1 development and application of hazard analysis & risk assessment models for the korea railway...

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Development and Application of Hazard Analysis

& Risk Assessment Models for the Korea Railway

International Railway Safety Conference 2008

Denver, Colorado

October 5-10, 2008October 5-10, 2008

Chan-Woo Park, Jong-Bae Wang, Sang-Log Kwak, Don-Bum Choi

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About KRRI :Korea Railroad Research Institute

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• Founded in 1996, financed by Korean government

• 254 individuals works for railway R&D division and national project division

• Key research area

- Rolling stock, track & civil engineering, signaling & electrical engineering,

railway policy & operation

• National projects

High speed train development , upgrading conventional railway,

design urban rail transit system, transportation technology, trans-Korean railway construction

• National safety R&D program from 2004

• Homepage : www.krri.re.kr

About KRRI :Korea Railroad Research Institute

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I Introduction

Contents

II Risk Assessment Procedure

III Hazard Identification

IV Risk Assessment Model Development

V Conclusion

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Background

1. Introduction

• Cyclic occurrence of major train accidentsCyclic occurrence of major train accidents - 2003: Daegu, subway train fire accident, 191 fatalities- 2003: Daegu, subway train fire accident, 191 fatalities

- 1993: Gupo, train derailment accident, 78 fatalities- 1993: Gupo, train derailment accident, 78 fatalities

- 1982: Kyongsan, train collisions, 54 fatalities- 1982: Kyongsan, train collisions, 54 fatalities

• Environmental changes in Korea - KTX (Korea Train eXpress) operation at 2004 - Structural reform of railroad industries - Electrification of conventional lines - Preparation of TCR & TSR

• ““Railway Safety Act” announced in 2004Railway Safety Act” announced in 2004 - Focused on the risk-based safety management- Focused on the risk-based safety management - Nation-wide railroad safety program & safety regulations - Hazard analysis, risk assessment & control

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1. Introduction

Research Objective

Since Oct. 2005, KRRI has developed

the common hazard analysis & risk assessment models

for the Korea Railway.

- Developing procedure of the risk models

- Application of the developed model to the Korea railway.

Research Objective is to introduce

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ConstructioConstructionn

2. Risk Assessment Procedure

Common Approach Risk Management

Railway System

Techniques/

Technology

Context

Organization

Operation

ConceptConcept DesignDesign ExploitationExploitation DemolitioDemolition n

SystemSystemDefinitionDefinition

RiskRiskManagementManagement

RiskRiskAnalysis Analysis

RiskRiskDefinitionDefinition

RiskRiskEvaluationEvaluation

RiskRiskReductionReduction

ModificationModification

MaintenanceMaintenanceSystem Life CycleSystem Life Cycle

Risk Management Process

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2. Risk Assessment ProcedureNational Railway Risk ManagementSystem Architecture

Safety Evaluation

National SafetyNational SafetyManagementManagement

SystemSystem

SafetyControl

Measures

HazardAnalysis

Construction of Safety

Infrastructure

Safety Management

SE Management Concept Design Design Production Operation Evaluation

1. National Safety Policies (NSP)

2. National Safety Objectives (NSO)

3. National Safety Organization (NSOR)

4. National Safety Integrated Plan (NSP)

5. National Safety Information Sys. (NSI)

6. Nation RiskAssessment Sys. (NRA)

7.National Education & Training Sys, (NET)

