Ezequiel L. Posesorski

Between Reinhold and FichteAugust Ludwig Hülsen's Contribution to the Emergence of GermanIdealism

KIT Scientific Publishing

2. Fichte

Publisher: KIT Scientific PublishingPlace of publication: KIT Scientific PublishingYear of publication: 2012Published on OpenEdition Books: 13 January 2017Serie: KIT Scientific PublishingElectronic ISBN: 9782821874299

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Electronic referencePOSESORSKI, Ezequiel L. 2. Fichte In: Between Reinhold and Fichte: August Ludwig Hülsen's Contributionto the Emergence of German Idealism [online]. Karlsruhe: KIT Scientific Publishing, 2012 (generated 12janvier 2021). Available on the Internet: <http://books.openedition.org/ksp/1946>. ISBN:9782821874299.

2. Fichte

2 .1 F ichte ’ s Influence

D ie z ’ s objections caused Reinhold to m odify his Elem entarphilosophie in w ays unacceptable to H ülsen. F ich te ’ s position enabled H ülsen to

reform ulate R einh old ’ s system in his ow n w ay. The W issenschaftslehre allowed H ülsen to embrace the new Fichtean paradigm : self-determ i­ning know ledge as a personal self-grounded expression o f a holistic ac­

tiv ity o f the w ill, and not as a grounded form o f m onadic subjectivism .1 F ichte ’ s position provided H ülsen w ith a new synthetic alternative capable of fusing and re-grounding m orality and epistem ology. It

paved the w a y fo r a critical m onism capable o f transform ing and ex­panding R ein h old ’ s system atic approach to the h istory of ph ilosophy:

the main m issing feature o f F ich te ’ s “ im proved” Elem entarphilosophie

and H ü lsen ’ s ow n contribution. Fichte influenced H ülsen in m any other w ays. The adoption of a circular or self-reflecting m ethod o f deri­vation, the personal concept of infinite practical striving, its im portance fo r the consolidation o f a critical “ m oral order” w ithin the sphere of a p u rposively coordinated com m unity, the strict p rim acy of “ sp irit” on

“ letter” , the articulating concept o f inherent system atic coherence, the

ethical m odel of the scholar, etc, are perhaps the m ost preem inent examples o f such influence.

2.2 The R ezension des A en esid em u s : the O rigins of the Wissenschafts­lehre

1792 w as a crucial year for the Elem entarphilosophie. A p art from the objections raised b y D iez, A rth u r Schopenhauer’ s brilliant teacher,

G ottlob Ernst Schulze ( 17 6 1- 18 3 3 ) , challenged R ein h old ’ s system in an

1 This paradigm was Fichte’s critical alternative to the skeptically refutable para­digm of the monadic-subjectivist tradition, which saw philosophical knowledge as the result of contemplation or speculation. See: Beiser 2002, 259

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an onym ou sly published essay entitled A enesidem us oder ü ber die F u n ­dam ente d er von dem H errn Professor R e in h o ld in Je n a gelieferten

E lem en ta r-P h ilo sp h ie : N eb st einer V ertheidigung des Skepticism us gegen die A nm aassungen der V ernunftkritik . Schulze objected to the sy s­tematic value o f R ein h old ’ s first principle; Schulze’ s skeptical criticism

w as also aimed at questioning the status of the thing-in-itself and the grounded human capacity fo r philosophical know ledge. It invalidated the system atic p ossib ility of affirm ing the correspondence of an em piri­

cally represented object and its noum enal correlate.2B y the time Schulze’ s essay appeared in print, Joh an n G ottlieb Fichte

( 1 7 6 2 - 18 14 ) was one of the prom inent em erging figures o f the critical

m ovem ent. H is Versuch einer K ritik a ller O ffen b a ru n g (1792) made him one of the emergent hopes o f the new generation of post-K antian thinkers. Schulze’ s skeptical criticism o f Reinhold forced Fichte to reconsider his early critical convictions and rethink his ow n p h ilo ­

sophical prem ises.3 Fichte reacted to Schulze’ s criticism in R ezension des A enesidem us ( 179 3), a short analytic review that appeared in the

A llg em ein e L itera tu r-Z eitu n g . F ich te ’ s essay not on ly opened a new chapter in the h istory of Germ an philosophy; its sketch o f a critical

solution to Schulze’ s criticism o f Reinhold reinforced H ü lsen ’ s con ­viction that the early position of his first ph ilosop h y teacher w as in ­

sufficiently grounded.

2 See: Schulze 19 11, 18. Dieter H enrich (2003, 149) summarizes Schulze’s criti­cism of Kant and Reinhold: “According to Schulze [...] transcendental philo­sophy shows, with sufficient evidence, that we cannot avoid thinking the idea of a cause of sensations or of what is given in our sensations. We also cannot avoid thinking some idea of an origin of our representations, concepts, and so forth. From these unavoidable thoughts, however, we may draw no legitimate conclu­sion about the existence of things-in-themselves, or a faculty of representation, or of reason — that is, some specific entity in terms of which we can understand why representation really exists. In particular, we may not say that our knowledge depends on the faculty of reason, nor attribute the content of our knowledge to external causes.”

3 See F ichte’s letter to J. F. Flatt from November or December 1793 in: K abitz 1968, 30-1*

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R einh old ’ s early Elem entarphilosophie demands that p h ilosop h y ’ s foundation be both m aterially (real) and fo rm ally (logical) valid. The proposition o f consciousness is R ein h old ’ s form al expression of the self-

evidently existing fact o f consciousness.4 Fichte agrees w ith Reinhold on the need of grounding ph ilosop h y on a first self-evident principle.

Fichte argued how ever, that Schulze’ s criticism o f the early E lem en tar­philosophie finds a serious inconsistency in R ein h old ’ s attempt to ground p h ilosophy on a fact of consciousness.

D er Satz des Bewußtseins, an die Spitze der gesamten Philosophie gestellt, gründet sich demnach a u f empirische Selbstbeobachtung, und sagt allerdings eine Abstraktion aus. Freilich fühlt jeder, der diesen Satz w ohl versteht, einen innern Widerstand, demselben bloß empirische Gültigkeit beizumessen. Das Gegenteil desselben läßt sich auch nicht einmal denken. A ber eben das deutet darauf hin, daß er sich noch a u f etwas anderes gründen müsse als a u f eine bloße Tatsache.5

Fichte argued that R einh old ’ s principle of consciousness does not

achieve the required criterion of a universal or unconditionally self­grounded synthetic principle. F o r according to Fichte, it is actually

arrived at a posteriori through abstraction from objectively determ ined self-observation. Fichte accordingly claimed that R einh old ’ s principle

is on ly an em pirically valid and subordinated principle. It depends on the concrete representational conditions o f consciousness. Fichte de­nied that R ein h old ’ s principle be ascribed the self-evident status of a first principle o f ph ilosophy. I f its establishm ent depends on a m ediating act

o f abstraction , then its imm ediate and “ transparent” self-certainty must be discounted. Fichte so underm ined R ein h old ’ s claims fo r the im ­

mediate epistem ic and sem antic self-grounding nature of the principle o f consciousness. A lso the subordinated character of R ein h old ’ s p rin ­

ciple allow s fo r the p ossib ility of skeptical objections. It is possible to question the valid ity o f the presupposed or unjustified conditions from

w hich this principle is derived.6 Schulze claimed that the proposition of

4 See: R einhold 1978, 109-105 F ichte, ga 1-2, 466 See: H artmann 1 960, 46

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consciousness is a subordinated proposition ; it presupposes the highest rule o f judgm ent, i.e ., the logical principle o f contradiction.7 C o n ­

sequently, Schulze concluded that the proposition of consciousness could not qu alify as the first principle of p h ilosop h y.8 Paul Franks pointed out the radical im portance o f F ichte’ s response to Schulze’ s

criticism of Reinhold:

First, no universal and necessary principle can be justified through abstraction, so the Principle can be at best inductive and probable. Second, no absolutely unconditioned condition can be arrived at through mere negation of certain conditions. Such a procedure can yield at best a relatively unconditioned that is homogeneous with that which it is supposed to condition. Even if the Principle of Consciousness is not spatiotemporally conditioned, it will still turn out to share some conditions with the empirical acts or states from which it is abstracted, and so it will not be fit to serve as their absolutely un­conditioned first principle, for it will be incapable of stopping the regress [i.e., the effect caused by the transformation of the principle into a part or a member subjected to the governing laws of the series from which it is abs­tracted]. [... ] H is [i.e., Reinhold’s] underlying conception of the first prin­ciple is itself ambiguous. On the one hand, he conceives it as a principle that is self-explanatory and therefore heterogeneous to what it conditions. On the other hand, he conceives it as a principle that is self-evident through “ empirical self-observation” and therefore homogeneous with what it con­ditions. Moreover, this ambiguity must infect his conception of the entire system because it infects the character of his transcendental arguments. For if the first principle is heterogeneous with what it conditions, then systema­tic derivations from it should progress from ground to grounded. But if the first principle is homogeneous with what it conditions, then systematic deri­vations from it should regress from grounded to ground. Reinhold is — to use an apt phrase — system atically am biguous.9

7 According to Fichte (ga 1-2, 43), Reinhold may have accepted Schulze’s criti­cism but have probably argued that “ der Satz des Bewustseyns freylich unter dem Princip des Widerspruchs stehe, aber nicht als unter einem Grundsatze, durch den er bestimmt werde, sondern als unter einem Gesetze, dem er nicht widersprechen dürfe; [...].”

8 See: Fichte, ga 1-2, 439 Franks 2005, 234-5. For the bracketed clarification, see: Franks 2005, 226-7

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System atic am biguity, R ein h old ’ s failure to distinguish the transcen­dental and the em pirical uses o f representation, and the conditions

w hich his strategy presupposed and w hich Schulze could legitim ately question, led Fichte to the conclusion that ph ilosop h y cannot be groun­

ded on a fact (Thatsache).10

A ccord in g to R ein h old ’ s ow n standards, Fichte argued, the principle o f consciousness could on ly assure an a p rio ri form al-logical certain­ty .11 Reinhold conceded that the content o f his principle is em pirically

given: that it on ly emerges a posteriori through the affecting action o f a thing-in-itself. This dependence according to Fichte confirm s that the principle o f consciousness cannot fu lfill the criteria o f a first principle

of ph ilosophy; it is not a universally self-determ in ed principle. O n to ­logically, R ein h old ’ s principle is m aterially deficient.

