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The Place of "aporta" in Plato's "Charmides" Author(s): Vasilis Politis Source: Phronesis, Vol. 53, No. 1 (2008), pp. 1-34Published by: BrillStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40387946Accessed: 23-12-2015 10:48 UTC

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BRILL Phronesis 53 (2008) 1-34 www.brill.nl/phro

The Place of aporia in Plato's Charmides

Vasilis Politis Department of Philosophy, Trinity College Dublin,

College Green, Dublin, Ireland [email protected]

Abstract The aim of the paper is twofold: to examine the argument in response to Socrates' question whether or not reflexive knowledge is, first, possible, and, second, beneficial; and by doing so, to examine the method of Platos argument. What is distinctive of the method of argument, I want to show, is that Socrates argues on both sides of these questions (the question of possibility and the question of benefit). This, I argue, is why he describes these questions as a source of aporia. Socrates can argue, without contradiction, on both sides of these questions because the arguments against the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge are

premised on the supposition, defended by Critias, that this knowledge is only of ones

knowledge and lack of knowledge, whereas the arguments for its possibility and benefit are not committed to this supposition.

Keywords Aporia, inquiry, method of argument, reflexive knowledge

Introduction

My aim in this paper is to examine the argument in the second part of the Charmides (164-end), and by doing so, to contribute to the understanding of the method of Platos argument. It will emerge that the argument is part of an extended inquiry that is distinguished by being what we may call aporia-based. By this I mean that the inquiry is motivated, structured and directed by a particular aporia: aporia in the sense of the puzzlement characteristic of the grasp of a particular problem, a problem which is articulated in a question with two sides {whether or not. . .) such that there are apparently good reasons on both sides.

Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008 DOI: 10.1163/156852808X252576


2 V Politis I Phronesis 53 (2008) 1-34

The question to which the argument in the second part of the dialogue is addressed is succinctly stated at 167b 1-4, and it is immediately referred to, at l67b6-8, as what Socrates' aporia, expressly so called, is about. It is the question whether or not a certain kind of knowledge is, first, possible, and, second, beneficial. The knowledge in question (we shall refer to it as reflexive knowledge) is characterized here as the knowledge of what one knows, that one knows it, and of what one does not know, that one does not know it. It is also characterized by the summary formula: the knowledge of ones knowledge and lack of knowledge.1 This question comes to be central in the dialogue because Critias has argued that temperance ought to be defined as, precisely, this knowledge, and this means that Socrates' examination of the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge is at the same time an examination of this proposed definition. Socrates' response to the question about the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge - the question which is the source of his aporia - makes up the extended and complex argument in the remainder of the dialogue.

We may wonder, of course, why this should even be a plausible definition of , or temperance? What, we may ask, has reflexive knowledge thus characterized to do with virtue in general and this virtue in particular? An examination of the concept of , in general and in this dialogue, is not part of our task, but the following observations may help. First, the second conjunct in the characterization of reflexive knowledge, knowing of what one does not know, that one does not know it, is clearly meant to pick up on a central feature of the concept of , namely, that it is peculiar to being that one does nothing in excess and that in general one knows one's limitations - 'knows oneself in at least this sense.2 And it is natural to think, as we shall see, that the two conjuncts in

]) . shall suppose that the knowledge that is in question here is the knowledge of ones or someone's knowledge and lack of knowledge. Just as the use of 'knowledge' in English, so too the use of in Greek can serve to refer to a state of knowing, whether it is ones state or someone's-, and this is, I believe, the function of the genitive in : 'the knowledge of [ones/some- ones] knowledge'. It is also difficult to see what (Of lack of knowledge') could mean, if not: Of [ones/someone's] lack of knowledge'. Here I follow M. Dyson, 'Some Problems Concerning Knowledge in Plato's "Charmides" ', Phronesis XDt (1974), 102-1 11; see section I. 2) Witness Critias' appeal to the authority of the Delphic oracle for his claim that temperance ought to be identified with self-knowledge (I64d-165b).


V Politis I Phronesis 53 (2008) 1-34 3

the characterization of reflexive knowledge are meant to be mutually impli- cative: one can know the limits of ones knowledge if, and only if, one can know the positive extent of ones knowledge. What is striking, however, is that is defined in terms of knowing, in particular, the limits of ones knowledge. What, we ought to ask, is the relation between knowing one's limitations, when these are relevant for being virtuous in general and temperate in particular, and knowing the limits of one's knowledge? The supposition here, it appears, is that the failure to know the limits of one's knowledge is what is ultimately responsible for any wider failure to know one's ethical limitations, and that the knowledge of the positive extent of one's knowledge is ultimately what would enable one to act, and to act well, within these limitations.

Second, what leads to the proposal, by Critias, that temperance ought to be defined as reflexive knowledge is his proposal that it ought to be defined as 'the doing of good things'.3 Notable here is that what is defined appears to be not one particular virtue among others, but virtue in general. It ought not, therefore, to come as a surprise that when, later, Socrates considers the possible benefits of reflexive knowledge, he argues that these would have to include nothing less than acting well and being happy (see 172a and 173c-d). Third, both Socrates and Critias suppose that any definition of temperance must imply that possessing temperance is something greatly beneficial to the possessor. This, we may suppose, is why Socrates focuses on the question whether or not the possession of reflexive knowledge is beneficial - and why, at the end of the dialogue, he describes as Very offensive' the conclusion that it is not (175d3-5). If we ask why he focuses equally on the question whether or not reflexive knowledge is possible, the answer, as we shall see, is that if one supposes that the possession of a thing, F, is beneficial, then one must suppose that it is at least possible that there should be such a thing, F; and Socrates argues that there is reason to doubt the possibility of reflexive knowledge, at least on a particular understanding of this knowledge.

Our overall aim is to consider, first (in section 1), the meaning and source of Socrates' aporia at l67b6-8; second (in section 2), the structure of Socrates' response to the question and problem that his aporia is about, and the diagnosis of the source of the problem; and third (in section 3),

3) 'So I give you a clear definition of temperance as the doing of good things' (l63elO-l 1). We shall consider later how this leads to the definition in terms of reflexive knowledge.


V Politis I Phronesis 53 (2008) 1-34

the upshot of Socrates' attempt to answer this question and resolve the problem.

I shall defend the following conclusions. First, when Plato speaks of Socrates' aporia at l67b6-8, he is not - contrary to a common and traditional view about the meaning and place of opona in the early dialogues -

speaking of the puzzlement characteristic of the failure of a search, and typically the search for a definition and answer to the Socratic-type question, 'What is F?'; and it is not his intention to indicate the end of a search.4 He is speaking rather of the puzzlement characteristic of the grasp of a particular problem, the problem articulated in the question that his aporia is said to be about, and his intention is to indicate the beginning and starting-point of a particular search, the search that is motivated, structured, and directed by, precisely, this problem.5

Second, what is distinctive of the structure of Socrates' extended argument, in response to the question about the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge, is that Socrates argues on both sides of this question. He argues both against the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge and for its benefit, and, by implication, possibility. What allows him to argue, without contradiction, on both sides of the question, is that the argument against is premised on a particular supposition about what reflexive knowledge is of, namely, that it is only of one's knowledge and lack of knowledge (with repeated emphasis on the only), whereas in the argument for, reflexive knowledge is characterized simply as being of one's knowledge and lack of knowledge, and it is left open whether this is the only thing that it is of.

4) For a recent expression of the traditional view, and one that takes it for granted, see David Wolfsdorf, 'Interpreting Plato's Early Dialogues', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philoso- phy XXVII (2004), 15-40, esp. section 3. In clarification of the place and function o aporia in these dialogues, he writes: 'Notably, the discussions do not always succeed in finding compelling reasons or in reaching satisfactory conclusions; some dialogues end in aporia'; and, 'Every definitional dialogue ends in aporia' (24). For further references to, and criti- cism of, the traditional view, see my 'Aporia and Searching in the Early Plato', in L. Judson and V. Karasmanis (eds.)> Rememberng Socrates (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 88-109. 5) In the paper

' Aporia and Searching in the Early Plato' I argued, on the basis of a compre-

hensive review of the use of the term and its cognates in the early dialogues, that Plato uses the term not only in the way recognized by the traditional view, but also in this, significantly different way. The present paper takes this project further by providing an in- depth case-study, based on a single dialogue, of the place and function of aporia in regard of Plato's method of argument.