8. National Accident Investigation Sys, (NAI)

9. Training & Supplyfor Safety Specialist (TS)

10. Safety P.R. Sys. (SPR)

11. InfrastructureSafety Inspection (ISI)

12. Infrastructure Safety (IS)

13. Railway Rolling Stock Safety (RS)

14. Train Operation Safety & Train Protection (TR&TP)

NSO Evaluation

NSO Evaluation

SPR AppropriatenessEvaluation

NRA Establishment Establishment of

Basis Direction for NRANRA Construction

NRA Operation & Management

NRAUtility Evaluation

NETUtility Evaluation

TSUtility Evaluation

NAIUtility Evaluation

NSP Evaluation

NSI Evaluation

NSPEvaluation

TR&TP Safety PerformanceEvaluation Operation

IS Safety PerformanceEvaluation

IS Safety PerformanceEvaluation Operation

ISI Sys. Appropriateness Evaluation

Establishment of Basis Direction for NET

Establishment of Basis Direction for NAT

Establishment of plan for NSP

Establishment Of National Safety Objectives

NSOR Design

SPR Establishment

NET Establishment

TS Establishment

NAI Establishment

NSP Establishment

NSI Design

Resource Construction & Distribution

NSOR Construction

SPR Construction

NET Construction

TS Construction

NAI Construction

NSI Construction

Resource Management

NSOR Management

SPR Operation

NET Operation & Management

TS Operation & Management

NAI Operation & Management

NSP Operation Management

NSI Management

Construction ofOperation Basis for NSP

Establishment of Basis Direction for NSP

Construction ofBasis for NSP

NSP Management

Establishment of Basis Direction for NSO

Establishment of Basis Direction for NSOR

Establishment of Basis Direction for NSP

Establishment of Basis Direction for NSI

IS Hazard Analysis

TR&TP Hazard Analysis- Terror, illegality

RSHazard Analysis

Establishment of TR&TP Safety Design Requirements

Establishment of IS Safety Design Requirements

Establishment of RS Safety Design Requirements

ISI Plan Establishment

Construction of TR&TPSafety Certification System

Construction of ISSafety Certification System

Construction of RSSafety Certification System

ISI Sys.Modernization

TR&TP Safety Certification System Operation

IS Safety Certification System Operation

RS Safety Certification System Operation

ISI Sys.Operation

Establishment of Basis Direction for TS

Establishment of Basis Direction for SPR

Analysis of ISI Problems

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2. Risk Assessment Procedure

Railway Risk Assessment Procedure

Railway Accident Railway Accident

Appearance ScenariosAppearance Scenarios


Appearance ScenariosAppearance Scenarios

FTA Model FTA Model FTA Model FTA Model


Progress Scenarios Progress Scenarios


Progress Scenarios Progress Scenarios

ETA Model ETA Model ETA Model ETA Model

Casu

al A

nalysis

Co

nseq

uen

ceA

nalysis

Hazard Identification Hazard Identification Hazard Identification Hazard Identification

Defining the Initiating Hazardous EventsDefining the Initiating Hazardous EventsDefining the Initiating Hazardous EventsDefining the Initiating Hazardous Events

Development of Accident Scenarios Development of Accident Scenarios Development of Accident Scenarios Development of Accident Scenarios

Risk Evaluation & ReductionRisk Evaluation & Reduction

HazardousHazardous

EventsEvents

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3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios

Hazard Identification Procedure

System definition and boundary settingSystem definition and boundary settingSystem definition and boundary settingSystem definition and boundary setting

Identifying hazardous events/ hazards/ barriersIdentifying hazardous events/ hazards/ barriersIdentifying hazardous events/ hazards/ barriersIdentifying hazardous events/ hazards/ barriers

Developing accident appearance scenariosDeveloping accident appearance scenariosDeveloping accident appearance scenariosDeveloping accident appearance scenarios

Developing accident progress scenariosDeveloping accident progress scenariosDeveloping accident progress scenariosDeveloping accident progress scenarios

Accident scenario managementAccident scenario managementAccident scenario managementAccident scenario management

Setting up objective of hazard identification & its boundary

Including the definition of measures which stops the increases of accident

Defining relationships among hazardous events, hazards and barriers.

Considering the relevant key influential factors.

Drawing up hazard log.

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System & Boundary Definition

Typical railway system configuration proposed in SAMRAIL project

According to the accident classification of “Railway Accident Report Regulation”,

The scenarios were divided into the five main areas

1) Train collision accident,

2) Train derailment accident,

3) Train fire accident,

4) Level crossing accident,

5) Railway (traffic/safety) casualty accident.

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Hazardous Event IdentificationRailway

Category Hazardous Events

TrainCollision

Misrouted train Mistaking in dealing points, point faults, mistaking in dealing blockage, interlocking system faults

Faults in driving Signal/direction violation, signal fault, mistaking in dealing braking system, braking system fault, over speeding

Abnormal train Train separation, car rolling, train stop, backward moving

Obstacles on the track

External obstacles, parts from train/freight falling, infrastructure collapsing/obstruction

Level Crossing Accident

Being trapped in level crossing

-Engine stop-Deviation of pathway-Gangway blocking-Lack of propulsion/braking-Violation entry-Limit interference -Breaking or detour

Crossing during warning signal

Breaking through or detour the

barrier

RailwayTraffic

Casualty Accident

People struck/crushed Striking with train, Striking with objects

Trip/Slip Trip/slip during train boarding/alighting, Trip/slip by train emergency braking/emergency start

Falling Falling from train, Falling from platform during train boarding/alighting

Caught/Dragged Caught in a train door, Caught between platform and train

Others Electric Shock, Burn, Suffocation

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Railway Accident Appearance Scenario

Built up by classifying properly the immediate causes and underlying causes.

