first 25 cases in administrative law (without ruperto vs. torre)

Upload: jazz-ortega

Post on 19-Feb-2018

215 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    1/268

    G.R. No. 90336 August 12, 1991

    RUPERTO TAULE, petitioner,

    vs.

    SECRETARY LUIS T. SANTOS and GOERNORLEAN!RO ERCELES, respondents.

    Balgos & Perez and Bugaring, Tugonon & Associates

    Law Ofces or petitioner.

    Juan G. Atencia or private respondent.

    GANCAYCO,J.:p

    The extent of authority of the Secretary of Local

    Government over the atipunan ng !ga "aranga#or

    the barangay councils is brought to the fore in this

    case.

    On June 1,1!!, the "ederation of #ssociations of

    $arangay %ouncils &"#$%' of %atanduanes, composed

    of eleven &11' members, in their capacities as(residents of the #ssociation of $arangay %ouncils in

    their respective municipalities, convened in )irac,

    %atanduanes *ith six members in attendance for the

    purpose of holding the election of its o+cers.

    (resent *ere petitioner uperto Taule of San -iguel,

    #llan #uino of )iga, )icente #vila of )irac, "idel Jacob

    of (anganiban, Leo Sales of %aramoran and -anuel

    Torres of $aras. The $oard of /lection

    Supervisors0%onsultants *as composed of (rovincial

    Government Operation O+cer &(GOO' #lberto (.

    -olina, Jr. as %hairman *ith (rovincial Treasurer Luis #.

    -anlapa, Jr. and (rovincial /lection Supervisor #rnoldSouerata as members.

    2hen the group decided to hold the election despite

    the absence of 3ve &4' of its members, the (rovincial

    Treasurer and the (rovincial /lection Supervisor *al5ed

    out.

    The election nevertheless proceeded *ith (GOO

    #lberto (. -olina, Jr. as presiding o+cer. %hosen as

    members of the $oard of 6irectors *ere Taule, #uino,

    #vila, Jacob and Sales.

    Thereafter, the follo*ing *ere elected o+cers of the

    "#$%7

    (resident 8 uperto Taule

    )ice9(resident 8 #llan #uino

    Secretary 8 )icente #vila

    Treasurer 8 "idel Jacob

    #uditor 8 Leo Sales 1

    On June 1!, 1!!, respondent Leandro :. )erceles,

    Governor of %atanduanes, sent a letter to respondent

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    2/268

    Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local

    Government,"protesting the election of the o+cers of

    the "#$% and see5ing its nulli3cation in vie* of several

    ;agrant irregularities in the manner it *as

    conducted.2

    :n compliance *ith the order of respondent Secretary,

    petitioner uperto Taule as (resident of the "#$%, 3led

    his comment on the letter9protest of respondent

    Governor denying the alleged irregularities and

    denouncing said respondent Governor for meddling or

    intervening in the election of "#$% o+cers *hich is a

    purely non9partisan as, petitioner see5s

    the reversal of the resolutions of respondent Secretary

    dated #ugust =, 1!! and September 4, 1!! for

    being null and void.

    (etitioner raises the

    follo*ing issues7

    1' 2hether or not the respondent

    Secretary has ?urisdiction to entertain an

    election protest involving the election of

    the o+cers of the "ederation of

    #ssociation of $arangay %ouncils@

    A' 2hether or not the respondent

    Governor has the legal personality to 3le

    an election protest@

    B' #ssuming that the respondent

    Secretary has ?urisdiction over the

    election protest, *hether or not he

    committed grave abuse of discretion

    amounting to lac5 of ?urisdiction in

    nullifying the election@

    The $atipunan ng !ga Baranga#is the organiation ofall sangguniang "aranga#sin the follo*ing levels7 in

    municipalities to be 5no*n as atipunang "a#an@ in

    cities, atipunang panlungsod@ in

    provinces, atipunang panlalawigan@ in

    regions,atipunang pa!poo@ and on the national

    level, atipunan ng !ga "aranga#. 6

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    3/268

    The Local Government %ode provides for the manner

    in *hich the atipunan ng !ga "aranga#at all levels

    shall be organied7

    Sec. 11C. Organization. 8 &1' The5atipunan at all levels shall be organied

    in the follo*ing manner7

    &a' The 5atipunan in each level shall elect

    a board of directors and a set of o+cers.

    The president of each level shall

    represent the 5atipunan concerned in the

    next higher level of organiation.

    &b' The 5atipunan ng mga barangay shall

    be composed of the 5atipunang pampoo5,

    *hich shall in turn be composed of the

    presidents of the 5atipunang

    panlala*igan and the 5atipunang

    panlungsod. The presidents of the

    5atipunang bayan in each province shall

    constitute the 5atipunang panlala*igan.

