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E N B A N C

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR G.R. No. 179271NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT), Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board ofCanvassers), Respondent.

ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCEPROFESSIONALS, Intervenor.

AANGAT TAYO, Intervenor.

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONSOF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIORCITIZENS), Intervenor.x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xBAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR G.R. No. 179295TEACHER EMPOWERMENT

THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION Present:AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., PUNO, C.J.,and ABONO, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,Petitioners, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES,, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, and BERSAMIN, JJ.

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:The Case

Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) — in a petition for certiorari and mandamus, assails the Resolution promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELEC’s resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.

The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).

Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) — in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition, assails NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC (Veterans).

Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.

The Facts

The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.

On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because “[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats. There were no intervenors in BANAT’s petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.

On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabriela’s Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;

WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:

Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections

i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated 15,283,659

ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred) 1,337,032

iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome) from areas not yet submitted for canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and Pagalungan, Maguindanao) 102,430

Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes;

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party, organization or coalition receving more than the required two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-list ballots have been completely canvassed;

WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:

RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/COALITION

VOTESRECEIVED

1 BUHAY 1,163,218

2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730

3 CIBAC 760,260

4 GABRIELA 610,451

5 APEC 538,971

6 A TEACHER 476,036

7 AKBAYAN 470,872

8 ALAGAD 423,076

9 BUTIL 405,052

10 COOP-NATCO 390,029

11 BATAS 386,361

12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036

13 ARC 338,194

14 ABONO 337,046

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an URGENT PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties, organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at least one seat under the party-list system of representation in the meantime.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System:

1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY

2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA

3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC

4 Gabriela Women’s Party GABRIELA

5 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives APEC

6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation A TEACHER

and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc.

7 Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party AKBAYAN

8 Alagad ALAGAD

9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL

10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO

11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS

12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC

13 Abono ABONO

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.

The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and academic.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELEC’s interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:

WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each;

WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of Canvassers, the projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:

Party-List Projected total number of votes

1 BUHAY 1,178,747

2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476

3 CIBAC 755,964

4 GABRIELA 621,718

5 APEC 622,489

6 A TEACHER 492,369

7 AKBAYAN 462,674

8 ALAGAD 423,190

9 BUTIL 409,298

10 COOP-NATCO 412,920

11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165

12 ARC 375,846

13 ABONO 340,151

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes among the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the “first party” in accordance with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;

WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system of representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme Court in Veterans;

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the “first party”, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans, is:

Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - = party relative to total votes for Total votes for party-list system party-list system

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats:

Proportion of votes receivedby the first party

Additional seats

Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats

Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% One (1) additional seat

Less than 4% No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:

1,178,747- - - - - - - - = 0.07248 or 7.2%16,261,369

which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:

No. of votes of concerned party No. of additional

Additional seats for = ------------------- x seats allocated to a concerned party No. of votes of first party

first party

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:

Party List Percentage Additional Seat

BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1

CIBAC 1.28 1

GABRIELA 1.05 1

APEC 1.05 1

A TEACHER 0.83 0

AKBAYAN 0.78 0

ALAGAD 0.71 0

BUTIL 0.69 0

COOP-NATCO 0.69 0

ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0

ARC 0.63 0

ABONO 0.57 0

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the

following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit:

Party List Additional Seats

BUHAY 2

BAYAN MUNA 1

CIBAC 1

GABRIELA 1

APEC 1

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1) additional seat.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Acting on BANAT’s petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which reads as follows:

This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).

Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:

COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:

Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to wit:

1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.

2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.

3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and

4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed in the “ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX “A” of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].

5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed.

RECOMMENDATION:

The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.

The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re “In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and

Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections” resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.”

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic.

Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.

SO ORDERED.

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.

Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP), Anak Mindanao (AMIN), and An Waray. Per the certification by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:

Party-List No. of Seat(s)

1.1 Buhay 3

1.2 Bayan Muna 2

1.3 CIBAC 2

1.4 Gabriela 2

1.5 APEC 2

1.6 A Teacher 1

1.7 Akbayan 1

1.8 Alagad 1

1.9 Butil 1

1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1

1.11 Anak Pawis 1

1.12 ARC 1

1.13 Abono 1

1.14 AGAP 1

1.15 AMIN 1

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250.

Issues

BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?

Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their petition:

I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule:

A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.

B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:

1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats for the “First Party” violates the principle of proportional representation under RA 7941.

2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the “First Party” and another for the qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.

