1399270

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The Karmic a Priori in Indian PhilosophyAuthor(s): Karl H. Potter

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Jul., 1992), pp. 407-419Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399270.

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The

Karmic

A

Priori in

Indian

Philosophy

What are we

looking

for

when we look

to

Indian

thought

seeking

an

a

priori?

One

thing

that

we do find

recognized

in

Indian

philosophy

is

what

I

shall call

interpretation,

which is

understood

to

be

distinguishable

from the given. The notion that we-our minds -contribute some

but not all of

what determines our

experience

is a notion

frequently

met

with

in

Indian

philosophical

treatises. There

is a

series of

terms,

familiar

to

those who

study

Indian

thought-terms

such as

vikalpa

and

kalpana-

which

might

be translated

as

conceptual

construction.

Such

construc-

ting

or

interpreting

is viewed

by

all

systems

of Indian

thought

as

the

mechanism of our

ignorance

and

bondage.

But are these

conceptual

constructions a

priori?

The term a

priori

is

sometimes used to describe a

statement

or

proposition

embedded

in

an

interpretative

scheme the structure of which

is

internally necessary,

such that

the relations

among

its

constituents are

fixed

in

advance

of its

application. By

extension,

the scheme itself comes

to be referred to as

the

a

priori.

We

say

that one can know a

priori

that

2

+

2

=

4,

meaning

that it is

in

some sense

inconceivable

or

impossible

that it

be

otherwise,

that the

necessity

of this

truth

is

independent

of

counting

apples

or

otherwise

applying

this

structure

to

experience. By

contrast,

a

contingent

or a

posteriori

judgment

is

one the truth

or

falsity

of which is not

fixed

by

the structure of the

interpretative

scheme in

which it

figures;

its truth-value is

dependent upon something

beyond

the internal

structure

of

the scheme.

The

question

about

synthetic

a

priori

truths is

one that concerns

what

determines the

fixity

of its

interpretative

structure. Are all a

priori

statements

analytic?

That

is,

is

logical

consistency among

the

concepts

that

figure

in

the scheme

the

only

consideration

determining

the neces-

sity

or

contingency

of

statements

in

it?

Or are there other factors which

might

fix

the

structure

of

a

scheme

so as

to make it

unavoidable for us

to

interpret

things

that

way?

If

the

latter,

there arises

the

possibility

that a

statement,

a

priori

because embedded

in

a

fixed

scheme,

might

still be

synthetic

because

it

is not

true

by

definition.

A

revered

teacher

of

mine,

who

had a

great

influence on

the Harvard

philosophy

that Bimal

Matilal and I

were

involved

in

at

different

points

in

its

history,

was Clarence

Irving

Lewis. In his Mind and the World

Order

Lewis

treats

the

a

priori

and

the

given

at

length

in

order to

repudiate

views

which

ascribe

the

fixity

of

an a

priori

interpretative

scheme to

sources

independent

of

our

decisions. If

the

scheme is

determined en-

tirely by

factors

beyond

our

control,

our

freedom to

improve

our

under-

standing

to

make

conceptual

progress

in

science and

in

practical

affairs,

seems to

become

illusory.

One such

view Lewis

finds in Kant.

Kant

locates

the a

priori

principles

of

sensibility

and

categories

of

the

understanding

Professor

in

the

Department

of

Philosophy

at the

University

of

Washington

Philosophy

East &

West

Volume

42,

Number 3

July

1992

407-419

? 1992

by

University

of

Hawaii Press

407

KarlH.

Potter

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in the

very

nature of human

rationality.

It

is because we are the kind of

beings

we

are,

with minds

limited

to

developing

structures

of

a

sort

which reflect human

rationality,

that we find each other

thinking

in

ways

which

we can

recognize

and

share,

characterized

by

the

familiar relations

of

time,

space, causality,

and so

forth. Not

to

recognize

and

respect

these

categorical relations is to be irrational,to deviate from the essence of

humanity.

We

have

no

choice

but to think in

these

categories,

says

Kant,

and that

is

why

a statement such as

every

event has a

cause

is

a

necessary

truth-to think

otherwise

would be irrational.

Lewis finds this Kantian

conception

of

the

a

priori

objectionable.

In

attacking

it he sets out an

interesting analysis

of what the a

priori

must

(or

ought

to)

be,

as

a

way

of

indicating

what is

wrong

with Kant's notion.

According

to

Lewis'

analysis,

the a

priori

must

have

three

properties:

(1)

It must have

features

of a sort which will allow

us

to use

it to

catch the

given

(that

is,

the

data

given

to

us in

sensation).

Characteristically,

we

employ

the a

priori

to

distinguish reality

rom what is

not

real,

that

is,

to

tell

truth from

error,

and we couldn't

do

that,

Lewis

argues,

if our

concepts

didn't have

any

features

which

could match

or fail to match

the

given.

(2)

It

must

be true

no matter

what,

it

must

legislate

rather than

report.

It

cannot be dictated

by

experience

if

it

is

to

be useful

in

orga-

nizing

that

experience.

This

is the

fixity

of

the a

priori

of which I have

spoken.'

(3)

It must be unrevisable

n

the

sense

that

it

is

a

scheme which

we can choose to

apply

or

not

to

apply,

but with which we cannot

tamper

without

destroying

it.

