2006 idga - simulation in airline manpads protection

The Roles of Dynamic Simulation

in Airliner MANPADS Protection

IDGA MANPADS Seminar

March 2006

Dr. T.W. Tucker

Tactical Technologies Inc.

356 Woodroffe Ave.

Ottawa, Ontario, K2A 3V6

Tel: (613) 828-0775, e-mail: [email protected] URL: www.tti.on.ca

3/9/2009 1Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright

2009, All Rights Reserved

Presentation Outline

• Self Protection Evaluation – Static Analysis of Threat Parameters

– Missile Miss Distance as a Primary MOE

– Impact of Non-Linear Interactions (Chaotic Behavior) on Missile Miss Distance

• Dynamic Simulation of Tactical Engagements– Several Classes (Generations) of Missiles

– Vs Jammer and Flare Airliner Protection Options

• The Roles of Dynamic Software Simulation



Evaluation Methodology• Was stimulated by the need to understand the

effectiveness of “off the shelf” self protection (ECM) systems - in relation to specific threat weapons and engagement geometries

• Was stimulated by the high cost of field trials and the availability of airliners

• Was stimulated by the need for a systematic & repeatable analytical approach resulting in a documented self protection effectiveness audit trail



Seeker

Detector, ECCMs,

Tracker

Airframe

Mass, Length,Wing Config.Autopilot

PN Coeff.

ECM Effectiveness Evaluation

Flare

Signature vs Time

Pos’n vs Time

Aircraft

Signature vs Aspect

Pos’n vs Time

At End Game:

What is the Miss Distance?



Focus On Missile Miss Distance

• Survivability of the airliner is assured if the miss

distance is sufficiently large that the missile does

not impact the target or trigger the fuse - the

warhead does not detonate

• Avoids the complex characterization of target

hardness and missile warhead fragmentation

• The probability of survival is based on a simple

characterization of target hardness and missile

warhead as a relative measure only - not an

absolute measure



Miss Distance is determined by

integrating incremental flight path

errors over the entire missile’s flight

The Determination Of Miss Distance

Countermeasure May

Generate Angle Track Error

In Seeker

Angle Track Error May

Generate Steering Error

In Autopilot

Steering Error May

Generate Flight Path

Error

In Missile Flight



Evaluation Methodology

• Step 1- Static Analysis:– Characterize the threat weapon system using a

standardized parameter set - EWIRDB

• Step 2 - Static Analysis:– Determine optimum electronic countermeasure

parameters based on weapon system parameters

• Step 3 - Dynamic Engagement

Simulation:– Determine over-all effectiveness of the self protection

in tactical engagements - Missile miss distance or

probability of survival



Engagement Characterization

• Target Platform - Signature and Maneuver

• Threat Weapon - Guidance and Dynamics

• Countermeasures - Techniques and Tactics

• Propagation - Attenuation vs Wavelength

• Background Clutter

• Engagement Geometry

• Characterizing all systems involves more than 250 parameters



Threat Weapon System Analysis

• For self protection (ECM) effectiveness evaluation, the weapon system analysis must focus on the system’s aerodynamic, guidance, tracking & control subsystems

• The most important weapon parameters describe the time response and target discrimination characteristics of various missile subsystems (eg. servo bandwidths and ECCMs)

• Using standardized weapon parameters such as EWIRDB facilitate this process

• Analysis methods are available for computing estimated values for parameters unavailable from EW Databases or exploitation reports



IR Seeker Basic Characteristics

• Passive infra-red angle only tracking

• Many angular scanning/tracking techniques

– Spin scan, conscan, rosette, FPA

• Some possible ECCM discrimination techniques

– Narrow optical field-of-view

– Spectral filtering (two or more color/bands)

– Sudden increase in signal power/intensity

– Sudden change in rate of line of sight (angle)