3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from those required under RA 7941;

C. Violates the “Four Inviolable Parameters” of the Philippine party-list system as provided for under the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.

II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the same being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v.

COMELEC, the instant Petition is a justiciable case as the issues involved herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct interpretation and implementation of RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to our nation.

Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:

First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;

Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are “qualified” to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one “qualifying” and two additional seats;

Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to their total number of votes.”

However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term “proportional representation,” this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.

Number of Party-List Representatives: The Formula Mandated by the Constitution

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the “House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law.” The House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives.

Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:

Number of seats available to legislative districts x .20 =

Number of seats available toparty-list representatives

.80

This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.

220 x .20 = 55

.80

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.

Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives: The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold and the Three-Seat Cap

All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of “additional seats” under the Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule, and Justice Vicente V. Mendoza’s dissent in Veterans presented Germany’s Niemeyer formula as an alternative.

The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — x x x

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. — The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list representative seats.

The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:

(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of the House of Representatives including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District Representatives in the 14 Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.

(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).

(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups under the immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.

Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s first interpretation.

The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:

(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.

BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is “by making the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats.” Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s second interpretation.

In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC’s original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are filled up.

We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.

Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes garnered during the elections.

Rank Party Votes Garnered Rank Party Votes Garnered

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI 79,386

3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541

4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424

5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327

6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686

8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544

9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220

10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993

11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717

12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012

14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846

15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751

16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522

17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722

18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837

19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612

21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624

22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062

23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512

25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835

26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098

27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938

28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903

29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691

30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896

31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255

32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA PILIPINO 29,130

33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271

34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781

35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946

36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744

37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916

38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729

39 ABANSE! PINAY 130,356 86 APO 16,421

40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241

41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161

42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445

43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915

44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471

45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406

46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221

47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that “parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each.” This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.

Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for the party-list.

Rank Party Votes Garnered

Votes Garnered over Total Votes for Party-List, in % Guaranteed Seat

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1

6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1

9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1

10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1

11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1

15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1

17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1

Total 17

18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are “entitled to one seat each,” or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.

The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that “those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.” This is where petitioners’ and intervenors’ problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause “in proportion to their total number of votes” to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.

We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Rank Party Votes Garnered

Votes Garnered

overTotal Votes

for Party List, in %

(A)

Guaranteed Seat

(First Round)

(B)

AdditionalSeats

(Second Round)

(C)

(B) plus (C), in whole

integers

(D)

Applying the three seat cap

(E)

1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.

2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.

3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.

4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.

6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.

9 COOP-NATCCO

409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.

10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.

11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.

12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.

13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.

15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.

16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.

17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.

18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.

21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.

22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.

23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

26 SENIOR CITIZENS

213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.

27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.

28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.

29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.

30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.

31 ANG KASANGGA

170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.

32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.

33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.

34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.

35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.

36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.

Total 17 55

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would he qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang “reserve.” Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to make common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and the political parties to come together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.

It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political parties and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other so that the very objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives later on through a party list system; and even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting political power in the wider constitutional arena for major political parties.

x x x(Emphasis supplied) R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector,

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.

Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list elections.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a “party” that participates in party-list elections as either “a political party or a sectoral party,” R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.

The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:

Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization’s nominee “wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity” as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: “The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x.” The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

We quote below the discussion in Veterans explaining the First Party Rule:

Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party

Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice the latter’s number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:

Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of -------------------- = first party relative to Total votes for total votes for party-list system party -list system

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.

We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives.

Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of votes — say, twenty percent — to grant it the same number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first party.

Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties

Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the following complex fraction:

No. of votes of concerned party------------------Total no. of votes

Additional seats for party-list system No. of additionalfor concerned = ----------------------- x seats allocated toparty No. of votes of the first party

first party--------------Total no. of votesfor party list system

In simplified form, it is written as follows:

No. of votes of Additional seats concerned party No. of additional

for concerned = ------------------ x seats allocated to party No. of votes of the first party

first party

x x x Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.

The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional

representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 7941: AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Party-List System Act."

Section 2. Declaration of part y. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadcast possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector,(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.

Section 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. Any party, organization, or coalition already registered with the Commission need not register anew. However, such party, organization, or coalition shall file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system.

Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.

The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;(3) It is a foreign party or organization;(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

Section 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling places on election day. The names of the part y-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list.

Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.

Section 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first is a vote for candidate for member of the House of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the party, organizations, or coalition he wants represented in the house of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted: Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list system shall be held in May 1998.

The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information campaign for purposes of educating the electorate on the matter of the party-list system.