Lewis

argues

that

his

own

conception

of the a

priori,

which he

calls

the

pragmatic

a

priori,

atisfies these

requirements

both

in

letter and

in

spirit.

Where Kant

finds

the

necessity

of

the

categories

to

be

a

result

of

the

limitations of

human

reason,

Lewis

argues

that this

necessity

derives

from

our

social nature. The

categories,

he

says,

are

our

ways

of

acting, by

which he means

that it is

our

practical

concerns,

including

communication

with

others,

which are

responsible

for

the nature

of the

categories

we

adopt.

The

reality

which our chosen

categories

define

is

a

common

reality.

Our

categories

and

definitions

are

peculiarly

social

products,

reached

in the

light

of

experiences

which

have much

in

com-

mon,

and beaten

out,

like other

pathways,

by

the

coincidence

of

human

purposes

and the

exigencies

of

human

cooperation. 2

It is instructive to

compare

the

implications

of this remark with

the

three

requirements

just

mentioned,

and

to

contrast

them with

the

Kantian

conception.

The

first

requirement

is

that

the a

priori

must have

features

of a kind which

enable

it to

catch

or match the

given.

It

is

doubtful

if

Kant

thought

that

this

was true of his

pure

reason,

since

his

given

has

no

cognizable

features.

On the

Kantian

conception

in its

most consistent

form,

the

given,

that

is,

the

manifold,

consists

of

Philosophy

East

&

West

things-in-themselves

which have

no features

at

all,

at

any

rate

no

408


7/21/2019 1399270

4/14

features we can

grasp

without

using

our reason.

The

things-in-themselves

do not

even

possess

spatial

and

temporal

locations;

they possess

neither

primary

nor

secondary qualities.

Now

if,

in

spite

of all

this,

one is

still

inclined to

say

that the

categories

must

nevertheless catch or

match

the

given

for

Kant,

it will

be

in

a

very mysterious

sense,

involving

a

catching

or

matching

which

we

are unable to verify in principle. It

becomes a

puzzle

on this

conception

how it is

that

the

givens

of

our

experience

could

accommodate or

resist the

application

of

one

category

rather than

another.

In

point

of

fact,

there is no

experience

for Kant

prior

to

interpretation.

By

contrast,

Lewis'

theory

of the

given

grants

it

features,

so

that

our

understanding

may

either

capture

it or

fail to do

so. The

given

or

quale

has

features. The

activity

of

interpretation

is

depicted

by

Lewis as

the

business of

selecting

certain of

these

features-the ones that

display

repetition

or

regularity,

for

instance-and

identifying

these as the

fea-

tures of

reality

while

disregarding

the other

more chaotic or

fleeting

characteristics of

the

given.

Lewis thinks of

experience

as a

flowing

presentation

of

sensory qualia.

In

The

Analysis

of

Knowledge

and

Valua-

tion

he

is

even

led to

consider

the

possibility

of an

expressive

language

in

which

we

might

be able to

speak

about

the

given

in its

nature

prior

to

the

application

of

the a

priori.

Given this

conception,

he

supposes,

it

is

no

longer

a

mystery

how

the

categories

can

fit

the

given.

The

second

requirement

is that

the

a

priori

is

necessarily

true

in

a

fashion

completely

independent

of

the

given.

Kant's a

priori

fails

this

requirement.

For

Kant,

the

necessity

of

the a

priori

stems from

the

impossibility

of our

conceiving

things

otherwise,

an

impossibility

deriving,

however,

from

an

assumed

fact,

namely,

that

the

workings

of

the human

mind

are

subject

to

just

these

limitations. If

we

legislate

to

the

given,

then,

it is

only

in

a

secondary

manner;

Mother

Nature,

or

whoever

gave

us

our

reason,

is

ultimately responsible

for

the

legislation.

Lewis'

conception,

on

the other

hand,

makes

the

necessity

of

the

a

priori

a

matter of

our

decision.

We

legislate

to

the

given

in

a

fashion

analo-

gous

to

the

way

that,

in

stipulating

a

definition,

we

legislate

linguistic

usage.

Thus

it is

hardly

surprising

that

Lewis

has no

use for

the

synthetic

a

priori.

The a

priori

is

always

analytic

for

him,

in

that

we

can if

we

wish,

and

must as

long

as

we

are

consistent,

maintain

the

relationships

among

our

concepts

which

they

have

by

virtue of their

definitions,

definitions for

which

we

(and

not

Mother

Nature)

are

ultimately

responsible.

The

third

requirement

of

unrevisability

s

adhered

to

by

both

Kant

and

Lewis,

but in

rather

different

ways.

Kant's a

priori

is

unrevisable in

view

of

who

we

are;

to

revise it is

merely

to

become

irrational.

Lewis will

agree

that an

inconsistent

conceptual

system

is

irrational,

but

urges

that

what

Kant

fails

to

see is

that

there

are

indefinitely

many possible

concep-

tual

systems,

each

one

internally

self-consistent

and

so

rational.

Though

KarlH.

Potter

409


7/21/2019 1399270

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we cannot

rationally

revise

such

a

system,

we

can

reject

it,

exchange

it for another.

Indeed,

thinks

Lewis,

this

ability

to

adopt

new

conceptual

schemes

is

a

measure of

our

freedom,

making

sense

of

the

pragmatist's

affirmation

of

meliorism as

opposed

to

the

block-universe

quietism

which

follows

in a

world

in

which whatever

is

must be.