• Angle servo electronics determine tracking and

maneuver responsive of threat missile



Threats Exceed

500,000 Missiles

World-wide

1960sUncooled Spin Scan

2010 2nd Generation

Spectral Imagers

Threat Evolution

1970/80Cooled

Con Scan

1980s/90s Cross Array/Rosette

Flare CCMs

2005 1st Generation

Imagers

Courtesy LAIRCM SPO, AFRL

2000Scanning

Imagers



Spinning Reticle AM Tracker – 1st GenAKA Spin Scan

Graphic: “Test And Evaluation Of The Tactical Missile” By E.J. Eichblatt



Spinning Optics FM Tracker – 2nd GenAKA Con Scan

Graphic: “Surface Based Air Defense System Analysis” By. H.M. Macfadzeqn



Multiple Spinning Optics - 3rd GenAka Rosette Scans

Graphic: “The Infra-Red Handbook” Edited By W.L Wolfe And G.J. Zessis



Angle Tracking Servo Loop

• Seeker field-of-view determined by optics and reticule

• Tracking (Servo) loop response determined by filter bandwidths and amplifier gains

Detector Preamp

Band-

Pass

Filter

AGC DemodBand-

Pass

Filter

Phase

Detector

Error Signal

Scanning Phase Reference

IR Radiation

Telescope

Position

Drive

Reticule

Light

Collector

Detector

Tracker

Electronics

Error Signal



Sample SA-7 Parameter Data

Data From “Soviet Air Defence Missiles” by S. Zaloga

Track Technique Spin Scan



Analyzed SA-7 Parameters

• Physical Parameters– Mass: 5.5 to 9.2 kg

– Length: 1.42 m

– Diameter: 0.07 m

– Altitude: 0 to 4.5 km

– Velocity: 580 m/sec

– Wing Span: 0.14 m

– Mean Chord: .08 m

– Configuration: Cruciform

• Response Parameters– Airframe Natural Frequency:

14.9 to 21.6 rad/sec

– Airframe Damping Coefficient:

.06 to .09

– Airframe Maximum Latax:

12.1 to 30.3 g’s

– Autopilot PN Constant (Tail-on):

1.7

– Seeker Servo Bandwidth:

1.1 to 1.9 Hz

Analytic

Models

Graphic: “High-Tech Warfare”

by D. Richardson, et al.

• Other (Zaloga)

– Field Of View : 1.9 degrees

– Spectral Band : 1.7 to 2.8

microns3/9/2009 17Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright


MANPADS/ECM Expectations• ECM Characteristics - Tactics, Maneuvers and

Timing - will all affect engagement outcomes as measured by missile miss distance

• Virtually an infinite number of threat parameter, ECM parameter and engagement geometry combinations are possible - only select combinations result in aircraft survivability - Miss Distance >> Warhead Fuse Distance

• Threat characterization, parameter certification and data management may have major impact on outcomes

• Management of each engagement’s results, in relation to the associated input parameter combinations, is essential

• Calls for database management



Data Management Complexity(Seeker Search and Track Parameters)



Aerodynamic and Autopilot Parameters

Zarchan’s Aerodynamic Model Parameters

Zipfel’s Aerodynamic Model Parameters



Typical Jet A/C & Flare Signatures

Turbo-Jet Aircraft Radiant Intensity,

Military Power, 150 o Aspect at 300 m

Typical Flare Radiant Intensity

From:”Sources Of Radiation” Vol 1

IR/EO Systems Handbook, Ed G. Zissis



Aircraft & Flare SignaturesRadiant Intensity

vs Wavelength

vs Aspect Angle



Target & Flare SignaturesIR Radiant Intensities In 1.7 to 2.8 Micron Band

(dBw/sr)

0

5

10

15

20

25

Aircraft

Flare Peak

Flare

Radiant

Intensity

(dBw/sr)

10

20

30

1 32 4Time (sec)

vs Aspect Angle

Flare

Radiant Intensity

Vs Time



Flare Signature Control

The Dark Flare

A Standard Flare

The Dark Flare By Aircraft Protections Systems



Visible IR IR IR

Atmospheric Transmission

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Wavelength (micrometers)

Att

en

tuati

on

(d

B/K

m)



Jammer & DIRCM Parameters

Radiant Intensity

Vs Wavelength

Modulation Scheme

Time Sequence



IR Seeking Missile Reality

AN/AIM 9 Sidewinder Characteristics

Length: 2.89 meters

Diameter: 0.13 meters

Fin Span: 0.63 meters

Speed: Supersonic

Warhead: 9.36 kg blast fragmentation

Launch Weight: 85.5 kg

Range: 16+ km

Guidance System: Solid-state infrared homing

From: “Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability & Design”

