10. everett, 1948 - review of horkheimer - eclipse of reason

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Review Author(s): John R. Everett Review by: John R. Everett Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 45, No. 22 (Oct. 21, 1948), pp. 603-605Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2019609Accessed: 25-07-2015 21:13 UTC

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BOOK REVIEWS 603

verification, but I know of none which can. It is, however, based on a careful analysis of the phenomena and the acceptance of all well verified scientific findings. It uses no terms that do not have referents clearly present in experience. It introduces no hypothesis that is not a vera causa, i.e., supported by good analogy. In terms of such hypotheses it gives an account of all the relevant facts and in doing so employs a minimum of hypothesis. It therefore ad- heres to all the canons of scientific method applicable to the problem, as required by naturalists. This, I think, can not be said for any other hypothesis, and certainly not, as I have tried to show, for the type of theory here criticized, which usually goes under the name of naturalism today.

A. CAMPBELL GARNETT THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

BOOK REVIEWS

Eclipse of Reason. MAX HORKHEIMER. New York: Oxford Uni- versity Press. 1947. 187 pp. $2.75.

Professor Horkheimer has written a book which states more clearly than he had done previously his fundamental thesis regard- ing the decline of the West. His avowed purpose is to show how the condition of Western philosophy indicates the disintegration of meaningful society. True to his dialectical heritage he sometimes blames philosophy for the social collapse, and at other times charges commercialized capitalism with responsibility for bad philosophy.

Modern philosophy, says Professor Horkheimer, has allowed reason to become "subjective," with the result that Western man can no longer discern "a structure inherent in reality that by itself calls for a specific mode of behavior." Subjective reason ("the ability to calculate probabilities and thereby to coordinate the right means with a given end") is incapable of giving direc- tion to modern society because it can only deal with the proximate problems involved in correlating given facts of experience. The truly great philosophical systems of the past, such as those of "Plato and Aristotle, scholasticism and German idealism," were based firmly in the idea that reason has both subjective and objective characteristics. The subjective aspect was, however, always re- garded as "only a partial, limited expression of a universal rationality." The fundamental emphasis of the late great systems was upon objective reason which concerned itself with "evolving a comprehensive system, or hierarchy of all beings" and with "ends rather than means." With the loss of objective reason,


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man's ends are dictated by irrational urges, while his means achieve a high degree of rational organization. The conclusion, seen in part today, but certainly in the future, is Western man, busily, ef- ficiently, and rationally organizing himself for meaningless activity, and, probably, for purposeless destruction.

This book does not attempt to give an answer, except to imply that salvation will be achieved only when the ability to determine ultimate and objective truth is once again regained. Whatever this objective truth is, it will never be found by science. Science, and all philosophies which equate truth with the conclusions of scientific analysis, are only capable of calculating probabilities and organizing proper means. They are totally incapable of determin- ing the difference between ultimate truth and falsity. The posi- tivists, and these include all naturalists, and men such as Dewey, Russell, James, Max Weber, Nagel, Hook, and Carnap, have denied "autonomous philosophy and a philosophical concept of truth" and have therefore become classifiers and formalizers of scientific methods, and not philosophers at all. The scientistic panacea which they hold out is a murderous delusion with "meaninglessness as its meaning," which "restricts intelligence to functions necessary to the organization of material already patterned according to that very commercial culture which intelligence is called upon to criticize. Such restriction makes intelligence the servant of the ap- paratus of production.

As Professor Horkheimer sees it, there is another panacea in conflict with positivism-neo-Thomism. Medieval scholasticism, al- though wrong in many details, was essentially on the right tract in its emphasis upon ends rather than means. The neo-Thomists, however, have failed modern man by caring about the usefulness of their teachings. "Like the German neo-pagans, the neo-Thomists are streamlining old ideologies, trying to adapt them to modern purposes. By doing so they compromise with existing evil.... [They] are little concerned with belief in the Mater dolorosa . . . [and concentrate] on belief in belief as a good remedy for today's social and psychological difficulties." Thus the neo-Thomist solu- tion is corrupted by pragmatism, a species of positivism, and con- sequently loses its position as an avenue of salvation. It has become mere ideology and "a servant of profane aims."

The basic difficulty with positivism and neo-Thomism, and seemingly the definition of any panacea, is found in the attempt to make "truth and goodness identical with reality," and from this conclude that the adaptation to reality is man's highest goal. "It can be said that this doubtful principle of adapting humanity to what theory recognizes as reality is one root cause of the present


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intellectual decay. . . In our day the hectic desire of people to adapt themselves . . . has led to a state of irrational rationality."

That Professor Horkheimer appears ignorant of some of the most important work done by contemporary naturalistic philosophers is apparent from the quotations already given. His own rather thinly disguised left-wing Hegelianism allows him to lump all who disagree into categories called either positivism or neo- positivism. The refusal to recognize the close interconnection between ends and means; the self-critical and expansive nature of the scientific method; the meaning of "organized social intelligence" and its ability to criticize society; and the possibility of a coherent pluralistic metaphysic all conspire to weaken both his account of and his attack on modern philosophy. It is possible to criticize contemporary naturalism fairly by saying that it has not yet developed theories of value which satisfy the crying needs of our time. But this is hardly the same as saying, "It is an empty promise that some day positivism [here he is writing of Dewey] will solve the essential problems it has been too busy to solve up to now." Such criticism is particularly inappropriate when directed toward Dewey when one remembers his forthright social philosophy, based on an ethic of self-realization, and issuing in his concept of a "new individualism."

In spite of the excesses of Professor Horkheimer's attacks upon naturalism, his final chapter on the task of philosophy attempts to achieve a balance. He recognizes that "objective reason displays an inclination to romanticism" and that it (objective reason) often asserts "meaning that proves to be an illusion" and aids in the construction of "reactionary ideologies." In effect he asks for philosophy what most balanced philosophers have always asked: a mutual critique which takes the best from rationalism and the best from empiricism. I doubt, however, that Professor Hork- heimer's own treatment of empirical philosophies adds much to the reconciliation. To place all the ills of the present world on the doorstep of empiricism is a rather jaundiced peace-offering.

JOHN R. EVERETT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Basis and Structure of Knowledge. W. H. WERKMEISTER. New York and London: Harper & Brothers. 1948. ix + 451 pp. $5.00. This book is an expansion and systematic reformulation of the

conceptions concerning the nature of knowledge contained in the author's earlier A Philosophy of Science. Professor Werkmeister's interpretation of science draws its inspiration from Kant and the


Article Contentsp. 603p. 604p. 605

Issue Table of ContentsThe Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 45, No. 22 (Oct. 21, 1948) pp. 589-616Front Matter [pp. ]A Naturalistic Interpretation of Mind [pp. 589-603]Book ReviewsReview: untitled [pp. 603-605]Review: untitled [pp. 605-607]Review: untitled [pp. 607-610]Review: untitled [pp. 610-613]

Book NotesReview: untitled [pp. 613]Review: untitled [pp. 613-614]Review: untitled [pp. 614-615]Review: untitled [pp. 615]Review: untitled [pp. 615-616]

Current Journals [pp. 616]Back Matter [pp. ]

10. everett, 1948 - review of horkheimer - eclipse of reason

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