Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION A.C. No. 8620 January 12, 2011

JESSIE R. DE LEON, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EDUARDO G. CASTELO, Respondent. DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: This administrative case, which Jessie R. De Leon initiated on April 29, 2010, concerns respondent attorneys alleged dishonesty and falsification committed in the pleadings he filed in behalf of the defendants in the civil action in which De Leon intervened. Antecedents On January 2, 2006, the Government brought suit for the purpose of correcting the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering two parcels of land located in Malabon City then registered in the names of defendants Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu due to their encroaching on a public callejon and on a portion of the Malabon-Navotas River shoreline to the extent, respectively, of an area of 45 square meters and of about 600 square meters. The suit, entitled Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Regional Executive Director, Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, Gorgonia Flores, and the Registrar of Deeds of Malabon City, was docketed as Civil Case No. 4674MN of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, in Malabon City.1 De Leon, having joined Civil Case No. 4674MN as a voluntary intervenor two years later (April 21, 2008), now accuses the respondent, the counsel of record of the defendants in Civil Case No. 4674MN, with the serious administrative offenses of dishonesty and falsification warranting his disbarment or suspension as an attorney. The respondents sin was allegedly committed by his filing for defendants Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu of various pleadings (that is, answer with counterclaim and cross-claim in relation to the main complaint; and answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim) despite said spouses being already deceased at the time of filing.2 De Leon avers that the respondent committed dishonesty and falsification as follows: xxx in causing it (to) appear that persons (spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu) have participated in an act or proceeding (the making and filing of the Answers) when they did not in fact so participate; in fact, they could not have so participated because they were already dead as of that time, which is punishable under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent also committed the crime of Use of Falsified Documents, by submitting the said falsified Answers in the judicial proceedings, Civil Case No. 4674MN; Respondent also made a mockery of the aforesaid judicial proceedings by representing dead persons therein who, he falsely made to appear, as contesting the complaints, counter-suing and cross-suing the adverse parties.

12. That, as a consequence of the above criminal acts, complainant respectfully submits that respondent likewise violated: (a) His Lawyers Oath: xxx (b) The Code of Professional Responsibility:3 xxx On June 23, 2010, the Court directed the respondent to comment on De Leons administrative complaint.4 In due course, or on August 2, 2010,5 the respondent rendered the following explanations in his comment, to wit: 1. The persons who had engaged him as attorney to represent the Lim family in Civil Case No. 4674MN were William and Leonardo Lim, the children of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu; 2. Upon his (Atty. Castelo) initial queries relevant to the material allegations of the Governments complaint in Civil Case No. 4674MN, William Lim, the representative of the Lim Family, informed him: a. That the Lim family had acquired the properties from Georgina Flores; b. That William and Leonardo Lim were already actively managing the family business, and now co-owned the properties by virtue of the deed of absolute sale their parents, Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, had executed in their favor; and c. That because of the execution of the deed of absolute sale, William and Leonardo Lim had since honestly assumed that their parents had already caused the transfer of the TCTs to their names. 3. Considering that William and Leonardo Lim themselves were the ones who had engaged his services, he (Atty. Castelo) consequently truthfully stated in the motion seeking an extension to file responsive pleading dated February 3, 2006 the fact that it was "the family of the defendants" that had engaged him, and that he had then advised "the children of the defendants" to seek the assistance as well of a licensed geodetic surveyor and engineer; 4. He (Atty. Castelo) prepared the initial pleadings based on his honest belief that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were then still living. Had he known that they were already deceased, he would have most welcomed the information and would have moved to substitute Leonardo and William Lim as defendants for that reason; 5. He (Atty. Castelo) had no intention to commit either a falsehood or a falsification, for he in fact submitted the death certificates of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in order to apprise the trial court of that fact; and 6. The Office of the Prosecutor for Malabon City even dismissed the criminal complaint for falsification brought against him (Atty. Castelo) through the resolution dated February 11, 2010. The same office denied the complainants motion for reconsideration on May 17, 2010.

On September 3, 2010, the complainant submitted a reply,6 whereby he asserted that the respondents claim in his comment that he had represented the Lim family was a deception, because the subject of the complaint against the respondent was his filing of the answers in behalf of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu despite their being already deceased at the time of the filing. The complainant regarded as baseless the justifications of the Office of the City Prosecutor for Malabon City in dismissing the criminal complaint against the respondent and in denying his motion for reconsideration. The Court usually first refers administrative complaints against members of the Philippine Bar to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and appropriate recommendations. For the present case, however, we forego the prior referral of the complaint to the IBP, in view of the facts being uncomplicated and based on the pleadings in Civil Case No. 4674MN. Thus, we decide the complaint on its merits. Ruling We find that the respondent, as attorney, did not commit any falsehood or falsification in his pleadings in Civil Case No. 4674MN. Accordingly, we dismiss the patently frivolous complaint. I Attorneys Obligation to tell the truth All attorneys in the Philippines, including the respondent, have sworn to the vows embodied in following Lawyers Oath,7 viz: I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyers Oath, providing:8 CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. The foregoing ordain ethical norms that bind all attorneys, as officers of the Court, to act with the highest standards of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness. All attorneys are thereby enjoined to obey the laws of the land, to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct themselves according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their clients. Being also servants of the Law, attorneys are expected to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make themselves exemplars worthy of emulation by others.9 The least they can do in that regard is to refrain from engaging in any form or manner of unlawful conduct (which broadly

includes any act or omission contrary to law, but does not necessarily imply the element of criminality even if it is broad enough to include such element).10 To all attorneys, truthfulness and honesty have the highest value, for, as the Court has said in Young v. Batuegas:11 A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients." He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his clients rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his clients cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth. Their being officers of the Court extends to attorneys not only the presumption of regularity in the discharge of their duties, but also the immunity from liability to others for as long as the performance of their obligations to their clients does not depart from their character as servants of the Law and as officers of the Court. In particular, the statements they make in behalf of their clients that are relevant, pertinent, or material to the subject of inquiry are absolutely privileged regardless of their defamatory tenor. Such cloak of privilege is necessary and essential in ensuring the unhindered service to their clients causes and in protecting the clients confidences. With the cloak of privilege, they can freely and courageously speak for their clients, verbally or in writing, in the course of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, without running the risk of incurring criminal prosecution or actions for damages.12 Nonetheless, even if they enjoy a number of privileges by reason of their office and in recognition of the vital role they play in the administration of justice, attorneys hold the privilege and right to practice law before judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative tribunals or offices only during good behavior.13 II Respondent did not violate the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility On April 17, 2006, the respondent filed an answer with counterclaim and cross-claim in behalf of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, the persons whom the Government as plaintiff named as defendants in Civil Case No. 4674MN.14 He alleged therein that: 2. The allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint are ADMITTED. Moreover, it is hereby made known that defendants spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu had already sold the two (2) parcels of land, together with the building and improvements thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (148805) 139876 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal, to Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim, of Rms. 501 502 Dolores Bldg., Plaza del Conde, Binondo, Manila. Hence, Leonardo Lim and William Lim are their successors-in-interest and are the present lawful owners thereof. In order to properly and fully protect their rights, ownership and interests, Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim shall hereby represent the defendants-spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu as substitute/representative parties in this action. In this manner, a complete and expeditious resolution of the issues raised in this case can be reached without undue delay. A photo copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property, executed by herein defendants-spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in favor of said Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim, is hereto attached as Annex "1" hereof.