There is a possible misunderstanding about the a prioriwhich Lewis

finds himself

attending

to

at

length

in

The

Analysis

of

Knowledge

and

Valuation. There

he

controverts

a

position

he dubs conventionalism.

A

conventionalist

might

accept

all

that Lewis

says

about the a

priori, aking

particularly seriously

the second

point

about

its

analytic

character. The a

priori

is indeed true

by

definition,

says

the

conventionalist,

and thus

it

is

true because of our

linguistic

conventions.

It is our

decisions

on

how

to

use words which

determine

reality,

and to

exchange

one

conceptual

scheme for another involves

merely exchanging

one

set

of conventions

for

another.

We saw that

Lewis

points

to the mechanism of

stipulative

definition

as a model or

analogue explaining

the

analyticity

of

an

a

priori

conceptual

scheme.

The conventionalist takes

stipulation

not as an anal-

ogy

but as itself the

very

mechanism

for

exchanging conceptual

schemes.

To

adopt

a

new scheme

is,

on

conventionalist

assumptions,

to

stipu-

late

new

definitions

for our

terms,

or

to create

an

artificially

improved

language.

Lewis recoils

from

this view

(which

he

presumably

found

in

the

thought

of Harvard

colleagues

and others

of a

positivistic

bent)

since it

seems to

grant

us too much

freedom,

so

much

as

to

make the

improve-

ment

of our

conceptual systems

a trivial

matter,

astonishingly easy.

The

conventionalist

(as

Lewis views

him)

supposes

he

can make

anything

the

case

merely by defining

it

so.

Lewis claims that this

is

to

confuse sense

meaning

with

linguistic meaning,

to fail to

recognize

that a

concept

embedded

in

a

conceptual system

has

a character

in

virtue

of that

embedding

which

makes it

impossible

to redefine

it.

If it is a

necessary

truth

about our

conceptual system

that

Wednesday

is

the

day

after

Tuesday

(to

appeal

to

his own

example),

then

that

necessity

is not less-

ened

or

removed

by defining

the

day

after

Tuesday

as

(say) Shrewsday.

To do this

is

merely

to trade

in one

name,

Tuesday,

or another

name,

Shrewsday ;

it

is not to

exchange

one

conceptual

system

for another.

The

criteria-in-mind,

as

Lewis

calls

them,

which we use

to

identify

what we (now) call

Tuesday

and what we are

being

asked to call

Shrewsday

are

presumably

the

same,

and that

is

why

these

are

two

names

for the same

thing.

If

we

go

farther,

but

not all

the

way,

in

our

stipulations

we

will

obviously

produce

an

incoherent

scheme which

on

Lewis'

principles

is no a

priori

at

all.3

Where the

Kantian

a

priori

is too

rigid,

the conventionalist

a

priori

is

too

flexible. Lewis

believed

that

his a

priori,

the

pragmatic

a

priori,

like

Philosophy

East

&

West

Baby

Bear's

porridge,

is

just right.

Indeed,

it

is

arguable

that if we mean

410


7/21/2019 1399270

6/14

by

a

priori

what Lewis

says

we should mean

by

it-a

concept

answer-

ing

to

the three

requirements

I

have indicated-then

only

the

pragmatic

a

priori

is a

genuine

a

priori,

the Kantian and conventionalist

a

prioris

not

answering

to all the

requirements.

This is a verbal

point,

needless

to

say,

and I

shall assume that Lewis'

requirements

are

not definitive of

the

notion of a priori but rather constitute a recommendation or theory

about the nature of what

the

a

priori

should be.

Now: is there an a

priori

in

Indian

thought?

For

there

to be

one,

it

would seem that

it would

either have

to

be

analytic,

as the conven-

tionalist

and

pragmatic

conceptions

hold it to

be, or,

if in

part synthetic,

it

would have

to be

necessary

in

some

way

that makes it

impossible

for

us to

revise that

synthetic part,

as in

the Kantian

conception

of

the

forms

and

categories.

I

do not think

there

is

any

systematic

concept

of

analyticity

in

Indian

philosophy.

Characteristic

symptoms

of

analyticity

are

absent

from what

Indians

think

and

say

about

necessary relationships.

Sanskrit doesn't have

terminology

to

distinguish necessary

from

regular

or

lawful.

They

use

such terms

as virodha

or asambhava both

in

contexts where we

should be

likely

to

say

impossible

as

well

as in

contexts where we

should

say

contrary

to fact.

Consider the kinds

of

examples

of

empty

terms

which

one

finds

scattered

through

the

pages

of Indian

technical

philosophy.

One favorite

among

such

illustrations

is

the son of a

barren woman.

Others,

used

for

exactly

the

same

purposes,

are

sky-flower

or

hare's

horn.

We would

say

that it is

impossible

for

there to

be

a son

of

a barren woman

because

to

be barren means

to

have

no

children,

while the nonexistence of

flowers

growing

in

the

sky,

or

of

horns

growing

on

rabbits'

heads,

is

a

matter

not of

meaning

but of fact.

It is not

logically

impossible,

we

intone,

for

a

flower to

grow

in

the

sky,

or a horn on

a hare's

head;

these

conceptions

are

not

self-contradictory,

as son of

a barren woman is.