D espite the system atic inconsistencies caused b y the thing-in-itself,

Fichte, as later H ülsen , demanded that the first principle of p h ilosophy fu lfill this m aterial-ontological condition. Fichte pointed out that the principle of consciousness admits that in the act o f representation tw o

original sim ultaneous procedures of the human spirit are synthesized: distinction and relation. Schulze’ s objection w as that in R ein h old ’ s sy s­tem these tw o procedures are vaguely defined and left open to am bi­

guous interpretations. Fichte, agreeing w ith Schulze, concluded that Reinhold did not entirely explain the necessary transcendental con­ditions of this original synthesis o f the human sp irit.12

Fichte w as w ell aware o f the skeptical im plications o f Schulze’ s criticism . The non-determ ined character of the transcendental condi­

tions suggests that the principle o f consciousness is not an exhaustive principle; it is not kn ow ledge’ s superior instance. Since representation

is ( 1 ) a transcendental synthetic act, Fichte reasoned, its grounding p ossib ility must com prehend (2) a thetic (“ subjective” ) and (3) an anti­

thetic (“ objective” ) constituting elements w h ereby the sim ultaneous acts of distinction and relation be accom plished. A ccord in g to Fichte,

10 See: F ichte, ga, 1, 2, 4611 F ichte, ga, 1, 2, 4612 See: F ichte, ga, 1, 2, 44

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Reinhold conceded that a noum enal or original subject and object must be logically presupposed to enable the im m ediate p ossib ility o f repre­sentation. Both subject and object must be thought o f as indirectly p re­sent in consciousness under the form s of the representing subject and a represented object. A ccord in g to Reinhold, know ledge of these tw o noum enal elements could be claimed on ly after their representation. In

addition, Fichte contended that the original acts of distinguishing and

relating be understood as tw o sim ultaneous procedures that point to the p re- and non-representational w a y in w hich the human spirit must be thought to act to produce the transcendental p ossib ility of represen­tation. In Versuch Reinhold acknow ledged, though on ly in passing, the

system atic requirem ent o f these fo u r original proto-conscious elements, nam ely a pre-representational ( 1 ) subject and (2) objet, as w ell as their sim ultaneous acts of (3) distinction and (4) relation.13 Fichte n otw ith­standing claimed, perhaps unfairly , that Reinhold reserved the discus­sion of this intrinsic issue fo r some future tim e.14 W hat Reinhold argues, Fichte quoted in R ezen sion , is that

die bloße Vorstellung sei unmittelbar, Subjekt und O bjekt aber nur verm it­telst der Beziehung jener a u f diese im Bewußtsein vorhanden; denn das­jenige, was im Bewußtsein a u f O bjekt und Subjekt bezogen werde, müsse zwar nicht der Z eit, aber seiner N atur nach vor den H andlungen des B e­zogenwerdens da sein, inwiefern nichts bezogen werden könne, wenn nichts vorhanden sei, das sich beziehen lasse.13

F o r Fichte, the reinstitution of the critical status of ph ilosop h y de­manded a system atic explanation of the transcendental possibilities of the three original elements com prehended in the act o f representation

[thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis (of distinction and relation)].16 Fichte

13 See: R einhold 1963, 323-414 See: F ichte, ga, 1, 2, 45-815 F ichte, ga, 1, 2, 4816 In a letter from July 2, 1 795, F ichte [ga, iii , 2, 345] gave Reinhold the follo­

wing explanation: “Kant fragt nach dem Grunde der Einheit des mannigfaltigen im Nicht-Ich. Wie vereinigt ihr A. B. C. u.s.w. die auch schon gegeben sind, zur Einheit des Bewußtseyns? und auch Sie scheinen mir die Philosophie bei diesem Punkte aufzunehmen. [...] Ich glaube es braucht nur gesagt zu werden [...], daß

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suggested, how ever, that the new original self-explanatory principle of p h ilosophy should not be a subjectivist m onadic principle, but a holistic

act o f the human spirit (T hathandlung). This act enables a critical m onistic derivation of the exhaustive p ossib ility o f the subjectivist- m onadic mechanism of representation, and secures it from all possible

skeptical attacks.17 Reinhold and F ich te ’ s focus on the original subject also differ in another substantial aspect. A s Frederick N euh ouser com ­

ments,

[...] Fichte starts with the world Tatsache but replaces Sache (“ thing” ) with Handlung (“ act” ), thereby expressing what will become the central point of his theory of the subject: The I is not to be understood as a thing but as an activity. Furthermore, the subject is a “ Tat” -Handlung, an activity that is at the same time a deed, or fact. The point of joining Tat with Handlung to coin a [. ] term for the subject is to suggest that the existence of the I, its facticity, stands in some intimate relation to its activity and, further, that it is this relation that essentially distinguishes a subject from a thing.18

Fichte believed that through a holistic T h athandlung “ act-grounding” o f R ein h old ’ s subjectivist-m onadic fact of consciousness, ph ilosop h y is

provided w ith a certain and unitary ground fo r all possible syntheses of the human spirit, including its concrete m odes of representation. T hrough his criticism of Reinhold, Fichte sketches the foundations o f a

new synthetically grounded p h ilosophy (in the sense of the early E le ­m entarphilosophie) the building blocks o f w hich seem to be outlined, at least to some extent, b y R einhold him self.19 A m on g R ein h old ’ s students,

jene Frage eine höhere voraussetzt, die: Wie kommt ihr denn erst zu A. und zu B. und zu C.? Sie werden gegeben; das heißt doch wohl auf gut Teutsch: ihr wißt es nicht - Wohl: so lange ihr es noch nicht wißt, nicht von Philosophie, als einer Wißenschaft.”

17 Fichte’s strategy provides evidence of Schulze’s criticism of critical philosophy. For as Dieter H enrich (2003, 151) explains, “What Schulze is suggesting can be conceived as a variety of philosophical phenomenalism, a method of description of consciousness that does not have any hidden implications regarding the ex­planation of consciousness.”

18 N euhouser 1990, 106-719 See: F ranks 2005, 229

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H ülsen was one o f the first enthusiastic receptors of F ichte ’ s new para­digm .

F o r Fichte, the on ly possible w a y to keep the valid ity o f R ein h old ’ s th eory is through an a p rio ri subordination or derivation o f its G ru n d ­

satz from a new original self-explanatory principle. Fichte focuses on

R einh old ’ s early Elem entarphilosophie as a propaedeutic that calls for critical re-grounding and correction. F ichte ’ s attempt w ill be to in­corporate R ein h old ’ s system into a m ore encom passing system : the

W issenschaftslehre.20 O ne of F ich te ’ s efforts w ill be to disam biguate R einh old ’ s transcendental-em pirical equivocation. A s Paul Franks holds, F ichte ’ s fundam ental purpose w ill be to determ ine the That-

handlung as

a uniquely necessary, absolute first principle, heterogeneous with everything empirical, yet with demonstrable actuality; and to progressively derive from this principle, in uniquely necessary steps, the a priori conditions of experienceand its objects, while demonstrating that these conditions have actuality withinexperience.21

A ccord in g to Fichte, the progressive deduction of the subjectivist-m o­nadic levels of the system of know ledge dem ands an inquiry about the original proto-conscious acts o f the human spirit. Fichte w ill first d is­

cuss this issue system atically in his 1794-5 G ru n d la g e d er gesam m ten W issenschaftslehre, an essay w hich w ill influence H ülsen crucially.

2.3 The G ru n d la g e der gesam m ten W issenschaftslehre: the N o d al

Points o f F ichte ’ s C orrection o f Reinhold

The purpose o f F ich te ’ s 1794-5 G ru n d la g e der gesam m ten Wissen­schaftslehre is to lay dow n the entire foundations o f the Science of

K now ledge. F o r H ülsen it paved the w a y fo r his expansion and re- articulating o f R ein h old ’ s approach to the h istory o f ph ilosophy. A s

during the last decades Fichte ’ s G ru n d la g e was the object of m any

20 See: F ichte, ga, 1, 2, 149, and B reazeale 1982, 81221 Franks 2005, 259

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A n glo-Saxon and G erm an scholarly studies, I w ill here discuss only those results o f F ich te ’ s correction o f Reinhold w hich are relevant for the understanding of H ü lsen ’ s achievem ent.22

Fichte’ s holistic m onism is com m itted to a first absolute principle: the T hathandlung. The self-reflectively grounded character thereof determines an imm ediate self-com plem entary fusion o f the real and the

ideal activities o f the human spirit.23 T hus, an original pattern is es­tablished fo r all that that w ill emerge as the im m anently self-posited

system o f know ledge: no practical grounding element can exist w ithout

22 Scholars of Fichte do not agree on the nature of the foundations of the Grund­lage. Although a full discussion of this topic transcends the limits of this monograph, a brief discussion is necessary for the understanding of Hülsen’s logical-historical project. Some commentaries of Fichte’s work such as those of Frederick Beiser and Alain Perrinjaquet ascribe to Fichte a moral foundational position. [See: Beiser 1992 and Perrinjaquet 1994]. Others such as Tom Rockmore focus on Fichte’s approach as a theoretically ungrounded system the foundations of which attain at best only a regulative status. [See: Rockmore 1994, 96-112]. I myself am in agreement with Paul Franks. This commentator characterizes Fichte’s self-grounded standpoint as a practical-theoretical or rather real-ideal “holistic monism” , which explains why Fichte strongly recom­mended the study of Preisschrift for understanding his own Wissenschaftslehre. Franks’ position is that “holistic monism” should fulfill the following criteria: “ The Holistic requirement is that, in an adequate philosophical system, empirical items must be such that all their properties are determinable only within the context of a totality composed of other items and their properties. The Monistic requirement is that, in an adequate philosophical system, the absolute first prin­ciple must be immanent within the aforementioned totality, as its principle of unity. The two requirements together entail, first, that the absolute first principle both necessitates its derivatives and is impossible without them and, second, that between the principle and its derivatives, there can be no real distinctions.” Franks 2005, 85-6

23 According to Paul Franks, the separated presentation of the theoretical and the practical divisions of the Grundlage encourages a misreading of their self- complementary condition. [See: Franks 2005, 317]. Fichte characterizes these divisions only as “ logically distinguished, or rather reciprocally presupposing mo­ments of the same single positing activity of the I .” [See: F ichte, ga, 1, 2, 286]. For Fichte’s later clarification of this aspect of the Grundlage, see: F ichte, ga, iv, 2, 16-7

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its theoretical derivatives and vice versa. This necessary nexus prevents real ensuing distinctions between grounding and grounded elements.

[ 1 ] The deduction of the G rundsatz or the Thathandlung p ro p o ­sition “ I = I ” or “ I am ” , has a significant role in overcom ing three m ajor

failings of R ein h old ’ s early Elem entarphilosophie: ( 1 ) the material

deficiency o f the principle of consciousness, (2) the idea of a noum enal subject presupposed b y all representation, and (3) the concept of an im m ediately given certainty.

(1) Fichte argues that according to R ein h old ’ s ow n standards the principle o f consciousness can on ly assure an a p rio ri form al-logical certainty. The T h athandlung is F ichte ’ s holistic w a y to overcom e this

uncritical inconsistency. A s an original onto-epistem ic act, the That­h andlung establishes im m ediately and exhaustively the necessary p ro to ­conscious material and form al features dem anded b y a true first

principle o f ph ilosophy. A ccord in g to Fichte, Reinhold unsuccessfully tried to have provided these universal features through the am biguous dualistic interrelation o f the form al a p rio ri principle of consciousness,

and the a posteriori evident factual m ateriality enabled b y the thing-in- itself.

(2) F ich te ’ s position p lays an intrinsic role in the overcom ing of

R ein h old ’ s uncritical argum ent about the presupposition of a noum e- nal subject as a necessary logical condition fo r all representation. Fichte

refutes and develops R ein h old ’ s thesis b y show ing that the A bsolute I

is not a transcendent entity. The concept “ A bsolute I ” conceptualizes a holistic activity of imm ediate “ self-aw areness” that exists exclusively for, in and b y itself. The A bsolute I is not a noum en al entity or a

“ th in g ” at all; it is nothing but an unconditional act o f self-positing in the sense explained earlier. W hat fo llow s is that p h ilosophy should be idealistic. F o r even the most elemental condition demanded b y a criti­

cal epistem ology, nam ely an unconditionally self-posited I, can on ly exist fo r itself.

(3) T hrough the Thathandlung, a necessary logical coincidence is

established between the u n iversa l-fo rm a l-fa cto r-I and the universal- content-factor-I. The original proto-conscious possib ility o f all certain­ty is thus established as an imm ediate act of connection o f all possible

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form and m atter of cognition.24 So the proposition expressing the form ,

the m atter, and the necessary reciprocal presupposition o f these tw o,

nam ely the T h athandlung proposition “ I = I ” is an absolutely valid p ro ­position.

