1 overview of east asia science and security project report: nuclear fuel cycle cooperation...
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Overview of East Asia Overview of East Asia Science and Security Project Science and Security Project Report: Nuclear Fuel Cycle Report: Nuclear Fuel Cycle Cooperation Scenarios for Cooperation Scenarios for
East Asia-PacificEast Asia-PacificDavid F. von HippelDavid F. von HippelNautilus InstituteNautilus Institute
Prepared for the East Asia Science and Security Prepared for the East Asia Science and Security Project MeetingProject Meeting
September 23-24, 2010September 23-24, 2010Tsinghua University, Beijing, PRCTsinghua University, Beijing, PRC
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 2 D. von Hippel 9/2010
FUEL CYCLE COOPERATION: FUEL CYCLE COOPERATION: OUTLINE OF PRESENTATIONOUTLINE OF PRESENTATION
Overall East Asia Science and Society (EASS) Project Approach, Organization
Nuclear Capacity “Paths” for East Asia and the Pacific
“Scenarios” of Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Cooperation
Analytical Approach, and Key Results Conclusions and Next Steps
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 3 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Overall EASS Project Nuclear Fuel Cycle Analysis: Organization and Approach
10 Country Working Groups in East Asia/Pacific nations Modeling energy paths, including BAU, “maximum
nuclear”, “minimum nuclear” Using common software (LEAP) and analysis methods Models nuclear energy paths in context of full energy
sector, economy of each country Group of nuclear specialists advising/contributing
on formulation and analysis of regional scenarios for nuclear fuel cycle cooperation Including J. Kang (ROK), T. Suzuki and T. Katsuta
(Japan), A. Dmitriev (RF), and others
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 4 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Overall EASS Project Nuclear Fuel Cycle Analysis: Organization and Approach
Nuclear paths by country specified by working groups, in some cases modified/updated somewhat, serve as basis for calculating fuel requirements, spent fuel arisings
Apply to nuclear paths four scenarios of regional cooperation (or lack of cooperation) on nuclear fuel cycle issues Evaluate required inputs, implied outputs, costs, and
other key Energy Security (broadly defined) attributes (quantitative and qualitative)
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 5 D. von Hippel 9/2010
GROWTH IN ELECTRICITY DEMAND IN EAST ASIA/PACIFIC
Projections from EASS LEAP data and other sources
Regional Electricity Demand Projections
-
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
2024
2026
2028
2030
TW
h
Japan ROK China
RFE Taiwan DPRK
Indonesia Vietnam Australia
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 6 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Nuclear Capacity Paths in East Asia/Pacific: BAU Paths
Total Nuclear Capacity Net of Decommissioned Units: BAU Capacity Expansion Case
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014
2017
2020
2023
2026
2029
2032
2035
2038
2041
2044
2047
2050
GW
e
Japan ROK China
RFE Taiwan DPRK
Indonesia Vietnam Australia
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 7 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Nuclear Capacity Paths in East Asia/Pacific: Maximum Nuclear Paths
Total Nuclear Capacity Net of Decommissioned Units: Maximum Nuclear Capacity Expansion Case
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014
2017
2020
2023
2026
2029
2032
2035
2038
2041
2044
2047
2050
GW
e
Japan ROK China
RFE Taiwan DPRK
Indonesia Vietnam Australia
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 8 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Nuclear Capacity Paths in East Asia/Pacific: Minimum Nuclear Paths
Total Nuclear Capacity Net of Decommissioned Units: Minimum Nuclear Capacity Expansion Case
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008
2011
2014
2017
2020
2023
2026
2029
2032
2035
2038
2041
2044
2047
2050
GW
e
Japan ROK
China RFE
Taiwan DPRK
Indonesia Vietnam
Australia
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 9 D. von Hippel 9/2010
“Scenarios” of Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Cooperation
Four “Scenarios” of regional nuclear fuel cycle cooperation (or lack of cooperation) evaluated1. “National Enrichment, National Reprocessing”2. “Regional Center(s)”3. “Fuel Stockpile/Market Reprocessing”4. “Market Enrichment/Dry Cask Storage”
Scenarios chosen not necessarily as most likely, but as illustrations of possible cooperation arrangements To allow for analysis by country, many assumptions as to
