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55Frege’s Frege’s

Anti-PsychologismAnti-Psychologism

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The Rejection of The Rejection of PsychologismPsychologism

See Dummett 1993: ch.4See Dummett 1993: ch.4

Frege’s statements:Frege’s statements:

““Always separate sharply the logical from Always separate sharply the logical from the psychological, the objective from the the psychological, the objective from the subjective.”subjective.” (Frege: (Frege: GrundlagenGrundlagen))

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““In logic we must reject all distinctions In logic we must reject all distinctions that are made from a purely psychological that are made from a purely psychological point of view. What is referred to as point of view. What is referred to as depending of logic by psychology in depending of logic by psychology in nothing but a falsification of it by nothing but a falsification of it by psychology.”psychology.” (Frege 1979: 142) (Frege 1979: 142)

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Thoughts and Thoughts and ConsciousnessConsciousness

For Frege thoughts are not constituents of For Frege thoughts are not constituents of consciousness.consciousness.

Grasping a thought is a mental actGrasping a thought is a mental act, , but the thought exists independently of but the thought exists independently of being grasped.being grasped.

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To avoid psychologism, Frege endorses To avoid psychologism, Frege endorses PlatonismPlatonism..

Cf. Frege’s Cf. Frege’s dichotomy between the dichotomy between the subjective subjective (ideas)(ideas) and the objective and the objective (thoughts).(thoughts).

Frege doesn’t recognise the intermediate Frege doesn’t recognise the intermediate category of the category of the intersubjectiveintersubjective..

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Language as a Social Language as a Social EntityEntity

If we look for something non-mythological If we look for something non-mythological but objective and external to the mind, we but objective and external to the mind, we are left with language are left with language quaqua social institution. social institution.

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Language as a praxisLanguage as a praxis (cf. Wittgenstein) (cf. Wittgenstein)

The The objectivityobjectivity required is given by the required is given by the common practicecommon practice of speaking a of speaking a language. Thoughts are generated by language. Thoughts are generated by language.language.

Language and thoughts are inseparable Language and thoughts are inseparable (Dummett). A thought cannot be (Dummett). A thought cannot be dissociated from its mode of expression dissociated from its mode of expression (cf. thoughts (cf. thoughts vsvs. proto-thoughts).. proto-thoughts).

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“The extrusion of thoughts from the mind initiated by Bolzano led to what is often termed ‘Platonism’, as exemplified by Frege’s mythology of the ‘third realm’: for, if thoughts are not contents of the mind, they must be located in a compartment of reality distinct both from physical world and the inner world of private experience. This mythology served Frege and Husserl as a bulwark against the psychologism which they opposed. If, now, our capacity for thought is equated with, or at least explained in terms of, our ability to use language, no such bulwark is required: for language is a social phenomenon, in no way private to the individual, and its use is publicly observable. It is for this reason that the linguistic turn may be seen as a device for continuing to treat thoughts as objective and utterly disparate from inner mental events, without having recourse to the Platonistic mythology.” (Dummett 1993: 131)

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Grasping a ThoughtGrasping a Thought

((See Dummett 1993: ch.10)See Dummett 1993: ch.10)

Grasping is a dispositional relationGrasping is a dispositional relation. .

We are disposed to grasp new thoughts We are disposed to grasp new thoughts inasmuch as we know the senses of the inasmuch as we know the senses of the expressions. expressions.

This is not a mental act but a kind of This is not a mental act but a kind of abilityability. (cf. Wittgenstein who argues that . (cf. Wittgenstein who argues that understanding is not a mental process).understanding is not a mental process).

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Knowledge of language is akin to Knowledge of language is akin to knowing howknowing how……

See the French “connaitre” See the French “connaitre” vsvs. “savoir”.. “savoir”.

(1) Jane knows how to ride a bike(1) Jane knows how to ride a bike

(2) * Jane knows that to ride a bike(2) * Jane knows that to ride a bike

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Frege’s realism on senses doesn’t Frege’s realism on senses doesn’t recognise the dispositional character of recognise the dispositional character of the grasping. the grasping.

For Frege the grasping relation rests on a For Frege the grasping relation rests on a link between the mind and the link between the mind and the sense/thought.sense/thought.

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If grasping a sense is an ability, If grasping a sense is an ability, to grasp to grasp a sensea sense is a primary concept is a primary concept. .

We have no account of what a sense is We have no account of what a sense is save that embedded in an account of the save that embedded in an account of the grasping of that sense.grasping of that sense.

Abilities are manifested … Abilities are manifested …

Disposition to act appropriately in given Disposition to act appropriately in given circumstances.circumstances.

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““This does not account with the This does not account with the mythology, according to which a sense is mythology, according to which a sense is an independently existing object with an independently existing object with which the mind somehow makes contact.”which the mind somehow makes contact.” (Dummett 1993: 108)(Dummett 1993: 108)

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Thought and LanguageThought and Language

((See Dummett 1993: ch.13)See Dummett 1993: ch.13)

philosophy of thoughtsphilosophy of thoughts: :

Is concerned both with:Is concerned both with:

(i)(i) the question of what it is to have a the question of what it is to have a thought and thought and (ii)(ii) the structure of thoughts.the structure of thoughts.

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The The parallelism between thought and parallelism between thought and languagelanguage allows us to take the allows us to take the linguistic linguistic turn.turn.

If our capacity for thoughts is equated with If our capacity for thoughts is equated with the capacity of using a language we can the capacity of using a language we can give up Platonism. give up Platonism.

This contrast with the code conception of This contrast with the code conception of language (cf. slides 4).language (cf. slides 4).