Third, the extended inquiry in this part of the dialogue results, as we know, in the ultimate failure to define temperance and accomplish their overall task - the dialogue ends, as we are traditionally accustomed to saying, in aporia. On a common and traditional view, moreover, this overall failure is due precisely to their failure to answer the Socratic-type question, 'What is temperance?', and to define the thing in question. But this view is, I think, mistaken. The overall failure of the inquiry is not due to their failure to establish a definition, it is due to their failure to answer a particular question and resolve a particular problem - the question and problem that Socrates' aporia is said to be about. And it is remarkable that this question, and the reasons why it articulates a problem, can be properly understood without a prior general commitment to the search for a Socratic-type definition, and even without being familiar with such a search or indeed with the Socratic-type question,


1. The Meaning and Source of Socrates' aporta

Traditionally we are accustomed to think of an aporetic early Platonic dialogue as one that ends in aporia and does so because the Socratic-type search for a particular definition ultimately fails. And certainly, if, as we are traditionally accustomed to, we mean by aporia the puzzlement characteristic of the failure of a particular search, and typically the search for an answer to a Socratic-type question,


The use of the term here cannot be the traditionally recognized one: aporia as the puzzlement characteristic of the failure of a particular search and typically the search for a Socratic-type definition. First, it serves here to indicate not the end of an inquiry, but its beginning and starting-point. Socrates says that he is in a state of aporia about certain things ( ), and what he is referring to is, precisely, the questions that he has formulated in the immediately preceding lines (167b 1-4), that is, the question about, first, the possibility, and, second, the benefit of reflexive knowledge. But this question serves to introduce an extended inquiry, namely, the one into, precisely, the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge, which extends to the end of the dialogue and Socrates' profession of ultimate failure. Second, we cannot suppose that when this inquiry is introduced, it is meant to be already clear that it will fail. On the contrary, at the point when it is introduced, we are evidently meant to consider it an open question whether the inquiry will succeed or fail.

Plato may at times use the verb in a casual way and without meaning to signify any particular puzzlement - as when in English we say wonder whether p' while being perfectly certain that, for example, not-p. Such a use would be compatible with supposing that Socrates directly goes on to argue that reflexive knowledge is neither possible nor beneficial. But the present use is anything but casual, for it is expressly associated with the question (cf. ), first, whether or not reflexive knowledge is possible, and, second, supposing it is possible, whether or not it is beneficial. And we shall see that this question determines the overall structure of the argument in the remainder of the dialogue, and that Socrates will argue on both sides {whether or not. . .) of both parts of this question (whether or not it is, first, possible and, second, beneficial). Socrates' profession of puzzlement is, therefore, meant to be genuine and especially significant. More- over, we shall see that it is because in the end he thinks they have failed to answer this question that he professes that they have failed in their inquiry and their overall attempt to define temperance.

What, then, does Plato intend to signify by the use of the verb when Socrates says that he 'is puzzled' about this very question? Appar- ently, he intends to signify that Socrates is in a state of puzzlement about a particular problem, the problem articulated in this question. And when Socrates adds that he wants to show the way in which he is puzzled ( , ;), we may suppose his meaning to be that he wants to show how what is articulated in this question amounts to a particular, and



particularly intractable problem. This, we shall see, is what he goes on to do, step by step, in the remainder of the dialogue. The reason why this question amounts to a problem is that there are reasons, and apparently good reasons, on both sides, that is, reasons both to affirm and to deny that reflexive knowledge is, first, possible and, second, beneficial. What Socrates goes on to do in the remainder of the dialogue is show the way in which there are particular reasons on both sides.

On the traditional view, then, Plato s use of the term and its cognates in the early dialogues serves to signify the puzzlement characteristic of the failure of a particular search and typically the search for a Socratic-type definition. But even if this is how Plato uses the term in a number of places in these dialogues, it is not how he uses it on a very significant occasion in the Charmides (l67b6-8). For what he means by the use of this term here is, rather, the puzzlement characteristic of the grasp of a particular problem, a problem that is articulated in a particular two-sided question {whether or not. . .) with apparently good reasons on both sides.

This, notably, appears to be close to the use that Aristotle is thinking of when he says that certain, unnamed thinkers define aporia as the equality of opposite reasonings, but then adds, by way of objection, that, properly speaking, aporia is rather the mental state that is caused by the apprehen- sion of an equality of opposite reasonings {Topics VI. 1 45b 16-20). For in the Charmides passage, it appears, the term is used, precisely, for the mental state of puzzlement that is caused by the recognition of such a problem, a problem that consists in the presence of reasons, and apparently good reasons, on both of the opposed sides of a question.

We may note that while in the Charmides passage and generally in the dialogue the term is used to signify the puzzlement characteristic of the recognition of a particular problem, it is not used to signify such a problem itself. But we should also note that this latter use - the term being used for a particular problem - is present in other early Platonic dialogues.9

9) If, that is, we suppose that the Charmides is early. But nothing in the present paper depends on this supposition. For I am treating this dialogue in its own right rather than as part of a group; and, to the extent that I am comparing it with (so-called) early dialogues - in respect of the use of the term and its cognates - the comparison contains both elements of contrast (to, for example, Laches 194a-c and 196a-b, Euthyphro 1 lb-d, and Meno 80a-b and 72a) and of similarity (with, for example, Protagoras 324d2-e2). For a good discussion on the vexed issue of chronology, see C. Kahn, 'On Platonic



A striking instance is Protagoras 324d2-e2, where Plato (notably through Protagoras, who is referring to Socrates' aporia) twice uses the expression Cthe puzzle/problem that you are puzzled about'), and speaks of the need to identify exactly what is required in order to resolve this aporia or problem (cf. ). For it appears that in the expression the second occurrence of the term refers to the state of puzzlement that is caused by and is about a particular problem, and the first occurrence refers to the problem itself that Socrates' state of puzzlement is caused by and is about.10 In the Charmides we have only the latter use, but both these uses are distinct from and must be set against the use, exhibited in a number of familiar passages, traditionally recognized.

There is one more passage in which Plato uses the term in the Charmides. This is I69c3-dl, where Critias is described as catching Socrates' aporia - like a contagious yawn - and as reacting, quite unlike Socrates, by feeling shame and his pride hurt in front of the others, and as trying to conceal his puzzlement and inability to determine what Socrates has just requested of him (I69b5-c2). It may seem that here Plato is using the term simply in the familiar and traditionally recognized way, to signify the puzzlement characteristic of the failure of a search and typically the search for a Socratic- type definition. But this impression is, I think, mistaken. For what Socrates has just asked Critias to determine is, first, that reflexive knowledge is possible, and, second, that in addition to being possible it is also beneficial (see I69b5-c2); that is, he has asked him to defend, precisely, the one answer to the original question, which Socrates' aporia was originally said to be about. This, of course, is the answer that Critias must defend if he is to uphold the definition of temperance as reflexive knowledge. And it is because he is unable to do this that Critias feels the force of this, Socrates' original aporia}1 This demonstrates that although, certainly, the term is

Chronology', in J. Annas and C. Rowe (eds.), New Perspectives on Plato: Modern and Ancient (Harvard: University Press, 2002), 93-127. W) See 99-102 or my Aporia and Searching in the ^arly Flato . n) For a good account of Critias' aporia here, see Press, 'The Eknchos in the Charmides1, 262. But Press does not mention the use of the term in 167b, or relate the two passages; and when he concludes by saying that 'the dialogue ends aporetically', he means (in confor- mity with the traditional view of what it means for a dialogue to end aporetically) that 'no Socratic or Platonic doctrine &sphrosun is directly propounded' (265).


