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105mm Howitzer Batta l ion in at tack of aposi t ion, Hi l l 192, N ormandy, 11 Ju l 44 ,by Lt Col D. C. Litt le, FA . Command and

Staff College, 1946-47.

This DocumentIS A HOLDING OF THE

ARCHIVES SECTIONLIBRARY SERVICES

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

DOCUMENT NO.N- 225131 COPY NO . 1

CGSC Form 16013 Mar 51

ap

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COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

FORT LEAVENWORTH

KANS S

School of Combined Arms

Regular Course

1946-1947

105mm Howitzer Bat t a l ion in At tack of a P o s i t i o n

H i l l 192, NORMANDY, 11 Ju ly, 1944

( P e r s o na l Exper ience of Bat t a l ion Commander)

L t. Col. Donald C. Little, FA

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Table of Contents

Index page a

Bibliography b

In t roduc t ion 1

Th e situation 1

The terraih 2

The enemy 3

The plan of a t t ack 4

The artillery plan 5

Preparation for the attack 6

The a t t ack 7

Conclusions 8

Lessons learned 8

Char t 1 Progress 2d In f Div from 7-17 June, 1944

Sketch Hegerows of Normandy

Chart 2 Plan of Attack

Overlay to Chart 2 Artillery Plan--Barrage

Char t 3 Organiza t ion of Suppor t ing Artillery

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B i b l i ography

* P e r s o n a l Diary (Copy of Diary of 38th FA Bn)

** Divis ion History (Combat HIs ry of the Second Infantry

Divis ion in World War II)

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Introduction

In th i s talk I wish to desc r ibe th e p l ans an d ac t ions

of a 10 5 mm h o w i t z e r b a t t a l i o n of an i n f a n t r y d iv i s ion in

an a t t ack on an organized p o s i t i o n . In t h i s opera t ion a

rolling bar rage was used . A r o l l i n g ba r r age is a s e r i e s of

artillery fires de l ive red on succe s s ive l i n e s on a f i x e d

t ime schedule. During World War I, th e r o l l i n g bar rage was

th e normal method of artillery fire in an a t t a c k . Experience

with the rolling bar rage i nd i ca t ed t h a t it was both waste fu l

of ammunition an d i n e f f e c t i v e , s ince we had no p o s i t i v e

means of coordina t ing its advance exac t l y with t h a t of th e

i n f a n t r y.

The forward observer system adopted by our field artillery

between World Wars I an d II enabled our artillery to fire on

areas of enemy resistance successively as aur infantry ad-

vanced in th e a t t ack . Why then was a rolling bar rage fired

during the attack of the 2d In fan t ry Division on Hill 19 2

in July, 1944? We shall see .

The situaton (Chart 1)

Hill 192 was a commanding height situated three miles

e a s t of ST LO, FRANCE. On June 7, 1944 (D plus one of th e

Normandy landings)t he

2d Infantry Division had landed on

OMAHA beach, passed through elements of th e 1 st an d 29th

Infantry Divisions which held th e beachhead, and fought 30

ki lometers sou th to H i l l 192. o There, because of stiffening

German r e s i s t ance an d l ack of logistical suppor t , th e d i v i s i o n

had halted on June 17.

For over t h r ee weeks th e d i v i s i o n s a t on th e nor the rn

s lopes of H i l l 192 an d on a l i ne 6 k i lome te r s e a s t of it,

while supp l i e s and r e i n f o r cemen t s were brought i n to th e beach-

head. Then on Ju ly 11 th e d iv i s ion was ordered to capture

H i l l 19 2 an d th e ST LO-_BAYEUX road one ha l f -mi l e sou th of

it, as a pre l imina ry t o th e gene ra l ST LO breakt rough to

take place two weeks later.

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Chart 1

Progress .2d In f Div from 7-17 June, 1944

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Sketch

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The terrain

Hill 192 was not a commanding peak, but was a long, sugar-

l o a f hill some 50 meters h ighe r than the surrounding ground.