xxx 21. There is improper joinder of parties in the complaint. Consequently, answering defendants are thus unduly compelled to litigate in a suit regarding matters and facts as to which they have no knowledge of nor any involvement or participation in. 22. Plaintiff is barred by the principle of estoppel in bringing this suit, as it was the one who, by its governmental authority, issued the titles to the subject property. This action is barred by the principles of prescription and laches for plaintiffs unreasonable delay in brining this suit, particularly against defendant Flores, from whom herein answering defendants acquired the subject property in good faith and for value. If truly plaintiff has a clear and valid cause of action on the subject property, it should not have waited thirty (30) years to bring suit. Two years later, or on April 21, 2008, De Leon filed his complaint in intervention in Civil Case No. 4674MN.15 He expressly named therein as defendants vis--vis his intervention not only the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, the original defendants, but also their sons Leonardo Lim, married to Sally Khoo, and William Lim, married to Sally Lee, the same persons whom the respondent had already alleged in the answer, supra, to be the transferees and current owners of the parcels of land.16 The following portions of De Leons complaint in intervention in Civil Case No. 4674MN are relevant, viz: 2. Defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, are Filipino citizens with addresses at 504 Plaza del Conde, Manila and at 46 C. Arellano St., San Agustin, Malabon City, where they may be served with summons and other court processes; 3. Defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee are all of legal age and with postal address at Rms. 501-502 Dolores Bldg., Plaza del Conde, Binondo, Manila, alleged purchasers of the property in question from defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu; 4. Defendants Registrar of Deeds of Malabon City holds office in Malabon City, where he may be served with summons and other court processes. He is charged with the duty, among others, of registering decrees of Land Registration in Malabon City under the Land Registration Act; xxx 7. That intervenor Jessie de Leon, is the owner of a parcel of land located in Malabon City described in TCT no. M-15183 of the Register of Deeds of Malabon City, photocopy of which is attached to this Complaint as Annex "G", and copy of the location plan of the aforementioned property is attached to this complaint as Annex "H" and is made an integral part hereof; 8. That there are now more or less at least 40 squatters on intervenors property, most of them employees of defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee who had gained access to intervenors property and built their houses without benefit of any building permits from the government who had made their access to intervenors property thru a two panel metal gate more or less 10 meters wide and with an armed guard by the gate and with permission from defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and/or and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee illegally entered intervenors property thru a wooden ladder to go over a 12 foot wall now separating intervenors property from the former esquinita which is now

part of defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chus and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoos and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lees property and this illegally allowed his employees as well as their relatives and friends thereof to illegally enter intervenors property through the ladders defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu installed in their wall and also allowed said employees and relatives as well as friends to build houses and shacks without the benefit of any building permit as well as permit to occupy said illegal buildings; 9. That the enlargement of the properties of spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu had resulted in the closure of street lot no. 3 as described in TCT no. 143828, spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu having titled the street lot no. 3 and placed a wall at its opening on C. Arellano street, thus closing any exit or egress or entrance to intervenors property as could be seen from Annex "H" hereof and thus preventing intervenor from entering into his property resulted in preventing intervenor from fully enjoying all the beneficial benefits from his property; 10. That defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and later on defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee are the only people who could give permission to allow third parties to enter intervenors property and their control over intervenors property is enforced through his armed guard thus exercising illegal beneficial rights over intervenors property at intervenors loss and expense, thus depriving intervenor of legitimate income from rents as well as legitimate access to intervenors property and the worst is preventing the Filipino people from enjoying the Malabon Navotas River and enjoying the right of access to the natural fruits and products of the Malabon Navotas River and instead it is defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee using the public property exclusively to enrich their pockets; xxx 13. That defendant spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu and defendant spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo and defendant spouses William Lim and Sally Lee were confederating, working and helping one another in their actions to inhibit intervenor Jessie de Leon to gain access and beneficial benefit from his property; On July 10, 2008, the respondent, representing all the defendants named in De Leons complaint in intervention, responded in an answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim,17 stating that "spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu xxx are now both deceased," to wit: xxx 2. The allegations in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Complaint are ADMITTED, with the qualification that defendants-spouses Leonardo Lim and Sally Khoo Lim, William Lim and Sally Lee Lim are the registered and lawful owners of the subject property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. M-35929, issued by the Register of Deeds for Malabon City, having long ago acquired the same from the defendants-spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, who are now both deceased. Copy of the TCT No. M-35929 is attached hereto as Annexes "1" and "1-A". The same title has already been previously submitted to this Honorable Court on December 13, 2006. xxx The respondent subsequently submitted to the RTC a so-called clarification and submission,18 in which he again adverted to the deaths of Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, as follows:

1. On March 19, 2009, herein movants-defendants Lim filed before this Honorable Court a Motion for Substitution of Defendants in the Principal Complaint of the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DENR; 2. The Motion for Substitution is grounded on the fact that the two (2) parcels of land, with the improvements thereon, which are the subject matter of the instant case, had long been sold and transferred by the principal defendants-spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu to herein complaint-in-intervention defendants Leonardo C. Lim and William C. Lim, by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale, a copy of which is attached to said Motion as Annex "1" thereof. 3. Quite plainly, the original principal defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu, having sold and conveyed the subject property, have totally lost any title, claim or legal interest on the property. It is on this factual ground that this Motion for Substitution is based and certainly not on the wrong position of Intervenor de Leon that the same is based on the death of defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu. 4. Under the foregoing circumstances and facts, the demise of defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu no longer has any significant relevance to the instant Motion. To, however, show the fact of their death, photo copy of their respective death certificates are attached hereto as Annexes "1" and "2" hereof. 5. The Motion for substitution of Defendants in the Principal Complaint dated March 18, 2009 shows in detail why there is the clear, legal and imperative need to now substitute herein movants-defendants Lim for defendants Lim Hio and Dolores Chu in the said principal complaint. 6. Simply put, movants-defendants Lim have become the indispensable defendants in the principal complaint of plaintiff DENR, being now the registered and lawful owners of the subject property and the real parties-in-interest in this case. Without them, no final determination can be had in the Principal complaint. 7. Significantly, the property of intervenor Jessie de Leon, which is the subject of his complaint-in-intervention, is identically, if not similarly, situated as that of herein movants-defendants Lim, and likewise, may as well be a proper subject of the Principal Complaint of plaintiff DENR. 8. Even the plaintiff DENR, itself, concedes the fact that herein movants-defendants Lim should be substituted as defendants in the principal complaint as contained in their Manifestation dated June 3, 2009, which has been filed in this case. WHEREFORE, herein movants-defendants Lim most respectfully submit their Motion for substitution of Defendants in the Principal Complaint and pray that the same be granted. xxx Did the respondent violate the letter and spirit of the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility in making the averments in the aforequoted pleadings of the defendants? A plain reading indicates that the respondent did not misrepresent that Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living. On the contrary, the respondent directly stated in the answer to the complaint in intervention with counterclaim and cross-claim, supra, and in the clarification and submission, supra, that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were already deceased. Even granting, for the sake of argument, that any of the respondents pleadings might have created any impression that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living, we still cannot hold the respondent guilty of any dishonesty or falsification. For one, the respondent was