    The 5atipunang panlungsod and the

    5atipunang bayan shall be composed ofthe punong barangays of cities and

    municipalities, respectively.

    xxx xxx xxx

    The respondent Secretary, acting in accordance *ith

    the provision of the Local Government %ode

    empo*ering him to Dpromulgate in detail the

    implementing circulars and the rules and regulations

    to carry out the various administrative actions reuired

    for the initial implementation of this %ode in such a

    manner as *ill ensure the least disruption of on9going

    programs and pro?ects%

    issued 6epartment of LocalGovernment %ircular Eo. !9C! on #pril F, 1!!, &to

    provide the guidelines for the conduct of the elections

    of o+cers of the $atipunan ng !ga Baranga#at the

    municipal, city, provincial, regional and national levels.

    :t is no* the contention of petitioner that neither the

    constitution nor the la* grants ?urisdiction upon the

    respondent Secretary over election contests involving

    the election of o+cers of the "#$%, the atipunan ng

    !ga "aranga#at the provincial level. :t is petitioners

    theory that under #rticle :H, %, Section A of the 1!F

    %onstitution, it is the %ommission on /lections *hich

    has ?urisdiction over all contests involving elective

    barangay o+cials.

    On the other hand, it is the opinion of the respondent

    Secretary that any violation of the guidelines as set

    forth in said circular *ould be a ground for 3ling a

    protest and *ould vest upon the 6epartment?urisdiction to resolve any protest that may be 3led in

    relation thereto.

    >nder #rticle :H, %, Section A&A' of the 1!F

    %onstitution, the %ommission on /lections shall

    exercise Dexclusive original ?urisdiction over all

    contests relating to the elections, returns, and

    uali3cations of all elective regional, provincial, and

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    4/268

    city o+cials, and appellate ?urisdiction over all

    contests involving elective municipal o+cials decided

    by trial courts of general ?urisdiction, or involving

    elective barangay o+cials decided by trial courts of

    limited ?urisdiction.D The 1!F %onstitution expandedthe ?urisdiction of the %O-/L/% by granting it

    appellate ?urisdiction over all contests involving

    elective municipal o+cials decided by trial courts of

    general ?urisdiction or elective barangay o+cials

    decided by trial courts of limited ?urisdiction. 9

    The ?urisdiction of the %O-/L/% over contests

    involving elective barangay o+cials is limited to

    appellate ?urisdiction from decisions of the trial courts.

    >nder the la*, 10the s*orn petition contesting the

    election of a barangay o+cer shall be 3led *ith the

    proper -unicipal or -etropolitan Trial %ourt by any

    candidate *ho has duly 3led a certi3cate of candidacy

    and has been voted for the same o+ce *ithin 1C days

    after the proclamation of the results. # voter may also

    contest the election of any barangay o+cer on the

    ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the epublic of

    the (hilippines by 3ling a s*orn petition for%uo

    warranto*ith the -etropolitan or -unicipal Trial %ourt*ithin 1C days after the proclamation of the results of

    the election.11Only appeals from decisions of inferior

    courts on election matters as aforestated may be

    decided by the %O-/L/%.

    The %ourt agrees *ith the Solicitor General that the

    ?urisdiction of the %O-/L/% is over popular elections,

    the elected o+cials of *hich are determined through

    the *ill of the electorate. #n election is the

    embodiment of the popular *ill, the expression of the

    sovereign po*er of the people. 12:t involves the choice

    or selection of candidates to public o+ce by popular

    vote.13

    Speci3cally, the term Delection,D in the contextof the %onstitution, may refer to the conduct of the

    polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the

    electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of

    the votes 1#

    *hich do not characterie the election of

    o+cers in the $atipunan ng !ga "aranga#. D/lection

    contestsD *ould refer to adversary proceedings by

    *hich matters involving the title or claim of title to an

    elective o+ce, made before or after proclamation of

    the *inner, is settled *hether or not the contestant is

    claiming the o+ce in dispute 1$and in the case of

    elections of barangay o+cials, it is restricted to

    proceedings after the proclamation of the *inners as

    no pre9proclamation controversies are allo*ed.16

    The ?urisdiction of the %O-/L/% does not cover

    protests over the organiational set9up of the

    5atipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly

    electedpunong "aranga#s as prescribed by la* *hose

    o+cers are voted upon by their respective members.The %O-/L/% exercises only appellate ?urisdiction over

    election contests involving elective barangay o+cials

    decided by the -etropolitan or -unicipal Trial %ourts

    *hich li5e*ise have limited ?urisdiction. The authority

    of the %O-/L/% over the atipunan ng !ga

    "aranga#is limited by la* to supervision of the

    election of the representative of

    theatipunanconcerned to the sanggunianin a

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    5/268

    particular level conducted by their o*n respective

    organiation. 1%

    Io*ever, the Secretary of Local Government is not

    vested *ith ?urisdiction to entertain any protestinvolving the election of o+cers of the "#$%.