The Germans built a tower in th e t r e e s on its summit, an d f r o m

th i s tower, on a clear day, you cogld s ee the shipping off

OMAHA beach, twenty-odd miles to th e nor th . We thought tha t

when we had taken H i l l 192 we would turn th e trick on the Ger-

mans, but we were disappointed to find that ground south of Hill

192 was. even h ighe r. It was a f i ne OP look ing nor th , no good

look ing south .

This was th e hedgerow count ry of Normandy. H i l l 192 and

th e entire zone of the 2d In fan t ry Division was a patchwork

of hedgerows ( ske tch) . The hedgerows surrounded f i e l d s an d

lined sunken roads. The fields were of va r ious sizes and shapes.

About a third of the f i e l d s were orchards, th e rest under cul-

t i v a t i o n . Small groups of farm bu i ld ings dot ted the a rea .

The hedgerows themselves were fo rmidable obstac les . They

ran from f o u r to e igh t f e e t i n h e i g h t and from th ree to e igh t

feet in thickness. They. ere built of closely packed earth

and rock and were usually sodded and topped with hedge, whose

roo t s f u r t h e r s t rengthened th e wal l .

It can be seen from the preceding description that each field

in this terrain was a battleground in itself. Each hedge-

row was obs tac le an d obse rva t i on combined and a ffo rded field

of fire only to t h e n ex t hedgerow. On H i l l 192, however,

th e Germans had excellent observation of not only th e zone

of th e 2d In fan t ry Div i s ion , b u t of th e 29th an d 1 s t on th ewest an d eas t , r e spec t ive ly. From H i l l 192 artillery fire

was directed over the entire area of V Corps, and roving

guns fired from any number of firing po in t s .

It was t h i s dominat ing hill, i n t e r l aced throughout

its length and heightby fo rmidable hedgerows, t h a t the 38 th

In fan t ry of th e 2d In fntry Divis ion was o capture on July 11,

1944.

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The enemy

Of more importance than th e t e r r a i n was th e enemy tha t

defended Hi l l 192. In th e first dk ys of th e f i g h t i n g south

of OMAHA Beach the enemy had been for the most part members

of the static coast defenses, including Russians. As Hill

192 was approached, however, a new brand of opposition de-

veloped. These new defenders all wore mottled camouflage

suits and seemed to be all armed with automatic weapons.

Soon they were i d e n t i f i e d as members of th e 9th Parachute

Regiment of the 3d Parachute Division, who had been rushed

from BRITTANY to halt th i s American pene t r a t ion of th e Nor-

mandy defenses .

They were c l e v e r, t enac ious foes . Th y f i r e d their

"burrp" guns from t r e e s , hedgerow corners , an d buildings.

During th e pe r iod from June 17 to Ju ly 11, while th e Americans

awaited the order to resume th e attack, th e paratroopers

conver ted each hedgerow on th e nor thern s lope of H i l l 192

i n to a maze of dugouts and firing p o s i t i o n s . Tunnels were

dug a t ground l e v e l th rough th e hedgerows to a ffo rd ape r tu re s

a t th e base of th e hedgerows. P i t s dug th rough th e tops of the

hedgerows were zig-zaged fo r g r e a t e r p r o t e c t i o n .

Machineguns and towed an d s e l f - p r o p e l l e d a n t i - t a n k guns

fired from p r epa re d p o s i t i o n s t h r o u g h o u t th e defended a r ea .

Movement laterally an d to th e f r o n t was covered by th e hedge-

rows themse lves an d th e many orchards an d t r ee - l ined trails

t h r o u g h o u t . Mortars were emplaced in coun t l e s s p o s i t i o n s ,

an d covered every American p o s i t i o n and avenue o f advance.