individual national activities go into each scenario Common assumptions across scenarios (such as U, SWU costs)
In general, where scenarios include regionally-shared fuel cycle facilities, locations of facilities are not specified In some cases, more than one facility could serve the region In practice, choices of countries to host regional facilities will be
limited by multiple considerations (geological, political, social…)
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 10 D. von Hippel 9/2010
“Scenarios” of Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Cooperation
Scenario 1: “National Enrichment, National Reprocessing”
Major current nuclear energy users (Japan, China, the ROK) each pursue their own enrichment and reprocessing programs Japan, ROK import U; other nations eventually produce 50% of U needs
domestically (except Australia, 100%, RFE, 100% from RF) All required enrichment in Japan, China, ROK accomplished domestically
by 2025 or 2030 (other countries import enrichment services) Nuclear fuel is fabricated where U is enriched Reprocessing, using 80, 60, and 50 percent of spent fuel (SF) in
Japan/ROK/China, respectively, is in place in Japan by 2020, in ROK/China by 2030
50% of reactors in Japan, China, ROK eventually use 20% MOx fuel, but starting earlier in Japan
Disposal of spent fuel/high-level nuclear wastes from reprocessing done each individual country (interim storage or dry cask assumed 2050)
Security arrangements made by individual countries
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 11 D. von Hippel 9/2010
“Scenarios” of Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Cooperation
Scenario 2: “Regional Center(s)” Uses one or more regional centers for
enrichment/reprocessing/waste management, operated by international consortium, drawn upon and shared by all nuclear energy users in region Consortium imports U for enrichment from international market,
shares costs; China limits own production to current levels Nuclear fuel (including MOx) is fabricated at regional center(s) Reprocessing of SF from Japan/ROK/China in same amounts as
in Scenario 1, but in regional center(s) by 2025; reprocessing of 50% SF from other nations by 2050
MOx use as in Scenario 1 Disposal of spent fuel and high-level nuclear wastes from
reprocessing in coordinated regional interim storage facilities, pending development of permanent regional storage post-2050
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 12 D. von Hippel 9/2010
“Scenarios” of Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Cooperation
Scenario 3: “Fuel Stockpile/Market Reprocessing” Regional U purchase, use of international enrichment, but
countries cooperate to create a fuel stockpile (one year’s consumption, natural U and enriched fuel); reprocessing services purchased from international sources Enrichment from international sources except for existing
Japanese, Chinese capacity Nuclear fuel (excluding MOx) is fabricated where enriched Reprocessing of SF from in same amounts as in Scenario 2, but
at international center(s), where MOx fuel is fabricated for use in region (MOx use is as in Scenarios 1 and 2)
Disposal of spent fuel and high-level nuclear wastes from reprocessing in international interim storage facilities, possibly including facilities in the region, pending development of permanent regional storage post-2050
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 13 D. von Hippel 9/2010
“Scenarios” of Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Cooperation
Scenario 4: “Market Enrichment/Dry Cask Storage” Almost all countries continue to purchase enrichment
services from international suppliers; all spent fuel goes into dry cask storage at reactor sites or interim storage facilities U resources purchased by regional consortium Enrichment from international sources except for existing Chinese
capacity; existing Japanese capacity closed after 2020 Japan’s MOx use phased out by 2013; no MOx use elsewhere Japan and China cease reprocessing in 2015—no other countries
reprocess SF (at international or in-region facilities) Cooled spent fuel stored at reactor sites in dry casks, or in
national interim storage facilities (Japan, RFE); high-level wastes from reprocessing (before 2016) placed in interim storage facilities
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 14 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key Results Nuclear paths specified by EASS country
working groups, in some cases modified, serve as basis for calculating fuel requirements, spent fuel arisings
