and countries. As wementioned earlier, Public Citizen and Oxfam provide notable examples inthis regard. In the landmine case, NGOs framed use of the "antipersonneldevices" not as a national security or military security issue but as a hu-manitarian and human security issue, a personal security issue. This effec-tively defined each issue participant's position in terms of a simple moralchoice for or against the treaty, with exceptions not permitted. 43 In both


the MAI and the landmine case, the World Wide Web contributed dramat-ically to the success of involved NGOs' efforts to frame their issues.Specifically, the Web provided the means to communicate with each other,as well as a relatively inexpensive means to offer immediately availableand easily revised information to a wider audience. In the landmine case,the Web's multimedia format also provided the opportunity to help shapeissue discourse through the use of visual images and audio clips.

Second, the success or failure of multilateral endeavors will be de-pendent on effective leadership, the specific form of which may differfrom issue to issue. As discussed above, NGOs clearly were primary play-ers in our two subject cases. The World Wide Web allowed NGOs to bemore effective leaders-and, in the landmine case, initiators of the politi-cal process-by facilitating the gathering and dissemination of informa-tion, as well as the building of transnational coalitions. Organizationalwebsites also provided a means for individuals to communicate with oth-ers around the world, both private citizens and key government officials,thereby broadening public participation in each issue.

However, particularly in the landmine case, leaders from a group ofcore states also made several significant decisions and took importantsteps toward helping NGOs realize their objectives. The landmine treatywas initially drafted by Austrians, with the instructions that it be kept sim-ple and uncomplicated, and was put on a fast track made possible by theWeb. The speed at which the World Wide Web allowed information aboutthe treaty to be disseminated and the wide audience that this informationreached created a momentum for the treaty process that threatened to leave"slow" states behind. The Web also facilitated speed and organization that,when combined with the no-compromise attitude adopted by key statesand NGOs, also left any opposition "out of the loop."

Third, states will continue to play important roles in an enlarged mul-tilateral diplomacy but with new "twists." Key states increasingly will takeon different roles in their relationships with other actors. In both the MAIand landmine cases, states established relationships with NGOs and drewon their insights and skills at certain points throughout the process. Al-though these relationships were more explicit and extensive in the land-mine case than in the MAI case, both cases exhibited similar dynamics inthis respect. Key states also will vary from issue to issue, and clearly thesestates will not always be so-called great powers or hegemons. This reflectsa shift similar to the devolution from state to nonstate actors. In the land-mine case, Canada and Austria-both middle powers-played key roles.In the MAI case, France similarly played an important role, as did a num-ber of lesser powers and smaller states from the South. Finally, states' im-portance in multilateral political processes and their influence over theoutcomes also will vary, depending on the issue at hand. In the MAI case,states played a relatively more important role in relation to NGOs than was


true in the landmine case; and states arguably had a greater influence overthe outcome in the MAI case than they did in the landmine case. Suchtwists may increasingly "muddy the waters" of multilateralism, as chang-ing roles affect the political legitimacy of both states and NGOs in futurenegotiations and endeavors.

Fourth, an enlarged multilateralism may become more democratized atboth the state and international levels, increasingly a bottom-up processthat relies for its success on the capabilities and support of nonstate actors.At the state level, this already can be seen in the encroachment of demo-cratic processes on individual countries' foreign policy processes. Both ofour subject cases exhibited a similar pattern in this regard. In framing thediscourse used to discuss their subject issue, involved NGOs retooled thelanguage in ways that corresponded more closely to their organizationalstrengths and experiences. Practically speaking, this meant moving awayfrom the detached, objectively framed language widely employed by statesand institutions in their discussion of foreign investment and landmine use,in favor of a more frankly stated and emotionally based discourse. It alsoinvolved redefining the primary issue areas into which landmines andtrade liberalization processes traditionally had been placed, from the moreabstract (military security and economics, respectively) to the more prac-tical and publicly accessible (human security and democracy/develop-ment/environment). The effect of these shifts, particularly combined withNGOs' extensive use of the Web, was to open to public scrutiny and par-ticipation private discussions and political processes conventionally con-sidered the (foreign policy) domain of states. Although arguably few gov-ernments recognize that this process is occurring, some (e.g., Canada)have moved to capitalize on it.