1 0 V Politis I Phronesis 53 (2008) 1-34

used here to signify the puzzlement characteristic of the failure (at least at this stage of the inquiry) of a particular search, which is indeed an integral part of the search for a Socratic-type definition, it is used in a way that directly picks up on, and depends on, its use in 167b6-8, when it signified the puzzlement characteristic of the grasp of a particular problem.

Finally, it is plausible to think that the two uses of the term and its cognates (to signify the puzzlement characteristic of the grasp of a particular problem, and to signify the puzzlement characteristic of the failure of a particular search) are closely related, and that the latter depends on the former. This is immediately plausible on the following natural supposition: the puzzlement characteristic of the grasp of a particular question and problem (as in 167b6-8) becomes all the more pressing and pronounced to the extent that one tries but fails to answer the question and resolve the problem (as in 169c3-dl).12

2. Hie Dilemmatic Structure of Socrates' Response to the Question that his aporia is about, and the Diagnosis of the Source of the Problem

A. Socrates' response to the question that his aporia is said to be about, I want to argue, is dilemmatic in structure, that is, it is fashioned as a response to a two-sided question (in fact, two closely related two-sided questions) and one to which he responds by arguing on both sides. The dilemmatic structure is indicated already in the way in which the question is formulated:

Let us, then, make a new start and consider, first, whether or not it is possible that there should be such a thing as this, that is, the knowing of what one knows and of what one does not know, that one knows it and that one does not know it; and further, if this is perfectly possible, what benefit there would be for us of knowing this. (167b 1-4)

The question about the possibility of reflexive knowledge is expressly two- sided ( ' ). The question about its benefit is likewise two-sided, if (as the grammar indicates and as is borne out by what follows) we take it to mean not what the benefit would be, but what

12) In 'Aporia and Searching in the Early Plato' I treated the two uses as separate; but this, I now think, is a mistake.



benefit there would be - that is, would there be any? - of possessing this knowledge.13

What follows the statement of this question, and extends to the conclusion of the dialogue (175a8), is a series of four arguments in response to it:

1) argument for the conclusion that reflexive knowledge (on a particular supposition about what this knowledge is of) is impossible (167blO-169d2);

2) argument for the conclusion that reflexive knowledge (on a particular supposition about what it is of) is of no benefit (I69d2-171d2);

3) argument for the conclusion that reflexive knowledge is greatly beneficial (171d2-173c7);

4) argument for the conclusion that reflexive knowledge (on a particular supposition about what it is of) is of no benefit (173c7-175a8).

They can be briefly summarized as follows (I shall properly examine them later). First Socrates argues that, on the supposition that reflexive knowledge is only of ones knowledge and lack of knowledge,14 it is impossible that there should be such a thing as this knowledge. Second, in response to Critias' objection to this argument, he goes on to argue that if the possibility of reflexive knowledge is conceded,15 then, again on the supposition that this knowledge is only of ones knowledge and lack of knowledge,16 the possession of this knowledge will be of no benefit. Third, he argues, on the other side, and subject to the concession of the possibility of reflexive knowledge, that the possession of reflexive knowledge is greatly beneficial. Finally, he argues, going back to the original side, that, on the supposition that reflexive knowledge is only of one s knowledge and lack of knowledge,17 this knowledge will not be of the good and the bad, and it will not, therefore, be beneficial - intrinsically and essentially beneficial, that is.

13) That this is the force of the formulation is also evident from the way in which the same formulation is used at 171dl-2 to conclude that temperance, if defined as reflexive knowledge, would, precisely, be of no benefit to us. 14) This supposition is first stated at 167blO-c2. See below for full quotations of all the relevant passages. 15) See l69d2-4 for this concession, expressly so called (cf. ). For further references to this 'concession , expressly so called, see 172c6-8 and the multiple references in 175b4-c7. 16) The supposition is stated thrice in this argument: 170b7-8, 170c6-7, 171c4-5. 17) See 174e5-7 for this, the last statement of the supposition.



It appears, certainly, that Socrates argues on both sides of at least the one question, the question whether or not reflexive knowledge is beneficial; for argument 2 defends a negative answer whereas argument 3 defends an affirmative answer. One might object that he argues only for a negative answer, that is, only for the claim that reflexive knowledge is of no benefit. For what the conclusion of argument 3 says is that if the temperate person knew his knowledge and lack of knowledge, and if he were able to examine others with regard to their state of knowledge, then the possession of this knowledge would be greatly beneficial (171d2-6). One might think that the function of the subjunctive here is to indicate that reflexive knowledge is impossible; and that this means that the conclusion of argument 3 is not that reflexive knowledge is greatly beneficial, but only that if, per impossi- bile, reflexive knowledge were possible, its possession would be greatly beneficial. And this conclusion is obviously compatible with the claim (defended in argument 2) that reflexive knowledge is of no benefit.

But this objection is based on a misunderstanding of the function of the subjunctive here. Socrates has already conceded the possibility of reflexive knowledge (at l69d2-4), and it is against the background of this concession that he argues, first (in argument 2) against its benefit, and then (in argument 3) for its benefit. The function of the subjunctive at 171d2-4 is not, therefore, to indicate that the antecedent of the conditional ('if the temperate person knew. . .') could not be true. Its function, we may suppose, is, rather, to indicate that the antecedent s being true, and indeed the possibility of its being true, is only entertained (entertained as a concession), not asserted.18 And there does appear to be a contradiction between the claim 'if the possibility of reflexive knowledge is conceded, its possession is of no benefit' (defended in argument 2) and the claim 'if the possibility of reflexive knowledge is conceded, its possession is greatly beneficial' (defended in argument 3). Socrates defends both these apparently contradictory claims - each belonging to each side of the question that he said his aporia is about. This, we may suppose, is why he is in an aporia.

One may still object that if a single supposition (for example, that reflexive knowledge is possible) is a shared premise in a pair of arguments for contradictory conclusions, then the ensuing contradiction need not be asserted, but only entertained, and it may be entertained precisely for the

18) Alternatively, its function may be simply to indicate the evident fact that we do not actually possess this knowledge and that its possession is aspirational.


V Politis I Phronesis 53 (2008) 1-34 1 3

purpose of indicating the need to deny the shared premise.19 However, we shall see (when we examine more closely arguments 2 and 3) that the supposition that reflexive knowledge is possible is not a premise in Socrates' arguments first against and then for the benefit of reflexive knowledge. It is, rather, a concession that he needs to make in order to be able to raise, so as to try to answer it either way, the very question whether or not the possession of reflexive knowledge is beneficial.

Socrates, we may conclude, argues both against and for the benefit of reflexive knowledge - he argues on both sides of at least this question. However, it is notable that he does not argue for the possibility of reflexive knowledge, at least not directly; he only argues against it. How are we to understand this feature of the overall argument? One response would be that he takes himself to have conclusively established (in argument 1) that reflexive knowledge is impossible. This would, of course, undermine the case for the overall argument being dilemmatic. But this response is not really tenable. Immediately following the argument against the possibility of reflexive knowledge (argument 1), Socrates concedes its possibility (169d2-4). But it would not make sense that should make this concession while thinking that the argument against its possibility is conclusive. In fact there are clear indications that the argument is not supposed to be conclusive, that is, the reasons in this argument are indeed supposed to be good reasons, but they are not supposed to be conclusive reasons. At 168a9 Critias resisted the analogy between reflexive knowledge and the other states of the soul that are of some thing: he granted that these other states cannot be only of themselves, but refused to grant this with regard to reflexive knowledge (see below for a closer examination of this argument). And Socrates responded, concessively, that the impossibility of reflexive knowledge has not yet been established (168a 10- 11). Moreover, he concluded the remainder of argument 1 (168b- 169a) by saying that he thinks he is not himself capable of determining whether or not reflexive knowledge is possible and that this is a task for a greater man (169a).