Yet Indian

thought

regularly

assimilates all

these instances into a

single

sort.

Definitions

do

not work in

Indian

thought

the

way

they

do in

ours.

The Sanskrit

term we translate

into

English

as

definition is

laksana.

Laksana

means a

mark,

a

feature

by

which

we

demarcate

or

recognize

the

definiendum

(in

Sanskrit,

the

laksya).

Likewise,

when

Westerners offer

a definition

they specify

a feature or

group

of features

by

which one

may

demarcate

or

recognize

the

definiendum,

call it

X. But that a

feature

demarcates or

brings

on

the

recognition

of

something

is

not

sufficient to

qualify

that

feature as

a definition.

That a

feature is a

defining

characteris-

tic

of

X can

be

challenged by

asking

whether

something

lacking

that

feature

would still

be called an

X.

Thus

to

say

that

Y

is

a

defining

characteristic of an X

is to

say

that Y

is a

logically

essential

characteristic,

that

the

presence

of Y is a

logically

necessary

condition

for

anything

to

KarlH. Potter

411


7/21/2019 1399270

7/14

be an X.

By

contrast,

an

Indian

definiens is

satisfactory

merely

if

in

fact it

does not

overlap

or

underlap

the

definiendum.

Therefore to

be

true

by

definition in

Indian

thought

is

merely

one

way

of

being

true;

it is

not

a

different

kind of truth

( logical

truth ).

We do

not find

speculations

about

possible

worlds

in

Indian

thought

of the kind that has become respectable in modern analytic philosophy.

Indians

don't

believe that

their

reason

is

capable

of

exploring

other

possible

worlds. That

there are

other actual worlds

is a

commonplace

assumption

among

Indians,

entrenched

in

their

psyches

by

a

grand

tradition of

myth

and

legend.

But Indian

philosophers

agree

that

what-

ever we know

about

those worlds

we

know

ultimately

through

the

testimony

of

those who

have been

there-we can't reason

out what it

must be like

there. Or at

least

if

we can

they

aren't interested.

Many

writers have

remarked on

the

lack of

formal

logic

in

India.

There

is no

concern to

discover the

structure

of

validity

as

distinct from

the

procedures

of sound

inference. The notion that

from all

pigs

have

wings

and

my

Bessie

is

a

pig

I

can

validly

infer

my

Bessie has

wings

never seems to

have occurred to classical Indian

logicians.4

At

least there

is no

explicit

discussion of formal

validity.

Now one

may

insist that it must

be

there

anyhow-but

that is not

my point;

my point

is

about what

they thought,

not about what

we

may

think

they ought

to

have

thought.

Along

with

the

lack

of

explicit

attention

to

formal

logic

one must

marshal

the

point

that

mathematics,

though

an Indian

science,

has little

or no

connection with Indian

logic.

Indian

logicians

do not

appeal

to

mathematical

examples

as

paradigms,

nor to mathematical truth as a

model

of,

or

extension

of,

or even

analogy

to,

logical

truth.

There is no

logical

truth distinct from

factual

truth,

so far as

I

can

tell,

in

classical

Indian

philosophy.

The Indian

conception

of

interpretation,

then,

is

neither

of

the

prag-

matic

nor of

the conventionalistic

variety,

since Indians do not confine

necessity

to

analytic relationships.

But what about the Kantian

variety

of

a

priori,

which

allows for

synthetic

a

priori judgments

but

locates their

necessity

in

the limits of human reason? Is the Indian

conception

like

that?

The answer is no. Classical Indian

thought

insisted that

we

can

reject

our

conceptual categories

and

replace

them with others.

I do not

think

Indians

even

supposed

that

this must be done

holistically:

their view

allowed for

piecemeal

revision of a

conceptual

system.

Lewis deems such

a

scheme

insufficiently rigorous

to

allow

for its

application

to the

given.

Certainly

it

seems

to

present problems

for those

attempting

to follow

the

development

of theories

if

the

meaning

of a term

may

change

in

the

course

of the

development.

But some have

viewed

this as a standard

feature

of dialectical

progress,

and

Indian

thought

is full of

dialectical

arguments involving

shifts of levels.

More

disturbing

would

be the

Philosophy

East

& West

possibility

that

every

term can

mean

anything

at

all,

and

something

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different

from moment to

moment.

With such

a

chaotic

instrument to

try

to catch a

given

and hold it

long

enough

to

identify

it,

relating

it

to

others

would be a

chancy

business-and how would we know when we

had

succeeded?

Interpretation,

even

if

not

a

priori,

should have

some

structure,

some

fixityover at least the period of inquiry,it seems. Does the Indianconcept

of

interpretation grant

it

even

that much?

Certainly.

It is time for me to

attempt

to

say

in

positive

terms

what the

Indian

conception

of

interpreta-

tion is.

Despite

their

rejectability

and even

revisability,

within limits

Indian

conceptual

constructions

are not random

or chaotic. The

general

as-

sumption governing

the

Indian account is

that our

concepts

are

gener-

ated

by

our karmic

inheritance,

and

that within the limits of the

theory

of

karma

it

can be

manipulated,

revised,

or

exchanged

for

something

else.