    There is no uestion that he is vested *ith the po*er

    to promulgate rules and regulations as set forth in

    Section AAA of the Local Government %ode.

    Li5e*ise, under $oo5 :), Title H::, %hapter 1, See. B&A'

    of the #dministrative %ode of 1!F, ""

    the respondent

    Secretary has the po*er to Destablish and prescribe

    rules, regulations and other issuances andimplementing la*s on the general supervision of local

    government units and on the promotion of local

    autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said

    units.D

    #lso, the respondent Secretarys rule ma5ing po*er is

    provided in See. F, %hapter ::, $oo5 :) of the

    #dministrative %ode, to *it7

    &B' (romulgate rules and regulations

    necessary to carry out department

    ob?ectives, policies, functions, plans,

    programs and pro?ects@

    Thus, 6LG %ircular Eo. !9C! *as issued by

    respondent Secretary in pursuance of his rule9ma5ing

    po*er conferred by la* and *hich no* has the force

    and e

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    6/268

    supervision is exercised by the (resident through the

    Secretary of Local Government. 2#

    :n administrative la*, supervision means overseeing or

    the po*er or authority of an o+cer to see that thesubordinate o+cers perform their duties. :f the latter

    fails or neglects to ful3ll them the former may ta5e

    such action or step as prescribed by la* to ma5e them

    perform their duties. %ontrol, on the other hand,

    means the po*er of an o+cer to alter or modify or

    nullify or set aside *hat a subordinate o+cer had done

    in the performance of his duties and to substitute the

    ?udgment of the former for that of the latter. The

    fundamental la* permits the %hief /xecutive to *ield

    no more authority than that of chec5ing *hether said

    local government or the o+cers thereof perform their

    duties as provided by statutory enactments. Ience,

    the (resident cannot interfere *ith local governments

    so long as the same or its o+cers act *ithin the scope

    of their authority. 2$Supervisory po*er, *hen

    contrasted *ith control, is the po*er of mere oversight

    over an inferior body@ it does not include any

    restraining authority over such body. 26

    %onstruing the constitutional limitation on the po*er of

    general supervision of the (resident over local

    governments, 2e hold that respondent Secretary has

    no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of

    the election of the o+cers of the 5atipunan. To allo*

    respondent Secretary to do so *ill give him more

    po*er than the la* or the %onstitution grants. :t *ill in

    e

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    7/268

    supervision of the Secretary over local governments

    *hich as earlier discussed is limited to chec5ing

    *hether the local government unit concerned or the

    o+cers thereof perform their duties as provided by

    statutory enactments. /ven the Local Government%ode *hich grants the Secretary po*er to issue

    implementing circulars, rules and regulations is silent

    as to ho* these issuances should be enforced. Since

    the respondent Secretary exercises only supervision

    and not control over local governments, it is truly

    doubtful if he could enforce compliance *ith the 6LG

    %ircular. 32#ny doubt therefore as to the po*er of the

    Secretary to interfere *ith local a

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    8/268

    to uestion the regularity of the elections of the

    o+cers of the "#$%.

    #s to the third issue raised by petitioner, the %ourt has

    already ruled that the respondent Secretary has no?urisdiction to hear the protest and nullify the

    elections.

    Eevertheless, the %ourt holds that the issue of the

    validity of the elections should no* be resolved in

    order to prevent any unnecessary delay that may

    result from the commencement of an appropriate

    action by the parties.

    The elections *ere declared null and void primarily forfailure to comply *ith Section A.= of 6LG %ircular Eo.

    !9C! *hich provides that Dthe incumbent "#$%

    (resident or the )ice9(resident sallpreside over the

    reorganiational meeting, there being a uorum.D The

    rule speci3cally provides that it is the incumbent "#$%

    (resident or )ice9(resident *ho shall preside over the

    meeting. The *ord DshallD should be ta5en in its

    ordinary signi3cation, i.e., it must be imperative or

    mandatory and not merelypermissive, 3%as the rule is explicit and reuires no

    other interpretation. :f it had been intended that any

    other o+cial should preside, the rules *ould have

    provided so, as it did in the elections at the to*n and

    city levels 3&as *ell as the regional level..39

    :t is admitted that neither the incumbent "#$%

    (resident nor the )ice9(resident presided over the

    meeting and elections but #lberto (. -olina, Jr., the

    %hairman of the $oard of /lection

    Supervisors0%onsultants. Thus, there *as a clear

    violation of the aforesaid mandatory provision. On this

    ground, the elections should be nulli3ed.