Why, then, does Socrates concede the possibility of reflexive knowledge, immediately after arguing against it and in preparation for considering whether or not the possession of this knowledge is beneficial? Apparently, because of the following principle: if we suppose that the possession of a

19) As, arguably, in some arguments in the second part of the Parmenides. And as, famously, in Kant's antinomies.



thing, F, is beneficial, then we must suppose that it is possible that there should be such a thing, F. On the supposition of this principle, moreover, it follows that the argument for the benefit of reflexive knowledge (argument 3) is, by implication, also an argument for its possibility. There are two textual reasons for thinking that this principle is assumed here. First, when Socrates formulates the question about the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge (1 67b 1-4), he makes the question of benefit conditional on a positive answer to the question of possibility ('and further, if this is perfectly possible, what benefit there would be for us of knowing this'). Second, he asserts that raising the question whether or not reflexive knowledge is beneficial requires Conceding' its possibility (169d2-7 and 172c6-d2). Why is this principle thought to be plausible? That depends on what is meant by 'possibility' in the question about the possibility of reflexive knowledge. If what is meant were the possibility of acquiring or possessing this knowledge, the principle would be based on the claim, perhaps a plausible one, that if we suppose that a thing is beneficial, and hence if we want to possess it, we must suppose that it is possible to acquire it and possess it. This is not, however, what is meant by 'possibility'. The question about the possibility of reflexive knowledge is, rather, the question whether, if this knowledge is understood in a certain way, it can coherently be understood at all. It is, as we may say, a question of logical or conceptual possibility. And it does seem perfectly plausible to think that if we suppose that a thing is beneficial, then we must suppose that it is possible to form a coherent conception ofthat thing.

We may conclude that Socrates, in response to the question about the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge, argues on both sides: he argues directly against and directly for the benefit of this knowledge; and he argues directly against and indirectly for its possibility.

B. To understand the overall sequence of arguments in this, the second part of the dialogue we must, therefore, address two questions. First, how, without contradiction, can Socrates argue on both sides of the question about the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge? And second, why does he argue on both sides?

We may immediately set aside any suggestion that Socrates is presented as really arguing for what is plainly a contradiction, with the aim of indicating fallacies in the arguments.20 Such a suggestion would be without

20) This is how, for example, Cohen reads the argument (Maurice R. Cohen, 'The Aporias in Plato's Early Dialogues: ', Journal of hhe History of Ideas XXIII (1962), 163-74, see 168).



basis; for there does not appear to be any particular inference in these arguments of which it would be true to say both that it is so obviously falla- cious that Plato would have intended the reader to recognize the fallacy and that recognizing it would serve a particular purpose. On the contrary, it appears that all four arguments are presented as based on inferences that are endorsed and supposed to be valid.

My response to the first question ('How can Socrates argue for what appears to be a plain contradiction?') is this. The arguments against the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge are, expressly, premised on a particular supposition about what this knowledge is of, namely, that it is only of ones knowledge and lack of knowledge (with the emphasis on the only). On the other hand, the argument for the benefit of reflexive knowledge (and, by implication, its possibility) assumes only that reflexive knowledge is of one s knowledge and lack of knowledge and leaves open whether or not this is the only thing that it is of. The conclusion of the overall sequence of arguments is, therefore, that, on a particular supposition about what this knowledge is of, reflexive knowledge is either impossible or, if its possibility is conceded, of no benefit, but that, without this supposition, we are entitled to think that reflexive knowledge is greatly beneficial (and, by implication, possible). In this overall conclusion there is, of course, no contradiction. When, moreover, we turn to the critical supposition itself, we shall see that this is defended by Critias, and that the defence, though it falls short of establishing the supposition, succeeds in making it plausible and motivating it - and for this reason alone Socrates' aporia-based and dilemmatic response is appropriate and worthwhile.

It is remarkable how, repeatedly and at regular intervals in his argument against the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge, Socrates indicates that the argument is premised on the supposition that reflexive knowledge is only of one s knowledge and lack of knowledge. He prefaces the first argument with a statement to that effect:

Will not, then, all this be so, if as you were just saying, there is some one knowledge which is of nothing other than itself and any other knowledge, and which same knowledge is likewise of the lack of knowledge? (167blO-c2)

What he fastens on here, as distinctive of Critias' understanding of reflexive knowledge, is precisely the supposition that this knowledge is only of one's knowledge and lack of knowledge ('if, as you were just saying, there is some one knowledge which is of nothing other than itself. . .'). I shall use the term Supposition' to pick up the cif, and this 'if', we shall see, is repeated



in three of the four further passages in which Socrates points to this understanding of reflexive knowledge as being the main premise of his argument:

If then, one does not also know the healthy and the just, but one knows only knowledge, inasmuch as this is the only thing one has knowledge of, it is indeed likely that one will know, both in one s own case and that of others, that one knows something and that one is in possession of some knowledge. (170b7-8)

But, by means of temperance, if indeed ix. is the knowledge only of knowledge, how will he know that he knows the healthy or that he knows the art of building? ('70c6-7)

Tjf temperance is the knowledge only of knowledge and lack of knowledge, . . . (171c4-5)

Or did we not long ago affirm that it is the knowledge that is only of knowledge and lack of knowledge, and of no other thing. Was it not so? (174e5-7)

Moreover, if we examine the arguments against the possibility and the benefit of reflexive knowledge, we shall see that they depend crucially for their validity on the supposition that reflexive knowledge is only of one s knowledge and lack of knowledge, and that, if the only is omitted, these arguments do not even present the appearance of being valid. In what follows I examine the individual arguments in the following order: 1, 2, 4, 3. It will be useful to examine arguments 1 , 2 and 4 first, as they are directed against the possibility and the benefit of reflexive knowledge, and leave the contrastive argumenter its benefit (and, indirectly, its possibility) till the end.

Argument 1. The first part of the argument against the possibility of reflexive knowledge is by induction or analogy (l67blO-168bl), and it argues that it would be 'bizarre' or 'absurd' (, I67c4, l68alO) that there should be such a knowledge, since it appears that in no other case (cf. , l67c4-5), that is, with regard to no other state of the soul that is of some thing - be it the state of sense perception, appetite, wish, love, fear, or belief- is the state not of any thing distinct from itself, but is of itself and of other such states and the lack of them, that is, of whether or not one is in such a state. Thus, for example, there is no state of seeing that is not of some colour, but is of itself and of other states of seeing and not-seeing, that is, of whether or not one is seeing some thing; and analo- gously with hearing, sensory perceiving in general, appetitive desiring, wishing, loving, fearing, and believing. But what is supposed to be the absurdity indicated in this? Evidently, it is that, for example, there should



be a state of seeing which is not of a colour, but is only of whether or not one is seeing some thing. This would indeed be absurd or certainly bizarre. Because, first, it is absurd or certainly bizarre that there should be a state of seeing that is not of a colour; and second, it is absurd that there should be a state of seeing that is of whether or not one is seeing some thing, such as a colour, without being (or at least being capable of being) of such a thing, a colour. The absurdity, therefore, is supposed to be that there should be a knowing that is not of any thing distinct from itself, but is only of itself and of other states of knowing and lack of knowing, that is, only of whether or not one knows some thing. The argument does not claim absurdity in the idea that there should be a state of the soul that is of itself and of other such states and the lack of them; it claims absurdity in the idea that there should be a state of the soul that is only of itself and of other such states and the lack of them. This is precisely what Socrates indicates when he prefaces it by indicating that it is premised on Critias' supposition that reflexive knowledge is only of one s knowledge and lack of knowledge (cf. , 167bl 1-cl).