Fichte and R einh old ’ s concept of imm ediate certainty differ in a signi­

ficant w ay . C ertain ty in Fichte ’ s W issenschaftslehre is not im m ediately g iv en as in R ein h old ’ s early Elem entarphilosophie. Instead, it is im ­m ediately self-produced or se lf-d eriv ed b y the I as som ething exclusively

valid for itself. In this w ay , Fichte gives a critical answ er to one of his im plicit Program m schrift objections to Reinhold, nam ely: h o w the certainty of the first principle o f ph ilosop h y is itself established.25 Im m ediate self-grounding frees F ich te ’ s concept of certainty from p re­

vious logical determ inations such as the law o f contradiction (Schulze’ s objection to R einh old); it secures the concept Thathandlung from

possible skeptical objections.26A s Preisschrift show s, F ich te ’ s original m onistic act enabled H ülsen,

w h o sought original un ity of thought or presum ably the holistic p o ssi­

b ility of original system atic certainty, to not on ly distance him self from the objectionable position of R ein h old ’ s principle o f consciousness, but also to approach the disam biguated self-grounded standpoint of

the W issenschaftslehre.[2] The three foundational acts o f the W issenschaftslehre (thesis, anti­

thesis, and synthesis) provide the holistic grounds fo r all that that w ill

emerge as the subjectivist-m onadic system of know ledge.27 Fichte ’ s system , as W ayne M artin points out, abandons R ein h old ’ s ideal o f a

24 See: F ichte, ga, i, 2, 120-225 See: F ichte, ga, i, 2, 11626 See: Pipin 2000, 149. According to Rolf-Peter H orstmann (2000, 120), Fichte

“ [...] wants to overcome skepticism by showing that most of the judgments that are subject to skeptical attacks have the status of indisputable truths because they all have in common the characteristic of certainty. Thus, what has to be done in order to refute skepticism is to dispute not skepticism’s material claims but rather its assumption that there is a basis for doubt about the propositions it challenges.”

27 See: F ichte, ga, i, 2, 272

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single and self-evident starting point. F ichte ’ s W issenschaftslehre is not founded on a universal “ transparent” principle such as the fact of cons­

ciousness. Instead, it is self-grounded on a set o f three original acts of the A bsolute I, nam ely self-positing (thesis), counter-positing (anti­thesis), and quantified lim itation (synthesis). N onetheless, these appear as three correlative m oments of an original synthetic principle.28 So

Fichte ’ s reform ulation enables, though in an entirely new w a y adhe­rence to the ideal o f the first principle of R ein h old ’ s early system .

Fichte’ s reform ulation, as Preisschrift show s, enabled H ülsen, a persistent supporter o f the synthetic character of R ein h old ’ s early E le ­m entarphilosophie, to find a p u re system atic A rch im edean p o in t to re­

ground and expand R ein h old ’ s logical-historical insights.29[3] F o r Fichte the quantified form al-subjective and m aterial-ob­

jective agents involved in the foundational act o f all finite know ledge

are transcendental products o f the self-reflecting activity o f the im agi­nation spontaneously, im m anently, and synthetically counter-posited. B oth this self-positing activity and its im m anently self-posited p ro ­ducts are opposed aspects o f the same single practical-theoretical activity of the A bsolute I. The self-reflective act of the im agination

provides the transcendental ground o f representation.30 It emerges as

(1) a synthetic act of the A bsolute I w h ereb y (2) an objective-m aterial agent, a quantified N o t-I , is counter-posited to (3) a subjective-form al agent, a quantified I. In this w ay , the p ossib ility of the acts of distinc­

tion and relation that Reinhold presupposed in the act o f represen­tation is determ ined system atically. The quantified subject and object furnish the basic ground fo r the emergence of the representing subject

and a represented object. The faculty o f im agination lays dow n the transcendental foundation fo r a parallel spontaneous (active) and re­ceptive (passive) activity of the subjective agent, another feature that R einhold attributed to the facu lty of representation. T hrough it, the

principle o f all individuation is furtherm ore established system atically.

28 See: Martin 1997, 9629 On this point, I am partially indebt to Franz G. Nauen.30 F ichte, ga, i, 2, 306-8, 311-4, 325-6, 330-8

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T he rational being emerges as a pure-em pirical spiritual being, the holistic foundational m om ent of w hom is absolute rationality.

F ichte ’ s th eory o f the im agination enabled H ülsen to distance him ­self from Reinhold on tw o other questionable issues. ( 1 ) F ich te ’ s theory lays dow n the foundations fo r an innovative transform ation of reason into logical-historical self-reflecting agent em bodied in the real-ideal

figure of the subject. This is the system atic ground o f H ü lsen ’ s holistical-

ly self-grounded alternative to R ein h old ’ s vague concept o f ph ilosop h iz­ing reason. (2) H ü lsen ’ s transform ation of the activity o f the im agination

also furnishes the ground fo r a historical self-reflecting capacity o f the subject to strive after a regulative reconciliation of the pure (holistic) and

the em pirical (monadic) characters of the A bso lu te I. F o r H ülsen, the subject’ s spontaneous ability to self-determ ine him self autonom ously is a necessary constitutive fea tu re o f his spiritual nature. F o r Reinhold

self-determ ination w as on ly the result of an u n explained causal co­incidence between the personal independent theoretical account of the self-thinker and the true a p rio ri system of know ledge.

The im portance of all this fo r understanding H ülsen must be stressed. H ü lsen ’ s original contribution is his interpretative transform ation of reason into a logical-historical im aginative agent. Regarding all the antecedent acts that integrate the system of all know ledge, Fichte and H ülsen are in com plete agreement.

2.4 The Spiritual-Im aginative D im ension o f the W issenschaftslehre

T he self-reflective activity demanded fo r the system atic articulation of the W issenschaftslehre is personal. The on ly w a y possible to uncover the tim elessly accom plished acts of the A bso lu te I is b y repeating them

personally through a tem poral-actualizing series of correlative repre­senting acts o f the im agination. Philosophizing or rather the self-

reflecting articulation of the system o f all know ledge, is an activity that

each single individual must exclusively do for him self.31 Fichte w rote

31 See: F ichte, ga, 11, 3, 325. Notice in addition the following passage from the Programschrift: “Nun aber ist ja die Wissenschaftslehre selbst die Wissenschaft

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this in U eber den U nterschied des Geistes u n d Buchstabens in der P h i­losophie, a series o f lectures delivered in Jen a on 1 794.32 These lectures

w ere published on ly on 1 8oo. It is m ore than probable that ow ing to his close friendship w ith Fichte, H ülsen w as acquainted w ith their con ­tent w hen he w rote Preisschrift. Som e specific aspects o f these lectures

demand a short discussion. T h e y m ay have furnished the ground of one of H ü lsen ’ s central argum ents: critical know ledge cannot be ex­pressed through the printed letter.

In the opening section o f U eber den U nterschied, Fichte identifies the facu lty o f im agination, the spontaneous capability o f self-reflection responsible fo r creating all epistem ic contents, w ith the human spirit.33

N o philosophizing is possible w ithout spirit, fo r

Diese Vorstellungen aber, über welche die Philosophie reflektiert werden soll, sind durch, u. vermittelst der bloßen abstraction noch nicht da; sie müßen erst, wenigstens zum Theil d.i. insofern in ihnen eine Anschauung enthalten ist, durch Einbildungskraft hervorgebracht werden. Dieses Vermögen der Einbildungskraft aber, besonders insofer es höhere, u. in der gewöhnlichen Erfahrung nicht vorkommende Bilder zum Bewußtseyn erhebt, heißt Geist. Ohne Geist ist demnach nicht einmal der Stoff der Philosophie möglich?4

N o epistem ic outcom e can be divorced from the personal activity that

brings it about. Such a hypothetic divorce causes w hat Fichte calls “ p h ilosophy b y fo rm u la” , nam ely a ph ilosop h y in w hich imaginative

intuition or spirit is absent.35 Fichte concludes:

Diese Gesinung, M. H. ist Philosophie, und sie ist die einige Philosophie. Nicht das, was in unserem Gedächtniße schwebt, nicht das, was in unsern Büchern gedruckt zu lesen ist, ist Philosphie; sondern das, was unsern Geist

von etwas; nicht aber dieses Etwas seihst. Mithin wäre dieselbe überhaupt mit allen ihren Sätzen Form eines gewissen vor derselben vorhandenen Gehaltes. [...] Das Object der Wissenschaftslehre ist nach allem das System des mensch­lichen Wissens. Dieses ist unabhängig von der Wissenschaft desselben vorhanden, wird aber durch sie in systematischer Form aufgestellt.” Fichte, ga, I, 2, 140

32 See also Fichte’s Grundlage Statement in: Fichte, ga, 1, 2, 414-533 See: F ichte, ga, 11, 3, 30934 Fichte, ga, 11, 3, 33435 See: Fichte, ga, 11, 3, 329-30

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ergriffen, und umgeschaffen, u. in eine höhere geistige Ordnung der Dinge eingeführt hat, ist Philosphie. In uns, in uns muß die Philosophie seyn [. . .] .36

Fichte develops this idea in a letter to Reinhold from Ju ly 2, 1 7 9 5.

A ccord in g to Fichte, w hat the W issenschaftslehre tries to com m unicate cannot be said nor grasped through discursive thought alone, but it demands personal intuition. The printed w ord on ly guides the reader

to bring about the required inherent successive series o f im aginative intuitions so that he can personally self-reflect on them and p ortray the system o f all know ledge.37 A cco rd in g ly , the exhaustive p ossib ility of

this system can be proved on ly through its actual spiritual arti­culation.38 The W issenschaftslehre demands that one “ let w ords be w o rd s” and try instead to aw ake a series of necessary intuitions.39 A ll

philosophizing demands a spiritual activity w ithout w hich any critical thought is possible. N o text can convey this activity. Each single reader must supply it fo r him self w hile reading the text.40 The standpoint of

p h ilosophy therefore is as it w ill be in H ü lsen ’ s Preisschrift a personal standpoint.

A ccord in g to Fichte, the system of all know ledge emerges as a

“ pragm atic h istory o f the human sp irit” (pragm atische G eschichte des m enschlichen Geistes).41 Fichte em ploys this term as a synonym ous of “ transcendental deduction” . It designates a person al system atic account

o f the transcendental acts w h ereby the human spirit produced the sys-

36 F ichte, ga, ii , 3, 332-337 As Steven Hoeltzel (2001, 44) reminds us, “ [...] the philosopher begins by in­

tending representations of the protodiscursive activities of the I. These are one and all representations of a spontaneous dynamism, but the acts of the mind invariably occur in determinate, law-governed ways, and therefore “present a system for any observer” . Thus the reflecting philosopher should find that one representation — one represented act of the mind — necessarily gives way to a certain new representations, and no other, until the highest level of determinacy is reached: reflection grasps a representation of representational consciousness, structured as Reinhold’s principle describes it.”

