1 review of us human space flight plans committee leo access sub group bo bejmuk chairman

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Review of US Human Space Flight Plans Committee

LEO Access Sub group

Bo BejmukChairman

2Review of Human Space Flight Plans Committee

LEO Sub Group Charter

• Examine and evaluate existing and proposed launch systems (including Ares I and Ares V) and propose best combinations of launch systems to support the Beyond Leo and SSP & ISS sub teams’ scenarios

• Members: Bo Bejmuk, Dr. Sally Ride, Dr. Wanda Austin, Dr. Ed Crawley


LEO Sub Team Approach

• Identified broad array of Government and commercial, existing and proposed launch systems

• Segregated launch systems by their mass to LEO capability into classes, Low, Medium, Heavy, and Supper Heavy

• Received briefings from CxP, other NASA entities, and Industry on Program of Record and alternate systems

• Engaged Aerospace Corp to Provide independent evaluation using broad range of criteria – Maintain “level paling field”

• Aerospace also provided independent Cost, Schedule, and Technical evaluation of the Program of Record


LEO Sub Team Approach – Forward Work

• Using scenarios developed by the Beyond LEO and SSP & ISS sub teams propose best combinations of Launch Systems that support those scenarios

- Utilize data presented to HSF committee and Sub Teams

- Apply results of Aerospace’s independent evaluation

- Consider NASA budget constraints

- Include desire for robustness, simplicity, and operability

- Safety and human rating will be important drivers

- Favor systems which encourage commercial and international participation

• Present recommended LV selections in DC public meeting


Launch Vehicles by Performance

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Launch Vehicle PerformanceMLV HLV H/SHLV SHLV


Launch Vehicle Selection Logic

GOALS

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SSP & ISSScenarios

Beyond LEO Scenarios

Recommendation of Launch Systems

Filters:•Received briefings•Aerospace evaluation•HSF members judgment


Aerospace Presentation

• Launch systems independent evaluation

• Cost, Schedule, and Technical evaluation of POR

© The Aerospace Corporation 2009

The Aerospace Corporation’s Support to The Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Review Committee

July 29, 2009

Gary Pulliam

Vice President

Civil and Commercial Operations

8APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Today’s Presentation

•Launch vehicle assessment

•Constellation program assessment

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APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

Assessment Comparison

•Constellation– An existing government program of record

– Detailed data exists

– Risks and challenges more widely known

– Conformance to budget profiles known

•Alternate Launch Concepts– Various levels of maturity

– History indicates commercial launch vehicle development takes longer to IOC

– Sidemount and Direct are design studies only

– Limited detailed data exists

– Challenges exist with integrating other program elements

– COTS is complementary to exploration

– Conformance to budget profiles not known

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•Comparative assessment of– Ares I/Ares V

– Human rated EELV

– Direct

– Side Mount

– Falcon 9

– Taurus II

•The Aerospace Corporation’s approach– Developed an assessment methodology

– Shared methodology with each program

– Welcomed information

Launch Vehicle Assessment


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•Systems are designed for different missions

•Systems have varying levels of claims

•We evaluated system claims for cost, schedule, performance and safety / human rating as well as 8 other diverse metrics

•We also evaluated systems against 4 mission classes– Crew to ISS

– Cargo to ISS

– Crew to Earth Orbit Lunar Rendezvous and Beyond

– Cargo to Earth Orbit Lunar Rendezvous and Beyond

Evaluation Approach


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Launch Vehicle Performance

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Launch Vehicle PerformanceMLV HLV H/SHLV SHLV

ISS

EOLR


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Vehicle System by Mission Class

*Commercial Crew Vehicle, not Orion


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Assessments Provided to Committee

•Each system’s data is proprietary to that company

•Only general statements appropriate for public release

•Metrics for system’s claims– Performance, cost, schedule, human rating capability

•Metrics not necessarily claimed by system– Operability

– System maturity

– National workforce

– NASA workforce

– SRM Industrial base

– Commercial space stimulation

– Impacts on Science and Exploration

– Impacts to National Security Space

•Over 70 second order metrics used to support primary metrics


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Sample System Overview - Ares I

Data Provided by AdvocateCharacteristics:

5 Segment RSRB first stageJ-2X LOX/LH2 upper stage

Performance:ISS: 23 mT CrewLEO: 26 mT Crew

Cost:NRC: $13.5BRC: $557M/launch (2/yr)