The Germans' g r e a t e s t a s s e t was th e caliber of the t roops

themselves. They were always in the next hedgerow. Our pat-

rols sent out at night were shot up badly or gobbled up entire-

ly. If we withdrew a hedgerow or two to br ing down fire on

t h e i r p o s i t i o n s , they fo l lowed us back an d were aga in - - in th e

n e x t hedgerow. I watched as a group of pa ra t roope r s was being

questionaned after the hil l had been captured. One ragged

bearded survivor expressed the espri t of the 3d Parachute

3

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C1B r t 2

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Div i s ion when he was asked what he thought of th e Americans

now. Looking f i xed ly a t h is ques t i onne r he answered without

hesitation "Germany will wint"

The plan of attack (Chart 2)

When th e order came from V Corps to capture H i l l 192,

th e 38th In fan t ry held th e r i g h t t h i r d of th e 2d I n f a n t r y

Divis ion sec to r, with H i l l 19 2 to its f r o n t . On th e r i g h t

of th e 38th In fan t ry was th e 116th In fan t ry of th e 29th

In fan t ry Divis ion . On its left was th e 23 d In fan t ry of th e

2d.

With its t h r ee reg iments a l r eady on an extended f r o n t ,

th e d iv i s ion ordered th e 38th In fan t ry to capture H i l l 192,

th e 23 d to cap tu r e th e ST LO"wBAYEUX road in its gone, an d

th e d iv i s ion an d sup p o r t i n g corps artillery to weight th e e f-

fort of th e 38th Infant ry. The 29th In fan t ry Div i s ion would

a t t ack s imul taneous ly to capture h igh ground to th e west.

The 38th Infantry decided to attack with the 1st and

2nd Battalions abreast, the 2d on the right, to capture th e

objectives shown on Chart 2. In the zone of the 2d Battalion

la y th e main roads an d trails being used by th e enemy, th e

farm v i l l a g e s of CLOVILLE an d LE SOULAIRE, an d th e small patch

of woods on th e summit of H i l l 192. The 1 s t B a t t a l i o n zone

inc luded th e more exposed eas t e rn h a l f of th e hill an d a very

la rge p a t ch of t h i ck woods on th e r eve r se s lope of th e hill.

Because of th e hedgerows, th e opposing f r o n t l ines were

in some cases l e s s than 100 yards apa r t . Each hedgerow line

might be the main line of resistance. Therefore, in order

to br ing maximum fire of artillery an d mortars on th e nea re s t

enemy hedgerow, our l i ne of depa r tu r e fo r th e a t t ack wogld

be two hedgerows (about 200 yards) back of our presen t f ron t

l i n e . Withdrawal to th e l i ne of depar ture would take place

dur ing th e first p a r t of th e artillery prepa ra t ion . H-hour

fo r th e a t t ack was 0600 hours (about first l i gh t ) 11 Ju ly.

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Overlay to Chart 2

Artillery Plan- -Barrage

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Th artillery p lan

To suppor t this at tack th e d i v i s i o n artillery was r e in -V C o r 's

forced by th e 62d and 65th Armd FA Bat t a l ions of th e

, and two b a t t a l i o n s of heavy corps artillery.

The 38th FA En, in d i r e c t suppor t o f th e 38th In fan t ry,

was given th e 62d an d 65th Armd FA b a t t a l i o n s to r e in fo rce

i ts fires.

The artillery, fire plan cons i s t ed of two main par t s :

(1) th e prepa ra t ion which would last fo r one hour an d (2)

th e suppor t ing fires dur ing . the a t t ack , cons i s t ing of a

rollingarrage for the light battalions, and deepening and

thickening fires of the medium and heavy battalions.

During the first fifty minutes of th e p r e p a r a t i o n th e l i gh t

b a t t a l i o n s fired on loca ted machine gun and morta r pos i t i ons

in the enemy forward area, while mediums and heavies went

for enemy batteries, CP's, and reserve areas. In th e last

ten minutes of th e prepa ra t ion th e l i g h t s and mediums came

down on th e first enemy-held hedgerow, th e mediums firing

on impact, and the lights with time fire, the fragments

reaching down into the Germans' holes and emplacements.