Fifth, given the dynamics of the Web and recent advances in transna-tional communication technologies generally, conventionally negotiatedmultilateral responses increasingly will lag behind the demand-and theneed-for appropriate policy interventions. As illustrated by both the MAIand landmine cases, technological developments (e.g., satellites, faxes,e-mail, mobile phones, the World Wide Web) essentially have collapsed po-litical time by allowing exchanges and processes that once took weeks ormonths to now be accomplished in hours or days. For example, in the land-mine case, norms of prohibition were developed and reproduced with rela-tive speed, in years rather than the decades or centuries of the past. Yet thesechanges have not been accompanied by appropriately responsive mecha-nisms on the part of states and international institutions. In both of our sub-ject cases, traditional state-based actors were caught off guard by the speedwith which a global civil society used the Web to effectively mobilize peo-ple, raise issue awareness, and lobby for particular policy responses. Barringsubstantive and formalized institutional reforms, this gap between politicaldemands (or needs) and policy responses will continue to widen.


The evolvement of an enlarged multilateralism is not assured, nor areits particulars clearly defined yet. The MAI was under consideration for along time before it was forced into the open. This confirms the ability ofsome actors to keep certain discussions out of the public eye and suggeststhat the movement toward democratization may not be inevitable (at leastacross all issue areas). Even when issues do enter the public discourse,better-resourced actors-either governments or multinational corpora-tions-may be able to use information, technology, or institutions more ef-fectively. Alternatively, NGOs may find it difficult to collaborate on agiven issue-for political or other reasons-or be unable to frame the de-bate in a way that galvanizes broad public participation. 44 These and otherpossibilities raise important questions for multilateralism in the comingcentury: Will trends toward greater centralization of power in some issueareas, such as global finance, be counteracted by the activities of NGOs?Will mechanisms for NGO participation and accountability in multilateralprocesses become more developed and, possibly, institutionalized? Andwill NGOs be able to (continue to) use the World Wide Web in ways thatwill not only facilitate effective political action but also further reinforcethe dynamics and processes of an emergent global civil society? The an-swers to these questions remain unclear for now, but our analysis suggestsan affirmative response to each. 45

Notwithstanding such uncertainties, the dynamics and processes thatcharacterized the MAI and landmine campaigns are becoming a permanentpart of world politics. The French conceded this when they withdrew theirsupport of the MAI, stating: "The MAI ... marks a[n important] step ininternational ...negotiations. For the first time, we are witnessing theemergence of a 'global civil society' represented by nongovernmental or-ganizations, which are often active in several countries and communicateacross borders. This is no doubt an irreversible change." 46 Consistent withthis position, we believe that a global civil society and the inherently dy-namic communication medium that is the World Wide Web will continueto develop, often hand in hand; that NGOs and nonstate actors increasinglywill participate in transnational political processes; and that the effects ofthese changes will be felt ever more strongly in international relations,both in the relationship between international institutions and states and inthe politics of multilateralism. (

Notes

Craig Warkentin is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at theState University of New York, Oswego. Karen Mingst is professor in the Depart-ment of Political Science at the University of Kentucky. This article is based on apaper presented at "International Institutions: Global Processes, Domestic Conse-quences," a conference at Duke University, 9-11 April 1999.


1. Peter Willetts, Pressure Groups in the Global System: The TransnationalRelations of Issue-Oriented Non-Governmental Organizations (New York: St.Martin's Press, 1982).

2. See, for example, Ann Marie Clark, "Non-Governmental Organizationsand Their Influence on International Society," Journal of International Affairs 48,no. 2 (1995): 507-525; Ann Marie Clark, Elisabeth J. Friedman, and KathrynHochstetler, "The Sovereign Limits of Global Civil Society: A Comparison ofNGO Participation in UN World Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights,and Women," World Politics 51, no. 1 (1998): 1-35; Peter J. Spiro, "New GlobalCommunities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decision-MakingInstitutions," Washington Quarterly 18, no. 1 (1995): 45-56; Thomas Weiss andLeon Gordenker, eds., NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance (Boulder: LynneRienner, 1996); Peter Willetts, "The Conscience of the World": The Influence ofNon-Governmental Organizations in the U.N. System (Washington, D.C.: Brook-ings Institution Press, 1996).