    >nder Sec. A.B.A.F of the same circular it is provided

    that a $oard of /lection Supervisors0%onsultants shall

    be constituted to oversee and0or *itness the

    canvassing of votes and proclamation of *inners. The

    rules con3ne the role of the $oard of /lection

    Supervisors0%onsultants to merely overseeing and

    *itnessing the conduct of elections. This is consistent

    *ith the provision in the Local Government %ode

    limiting the authority of the %O-/L/% to the

    supervision of the election. #0

    :n case at bar, (GOO -olina, the %hairman of the

    $oard, presided over the elections. There *as direct

    participation by the %hairman of the $oard in the

    elections contrary to *hat is dictated by the rules.

    2orse, there *as no $oard of /lection Supervisors to

    oversee the elections in vie* of the *al5 out staged by

    its t*o other members, the (rovincial %O-/L/%Supervisor and the (rovincial Treasurer. The ob?ective

    of 5eeping the election free and honest *as therefore

    compromised.

    The %ourt therefore 3nds that the election of o+cers of

    the "#$% held on June 1, 1!! is null and void for

    failure to comply *ith the provisions of 6LG %ircular

    Eo. !9C!.

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    9/268

    -ean*hile, pending resolution of this petition,

    petitioner 3led a supplemental petition alleging that

    public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his

    memorandum dated June F, 1!!C, designated #ugusto

    #ntonio as temporary representative of the "ederationto the sangguniang panlalawiganof

    %atanduanes. #1$y virtue of this memorandum,

    respondent governor s*ore into said o+ce #ugusto

    #ntonio on June 1=, 1!!C. #2

    The Solicitor General 3led his comment on the

    supplemental petition #3as reuired by the resolution

    of the %ourt dated September 1B,1!!C.

    :n his comment, the Solicitor General dismissed thesupervening event alleged by petitioner as something

    immaterial to the petition. Ie argues that #ntonios

    appointment *as merely temporary Duntil such time

    that the provincial "#$% president in that province has

    been elected, appointed and uali3ed.D ##Ie stresses

    that #ntonios appointment *as only a remedial

    measure designed to cope *ith the problems brought

    about by the absence of a representative of the "#$%

    to the Dsanggunian ang panlala*igan.D

    Sec. AC4 &A' of the Local Government %ode &$.(. $lg.

    BBF' provides9

    &A' The sangguniang panlala*igan shall

    be composed of the governor, the vice9

    governor, elective members of the said

    sanggunian and the presidents of te

    atipunang panlalawigan and the

    5abataang barangay provincial federation

    *ho shall be appointed by the (resident

    of the (hilippines. &/mphasis supplied.'

    $atas (ambansa $lg. 41, under Sec. A li5e*ise states7

    xxx xxx xxx

    The sangguniang panlala*igan of each

    province shall be composed of the

    governor as chairman and presiding

    o+cer, the vice9governor as presiding

    o+cer pro tempore, the elective

    sangguniang panlala*igan members, andthe appointive members consisting of the

    president of te provincial association o

    "aranga# councils, and the president of

    the provincial federation of the 5abataang

    barangay. &/mphasis supplied.'

    :n 'gnacio vs. Banate Jr. #$the %ourt, interpreting

    similarly *orded provisions of $atas (ambansa $lg.

    BBF and $atas (ambansa $lg. 41 on the composition ofthe sangguniang panlungsod, #6declared as null and

    void the appointment of private respondent Leoncio

    $anate Jr. as member of the (angguniang

    Panlungsodof the %ity of oxas representing

    theatipunang panlungsod ng !ga "aranga#for he

    lac5ed the elegibility and uali3cation reuired by la*,

    not being a barangay captain and for not having been

    elected president of the association of barangay

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    10/268

    councils. The %ourt held that an unuali3ed person

    cannot be appointed a member of the sanggunian,

    even in an acting capacity. :n )e#es vs. *errer,#%the

    appointment of Eemesio L. asgo Jr. as representative

    of the youth sector to the sangguniang panlungsodof6avao %ity *as declared invalid since he *as never

    the president of the 5abataang barangay city

    federation as reuired by Sec. 1FB, $atas (ambansa

    $lg. BBF.