Let me call this the

karmic

a

priori,

or even

though

it lacks the

features

which Lewis

requires

of a true a

priori,

or

even

the features

that Kant's a

priori

has,

it is

supposed

to

have the same

general

function

that those

a

prioris

have,

namely,

to order our

experience

into true versus

false,

real

versus

unreal. That

it

can

do this

requires

that

it

have

some

regularity

of

structure

in

advance

of the

given,

on

pain

of our not

being

able to tell whether

any

worthwhile

ordering

has been

accomplished.

Without some

a

priori,

language

and

thought

would not

occur at all.

According

to

the karmic

a

priori

it is not the limitations

of human

reason which determine the

categories

of

interpretation

that we use. It

is

rather

those

habits

of mind that have

been

generated

from

past

lives.

These habits are held

by

Indians

to be

the

outcome of two kinds

of

conditioning

factors. On the one hand

are

what are called

vasanas,

rather

general dispositions

toward the

taking

of

certain sorts of attitudes

which

help

lead

to the

development

of certain sorts of

beliefs

and

desires.

These

vasanas

cooperate

with

more

specific

factors

arising

from

specific

acts

in

past

lives,

factors

referred

to as

samskaras, traces,

or

more

specifically

as

karmasaya,

karmic

residues.

It

is

difficult

but

not

altogether

impossible

to

gather

information

about

the

working

of

these

factors from

the textual

materials. There

is

an

irritating

tendency

to treat

karma as a

well-known matter which

needs

little

explanation

and

sometimes none at all.

Still,

there are clues.

For

example,

in the

Yogasutra

and its

major commentary

the

Yogabhasya

of

Vyasa,

we

get

a

clear

suggestion

that

the vasanas and samskaras of a

human

existence arise from

past

human existences

and

not

one's former

lives

as other

animals or other

kinds of

beings.

We

can

infer

this

from

passages

which

tell us that the

karmic forces

activated when one

is

born

as a

cat

are

feline

dispositions

and

traces

arising

from a

former feline

existence.5 It

is

evident that the

parallel

point

follows for a

human

being.

Thus

there

is a

sense

in

which

a sort

of Kantian

conception

is

reflected:

if

Karl

H.

Potter

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human

rationality

is a

set

of

dispositions

(to

reason,

that

is,

to think

in

a

rational

way)

and if

that is

regularly

present

in

any

human

existence

or

condition,

then its

presence

is

determined

by

causes which

are outside

that

existence

or

condition

but which

are nevertheless in

a

sense the

result of

our free

choice,

albeit a

choice exercised in

the

past.

Let me

explain.

According

to

what we

may

call

the

philosophical

version

of karma

theory

(there

are

many

popular

versions

which

deviate

widely),

each

time

one

is

born,

a

certain

portion

of

one's karmic

residues

are tabbed to

be

activated and thus

burned off

during

the

coming

lifetime.

This

por-

tion is known

as

one's

prarabdhakarman,

the karma that is

due to

mature

during

the

present

birth.

Since

there

is a

definite time that it

will

take

for

just

these residues to

mature,

it is also

held that at the

time of birth

one's

length

of life is

determined

by

the same mechanism.

The matura-

tion or

burning

off of

these residues is

accomplished

through

one's

having appropriate

sorts of

experiences.

Thus

there

is a

sense

in

which

one's

experiences

are determined

by

the karmic

residues

they

burn

off.

Now as one

goes

through

life

having experiences

and

thus

burning

off old

karmic

residues,

one

performs

new actions

and

lays

down

new residues

which

in

turn will

have to be

burned

off

at some

subsequent

point

either

in this

life or

another.

It is

debatable

just

to what

extent the

nature

of

one's actions is

determined

by

past

residues;

obviously,

if

the determina-

tion

were

complete

this would

lead

naturally

to a kind of

fatalist

feeling

( I

am at

the

mercy

of

my past

karma and can't do

anything

about

it ),

a

fatalism which has

been

felt,

by

some who have

studied Indian

attitudes,

to

have led

to

villagers' passivity

and to

quietistic teachings

in

certain

kinds

of Indian

literature.

In

philosophical

contexts,

however,

it is not

construed that

way,

since

philosophical writings clearly

assume

the

ability

of individuals to

change

their attitudes and

beliefs,

to

perform

actions the

results

of which will

bring pleasure

in

the future rather than

pain,

or to

achieve a kind of awareness of

things

which leads to cessation of action

and

release

from

transmigration.

One

suspects

that such a

change

of

heart

and mind will

involve

revising

one's

va,sanas,

the

general disposi-

tions which

incline

us toward

certain

kinds of

concerns

rather than

others,

and this

suspicion

is born out

in

several

ways, though

one would

like a more

straightforward

statement

to that effect somewhere

in the

texts.

If

we

adopt

the

nonfatalistic,

philosophical

reading

of the karma

theory

as sketched above

and construe

our a

priori

conceptual

scheme

as a function of karmic causes

such as

vasanas,

we

get

a kind of a

priori

which is

both

fixed

and revisable.

It is

fixed

in that

those

karmic residues

which are due to mature

in this

lifetime

are

going

to do so

regardless

of

what

choices,

decisions,

or even

changes

of attitude

and

belief we

may

Philosophy

East

&

West make

or

undergo

during

this

lifetime. The

power

of

prarabdhakarman

is

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judged

to

be

considerable.

