1/28 type safety from the ground up. chris hawblitzel (joint work with jean yang, juan chen, and...

1/28

Type safety from the ground up.

Chris Hawblitzel(joint work with Jean Yang, Juan

Chen, and Gregory Malecha)

2/28

Modern computer systems are great!(but they have bugs)

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Answer #1: Type Safety!

source code(e.g. C#)

assembly language

Type checker

Compiler

(but compilers have bugs)

• Catches many common bugs (at compile time or run time):• buffer overflows• double frees• ...

Web scripting: Java, Javascript, .NET, ...Operating systems: SPIN, Singularity, ...

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Example compiler bug (in Bartok)

void F(int[] arr, int i) { if (i <= arr.Length) { // i ≤ arr.Length int j = i - 1; // j < i ≤ arr.Length if (j >= 0) { // 0 ≤ j < i ≤ arr.Length // no bounds check required! arr[j]++; } }}

counterexample: i = -231

j = 231 - 1 j > i

vulnerability: address = &(arr[0]) + 4*j = &(arr[0]) + 4*(231 - 1) = &(arr[0]) - 4

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Answer #2: Typed Assembly Language!(Morrisett et al, POPL 1998)


typedassembly language

Type checker

Compiler

• catches type errors in assembly language program

• types for objects, stacks, code pointers, etc.

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Answer #2: Typed Assembly Language!



Type checker

Compiler

(but run-time systems and operating systems have bugs)

run-time system (GC, ...)

OSservices

Linker / loader

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From: Apple Product SecurityDate: Fri, 11 Jul 2008...Available for: iPhone v1.0 through v1.1.4,iPod touch v1.1 through v1.1.4Description: A memory corruption issue exists in JavaScriptCore's handling of runtime garbage collection. Visiting a maliciously crafted website may lead to an unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution. This update addresses the issue through improved garbage collection.

Example GC vulnerabilities

Mozilla Firefox Bug in JavaScript Garbage Collector Lets Remote Users Deny Service Advisory: Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory Date: Apr 16 2008 A remote user can create specially crafted HTML that, when loaded by the target user, will trigger a flaw in the JavaScript garbage collector code and cause the target user's browser to crash. ... The vendor indicates that similar crashes have been exploitable in the past, so arbitrary code execution may be possible...

MS07-057: Cumulative security update for Internet Explorer Date: October 2007...Internet Explorer 6 may exit with an access violation when the JavaScript garbage collector runs and you have dynamically removed a TBODY, THEAD, or TFOOT HTML tag from a table in Windows XP...

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Answer #3: Verification!(via automated theorem proving)



Type checker

Compiler

run-time system (GC, ...)

low-level OSservices

Linker / loader

Verifier

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Verve: a verifiably safe OS

Verified Garbage Collector

Verified Threads

Verified InterruptHandlers

Verified DeviceInterface

VerifiedStartup

Verifysafetywith TALchecker

Verifysafety &correctnesswithBoogie/Z3

Boot Loader

x86 Hardware

Small Operating System (C#)

Typed Assembly Language

Bartok

“every assembly language instruction checked for safety”

Kern

elN

ucle

us

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Kern

elN

ucle

us

Small Operating System (C#)

Typed Assembly Language

Bartok

ThreadsGetStackStateResetStackYieldTo

GC HeapAllocObjectAllocVectorGarbageCollectThrow(readField)(writeField)(readStack)(writeStack)

InterruptsFaultHandlerErrorHandlerInterruptHandlerFatalHandler

Device IOVgaTextWriteTryReadKeyboardStartTimerSendEoiPciConfigRead32PciMemSetupPciMemRead32PciMemWrite32DmaBufferDmaPhysicalAddrRdtsc

• Class types, interface types• Array types• Method invocations• Stack frames• Casts, array store checks• ...

Verve: a verifiably safe OS

BUILD!

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Related work

• (Mostly) type-based– House (Hallgren et al)– TALK (Maeda et al)– Typed GC interface (Vanderwaart et al)

• (Mostly) interactive theorem proving– FLINT / certified code (Shao et al)– seL4 (Klein et al)

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Demo: Boogie/Z3

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Z3: Automated theorem prover

DECIDABLE THEORIESboolean expressions e ::= true | false | !e | e && e | e ==> e | ...linear integer arithmetic e ::= ... | -2 | -1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | e + e | e – e | e <= e | ...bit vector arithmetic e ::= ... | e & e | e << e | ...arrays e ::= ... | e[e] | e[e := e]

UNDECIDABLEquantifiers e ::= ... | forall x.e | exists x.e

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Practical, verified copying collector code

procedure CopyAndForward(ptr:int, _tj:int) requires ecx == ptr; requires CopyGcInv(...); requires Pointer(r1, ptr, r1[ptr]); ...{ call edx := GcRead(ecx + 4); esp := esp - 4; call GetSize(ptr, edx, r1, r1); call ebp := Mov(eax);... call edi := Mov(0); call edx := Mov(0); loop: assert 4 * edi == edx; assert CopyGcInv(...); ... if (edx >= ebp) { goto loopEnd; } call copyWord(ptr, _tj, esi, edi, ebp); call edi := Add(edi, 1); call edx := Add(edx, 4); goto loop;

loopEnd: call eax := Lea(esi + 4); call GcWrite(ecx + 4, eax);...

mov edi, 0 mov edx, 0 CopyAndForward$loop:

cmp edx, ebp jae CopyAndForward$loopEnd

automatictranslation

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Memory management

Code,Static fields,GC info

Interrupttable

IO-MMUpagetables

DMAarea

General-purposememory

Nucleusprivatestack

PCItables

Threadcontexts

C#/TALstacks

GCheap

Trusted specification

Untrusted definitions

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Memory management


Interrupttable

IO-MMUpagetables

DMAarea


Nucleusprivatestack

PCItables

Threadcontexts

C#/TALstacks

GCheap

Defined by (trusted) specification


from-space

to-space

... && (forall i:int::{T(i)} T(i) && Fi <= i && i < Fk && r1[i] != NO_ABS && (IsFwdPtr(gcMem[i + 4]) ==> Pointer(r2, gcMem[i + 4] - 4, r1[i]) && AlignedHeapAddr(i + 4) && word(gcMem[i + 4]))...