acting in the interest of the actual owners of the properties when he filed the answer with counterclaim and cross-claim on April 17, 2006. As such, his pleadings were privileged and would not occasion any action against him as an attorney. Secondly, having made clear at the start that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer the actual owners of the affected properties due to the transfer of ownership even prior to the institution of the action, and that the actual owners (i.e., Leonardo and William Lim) needed to be substituted in lieu of said spouses, whether the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were still living or already deceased as of the filing of the pleadings became immaterial. And, lastly, De Leon could not disclaim knowledge that the Spouses Lim Hio and Dolores Chu were no longer living. His joining in the action as a voluntary intervenor charged him with notice of all the other persons interested in the litigation. He also had an actual awareness of such other persons, as his own complaint in intervention, supra, bear out in its specific allegations against Leonardo Lim and William Lim, and their respective spouses. Thus, he could not validly insist that the respondent committed any dishonesty or falsification in relation to him or to any other party. III Good faith must always motivate any complaint against a Member of the Bar According to Justice Cardozo,19 "xxx the fair fame of a lawyer, however innocent of wrong, is at the mercy of the tongue of ignorance or malice. Reputation in such a calling is a plant of tender growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored." A lawyers reputation is, indeed, a very fragile object. The Court, whose officer every lawyer is, must shield such fragility from mindless assault by the unscrupulous and the malicious. It can do so, firstly, by quickly cutting down any patently frivolous complaint against a lawyer; and, secondly, by demanding good faith from whoever brings any accusation of unethical conduct. A Bar that is insulated from intimidation and harassment is encouraged to be courageous and fearless, which can then best contribute to the efficient delivery and proper administration of justice.1avvphil The complainant initiated his complaint possibly for the sake of harassing the respondent, either to vex him for taking the cudgels for his clients in connection with Civil Case No. 4674MN, or to get even for an imagined wrong in relation to the subject matter of the pending action, or to accomplish some other dark purpose. The worthlessness of the accusation apparent from the beginning has impelled us into resolving the complaint sooner than later. WHEREFORE, we dismiss the complaint for disbarment or suspension filed against Atty. Eduardo G. Castelo for utter lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 5834 February 22, 2011 (formerly CBD-01-861) TERESITA D. SANTECO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE, Respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: The case originated from an administrative complaint1 filed by Teresita D. Santeco against respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance for mishandling Civil Case No. 97-275, an action to declare a deed of absolute sale null and void and for reconveyance and damages, which complainant had filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. In an En Banc Decision2 dated December 11, 2003, the Court found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for, among others, abandoning her clients cause in bad faith and persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her without any explanation for doing so. She was ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years, and was likewise directed to return to complainant, within ten (10) days from notice, the amount of P3,900.00 which complainant paid her for the filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which she never filed. Respondent moved to reconsider3 the decision but her motion was denied in a Resolution4 dated February 24, 2004. Subsequently, while respondents five-year suspension from the practice of law was still in effect, Judge Consuelo Amog-Bocar, Presiding Judge of the RTC of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, sent a letter-report5 dated November 12, 2007 to then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock informing the latter that respondent had appeared and actively participated in three cases wherein she misrepresented herself as "Atty. Liezl Tanglao." When her opposing counsels confronted her and showed to the court a certification regarding her suspension, respondent admitted and conceded that she is Atty. Luna B. Avance, but qualified that she was only suspended for three years and that her suspension has already been lifted. Judge Amog-Bocar further stated that respondent nonetheless withdrew her appearance from all the cases. Attached to the letter-report were copies of several pertinent orders from her court confirming the report. Acting on Judge Amog-Bocars letter-report, the Court, in a Resolution6 dated April 9, 2008, required respondent to comment within ten (10) days from notice. Respondent, however, failed to file the required comment. On June 10, 2009, the Court reiterated the directive to comment; otherwise the case would be deemed submitted for resolution based on available records on file with the Court. Still, respondent failed to comply despite notice. Accordingly, this Court issued a Resolution7 on September 29, 2009 finding respondent guilty of indirect contempt. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads: ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby found guilty of indirect contempt and is hereby FINED in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely.

Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Resolution, and be it duly recorded in the personal file of respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance.8 A copy of the September 29, 2009 Resolution was sent to respondents address of record at "26B Korea Ave., Ph. 4, Greenheights Subd., Nangka, Marikina City" by registered mail. The same was delivered by Postman Hermoso Mesa, Jr. and duly received by one Lota Cadete on October 29, 2009, per certification9 dated February 3, 2011 by Postmaster Rufino C. Robles of the Marikina Central Post Office. Despite due notice, however, respondent failed to pay the fine imposed in the September 29, 2009 Resolution based on a certification issued by Araceli C. Bayuga, Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Cash Collection and Disbursement Division, Fiscal Management and Budget Office. The said certification reads: This is to certify that as per records of the Cashier Division, there is no record of payment made by one ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as payment for COURT FINE imposed in the resolution dated 29 Sept. 2009 Re: Adm. Case No. 5834.10 In view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent unfit to continue as a member of the bar. As an officer of the court, it is a lawyers duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyers obedience to court orders and processes.11 Here, respondents conduct evidently fell short of what is expected of her as an officer of the court as she obviously possesses a habit of defying this Courts orders. She willfully disobeyed this Court when she continued her law practice despite the five-year suspension order against her and even misrepresented herself to be another person in order to evade said penalty. Thereafter, when she was twice ordered to comment on her continued law practice while still suspended, nothing was heard from her despite receipt of two Resolutions from this Court. Neither did she pay the P30,000.00 fine imposed in the September 29, 2009 Resolution. We have held that failure to comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyers suspension or even disbarment.12 Sebastian v. Bajar13 teaches Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders not "only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."141avvphi1 Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from office as an attorney for gross misconduct and/or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, to wit: SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose

of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied.) In repeatedly disobeying this Courts orders, respondent proved herself unworthy of membership in the Philippine Bar. Worse, she remains indifferent to the need to reform herself. Clearly, she is unfit to discharge the duties of an officer of the court and deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment. WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE is hereby DISBARRED for gross misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders of a superior court. Her name is ORDERED STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts of the land. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 8253 March 15, 2011 (Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1067) ERLINDA R. TAROG, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ROMULO L. RICAFORT, Respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM: We resolve a complaint for disbarment for alleged grave misconduct brought against Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort for his failure to account for and to return the sums of money received from his clients for purposes of the civil action to recover their property from a foreclosing banking institution he was handling for them. The original complainant was Arnulfo A. Tarog, but his wife, Erlinda R. Tarog, substituted him upon his intervening death. Antecedents In 1992, the Tarogs sought the advice of Atty. Jaime L. Miralles regarding their bank-foreclosed property located in the Bicol Region. Atty. Miralles advised them to engage a Bicol-based attorney for that purpose. Thus, they went to see Atty. Ricafort accompanied by Vidal Miralles, their friend who was a brother of Atty. Miralles.1 They ultimately engaged Atty. Ricafort as their attorney on account of his being well-known in the community, and being also the Dean of the College of Law of Aquinas University where their son was then studying. Having willingly accepted the engagement, Atty. Ricafort required the Tarogs to pay P7,000.00 as filing fee, which they gave to him. 2 He explained the importance of depositing P65,000.00 in court to counter the P60,000.00 deposited by Antonio Tee, the buyer of the foreclosed property. After they informed him that they had only P60,000.00, he required them to add some more amount (dagdagan niyo ng konti).3 To raise the P65,000.00 for the Tarogs, therefore, Vidal solicited a loan from one Sia with the guarantee of his brother Atty. Miralles. Sia issued a check in that amount in the name of Arnulfo.4 On November 7, 1992, the Tarogs and Vidal went to the office of Atty. Ricafort to deliver the P65,000.00. When Arnulfo said that he had first to encash the check at the bank, Atty. Ricafort persuaded him to entrust the check to him instead so that he (Atty. Ricafort) would be the one to encash it and then deposit the amount in court. On that representation, Arnulfo handed the check to Atty. Ricafort.5 After some time, the Tarogs visited Atty. Ricafort to verify the status of the consignation. Atty. Ricafort informed them that he had not deposited the amount in court, but in his own account. He promised to return the money, plus interest. Despite several inquiries about when the amount would be returned, however, the Tarogs received mere assurances from Atty. Ricafort that the money was in good hands. The Tarogs further claimed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, in Sorsogon (RTC), where their complaint for annulment of sale was being heard, had required the parties to file their memoranda. Accordingly, they delivered P15,000.00 to Atty. Ricafort for that purpose, but he did not file the memorandum.6