Samkara,

for

example,

holds that

persons

who

have

achieved release from

bondage during

a

human existence must

still

experience

the

fruits

of

their

prarabdhakarman,

and he is followed

in

this

by many

other theorists.

We

may say,

then,

that inasmuch as

the

maturing

of

one's

prarabdhakarman

involves our

viewing things

as

hu-

man beings do rather than as cats do, the human vantage point must be

maintained until the conclusion

of this

lifetime. To that extent there is

no

possibility

of

rejecting

the

a

priori

or

exchanging

it for

some

completely

different scheme.

Yet inasmuch as

we are

only

sometimes human

beings,

but

some-

times cats

and so

forth,

human

rationality

is not an

unavoidable

inheri-

tance. Not that

we would

perhaps

choose to

be

a

cat-but

many

would

sensibly

choose

to

be a

god,

since the

divine state is held forth in

Indian

thought

as a

genuine

kind of

birth.

However,

that is to blur

my present

point

somewhat,

which is

that

even

though

we

must in a

given

hu-

man

lifetime maintain our

reason insofar as it is

an

expression

of our

prarabdhakarman,

we can

attempt

to

condition our

future

dispositions

so that

future

lives,

or

even

the future

part

of this

one,

will

be different

than

otherwise.

It is

never

suggested

that this will

be

easy.

But what

is

suggested

is that

one

can

with

difficulty

repress-though

not

to the

point

of

exclusion-one's

inherited

vasanas

and

replace

them with

others

deemed

preferable.

The

texts

especially speak

of this

process

in

connection

with

the

gaining

of

release from

bondage

to karma

altogether.

The various

instru-

ments of

such

change

include,

notably,

yoga

and

meditation as

well as

devotion to

God

and overt

habituation to

righteous

kinds of

activity.

The

purpose

of

any

of

these is to

produce

a

change

in

one's

ways

of

inter-

preting

the

given,

in

one's

a

priori

if

you

will,

or

perhaps

to

eliminate

the

interpretative

process

altogether,

at

least in

the

sense

of

no

longer

taking

its

categories

seriously,

of not

being

attached to it.

Which

conception

of

release and

which

type

of

instrument

one should

prefer

are what

mainly

distinguish

the

Indian

schools of

philosophy

from

one

another.

Thus we

are

brought

back to

the

term

vikalpa

or

conceptual

con-

struction,

which

I

suggested

at

the

outset is

the

closest

Sanskrit

term to

a

priori.

Many

Indian

schools

view

vikalpa

as

that

specific

factor which

occasions

bondage,

and

whose

removal

must

yield

release

or

liberation.

For

example,

the

Yoga systems

of both

Hinduism

and

Buddhism

spend

a lot

of

time on

vikalpa.

The

Buddhist

variety expounded

by

such

writers

as

Dignaga

and

DharmakTrti

akes

the

external

world to

be a

construction.

Whether

it is a

construction

from a

given

with

features

which

the

constructions

match or

fail to

match

is a

puzzle

which

scholars

are

not

altogether

clear

about.

Both

classical

Indian

writers and

modern

Western

scholars

have

apparently

thought

that

the

given

in

this

type

of

Buddhism

is

like

Kant's

things-in-themselves,

without

features that

we

Karl

H.Potter

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can

identify, although

closer

inspection

of

Buddhist texts

of this

school

raises

questions

about

that

interpretation.

Another

type

of Buddhist

Yoga system,

championed

by

Vasubandhu,

seems to have

thought

that

it

is

karma which

is

responsible

for the

given

as

well as for the constructions

or

interpretations

of it.

Vasubandhu's

argument is that our experiences are determined by our karmic residues

in

exactly

the

way

other Indian

philosophers

believe

our

dreaming experi-

ences are.

In

dreams,

it is

commonly

believed,

the

mind

projects

visual,

tactile,

and so forth

sensations

and

proceeds

to

interpret

them as bases

for

(dream)

beliefs and

actions,

thus

working

off more

of

its karmic

baggage.

Vasubandhu sees

no

reason to

suppose

this is not true of all

experiences,

waking

as

well

as

dreaming.

Patanjali's

Yoga

system

finds

the

function

of

construction as

leading

to confusions between

idea, word,

and

object

and,

as a

result,

to the

development

of

our characteristic

interpretative categories.

Patanjali,

he

author of the

Yogasutras,

counsels

practicing,

at a crucial

stage

in

the

yogic

meditative

process,

attainment

of a kind of

trance

state called

nirvikalpaka

samadhi,

in which one

directly

confronts

the

object

as

it

is

in

itself,

without

any linguistic

or

conceptual

distinctions

obscuring

this

clear

insight.

This

would

seem

to

imply

that,

contrary

to Buddhist

Yoga,

Patanjali

believes

that there

are

objects

out

there

with

identifiable

features.

In the Advaita Vedanta

system pioneered

by Gaudapada,

Mandana

Misra,

and

Samkaracarya,

there is constant

interplay

between the

notions

of

construction,

by

which we

interpret

the

given,

and

creation,

by

which

someone- is

it

God

or

ourselves?-generates

the

given.

All

conceptual

distinctions

are the

product

of

construction,

which is viewed

as

always

involving

the

making

of distinctions.

The

appreciation

that distinction

or

difference

(bheda)

is

a

nonapplicable

category,

that

discriminating

is

the source

of

bondage,

is

fundamental

to the realization

which

is self-

knowledge

and release.