• Immediate Causes: conditions which immediately cause hazardous events

- Substandard Act: Substandard acts/behavior of who can cause hazardous events

- Substandard Conditions: Physical conditions which can cause hazardous events

• Underlying CausesUnderlying Causes: reason or source of substandard acts and conditions: reason or source of substandard acts and conditions

- Human Management Factors

- Technological Factors

- External Factors

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Immediate Causes Underlying CausesHazardous Event

Railway Accident Appearance Scenario

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Railway Accident Scenario

Critical factors influencing accident severity

were identified in the accident progress scenarios”

Example of the Accident Progress Scenarios

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4. Risk Assessment Model Development

Risk Measure Method

Collective RiskCollective Risk ((Average Number of FWI/yearAverage Number of FWI/year))

==

FrequencyFrequency ((Average frequency at which the scenario sequence occursAverage frequency at which the scenario sequence occurs))

XX

ConsequencesConsequences (the number of FWI/scenario sequence)(the number of FWI/scenario sequence)

1 FWI = 1 fatality = 10 major injuries = 200 minor injuries1 FWI = 1 fatality = 10 major injuries = 200 minor injuries

Risk assessment model : the form of a cause and consequence analysis: using fault trees and event trees.

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Data Population

• Industry safety data: safety related incidents within industry database.

• Incidents recorded range from train collisions to passenger burns from coffee spills

• Many thousands of records are reviewed and classified

• Where data was not available,

Use was made of:

- Human error probability assessments

: using a revised Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART)

- Safety expert judgment from in-house expertise within Korea railway.

- Statistical methods including Monte Carlo simulation and Bayesian uncertainty distributions.

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4. Risk Assessment Model DevelopmentRailway Risk Assessment & InformationManagement System (RAIMS)

RAIMS

AccidentAnalysis

Accident Search

EnvironmentAnalysis

Hazard Analysis

Damage Analysis

Options Analysis

RiskAnalysis

Event Tree Analysis

Fault Tree Analysis

Risk Evaluation

Human FactorAnalysis

Safety RequirementVerification Management

Safety RequirementManagement

Railway SystemManagement

Safety RequirementChange

Management

RequirementTraceabilityManagement

SystemManagement

User Management

Code Management

ClassificationManagement

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Web-Based Accident Analysis Subsystem

• One purpose is to provide

- Fundamental information for an in-depth risk assessment of railway accidents

- Information on railway safety performance levels to both assessors and the public

• This system is composed of three modules

1) Accident input module.

2) Accident analysis & statistics module

3) Hazard management module.

Environment Analysis Accident Analysis Accident Statistic Analysis

• Application running on the web

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Risk Analysis Subsystem

• Dedicated railway risk assessment software package

- Event Tree Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, Risk Evaluation, Human Factor Analysis

• The risk of the railway systems can be assessed by the ET/FT linking approach

- Accident progress scenarios: defined as event trees, using an event tree editor.

- Each branch of the accident progress sequences requires one or more supplementary fault trees,

which can be developed by a fault tree editor.

- Sum of the frequency of each sequence becomes the total frequency of the accident of concern.

• Windows-based application

Event Tree Editor View ET/FT Linking approach Fault Tree Editor View

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Railway Human Reliability Analysis (R-HRA) Module

• Supporting the analysts in analyzing potential human errors

• Used under the railway risk assessment framework

• Computer software developed for aiding the R-HRA process.

• Revised R-HRA method supplementing the original R-HRA method developed by RSSB

• Providing a specific task analysis guideline and a classification of performance shaping

factors (PSFs)

General Information Input Error Analysis & Quantification Reporting Results

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Railway Accident Risk Assessment Results

• Railway accident data until 2005 year on the main line of South Korea• Train operation on the main line fully carried out by Korea Railroad Corp.. • The total risk: 217 FWI per year

• The overall risk made up from different profiles of frequency and consequences. • Railway casualty accident

: Tend to consist of high frequency low consequence type events (slips, trips and falls)• Train accidents

: Tend to have a risk contribution from the low frequency high consequence type events

: Increase the risk contribution for the hazardous events above the level seen in practice.

Accident Category Risk (FWI)

Train collision accident 0.6744

Train derailment accident 3.6898

Train fire accident 14.1

Level crossing accident 16.94

Railway traffic casualty accident 161.138

Railway safety casualty accident 20.742

Total 217.284

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Future Development of the Risk Model

The model is being prepared currently and will include:

• Feasibility and uncertainty test in the results of the developed model

• Improved level of human factors modeling

• Use of more sophisticated statistical analysis techniques

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5. Conclusion

This study has proposed

• Developing procedure of the risk models for the Korea railway

• Application of their application to the Korea railway

The developed model will provide a generic model of the safety risk on the Korea railway

Which will

• Increase the industry’s knowledge of the risk from the operation and maintenance

• Allow the identification of areas of railway operation that need further risk controls

• Allow sensitivity analyses to be carried out to determine the risk reduction

• Allow cost benefit analysis of proposed changes

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Thank you!

1 development and application of hazard analysis & risk assessment models for the korea railway...

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