When it became apparent to the Tarogs that Atty. Ricafort would not make good his promise of returning the P65,000.00, plus interest, Arnulfo demanded by his letter dated December 3, 2002 that Atty. Ricafort return the P65,000.00, plus interest, and the P15,000.00 paid for the filing of the memorandum.7 Yet, they did not receive any reply from Atty. Ricafort. In his defense, Atty. Ricafort denied that the P65,000.00 was intended to be deposited in court, insisting that the amount was payment for his legal services under a "package deal," that is, the amount included his acceptance fee, attorneys fee, and appearance fees from the filing of the complaint for annulment of sale until judgment, but excluding appeal. He claimed that the fees were agreed upon after considering the value of the property, his skill and experience as a lawyer, the labor, time, and trouble involved, and his professional character and social standing; that at the time he delivered the check, Arnulfo read, understood, and agreed to the contents of the complaint, which did not mention anything about any consignation;8 and that Arnulfo, being a retired school principal, was a learned person who would not have easily fallen for any scheme like the one they depicted against him. Findings of the IBP Commissioner Following his investigation, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline rendered his Report and Recommendation dated October 7, 2004,9 in which he concluded that: It is respectfully recommended that respondent, Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort be DISBARRED and be ordered to return the amount of P65,000 and P15,000 which he got from his client. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. Commissioner Reyes regarded the testimonies of Erlinda and Vidal more credible than the testimony of Atty. Ricafort, observing: Based on the said testimony, statements and actuations of complainant Erlinda Tarog and his collaborating witness, we find their statements to be credible. Atty. Ricafort in his testimony attempted to show that the amount of P65,000.00 was paid to him by the complainant as acceptance fee on a package deal basis and under said deal, he will answer the filing fee, attorneys fees and other expenses incurred up to the time the judgment is rendered. He presented a transcript of stenographic notes wherein it was stated that complainant himself did not consign the money in court. The respondent admitted in his testimony that he did not have any retainer agreement nor any memorandum signed or any receipt which would prove that the amount of P65,000.00 was received as an acceptance fee for the handling of the case. Atty. Romulo Ricafort stated that there was no retainer agreement and that he issued only receipt because the late Arnulfo Tarog will not pay unless a receipt is issued. The Undersigned Commissioner asked the respondent "Basically you describe that thing that will happen in the litigation related to the payment of fees. But when you received that P65,000.00 did you not put anything there that you will describe the nature of legal work which you will undertake considering that you have considered this P65,000.00 as your attorneys fees? And Atty. Ricafort stated: Yes I did. I do not know why they were not showing the receipt. That is a big amount, Your Honor. They demanded for me the receipt of P30,000.00 how much more with that P65,000.00. They demanded for the receipt of that P65,000.00 but I cannot explain the reason why During the clarificatory questioning, the Undersigned Commissioner also asked Atty. Ricafort why he did not answer the demand letter sent by Arnulfo Tarog and the proof of service of the said letter was presented by the complainant. Conveniently, Atty. Ricafort stated that he did not receive the letter and it was received by their helper who did not forward the letter to him. He

also adopted the position that the complainant was demanding the P65,000.00 wherefore this case was filed. When confronted by the testimony of Mr. Vidal Miralles, the respondent Atty. Ricafort just denied the allegation that he received the P65,000.00 for deposit to the court. He also denied that Mr. Miralles has visited his residence for follow-up the reimbursement. The Undersigned Commissioner asked the respondent if he has personal animosity with Arnuldo Tarog, Erlinda Tarog and Vidal Miralles and if there are any reason why this case was filed against him. In his answer the respondent stated that we have been very good friends for the past ten (10) years and he said that in fact he was surprised when the complaint was filed against him and they even attached the decision of the Supreme Court for his suspension and maybe they are using this case to be able to collect from him. The main defense of the respondent is that the complainant in this case testified that the total amount to redeem his property is P240,000.00 and when asked whether he consigned the money to the court to redeem the property he answered in the negative. The alleged payment of P65,000.00 was made prior to the said testimony sometime in 1992. Hence, it was stated on complainants affidavit that on November 7, 1992, prior to filing said complaint I had given him the sum of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos to be deposited to the Regional Trial Court representing redemption money of the Real Estate Mortgage. The amount of P65,000.00 is very much close to the amount of the principal obligation of the complainant and it is not surprising for a non-lawyer to hold on to the belief that with the filing of the case for annulment of foreclosure his case would be strengthened by making a deposit in court hence, the motivation to produce the deposit was logical and natural insofar as the complainant is concerned. The testimony of the complainant in court that the bank needed P240,000.00 for the redemption of the property will have no bearing on the actuation of the complainant who has been required to deposit P65,000.00 by his lawyer. The Undersigned Commission has no alternative but to believe in the credibility and truthfulness of complainants narration that of Mrs. Erlinda Tarog and Vidal Miralles.10 Commissioner Reyes concluded that Atty. Ricafort violated Canon 15, and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by taking advantage of the vulnerability of his clients and by being dishonest in his dealings with them by refusing to return the amount of P65,000.00 to them. On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XVI-2004-473, 11 resolving to return the matter to Commissioner Reyes for a clarification of whether or not there was evidence to support the claim that the P65,000.00 had been in payment of attorneys fees and other expenses. On October 11, 2005, Commissioner Reyes issued a second Report and Recommendation, 12 in which he declared that Atty. Ricafort did not present any retainer agreement or receipt to prove that the amount of P65,000.00 had been part of his attorneys fees; that Atty. Ricafort had willfully ignored the demand of Arnulfo by not replying to the demand letter; that, instead, Atty. Ricafort had insisted that the househelp who had received the demand letter had not given it to him; and that in his (Commissioner Reyes) presence, Atty. Ricafort had also promised to the complainant that he would settle his liability, but Atty. Ricafort did not make good his promise despite several resettings to allow him to settle his obligation. Action of IBP Board of Governors Through Resolution No. XVII-2006-569,13 therefore, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Reyes and recommended the disbarment of Atty. Ricafort and the order for him to return the amounts of P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 to Erlinda, viz:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Respondent has taken advantage of his client [sic] vulnerability and has been dishonest with his dealings to his client, Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort is hereby DISBARRED and Ordered to Return the amount of P65,000 and P15,000 to complainant. Atty. Ricafort moved for reconsideration,14 maintaining that a retainer agreement was immaterial because he had affirmed having received the P65,000.00 and having issued a receipt for the amount; that he had not kept the receipt because "the practice of lawyers in most instances is that receipt is issued without duplicate as it behooves upon the client to demand for a receipt;"15 that considering that the Tarogs had produced a photocopy of the receipt he had issued for the P30,000.00 in connection with their appeal, it followed that a similar receipt for attorneys fees had been made at the time when the case had been about to be filed in the RTC; that the testimonies of Erlinda and Vidal were inconsistent with Arnulfos affidavit; and that he did not receive Arnulfos demand letter, which was received by one Gemma Agnote (the name printed on the registry receipt), whom he did not at all know. Acting on Atty. Ricaforts motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors downgraded the penalty from disbarment to indefinite suspension,16 thus: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Recommendation of the Board of Governors First Division of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with modification of Resolution No. XVII-2006-509 of the Board of Governors dated 18 November 2006, that in lieu of the Disbarment of Atty. Romulo Ricafort, he is INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED from the practice of law and Ordered to return the amount of P65,000 and P15,000 to complainant. Atty. Ricafort filed a second motion for reconsideration,17 assailing the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors for violating Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court requiring the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to be in writing and to clearly and distinctly state the facts and reasons on which the decision was based. Hence, the administrative case is now before the Court for resolution. Ruling We affirm the findings of the Commissioner Reyes, because they were supported by substantial evidence. However, we impose the penalty of disbarment instead of the recommended penalty of indefinite suspension, considering that Atty. Ricafort committed a very serious offense that was aggravated by his having been previously administratively sanctioned for a similar offense on the occasion of which he was warned against committing a similar offense. A. Version of the complainants was more credible than version of Atty. Ricafort Atty. Ricafort admitted receiving the P65,000.00 from the Tarogs. Even so, we have two versions about the transaction. On the one hand, the Tarogs insisted that the amount was to be consigned in court for purposes of their civil case; on the other hand, Atty. Ricafort claimed that the amount was for his fees under a "package deal" arrangement. Commissioner Reyes considered the Tarogs version more credible.