R. E. Ball, AIAA Press, Second Edition (CD-ROM)



26 May 04

Shephard ConferenceShephard Conference

Claimed to be a picture of the actual attack on the DHL ac

taken by French reporters

As Filmed by French Reporters

DHL A300 vs Igla (SA-14) in Baghdad, Nov 22, 2003



DHL A300 On Fire

The second

missile missed



DHL A300 Aftermath



Key ECM Effectiveness Issues

• Countermeasure effectiveness measured by missile miss distance at end game– Large missile miss distance = effective countermeasure

– Successful velocity or range deception does not normally cause a large missile miss distance

– Successful steady angle error deception against proportional navigation guidance does not normally cause a large missile miss distance

• Missile miss distance measurement requires complete closed-loop dynamic missile fly-out, including:– Missile and target aerodynamics and kinematics

– Threat missile guidance and control including non-linearities

– Threat radar/seeker and electronic countermeasure interactions



Repeat: Miss Distance DeterminationMiss Distance Is Determined By

Integrating Incremental Flight Path

Errors Over Entire Missile Flight

Countermeasure May

Generate Angle Track Error

In Seeker

Angle Track Error May

Generate Steering Error

In Autopilot

Steering Error May

Generate Flight Path

Error

In Missile Flight



Required Simulation Features• Dynamic closed-loop missile fly-out engagements

• Various missile seeker tracking types required

– Spin Scan, Con Scan, Rosette, Quadrant, Array

• Various countermeasure types required

– On-Board Omni-directional and Directed (DIRCM)

– Off-Board Flares and Towed Decoys

• Non-linear interactions between seeker and ECM

• IR signatures vs aspect angle and wavelength

• Atmospheric propagation and background

• Engagement geometry and target aircraft tactics

• Output result includes missile miss distance



Simulation Engagement Control

Systems’ Data Management

Engagement Scenario Management3/9/2009 34Tactical Technologies Inc. Copyright


Miss Distance vs IR Flares



Non-linear interactions & miss distance

• Missile miss distance occurs after extended dynamic interactions between ECM and Missile’s Seeker

• Seeker contains many non-linear functions and components, such as steering surface limits, saturating amplifiers and S-shaped tracking discriminators

• ECM signals inherently cause seekers to operate in non-linear regions and with non-linear logic and functions

• Extended dynamic interactions between non-linear systems inherently gives rise to chaotic behavior

• Chaotic behavior means a small change in an inputcondition or parameter can lead to a large change in missile miss distance



What Is Chaotic Behavior?• Noticed By Lorenz In Weather Prediction Studies

• Plot Trajectory Is Not

Repetitive

• May Possess Multiple

“Strange Attractors”

• Final Result Depends On

Duration Of Interaction

• May Possess “Quasi- Stable

Regions

• Caused By Non-Linearities In Extended Dynamic Interactions

• Plot Trajectory Depends On

Initial Conditions



Simulating Chaotic Behavior

For realistic and valid simulation the threat subsystems must

include appropriate non-linearities and narrow threat

parameter ranges

Simulation models and input parameter values must be

validated to confirm they include key non-linear interactions

and models and parameters together generate realistic

chaotic behavior

Multiple simulation runs (Batch Runs) of engagements,

using Monte Carlo selection of expected threat, ECM and

engagement parameter values, should be performed

The chaotic scatter results from individual runs in the batch

should be collected to establish statistical distributions



Sample MANPADS Batch Result:Miss distance scatter vs missile launch azimuth for a particular flare deployment patternMiss Distance vs Missile Launch Azimuth

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

Launch Angle (deg)

Mis

s D

ista

nce

Mis

s D

ista

nce

(m

)

Missile Launch Angle (deg)

Fixed Parameters

A/C IR Rad Int800 w/str

Flare IR Rad Int4000 w/str

Flare Deployment6 flares

0.5 sec spacing

Random Parameters(Monte Carlo Selection)

Launch Distance

2000 to 4000 m

Missile Velocity

600 to 1000 m/s



Probability Miss Exceeds ThresholdProbability Miss Distance Exceeds Indicated Thresholds

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

100 m

200 m

300 m

Fixed Parameters

A/C IR Rad Int

800 w/str

Flare IR Rad Int

4000 w/str

Flare Deployment

6 flares

0.5 sec spacing

Random Parameters(Monte Carlo Selection)

Launch Distance

• 2000 to 4000 m

Missile Velocity

• 600 to 1000 m/s

100 m

200 m

300 m



Plotting CM Effectiveness

• Plot miss distance scatter data so that the

probability (Percentage Of Runs) miss distance

exceeds pre-selected thresholds as a function of

missile azimuth launch angle.