Schedule:IOC: March 2015

Strengths:• Flight proven human-rated motor design• J-2X has Saturn heritage• In development/construction

Weaknesses:• Thrust oscillations of large SRMs• Vibro-acoustics issues• No full scale testing of stage separation is planned• Low performance margins

Critical Assumptions of System:• Complete separation of Crew and Cargo• RSRM thrust oscillation issue is solvable• Virbro-acoustic issues are solvable

IA Comments:• Retains SRM and KSC workforce• Supports separation of Crew and Cargo

Metrics

PerformanceNR CostRec CostScheduleHuman Capability

OperabilityMaturityNational WorkforceNASA WorkforceSRM Industrial BaseComm'l StimulationExploration & ScienceNSS

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Crew to EOLR

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Cargo to ISS

Crew to ISS

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Cargo to LEO+

3 3

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4


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Metrics

Performance 4 3 3 2 3 2 4 2NR Cost 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1Rec Cost 1 2 3 1 3 1Schedule 4 3 3 2 3 3 3 1Human Capability 4 2 4 3 4 2 3 2

Operability 4 3 3 2 3 2 3 2Maturity 3 2 4 2 2 2 2 2National Workforce3 3 4 2 2 2 2 2NASA Workforce 3 3 2 2 3 2 3 2SRM Industrial Base3 3 1 3 3 2 3 2Comm'l Stimulation2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2Exploration & ScienceNSS

System 7System 8System 9System 1System 2System 3System 4System 5System 6Metrics

Performance 4 3 4 3 4 3 3 2 4 2 4 1 4 1NR Cost 3 1 4 3 4 3 3 1 2 1 3 1Rec Cost 4 3 4 3 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1Schedule 4 1 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1Human Capability

Operability 2 2 4 3 4 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2Maturity 2 2 5 3 5 3 2 2 2 2 4 1 3 1National Workforce 3 3 4 3 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 3 4 3NASA Workforce 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 1 3 1 3SRM Industrial Base 3 3 1 3 1 3 3 2 3 2 1 3 2 2Comm'l Stimulation 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 4 2Exploration & Science 5 2 4 3 4 3 5 1 5 1 5 2 4 2NSS 4 1 4 3 4 3 4 1 4 1 3 2 3 2


Performance 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 2 4 1 4 1NR Cost 4 3 4 3 3 1 2 1 3 1Rec Cost 4 3 4 3 2 1 3 1 3 1 3 1Schedule 4 3 4 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2Human Capability

Operability 4 3 4 2 4 2 3 2 3 2 3 2Maturity 5 3 5 3 3 2 2 2 4 1 3 1National Workforce 4 3 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 3 4 3NASA Workforce 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 1 3 1 3SRM Industrial Base 1 3 1 3 3 2 3 2 1 3 2 2Comm'l Stimulation 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 4 2Exploration & ScienceNSS


Performance 4 3 4 3 3 2 4 3 4 2 4 1 3 1NR Cost 3 2 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 1 3 1Rec Cost 4 2 1 2 2 1 3 1 3 1 3 1Schedule 4 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 1 3 2 2 1Human Capability 4 2 3 3 4 3 4 2 3 2 2 1 2 1

Operability 4 3 2 2 3 2 4 2 3 2 2 3 2 1Maturity 3 2 4 2 4 2 3 2 2 2 4 1 3 1National Workforce3 3 4 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 4 3 4 3NASA Workforce 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 2 1 3 1 3SRM Industrial Base3 3 1 3 1 3 3 2 3 2 1 3 2 2Comm'l Stimulation2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 4 2Exploration & ScienceNSS

System 1System 2System 3System 4System 5System 6System 7System 8System 9

Metric Summaries by Mission

Rating of LV Claim Degree of Uncertainty Associated with Rating

Crew to ISS

Cargo to ISS

Cargo to LEO +

Crew to EOLR


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MetricsSystem 1System 2System 3System 4System 5System 6System 7System 8System 9

Performance 2 2 4 4NR Cost 1 2 3 3Rec Cost 3 2 2Schedule 5 4 2 3Human Capability 4 4 4 3

Operability 5 4 2 3Maturity 3 4 2 2National Workforce 3 4 2 2NASA Workforce 4 2 3 3SRM Industrial Base 5 1 5 5Comm'l Stimulation 2 2 2 2Exploration & ScienceNSS