Socrates complements this inductive and analogical argument against the possibility of reflexive knowledge (167b 10- 168b 10) with an attempt (but one he acknowledges is inconclusive, 169al-8) at a more general and systematic argument for the same conclusion (l68blO-l69d2). First, he distinguishes cases where it appears to be altogether impossible ( , I68e4 and 6) that something should have its peculiar capacity (), that is, the capacity to be of some thing, directed at itself. They include the case of the larger and the smaller, which evidently cannot be larger than itself or smaller than itself; also the double and the half, the heavier and the lighter, the older and the younger (l68b5-cl0). Second, he sets such cases against cases where it is highly doubtful ( , I68e4) but there is still a real issue about (cf. l68elO-169al) whether or not this is possible. These cases include, in particular, the case of hearing and seeing (I68d3-el), also that of moving and warming (I68e9-I69al). But why is it highly doubtful whether such things can have their capacity to be of some thing (), or to be directed at some thing ( ), directed at themselves? Because, Socrates says:

If any thing had its peculiar capacity [that is, the capacity to be of some thing] directed at itself, would it not have the being [or: the essence, ] at which its capacity is directed? (168dl-3)



For example, he clarifies, if hearing, since it is precisely the hearing of sound, could hear itself, it would have to have sound; or if seeing, since it is precisely the seeing of colour, could see itself, it would have to have colour (I68d3-el). But why is it highly doubtful whether this is possible? Apparently, because of the following principle (supposing here means 'essence'):

Any thing that is, essentially, of some thing or directed at some thing, is what it is in virtue of the thing it is of or directed at.

For example, if something is the hearing of some thing or the seeing of some thing, then it is what it is in virtue of the thing that it is of being sound or being colour; or, if something is the moving of some thing or the warming of some thing, then it is what it is in virtue of the thing that it is of being moved or being warmed. We can now see why it is highly doubtful whether things such as hearing, seeing, moving, or warming can have their capacity to be of some thing, or to be directed at some thing, directed at themselves. This is because, if this were possible, then these things (hearing, seeing, moving, warming) would be indistinguishable from the things they are ofoi directed at, or certainly there would be a problem of distinguishing them from the things they are of or directed at (sound, colour, something moved, something warmed). It appears that this - the problem of distinguishing something that is of some thing from the thing that it is of- is just what Socrates wants to indicate when he says that, if it were possible for hearing or seeing to be of itself, then hearing would have to have sound and seeing would have to have colour (I68d3-el). But we ought to note that, with regard to reflexive knowledge in particular, this problem arises only on the supposition that this knowledge is only of ones knowledge and lack of knowledge, that is, only of (the fact) that one knows or does not know some thing, x. On this supposition, there will certainly be a problem of how to distinguish the state of knowing from the thing that it is of. If, however, reflexive knowledge is not only of one's knowledge and lack of knowledge, but also of the thing, x, that one's (first- order) knowledge is of, then evidently there will not be such a problem. For then the distinction is readily available between the knowledge of and - and in general the distinction between something that is, essentially, of some thing and the thing that it is of



Argument 2. The first argument against the benefit of reflexive knowledge is as follows (I69d2-171d2). Socrates argues that, first (l69d2-170d4), on the supposition that reflexive knowledge is only of one s knowledge and lack of knowledge (the only is underlined at 170b7-8 and c6-7), the possession of this knowledge will only enable one to know that one knows some thing or that one does not know some thing, it will not enable one to know what ont knows and what one does not know; and second (170d5- 171d2), if this is so, then the possession of this knowledge will be of no benefit. The inference in the first part of the argument is defended as follows. Socrates argues (see 170a6-c6) that, on the supposition of the only, any thing that one knows or that one does not know, such as, for instance, health, or justice, or harmonics, or the art of building, will be the object only of some knowledge other than reflexive knowledge, such as, for instance, medicine, politics, music, or the knowledge of the art of building; it will not be an object of reflexive knowledge. This inference appears to be valid, but evidently it relies on the supposition that reflexive knowledge is only of one s knowledge and lack of knowledge. For if reflexive knowledge were characterized simply as the knowledge of one's knowledge and lack of knowledge (without the only), this would leave open the possibility that it is not only of ones knowledge and lack of knowledge, but also of, for example, health, justice, harmonics, or the art of building. Socrates infers that reflexive knowledge is of no benefit. This inference (see at 170d5) appeals to the claim that the person in possession of reflexive knowledge, if he knows only that he knows some thing or that he does not know some thing but does not know what he knows or what he does not know, will not be able to distinguish, for example, a knowledgeable doctor from one who pretends to be knowledgeable or who wrongly thinks he is knowledgeable, and that only a knowledgeable doctor will be able to do so (171c5-9). This leads directly to the conclusion that reflexive knowledge is of no benefit (171dl-2), because it is supposed that if reflexive knowledge is beneficial, it will enable one to distinguish a genuinely knowledgeable person, whether this is oneself or another, from one who pretends to be knowledgeable or who wrongly thinks he is knowledgeable, and to live accordingly (171d6-172a5; see also 173a8-d5).

Argument 4. The second argument against the benefit of reflexive knowledge (173c7-175a8) is a response to the argument for its benefit (which we shall examine presently). In response to this argument, Socrates concedes



that the possession of reflexive knowledge would enable us to live knowledgeably (), but questions whether this would enable us to act well and live happily. He questions this by asking what the knowledge must be of whose end and product (cf. , 173d6, and , 174e5 and 175a4) is to act well and live happily; and he argues, with Critias' assistance and consent, that this knowledge must be, precisely, of 'the good and the bad' (174blO-c3). On this basis he concludes that this knowledge, the knowledge that would enable us to act well and live happily, is not the knowledge of one s knowledge and lack of knowledge, but is the knowledge of the good and the bad.21 This crucial inference - which basically concludes the overall inquiry into the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge - appears to overlook the possibility that this knowledge could be both of ones knowledge and lack of knowledge and of the good and the bad. But this objection is anticipated when Socrates reminds Critias that they agreed long ago (by 166c) that the knowledge of ones knowledge and lack of knowledge is only of this and of no other thing ( ... , 174e5-7). This, if any doubt should remain, shows that Socrates' last argument against the benefit of reflexive knowledge depends, and is supposed to depend, for its validity, on the supposition that this knowledge is only of one's knowledge and lack of knowledge.

Argument 3. It is all the more remarkable, therefore, that reference to the only is absent from the argument for the benefit of reflexive knowledge, and that this argument does not depend on the presence of the only (171d2-173c7). The argument begins with a statement of its conclusion:

Because if, as we supposed at the outset, the temperate person knew of what he knows and of what he does not know, that he knows the former and that he does not know the latter, and if he were able to examine another with regard to the same state, then it would be of the greatest benefit to us to be temperate. (171d2-6)

Compared to the number of passages, in the arguments against the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge, in which the only is stated and underlined, in this passage the only is notable by its absence. The passage

2i) l74d4-6: 'This knowledge, therefore, is not of [ones states of] knowledge and lack of knowledge, but of the good and the bad'.



refers back ('as we supposed at the outset'), apparently, to I67a-b, when Socrates first formulated the question about the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge, and it is striking that in that original formulation (167b 1-4) reference to the only is likewise absent. The argument states a variety of vital benefits that it would be natural to associate with the possession of reflexive knowledge, thus characterized. These are, for instance: not unthinkingly relying on oneself in one s deliberations about how to act, but knowing when it is appropriate to rely on oneself and when to defer to the authority of others; being better able to learn things; being better able to examine others with regard to their state of knowing or not knowing some thing; and being able to distinguish those who know some thing from those who only think they do or pretend to. It is summed up in the claim that the possession of reflexive knowledge would enable us to live 'knowledgeably (, 173dl), a condition with which such benefits are associated. Unlike the arguments against the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge, there is no reference, certainly none that is explicit, in the course of this argument to reflexive knowledge being only of ones knowledge and lack of knowledge. If it is objected that the reference may be elided and implicit, we ought to respond that in that case what Socrates would have had to have argued is, on the contrary, that the possession of reflexive knowledge is of no benefit, since this is, precisely, what he argues, and does so on the basis of the only, whenever there is a reference to the only. This suggests that not only is the reference to the only absent and the argument does not depend on its presence; the argument positively depends on its absence.