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes : Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.

Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.

Section 14. Term of Office. Party-list representatives shall be elected for a term of three (3) years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No party-list representatives shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization.

Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list representatives, the vacancy shall be automatically filled by the next representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted to the COMELEC by the same party, organization, or coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party, organization coalition concerned shall submit additional nominees.

Section 17. Rights of Party-List Representatives. Party-List Representatives shall be entitled to the same salaries and emoluments as regular members of the House of Representatives.

Section 18. Rules and Regulations. The COMELEC shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

Section 19. Appropriations. The amount necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be provided in the regular appropriations for the Commission on Elections starting fiscal year 1996 under the General Appropriations Act.

Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby authorized to utilize savings and other available funds for purposes of its information campaign on the party-list system.

Section 20. Separability Clause. If any part of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.

Section 21. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.

Section 22. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

Approved, March 3, 1995.

G.R. No. 77365 April 7, 1992

RITA CALEON, Petitioner, vs. AGUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

 BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the January 28, 1987 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 10990 entitled "Rita Caleon V. Hon. Samilo Barlongay, et al." dismissing the petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34, which affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch XII, ejecting the petitioner.

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Private respondent Agus Development Corporation is the owner of a parcel of land denominated as Lot 39, Block 28, situated at 1611-1619 Lealtad, Sampaloc, Manila, which it leased to petitioner Rita Caleon for a monthly rental of P180.00. Petitioner constructed on the lot leased a 4-door apartment building. l

Without the consent of the private respondent, the petitioner sub-leased two of the four doors of the apartment to Rolando Guevarra and Felicisima Estrada for a monthly rental of P350.00 each. Upon learning of the sub-lease, private respondent through counsel demanded in writing that the petitioner vacate the leased premises (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 20).

For failure of petitioner to comply with the demand, private respondent filed a complaint for ejectment (Civil Case No. 048908) with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch XII against the petitioner citing as ground therefor the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, Section 5, which is the unauthorized sub-leasing of part of the leased premises to third persons without securing the consent of the lessor within the required sixty (60)-day period from the promulgation of the new law (B.P. 25). (Rollo, Petition, p. 8). After trial, the court a quo rendered its decision ordering petitioner and all persons claiming possession under her (a) to vacate the premises alluded to in the complaint; (b) to remove whatever improvement she introduced on the property; (c) to pay private respondent the amount of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees; and (d) to pay the costs (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 19).

Petitioner appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court and on November 24, 1980, presiding judge of the RTC, the Hon. Samilo Barlongay, affirmed in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 19).

The decision of the Regional Trial Court was appealed to the Court of Appeals for review. The respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision dated January 28, 1987, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition not being prima facie meritorious, the same is outright dismissed.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 21)

Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.

The principal issue in this case is whether or not the lease of an apartment includes a sublease of the lot on which it is constructed, as would constitute a ground for ejectment under Batas Pambansa BLg. 25.

Petitioner is of the view that Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 is not applicable because what she leased was her own apartment house which does not include a sublease of the lot she leased from private respondent on which the apartment is constructed.

Petitioner's contention is untenable.

This issue has already been laid to rest in the case of Duellome v. Gotico (7 SCRA 841 [1963]) where this Court ruled that the lease of a building naturally includes the lease of the lot, and the rentals of the building includes those of the lot. Thus:

. . . the lease of a building would naturally include the lease of the lot and that the rentals of the building include the rentals of the lot.

Furthermore, under our Civil Code, the occupancy of a building or house not only suggests but implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which they are constructed. This is not a new pronouncement. An extensive elaboration of this rule was discussed by this Court in the case of Baquiran, et al., v. Baquiran, et al., 53 O.G. p. 1130.

. . . the Court of Appeals should have found the herein appellees lessees of the house, and for all legal purposes, of the lot on which it was built as well.

But petitioner insists that the ruling in the aforecited case is not applicable to the case at bar because the former is a damage suit while the latter is an ejectment case.ch

Be that as it may, this Court has categorically answered in the affirmative, the principal question, common to both cases and on which rests the resolution of the issues involved therein. Under the above ruling it is beyond dispute that petitioner in leasing her apartment has also subleased the lot on which it is constructed which lot belongs to private respondent. Consequently, she has violated the provisions of Section 5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 which is a ground for Ejectment.

Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 enumerates the grounds for judicial ejectment, among which is the subleasing of residential units without the written consent of the owner/lessor, to wit:

Sec. 5 Grounds for judicial ejectment. Ejectment shall be allowed on the following grounds: a) Subleasing or assignment of lease of residential units in whole or in part, with the written consent of the owner/lessor: Provided that in the case of subleases or assignments executed prior to the approval of this Act, the sublessor/assignor shall have sixty days from the effectivity of this Act within which to obtain the written approval of the owner/lessor or terminate the sublease or assignment.Section 2(b) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 defines the term residential unit as follows:

Sec. 2. Definition of Terms - Unless otherwise indicated wherever in this Act, the following shall have the following meaning:

b. A residential unit - refers to an apartment, house and/or land on which another's dwelling is located used for residential purposes and shall include not only buildings, parts or units thereof used solely as dwelling places, except motels, motel rooms, hotels, hotel rooms, boarding houses, dormitories, rooms and bedspaces for rent, but also those used for home industries, retail stores, or other business purposes if the owner thereof and his family actually live therein and use it principally for dwelling purposes: . . .

Petitioner argued further that Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 cannot be applied in this case because there is a perfected contract of lease without any express prohibition on subleasing which had been in effect between petitioner and private respondent long before the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25. Therefore, the application of said law to the case at bar is unconstitutional as an impairment of the obligation of contracts.

It is well settled that all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54 [1974]). In fact, this Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented (Tropical Homes, Inc. v. National Housing Authority, 152 SCRA 540 [1987]).

In any event, it is now beyond question that the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the exercise of police power of the state in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare (Kabiling, et al. v. National Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623 [1987]). In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interest may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al., supra). In fact, every contract affecting public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the

general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power (Villanueva v. Castañeda, 154 SCRA 142 [1987]).

Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, "An Act Regulating Rentals of Dwelling Units or of Land On Which Another's Dwelling is Located and For Other Purposes" shows that the subject matter of the law is the regulation of rentals and is intended only for dwelling units with specified monthly rentals constructed before the law became effective (Baens v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 634 [1983]).cha

Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 is derived from P.D. No. 20 which has been declared by this Court as a police power legislation, applicable to leases entered into prior to July 14, 1971 (effectivity date of RA 6539), so that the applicability thereof to existing contracts cannot be denied (Gutierrez v. Cantada, 90 SCRA 1 [1979]).

Finally, petitioner invokes, among others, the promotion of social justice policy of the New Constitution. Like P.D. No. 20, the objective of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 is to remedy the plight of lessees, but such objective is not subject to exploitation by the lessees for whose benefit the law was enacted. Thus, the prohibition provided for in the law against the sublease of the premises without the consent of the owner. As enunciated by this Court, it must be remembered that social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice consecrated in our Constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto (Salonga v. Farrales, 105 SCRA 360 [1981]).

WHEREFORE, the Petition is Denied for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur. Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Citation. 262 U.S. 390,43 S. Ct. 625,67 L. Ed. 1042,1923 U.S.Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from creating legislation that restricts liberty interests when the legislation is not reasonably related to an acceptable state objective.

Facts. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the conviction.

Issue. Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?Held. The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty interests of the plaintiff and fails to reasonably relate to any end within the competency of the state.The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily restraint. The state argues that the purpose of the statute is to encourage the English language to be the native tongue of all children raised in the state. Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution extends to those who speak other languages. Education is a fundamental liberty interest that must be protected, and mere knowledge of the German language cannot be reasonably regarded as harmful.

Discussion. Liberty interests may not be interfered with by the states when the interference is arbitrary and not reasonably related to a purpose which the state may permissively regulate.

Department of Education vs. San Diego G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989 The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again. The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that- A student shall be allowed only 3 chances to take the NMAT. After 3 successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.

Facts: Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of BS Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT 3 times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the RTC of Valenzuela to compel his admission to the test. In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.

Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution on academic freedom, due process and equal protection.

Held: No. The court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical education.

Ratio: While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These

resources must be applied in a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction. The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love. No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest. In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant future. We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the farm and engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as merchants. It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are a nation of misfits.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 PHIL 143

FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9.

Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commision and the subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative, (2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly

RULING: On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system of government. It obtains not through a single provision but by actual division in our Constitution that each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from that fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely restrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.

In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral and constituent units thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectability, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances and subject to the specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument.

The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.

Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution, but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must respect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of government.

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting wihtin the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate

department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission

The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain errors of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. The purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal.

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and exercise of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.

The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time within which protests instructed to its cognizance should be filed. Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized.

While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.

HELD: The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against he election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.