    :n the present controversy involving the sangguniang

    panlalawigan, the la* is li5e*ise explicit. To be

    appointed by the (resident of the (hilippines to sit in

    the sangguniang panlalawiganis the president of

    the atipunang panlalawigan. The appointee must

    meet the uali3cations set by la*. #&The appointing

    po*er is bound by la* to comply *ith the

    reuirements as to the basic uali3cations of the

    appointee to the sangguniang panlalawigan. The

    (resident of the (hilippines or his alter ego, the

    Secretary of Local Government, has no authority to

    appoint anyone *ho does not meet the minimum

    uali3cation to be the president of the federation of

    barangay councils.

    #ugusto #ntonio is not the president of the federation.

    Ie is a member of the federation but he *as not even

    present during the elections despite notice. The

    argument that #ntonio *as appointed as a remedial

    measure in the exigency of the service cannot be

    sustained. Since #ntonio does not meet the basic

    uali3cation of being president of the federation, his

    appointment to the sangguniang panlalawiganis not

    ?usti3ed not*ithstanding that such appointment is

    merely in a temporary capacity. :f the intention of the

    respondent Secretary *as to protect the interest of the

    federation in thesanggunian, he should haveappointed the incumbent "#$% (resident in a hold9over

    capacity. "or even under the guidelines, the term of

    o+ce of o+cers of the atipunanat all levels shall be

    from the date of their election until their successors

    shall have been duly elected and uali3ed, *ithout

    pre?udice to the terms of their appointments as

    members of the sanggunian to *hich they may be

    correspondingly appointed. #9Since the election is still

    under protest such that no successor of the incumbent

    has as yet uali3ed, the respondent Secretary has no

    choice but to have the incumbent "#$% (resident sit as

    member of the sanggunian. Ie could even have

    appointed petitioner since he *as elected the

    president of the federation but not #ntonio. The

    appointment of #ntonio, allegedly the protege of

    respondent Governor, gives credence to petitioners

    charge of political interference by respondent

    Governor in the organiation. This should not be

    allo*ed. The barangays should be insulated from anypartisan activity or political intervention if only to give

    true meaning to local autonomy.

    2I//"O/, the petition is G#ET/6 in that the

    resolution of respondent Secretary dated #ugust =,

    1!! is hereby S/T #S:6/ for having been issued in

    excess of ?urisdiction.

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    11/268

    The election of the o+cials of the #$% "ederation held

    on June 1, 1!! is hereby annulled. # ne* election of

    o+cers of the federation is hereby ordered to be

    conducted immediately in accordance *ith the

    governing rules and regulations.

    The Supplemental petition is hereby G#ET/6. The

    appointment of #ugusto #ntonio as representative to

    the(angguniang Panlalawiganin a temporary capacity

    is declared null and void.

    Eo costs.

    SO O6//6.

    G.R. No. 110120 'a()* 16, 199#

    LAGUNA LA+E !EELOP'ENT

    AUTORITY, petitioner,

    vs.

    COURT O- APPEALS, ON. 'ANUEL N. SERAPIO,

    P(/sdng udg/ RTC, (an)* 12%, Caoo)an Ct,

    ON. 'ACARIO A. ASISTIO, R., Ct 'ao( o4

    Caoo)an and5o( TE CITY GOERN'ENT O-CALOOCAN, respondents.

    Al"erto +. idalgo and -a. Teresa T. Oledan or

    petitioner.

    Te it# Legal Ofcer & ie, Law /epart!ent or

    -a#or -acario A. Asistio, Jr. and te it# Govern!ent

    o aloocan.

    RO'ERO,J.:

    The clash bet*een the responsibility of the %ityGovernment of %aloocan to dispose o< the B4C tons of

    garbage it collects daily and the gro*ing concern and

    sensitivity to a pollution9free environment of the

    residents of $arangay %amarin, Tala /state, %aloocan

    %ity *here these tons of garbage are dumped

    everyday is the hub of this controversy elevated by the

    protagonists to the Laguna La5e 6evelopment

    #uthority &LL6#' for ad?udication.

    The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition 3led*ith this %ourt by Laguna La5e 6evelopment #uthority

    &LL6# for short' doc5eted as G..

    Eo. 1CF4=A against the %ity Government of %aloocan,

    et al. :n the esolution of Eovember 1C, 1!!A, this

    %ourt referred G.. Eo. 1CF4=A to the %ourt of #ppeals

    for appropriate disposition. 6oc5eted therein as %#9

    G.. S(

    Eo. A!==!, the %ourt of #ppeals, in a

    decision1

    promulgated on January A!, 1!!B ruled thatthe LL6# has no po*er and authority to issue a cease

    and desist order en?oining the dumping of garbage in

    $arangay %amarin, Tala /state, %aloocan %ity. The

    LL6# no* see5s, in this petition, a revie* of the

    decision of the %ourt of #ppeals.