38 See: F ichte, ga, i, 2, 119, 12639 See: F ichte, ga, iii, 2, 34440 See: F ranks 1997, 31241 See: F ichte, ga, i, 2, 146-7, 365

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tem of know ledge.42 O r rather, a genetic system atization o f reason’ s a p rio ri or tim eless course of production of the different transcendental

levels o f this system to be exclusively self-determ ined a posteriori b y personal self-conscious reflection (im agination/spirit).43 H ülsen w ill fuse Fichte ’ s bi-dim ensional position in his ow n tem poral-im aginative concept of rationality.44

2 .5 The System atic Fusion o f M ethod and System of K now ledge

In H ü lsen ’ s Preisschrift, the logical-historical deduction o f system re­

produces the self-reflective steps taken b y reason throughout its course o f developm ent. This fusion of deductive m ethod and system of know ledge is another aspect of F ichte ’ s overcom ing of Reinhold

adopted and augm ented b y H ülsen.The object o f inqu iry of F ich te ’ s W issenschaftslehre is know ledge

itself or rather its actual self-grounded possib ility. Philosophizing de­mands that one proceed self-reflectively. The system of know ledge

should be articulated in a progressing circular manner starting from its G ru n d sa tz . Its deduction demands gradual ascension in thinking and self-reflection on the transcendental p ossib ility of each perform ed

thought. F o r Fichte and H ülsen the circularity of this m ethod does not entail either an obstacle or an error as fo r Reinhold , for w hom

deduction is essentially linear. Since a circular m ethod o f deduction is unavoidable, Fichte argues, it should be openly acknow ledged.45

42 See: B reazeale 2001, 2343 See: B reazeale 2001b, 687, 693, 69944 Fichte’s distinction between spirit and letter in Ueber den Unterschied differs

from the distinction made by Kant, Reinhold, and Fichte himself in the 1798 Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre. For in this early text Fichte focuses neither on the interconnected reading of philosophical texts according to the idea of the whole, nor on the “ spirit” and the intention that individual passages may display. See: F ichte, ga, 1, 4, 231-2

45 See: F ichte, ga, i, 2, 132-3

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The intuitional self-reflection, first enabled b y the facu lty of im a­gination, emerges as the necessary ensuing part o f the original analytic- synthetic m ethod o f deduction brought about b y the self-excluding I and N o t-I . W ith it, reflection ceases to be m ainly inferential. The philosopher appears as a spectator of the im aginative products that he

has gradually self-deduced fo r him self as w ell as o f the self-positing I behind them. A s D aniel Breazeale points out, the derivative m ethod of F ich te ’ s W issenschaftslehre is a “ m ixed” m ethod. F o r it com bines

analytic-synthetic logical inference, im aginative production, and self- reflective or rather pragm atic descriptive observation.46

Fichte’ s “ m ixed” m ethod is crucial fo r the overcom ing of another

problem posed b y R ein h old ’ s standpoint. Fichte in the P rogram m ­schrift objected to the syllogistic m ethod o f deduction o f R ein h old ’ s early Elem entarphilosophie. Fichte criticized Reinhold fo r ( 1 ) om itting

the discussion o f the k ey system atic relation o f the G rundsatz to it’ s a p rio ri m ethod o f inference, as w ell as (2) fo r the spurious authority (Befugniß) o f this m ethod to derive the subordinated propositions of

p h ilosop h y.47 Fichte suggested that Reinhold used the syllogistic rule o f logic in an arbitrary and thereby uncritical w ay. F ich te ’ s “ m ixed” m ethod provided a solution to these tw o m ajor inconsistencies derived necessarily from the original proto-conscious set o f acts of the A b ­solute I. Its unavoidable circular or self-reflective character enables that the system of all know ledge be articulated b y reproducing the same

genetic (correlative) acts accom plished b y the A bso lute I. F ichte ’ s m ethod is connected therefore transcendentally to its G rundsatz. The system of all know ledge can on ly be articulated b y fo llow in g a “ m ixed” m ethod; on ly this disarm s the objections of a possible skeptic opponent. W hat distinguishes Fichte ’ s W issenschaftslehre, and b y ex­tension, H ü lsen ’ s h istorically enlarged version from R ein h old ’ s Elem entarphilosophie, is its fusion of m ethod and system of k n o w l­edge. O n ly b y a “ m ixed” m ethod can p h ilosop h y ’ s propositions be determ ined critically.

46 See: B reazeale 2001, 2947 See: F ichte, ga, i, 2, 116

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2.6 The Q ualitative Com pleteness of the W issenschaftslehre

H ülsen holds that the qu alitative logical-historical evolution of the system o f know ledge, and of its inherently contained h istory o f p h ilo ­sophy, is exhausted w ith the emergence of p h ilosop h y ’ s distinctive self-conscious insight. This self-reflective act is regressive. Reason (or the A bsolute I) reemerges through it as one’ s ow n original articulating point o f departure. Self-consciousness reveals the im possib ility o f de­

riving additional transcendental or qualitative progressive instances of cognition from The G rundsatz. W hat fo r Fichte and H ülsen remains is

fo r the rational being to achieve striving after a quan titative expansion

o f these exhaustive instances. F o r Fichte m orality demands self­determ ination of all possible reality (N o t-I); quantitative progress is the rational being’ s practical means to reach reason ’ s originally and

absolutely self-posited being. F o r H ülsen , the inexhaustible character o f this being also com pels an unending logical-historical process o f self­determ in ing approxim ation. H ü lsen ’ s position is therefore that the

pragm atic portrayal o f ph ilosophy, the system atic articulating thereof, w ill yield full qu alitative completeness. H ü lsen ’ s logically-h istorically augm ented position tallies in this theoretical aspect w ith F ich te ’ s ow n m oral position, w hich H ülsen shared. F ichte ’ s insight enabled H ülsen to com plete his ow n critical reform ulation of R einh old ’ s skeptically

objectionable logical-historical view s, provide them w ith a new in­

herent system atic coherence, and develop a h istory of ph ilosop h y to augm ent Fichte ’ s W issenschaftslehre.

In section “ F o u r” o f the Program m schrift, Fichte discusses the arti­culating criteria, w hich the W issenschaftslehre, the pragm atic portrayal

o f the a p rio ri system o f all know ledge, has to fu lfill. These criteria w ere of significant im portance fo r enriching and consolidating H ü lsen ’ s h istori­

cally expanded concept o f system atic articulation. Fichte distinguishes between ( 1 ) negative and (2) positive criteria.

Ein Grundsatz ist erschöpft, wenn ein vollständiges System a u f demselben aufgebaut ist, d.i. wenn der Grundsatz nothwendig a u f alle aufgestellten Sätze führt, und alle aufgestellten Sätze nothwendig w ieder a u f ihn

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zurückführen. Wenn kein Satz im ganzen System vorkommt, welcher wahr seyn kann, wenn der Grundsatz falsch ist — oder falsch, wenn der Grundsatz wahr ist, so ist dies der negative Beweis, dass kein Satz zu vie l in das System aufgenommen worden; denn derjenige, der nicht in das System gehörte, würde wahr seyn können, wenn der Grundsatz falsch, — oder falsch, wenn auch der Grundsatz wahr wäre. Ist der Grundsatz gegeben, so müssen alle Sätze gegeben seyn; in ihm und durch ihn ist jeder einzelne gegeben. Es ist aus dem, was w ir oben über die Verkettung der einzelnen Sätze in der Wissenschaftslehre gesagt haben, klar, dass diese Wissenschaft den angezeig­ten negativen Beweis unmittelbar in sich selbst und durch sich selbst führe. Durch ihn w ird erwiesen, dass die Wissenschaft überhaupt systematisch sei, dass alle ihre Theile in einem einzigen Grundsatze zusammenhängen.48

Fich te ’ s m ethod o f deduction fulfils the negative logical p ro o f dem an­ded to ground the W issenschaftslehre system atically. Its pragm atic (self-subsum ing) condition assures ( 1 ) the rigorous necessary character,

as w ell as (2) the exclusive gradual inclusion o f each derived p ro p o ­sition. This conclusion applies to Preisschrift. F ich te ’ s m ethod is one of

H ü lsen ’ s main sources. A s to the required positive criteria, a point about w hich there is much confusion in scholarly literature Fichte writes that

— D ie Wissenschaft ist ein System, oder sie ist vollendet, wenn weiter kein Satz gefolgert werden kann: und dies giebt den positiven Beweis, dass kein Satz zu wenig in das System aufgenommen worden. D ie Frage ist nur die: wann und unter welchen Bedingungen kann ein Satz weiter gefolgert w er­den; denn es ist klar, dass das bloss relative und negative M erkmal: ich sehe nicht was weiter folgen könne, nichts beweist. Es könnte w ohl nach mir ein anderer kommen, welcher da, wo ich nichts sah, etwas sähe. Wir bedürfen eines positiven Merkmals zum Beweise, dass schlechthin und unbedingt nichts weiter gefolgert werden könne; und das konnte kein anderes seyn, als das, dass der Grundsatz selbst, von welchem w ir ausgegangen wären, zu­gleich auch das letzte Resultat sey. Dann wäre klar, dass w ir nicht weiter gehen könnten, ohne den Weg, den w ir schon einmal gemacht, noch einmal zu machen. — Es w ird sich bei einstiger Aufstellung der Wissenschaft zeigen, dass sie diesen K reislauf wirklich vollendet, und den Forscher gerade bei dem

48 F ichte, ga, i, 2, 130

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Puncte verlässt, von welchem sie mit ihm ausging; dass sie also gleichfalls den zweiten positiven Beweis in sich selbst und durch sich selbst führt.49

Fich te ’ s positive criterion is to exhaust the theoretical grounding of the

system of know ledge b y preventing unconditionally the p ossib ility of further transcendental deduction. The closing of the deductive circle is not meant to determ ine the definitive logical certainty o f the first

principle of the W issenschaftslehre.50 Its ra iso n -d ’être is rather to p ro ­vide a rigorous logical p ro o f o f the inherent system atic coherence or consistency o f the system of ph ilosophy, to establish an inherent sys­

tem atic identity between its starting and concluding point. This identity assures the dedu ctive correctness o f system . Fichte claimed that the articulation of the W issenschaftslehre closes the circle and provides

the required positive proof. The W issenschaftslehre has the ability to yield full qualitative theoretical com pleteness. B y expanding this strate­gy, H ülsen derived from Fichte system atic benefits for his ow n historically augmented concerns.

The purpose o f the theoretical division of the W issenschaftslehre is to deduce the transcendental possibility behind the A bsolute I ’ s self-

lim iting of itself through a counter-posited quantified N o t-I . The deduction o f the facu lty of im agination furnishes the ground o f the first sensually represented object. The full discursive self-determ ination of

this object demands an ascending self-subsum ing series of imaginative self-reflections. This series is a pragm atic disclosure and portrayal of

49 F ichte, ga, i, 2, 130-150 As Daniel B reazeale (1994, 51) comments, “ one should not [...] be misled by

Fichte’s remarks [...] and [...] conclude that, for all of his insistence upon the need for a self-evidently certain starting point, he actually anticipated the fami­liar Hegelian view that criticizes all claims to immediate certainty and that treats the truth of the starting point as something that can be established only as a “ result” of the system. However attractive one may find such a position to be, it is not Fichte’s.” [my bold]. The Grundsatz is a postulate, namely the proposi- tional expression of a principle that is not susceptible to logical proof. The Grundsatz represents a meta-logical principle, the exclusive establishment of which demands the actual accomplishment of a pure or immediate act of self- positing. See: F ichte, ga, 1, 2, 255

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the rem aining levels o f the a p rio ri system of all know ledge. Each one of these deductive steps represents a higher degree o f transcendental self­

determ ination o f the sam e single em pirically represented object posited b y the facu lty of im agination. In other w ords, the em erging content of these concatenated self-reflections is the transcendental and therefore

qu alitatively “ evo lvin g” structure of an actual fixed qu an tity .51 This self-subsum ing series ends w ith the emergence o f finite self-conscious­ness, a self-referential abstracting capability founded on the facu lty of reason. R eason ’ s deduction, the topic that closes the theoretical division of the G ru n dlage, m ay be the key to F ich te ’ s claim that his approach provides the positive articulating p ro o f demanded to establish the re­

quired inherent logical coherence. The pragm atic series unveils the transcendental “ evolution” o f a fixed quantity. H ence, the scope o f the resulting logical coherence w ill be on ly qualitative. The self-determ i­

nation o f reason’ s p ossib ility is the pragm atic “ event” that ends un­conditionally the deduction o f the system o f all know ledge. From its self-conscious regressive angle, the A bsolute I emerges as a n on-tran­

scendent and therefore exhaustive instance of deduction. This explains F ichte ’ s claim that reason’ s deduction constitutes that theoretical in­stance from w hich the W issenschaftslehre cannot advance any further.52

Self-consciousness proves that reason or the A bsolute I is the universal and hence exhaustive qu alitative agent behind the actual self-positing o f the aforem entioned qu a n tity . The pragm atic procedure enables the

system atic self-determ ination o f the un iversal a p rio ri conditions w h ereby the A bsolute I self-lim its itself through a counter-posited quantified N o t-I ; it enables the system atic deduction in concreto o f the

transcendental ground o f all theory. Fichte therefore concludes that

51 As Tom Rockmore (2001, 66) alternatively puts it, “ [...] Fichte does not focus on the a priori analysis of the conditions of the possibility of experience in general, but rather on the conditions of real experience. He takes experience [...] and argues [...] form conditioned to condition thereof in order to explain how experience is really possible. He never attempts to deduce conditions of abstract possibility, or possibility whatsoever. He consistently describes real conditions of actual experience.”