How, then, ought we to understand the significance of this apparent duality in the characterization of reflexive knowledge, sometimes with, sometimes without reference to onlyi Perhaps we ought to suppose that Plato intends solely the characterization with the onlyy and that, whenever it is not stated, the only is simply elided and implicit. This view may be eco- nomical, but is it plausible? It does not seem plausible to suppose that Plato should, in formulations that are central (above all 167b 1-4, when the central question is first formulated; also 171d2-6), elide a term that he then repeatedly states and underlines as central to his argument. And while the suggestion of elision may be plausible if we consider only the arguments against the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge, it appears to overlook the argument for its benefit. Moreover, on this suggestion,



what means have we for avoiding the result that, when he argues on both sides of the question about the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge, Socrates is arguing for a plain contradiction?

If it is objected (especially by appealing to 174d4-6, the claim that temperance is not reflexive knowledge but is the knowledge of the good and the bad) that Socrates ultimately settles for the argument on the one side of the question, that is, against the benefit of reflexive knowledge, we ought to respond, first of all, that Socrates' seemingly positive conclusion at 174d4-6 is premised on Cri tias' understanding of reflexive knowledge. We must, therefore, ask whether we are entitled to move from On Critias' understanding of reflexive knowledge, it follows that temperance is not reflexive knowledge' to 'temperance is not reflexive knowledge'. I have argued that this move is mistaken, for it overlooks that Critias' is not the only understanding of reflexive knowledge in play; but even setting aside this argument, such a move is questionable. Furthermore, the objection ignores the fact that the dialogue does not end on a positive note: with a profession of the discovery both of what temperance is not (reflexive knowledge) and of what it is (the knowledge of the good and the bad); on the contrary, it ends with Socrates' profession of defeat.

I propose, therefore, the following manner of understanding the significance of this duality in the characterization of reflexive knowledge. Plato deliberately characterizes reflexive knowledge in two ways:

Reflexive knowledge, narrow understanding reflexive knowledge is the knowledge that is only of what one knows, that one knows it, and of what one does not know, that one does not know it. In short, it is the knowledge that is only of one's knowledge and lack of knowledge.

Reflexive knowledge, broad understanding Reflexive knowledge is the knowledge of what one knows, that one knows it, and of what one does not know, that one does not know it. In short, reflexive knowledge is the knowledge of one's knowledge and lack of knowledge.

The narrow characterization is defended by Critias, and it appears that it formulates the only understanding of reflexive knowledge that he is sensitive to. It is this characterization that Socrates premises his arguments on when he argues against the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge.



The broad characterisation, on the other hand, is employed by Socrates, both in the original question about the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge, and in the argument for its benefit. The logical relation between the two characterizations is that the narrow entails the broad, but not con- versely. We may say that the two characterizations, Critias' and Socrates', have a core concept in common, the concept of reflexive knowledge as: the knowledge of ones knowledge andhck of knowledge. Plato, I want to suggest, characterizes reflexive knowledge in these two ways because it enables him to argue that, on one understanding of it (the one with the only), reflexive knowledge is either impossible or of no benefit, but also that, on a different understanding of it (the one without the only), we are entitled to think that it is greatly beneficial (and, by implication, possible).

Let me briefly address some objections to and misunderstandings of this proposal.

Socrates refers to Critias' view sometimes with, sometimes without stating the only;22 but if omitting the only made such a difference, this would be inappropriate. But there need not be anything inappropriate in Socrates' referring to Critias' view in both these ways. Since Critias' narrow characterization entails Socrates' broad one, Socrates may use the broad one to refer to understandings of reflexive knowledge that include, but are not limited to, Critias'.

On our interpretation, Socrates is trading on an ambiguity, and this is an unattractive feature. But there is no ambiguity. When Socrates uses the formulation of reflexive knowledge with the only, he intends the narrow understanding, so he means just what he says; and when he uses the formulation without the only, he intends the broad understanding, so again he means just what he says.23

There is no indication (apart from the inclusion and omission of the only,) that Phto is at all sensitive to an understanding of reflexive knowledge other

22) At 167a, for example, when Socrates prepares for the statement of the question that his aporia is about, he refers to Critias' view without stating the only. 23) One may object that Socrates' statement at 167blO-c2, which includes the only, contains a back reference ( ), and that this is to Socrates' summary at 167a, which does not include the only. But we ought to respond that the back reference may be rather to Critias' statement at I66b-c, when he concluded that, unlike all other knowledge, the knowledge which is temperance is not of anything other than one's states of knowledge. This is not only possible, it is also natural that the should refer to a passage in which it was he, Critias, that was speaking.



than Critias'. But there is significant indication. For it is not as if Critias simply assumes that the knowledge which is temperance is only of one s knowledge and lack of knowledge. Rather, Socrates, having argued that other kinds of knowledge are of something other than themselves (I66a3 f., for example, calculation is of the odd and even), asks what thing, other than temperance itself, temperance is the knowledge of (l66b5-6). It is in response to this question that Critias argues that temperance is different from and unlike all other knowledge in that while all other knowledge is of some thing other than ones states of knowledge, the knowledge that is temperance is unique (cf. , 166c2) in being, precisely, of ones other states of knowledge as well as of this state of knowledge, temperance, itself (I66b7-c6). It is the conclusion to this argument that Socrates refers to when he says (at l67blO-c2) that, according to Critias' view, there is a certain knowledge which is only of itself and the other (states of) knowledge and lack of knowledge, a formulation of his view that Critias readily accepts. The question, Ts the knowledge which is temperance only of ones knowledge and lack of knowledge?' is one that Plato expressly raises and indicates as central; Critias argues in the affirmative; and Socrates goes on, at length and with great care, to show that, on Critias' answer, it follows that temperance is either impossible or - absurdly, since temperance, what- ever else it is, is a virtue - of no benefit. The upshot of this overall reductio, therefore, is that it is not the case that the knowledge which is temperance is only of one's knowledge and lack of knowledge - with the emphasis expressly on the only24

C. Why does Socrates argue on both sides of the question about the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge? And why does he do so in the way he does, that is, with reference to, and on the basis of, the only when arguing on the negative side but without such reference when arguing on the positive side? Consider, first, the positive side, that is, for the benefit of reflexive knowledge. It is natural, and I think unobjectionable, to reason as Socrates does here (see 171d2 f.): if I but knew what I know, that I know it, and what I do not know, that I do not know it, and if I were but able to examine others with regard to this, this would indeed be greatly beneficial both to me and others, and would afford us a variety of vital benefits. If it

24) See below for this upshot.



were objected against this reasoning that, if this knowledge is understood as being only of ones knowledge and lack of knowledge, then, even if it is possible, it will be of no benefit - then surely I would be justified in responding: I wasn't understanding this knowledge in this particular way, I wasn't so much as thinking of the only. The core concept of reflexive knowledge, as this knowledge was characterized in the original question about its possibility and benefit (1 67b 1-4), is: the knowledge of one s knowledge and lack of knowledge. But this concept does not indicate a question of, much less settle, whether or not this knowledge is only of one's knowledge and lack of knowledge. It is, therefore, natural and appropriate that, if asked whether this knowledge is beneficial, one should address this question without reference to the only.

With regard to the negative side, that is, against the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge, the immediate reason why Socrates argues on this side, and does so with a repeated reference to the only, is evidently that Critias has just defended the view that reflexive knowledge, the knowledge which is temperance, is only of one's knowledge and lack of knowledge (see esp. I66b5-c3); and Socrates wants to examine the consequences of this view. The underlying reason, we may suppose, is that Critias' view about reflexive knowledge, as he defends it, is supposed to be at least plausible and well-motivated - and therefore deserving of serious consideration - whether or not it is ultimately correct. We need, therefore, to consider Critias' argument for this view.