3. Jackie Smith, Ron Pagnucco, and Charles Chatfield, "Social Movementsand World Politics: A Theoretical Framework," in Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield,and Ron Pagnucco, eds., Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics:Solidarity Beyond the State (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1997),p. 61.

4. As described by Kreisberg, TSMOs are international NGOs "that seek tobring about a [progressive] change in the status quo." Louis Kreisberg, "SocialMovements and Global Transformation," in Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco,Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics, p. 12.

5. Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches(New York: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1992); Chris Brown, "International Theory andInternational Society: The Viability of the Middle Way?" Review of InternationalStudies 21, no. 2 (1995): 183-196; Clark, "Non-Governmental Organizations";Paul Ghils, "International Civil Society: International Non-Governmental Organi-zations in the International System," International Social Science Journal 44, no.3 (1992): 417-431; M. J. Peterson, "Transnational Activity, International Societyand World Politics," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 21, no. 3 (1992):371-388; Richard Shapcott, "Conversation and Coexistence: Gadamer and the In-terpretation of International Society," Millennium: Journal of International Stud-ies 23, no. 1 (1994): 57-83.

6. Ronnie Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence ofGlobal Civil Society," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 21, no. 3(1992): 389-420.

7. See Craig Warkentin, "Framing a Global Civil Society: NGOs and thePolitics of Transnational Activity" (Ph.D. diss., University of Kentucky, 1998), pp.48-53.

8. See ibid. for illustrative case studies.9. Preamble Center, "The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Timeline

of Negotiations," fact sheet, updated 6 November 1998, online athttp://www.preamble.org/MAI/maihist.html (24 November 1999).

10. William A. Dymond, "The MAI: A Sad and Melancholy Tale," in FenOsler Hampson, Michael Hart, and Martin Rudner, eds., Canada Among Nations1999: A Big League Player? (Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.29.

I1. See, for example, Public Citizen, "Public Citizen's Global Trade WatchBackgrounder: The Alarming Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) NowBeing Negotiated at the OECD," online at http://www.citizen.org/pctrade/mai/


What%20is/maibg.html (24 November 1999). Despite such outcry, the MAIlargely was ignored by the mainstream press, prompting Project Censored to namethe Multilateral Agreement on Investment the "Top Censored Story" of 1998. Pro-ject Censored, "Project Censored's Top 25 1999," online at http://www.sonoma.edu/ProjectCensored/t2599.html (10 June 1999).

12. Stephen J. Kobrin, "The MAI and the Clash of Globalizations," ForeignPolicy 112 (fall 1998): 97-98.

13. See Preamble Center, "The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: KeyProvisions," fact sheet, Washington, D.C., online at http://www.preamble.org/MAI/keyprovs.html (24 November 1999); Oxfam GB, "Update on the ProposedMultilateral Agreement on Investment," briefing paper, April 1998, online athttp://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/maiapr98.htm (24 November 1999); Ox-fam GB, "Oxfam GB Update on the MAI (Multilateral Agreement on Investment),"briefing paper, December 1998, online at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/maiLupdate/mai-update.htm (24 November 1999).

14. Preamble Center, "The Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Views Proand Con," fact sheet, online at http://www.preamble.org/MAI/procon.htmi (24November 1999); Oxfam GB, "Oxfam GB Update."

15. Kobrin, "The MAI," p. 98.16. David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert

D. Benford, "Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Par-ticipation," American Sociological Review 51 (1986): 475. See also David A. Snowand Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobiliza-tion," in Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow, eds., FromStructure to Action: Comparing Social Movement Research Across Cultures(Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1988), pp. 197-217.

17. Oxfam GB, "Oxfam GB Update."18. Kobrin, "The MAI," p. 99.19. Council of Canadians, "France's Official Position on Withdrawing from

the MAI Negotiations," online at http://www.canadians.org/campaigns/campaigns-maipub03.htm (24 November 1999).