52 See: F ichte, ga, i, 2, 384

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D ie Wissenschaftslehre hat also absolute Totalität [i.e. , logical totality]. In ihr führt Eins zu Allem, und Alles zu Einem. Sie ist aber die einzige Wissen­schaft, welche vollendet werden kann; Vollendung ist demnach ihr auszeich­nender Charakter. A lle andere Wissenschaften sind unendlich, und können nie vollendet werden; denn sie laufen nicht w ieder in ihren Grundsatz zu­rück. D ie Wissenschaftslehre hat dies fü r alle zu beweisen und den G rund davon anzugeben .53

The consolidation o f a critical “ m oral order” com pels a regulative

striving after an exhaustive quantitative expansion of p h ilosop h y ’ s transcendental conditions. A ll these system atic aspects of F ichte ’ s W issenschaftslehre apply to H ü lsen ’ s Preisschrift. F ichte ’ s position enabled H ülsen to com plete his critical reform ulation of R ein h old ’ s

unjustified logical-historical view s, and provide them w ith a new in­herent system atic coherence.

53 F ichte, ga, i , 2, 13 1. Some passages of the Programmschrift (particularly in section “ Seven”) question the possibility of establishing this inherent logical coherence. Fichte held that there ought to be something that could not be demonstrated strictly, something that ought to be assumed to be probable only, namely the fact that systematic coherence could have been established accidentally through incorrect deduction. [See: F ichte, ga, i , 2, 146-7, 149] Nevertheless, in the 1798 reediting of the Programmschrift, Fichte acknowledged that these doubts were concerned with his own early deductions. See: F ichte, ga, i, 2, 146

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2.7 The W issenschaftslehre and its System atic C onnection w ith the H isto ry o f P h ilosoph y

Still, Fichte did not neglect entirely the h istory o f p h ilosop h y.54

Fichte ’ s exhaustive reconstruction of R ein h old ’ s system im pelled a reconstruction of its in troductory part. A lthough Fichte never

reconstructed R einh old ’ s h istory o f ph ilosop h y system atically, his w ritings on the W issenschaftslehre contain m any passages in w hich

different aspects o f R einh old ’ s insight are restated in passing. M ost of these passages can be found in the Program m schrift, the 1 794 essay in w hich Fichte outlined the program of his forthcom ing system . D ue to

their incidental character, m ost o f F ich te ’ s statements are not justified system atically.

M y m odest purpose here is to show w ays in w hich Fichte m ay have

intended to develop a h istory of ph ilosop h y on the foundations of the W issenschaftslehre. This discussion w ill uncover another reason for

F ichte ’ s 1 797 enthusiastic identification of H ü lsen ’ s Preisschrift w ith

the W issenschaftslehre. Since R einh old ’ s early Elem entarphilosophie is the historical source o f this k ey aspect of H ü lsen ’ s approach, I w ill lim it m yself to show ing the Reinholdian origins of F ich te ’ s ow n frag­m entarily developed position.

It w ould be a m istake how ever to confuse Fichte ’ s occasional re­m arks w hich connect the W issenschaftslehre w ith the h istory o f p h ilo ­

sophy w ith his description of his system as a pragm atic h istory o f the human spirit. Pragm atische G eschichte des m enschlichen Geistes desi­gnates reason’ s timeless course of production o f the different levels of

the a p rio ri system of all know ledge, w hich are exclusively uncovered and portrayed genetically b y personal self-conscious reflection. H istory o f philosophy on the other hand refers to the gradual system atic process

54 Both German and Anglo-Saxon studies of Fichte do not pay sufficient attention to the fragmentary allusions in the Wissenschaftslehre to the history of philoso­phy. Scholars overlook this issue because they fail to notice the systematic connection of Reinhold’s early Elmentarphilosophie with the history of philo­sophy.

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of developm ent w h ereby the necessary philosophizing activity o f m any different finite rational beings results in the historical d iscovery of the

self-conscious pragm atic capability to articulate the a p rio ri system of all know ledge.

Fichte fo llow in g Reinhold focuses on the h istory of ph ilosop h y as a

necessary accum ulative process. A s in R ein h old ’ s early E lem en tarph ilo ­sophie, a transcendental agent carries out this process: the reflecting or philosophizing facu lty of judgm ent (reflectierende or philosophirende

U rtheilskraft). Fichte shares R einh old ’ s focus on p h ilosop h y ’ s h istori­city as the ascendant product of a logical-historical activity o f reason. F ichte ’ s scattered rem arks are causal restatements of som e o f R ein ­hold ’ s argum ents. The scope of the task of the exhaustive articulation

of the W issenschaftslehre is too great fo r a single human lifetim e.55 E very ascending step taken to reach ph ilosop h y has to be first clim bed

before a higher step is reached.56 A ll past efforts made throughout the h istory o f p h ilosophy appear as necessary p a rtia l attempts o f the p h ilo ­sophizing facu lty o f judgm ent at an articulation of a Wissenschafts-

leh re .57 The articulation of ph ilosop h y depends on all previous logical- historical steps. Philosophers emerge as necessary historical mom ents of this general process. T hrough their philosophizing activity, the

philosophizing facu lty o f judgm ent gradually uncovers the a p rio ri system of all know ledge.58

A ccord in g to Fichte, the articulation o f the W issenschaftslehre de­

mands that concrete rational beings spontaneously turn their rational activity in a specific direction: self-conscious reflection. F ich te ’ s argu­ment that person al articulation is an indispensable condition to establish

55 See: F ichte, ga, i, 2, 11856 See: F ichte, ga, i, 2, 1 1 157 Note the following Statement from Ueber den Unterschied: “Alle, die jemals

Erfinder in der Philosophie wurden, alle welche neue Systeme aufgestellt haben, die wenn sie sich auch nicht behaupteten, doch immer einer von den nothwen- digen Versuchen des menschl. Geistes zur Hervorbringung einer Wißenschafts- lehre waren F ichte, ga, ii, 3, 337

58 See: F ichte, ga, i, 2, 110-1

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the p ossib ility of the Science of K now ledge,59 can be connected to a gen era l logical-historical process of developm ent, the carrying out of

w hich might be the result o f the ascending degree of self-conscious ac­tiv ity (philosophizing) o f different historically situated philosophers.60 This fusion of the gen era l and the person al spheres o f logical-historical

developm ent is also a distinctive feature o f R ein h old ’ s standpoint. In the third book of the G ru n dlage, Fichte how ever im plies the practical grounding of this possib ility. The self-reflecting nature of the rational

being is a holistically individuated striving nature. Fichte im plies in this w a y the possib ility fo r a general-personal logical-historical activity b y the philosophizing facu lty of judgm ent.61

Fichte also shares R ein h old ’ s idea that all philosophers shared the same logical-historical goal: the attainment of critical know ledge. A ccord in g to him, they all tried to use reflection to separate the human

spirit’ s necessary m ode of acting from its contingent conditions. B y attempting to achieve this, the philosophizing faculty of judgm ent p ro ­gressed historically and approached its inherent goal: the Wissenschafts-

leh re .62 Reinhold and Fichte do not on ly agree as to the necessary

59 See: F ichte, ga, i, 2, 11960 The following statement from Ueber die Bestimmung des Gelehrten provides

additional evidence of this point. In his discussion of rational coordination, Fichte (ga, i, 3, 49) argues: “ Wenn wir die entwickelte Idee auch nur ohne alle Beziehung auf uns selbst betrachten, so erblicken wir doch wenigstens ausser uns eine Verbindung, in der keiner für sich selbst arbeiten kann, ohne für alle anderen zu arbeiten, oder für den anderen arbeiten, ohne zugleich für sich selbst zu arbeiten — indem der glückliche Fortgang Eines Mitgliedes glücklicher Fortgang für Alle, und der Verlust des Einen Verlust für alle ist [...].”

61 Jürgen Stolzenberg discusses the personal possibility of such a practically grounded historical capability. He however does not enlighten it as the philo­sophizing faculty of judgment’s ground of logical-historical striving. Nor does he connect this point to any of the Reinholdian influences that I attribute to Fichte. See: Stolzenberg 2002, 93-106

62 See: F ichte, ga, i, 2, 143. In the preface to the first edition of the Programm­schrift, Fichte describes Kant as someone who drove philosophizing judgment from the standpoint at which he found it toward its final goal. See: F ichte, ga, 11, 2, 110

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teleological character o f all logical-historical philosophizing activity. T h ey additionally concur on the em pirically reachable character o f rea­

son ’ s goal.Fichte argues that it w as reserved for critical p h ilosophy to take the

final developing step of the philosophical h istory of reason and un ­cover the true concept o f p h ilosop h y.63 The fo llow in g seems to be an adaptation of R ein h old ’ s claim that p h ilosop h y ’ s necessary emergence

enables a universal reconciliation o f all possible system atic positions.

Fichte argues that the conclusive step taken b y the philosophizing fa ­cu lty of judgm ent enables a universal reconciliation o f the conflicting claims of the on ly tw o possible system s o f thought, nam ely dogm atism and criticism .64

The main purpose of F ich te ’ s approach is to ground R ein h old ’ s un ­grounded concept of representation. In his Vergleichung des vom

H errn Prof. Sch m id aufgestellten Systems m it der W issenschaftslehre,65 Fichte states this unam bigously

Meines Erachtens — dies ist eine historische Behauptung, und ich appellire über diesen Punct an die besseren unter den jetzt lebenden philosophischen Schriftstellern, und an die gesammte Geschichte der Philosophie — meines Erachtens ist die Frage, welche die Philosophie zu beantworten hat, folgende: wie hangen unsere Vorstellungen mit ihren Objecten zusammen; inwiefern kann man sagen, dass denselben etwas, unabhängig von ihnen, und überhaupt von uns, ausser uns entspreche? [ _ ] Alle Philosophie, von Anbeginn an bis jetzt, hat die Beantwortung dieser Frage zu ihrem letzten Zwecke gehabt.66

Fichte shared R einh old ’ s v iew that w hat is crucial is to give an ex­haustive grounding answ er to the question about the transcendental p ossib ility representation. A n asking m echanism also characterizes

philosophizing judgm ent’ s logical-historical m odus operandi.

63 See: F ichte, ga, 1, 2, 28264 See: F ichte, ga, 1, 2, 10965 Fichte’s essay dates from 1796, a year after Hülsen wrote Preisschrift. I however

include it here for it provides additional evidence of Fichte’s incidental interest in a rational history of philosophy prior to his sympathetic rating of Hülsen’s Preisschrift in 1 797.

66 See: F ichte, ga, 1, 3, 247

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Es versteht sich, dass die philosophirende Urtheilskraft in der Beantwortung dieser Frage, oder in den Versuchen sie zu beantworten, systematisch zu Werke geht.67

A ccord in g to Fichte, the philosophizing faculty o f judgm ent progresses

historically b y giving system atic answers to the question about the transcendental p ossib ility of representation. A ll system atic attempts therefore are necessary developing stages o f an exclusive historically secured ph ilosop h y the p ossib ility of w hich m ay finally emerge as an exhaustive accum ulative answ er to this question. A ll such attempts

constitute a single h istorically extended system atic attempt of reason at

an articulation of ph ilosophy. The correlative emergence of these de­veloping stages is an ascending series o f rectifying or actualizing p er­

spectives w h ereb y the philosophizing facu lty of judgm ent uncovers the supra-historical system of all know ledge. The logical-historical process of developm ent that culminates in the critical concept o f p h ilosophy, in

the personal self-conscious ab ility to p ortray the pragm atic h istory of

the human spirit, should be understood as the h istory of reason

clim bing system atically to a full awareness of itself as an a p rio ri system

of know ledge.68 A ll these argum ents, as one could once again confirm , m ay have been inspired b y R ein h old ’ s approach to the h istory of philosophy.

F o r Fichte the W issenschaftslehre enables an increasing d isplay of

reason’ s practical potential (expanding self-determ ination). Fichte should be com m itted to R ein h old ’ s claim that the logical-historical emergence o f ph ilosop h y establishes the p ossib ility of a m oral im ­provem ent of the human species.

