1 tara bedi & brendan riordan my word is my bond my word is my bond: delivery of aid commitments...

1Tara Bedi & Brendan Riordan My Word is my Bond

My Word is My Bond:My Word is My Bond:Delivery of Aid CommitmentsDelivery of Aid Commitments

by Ireland and the UKby Ireland and the UK

Tara Bedi* and Tara Bedi* and

Brendan RiordanBrendan Riordan

*Trócaire, Maynooth, Ireland*Trócaire, Maynooth, Ireland


Ethical grounds for fulfilling Ethical grounds for fulfilling commitmentscommitments

1. Keep promises1. Keep promises- the deontological obligation;- the deontological obligation;

2. Consequences of failure to keep a 2. Consequences of failure to keep a promise,promise,especially consequences hurting especially consequences hurting other partiesother parties..


Structure of paperStructure of paper (after Gasper, 2004) (after Gasper, 2004)

I. EvidenceI. Evidence1. 1. Were commitments kept?Were commitments kept?

2. Consequences of not fulfilling 2. Consequences of not fulfilling commitmentscommitments..

II. Reflection on the evidenceII. Reflection on the evidence

III.Action to foster the keeping of III.Action to foster the keeping of commitments (Ethical Praxis)commitments (Ethical Praxis)


Official Development Assistance (ODA)Official Development Assistance (ODA)

a) a) GeneralGeneral commitmentscommitments- Increase ODA to 0.7 percent of N.I. Increase ODA to 0.7 percent of N.I.

b) Commitments to b) Commitments to individual individual countries and organisations countries and organisations engaged in developmentengaged in development Multi-year development programmes, Multi-year development programmes,

eg in Tanzania at 30 million each year.eg in Tanzania at 30 million each year.


I.1 Were commitments kept?I.1 Were commitments kept?

a) General commitmentsa) General commitments ODA increased slower than pledged in ODA increased slower than pledged in

2000 and 2005.2000 and 2005.

b) Individual commitmentsb) Individual commitments Over half of commitments in Country Over half of commitments in Country

Programmes apparently not delivered Programmes apparently not delivered in full on time (OECD, 2008).in full on time (OECD, 2008).


I.2 Consequences of not I.2 Consequences of not fulfilling commitmentsfulfilling commitments

a) a) General commitmentsGeneral commitments Behind schedule on progress towards theBehind schedule on progress towards the

Millennium Development Goals MDGsMillennium Development Goals MDGs

b)b) Individual commitmentsIndividual commitments Country development strategies Country development strategies

undermined.undermined.


I.2 I.2 ConsequencesConsequences of not fulfilling of not fulfilling commitmentscommitments

b)b) Individual commitments Individual commitments - continued- continued

Exacerbation of difficulties of Exacerbation of difficulties of managing low income aid managing low income aid dependant economies.dependant economies.

Inefficient use of aid, especially Inefficient use of aid, especially ‘aid windfalls‘aid windfalls’.’.



Aid promises have been Aid promises have been broken-broken-trusttrust in the promise giver in the promise giver

damaged. damaged. instability exacerbated;instability exacerbated;

Within low income countries: growth Within low income countries: growth of an atmosphere of trust hindered by of an atmosphere of trust hindered by disruptive effects of unreliable aid.disruptive effects of unreliable aid.



TrustTrust



TrustTrustand …..and …..


III Action to strengthen incentives III Action to strengthen incentives for donors to deliver commitmentsfor donors to deliver commitments To individual partnersTo individual partners

Through pressure on governments Through pressure on governments facilitated by publication of: facilitated by publication of: (a) Payment schedules for multi-year (a) Payment schedules for multi-year

commitments;commitments;(b) Statistics on aid received relative to (b) Statistics on aid received relative to

commitments.commitments.


III Action to strengthen incentives III Action to strengthen incentives for donors to deliver commitmentsfor donors to deliver commitments

To individual partners To individual partners ( (continued)continued)

Through the Through the law:law:

(c) Obligatory public reporting on (c) Obligatory public reporting on items (a) and (b);items (a) and (b);

(d) Embed commitments in (d) Embed commitments in contracts-contracts-


III Action to strengthen incentives III Action to strengthen incentives for donors to deliverfor donors to deliver

their their general commitmentsgeneral commitments(e) Through pressure (e) Through pressure

facilitated by publication of progress facilitated by publication of progress reports;reports;

(f) Obligatory reporting (f) Obligatory reporting on progress to reach ODA targets;on progress to reach ODA targets;

(g) Legislation (g) Legislation to ensure ODA rises to meet targets. to ensure ODA rises to meet targets.