Apply to each nuclear path, in each country, 4 scenarios of regional cooperation (or lack of cooperation) on nuclear fuel cycle issues Timeline: 2000 through 2050 Stock and flow accounting to generate estimates of
major required inputs/outputs of to nuclear fleet in each country
Fuel cycle nodes modeled: U mining/milling, U transportation/enrichment, fuel fabrication/reactor fuel transport, reprocessing/spent fuel management
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 15 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key Results Key inputs at each node:
U and Pu, energy, enrichment services, transport services, money, by country/year
Key outputs at each node: U, Pu, spent UOx and MOx fuel, major waste products, by
country/year Results for 12 different regional cooperation scenario and
nuclear power development path combinations Quantitative results coupled with qualitative considerations to
provide a side-by-side comparison of Energy Security attributes of four cooperation scenarios
Energy Security comparison methodology as developed by Nautilus and partners starting in 1998
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 16 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach: Additional Key Assumptions
Uranium Cost/Price: $120/kg in 2009, escalating at 1%/yr
Average Uranium concentration in ore: 0.1% International enrichment 30% gaseous diffusion in 2007,
declining to 0% by 2030 Enrichment costs $160/kg SWU—no escalation Raw Uranium transport costs at roughly container freight
rates Cost of U3O8 conversion to UF6: $6.2/kg U Cost of UOx fuel fabrication: $270/kg heavy metal (HM) Cost of MOx fuel blending/fabrication: $1800/kg HM Fraction of Pu in MOx fuel: 7%
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 17 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach: Additional Key Assumptions
Spent fuel transport costs (ship): ~$40/tHM-km Cost of reprocessing: $1200/kg HM (except in Japan,
$3400/kg HM) Effective average lag between placement of fuel in-service
and removal from spent fuel pool: 8 years Cost of treatment and disposal of high-level wastes: $150/kg
HM reprocessed Mass of Pu separated during reprocessing: 11 kg/t HM Cost of storage/safeguarding Pu: $3000/kg Pu-yr Capital cost of dry casks (UOx or MOx): $0.8 million/cask Operating cost of dry cask storage: $10,000/cask-yr Cost of interim spent fuel storage (total): $360/kg HM Cost of permanent storage of spent fuel: $1000/kg HM (but
not implemented or charged to any scenario by 2050)
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 18 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key Results: Enrichment needs net of MOx use
Scenario 1
-
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
2000
2003
2006
2009
201
2
201
5
2018
2021
202
4
2027
203
0
203
3
2036
2039
204
2
2045
204
8
Met
ric
To
nn
es E
nri
ched
Ura
niu
m
Enrichment out-of-country
Enrichment in-country
Scenario 2
-
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
2027
2030
2033
2036
2039
2042
2045
2048
Met
ric
To
nn
es
En
rich
ed U
ran
ium Enrichment out-of-country
Enrichment in-country
Scenario 3
-
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
2027
2030
2033
2036
2039
2042
2045
2048
Met
ric
To
nn
es E
nri
ched
Ura
niu
m
Enrichment out-of-country
Enrichment in-country
Scenario 4
-
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
2027
2030
2033
2036
2039
2042
2045
2048
Met
ric
To
nn
es
En
rich
ed U
ran
ium
Enrichment out-of-country
Enrichment in-country
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 19 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key ResultsEnrichment Requirements by Country, 2000-2050,
Scenario 1, BAU Capacity Path
-
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
2027
2030
2033
2036
2039
2042
2045
2048
En
ric
hm
en
t R
eq
uir
em
en
ts, M
illio
n k
g S
WU Australia China
DPRK IndonesiaJapan ROKRFE TaiwanVietnam
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 20 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key ResultsEnrichment Requirements by Country, 2000-2050,
Scenario 1, BAU Capacity Path
-
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
2027
2030
2033
2036
2039
2042
2045
2048
En
ric
hm
en
t R
eq
uir
em
en
ts, M
etr
ic T
on
ne
s
En
ric
he
d F
ue
l as
U
Australia China DPRK IndonesiaJapan ROKRFE TaiwanVietnam
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 21 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key ResultsEnrichment Requirements by Country, 2000-2050,
Scenario 4, BAU Capacity Path
-
10
20
30
40
50
60
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
2027
2030
2033
2036
2039