• Provides a means to:

Develop Effectiveness Requirements Specifications

Develop Equipment Test Procedures Based on

Effectiveness Specifications

Develop Countermeasure Deployment Tactics

Develop Aircraft Maneuver Timings And Strategies



MANPADS/Airliner/CM Engagements

• Wide Body Aircraft– Four Engines

– In Take-off, Climbing at 100

– Speed 100 m/sec,

– AC Altitude at Missile Launch: 400 m

– Demos Of Both Flare and DIRCM Protection

• Missile Launch– Launch Range 1.5 Km

– Demos Of First (One Color, Spin Scan Tracking) and Third Generation (Two Colour, Rosette Tracking) Missiles



MANPADS Characteristics

Threat Wave Band

(microns)

Tracking

Technique

Reference

SA-7

Grail

1.9-2.8

(uncooled)

Spin Scan

(AM)

Fiszer et al, JED, Jan 04

Zaloga, Janes Pub, 1988

SA-14

Gremlin

1.9-4.1

(cooled)

Con Scan

(FM)

Fiszer et al, JED, Jan 04

http://encyclopedia.thefreedictio

nary.com/SA-14

SA-18

Grouse

2-3 & 3-5

(two colour

discrimination)

Con Scan?

(FM)

Grossman et al, Rand Study,

#1713

Stinger

Post

IR/UV dual

(ECCM - colour

discrimination)

Rosette http://www.redstone.army.mil/

Systems/STINGER.html



Countering A Spin Scan Tracker

Graphics: “Test And Evaluation Of The Tactical Missile” By E.J. Eichblatt

Counter-Phase ECM Amplitude Modulation Causes Angle Error Sweeping

ECM AM Frequency Can Ensure Counter-Phasing

Spinning Reticle

Target Detection and Tracking

Relative Phase Determines Target Angle



Directed IR CM Protection

• Miss Distance Created By Anti-Phase Amplitude Modulated Jamming That Introduces:– Continuously Increasing Angle Track Error Throughout

The Missile’s Flight, Or

– Rapid Angle Track Error Sufficiently Large To Cause Seeker Break-Lock And No Re-Acquisition

• Directed Jammer Beam Offers Large Jam to Signal Ratio and Large Angle Track Error Normally (vs Omni-Directional Shuttered Heat Sources)

• Requires Detection and Closed Loop Tracking Of Attacking Missile Signature (Body/Plume) To Direct The Focused IR Beam



DIRCM Simulation Features

• Directed Jamming Beam– Laser or High Intensity Lamp

– Radiant Intensity vs Beamwidth & Wavelength

– Programmable Amplitude Modulation Sequences

• Closed-loop Servo Controlled Beam Steering– Quadrant Array, Two Color Missile Tracking

• Missile IR/UV Signatures vs Time, Aspect Angle and Wavelengths



DIRCM Swept AM vs Spin Scan



Role Of Dynamic Simulation

• Provides scopes of primary seeker subsystem responses to ECM stimuli enabling analysts to understand key interactions

• Provides graphics of missile and aircraft trajectories and end-game miss distance

• Batch simulation runs collect statistics of engagement outcomes (miss distance) for a wide range of engagement scenarios



Swept AM vs Spin ScanBatch Run Effectiveness Results

Average Miss Distance (m)

0.0

20.0

40.0

60.0

80.0

100.0

120.0



Swept AM vs Spin ScanMiss distance dependence on relative AM & Spin Scan Phase

(by varying missile launch range in a tail chase geometry)

Miss Distance Depends Somewhat on Launch Range (ie Relative AM and Spin Scan Phase)

Swept AM vs Spin Scan

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

90.0

100.0

1200 1250 1300 1350 1400

Missile Launch Range (m)

Mis

sil

e M

iss D

ista

nce (

m)

Miss Distance:

Average = 57.9 m

Last Mode:

100% In Search

Outboard

Inboard



Typical Rosette Scans (Multiple Spinning Optics)