In summary, the argument is as follows (I65c4-I67a8). Temperance, Critias has argued, is the knowledge of oneself (l64d3-4). But Socrates wants to know what this knowledge amounts to, because each particular knowledge ( ) is the knowledge of some thing (, l65c4-6; see also 171a5-6). He offers the suggestion to Critias that this knowledge is of some distinctive product () that it produces (, I65c8-e2), just as the product of medicine is health and that of the knowledge of building is houses. But Critias responds that not all knowledge is productive and that this knowledge is not like that (I65e3-I66a2). Socrates accepts this response (I66a3), but insists that we still need to know what distinctive thing this knowledge is of, in virtue of which it is distinct from any other non-productive knowledge (I66a3-b6). He insists, moreover, that this knowledge must be of some thing other than the knowledge itself, because all other knowledge, such as the knowledge of calculating or weighing (I66a5-b3), is of some thing other than the knowledge itself. At



this point, however, Critias responds, crucially, that what distinguishes this knowledge from any other knowledge is, precisely, the fact that it is not of anything other than ones knowledge - it is only of ones knowledge. Socrates adds that, in that case, this knowledge will be likewise of one s lack of knowledge (, l66e7-8), which Critias accepts.

How, then, and how plausibly, does Critias argue that this knowledge is only of one s knowledge and lack of knowledge? It appears that his argument is based on a principle about the individuation of knowledge, which says that:

Each distinctive knowledge is of some one thing, which is peculiar to it, and is distinct from any other knowledge in virtue of being of that thing.

This principle is introduced by Socrates (165c4-6), and he makes use of it when he distinguishes different kinds of knowledge, such as medicine, or the knowledge of building, or that of calculating, weighing, weaving, etc. It is readily accepted by Critias, who makes crucial use of it when he concludes, against Socrates, that reflexive knowledge is only of one s knowledge. A succinct statement of this principle, which refers back to its initial statement at l65c4-5, is provided later by Socrates:

Or was it not in virtue of this that each knowledge was distinguished as being not only knowledge, but a distinctive knowledge, that is, in virtue of its being 0/certain distinctive things? (171a5-6)

Certainly Critias' view of reflexive knowledge appears to be sufficient to satisfy this principle. If reflexive knowledge is the knowledge that is only of ones knowledge and lack of knowledge, then it will indeed be of some one thing, namely, one s knowledge and lack of knowledge, and since, as Cri- tias argues, this thing is peculiar to it and no other knowledge is of it, it will be distinct from any other knowledge precisely in virtue of being of this thing.

But is Critias' view of reflexive knowledge, with the emphasis on the only, necessary to satisfy the principle? One may object that it is obvious that a conception of reflexive knowledge without the only can likewise satisfy the principle, and that, therefore, the reasoning is obviously falla- cious. For, one may object, all that is required to distinguish reflexive (and in general second-order) knowledge from first-order knowledge is the



claim that while first-order knowledge is only of some thing, x, such as health, number, or colour, reflexive knowledge is not only ofthat thing, x, but also of one's knowledge or lack of knowledge of it. This objection is certainly to the point, but is it decisive? I think not. For it invites the following response. Suppose, contrary to the desired conclusion, that reflexive knowledge, which is essentially second-order, is not only of one s knowledge and lack of knowledge of some thing, x, but also of that thing, x. How, then, do the two elements in reflexive knowledge - that one knows or does not know some thing, and what thing one knows or does not know - contribute to the distinctness of reflexive knowledge from any other, and in particular first-order knowledge? Is reflexive knowledge distinct from first-order knowledge in virtue of being of the things that first- order knowledge is of, such as health, number, or colour? Evidently not. But then, apparently, it must be distinct from first-order knowledge only in virtue of being of one's knowledge and lack of knowledge. For if the one element contributes nothing by itself, then the contribution resulting from conjoining the two elements must be due entirely to the other element. It follows that reflexive knowledge, in so far as it is essentially second-order and distinct from first-order knowledge, is only of one s knowledge and lack of knowledge of some thing, x, and not also ofthat thing, x.

We may, of course, suspect that there is meant to be a mistake in this reasoning, and we may wonder what the mistake may be. It seems that, if there is a mistake, it is to suppose that the two elements in reflexive knowledge are independent of each other. It is this supposition that allows one, first, to consider the former element {that one knows or does not know some thing) independently of the latter {what thing one knows or does not know); second, to argue that in virtue of the latter element considered by itself, reflexive knowledge is not distinct from first-order knowledge, indeed it is indistinguishable from it; and, third, to conclude that, in so far as reflexive knowledge is distinct from first-order knowledge, it is so only in virtue of the former element considered by itself. But this mistake, if it is one, is not an obvious one, indeed it is not easy to recognize it. Moreover, even if it is recognized, it is not obvious how it ought to be rectified. For it is far from obvious how the two elements in reflexive knowledge are related to each other and how the one may depend on the other. We may conclude that Critias makes a good, even if inconclusive case for the view that reflexive knowledge is only of one s knowledge and lack of knowledge.



3. lhe Upshot of Socrates' Attempt to Answer the Question and Resolve the Problem

We have seen that practically the entire second half of the dialogue is addressed to the question whether or not reflexive knowledge is, first, possible, and, second, beneficial. And this question, which is at the outset (167b) succinctly stated and referred to as what Socrates' aporia is about, serves to motivate, structure, and direct the extended search in the remainder of the dialogue, a search which is distinguished especially by Socrates' arguing on both sides. But we know what the upshot of this search, and the dialogue as a whole, will be (175a9-end), namely, the failure of the inquiry and of finding what they were searching for, the definition of temperance. And it is of course this upshot that is behind the traditional view of the dialogue as aporetic. We have seen, however, that Plato does not use the term or its cognates at the end of the dialogue, and that, when he uses it (167b especially), he does so not for the puzzlement characteristic of the failure of a search, and hence to indicate the end of a search; he uses it, rather, for the puzzlement characteristic of the grasp of a particular problem, the problem articulated in the question that Socrates' original aporia was said to be about, and hence to indicate the beginning and starting-point of a particular search, the search that is motivated, structured, and directed by, precisely, this problem. The inquiry, it has emerged, is distinctively aporia-based - this is what most of all characterizes the method of Plato's argument.

Why, then, does the dialogue end with the failure of the overall inquiry into temperance - end with, as we are traditionally accustomed to saying, aporia?. On the traditional view, the overall inquiry has failed precisely because they have failed to answer the Socratic-type question, 'What is temperance?', and to define the thing in question. But this answer is, I think, mistaken. My point is not, of course, to deny the centrality, through- out the dialogue, of the search for the definition of temperance; it is, rather, to deny that the overall failure of the inquiry is because ofie failure of this search. It is true that the overall inquiry has failed, and that they have failed to define temperance, and that the two failures are closely associated. Indeed Socrates opens the concluding section by lamenting the fact that the search has defeated them, since, apparently, they have reached the offensive conclusion that temperance is of no benefit; and he directly asso-



ciates this failure with the failure to define temperance and discover what the thing is to which the word rightly applies (175a9-b4, also c8-d5). But the overall failure of the inquiry is not due to their failure to establish a definition, it is due to their failure to answer a particular question and resolve a particular problem - the question and problem that Socrates' aporia is said to be about. And it is remarkable that this question, and the reasons why it articulates a problem, can be properly understood without a prior general commitment to the search for a Socratic-type definition, and even without being familiar with such a search or indeed with the Socratic-type question, 'What is F?'

Socrates, having professed their failure to define temperance (175b3-4), immediately associates this failure with their failure to answer the question about the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge (see 175b4-c8). This failure, he now reckons, has been due to their readiness to make con- cessions that were not licensed by the argument, in particular the concession that reflexive knowledge is possible. He is referring here to a particular juncture in the argument about the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge (l69d2-4; also 172c6-d2), when he conceded its possibility in order to consider its benefit. That he is thinking of the original question, and thinking of it as the source of his original aporia, is evident also from the fact that he adds a last sharpening of the problem articulated in this question, when he says that to concede the possibility of reflexive knowledge (characterized, as it was originally, as the knowledge of what one knows, that one knows it, and of what one does not know, that one does not know it) implies (due to the second conjunct in this characterization) that it is possible to know in some sort of way what one does not know in any way - something that appears to be impossible and a plain contradiction (175c3-8). We may conclude that the reason why the inquiry has failed is precisely, and is expressly indicated as being, that they have failed to answer the question and resolve the problem that Socrates' original aporia was said to be about, the question about the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge.