2042
2045
2048
En
ric
hm
en
t R
eq
uir
em
en
ts, M
illio
n k
g S
WU Australia China
DPRK IndonesiaJapan ROKRFE TaiwanVietnam For Stockpile
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 22 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key Results: Enrichment needs net of MOx use
Total enrichment services requirements for BAU paths are about 45 M kg SWU in 2050 in Scenarios 1-3, about 50 M for Scenario 4 (no MOx use) For MAX path, needs rise to about 70 M SWU/yr in scenarios without
substantial MOx use, about 10% less in scenarios with MOx use For MIN path, requirements fall from a maximum of about 20 million
SWU in 2020s to about 15 million SWU in 2050. Under Scenario 1, additional enrichment capacity in the countries of
the region will need be required under all nuclear capacity expansion paths Under other scenarios, global enrichment capacity by 2015 would need
to be expanded significantly to meet 2050 regional plus out-of-region enrichment demand under BAU or MAX expansion paths
Under MAX expansion path and Scenario 1, China alone would need to build new enrichment capacity by 2050 approximately equal to 60 percent of today’s global capacity
Under MIN expansion path, international enrichment facilities as of 2015 are likely sufficient to meet regional and out-of-region demand without significant expansion
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 23 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key Results: Annual Cooled UOx SF (Scen-1, BAU path)
-
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
2027
2030
2033
2036
2039
2042
2045
2048
An
nu
al N
ew
ly-C
oo
led
Sp
en
t F
ue
l fo
r R
ep
roc
es
sin
g/D
isp
os
al (
me
tric
to
nn
es
) Australia China DPRK IndonesiaJapan ROKRFE TaiwanVietnam
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 24 D. von Hippel 9/2010
-
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
2027
2030
2033
2036
2039
2042
2045
2048
An
nu
al C
oo
led
Sp
ent
MO
x F
uel
fo
r S
tora
ge/
Dis
po
sal (
met
ric
ton
nes
HM
)
Australia China DPRK IndonesiaJapan ROKRFE TaiwanVietnam
Analytical Approach, and Key Results: Annual Cooled MOx SF (Scen-1, BAU path)
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 25 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key Results Cumulative difference between 90% of capacity in spent fuel pools
at domestic reactors and cumulative amount of spent fuel produced, BAU Nuclear Capacity Expansion Path and Regional Scenario 1
(40,000)
(30,000)
(20,000)
(10,000)
-
10,000
20,000
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
2027
2030
2033
2036
2039
2042
2045
2048C
um
ula
tiv
e N
et
Sp
en
t F
ue
l Ca
pa
cit
y (
me
tric
to
nn
es
)
Australia China DPRK IndonesiaJapan ROKRFE TaiwanVietnam
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 26 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key Results Implied Minimum Annual New Requirements for Out-of-reactor-pool Storage,
Disposal, or Reprocessing, BAU Nuclear Capacity Expansion Path and Regional Scenario 1
-
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
2027
2030
2033
2036
2039
2042
2045
2048
Min
imu
m S
pe
nt
Fu
el f
or
Re
pro
ces
sin
g/D
isp
osa
l (m
etr
ic
ton
ne
s)
Australia China DPRK IndonesiaJapan ROKRFE TaiwanVietnam
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 27 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key Results
Scenario 1
-
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
2000
2003
2006
2009
201
2
201
5
2018
2021
202
4
2027
203
0
203
3
2036
2039
204
2
2045
204
8
Met
ric
To
nn
es H
eavy
Met
al
Reprocessing out-of-country
Reprocessing in-country
Scenario 2
-
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
2000
2003
2006
2009
201
2
201
5
2018
2021
2024
2027
203
0
203
3
2036
2039
2042
2045
204
8
Met
ric
To
nn
es
Hea
vy M
etal
Reprocessing out-of-country
Reprocessing in-country
Scenario 3
-
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
200
0
200
3
200
6
200
9
2012
2015
201
8
202
1
202
4
202
7
2030
2033
203
6
203
9
2042
204
5
2048
Met
ric
To
nn
es H
eavy
Met
al
Reprocessing out-of-country
Reprocessing in-country
Scenario 4
-
50
100
150
200
250
300
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
2027
2030
2033
2036
2039
2042
2045
2048
Met
ric
To
nn
es H
eav
y M
etal
Reprocessing out-of-country
Reprocessing in-country
Cooled spent LWR fuel reprocessed in-country and out-of-country from regional spent fuel, by scenario, BAU Capacity Expansion Path
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 28 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key Results Cumulative mass of Pu separated from SF reprocessed (all locations), less Pu