Graphic: “The Infra-Red Handbook” Edited By W.L Wolfe And G.J. Zessis

• Scans While Tracks

• Digital Tracking

• Spatial Sampling

• Quasi-Imaging

• ECM Generation Of

Angle Error May Be

Difficult



Swept AM vs Rosette Engagement



Rosette AM Deception AnalysisRosette Characteristics

• Two Counter-Rotating Mirrors

• Rotation Rates =15 & 27 Hz

• Petal Frequency = 42 Hz

• Rosette Frequency = 3 Hz

• Number of Petals = 14

• Sequence As Shown

1

2

3

41

2

3

4

7

1013

5

8

11

14

6

9

12

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

AM ECM Characteristics• AM Center Frequency = 43.5 Hz



Angle Error vs AM Frequency

-1.000

-0.500

0.000

0.500

1.000

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

-1.000

-0.500

0.000

0.500

1.000

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

-1.000

-0.500

0.000

0.500

1.000

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

42.0 Hz

43.5 Hz

45.0 Hz

Angle Errors

Time (Sec)

AM Freq



Swept AM vs RosetteMiss distance dependence on missile launch range in tail chase geometry

Miss Distance Depends Substantially on Launch Range (ie Relative AM and Rosette Phase)

Swept AM vs Rosette

-20.0

0.0

20.0

40.0

60.0

80.0

100.0

120.0

140.0

160.0

1200 1250 1300 1350 1400

Missile Launch Range (m)

Mis

sile

Mis

s D

ista

nc

e (

m)

Miss Distance:

Average = 27.5 m

Last Mode:

50% In Search

OutboardInboard



Average Missile Miss Distance (m)

0.0

50.0

100.0

150.0

200.0

250.0

300.0

350.0

Swept AM vs Rosette Effectiveness



IR Jammer Protection

• Directional AM Jamming Offers Large A Jam to Signal Ratio That Is Normally Required To Generate A Large Angle Track Error

• Anti-Phase Amplitude Modulated Jamming May Create A Large Missile Miss Distance By :– Continuously Increasing Angle Track Error Throughout

Missile Flight, Or

– Introducing a Sufficiently Rapid Large Angle Track Error Causing Seeker Break-Lock And No Re-Acquisition (ie Missile Flies and Unguided, Ballistic Trajectory for a Portion of Its Flight)



Flares vs Rosette Engagement



Flares vs Rosette Effectiveness



Flares vs Spin Scan Effectiveness



Flare Protection

• Factors Affecting Missile Miss Distance:– Ejection Time Relative To Missile End Game

– Ignition and Burn Out Times

– Ejection Velocity, Direction, Kinematics

» Flare Velocity Dynamics Seeker Discrimination

– IR Signature (Radiant Intensity)

» Two Colour Seeker Discrimination

– Physical Extent Of Flare Cluster

» Spatial Seeker Discrimination (Imaging)



Airliner MANPADS Protection

• On-Board (DIRCM)

– Modulation’s Success

Depends on Threat’s Tracking

Technique

– Requires Threat Analysis

Capabilities

• Defeat of Advanced Trackers

May Be Difficult if DIRCM

Power Is Not Sufficient to

Cause Damage

• Off-Board (Flares)

– Deployment Sequence

Relative to End Game

(Timing) Is Important For

Success

– Success Is Engagement

Geometry Dependent

• Success Is Relatively

Independent Of Threat’s

Tracking Technique



The Roles Of Dynamic Simulation In


• Single simulation runs enable the analyst to understand the countermeasure characteristics required to produce large miss distances in various missiles and engagement geometries by viewing embedded seeker scopes

• Batch simulation runs produce operationally significant statistical effectiveness data and plots

• Simulations are critical for planning, conducting and analyzing expensive and limited field trials



Dynamic Simulation Properties

Required to Fulfill this Role• Simulations must be high fidelity and replicate the seeker’s responsiveness

and primary non-linearities - tracking discriminators, amplifiers, ECCM logic, and gimbal and control surface limits and physics based interactions with countermeasures

• Simulations must compute miss distance for effectiveness evaluations by integration of incremental flight path errors, including the influence of non-linearities

• Simulations must run batches quickly for efficient statistical data collection

• Simulations should possess one-for-one mapping of hardware seeker subsystems to software subsystems for validation - hierarchical system of systems

• Simulations must possess scopes and graphics embedded at various test points for engineering analysis



The Role of Dynamic Simulation In


IDGA MANPADS Seminar

March 2006

Questions?



2006 idga - simulation in airline manpads protection

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