Fires of the infantry heavy weapons were integrated with

the artillery preparation.

Then was to begin the second phase, or rolling barrage

(Overlay to Chart 2). It was estimated that th e infantyy I

might advance at the ra te o f 100 yards every 4 minutes , and

t he re fo re every four minutes th e artillery in th e bar rage

would raise the range 100 yards, fire one volley, and main-

t a in a slow fire of one round pe r gu n pe r minute until at

th e end of th e four minute per iod th e process was repeated.

In order to keep th e fire plan f l e x i b l e and conforming to

th e a c t u a l advance of th e i n fan t ry, th e 100 yard fire l i n e s

were superimposed on the 1:5000 yard battle map being used

by the infantry and forward observers. Each range line

wa s let tered, and the fire lines of each artillery battalion

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were n a m e d as a g r o u p by colors , so tha t a f o r w a r d obse rve r

c o u l d report " H o l d B r o w n on Jig, a d v a n c e G r e e n to K i n g " .

50 yard a d v a n c e s o f the barrage w e r e obtained b y calling for

"King p l u s 50" . J

Prdparation for the attack

Because of the na tu re of th e t e r r a i n , the c l o s e s t co -

o p e r a t i o n wa s n e c e s s a r y b e t w e e n infant ry, tanks, e n g i n e e r s ,

a n d artillery. Ta n k platoons o f the battalion attached to the

d iv i s ion were a t t ached to each a s s a u l t infant ry company, an d

i n t e n s i v e t ank - in fan t ry assau l t t ra ining wa s conduc ted in divi.-

l ion r e a r areas for tw o w e e k s pr io r to th e a t t a c k . Tanks

were n o t al l equ ipped at this t ime w i t h th e c u t t i n g teeth

tha t w e r e u s e d en t i r e ly in th e ST LO b r e a k t h r o u g h tw o weeks

later, a n d it w as necessary for demol i t ion t e a m s to precede

tanks a n d blast holes through the h e d g e r o w s for t h e m . It

was a squad and a t ank to a f i e ld , th e squad to a d v a n c e to

the next h e d g e r o w while covered b y the fire o f the tank,

t1n the t a n k advance w h i l e c o v e r e d by th e squad .

The artillery in direct s u p p o r t of th e 38 th Infantry

wa s organized as fo l lows (Char t 3):

a, Fire direction c e n t e r o f th e 3 8 t h FA Bn controlled

all fires, acted on requests of forward observers, a n d made

n e c e s s a r y changes in schedu led fires.

b. A f o r w a r d CP wa s e s t a b l i s h e d by th e 38th Infantry

in a sunken road a b o u t a t housand yards b a c k of th e l i ne of

d e p a r t u r e . At this f o r w a r d CP comple te communica t ions were

es t ab l i shed , inc lud ing l ines f r o m th e a r t i l l e ry l ia ison

officers to the a r t i l l e ry battalion c o m m a n d e r. H e r e the

progress of e a c h c o m p a n y w as studied a n d the fire plan

s u p p l e m e n t e d or r e v i s e d as n e c e s s a r y.

c It c a n b e seen f r o m Chart 3 that e a c h a r t i l l e ry

liaison officer w as on a party hookup w i t h th e forward

observers w i t h th e a s s a u l t r i f l e compan ie s , th e f i re d i rec t -

io n center, an d the artillery battal ion commander. Radio

of coarse wa s the alternate means of communication.