The comparison with the traditional view is instructive. On the traditional view, which says that the inquiry has failed because they have failed to define temperance, the failure of the search is dependent on its being a search for a definition, an answer to the Socratic-type question, 'What is F?' To understand this dependence we ought to recall, in general, that the



answer to a Socratic-type question must conform to certain requirements, such as the following: (1) the answer shall not consist simply in the appeal to individual things that are regarded as examples or exemplars (paradeig- matd) of things that are F; (2) it shall be general, that is, it shall not refer to any particular thing that is F; (3) it shall be unified, hence it shall not be disjunctive (see, for example, Meno 71e-72b); (4) it shall be explanatory, that is, what is signified in the definiendum shall depend, for being the very thing it is, on what is signified in the definiens, and this dependence shall be asymmetrical or at least non-symmetrical (as indicated in the Euthyphro dilemma). On the traditional view, therefore, if an inquiry fails because of the failure to define some thing, F, we may expect that this failure is due to the failure to satisfy a requirement of a Socratic-type definition.

But this is not why the inquiry of the Charmides fails. The particular search that makes up the second part of this dialogue fails not because they have failed to satisfy a requirement of a Socratic-type definition, but because they have failed to answer a particular question and resolve a particular problem. And the recognition of this question as articulating a problem is not dependent on a commitment to the search for Socratic- type definitions. To say this is not, of course, to suggest that the question about the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge, as it is taken up in the dialogue, is independent of the search for the definition of temperance: it is clearly dependent, since the dialogue is built around the search for the definition of temperance, and the definition under investigation here is that temperance is, precisely, reflexive knowledge. It is, rather, to observe that the understanding of the very question, and of the particular reasons for arguing on both sides of it (the reasons we have traced), does not depend on a prior general commitment to the search for Socratic-type definitions, or even any familiarity with this search and the requirements that help constitute it. Even if we had never heard of the Socratic search for definitions, we would be able adequately to understand, first, Socrates' original question, the one he says his aporia is about, and second, why, because of the reasons on both sides of it, the question articulates a particular, and particularly intractable problem.

The wider significance of this ought to be evident, especially for address- ing the general question: cWhat, in a Platonic dialogue that searches for but fails to find a definition, is the relation between the search for a definition and aporia? On the traditional view, which says that an aporetic


V. Politis I Phronesis 53 (2008) 1-34 3 1

dialogue ends in failure and aporia precisely because of the failure to define the thing in question, it follows that aporia is dependent on the search for definitions. But we have seen that the end of the Charmides does not conform to this view. If, therefore, we continue to describe the dialogue as aporetic, we ought to recognize that the grounds for doing so are very different from those traditionally recognized. The grounds are: that Socrates' original aporia (which was not the puzzlement characteristic of the failure of a search and did not indicate the end of a search, but was the puzzlement characteristic of the grasp of a particular question and problem and indicated the beginning and starting-point of a search) has become all the more pressing and pronounced by the end of the dialogue, because they have failed to answer the question and resolve the problem that the aporia was said to be about (see end of section 1). And there is, we have seen, an important sense in which this question and problem is independent of the search for definitions, for it can be understood, and recognized as being a problem, independently of a commitment to or familiarity with this search. There is, therefore, an important sense in which aporia, in a dialogue whose overall aim is to define some thing but which ends by pro- fessing the failure to define it, need not be dependent on the search for a definition.

This brings us to the end of the dialogue and our reading. There is left only Charmides' claim at 176a6-bl, when he says that he cannot possibly know whether or not he is temperate since they have failed to discover what temperance is. This claim is especially striking because it appears to be a clear and unambiguous instance of the so-called principle of the priority of definition, which says that (PD): it is not possible to know that some thing, x, is F, if one does not know the definition of E This principle is of course famous, not least since Geach's notorious charge that it amounts to a fallacy.25 But I shall leave this aside, for I believe that Charmides' final

25) Peter Geach, 'Plato's Euthyphro: An Analysis and Commentary', The Monist 50 (1966), 369-82; reprinted in William J. Prior (ed.), Socrates. Critical Assessments, vol. Ill, Socratic Method (Routledge, 1996), 152-162. It is worth noting that Gerasimos Santas, who wants to question whether Plato commits himself to PD, judiciously acknowledges that 'Charmi- des' question [at 176ab] is the most explicit text I have found for the Socratic fallacy' and that 'this passage [Charmides 176ab] - [is] the most explicit text for the Socratic fallacy' (see 174 and 175 of 'The Socratic Fallacy' ' Journal of ^the History of 'Philosophy 10 (1972), 127-41; reprinted in Prior (ed.), Socrates. Critical Assessments, vol. Ill, 163-179).


32 V Poiais I Phronesis 53 (2008) 1-34

claim, too, ought to be understood against the background of Socrates' original aporia and the problem it is about. That is, I would argue that the principle of the priority of definition ought to be understood as being conditional on the presence of a particular problem. What Plato commits himself to at the end of the dialogue is not PD, but rather: PD, if, and only if, there is an unresolved problem {aporia) about F. This, I would like to think, provides us with a particularly good, and hitherto untried means of answering Geach's charge. But this is another days work.

I would like to conclude by asking whether, notwithstanding their failure to answer the question and resolve the problem about the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge, they can be said to have made determi- nate progress in the search for an answer and resolution. The immediate overall conclusion of the dialogue, with regard to this question and problem, is this:

[A] If we suppose that reflexive knowledge is the knowledge that is only of one's knowledge and lack of knowledge, then this knowledge will be either impossible or of no benefit.

If, therefore, we want to defend the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge, we must suppose that it is not the case that this knowledge is only of one's knowledge and lack of knowledge.

Moreover, there is reason to think that reflexive knowledge would be greatly beneficial, so there is reason to want to defend its possibility and benefit.

This conclusion looks largely negative, but it requires no more than ele- mentary understanding of the negation of a statement of the form 'x [which is undeniably of y] is only of y, to derive an equivalent positive conclusion:

[B] If we want to defend the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge, we must suppose that this knowledge is not only of one's knowledge and lack of knowledge, but abo of other things.

We have also seen what these 'other things' must include:

[Bl] First, a necessary condition for reflexive knowledge being possible and beneficial is that this knowledge should be not only of (the fact)


V. Politis I Phronesis 53 (2008) 1-34 33

that one knows some thing or that one does not know some thing, but aho of what it is that one knows or what it is that one does not know.

Only in this way can the dissociation of the knowledge of (the fact) that one knows or does not know some thing from the knowledge of what it is that one knows or does not know, for which the narrow understanding of reflexive knowledge was responsible, be overcome.

[B2] Second, a sufficient condition for reflexive knowledge being greatly beneficial is that this knowledge should be not only of (the fact) that one knows some thing or that one does not know some thing, but aho of, precisely, the good and the bad.

This, I submit, is the overall positive upshot of the dialogue. Platos overall aim in the second part of the Charmides is not to argue against the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge, it is to argue against the possibility and benefit of reflexive knowledge on a certain supposition about what this knowledge is of. And his wider aim, we may suppose, is to determine on what suppositions about what it is of reflexive knowledge is, and on what suppositions it is not, possible and beneficial.

One last question. If this is the upshot, why does Plato not say so? [A] is, I think, an immediate and obvious consequence of what he says. But why does he not state, or indicate, [B] and [Bl-2]? The following reason may suggest itself. Consider the following account of reflexive knowledge, derived from [B] and [Bl-2]:

[C] Reflexive knowledge is the knowledge that is both of ones knowledge and lack of knowledge and of other things, including, in particular, the good and the bad.

This conjunctive account is not, however, acceptable as it stands, for it is compatible with thinking that the two conjuncts are independent of each other. But this (that the conjuncts should be independent of each other) would not be acceptable to Plato, not only on general grounds relating to the requirement that definitions be unitary, but also because, if the conjuncts are independent of each other, then the first conjunct will in effect refer to the knowledge that is only of one's knowledge and lack of knowledge, and any reference to any other thing that reflexive knowledge is of


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