SummarySummary

a) General ODA commitmentsa) General ODA commitments

b) Commitments to individual b) Commitments to individual development partnersdevelopment partners

In both, donors have not always In both, donors have not always delivered in full and on time.delivered in full and on time.


Summary continuedSummary continued

Failures to keep commitments:Failures to keep commitments:1.1. Damaged Damaged trusttrust that donors that donors

would do what they say – would do what they say – the the deontologicaldeontological obligationobligation

2.2. Diminished the value of aid Diminished the value of aid to recipients as a to recipients as a consequenceconsequence..


Summary continuedSummary continued

Action to strengthen incentives Action to strengthen incentives for donors to deliver:for donors to deliver:

Publish performance data;Publish performance data;

Legal enforcement of delivery.Legal enforcement of delivery.


ConclusionsConclusionsMore actionMore action is needed to is needed to

strengthen incentives so that strengthen incentives so that allall commitments are delivered in commitments are delivered in full, on time;full, on time;

Governments’ existing Governments’ existing commitments should havecommitments should havefirst call on the public pursefirst call on the public purse..


Thank youThank you

Please let us know your views,Please let us know your views,

Tara Bedi and Tara Bedi and

[email protected]@bRiordan.org


I.1 Were commitments kept?I.1 Were commitments kept? Cont. Cont.

b) Individual commitments - continuedb) Individual commitments - continued

Aid deliveries deviated from Aid deliveries deviated from commitments by an average 3 percent commitments by an average 3 percent in sub-Saharan Africa in 1998 to 2005.in sub-Saharan Africa in 1998 to 2005.

Deviations were ‘aid windfalls’ as well Deviations were ‘aid windfalls’ as well as shortfallsas shortfalls

CSOs also affected by funding delivery CSOs also affected by funding delivery differing from commitmentsdiffering from commitments..


II. Reflection on the evidence II. Reflection on the evidence cont.cont.

Low income – high income Low income – high income country development country development partnerships: trust damaged.partnerships: trust damaged.


II. Reflection on the evidence II. Reflection on the evidence contcont..

Trust dimension in aid relationsTrust dimension in aid relations

1.1. High TrustHigh Trust

2.2. Intermediate levelsIntermediate levels

3.3. Low levels – fragile statesLow levels – fragile states



Trust dimension in aid relations - continuedTrust dimension in aid relations - continued

1.1. High trustHigh trust Effective governance and Effective governance and

policies;policies; Aid via budget support; Aid via budget support; Multi-annual implicit Multi-annual implicit

contracts.contracts.



Trust dimension in aid relations - continuedTrust dimension in aid relations - continued

2. Intermediate levels of trust2. Intermediate levels of trust Aid with traditional Aid with traditional

conditionality; conditionality; Multi-annual legal contracts.Multi-annual legal contracts.


II. Reflection on the evidence II. Reflection on the evidence

Trust dimension in aid relationsTrust dimension in aid relations - continued- continued

3. Low trust – fragile states3. Low trust – fragile states Government largely impotent;Government largely impotent; Aid as goods and services or via Aid as goods and services or via

CSOs; CSOs; Short-term, highly focused, Short-term, highly focused,

contracts with government or contracts with government or CSOs.CSOs.


III Action to foster fulfillment III Action to foster fulfillment of commitments by donorsof commitments by donors

Why?Why?1. 1. ObligationObligation to do so to do so

on deontological grounds; on deontological grounds;

2. Current 2. Current weakness ofweakness of incentivesincentives for donors to deliver on their for donors to deliver on their commitments.commitments.

1 tara bedi & brendan riordan my word is my bond my word is my bond: delivery of aid commitments...

Documents

tara bedi brendan riordan

half of commitments

delivery of aid commitments

general commitments

b individual commitments

uk tara bedi

general commitments

bond conclusions