Performance 5 2 2 4 4 1 1NR Cost 2 5 5 3 3 3Rec Cost 5 4 2 2 5 5Schedule 1 5 4 2 2 5 4Human Capability

Operability 1 4 4 3 3 2 2Maturity 2 5 5 2 2 4 3National Workforce 3 4 4 2 2 4 4NASA Workforce 4 2 2 3 3 1 1SRM Industrial Base 5 1 1 5 5 1 2Comm'l Stimulation 2 3 3 2 2 4 4Exploration & Science 5 3 2 4 4 4 4NSS 4 2 3 5 5 1 1


Performance 2 2 3 4 1 1NR Cost 5 5 3 3 3Rec Cost 5 4 2 2 5 5Schedule 5 4 2 1 5 4Human Capability

Operability 3 3 5 2 1 1Maturity 5 5 3 2 4 3National Workforce 4 4 2 2 4 4NASA Workforce 2 2 3 3 1 1SRM Industrial Base 1 1 5 5 1 2Comm'l Stimulation 3 3 2 2 4 4Exploration & ScienceNSS

Metric Summaries by Mission – Comparative

Crew to ISS

Cargo to ISS

Cargo to LEO +

Crew to EOLR

Ranking of One LV System Relative to All Other LV Systems Evaluated



Performance 2 1 2 3 4 1 1NR Cost 1 5 2 3 3 3Rec Cost 5 3 2 2 5 5Schedule 4 4 4 2 1 5 3Human Capability 4 3 4 5 3 2 1

Operability 4 2 4 4 3 2 1Maturity 3 4 4 3 2 4 3National Workforce 3 4 4 2 2 4 4NASA Workforce 4 2 2 3 3 1 1SRM Industrial Base 5 1 1 5 5 1 2Comm'l Stimulation 2 2 2 2 2 4 4Exploration & ScienceNSS

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Alternate Launch Vehicle Assessment Summary

•COTS is an important complement to exploration

•Vehicles in HLV/SHLV category provide minimum capability for 2

launch solution

•Not all systems satisfy all missions

•Options exist for all mission classes

•Assessment certainty is greater for systems farthest along

•Several systems omit critical elements from their claims

• Information intended to guide committee deliberations

•Detailed, program review level assessment required prior to

decisions

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Constellation Program Independent Assessment

•Timeline was very compressed

•No detailed design review

•No traditional independent cost or schedule estimates

•Cx Program provided PMR’09 baseline cost data (IOC milestones), and Integrated Risk Management Analysis (IRMA) risk data

•Baseline Constellation (Cx) Program Independent Assessment (IA)

– Effects of Budget Reduction

– Effects of Technical Cost Risk Assessment

– Effects of ISS Extension to 2020

– Orion IOC “Quick-look” Schedule Assessment


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Available Cx Budget ($M FY09)FY09 President's Budget

FY10 PBS / ISS 2016

FY10 PBS / ISS 2020

ESAS Assumptions

Projected Constellation Program Funding has seen Significant Reductions since ESAS

Budget Reduction Impact - FY10 President’s Budget Submittal (PBS) significantly reduces

planned funding available to Cx program;More than $1.5B (FY09) per year starting in 2013

FY10 Budget Reductions

ISS extension

ESAS Anticipated Funding

*Budget request data runs for 5 years; out-year data is OMB estimate*ESAS budget numbers were not normalized for accounting structure changes

Potential 1.5 year impact to Orion / Ares I Initial Operational Capability (IOC) milestone due to the effects of the FY10 budget reductions

FY09 Budget Reductions


Technical Cost Risk Assessment

•Risks assessed were primarily from NASA

•We evaluated consequences on baseline – safety, performance, cost and schedule

– Reviewed hundreds of risks

– Reviewed mitigation plans, fallback plans and quantified risk amount (when provided in IRMA by Constellation Program)

– Develop ranking for top risks

• Final element risk ranking was used to modify each cost-risk S-Curve based on historical cost growth

• Cx Program level affordability analysis performed to account for project interdependencies

Potential delay of up to 2 years to Cx Program (Orion/Ares I ) IOCIncludes all Projects under Cx

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Orion IOC Schedule Risk Assessment

• A stand alone quicklook within the overall Cx assessment timeframe• Concentrate on sequential Critical Path elements, particularly in test• The Orion-2 schedule appears back-end loaded• Technical risk driving schedule uncertainties in the Requirements and