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Memory management


Interrupttable

IO-MMUpagetables

DMAarea


Nucleusprivatestack

PCItables

Threadcontexts

C#/TALstacks

GCheap



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DMAarea

Memory management


Interrupttable

IO-MMUpagetables


Nucleusprivatestack

PCItables Thread

contextsC#/TALstacks

GCheap



IO pagetable

IO-MMU IO pagetable

IO pagetable

... and(ptr, 4095) == 0&&(forall i:int::{T(i)} T(i) && 0 <= i && i < 512 ==> IoPageTableEntry(IomMem[ptr + 8 * i], IomMem[ptr + 8 * i + 4])...

ptr

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Threads and interrupts

Stacks

Interrupt table

Interrupt/error handling

procedure InterruptHandler(stackState:[int]StackState, …); requires StackState[S] == StackRunning; ensures NucleusInv(... StackState[S := StackInterrupted(eax, ebx, …)] [Stack0 := StackRunning] …);

TALcode

0

void KernelMain() { … // Schedule thread, wait for exception or // interrupt ScheduleNextThread();

// CurrentThread received exception, // interrupt, or exited voluntarily uint cid = CurrentThread; Thread t = threadTable[cid]; …}

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Micro-benchmarks

Verve functionality

Cycles

Round-trip yield

98

Round-tripwait + signal

216

Comparisons Cycles

L4 (IPC) 224

SeL4 (IPC) 448

Singularity (yield) 2156

Linux (yield) 2390

Windows (yield) 3554

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Size of code, specification

Copying Mark-sweepSpecification Boogie lines 1517Verified Boogie lines 5189 5734

x86 instructions 1747 1859

Boogie verification• ~1 person-year work• Boogie/Z3 runs in ~10 minutes

3x code

C# code (100% safe) 35,000

CODE!

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Building VerveVerifie

dKernel.cs

Nucleus.bpl (x86) Kernel.obj (x86)

Compiler

Specification

Boot loader

TAL checkerBoogie/Z3

Verve.iso

Translator /Assembler

Linker /ISO generator

DEMO!

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Bug Whose fault?

InitializeGC: clobber ebp

AllocObject: off-by-4

debugger stub

linking GC tables

String GC descriptor

Bugs in the trusted computing base

Specification

Boot loader

TAL checkerBoogie/Z3

Translator /Assembler

Linker /ISO generator

Specification

Specification

Debugger stub

Windows/Bartok

TAL checker

Specification TAL checker

TAL checkerLinker / ISO gen

Specification

procedure InitializeGc(); requires SMemRequireRA(...); requires MemInv(...); ... modifies Eip, eax, ..., ebp, esp; ensures WellFormed(toAbs); ensures ebp == old(ebp);

procedure AllocObject(...); requires isStack(S); requires NucleusInv(...); ... ensures eax == 0 || Pointer(toAbs, eax - 4, abs); ensures ebp == old(ebp);

Debugger stub


public sealed class String : ...{ private int m_arrayLength; private int m_stringLength; internal char[] m_chars; ...

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Towards foundational Verve(Gregory Malecha)

Nucleusspecification TAL checker

Well-typed registersWell-typed objects

Well-typed stack frames...

Specification for valuesSpecification for objects

Specification for stack frames...

Goal: mechanizedconnection

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Unified invariant

Nucleus invariant+ TAL well-typedness

... && (forall i:int::{T(i)} T(i) && Fi <= i && i < Fk && r1[i] != NO_ABS && (IsFwdPtr(gcMem[i + 4]) ==> Pointer(r2, gcMem[i + 4] - 4, r1[i]) && AlignedHeapAddr(i + 4) && word(gcMem[i + 4]))...

Inductive WellTypedIns : CodeType -> Instr -> CodeType -> Prop :=| Tmov : forall st st' from to ty, opdType st from ty -> regTyUpd st to ty = st' -> WellTypedIns st (Imov to from) st‘| ...

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Unified invariant MOV edx, esi

CALL ...Nucleus...

MOV edx, esi

CALL ...Nucleus...

MOV esi, eax

Nucleus invariant+ TAL well-typedness

TAL instruction = 1 stepNucleus call = 1 stepEach step maintains unified invariant

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Progress on “foundational Verve”• Approach so far (roughly)– Mechanically translate Boogie Spec into Coq– Specify “step” relation in Coq– Boogie/Z3 proofs become Coq axioms– (Try to!) prove invariant holds after each step

• We’re not done yet, but we’ve found spec bugs

procedure YieldTo(s:int, ...); requires ecx == s; requires (StackState[s] == StackRunning && ...) || (StackState[s] == StackYielded(...) && ...) || (StackState[s] == StackInterrupted(...) && ...) || (StackState[s] == StackEmpty && ...) || (!isStack(s));

implementation YieldTo(s:int, ...){ if (ecx >= ?NumStacks) { ... call debugBreak(); } ...}

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ConclusionsEvery x86 instruction checked for safety!Automated tools: checking scales to large code.

Open challenges– Complete, foundational TAL/runtime/OS– Concurrency, multicore– GPUs

1/28 type safety from the ground up. chris hawblitzel (joint work with jean yang, juan chen, and...

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