We hold that Commissioner Reyes appreciation of the facts was correct and in accord with human experience. Firstly, it is easier to believe that Atty. Ricafort persuaded the Tarogs on the need for that amount to be deposited in court for purposes of their civil case. Being non-lawyers, they had no idea about the requirement for them to consign any amount in court, due to the substantive and procedural implications of such requirement being ordinarily known only to lawyers. Their ready and full reliance on Atty. Ricaforts representations about the requirement to consign that amount in court was entirely understandable in view of their awareness of Atty. Ricaforts standing in the legal community of the place. Besides, as Commissioner Reyes observed, it was not far-fetched for the Tarogs to believe that an amount close in value to their original obligation was necessary to be deposited in court to boost their chances of recovering their property. Secondly, Atty. Ricaforts denial of receipt of Arnulfos demand letter was incredible. He already initially admitted receiving the letter through a househelp. 18 His denial came only subsequently and for the first time through his motion for reconsideration dated December 30, 2006,19 in which he completely turned about to declare that the Gemma Agnote who had received the letter was unknown to him.20 Expectedly, Commissioner Reyes disregarded his denial, because not only was the denial an apparently belated afterthought, it was even contradicted by his earlier admission of receipt. In any event, the fact that Gemma Agnote was even the househelp whom Atty. Ricafort had adverted to becomes very plausible under the established circumstances. Thirdly, Atty. Ricafort explained that he had no copies of the receipts for the P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 issued to the Tarogs because "the practice of lawyers in most instances is that receipt is issued without duplicate as it behooves upon the client to demand for a receipt." 21 But such explanation does not persuade us. Ethical and practical considerations made it both natural and imperative for him to issue receipts, even if not demanded, and to keep copies of the receipts for his own records. He was all too aware that he was accountable for the moneys entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only means of ensuring accountability was by issuing and keeping receipts. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly enjoins such accountability, viz: Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Definitely, Atty. Ricafort had a highly fiduciary and confidential relation with the Tarogs. As such, he was burdened with the legal duty to promptly account for all the funds received from or held by him for them.22 And, fourthly, to buttress his denial that the P65,000.00 was not intended for deposit in court, Atty. Ricafort insisted that Arnulfo did not object to the omission from the complaint in the civil action of any mention of consignation. However, the complaint that he himself had written and filed for the Tarogs contradicted his insistence, specifically in its paragraph 16, which averred the plaintiffs (i.e., Tarogs) readiness and willingness to deposit the amount of P69,345.00 (inclusive of the redemption price and interest) in court, thus: 16. And to show willingness and sincerity of the plaintiffs, they are ready and willing to deposit the amount of P69,345.00 as redemption price plus reasonable accrued interests, if there are any;23

Nor could the Tarogs have conjured or invented the need for consignation. The consignation was a notion that could have emanated only from him as their lawyer. In fact, Erlinda recalled while testifying before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline that they had brought to their meeting with Atty. Ricafort only P60,000.00 for the consignation, but that Atty. Ricafort had to instruct them to raise the amount. The excerpt of her pertinent testimony follows:

Comm. Reyes: Madam Witness, in this affidavit you stated that your late husband and Mr. Vidal Miralles went to the office of Atty. Ricafort to advise the latter that we already had the sum of P65,000.00 in the form of check, how did you come to know this fact? Witness: Paano po ba sabi nya na magdeposit ng P65,000.00 tapos may P60,000.00 kami sabi niya dagdagan niyo ng konti. Comm. Reyes: Kinausap ba niya kayo? Witness: Nandoon po ako. Comm. Reyes: Where you present when the check was given? Witness: Yes. Comm. Reyes: So, alam niyo, nakita niyo na binigay yong P65,000.00 na tseke? Witness: Opo. Comm. Reyes: Alam niyo ba kung ano ang nangyari doon sa tseke na idiniposit? Witness: Noong una sinabi niya sa amin na ididiposit niya sa court. Comm. Reyes: Nalaman niyo ba na hindi naman pala idiniposit sa court? Witness: Opo. Comm. Reyes: Kailan niyo nalaman? Witness: Nagsabi siya tapos sinabi pa niya na yong interest sa bank ay ibinigay niya sa amin ang sabi naming salamat.24 B. Atty. Ricaforts acts and actuations constituted serious breach of his fiduciary duties as an attorney The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship.25 In particular, Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Undoubtedly, Atty. Ricafort was required to hold in trust any money and property of his clients that came into his possession,26 and he needed to be always mindful of the trust and confidence his clients reposed in him.27 Thus, having obtained the funds from the Tarogs in the course of his professional employment, he had the obligation to deliver such funds to his clients (a) when they became due, or (b) upon demand.281avvphi1 Furthermore, Rule 16.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, imposes on an attorney the positive obligation to keep all funds of his client separate and apart from his own and from those of others kept by him, to wit: Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.