67 See: F ichte, ga, i , 3, 247. The following passage from Ueber den Begriff provides a negative evidence of the teleologically progressing character of the philosophizing faculty of judgment: “Diese Handlungsart überhaupt [i.e., the human spirit’s necessary way of acting], soll nach dem obigen durch eine reflectirende Abstraction von allem, was nicht sie ist, abgesondert werden. Diese Abstraction geschieht durch Freiheit, und die philosophirende Urtheilskraft wird in ihr gar nicht durch blinden Zwang geleitet.” F ichte, ga, i , 2, 143

68 See: Bubner 2003, 110

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Fichte should also be com m itted to the fo llow in g conclusion: as in R ein h old ’ s early Elem entarphilosophie, neither the recognition o f rea­

son ’ s system atic process o f teleological production, nor the articulation of the in troductory h istory of ph ilosop h y is possible prior to the log i­

cal-historical attainment o f critical know ledge. Earlier it is im possible to identify either the striving direction o f the philosophizing facu lty of

judgm ent, or the p ossib ility o f articulation. This fo llow s from Fichte ’ s discussion o f pure philosophical and philosophical-h istorical (logical- historical) know ledge in U eber die B estim m ung des G elehrten.

D ie Kenntniß der ersten A rt gründet sich a u f reine Vernunftsätze, und ist philosophisch; die von der zweiten zum Theil a u f Erfahrung, und ist insofern philosophisch-historisch; (nicht bloß historisch; denn ich muß ja die Zwecke, die sich nur philosophisch erkennen lassen, a u f die in der Erfahrung gegebe­nen Gegenstände beziehen, um die leztern als M ittel zur Erreichung der ersten beurtheilen zu können).69

A sim ilar v iew fo llow s from Fichte’ s brief discussion in P rogram m ­schrift o f the ongoing, though partially self-aw are attempts made

throughout the h istory o f ph ilosop h y to reach the standpoint o f the W issenschaftslehre. P rior to the W issenschaftslehre’s insight, the p h ilo­sophizing facu lty o f judgm ent can on ly strive unconsciously after its

logical-historical goal. It cannot recognize the inherent correlative character o f its ow n logical-historical course o f system atic pro- duction.70

D er menschliche Geist macht mancherlei Versuche; er kommt durch blindes Herumtappen zur Dämmerung, und geht erst aus dieser zum hellen Tage

69 F ichte, ga, 1, 3, 53. The following passage from the late 1796 Philosophische Wissenschaft des Rechts von Professor Fichte [Nachschrift Lossius. Fragment] provides further evidence of this point. “Die Geschichte dieser Wissenschaft [i.e., the science of law] kann man, wie die einer jeden andern, nicht eher verstehen, bis man die Wissenschaft selbst hat: denn Geschichte eines Dinges, das nicht ist, ist nichts. So war die bis herige Geschichte der Philosophie immer nur Geschichte der Philosophen.” F ichte, ga, iv, 3, 59

70 As in Reinhold’s system, Fichte ought to be committed to the view that during the epoch of pre-critical thought, all products of the philosophizing faculty of judgment appear to the observer as atomic facts.

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über. E r w ird Anfangs durch dunkle Gefühle (deren Ursprung und Wirklich­keit die Wissenschaflslehre darzulegen hat) geleitet; und w ir hätten noch heute keinen deutlichen Begriff, und wären noch immer der Erdkloss, der sich dem Boden entwand, wenn w ir nicht angefangen hätten, dunkel zu fü h ­len, was w ir erst später deutlich erkannten. — Dies bestätiget denn auch die Geschichte der Philosophie; und w ir haben jetzt den eigentlichen Grund angegeben, warum dasjenige, was doch in jedem menschlichen Geiste offen da liegt, und was jeder mit H änden greifen kann, wenn es ihm deutlich dar­gelegt wird, erst nach mannigfaltigem Herum irren zum Bewusstseyn einiger wenigen gelangte.71

A ccord in g to Fichte, the W issenschaftslehre provides an explanation of w h y so m uch w andering w as necessary to enable the final grasping of the ever-existing system of know ledge. Still, apart from im plying the

system atic p ossib ility of this logical-historical striving task fragm en­tarily, Fichte did not develop this topic during the years that concern us here. O ne of the issues that F ich te ’ s “ im proved” E lem en ta r­

philosophie fails to develop is the system atic grounding of its historical standpoint.72

T hough Fichte did not develop fu lly R ein h old ’ s concept o f a h istory of

p h ilosophy, his system atic introduction to the W issenschaftslehre agrees w ith R einh old ’ s position in a num ber o f central points. ( 1 ) The h istory of ph ilosop h y is a logical-historical ascending process. (2) H istorical

71 See: F ichte, ga, i, 2, 14372 Peter Baumanns (1974, 119) is right in objecting to Fichte that “Wenn die

Wissenschaftslehre “Naturlage” und das Prinzip der Wissenschaftslehre durch Evidenz ausgezeichnet soll, warum bedurfte es dann eines so langen Prozesses der Wegräumung von Evidenzhindernissen? Welcher art waren die Evidenz­hindernisse, daß sie einen so langen und mühseligen Prozeß ihrer Hinweg­räumung bedingten? A u f dieser Frage aber gibt die „ Programmschrift“ keine antwort. Sie will zwar „den eigentlichen Grund angegeben“ haben, warum alle bisherigen Philosophen die philosphierende Urteilskraft immer nur ein Stück vorrücken konnten; in Wahrheit aber wird bloß behauptet, daß es so sein mußte. Das, was zu erklären wäre: das herumtappen zur Dämmerung mittels dunkler Gefühle (eines „Wahrheitssinnes“) und das schließliche Übergehen zum „hellen Tage“, wird nicht erklärt, sondern in tautologischer Weise selbst als Erklärungs­grund ausgegeben.”

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progress is accomplished id eo log ica lly through the self-reflecting activi­ty of a transcendental agent (philosophizing reason or the philosophiz­

ing faculty of judgment). (3) The articulation of philosophy depends on all previous logical-historical steps taken b y this agent. (4) Critical knowledge emerges as the ultimate rational outcome of p h ilosop hy ’ s history. ( 5) It is the empirical result of reason’ s reaching of a non­regulative inherent goal. (6) Teleological progression is carried out

through a systematic and ongoing answer attempt of the question about

the transcendental possibility of representation. (7) A ll the systematic attempts made throughout the history of ph ilosophy appear as necessary developing stages of a single systematic attempt of reason at a definitive articulation of philosophy. (8) The correlative systematic emergence of all developing stages appears as an ascending sequence of rectifying or

actualizing perspectives that reason attains of the a p rio ri system of all

knowledge. (9) The necessary emergence of philosophy enables a uni­versal reconciliation of all philosophical positions. (10) It furthermore makes possible a moral improvement of the human species. ( 1 1 ) Neither

the necessary process of logical-historical development, nor the arti­culation of the introductory history of ph ilosophy is possible prior to the attainment of critical knowledge. (12) Philosophers emerge as necessary historical moments of the rational history of philosophy. T hrough their ascending general-personal efforts, reason uncovers the

system of all knowledge.

These coincidences provide sufficient evidence that the re-articulation of most of Reinhold ’ s introductory approach to the history of ph ilo­sophy was an idea that Fichte originally had in mind but did not

develop.A s to the intriguing question of w h y Fichte did not re-articulate this

aspect of Reinhold ’ s approach, tw o different answers are plausible.

(1) D uring the period of 179 4-1799 , Fichte ’ s interests were mainly focused on the development of the foundational epistemic principles of the W issenschaftslehre, as well as on the formulation of its Rechts- and

Sittenlehre parts. (2) Fichte lost interest in this historical dimension. Friedrich Schlegel’ s correspondence provides evidence that already in A ugust 1796, a few months after writing V ergleichung des vo m H errn

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Prof. Sch m id ,7 3 Fichte told him that he w as not interested in h istory .74 N otw ithstanding Schlegel’ s report, another possible reason fo r F ichte ’ s

desistence w as that he relegated this task to H ülsen.

2.8 The Practical V ocation o f the Scholar

W hile as theorist, H ülsen w as as much a student of R einhold as a

disciple of Fichte, as a m oral philosopher H ü lsen ’ s dependence on

Fichte is unam biguous. There is no evidence that H ülsen w as affected b y either R ein h old ’ s w ritings on the first principle of m orals in B e i­

träge vo l. I I 75 or b y the practical p h ilosophy at the close of the Versuchsschrift. F ich te ’ s W issenschaftslehre explains and insures an in­finite m oral im provem ent of the human species. The spontaneous or

unconditioned activity of the self-positing I, enables an ongoing self­determ ination of the human w ill. A ccord in g to Fichte in U eber die

Bestim m ung des G elehrten , a series o f public and non-system atic lec­

tures delivered in Jen a in 1794, the scholar, as the true expert on philosophy, the “ heir” o f the Reinholdian Selbstdenker, should be the most outstanding ethical person of his time. H e is responsible fo r the advancem ent and supervision o f the ethical im provem ent of the human species. H ülsen integrated F ich te ’ s scholar w ith R ein h old ’ s Selbst­d en k er in his ow n ethical m odel o f Selbstden ker; the critical p h ilo ­sopher responsible fo r turning hum anity ’ s attention to the logical-

historical path o f philosophizing reason leading to a m oral perfection

via the historically enlarged W issenschaftslehre. U eber die Bestim m ung

discusses tw o key features that H ülsen w ill embrace. (1) It introduces the idealistic concept of a purposive coordinated com m unity, a stance that opened the road fo r H ü lsen ’ s further understanding of a joint

73 Fichte’s essay appeared in print in the 12th issue of the Philosophisches Journal. It was officially announced on May 25, 1796 in the Allgemeine Literatur Z ei­tung. See: F ichte, ga, 1, 3, 231

74 See Schlegel’s letters to Körner from September 21 and 30, 1796 in: Schlegel (KA), XXIII, 333

75 See: Über das vollständige Fundament der Moral in: R einhold 2003, II, 131-81

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“ rational fate” of the human species. (2) It reformulates the Kantian concepts of the “ categorical imperative” and “ the highest good” , and links their expanding possibilities, the critical consolidation of a uni­versal “ moral order” , w ith personal regulative striving.

A ccording to Fichte, the scholar is a human being. The disclosure of

his practical vocation demands a previous inquiry into the vocation of the rational being as such, a strategy that H ülsen w ill apply. In the theoretical W issenschaftslehre, the know ing subject cannot achieve ex­

haustive self-determination. A s a finite rational being, he cannot attain absolute self-conscious knowledge. The subject attains consciousness of itself only as an empirically determined self-reflecting agent.76 Empirical

self-consciousness presupposes a quantitatively undetermined, and hence conditioning N o t-I . This N o t- I emerges infinitely as an extra- reflective aspect of self-determining reflection. It appears to the k n o w ­

ing subject as an insurmountable quantitative dependence, the alleged origin of which is “ external” and “ foreign” . M oral improvement impels a regulative striving for the overcoming of this empirically restricted

freedom. A s H ülsen learns from Fichte, the subject should subordinate under or harmonize this quantitative “ foreign” indeterminacy of the N o t- I with the holistic (thetic) self-positing activity of the pure or A bsolute I .77 The result of this should be absolute self-identity or self­agreement, for the absolutely self-posited I is indivisible and non- contradictable.