used to make MOx fuel, by Regional Scenario and Nuclear Expansion Path
-
50
100
150
200
250
300
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
2027
2030
2033
2036
2039
2042
2045
2048
Me
tric
To
nn
es
Plu
ton
ium
Ac
cu
mu
late
d
Scenario 1--BAU Scenario 1--MAX
Scenario 1--MIN Scenario 2--BAU
Scenario 2--MAX Scenario 2--MIN
Scenario 3--BAU Scenario 3--MAX
Scenario 3--MIN Scenario 4--BAU
Scenario 4--MAX Scenario 4--MIN
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 29 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key Results Annual fuel cycle costs in 2050, not including generation costs
Annual Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Costs, 2050: BAU Capacity Path
$-
$5,000
$10,000
$15,000
$20,000
$25,000
$30,000
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Mill
ion
US
D
Uranium Production/Purchase Uranium/Fuel/SF TransportUranium Conversion/Enrichment Fuel Fabrication
Reprocessing Waste Treatment/Pu StorageSpent Fuel Storage/Disposal
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 30 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key Results Cumulative fuel cycle costs, 2000-2050, not including generation costs
Cumulative Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Costs, 2000-2050: BAU Capacity Path
$-
$100,000
$200,000
$300,000
$400,000
$500,000
$600,000
$700,000
$800,000
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Mill
ion
US
D
Uranium Production/Purchase Uranium/Fuel/SF TransportUranium Conversion/Enrichment Fuel FabricationReprocessing Waste Treatment/Pu Storage*Spent Fuel Storage/Disposal
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 31 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key ResultsEnergy Security Attributes of Regional Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Cooperation Options: Summary Results Energy Supply Security
Scenario 1, with individual nations running enrichment and reprocessing facilities, provides greater energy supply security at the national level
On a regional level, scenarios 2, 3, possibly 4 may offer better energy supply security, including stockpiles aspect of scenarios 3 and 4
Economic Security Scenarios including reprocessing have significantly higher annual costs
over entire fuel cycle than scenario 4, but additional cost is a small fraction of overall cost of nuclear power
Use of reprocessing and related required waste-management technologies may expose countries of the region to risks of unexpectedly high technology costs
Required additional (government/government-backed) investment, (tens of billions of dollars, at least) in reprocessing may divert investment from other activities, within the energy sector and without
Development of in-country and in-region nuclear facilities will have its own job-creation benefits in the nuclear industry and related industries
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 32 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key ResultsEnergy Security Attributes of Regional Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Cooperation Options: Summary Results Technological Security
Scenario 1 makes nations dependent on specific technologies and plants for the operation of their nuclear energy sector
Scenario 4, using dry-cask storage, depends least on performance of complex technologies, but depends on future generations to manage today’s wastes (but so do other scenarios)
Environmental Security Scenarios 1 through 3 offer ~10% less Uranium mining and processing,
with attendant impacts/waste streams, relative to scenario 4 Reduced U mining/milling/enrichment offset by additional environmental
burden of need to dispose of solid, liquid, radioactive wastes from reprocessing
Differences between scenarios in generation of greenhouse gases, more conventional air/water pollutants likely to be relatively small, and inconsequential compared with overall national/regional emissions
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 33 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key ResultsEnergy Security Attributes of Regional Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Cooperation Options: Summary Results Social-Cultural Security
Given growing civil-society movements in some countries with concerns regarding nuclear facilities power in general, reprocessing in particular, and local siting of nuclear fuel-cycle facilities, Scenario 4 arguably offers the highest level of social-cultural security
In some cases current laws—in Japan, for example—would have to be changed to allow long-term at-reactor storage; changing those laws has its own risks.