Atty. Ricaforts act of obtaining P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 from the Tarogs under the respective pretexts that the amount would be deposited in court and that he would prepare and file the memorandum for the Tarogs erected a responsibility to account for and to use the amounts in accordance with the particular purposes intended. For him to deposit the amount of P65,000.00 in his personal account without the consent of the Tarogs and not return it upon demand, and for him to fail to file the memorandum and yet not return the amount of P15,000.00 upon demand constituted a serious breach of his fiduciary duties as their attorney. He reneged on his duty to render an accounting to his clients showing that he had spent the amounts for the particular purposes intended.29 He was thereby presumed to have misappropriated the moneys for his own use to the prejudice of his clients and in violation of the clients trust reposed in him.30 He could not escape liability, for upon failing to use the moneys for the purposes intended, he should have immediately returned the moneys to his clients.31 Atty. Ricaforts plain abuse of the confidence reposed in him by his clients rendered him liable for violation of Canon 16,32 particularly Rule 16.01, supra, and Canon 17,33 all of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His acts and actuations constituted a gross violation of general morality and of professional ethics that impaired public confidence in the legal profession and deserved punishment.34 Without hesitation, therefore, we consider Atty. Ricaforts acts and conduct as gross misconduct, a serious charge under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 8. Serious charges. Serious charges include: xxx 3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct; xxx That this offense was not the first charged and decided against Atty. Ricafort aggravated his liability. In Nuez v. Ricafort,35 decided in 2002, the Court found him to have violated Rules 1.0136 of Canon 1 and Rule 12.0337 and Rule 12.0438 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in relation to his failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of realty to the complainant (who had authorized him to sell the realty in her behalf). His failure to turn over the proceeds compelled the complainant to commence in the RTC a civil action to recover the proceeds against him and his wife. The Court meted on him the penalty of indefinite suspension, and warned him against the commission of similar acts, stating: We concur with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted and approved by the Board of Governors of the IBP, that respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with complainant. Indeed, the record shows respondents grave misconduct and notorious dishonesty. There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent gravely abused the confidence that complainant reposed in him and committed dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her property. Worse, with palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court for the recovery of the proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and energy therefor. Then, despite his deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting in his having been declared in default, he appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended such a step because he did not pay the docket fee despite notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted to prolong the travails and agony of the complainant and to enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and unlawfully done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution. But, remaining unrepentant of what he had done and in continued

pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been validly and lawfully adjudged by the court against him, respondent closed the account against which the checks were drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his obligation as proved by the fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not pay the obligation. All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondents claim of good faith in closing his account because he thought complainant has already encashed all checks is preposterous. The account was closed on or before 26 February 1996. He knew that there were still other checks due on 29 February 1996 and 15 March 1996 which could not be encashed before their maturity dates. By violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished public confidence in the law and the lawyers (Busios v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997]; Ducat v. Villalon, 337 SCRA 622 [2000]). Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the legal profession (Gonato v. Adaza, 328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra). Respondents act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment rendered by the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the checks despite demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of judicial processes, which he, as an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold.39 Bearing in mind his administrative record, and considering that the penalty for violation of Canon 16 ranges from suspension for six months,40 to suspension for one year,41 to suspension for two years,42 depending on the amount involved and the severity of the lawyers misconduct, we rule that disbarment is the commensurate punishment for Atty. Ricafort, who has shown no reformation in his handling of trust funds for his clients. WHEREFORE, we find and declare Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort guilty of a violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, accordingly, disbar him. The Bar Confidant is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Atty. Ricafort is ordered to return to Erlinda R. Tarog the sums of P65,000.00 and P15,000.00, plus interest of six percent per annum reckoned from the demand made on December 3, 2002, within twenty days from notice. This decision is effective immediately. Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for its reference. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio City SECOND DIVISION A.M. No. RTJ-09-2197 April 13, 2011 [Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 08-3026-RTJ] ANTONINO MONTICALBO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE CRESCENTE F. MARAYA, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Calubian, Leyte, Respondent. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This administrative case stemmed from a verified Complaint dated September 24, 2008 filed by complainant Antonino Monticalbo charging respondent Judge Crescente F. Maraya, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Calubian, Leyte, with gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence and grave abuse of authority thru false representation.1 Complainant Monticalbo is one of the defendants in a civil case for collection of a sum of money filed by Fatima Credit Cooperative against him and his wife before the 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Calubian-San Isidro, Leyte (MCTC).2 The case was dismissed by the said court in its February 1, 2008 Order on the ground that the representative of Fatima Credit Cooperative had no authority to prosecute the case.3 The MCTC, however, did not rule on the counterclaim of complainant Monticalbo for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. For said reason, he filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the court.4 Aggrieved, complainant elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Calubian, Leyte (RTC), where his appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. CN-89.5 He then filed a motion for extension of time to file a memorandum on appeal, which was granted by respondent judge in his Order dated June 25, 2008.6 In his August 26, 2008 Order, respondent judge dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time. He stated that: Under the rules on Summary Procedure which was applied to govern the proceedings of this case, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Being a prohibited pleading, it will not suspend the period of appeal. (Jaravata vs. CA G.R. No. 85467, April 25, 1990, 3rd Division). Since the appealed Order was received by counsel for the defendants-appellants on February 13, 2008, the notice of appeal, not a motion for reconsideration, should have been filed within a period of 15 days which lapsed on February 29, 2008. As the Notice of Appeal was filed on March 31, 2008, the appeal was, therefore, filed out of time and the appealed Order has become final and executory. The lapse of the appeal period deprives the courts of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment (Delgado vs. Republic, 164 SCRA 347).7 Complainant Monticalbo imputes the following errors on the part of respondent judge: (1) respondent erred in ruling that Civil Case No. CN-89 is covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, considering that the total claim of the plaintiff in the said case exceeded P10,000.00; (2) respondent, motivated by bad faith and corruption, cited the non-existent case of Jaravata v. Court of Appeals in his questioned Order; and (3) respondent accepted bribes in the form of food from plaintiff cooperative in Civil Case No. CN-89, through Margarito Costelo, Jr., then Sheriff

of the trial court presided over by respondent judge, and Chairman of the Board and President of the said cooperative.8 Complainant further avers that he personally witnessed the respondent judge enjoying a drinking spree with Costelo and his other male staff members in a nipa hut annexed to the building of the trial court during office hours in the afternoons of July 9, 2008, August 6, 2008 and September 10, 2008.9 In his Comment and Manifestations dated December 29, 2008, respondent judge refutes all the accusations hurled by complainant against him. He explains that he decided to dismiss complainants appeal because it was filed out of time under the Rules on Summary Procedure. This decision was made in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the MCTC and of his sound discretion.10 Secondly, he argues that complainants accusation of bad faith and corruption is baseless and that the complaint was filed upon the urging of Atty. Alexander Lacaba, his counsel, in an attempt to get even with him (respondent judge) for having lost the appeal in the case.11 Lastly, respondent denies having participated in any drinking spree with his staff members or Costelo, who has been prohibited by his doctor from drinking alcoholic beverages. He claims that he only eats his meals in the nipa hut because he has to refrain from eating in public eateries for security reasons.12 The administrative complaint was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and referred to the Executive Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City Station, for raffle among the justices thereat for investigation, report and recommendation.13 On April 13, 2010, Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon issued his Report and Recommendation, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows: In sum, it is recommended that respondent Judge be ABSOLVED from the charge of grave misconduct and corruption. However, the citation of a non-existent case by the respondent Judge in his assailed order of dismissal is tantamount to a misrepresentation and therefore reflect poorly on his esteemed position as a public officer in a court of justice, it is therefore recommended that he be ADMONISHED AND STRICTLY WARNED that a repetition thereof will be more severely dealt with.14 The Court agrees with the findings of the Investigating Justice. Grave Misconduct and Bribery In order to merit disciplinary action, it must be established that respondents actions were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred or were attended by fraud, dishonesty or corruption.15 In the absence of such proof, the decision or order in question is presumed to have been issued in good faith by respondent judge.16 This was emphasized in the case of Balsamo v. Judge Suan,17 where the Court explained: The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus, not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge.181avvphi1 In cases where a judge is charged with bribery or grave misconduct, bias or partiality cannot be presumed. Neither can bad faith or malice be inferred just because the judgment or order rendered by respondent is adverse to complainant.19 What constitutes bad faith has been expounded on in the case of Sampiano v. Judge Indar:20 Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill-will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind

affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes. Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.21 Before a judge can be held liable for deliberately rendering an unjust judgment or order, one must be able to show that such judgment or order is unjust and that it was issued with malicious intent to cause injustice to the aggrieved party.22 Well-established is the rule in administrative proceedings that the burden of proof rests on the complainant, who must be able to support and prove by substantial evidence his accusations against respondent.23 Substantial evidence, the quantum of proof required in administrative cases, is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.24 Failure of the complainant to substantiate his claims will lead to the dismissal of the administrative complaint for lack of merit because, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that a judge has regularly performed his duties will prevail.25 In this case, complainant has nothing but mere assertions and conjectures to buttress his allegations of grave misconduct and bribery on the part of respondent who, if complainant is to be believed, accepted bribes of food and engaged in drinking sprees with court employees during office hours. Contrary to complainants statement, the Investigating Justice found that respondent was attending to his cases during the dates when he allegedly had those drinking sessions. Time and again, this Court has held that charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence.26 Complainant miserably failed to substantiate his allegations of grave misconduct and bribery. He merely alleged hollow suppositions to shore up his Complaint. Consequently, this Court has no other option except to dismiss the administrative complaint for lack of merit. Although the Court will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the peoples faith in the judiciary, it will not hesitate to protect an innocent court employee against any groundless accusation or administrative charge which has no basis in fact or law.27 As succinctly put by Justice Quisumbing in the case of Francisco v. Leyva,28 This Court will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon employees of the Judiciary. At the same time, however, neither will we hesitate to shield the same employees from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.29 Gross Ignorance of the Law Respondent judge can be held liable for gross ignorance of the law if it can be shown that he committed an error so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith.30 In addition to this, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence, but should also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.31 Complainant Monticalbo insists that respondent judge erred in ruling that his counterclaim for attorneys fees and litigation expenses was covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure which provides that a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and will not toll the running of the period to appeal. To support his argument, complainant points out that his claim exceeds the P10,000.00 limit set in the Rule on Summary Procedure. Complainant is mistaken. A cursory reading of Section 1 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure clearly shows that complainants claim is covered by the said rule which reads:

Section 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction: A. Civil Cases xxx (2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the plaintiffs claim does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) in Metropolitan Manila, exclusive of interest and costs. Evidently, the complainant has been consulting old books. The rule now, as amended by A.M. No. 02-11-09-SC, effective November 25, 2002, has placed the ceiling at P100,000.00. As such, the complainant has no basis in charging that respondents "knowledge of law fell so short" and that he was remiss in his obligation to be familiar with the law which "even law students these days know such x x x."32 For this reason, counsel for complainant is reminded to choose his words carefully and refrain from hurling insults at respondent judge especially if, as in this instance, he is obviously mistaken in his reading of the law. His use of insulting language and unfair criticism is a violation of his duty as a lawyer to accord due respect to the courts. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that "a lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others." Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent judge erred in issuing the questioned order, he cannot be held liable for his official acts, no matter how erroneous, for as long as he acted in good faith.33 A judge is not required to be faultless because to demand otherwise would make the judicial office untenable for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the administration of justice can be infallible.34 As a matter of policy, a judge cannot be subject to disciplinary action for his erroneous actions, unless it can be shown that they were accompanied by bad faith, malice, corrupt motives, or improper considerations.35 The complainant should have elevated his grievance to the higher courts. The filing of an administrative case against the judge is not an alternative to the other judicial remedies provided by law, neither is it complementary or supplementary to such actions.36 With regard to this matter, the case of Flores v. Abesamis37 is instructive: As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as the case may be. Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed.38

Citation of non-existent case The Court now deals with the charge that respondent judge cited a non-existent case Jaravata v. Court of Appeals with case number CA G.R. No. 85467 supposedly promulgated on April 25, 1990 in his questioned Order. A search of available legal resources reveals that no such decision has been promulgated by the Supreme Court. Besides, Supreme Court docket numbers do not bear the initials, "CA G.R." And, it cannot be considered a CA case because the respondent is the "Court of Appeals." This undoubtedly runs counter to the standard of competence and integrity expected of those occupying respondents judicial position. A judge must be "the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence."39 The Code of Judicial Conduct also demands that he "be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence."40 While a judge may not be disciplined for error of judgment without proof that it was made with a deliberate intent to cause an injustice, still he is required to observe propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his official duties.41 As such, he should always strive to live up to the strict standards of competence, integrity and diligence in public service necessary for one in his position.42 The case of Lacanilao v. Judge Rosete appropriately states that: "A judge should always be a symbol of rectitude and propriety, comporting himself in a manner that will raise no doubt whatsoever about his honesty. Integrity, in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity."43 It is important to note that respondent did not offer any explanation for the incorrect citation of the said case in his Comment to the complaint against him. He should be admonished for his failure to address this issue, especially as it pertains to the proper execution of his office. Nonetheless, considering that this is the first time that respondent has been reported to have committed such carelessness, the Court will accord him leniency. WHEREFORE, the complaint for Grave Misconduct and Corruption is hereby DISMISSED. For citing a non-existent case, however, respondent judge is ADMONISHED to observe due care in the performance of his functions and duties and WARNED that a repetition thereof would be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 6683 June 21, 2011

RE: RESOLUTION OF THE COURT DATED 1 JUNE 2004 IN G.R. NO. 72954 AGAINST, ATTY. VICTOR C. AVECILLA, Respondent. DECISION PEREZ, J.: The present administrative case is based on the following facts: Prelude Sometime in 1985, respondent Atty. Victor C. Avecilla (Atty. Avecilla) and a certain Mr. Louis C. Biraogo (Mr. Biraogo) filed a petition before this Court impugning the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883, i.e., the law that called for the holding of a presidential snap election on 7 February 1986. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 72954 and was consolidated with nine (9) other petitions1 voicing a similar concern. On 19 December 1985, the Court En banc issued a Resolution dismissing the consolidated petitions, effectively upholding the validity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883.2 On 8 January 1986, after the aforesaid resolution became final, the rollo3 of G.R. No. 72954 was entrusted to the Courts Judicial Records Office (JRO) for safekeeping.4 The Present Case On 14 July 2003, the respondent and Mr. Biraogo sent a letter 5 to the Honorable Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Chief Justice Davide), requesting that they be furnished several documents6 relative to the expenditure of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). In order to show that they have interest in the JDF enough to be informed of how it was being spent, the respondent and Mr. Biraogo claimed that they made contributions to the said fund by way of the docket and legal fees they paid as petitioners in G.R No. 72954.7 On 28 July 2003, Chief Justice Davide instructed8 Atty. Teresita Dimaisip (Atty. Dimaisip), then Chief of the JRO, to forward the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 for the purpose of verifying the claim of the respondent and Mr. Biraogo. On 30 July 2003, following a diligent search for the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip apprised9 Chief Justice Davide that the subject rollo could not be found in the archives. Resorting to the tracer card10 of G.R. No. 72954, Atty. Dimaisip discovered that the subject rollo had been borrowed from the JRO on 13 September 1991 but, unfortunately, was never since returned. 11 The tracer card named the respondent, although acting through a certain Atty. Salvador Banzon (Atty. Banzon), as the borrower of the subject rollo.12