20. Kobrin, "The MAI," p. 107.21. Ibid.22. The OECD's "MAI Home Page" has since been replaced by its "Interna-

tional Investment," 19 November 1999, online at http://www.oecd.org/daflcmis/fdi/index.htm (24 November 1999). However, the organization's MAI docu-mentation remains available online at OECD, "MAI Documentation," 25 February1999, http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/mai/reports.htm (24 November 1999).

23. Council of Canadians, "France's Official Position."24. Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society

Targets Land Mines," International Organization 52, no. 3 (1998): 613-644.25. Stuart Maslen, "The Role of the International Committee of the Red

Cross," in Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin, eds., ToWalk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines (Toronto: OxfordUniversity Press, 1998), pp. 80-98.

26. Jody Williams and Stephen Goose, "The International Campaign to BanLandmines," in Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin, To Walk Without Fear, pp. 20-47.

27. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamicsand Political Change," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 896-897; seealso Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: AdvocacyNetworks in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).

28. Jerry White and Ken Rutherford, "The Role of the Landmine SurvivorsNetwork," in Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin, To Walk Without Fear, pp. 99-117.

Craig Warken tin & Karen Mingst 257

29. U.S. senator Patrick Leahy, "Oslo N.G.O. Forum on the LandmineTreaty," 8 September 1997, online at http://www.senate.gov/-Ieahy/s970908.html(24 November 1999).

30. See Philippe Chabasse, "The French Campaign," in Cameron, Lawson,and Tomlin, To Walk Without Fear, pp. 60-67.

31. Valerie Warmington and Celina Tuttle, "The Canadian Campaign," inCameron, Lawson, and Tomlin, To Walk Without Fear, pp. 48-59; Williams andGoose, "International Campaign."

32. Jessica Mathews, "The New, Private Order," Washington Post, 21 January1997, p. All.

33. Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics," p. 901.34. See, for example, "Seven Days in a Minefield," accessible from Interna-

tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), "Landmines," 17 November 1999, on-line at http://www.icrc.org/eng/mines (24 November 1999); OneWorld Online,"Killing Fields," online at http://www.oneworld.org/media/gallery/cambodia/l.html(24 November 1999); and OneWorld Online, "Landmines-The Hidden Enemy,"online at http://www.oneworld.orglmedia/gallery/landmines/l.html (24 November1999).

35. United Nations Association of the United States of America (UNA-USA), "UNA-USA Adopt-A-Minefield Program," online athttp://www.unausa.org/programs/aam/adoptamine.htm (24 November 1999).

36. Robert J. Lawson, Mark Gwozdecky, Jill Sinclair, and Ralph Lysyshyn,"The Ottawa Process and the International Movement to Ban Anti-PersonnelMines," in Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin, To Walk Without Fear, pp. 160-184.

37. Ramesh Thakur and William Maley, "The Ottawa Convention on Land-mines: A Landmark Humanitarian Treaty in Arms Control?" Global Governance 5,no. 3 (July-September 1999): 273-302.

38. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "An Ad-dress by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to theOpening of the Mine Action Forum," Ottawa, 2 December 1997, online athttp://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/news/statements/97_state/97_O57e.htm (24November 1999).

39. Williams and Goose, "International Campaign."40. Alex Vines, "The Crisis of Anti-Personnel Mines," in Cameron, Lawson,

and Tomlin, To Walk Without Fear, pp. 118-135.41. Richard Price, "Compliance with International Norms and the Mines

Taboo," in Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin, To Walk Without Fear, p. 343.42. See, for example, OneWorld Online, "Landmines-Campaigns," online at

http://www.oneworld.org/guides/landmines/landmines-campaigns.html (24 No-vember 1999).

43. Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin, "To WalkWithout Fear," in Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin, To Walk Without Fear, pp. 1-17.

44. Such has been the case, one might argue, with the campaign to establish apermanent International Criminal Court.

45. Key insights for this paragraph were provided by an anonymous reviewer,to whom we extend our thanks. For further discussion of power and information is-sues, see Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Power and Interdependencein the Information Age," Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (1998): 81-94; and SaskiaSassen's work on globalization, including "Losing Control? The State and the NewGeography of Power," Global Dialogue 1 (1999): 78-88.

46. Council of Canadians, "France's Official Position."

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