Das Resultat aus allem Gesagten ist folgendes: D ie vollkommene Uebereinstimmung des Menschen mit sich selbst, und — damit er mit sich selbst übereinstimmen könne — die Uebereinstimmung aller Dinge ausser ihm mit seinen nothwendigen praktischen Begriffen von ihnen, — den B e­griffen, welche bestimmen, wie sie seyn sollen, — ist das letzte höchste Z iel des Menschen.7 8

The subject’ s higher ethical goal is for Fichte as later for H ülsen in Preisschrift, absolute being or rationality, namely the quantitative self-

76 See: F ichte, ga, 1, 3, 2877 See: Fichte, ga, 1, 3, 30-178 Fichte, ga, 1, 3, 31

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conscious subsum ing of all possible experience. Fichte form ulates this in a practical com m and: “ D e r M ensch soll seyn, was er ist, schlechthin

darum , w e il er ist” .79 Exhaustive self-determ ination com pels the subject to strive personally and accom plish em pirically the full practical potentiality o f reason. The subject ought to grasp him self as the uncon­

ditional agent behind his ow n in fin itely expanding em pirical existence. O ngoing practical striving is his w a y to bring about a critically intensifying “ m oral order” and im prove him self existentially: the co­incidence between Fichte and H ülsen on this point is irrefutable.

F ichte ’ s concept of self-determ ination results in an innovative re for­m ulation of K an t’ s “ categorical im perative” , a reform ulation that H ülsen

w ill incorporate. A ccord in g to Fichte, a m anifold of quan titative em ­pirical determ inations contradict the original proto -qu an tifiab le identity of the absolute I. That is the reason w h y reason and sensibility, the

pu re and the em pirical spheres of the human spirit, are at first not in harm ony. N onetheless, this harm ony should be brought about. M oral perfection, the “ categorical im perative” , demands their ultimate self-

subsum ing identity. W hile the Kantian concept of the “ highest good ” , ethical virtue com bined w ith happiness, is tw ofo ld , for Fichte the “ highest good ” is a unitary concept. In F ich te ’ s W issenschaftslehre, the “ highest go o d ” is rational harm ony o f the rational being w ith him self, a self-determ ining identification of all N o t-I as his ow n self-posited

product, thus no happiness w ithout m oral acting. O n ly that w hich is

good makes us happy and not con versely.80 The “ highest good ” is, as Fichte w ill persuade H ülsen, an unavoidable b y-produ ct o f the critical­ly em erging “ m oral order” .

N onetheless, fo r Fichte his finite character prevents the subject from reaching absolute identity or harm ony. O u r practical vocation (Be­

stim m ung) is not fo r Fichte or H ülsen to reach this goal. Q ua finite

rational being, the subject’ s vocation lies in an unending approxim ation to absolute self-harm ony.

79 F ichte, ga, i, 3, 2980 See: F ichte, ga: i, 3, 31-2

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N ennt man nun jene völlige Uebereinstimmung mit sich selbst Vollkommen­heit, in der höchsten Bedeutung des Wortes, wie man sie allerdings nennen kann: so ist Vollkommenheit das höchste unerreichbare Z iel des Menschen; Vervollkommnung ins unendliche aber ist seine Bestimmung. E r ist da, um selbst immer sittlich besser zu werden, und alles rund um sich herum sinnlich, und wenn er in der Gesellschaft betrachtet wird, auch sittlich besser, und dadurch sich selbst immer glückseliger zu machen.81

A ccord in g to Fichte, the rational being is not an isolated being. H e is

destined to live in society, to interact w ith other autonom ous beings. A fter discussing the ontological existence of other free acting agents outside oneself, Fichte em ploys K an t’ s term inology and defines society as a purposeful coordinated com m unity o f self-determ ined rational

beings. F ichte ’ s insight w ill be H ü lsen ’ s w a y to expand R ein h old ’ s concept of self-determ ined consensus. Such a coordinated society is characterized b y the mutual respect o f the self-determ ined nature o f its interacting m em bers. T o restrict som eone’ s freedom is tantam ount as to master or subordinate him b y not taking into account his rational

nature. Such acting is im m oral, as it does not consider one’ s ow n

fellow m en as practical ends. So acting w ould interfere w ith one’ s ow n ability and b y extension, w ith the ability of one’ s fellow m en to achieve self-determ ined harm ony. F o r Fichte, coordination demands the

cultivation of the practical skills of autonom ous giving and receiving. A s H ülsen w ill learn from him, reason is in com plete agreem ent w ith

itself regarding hum anity ’ s ultimate goal: universal m oral perfection.82

D ie Vollkommenheit ist nur a u f eine A rt bestimmt: — sie ist sich selbst völlig gleich; könnten alle Menschen vollkommen werden, könnten sie ihr höchstes und letztes Z iel erreichen, so wären sie alle einander völlig gleich; sie wären nur Eins; ein einziges Subject.83

Fichte argued that in a coordinated society the activity of each rational being is characterized b y an ongoing striving for exhaustive im ­

provem ent of his ow n m oral quality as w ell as of that o f his fellow m en.

81 F ichte, ga, i, 3, 3282 See: F ichte, ga, i, 3, 36-8, 40-183 F ichte, ga, i, 3, 40

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Each rational being accom plishes this b y attem pting to raise him self and his fellow m en to his ow n m oral ideal of man. The ultim ate m oral

goal of society is a com plete unanim ous un ity of all its m em bers. The achievem ent o f this goal presupposes the achievem ent of the human vocation as such. N onetheless, this social goal remains unachievable;

the com plete un ity o f all m em bers o f society is the final ideal goal o f all rational coordinated beings but not their achievable vocation. M oral perfection therefore com pels an infinite striving approxim ation to this

social goal.84 Fichte w rites:

Dieses Annähern zur völligen Einigkeit und Einmüthigkeit mit allen In d i­viduen können w ir Vereinigung nennen. Also Vereinigung, die der Innigkeit nach stets fester, dem Umfange nach stets ausgebreiteter werde, ist die wahre Bestimmung des Menschen in der Gesellschaft: diese Vereinigung aber ist, da nur über ihre letzte Bestimmung die Menschen einig sind und einig werden können — nur durch Vervollkommnung möglich. Wir können demnach eben so gut sagen: gemeinschaftliche Vervollkommnung, Vervollkommnung seiner selbst durch die fre i benutzte Einwirkung anderer a u f uns: und Vervoll­kommnung anderer durch Rückwirkung a u f sie, als a u f freie Wesen, ist unsere Bestimmung in der Gesellschaft.85

H ülsen learned from Fichte that all coordinated beings resort to the

same rational means to strive after the same single m oral perfection. That is the reason their personal strivings interrelate.86 The ability to affect and let others affect oneself demands the cultivation of tw o

practical skills. ( 1 ) The trait of giving, nam ely the m oral ability to affect or cultivate the personality of other free rational beings precisely in those aspects of one’ s ow n personality in w hich one is strong and they

are w eak. (2) The trait o f receiving, nam ely the m oral ability to let others affect or cultivate one’ s ow n personality in those precise aspects in w hich one is w eak and they are strong.87 H ülsen w ill apply this idea

84 See: F ichte, ga, 1, 3, 40-185 Fichte, ga, 1, 3, 4086 As Wilhelm Weischedel (1973, 1 7) clarifies, “ Wenn nun die Erfahrung anderer

notwendig zum Menschsein gehört, dann gehört auch ihre unabtrennbare Voraussetzung, die Gemeinschaft mit den anderen, notwendig dazu.”

87 See: F ichte, ga, 1, 3, 43-5

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to the h istory o f ph ilosophy, and ju stify thereby the personal self­determ ined ab ility to contribute to and to incorporate som eone else’ s

system atic degree of practical progress. H ülsen w ill share Fichte ’ s conclusion that

Wenn w ir die entwickelte Idee auch nur ohne alle Beziehung a u f uns selbst betrachten, so erblicken w ir doch wenigstens ausser uns eine Verbindung, in der keiner fü r sich selbst arbeiten kann, ohne fü r alle andere zu arbeiten, oder fü r den anderen arbeiten, ohne zugleich fü r sich selbst zu arbeiten — indem der glückliche Fortgang Eines Mitgliedes glücklicher Fortgang fü r Alle, und der Verlust des Einen Verlust fü r A lle ist: ein Anblick, der schon durch die Harmonie, die w ir in dem allermannigfaltigsten erblicken, uns innig wohlthut und unseren Geist mächtig emporhebt.88

A ccord in g to Fichte, a certain kind o f know ledge is required to enable

the m oral progress o f the human species. Philosophical know ledge of m oral perfection alone is insufficient fo r m aking m oral progress

possible. M oral progress demands know ledge o f the particular cultural

level of historical developm ent o f one’ s ow n society. The philosopher must also be acquainted w ith the subsequent purposive level to be reached as w ell as w ith the means required fo r achieving this. This demands that the philosopher kn ow the means w h ereby the m oral aptitudes o f the rational being develop. The m oral im provem ent of

the human species requires a joint application o f (I ) philosophical,

(2) historical, and (3) philosophical-h istorical (logical-historical) know l- edge.89 Taken together, these three types of know ledge constitute w hat Fichte calls learning (G eleh rsam keit). The scholar is the person that

dedicates his life to the attainment o f this know ledge. Learning makes the scholar the ethically best man o f his time. O n ly the scholar is acquainted w ith the means required to im prove the m oral p erfo r­mances of man. Fichte therefore argues that the scholar should be the educator of hum anity. H is know ledge should be applied fo r the benefit o f society. The scholar is required to turn the attention o f his fe llo w ­

men upon their true needs, and make them acquainted w ith the means

88 F ichte, ga, i, 3, 4989 See: F ichte, ga, i, 3, 52-4, and F ichte, ga, 11, 3, 357

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demanded for their satisfaction. This pedagogic task com pels the scholar to act according to the m oral law, to em ploy ethical means to

influence society.90 Thus, the vocation of the scholar is to prom ote and to supervise unceasingly the m oral progress of the human species.91 The pedagogical task of the Fichtean scholar does not really d iffer from

that of the Reinholdian Selbstden ker. W hat distinguishes these tw o figures is the level o f post-critical impact that the labour o f the Fichtean scholar has on com m unal life. This higher degree of com m u­

nal com m itm ent, a k ey m oral concern o f the H ülsenian Selbstdenker, is another source of Preisschrift.

Self-determ ination com pels the scholar not to yield his w ill to any

academic authority. Fichte encourages the scholar to rigorou sly auto­nom ous and independent scholarship. It could be claimed that F ichte ’ s position w ill inspire H ü lsen ’ s ideas about a true academ y o f sciences.

Fichte discusses this in the 1ste Vorlesung. Im W in ter-H albjah r. [von der Bestim m ung der G eleh rten .]92 not included am ong the five published lectures o f U eber die Bestim m ung.

[...] alle Geisteskultur ist nichts, u. hilft nichts, ohne Characterbildung; u. ich erinnere abermals, was ich schon mehrmals erinnert habe, daß man irrt, wenn man in einer Akadem ie bloß eine Schule der Wissenschaften zu er- bliken glaubt. Sie soll zugleich seyn eine Schule des Handelns. Bilden Sie dahero zuförderst Ihren Character zum festen entschloßen Halten an Wahrheit, u. an Recht. Thun Sie nichts gegen Ihre Ueberzeugung; suchen Sie aber beständig Ihren Geist der beßeren Ueberzeugung offen zu erhalten. Unterlaßen Sie alles, wodurch Sie a u f irgend eine A rt abhängig, wodurch Sie zum Instrumente eines frem den Willens werden; oder wodurch Sie gehindert

90 As Liang Zhixue (1991, 229) reminds us: “ Wenn der Gelehrte im moralischen Leben zurückbleibt oder sogar durch eine entscheidende Handlung seinen ei­genen Lehren widerspricht, so werden die anderen seinen Lehren nicht folgen. Fichte lieh sich an dieser Stelle die Worte, die der Stifter der christlichen Religion an seine Schüler richtete, um die Gelehrten zu ermahnen: „Ih r seyd das Salz der Erde; wenn das Salz seine Kraft verliert, womit soll man salzen?“ wenn die Auswahl unter den Menschen verdorben ist, wo soll man noch sittliche Güte suchen?”