The next day, or on 31 July 2003, Chief Justice Davide took prompt action by directing 13 Atty. Dimaisip to supply information about how the respondent was able to borrow the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and also to take necessary measures to secure the return of the said rollo. Reporting her compliance with the foregoing directives, Atty. Dimaisip sent to Chief Justice Davide a Memorandum14 on 13 August 2003. In substance, the Memorandum relates that: 1. At the time the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was borrowed from the JRO, the respondent was employed with the Supreme Court as a member of the legal staff of retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (Justice Gancayco). Ostensibly, it was by virtue of his confidential employment that the respondent was able to gain access to the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.15 2. Atty. Dimaisip had already contacted the respondent about the possible return of the subject rollo.16 Atty. Dimaisip said that the respondent acknowledged having borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 through Atty. Banzon, who is a colleague of his in the office of Justice Gancayco.17 On 18 August 2003, almost twelve (12) years after it was borrowed, the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 was finally turned over by Atty. Avecilla to the JRO.18 On 22 September 2003, Chief Justice Davide directed19 the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) of this Court, to make a study, report and recommendation on the incident. On 20 November 2003, the OCAT submitted a Memorandum20 to the Chief Justice opining that the respondent may be administratively charged, as a lawyer and member of the bar, for taking out the rollo of G.R. No. 72954. The OCAT made the following significant observations: 1. Justice Gancayco compulsorily retired from the Supreme Court on 20 August 1991.21 However, as is customary, the coterminous employees of Justice Gancayco were given an extension of until 18 September 1991 to remain as employees of the court for the limited purpose of winding up their remaining affairs. Hence, the respondent was already nearing the expiration of his "extended tenure" when he borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 on 13 September 1991.22 2. The above circumstance indicates that the respondent borrowed the subject rollo not for any official business related to his duties as a legal researcher for Justice Gancayco, but merely to fulfill a personal agenda.23 By doing so, the respondent clearly abused his confidential position for which he may be administratively sanctioned.24 3. It must be clarified, however, that since the respondent is presently no longer in the employ of the Supreme Court, he can no longer be sanctioned as such employee. 25 Nevertheless, an administrative action against the respondent as a lawyer and officer of the court remains feasible.26 Accepting the findings of the OCAT, the Court En banc issued a Resolution 27 on 9 December 2003 directing the respondent to show cause why he should not be held administratively liable for borrowing the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and for failing to return the same for a period of almost twelve (12) years. The respondent conformed to this Courts directive by submitting his Respectful Explanation (Explanation)28 on 21 January 2004. In the said explanation, the respondent gave the following defenses: 1. The respondent maintained that he neither borrowed nor authorized anyone to borrow the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.29 Instead, the respondent shifts the blame on the person whose signature actually appears on the tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 and who, without authority, took the subject rollo in his name.30 Hesitant to pinpoint anyone in particular as

the author of such signature, the respondent, however, intimated that the same might have belonged to Atty. Banzon.31 2. The respondent asserted that, for some unknown reason, the subject rollo just ended up in his box of personal papers and effects, which he brought home following the retirement of Justice Gancayco.32 The respondent can only speculate that the one who actually borrowed the rollo might have been a colleague in the office of Justice Gancayco and that through inadvertence, the same was misplaced in his personal box.33 3. The respondent also denounced any ill-motive for failing to return the rollo, professing that he had never exerted effort to examine his box of personal papers and effects up until that time when he was contacted by Atty. Dimaisip inquiring about the missing rollo. 34 The respondent claimed that after finding out that the missing rollo was, indeed, in his personal box, he immediately extended his cooperation to the JRO and wasted no time in arranging for its return.35 On 24 February 2004, this Court referred the respondents Explanation to the OCAT for initial study. In its Report36 dated 12 April 2004, the OCAT found the respondents Explanation to be unsatisfactory. On 1 June 2004, this Court tapped37 the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) to conduct a formal investigation on the matter and to prepare a final report and recommendation. A series of hearings were thus held by the OBC wherein the testimonies of the respondent, 38 Atty. Banzon,39 Atty. Dimaisip40 and one Atty. Pablo Gancayco41 were taken. On 6 August 2007, the respondent submitted his Memorandum42 to the OBC reiterating the defenses in his Explanation. On 13 October 2009, the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation 43 to this Court. Like the OCAT, the OBC dismissed the defenses of the respondent and found the latter to be fully accountable for taking out the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 and failing to return it timely. 44 The OBC, thus, recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year.45 Our Ruling We agree with the findings of the OBC. However, owing to the peculiar circumstances in this case, we find it fitting to reduce the recommended penalty. The Respondent Borrowed The Rollo After reviewing the records of this case, particularly the circumstances surrounding the retrieval of the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, this Court is convinced that it was the respondent, and no one else, who is responsible for taking out the subject rollo. The tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 bears the following information: 1. The name of the respondent, who was identified as borrower of the rollo,46 and 2. The signature of Atty. Banzon who, on behalf of the respondent, actually received the rollo from the JRO.47 The respondent sought to discredit the foregoing entries by insisting that he never authorized Atty. Banzon to borrow the subject rollo on his behalf.48 We are, however, not convinced. First. Despite the denial of the respondent, the undisputed fact remains that it was from his possession that the missing rollo was retrieved about twelve (12) years after it was borrowed from the JRO. This fact, in the absence of any plausible explanation to the contrary, is sufficient affirmation that, true to what the tracer card states, it was the respondent who borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954.

Second. The respondent offered no convincing explanation how the subject rollo found its way into his box of personal papers and effects. The respondent can only surmise that the subject rollo may have been inadvertently placed in his personal box by another member of the staff of Justice Gancayco.49 However, the respondents convenient surmise remained just thata speculation incapable of being verified definitively. Third. If anything, the respondents exceptional stature as a lawyer and former confidante of a Justice of this Court only made his excuse unacceptable, if not totally unbelievable. As adequately rebuffed by the OCAT in its Report dated 12 April 2004: x x x However, the excuse that the rollo "inadvertently or accidentally" found its way to his personal box through his officemates rings hollow in the face of the fact that he was no less than the confidential legal assistance of a Member of this Court. With this responsible position, Avecilla is expected to exercise extraordinary diligence with respect to all matters, including seeing to it that only his personal belongings were in that box for taking home after his term of office in this Court has expired.50 Verily, the tracer card of G.R. No. 72954 was never adequately controverted. We, therefore, sustain its entry and hold the respondent responsible for borrowing the rollo of G.R. No. 72954. Respondents Administrative Liability Having settled that the respondent was the one who borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954, We next determine his administrative culpability. We begin by laying the premises: 1. The respondent is presently no longer in the employ of this Court and as such, can no longer be held administratively sanctioned as an employee.51 However, the respondent, as a lawyer and a member of the bar, remains under the supervisory and disciplinary aegis of this Court.52 2. The respondent was already nearing the expiration of his "extended tenure" when he borrowed the rollo of G.R. No. 72954 on 13 September 1991.53 We must recall that Justice Gancayco already retired as of 20 April 1991. Hence, it may be conclu