Design phase, System Qualification and Flight Production• Historical Examination

Potential delay of up to 18 months for Orion IOC only;6 months design, 12 months test


Orion Schedule Comparison to Human Space Flight (HSF) missions

Orion PMR09 Critical

Milestones to IOC • PDR: August 2009

• CDR: February 2011

• System Test Start: July 2012

• Delivery to KSC: Sept 2014

• Launch (Orion-2): March 2015

Planned Orion-2 “System Test to Launch” duration of 32 months is on par with Apollo but only ½ the duration of Shuttle

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System Test Startthrough Launch

PDR throughSystem Test Start

Duration (months)

Orion-2

Shuttle Orbiter (STS-1, Columbia)

Apollo (CSM 101)

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Orion Schedule Comparison to Historical Database Non-HSF Missions

•Historical Missions – Average shown for 13

National Security Space and NASA missions

– Single Flyers or 1st in a Block

– Dry Mass >2000kg

•Orion-2 – CDR to Launch period

(Back-end) is shorter relative to historical Non-HSF missions

Planned Orion-2 “CDR to Launch” duration of 49 months is 7 months short relative to the Historical NASA and SMC missions (>2000kg)

*Launch delays due to LV have been removed

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Orion-2

Historical SMC &NASA Missions

(13)

CDR to Launch (months)


ISS Life Extension and Effects on Human Lunar Return

• ISS life extension to 2020 could add an additional 6 month

delay to Constellation IOC

• Insufficient budget exists for the Human Lunar Return program

– Assumes a flat line budget beyond 2020

– No content reduction

•FY10 budget reductions force the need for a re-look at the

scope of the Human Lunar program

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Potential additional delay of up to 6 months to Cx Program IOC


Impact to the IOC at 65% Confidence Level

Multiple Effects Exacerbate the Gap

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HistoricalAdjusted Cx

Program basedon TechnicalAssessment

Cx ProgramBaseline

Increase in IOC Gap (years)

FY10 Budget EffectsTechnical Cost-risk EffectsISS Extension to 2020 Effects

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Constellation and Orion Assessment Summary

•Cx Program Independent Assessment – There is a potential 3.5-4 year impact to the Orion / Ares I Initial

Operational Capability (IOC) milestone due to the combined effects of the FY10 budget reduction, Cx Program technical cost-risk increase, and ISS extension to 2020

•Orion Project “Quick-look” Schedule Assessment– Orion technical risk driving schedule uncertainties

• A number of technical risks with potential schedule consequences

• “Quick-look” assessment suggests the design, and test risks may impact the Orion-2 IOC up to 18 months assuming a number of high-likelihood, high-schedule consequence IRMA risks on the Critical Path occur sequentially


Overall Summary

•History indicates IOC of 2015 was achievable at Constellation program start

•Budget reductions since ESAS formulation created cascading events

•Technical challenges exist, but they always do

• Insufficient budget exists to execute Constellation as directed

•Budget may be insufficient to execute alternative programs

•There may not be a feasible commercial solution to Constellation– COTS does not solve the exploration mission

– Humans on commercially developed systems is a dramatic change

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Potential Launch SystemsTo be Integrated with Beyond LEO and ISS/SSP Scenarios

Launch System Comments

POR – Ares I & Ares V Cost

Dual-Launch: Ares V Light (0.39) ISS by commercials

Dual-Launch: Atlas 5 Ph 2 H Lower cost, marginal performance

SDLV: Sidemount or Jupiter Could compliment shuttle extension

NO H/SHLV nor SHLV: use HLV and commercial MLV

Stimulate commercial; mission complexity; mission success question


Preliminary Findings

• Insufficient funding for POR to achieve ISS and Lunar IOC with reasonable gap and present Constellation content

• In spite of its technical and budgetary problems, Constellation has matured and could be successful given adequate funding

• NASA needs to address detrimental effect of “fixed cost” on execution of major programs

• If NASA mission and its implementation is changed, resulting changes to the POR launch system will have significant impact to cost and scedule


LEO Sub Team Summary

• Government and commercial LV identified

• Informational briefings received

• Aerospace independent evaluation conducted

• Beyond LEO and SSP & ISS teams scenarios will drive LV selection

• Filters for selection identified

• Proposed LV match to Scenarios will be deliberated in DC public meeting

1 review of us human space flight plans committee leo access sub group bo bejmuk chairman

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commercial crew vehicle

rating crew

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