Yet Samkara

is

unwilling

to side

with Vasubandhu

in

assigning

the

determination

of the

given

to

our

minds,

even

though

he

has often

been

taken

to

be

an idealist

of that

sort.

In

fact,

he

regularly

insists that

any

constructing

requires

a

ground.

Ultimately

that

ground

is

undifferentiated

Brahman,

so

that

one

may

still be

unsure whether

Sarmikara

eally

admits

the

mind-independence

of the

given

in

any

in-

teresting

sense.

Still,

some

Advaitins-perhaps

including

Gaudapada-

have

located

the

source of the

given

in

God's

handiwork.

God is

the

cause

of the

world,

as the

Brahmasutras

ell

us. The

mechanism

by

which

God

manages

to

create

the world

is

termed

maya.

God controls

this

maya,

not

we;

but

the

given

is

manipulated

in a

fashion

designed

to

suit

our karmic

requirements.

Thus in an indirect sense

our karma

may

control

the

given.

Advaitins

generally

tend

to

reject

the notion that

we

Philosophy

East& West

mentally

construct

the

world

out of

whole

cloth,

so to

speak. Exploration

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of

the relation

between

God's creation and our

interpretation

is

dilated

upon

by

later Advaita

scholiasts.

All

the

systems

surveyed

in

the last

few

paragraphs

agree

that

con-

structing

is

the

source of

bondage,

that

thinking

and

talking

are

ulti-

mately

the

enemy,

the

removal of which

constitutes the liberation

sought

by

both

Hindu and

Buddhist

thinkers.

An

important exception to this

linguaphobic

tendency

is to

be

found

in

the

twin

schools of

Nyaya

and

Vaisesika,

accompanied

by

the

philosophical

branches

of

MTmamsa

founded

by

Kumarila

and

Prabhakara.These

systems

connect

the

forma-

tion of

concepts

closely

with

the

registering

of

givens.

As

they

see

it,

when

our

senses

interact with an

object

of a

certain

kind,

the mind cannot

help

but

record

the

presence

of

a

property

instantiated

in

the

particular

datum.

We

construct

neither

givens

nor

concepts

out of

whole

cloth,

they

insist.

Erroneous

understandings

arise from

the

misrelating

of

givens,

not from

projecting

inappropriate

mind-constructed

concepts upon

them.

God

creates a

world in

accordance

with

our

karmic

requirements

but

independent

of

our

wishes

(or,

in

the

MTmamsa

systems,

it is

just

primordially

there).

We

commerce with this

real

external

world

through

our

sense

organs,

and

as

long

as

we

continue to do

so

we are

in

bondage.

To

gain

release it will

not

be

enough

to

stop

misinterpreting

the

given;

we

shall

have to

purify

ourselves

so that

we no

longer

reach

out

through

our

organs

to

commerce with

the

world at

all. In

Nyaya-Vaisesika

there

are

constructions

(vikalpa)

but

what

Naiyayikas

mean

by

that

term is

the

interrelating,

for

purposes

of

recognition

and

language,

of

characterized

givens,

givens

not

themselves

supplied

by

construction.

We

may

interre-

late

these

givens

successfully

or

unsuccessfully,

which is

to

say,

we

may

frame

true or

false

cognitions

about

them,

but

as

long

as

we

interrelate

them

at all

we

are

subject

to

and

creating

further

karmic

traces.

And

we

shall

go

on

interrelating

them

unless

and

until

we

lose

interest in

the

world

altogether

because of

our

nonattachment

to,

our

disinterest

in,

what

goes

on

there. It will

still

go

on,

though,

stimulated

(by

God

in

the

case

of

Nyaya)

in

accordance

with

the

karmic

requirements

of

others

not

released.

Though

these

systems

hardly

begin

to

exhaust

the

distinctive

varieties

of

Indian

speculation

on

the

relations

among

karma,

the

given,

and

the

a

priori,

they

may

serve

as

examples.

We

have,

even

in

such a

truncated

sampling,

a

spectrum

of views

running

from

Vasubandhu's

idealism

to

Vaisesika

realism.

Here

idealism

means

both

given

and

interpretation

mind-dependent,

while

realism

means

neither

given

nor

interpretation

mind-dependent,

and

there

are

compromise

positions

up

and

down

the

spectrum

for

which

names will

have to

be

invented.

But for

all of

these

views,

realistic

or

idealistic or in

between,

the

interpretation

is

karmically

dependent,

either

as

arranged

by

God

or

mechanically

in

God's

absence,

on

one's

past

actions

and

the

habits

of

conceptualizing

they

determine.

KarlH.

Potter

417


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Philosophy

East & West

Then-is

there an

a

priori

n

Indian

thought?

Well,

it

depends

what

you

mean....

Questions

requiring

that kind of

answer

most

often

should

be

rephrased,

and

that is

likely

the

case

here. It seems

to

me that

what

is

interesting

is

not so

much

what a

priori

should

be

understood to

mean,

but

rather what

sort of

necessity

characterizes

an

interpretative

scheme, what is responsible for that necessity, and what we can do

about it.

For

the

traditional

empiricist

the

necessity

of

the

interpretation

lies

in

the

relations

among

the terms or

meanings

constituting

it,

relations

which

define

that

very

conceptual

scheme and

without

which

we

would not

have that

scheme but

something

else.