    The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    12/268

    On -arch , 1!!1, the Tas5 "orce %amarin 6umpsite of

    Our Lady of Lourdes (arish, $arangay %amarin,

    %aloocan %ity, 3led a letter9complaint2*ith the

    Laguna La5e 6evelopment #uthority see5ing to stop

    the operation of the .9hectare open garbagedumpsite in Tala /state, $arangay %amarin, %aloocan

    %ity due to its harmful e. "uentes failed to settle the problem.

    #fter an investigation by its team of legal and technical

    personnel on #ugust 1=, 1!!A, the LL6# issued

    another order reiterating the 6ecember 4, 1!!1, order

    and issued an #lias %ease and 6esist Order en?oining

    the %ity Government of %aloocan from continuing its

    dumping operations at the %amarin area.

    On September A4, 1!!A, the LL6#, *ith the assistance

    of the (hilippine Eational (olice, enforced its #lias

    %ease and 6esist Order by prohibiting the entry of all

    garbage dump truc5s into the Tala /state, %amarin

    area being utilied as a dumpsite.

    (ending resolution of its motion for reconsideration

    earlier 3led on September 1F, 1!!A *ith the LL6#, the

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    13/268

    %ity Government of %aloocan 3led *ith the egional

    Trial %ourt of %aloocan %ity an action for the

    declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order *ith

    prayer for the issuance of *rit of in?unction, doc5eted

    as %ivil %ase Eo. %9144!. :n its complaint, the %ityGovernment of %aloocan sought to be declared as the

    sole authority empo*ered to promote the health and

    safety and enhance the right of the people in %aloocan

    %ity to a balanced ecology *ithin its territorial

    ?urisdiction.9

    On September A4, 1!!A, the /xecutive Judge of the

    egional Trial %ourt of %aloocan %ity issued a

    temporary restraining order en?oining the LL6# from

    enforcing its cease and desist order. Subseuently, thecase *as raKed to the egional Trial %ourt, $ranch

    1A of %aloocan *hich, at the time, *as presided over

    by Judge -anuel Jn. Serapio of the egional Trial %ourt,

    $ranch 1AF, the pairing ?udge of the recently9retired

    presiding ?udge.

    The LL6#, for its part, 3led on October A, 1!!A a

    motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, that

    under epublic #ct Eo. B!B1, as amended by(residential 6ecree Eo. !=, other*ise 5no*n as the

    (ollution %ontrol La*, the cease and desist order

    issued by it *hich is the sub?ect matter of the

    complaint is revie*able both upon the la* and the

    facts of the case by the %ourt of #ppeals and not by

    the egional Trial %ourt. 10

    On October 1A, 1!!A Judge -anuel Jn. Serapio issued

    an order consolidating %ivil %ase Eo. %9144! *ith

    %ivil %ase Eo. %9144C, an earlier case 3led by the

    Tas5 "orce %amarin 6umpsite entitled D"r. John -oran,

    et al. vs. Ion. -acario #sistio.D The LL6#, ho*ever,maintained during the trial that the foregoing cases,

    being independent of each other, should have been

    treated separately.

    On October 1, 1!!A, Judge -anuel Jn. Serapio, after

    hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the

    consolidated cases an order11denying LL6#s motion

    to dismiss and granting the issuance of a *rit of

    preliminary in?unction en?oining the LL6#, its agent

    and all persons acting for and on its behalf, fromenforcing or implementing its cease and desist order

    *hich prevents plainti< %ity of %aloocan from dumping

    garbage at the %amarin dumpsite during the pendency

    of this case and0or until further orders of the court.

    On Eovember 4, 1!!A, the LL6# 3led a petition

    for certiorari, prohibition and in?unction *ith prayer for

    restraining order *ith the Supreme %ourt, doc5eted as

    G.. Eo. 1CF4=A, see5ing to nullify the aforesaid orderdated October 1, 1!!A issued by the egional Trial

    %ourt, $ranch 1AF of %aloocan %ity denying its motion

    to dismiss.

    The %ourt, acting on the petition, issued a

    esolution12on Eovember 1C, 1!!A referring the case

    to the %ourt of #ppeals for proper disposition and at

    the same time, *ithout giving due course to the

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    14/268

    petition, reuired the respondents to comment on the

    petition and 3le the same *ith the %ourt of #ppeals

    *ithin ten &1C' days from notice. :n the meantime, the

    %ourt issued a temporary restraining order, e

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    15/268

    thereto, since appeal therefrom is *ithin the exclusive

    and appellate ?urisdiction of the %ourt of #ppeals

    under Section !, par. &B', of $atas (ambansa $lg. 1A!@

    and &A' the Laguna La5e 6evelopment #uthority has

    no po*er and authority to issue a cease and desistorder under its enabling la*, epublic #ct Eo. =4C, as

    amended by (.6. Eo. 1B and /xecutive Order

    Eo. !AF, series of 1!B.