91 See: F ichte, ga, i, 3, 54-892 For this lesson see: F ichte, ga, ii, 3, 357-67

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werden, fre i jedem unter die Augen zu treten. Erhalten sie sich diese Freiheit, die Ihnen die Gesetze geben .93

The prim ordial significance that Fichte attributes to the personal labour of the scholar confirm s that the W issenschaftslehre p lays an existential role in the m oral im provem ent o f the human species. A s

K laus V iew eg points out,

[...] die Bestimmung des Gelehrten als des höchsten wahren Menschen ist somit die letzte Aufgabe fü r philosophisches Forschen. B ei Fichte ist ebendiese Wissenschaft a u f die Humanität verpflichtet, er hält ausdrücklich alle Philosophie und Wissenschaft fü r nichtig, die nicht a u f das Z iel der Förderung der Kultur und der Erhöhung der Humanität ausgeht.94

A joint application o f philosophical, historical, and logical-historical know ledge is required to enable the m oral progress of hum anity. N onetheless, Fichte suggests that in this triad logical-historical k n o w l­edge p lays a preponderant role. In U eber die Bestim m ung, m oral

progress is described as depending directly upon the progress of philo- sop h y.95 A sim ilar statement is found in the 1 ste Vorlesung, in w hich

Fichte claims that

Nichts in der ganzen Geschichte seiner Z eit liegt dem Gelehrten näher, als der Zustand der Wissenschaften selbst; der Hoffnungen, oder Befürchtungen, die er vernünftiger weise über den Fortgang oder Rückgang derselben zu faßen hat.96

Peter Baum anns’ studies reveal that fo r Fichte true ph ilosop h y is

ethical anthropology, a foundation of personal critical know ledge according to the idea of the practical vocation o f man, or rather a

93 F ichte, ga, ii , 3, 366 [my bold]94 V ieweg 1995, 180. In a letter to Friedrich Heinrich Jacoby from August 30,

1795 Fichte writes: “ Wozu ist denn nun der spekulative Gesichtspunkt und mit ihm die ganze Phlosophie, wenn sie nicht fü r ’s Leben ist? [...] Wir fingen an zu philosophieren aus Uebermuth, und brachten uns dadurch um unsere Unschuld; wir erblickten unsere Nacktheit, und philosophieren seitdem aus Noth für unsere Erlösung.” F ichte, ga, 111, 2, 392-3

95 In F ichte’s (ga, 1, 3, 54) own words: “ Von dem Fortgange der Wissenschaften hängt unmmitelbar der ganze Fortgang des Menschengeschlechts ab.”

96 F ichte, ga, ii , 3, 357

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sim ultaneous foundation of m etaphysics of experience and m etaphysics of m an.97 F ich te ’ s claim about the preponderance o f logical-historical

know ledge suggests that an exhaustive form ulation of the Wissen­schaftslehre demands a system atic discussion of the relationship of the rational h istory of ph ilosop h y and the personal pre- and post-critical labour of the scholar (the self-determ ining subject). Fichte how ever does not discuss this issue. A ll he seems to im ply is, as w e saw earlier,

that the reaching of the standpoint of the W issenschaftslehre depends

on a general, ongoing, and ascending logical-historical process of deve­lopm ent the exclusive rational architects of w hich are concrete self-

reflecting philosophers. F ich te ’ s w ritings o f 1794-5 leave this question

open. H ü lsen ’ s Preisschrift characterization of all rational activity as general-personal logical-historical activity appears in the h istory of Germ an idealism as the first attempt to fuse these tw o apparent stems

of F ichte ’ s approach system atically.

2.9 The Sp iritual-N orm ative C haracter of the W issenschaftslehre

T he main difference between F ich te ’ s W issenschaftslehre and H ü lsen ’ s Preisschrift is H ü lsen ’ s inclusion o f a constitutive tem poral dim ension to F ich te ’ s a p rio ri concept of rationality. This divergence did not prevent Fichte from identifying H ü lsen ’ s position w ith his ow n stand­

point. Fichte recom m ended Preisschrift strongly as a w o rk w hich facilitated the study o f the W issenschaftslehre.

B oth Fichte and H ülsen agree that the concept o f the Wissenschafts­lehre is a “ spiritual” as opposed to “ litera l” concept, that it demands an in depen den t explanation, or rather a self-adaptable n orm ative com­

pletion. This explains Fichte and H ü lsen ’ s identification o f their not entirely concordant system atic positions and F ich te ’ s m otives for recognizing H ülsen as a partner in the com pletion of his system . Reinhold w as the first post-K antian thinker to refer to the possib ility

of reform ulating a philosophical standpoint and keep its “ sp irit” intact.

97 See: Baumanns 1974, 107

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T he reassertion of critical p h ilosophy appears in R ein h old ’ s early E le ­m entarphilosophie as an attempt to step back from the “ printed letter”

o f the K ritik and com plete it n o rm atively w ith a G ru n d sa tz .98 The objections of Schulze-A enesidem us and Fichte ’ s determ ination not to award v icto ry to the skeptic led him to develop R ein h old ’ s distinction between “ sp irit” and “ letter” .99 F ich te ’ s insistence that the Wissen­schaftslehre is the “ sp iritu al-n o rm ative” critical com plem ent to K an t’ s propaedeutic is w ell k n o w n .100 A nuance o f F ich te ’ s stance is the self- adaptable character of the norm ative task of “ spiritual” com pletion .101

Fichte attributes to the critical philosopher (or the scholar) a p ro m i­nent role in the achievem ent of this “ spiritualizing” task. In R ezension

des A enesidem us Fichte writes that

E r [i.e., the reviewer — Fichte] wünscht nichts lebhafter, als dass seine Be- urtheilung dazu beitragen möge, recht viele Selbstdenker zu überzeugen, dass diese Philosophie [i.e., the critical philosophy] an sich, und ihrem innern Gehalte nach, noch so fest stehe, als je, dass es aber noch vieler A rbeit be­dürfe, um die Materialien in ein w ohl verbundenes und unerschütterliches Ganze zu ordnen. Möchten sie dann durch diese Ueberzeugung selbst auf­gemuntert werden, jeder an seinem Orte, so v ie l in seinen Kräften steht, zu diesem erhabenen Zwecke beizutragen!1 02

Fichte acknow ledges that the self-thinker, an in depen den t p h iloso­phizing figure, is responsible fo r the restitution of the critical status of ph ilosophy. Fichte makes a sim ilar statement in G ru n dlage, though in this text the term “ self-th inker” is om itted. Fichte holds that the

98 See: H orstmann 1991, 47-899 See: B reazeale 1981, 548-9100 Take for instance the following passage from the Grundlage: “Die hier

aufgestellten und aufzustellenden Principien liegen offenbar den seinigen [i.e., Kant's] zum Grunde, wie jeder sich überzeugen kann, der sich mit dem Geiste seiner Philosophie (die doch wohl Geist haben dürfte) vertraut machen will. Dass er in seinen Kritiken die Wissenschaft nicht, sondern nur die Propädeutik der­selben aufstellen wolle, bat er einige Mal gesagt; und es ist schwer zu begreifen, warum seine Nachbeter nur dieses ihm nicht haben glauben wollen.” F ichte, ga, i , 2, 335

101 As far as I know, this topic was neglected in scholarly literature.102 F ichte, ga, i, 2, 67 [my bold]

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normative philosophizing activity w hereby the “ spirit” of critical ph ilo­

sophy should be completed demands independence (Selbstständigkeit), a position, which according to Fichte each philosopher can only confer

on himself.103 This independence is a not explicitly clarified extension of self-determining autonom y, the expression of which might be a nor­

m ative degree of person al appropriation or self-adapting com pletion of a given standpoint. The fo llow ing passage in the 179 7 Z w eite E in leitung, an essay that H ülsen of course could have not know n while writing

Preisschrift, is perhaps where Fichte formulates this already apparent early “ spiritualizing” conviction most clearly.

Es ist nicht die A rt der Wissenschaftslehre, noch ihres Verfassers, unter irgend einer Autorität Schutz zu suchen. Wer erst sehen muss, ob diese Lehre mit der Lehre irgend eines anderen Mannes übereinstimme, ehe er sich von ihr über­zeugen will, anstatt zu sehen, ob sie mit den Aussprüchen seiner eigenen Vernunft übereinstimme, a u f den rechnet sie überhaupt nicht, w eil ihm die absolute Selbstthätigkeit, der ganz unabhängige Glaube an sich selbst, fehlt, die durch jene Lehre vorausgesetzt werden. Aus einem ganz anderen Grunde sonach, als aus dem, seine Lehre zu empfehlen, ist der Verfasser der Wissen­schaftslehre mit der Vorerinnerung angetreten, dass dieselbe mit der Kann- tischen Lehre vollkommen übereinstimme, und keine andere sey, als die wohlverstandene Kantische.104

The standpoint of the W issenschaftslehre presupposes (1) personal in­

dependent observance of and (2) conformation to the practical demands of one's ow n reason. Fichte implies that a particu larizing and therefore distinguishing self-adapting procedure o f analysis ought to condition the “ spiritual” self-determined adoption of his standpoint.105 H ülsen will

103 See: F ichte, ga, i , 2, 326. F ichte (ga, 1, 4, 184) makes the same statement in the 1797 Erste Einleitung. There he claims that “ [...] mein System kein anderes sei als das Kantische, d.h.: Es enthält dieselbe Ansicht der Sache, ist aber in seinem Verfahren ganz unabhängig von der Kantischen Darstellung.” [my bold]

104 F ichte, ga, i, 4, 221 [my bold]105 In a letter to Niethammer from December 6, 1793, F ichte (ga, 111, 2, 21) seems

to argue the same about Kant’s Kritik. He writes: “Noch keiner hat ihn ver­standen; die es am meisten glauben, am wenigsten; keiner wird ihn verstehen, der nicht auf seinem Wege zu Kants Resultaten kommen wird, [...].” [my bold]

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deepen this point and hold that the autonomous adoption of a ph ilo­sophical standpoint conforms, inevitably, to a particular degree of logical-historical development. O riginally, for Reinhold the notion of

“ spiritual” reformulation presupposed the possibility of norm ative completion. Regarding the W issenschaftslehre, this option is assured b y

Fichte ’ s ow n claims about the incompleteness of his system. This m ay have persuaded H ülsen to introduce significant changes, and still call his modified system W issenschaftslehre.

A n immediate consequence of this is Fichte’ s recognition of the right of other philosophical authors to develop the concept of the Wissen­schaftslehre into n orm ative and hence not entirely concordant syste­

m atic positions. This is implied in the Ersten E in leitu n g , where Fichte recommends Jako b Sigismund B eck ’ s 1796 Ein zigm öglich er Ständ- pu n kt, aus w elchem die kritische Philosophie beurtheilt w erden muss as

the best philosophical preparation for “ those w ho whish to study the W issenschaftslehre from m y w ritings” .106 This m ay explain Fichte’ s 1797 identification of H ü lsen ’ s Preisschrift w ith his ow n standpoint. It

also explains his 1795 identification of Schelling’ s Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie w ith the W issenschaftslehre, 107 a statement, which seems to reconfirm the implicit existence of this “ spiritualizing” trend prior to the writing of the Ersten and Z w e ite E in leitung. It even could be held that F ichte ’ s claims that (1) his account is not complete, that (2) he wants his reader to develop his own thought, that (3) he encourages

independent thought, that (4) his system is subjected to revision, that (5) the G ru n d la g e is a plan for ho w to erect further systematic cons­truction upon its foundations, and (6) that he welcom ed suggestions from other philosophers,108 are encouragements to “ read” and develop the “ spirit” o f the W issenschaftslehre as H ülsen did: probably another reason w h y Fichte recommended Preisschrift so strongly.

106 In F ichte’s (ga, i , 4, 203) own words: “ Ich halte die angeführte Schrift [i.e., Beck’s essay] für das zweckmässigste Geschenk, das dem Zeitalter gemacht wer­den konnte, und empfehle sie denen, welche aus meinen Schriften die Wissen­schaftslehre studiren wollen, als die beste Vorbereitung.”

107 See Fichte’s letter to Reinhold from July 2, 1795 in: F ichte, ga, iii , 2, 347-8108 See: F ichte, ga, i, 2, 252-4

100