The source of

the

necessity

lies in

that

definitional

constituting,

and

what

we can do

about it

is to

exchange

it for

another

one with

different

definitions

but

equally

strict

in

its

rela-

tionships.

Both

Lewis

himself and his

conventionalist

are

types

of

tradi-

tional

empiricist:

they

differ over

the

source of the

necessity.

While

the

conventionalist

allegedly

finds

that

source

in

our

conventions of

the

moment,

however

whimsical,

Lewis

locates the

source in

our

common

interests as

social

beings

having

to rub

against

each

other

in

active

communication

and

practical

carryings-on.

As a

result,

while the conven-

tionalist

may

view the

exchanging

of

conceptual

schemes as a

technical

exercise-relatively simple

given

enough

of

the kinds of

materials that a

computer, say,

commands:

time

and

tape-Lewis

sees it

as much

more

difficult,

involving

insightful

changes

in

our

ways

of

getting along

with

one

another,

new

ways

of

thinking

which

are

accepted by

practically every-

one

as

nontrivial

solutions to

common

problems.

Both

Lewis and

the

conventionalist

accept

the

existence

of

an

independent

world of

givens,

data of

sense

which our

interpretation

must match on

pain

of

eventual

rejection.

Failure to match

these

givens

is

precisely

what

leads us to

consider

exchanging

our

present

scheme

for

another.

The traditional

empiricist

considers himself

liberal,

in

contrast to

the

Kantian,

in

that he allows to us

the

ability

to

exchange conceptual

schemes.

For

the

Kantian,

the

only way

we could

exchange

a

conceptual

scheme would

be

to

graduate

from

the

human

state

to

something

nonhuman-and

since we

cannot as humans

conceive what

that

might

be

with

any

real

clarity,

he is not inclined to follow that

thought very

far.

The Kantian

believes

that

the

necessity

of the

interpretative

scheme

we

have stems from the structure of the human mind. We can't do

anything

about

it,

it would

seem,

except

to

recognize

its

implications.

Among

these

are

the

featurelessness

of the

given

for

us,

and thus the

impossibility

of

making

sense

of the notion that a

concept

matches a

given.

The

reverse

side

of that coin is that it is likewise

impossible

for us

to know

whether

any

of our

concepts,

however

necessary

and

fundamental

they

are

(God,

freedom,

and so

on),

represent anything

other than internal

whirrings

of

the

apparatus

of

pure

reason.

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The

Indian

or

karmic

position

is

not

a

logical

alternative

to

these,

but

a

way

of

considering things

which

makes

possible

in

principle

analogues

to

these

and other views

about

interpretation

and

the

given,

yet

without

involving

the

triviality

of

the

conventionalist,

the

practical

urgency

and

implicit publicity

of the

pragmatist,

or the

conservatism

of the Kantian.

The interpretation, the karmic a priori,was determined by us, the karmic

account

holds,

through

our

past

actions.

It

is

fixed

by

the

products

of

those

actions-dispositions

and traces-and

its

necessity

derives

from

that. Yet we

can,

by

future

actions,

revise the

products

of our actions

so

that what

is determined

will

be different

in the future from what it has

been

up

to now. We

can

do this without

becoming any

less

human,

and

our

conceptual

scheme

may

become different

as a

result. We

can,

say

many

Indian

wise

men,

improve

our

interpretations

morally

and

spiritu-

ally

and

gain

heaven

in another

birth. But we

should,

if

we

are

truly

wise,

stifle our

interpretations

altogether.

None

of this settles

the

question

about the

nature and source

of the

given. Perhaps

it is featureless-

Brahman.

Perhaps

it does have

features,

in

as

Nyaya,

and

we

can discover

what its features are.

Perhaps,

although

it has

features,

we

cannot dis-

cover

what

they

are.

Perhaps

we cannot even

know whether

or not it has

features.

Perhaps,

says

the wise

man,

it

doesn't

really

matter.

Perhaps

not,

if

you're

a

wise

man.

NOTES

1

-

Lewis

says

that The

paradigm

of the a

priori

in

general

is

the

defini-

tion

(Clarence

I.

Lewis,

Mind and the World

Order

[New

York:

Dover

Publications, 19291,

p.

239)-because

definitions

legislate meaning

rather than

report

facts.

2

-

C.

I.

Lewis,

A

Pragmatic Conception

of

the a Priori,

n

Readings

in

Philosophical Analysis,

ed.

Herbert

Feigl

and Wilfrid

Sellars

(New

York:

Appleton-Century-Crofts,

1949),

p.

239.

3

-

I

think Lewis' strictures

here

were

in

fact

heeded-although perhaps

not

even

needed-by

his

opponents:

the holism of

Quine's

Two

Dogmas

and the Kuhnian

picture

of scientific revolution are cases

in

point,

even

though

the notion of

criteria-in-mind remains

some-

thing

of a

whipping

boy, suggesting

a

procrustean

urge

to

hypostatize

meanings.

4-

A

possible

exception might

be

urged

in

the case of late Buddhist

logic

as in

DharmakTrti,

ut

even here the

case

is

debatable.

5

-

Cf.

Patanjali,

Yogasutra

IV.2-3,

and

Vyasa's Bhasya

thereon.

Karl

H.

Potter

419

1399270

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