    The %ourt of #ppeals thus dismissed %ivil %ase Eo.

    144! and the preliminary in?unction issued in the said

    case *as set aside@ the cease and desist order of LL6#

    *as li5e*ise set aside and the temporary restraining

    order en?oining the %ity -ayor of %aloocan and0or the

    %ity Government of %aloocan to cease and desist fromdumping its garbage at the Tala /state, $arangay

    %amarin, %aloocan %ity *as lifted, sub?ect, ho*ever, to

    the condition that any future dumping of garbage in

    said area, shall be in conformity *ith the procedure

    and protective *or5s contained in the proposal

    attached to the records of this case and found on

    pages 14A91C of the )ollo, *hich *as thereby

    adopted by reference and made an integral part of the

    decision, until the corresponding restraining and0orin?unctive relief is granted by the proper %ourt upon

    LL6#s institution of the necessary legal proceedings.

    Ience, the Laguna La5e 6evelopment #uthority 3led

    the instant petition for revie* on certiorari, no*

    doc5eted as G.. Eo. 11C1AC, *ith prayer that the

    temporary restraining order lifted by the %ourt of

    #ppeals be re9issued until after 3nal determination by

    this %ourt of the issue on the proper interpretation of

    the po*ers and authority of the LL6# under its

    enabling la*.

    On July, 1!, 1!!B, the %ourt issued a temporaryrestraining order16en?oining the %ity -ayor of

    %aloocan and0or the %ity Government of %aloocan to

    cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala

    /state, $arangay %amarin, %aloocan %ity, e

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    16/268

    *hich the %ity Government of %aloocan has territorial

    ?urisdiction.

    The %ourt of #ppeals sustained the position of the %ity

    of %aloocan on the theory that Section F of (residential6ecree Eo. !=, other*ise 5no*n as the (ollution

    %ontrol la*, authoriing the defunct Eational (ollution

    %ontrol %ommission to issue an e01partecease and

    desist order *as not incorporated in (residential

    6ecree Eo. 1B nor in /xecutive Order Eo. !AF, series

    of

    1!B. The %ourt of #ppeals ruled that under Section =,

    par. &d', of epublic #ct Eo. =4C, as amended, the

    LL6# is instead reuired Dto institute the necessary

    legal proceeding against any person *ho shallcommence to implement or continue implementation

    of any pro?ect, plan or program *ithin the Laguna de

    $ay region *ithout previous clearance from the

    #uthority.D

    The LL6# no* assails, in this partition for revie*, the

    abovementioned ruling of the %ourt of #ppeals,

    contending that, as an administrative agency *hich

    *as granted regulatory and ad?udicatory po*ers andfunctions by epublic #ct Eo. =4C and its amendatory

    la*s, (residential 6ecree Eo. 1B and /xecutive Order

    Eo. !AF, series of 1!B, it is invested *ith the po*er

    and authority to issue a cease and desist order

    pursuant to Section = par. &c', &d', &e', &f' and &g' of

    /xecutive Order Eo. !AF series of 1!B *hich provides,

    thus7

    Sec. =. Additional Powers and *unctions.

    The authority shall have the follo*ing

    po*ers and functions7

    xxx xxx xxx

    &c' :ssue orders or decisions to compel

    compliance *ith the provisions of this

    /xecutive Order and its implementing

    rules and regulations only after proper

    notice and hearing.

    &d' -a5e, alter or modify orders reuiring

    the discontinuance of pollution specifying

    the conditions and the time *ithin *hichsuch discontinuance must be

    accomplished.

    &e' :ssue, rene*, or deny permits, under

    such conditions as it may determine to be

    reasonable, for the prevention and

    abatement of pollution, for the discharge

    of se*age, industrial *aste, or for the

    installation or operation of se*age *or5sand industrial disposal system or parts

    thereof.

    &f' #fter due notice and hearing, the

    #uthority may also revo5e, suspend or

    modify any permit issued under this Order

    *henever the same is necessary to

    prevent or abate pollution.

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    17/268

    &g' 6eputie in *riting or reuest

    assistance of appropriate government

    agencies or instrumentalities for the

    purpose of enforcing this /xecutive Order

    and its implementing rules andregulations and the orders and decisions

    of the #uthority.