6

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Chart 3

Organization of ' Supporting Ar t i l l e ry

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.... _ . _ . _ . .. ._ ... _.._ .. _ . , . . . . ._ . . _,...._. _ _ . . . . . _ . . . . ..,_._...._e,...M..._..__" _.__ .,.. ... _._.. . , . _ . . . __ .... ... ... ,...

a"

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d. Observat ion furn ished by fo rward observers was

supplemented by a sixty-foot tower OP erected in the trees

500 yards in r ea r of th e f r o n t l i nes , an d a f f o r d i n g exce l l en t

observa t ion of th e hill. Lia ison planes furn ished overa l l

surveillance of the battle area, and looked especially for

enemy batteries.

e. The fo rward observers of th e 38th FA Bn who opera ted

normally with th e a s s a u l t companies of th e 38th I n f a n t r y

would c o n t r o l th e bar rage fires o f th e t h r ee artillery

b a t t a l i o n s firing in f r o n t of th e i n fan t ry. The 62d an d

65th had fo rward observers out to r e p o r t any initial e r ro r s

direct to their own fire direction centers, but the f i re

direction center of the 38th gave the targets, time schedules

an d commands to fire to th e 62d an d 65th.

f. On th e two days p r i o r to Ju ly 11, th e e i g h t ba t -

t a l ions of d iv i s ion an d corps artillery t h a t were to support

th e a t t ack , r e g i s t e r e d on map loca ted po in t s on the hill.

Every lot of ammunition that was to be used was registered.

This assured direet hits on located gun 6mplacements during

th e prepa ra t ion . A e r i a l photos and p a t r o l s had uncovered

many of these exac t l oca t ions .

The attack

At 0600, 11 Ju ly, fo l lowing the artillery prepa ra t ion ,

the i n fan t ry jumped off, an d fo l lowing th e rolling barrage ,

by late afternoon had captured its objectives. Ene my

r e s i s t ance was cont inuous an d stubborn th roughout th e day,

fo r a l tho4gh gu n emplacements and hedgerows had taken d i rec t

hits from artillery fire, th e enemy was so wel l du g in tha t

many had to be killed at close quarters. Captured German

off i ce r s were cur ious a b o u t th e American "au tomat ic" artil-

l e ry. *

Cbuntera t tacks by th e enemy to r e t ake the hill were

expec ted , an d defensive fires were a l ready prepared on call,

an d fo rward observers ad jus t ed on check po in t s as soon as

* Pe r so n a l Diary

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the hill was taken in order to mass all fires. Th e counter-

a t t acks did not develop.

The 38th Infantry had taken fairly heavy casualties,

bu t they were less than had been an t i c ipa ted fo r th e re -

duction of this heavily defended area.** Less thah 200

prisoners were taken, but the enemy dead were many times

the number of prisoners. Many German dead, killed by time

fire an d b u r s t s on the tops o f hedgerows, had to be dug

out of ho l e s an d hedgerow emplacements.

An unmailed letter taken off a dead German two weeks

later described the shelling of Hill 192 to a friend back

in Germany: "At 1135 I left the platoon sector as last man.

Car r i e d m y machine gun through the enemy l i n e s into a slight-

ly more pro tec t ed def i l e and c rep t back again wi th another

fellow to get the wounded....On our way back we were covered

aga in with terrific artillery fire. We were j u s t ly ing in

an open area . Every mbment I expected deadly shrapne l .

At t h a t moment I lost my nerves . The others ac t ed just

l i ke me. When one hears fo r hours the whining, whistling,

and burs t ing o f s h e l l s an d th e moaning an d groaning of th e

wounded, one does no t feel to o well....Our company has only

30 men left (ou t of 170) ." ++

Conclusions

More than 25,000 rounds were fired by the eight artillery

battalions in this attack, an average of 300 rounds per piece

fo r th e 1051s. Except fo r th ree days dur ing th e Bat t l e of

the Bulge, this was the heaviest expenditure of ammunition

in the exper ience of th e 38th FA Bn .

This was the only rolling barrage fired by the 2d Infan-

try Div i s ion A r t il l e r y in e leven months of combat, bu t no-

where again did the situation require its use.

Lessons learned

(1) Unusual situations sometimes require unusual methods.

(2) Shells are less expensive than men's lives.

(3) In every operation careful prior planning saves

**Division History ,

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l ives and. assures accomplishment of~ the mission whatever

th e enemy react ion may be.

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