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A practice doesn’t rest on one entertaining A practice doesn’t rest on one entertaining some mental entities or one grasping some mental entities or one grasping something. something.

A practice A practice is an activityis an activity. .

The capacity to do something is The capacity to do something is manifested by doing it.manifested by doing it.

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ConceptsConcepts Concepts differ from ideas/images. Concepts differ from ideas/images.

A concept is not something which comes A concept is not something which comes to one’s mind.to one’s mind.

Dispositional natureDispositional nature: to have a concept : to have a concept is to apply it in an appropriate way in a is to apply it in an appropriate way in a given occasion. given occasion.

The ability to apply a concept is to have The ability to apply a concept is to have that concept. This ability is manifested in that concept. This ability is manifested in our linguistic competence.our linguistic competence.

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There is no gap for a psychological act of There is no gap for a psychological act of grasping to bridge.grasping to bridge.

““It is because concepts cannot be spoken of It is because concepts cannot be spoken of as coming into the mind as do mental images as coming into the mind as do mental images that they cannot be described as content of that they cannot be described as content of consciousness.”consciousness.” (Dummett 1993: 133) (Dummett 1993: 133)

An ability/capacity is not something coming An ability/capacity is not something coming to one’s mind. to one’s mind.

Knowing how to do something differs from Knowing how to do something differs from knowing that…knowing that…

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IdeasIdeas: :

They are mental but, They are mental but, pacepace Frege, are Frege, are communicable because we have thoughts communicable because we have thoughts about them which are public.about them which are public.

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The Social Character of The Social Character of Language Language vsvs. the Individual . the Individual

Character of BeliefsCharacter of Beliefs

An utterance’s meaning depends on the An utterance’s meaning depends on the correct use of the words in the common correct use of the words in the common language, while the content of beliefs language, while the content of beliefs depends on the personal grasping of the depends on the personal grasping of the words. words.

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Public senses Public senses vs.vs. private senses private senses

Is it the public sense or the private sense Is it the public sense or the private sense the sense-referent of expressions the sense-referent of expressions appearing in appearing in oratio obliquaoratio obliqua constructions? constructions?

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Which sense (the private or the public Which sense (the private or the public one) help us to block the substitution one) help us to block the substitution salva salva veritateveritate of coreferring terms embedded in of coreferring terms embedded in attitude ascriptions?attitude ascriptions?

Which one would be the indirect sense?Which one would be the indirect sense?

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If the sense-referent is:If the sense-referent is:

(i)(i) Public sensePublic sense: Then this solution may : Then this solution may work work for proper names but will not for for proper names but will not for indexicals.indexicals.

(ii)(ii) Believer-senseBeliever-sense: Then it will be : Then it will be difficult to difficult to accommodate the intuition accommodate the intuition that two people that two people believe the same believe the same thing. (“Both A and B thing. (“Both A and B believe/said that believe/said that C is F”)C is F”)

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(iii)(iii) Ascriber-senseAscriber-sense: Then it turns out : Then it turns out that the that the thought attributed and the thought attributed and the thought believed thought believed may differ.may differ.

(See Corazza 1999. “Washing Away (See Corazza 1999. “Washing Away Original Sinn”. Original Sinn”. Dialogue 38.Dialogue 38.))

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A(1) Tim believes A(1) Tim believes FaFaA(2) Sue believes whatever Tim A(2) Sue believes whatever Tim

believesbelievesThus:Thus: A(3) Sue believes A(3) Sue believes FaFa

is valid. is valid.

Hence, the term “Hence, the term “aa” cannot switch ” cannot switch reference from the premise A(1) to the reference from the premise A(1) to the conclusion A(3)conclusion A(3)

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To know what one believes we must know To know what one believes we must know how she understands the words. how she understands the words.

To do so we exploit the existence of To do so we exploit the existence of accepted meanings by using words of which accepted meanings by using words of which we have only an imperfect understanding we have only an imperfect understanding (cf. division of linguistic labour).(cf. division of linguistic labour).

““There is no sense in asking how much There is no sense in asking how much someone would have to know in order to someone would have to know in order to know everything that determines the use of know everything that determines the use of the name “Bologna” in the common the name “Bologna” in the common language.”language.” (Dummett 1993: 145) (Dummett 1993: 145)

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saying vs. believingsaying vs. believing

Saying exploits the common language Saying exploits the common language while believing exploits the understanding while believing exploits the understanding of the language. We start with the study of of the language. We start with the study of common language rather than with the common language rather than with the study of one’s knowledge of it.study of one’s knowledge of it.

Primacy of language over idiolects. Primacy of language over idiolects.

vsvs. Humpty Dumpty conception.. Humpty Dumpty conception.

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Meaning and Meaning and UnderstandingUnderstanding

They are They are correlated notionscorrelated notions. .

For, the meaning of an expression is what For, the meaning of an expression is what one must know to understand it. one must know to understand it.

Meaning is something that a speaker can Meaning is something that a speaker can know.know.

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In which sense can one be said to know In which sense can one be said to know the meaning of an expression? the meaning of an expression?

This relates to the problem of knowing a This relates to the problem of knowing a language which is (partly) a practical language which is (partly) a practical ability manifested in the actual practice of ability manifested in the actual practice of speaking the language.speaking the language.

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Theory of meaningTheory of meaning

It It is a theory of understandingis a theory of understanding, it is a , it is a representation of a practical ability, i.e.: representation of a practical ability, i.e.:

(i)(i) what a speaker must know in order to what a speaker must know in order to know a language, and know a language, and

(ii)(ii) in what the speaker having this in what the speaker having this knowledge consists (manifestation of it).knowledge consists (manifestation of it).