Military Security Safeguarding in-country enrichment and reprocessing facilities in
Scenario 1, including stocks of enriched U and of Pu, puts largest strain on military and/or other security resources
Security responsibilities are shifted largely to the regional level in Scenario 2, to the international level in Scenario 3
More stress on the strength of regional and international agreements Level of military security (guards and safeguard protocols) required in
Scenario 4 is likely considerably less than in other scenarios.
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 34 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Conclusions and Next Steps Conclusions
Consistent with other studies, analysis shows that nuclear fuel cycle cooperation scenario without reprocessing yields lower costs
Overall cost differences are probably less important than considerations of proliferation resistance, social-cultural security, and military security, for which scenario 4 (dry-cask storage, no reprocessing) has advantages
Options using mostly regional or international facilities (scenarios 2 and 3) provide some non-proliferation benefits over scenario 1 (national enrichment/reprocessing) at cost differences that are likely insignificant, but will require considerable effort to arrange
Issues related to DPRK “denuclearization” may play a role in shaping regional nuclear fuel cycle cooperation strategies
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 35 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Conclusions and Next Steps Next Steps in EASS Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Analysis Evaluate generation costs to compare three nuclear
capacity paths Investigate implications of climate change
mitigation/adaptation for nuclear power, and for regional spent fuel management/enrichment proposals in Asia
Investigate implications of new reactor and other nuclear technologies for regional spent fuel management/enrichment proposals in Asia
Explore possible safeguards implications of various nuclear fuel cycles and related cooperation scenarios
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 36 D. von Hippel 9/2010
THANK YOU!THANK YOU!
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 37 D. von Hippel 9/2010
EXTRA AND EXTRA AND REFERENCE REFERENCE
SLIDESSLIDES
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 38 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key ResultsEnrichment Requirements by Country, 2000-2050,
Scenario 2, BAU Capacity Path
-
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
2027
2030
2033
2036
2039
2042
2045
2048
En
ric
hm
en
t R
eq
uir
em
en
ts, M
illio
n k
g S
WU Australia China
DPRK IndonesiaJapan ROKRFE TaiwanVietnam
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 39 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key ResultsEnrichment Requirements by Country, 2000-2050,
Scenario 3, BAU Capacity Path
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5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
2018
2021
2024
2027
2030
2033
2036
2039
2042
2045
2048
En
ric
hm
en
t R
eq
uir
em
en
ts, M
illio
n k
g S
WU
Australia China DPRK IndonesiaJapan ROKRFE TaiwanVietnam For Stockpile
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 40 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key Results Nuclear capacity by Path—Republic of Korea
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5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
2000
2004
2008
2012
2016
2020
2024
2028
2032
2036
2040
2044
2048
GW
e N
uc
lea
r C
ap
ac
ity
BAU
MAX
MIN
EASS 2010, BeijingEASS 2010, Beijing 41 D. von Hippel 9/2010
Analytical Approach, and Key Results Nuclear capacity by Path—Japan
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
2000
2004
2008
2012
2016
2020
2024
2028
2032
2036
2040
2044
2048
GW
e N
uc
lea
r C
ap
acit
y
BAU
MAX
MIN