    The LL6# claims that the appellate court deliberately

    suppressed and totally disregarded the above

    provisions of /xecutive Order Eo. !AF, series of 1!B,

    *hich granted administrative uasi9?udicial functions

    to LL6# on pollution abatement cases.

    :n light of the relevant environmental protection la*scited *hich are applicable in this case, and the

    corresponding overlapping ?urisdiction of government

    agencies implementing these la*s, the resolution of

    the issue of *hether or not the LL6# has the authority

    and po*er to issue an order *hich, in its nature and

    e

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    18/268

    and po*er and authority, the LL6#, by virtue of its

    special charter, obviously has the responsibility to

    protect the inhabitants of the Laguna La5e region from

    the deleterious e

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    19/268

    To be sure, the LL6# *as not expressly conferred the

    po*er Dto issue and e01partecease and desist orderD

    in a language, as suggested by the %ity Government of

    %aloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct

    Eational (ollution %ontrol %ommission under Section Fof (.6. Eo. != *hich, admittedly *as not reproduced

    in (.6. Eo. 1B and /.O. Eo. !AF, series of 1!B.

    Io*ever, it *ould be a mista5e to dra* therefrom the

    conclusion that there is a denial of the po*er to issue

    the order in uestion *hen the po*er Dto !ae, alter

    or modify orders reuiring the discontinuance of

    pollutionD is expressly and clearly besto*ed upon the

    LL6# by /xecutive Order Eo. !AF, series of 1!B.

    #ssuming arguendothat the authority to issue aDcease and desist orderD *ere not expressly conferred

    by la*, there is ?urisprudence enough to the e

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    20/268

    reuirements of procedural due process

    yield to the necessities of protecting vital

    public interests li5e those here involved,

    through the exercise of police po*er. . . .

    The immediate response to the demands of Dthe

    necessities of protecting vital public interestsD gives

    vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the

    6eclaration of (rinciples and State (olicies or the 1!F

    %onstitution. #rticle ::, Section 1 *hich provides7

    The State shall protect and advance the

    right of the people to a balanced and

    healthful ecology in accord *ith the

    rhythm and harmony of nature.

    #s a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person,

    it carries the correlative duty of non9impairment. This

    is but in consonance *ith the declared policy of the

    state Dto protect and promote the right to health of the

    people and instill health consciousness among

    them.D2&:t is to be borne in mind that the (hilippines

    is party to the >niversal 6eclaration of Iuman ights

    and the #lma %onference 6eclaration of 1!F *hichrecognie health as a fundamental human right. 29

    The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order

    by the LL6#, as a practical matter of procedure under

    the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of

    its po*er and authority under its charter and its

    amendatory la*s. Iad the cease and desist order

    issued by the LL6# been complied *ith by the %ity

    Government of %aloocan as it did in the 3rst instance,

    no further legal steps *ould have been necessary.

    The charter of LL6#, epublic #ct Eo. =4C, as

    amended, instead of conferring upon the LL6# themeans of directly enforcing such orders, has provided

    under its Section = &d' the po*er to institute

    Dnecessary legal proceeding against any person *ho

    shall commence to implement or continue

    implementation of any pro?ect, plan or program *ithin

    the Laguna de $ay region *ithout previous clearance

    from the LL6#.D

    %learly, said provision *as designed to invest the LL6#

    *ith su+ciently broad po*ers in the regulation of allpro?ects initiated in the Laguna La5e region, *hether

    by the government or the private sector, insofar as the

    implementation of these pro?ects is concerned. :t *as

    meant to deal *ith cases *hich might possibly arise

    *here decisions or orders issued pursuant to the

    exercise of such broad po*ers may not be obeyed,

    resulting in the th*arting of its laudabe ob?ective. To

    meet such contingencies, then the *rits

    of !anda!usand in?unction *hich are beyond thepo*er of the LL6# to issue, may be sought from the

    proper courts.

    :nsofar as the implementation of relevant anti9pollution

    la*s in the Laguna La5e region and its surrounding

    provinces, cities and to*ns are concerned, the %ourt

    *ill not d*ell further on the related issues raised *hich

    are more appropriately addressed to an administrative

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    21/268

    agency *ith the special 5no*ledge and expertise of

    the LL6#.

    2I//"O/, the petition is G#ET/6. The temporary

    restraining order issued by the %ourt on July 1!, 1!!Ben?oining the %ity -ayor of %aloocan and0or the %ity

    Government of %aloocan from dumping their garbage

    at the Tala /state, $arangay %amarin, %aloocan %ity is

    hereby made permanent.

    SO O6//6.

    G.R. No. L13&2% S/7t/8/( 2&, 1962

    ENA'IN 'ASANGCAY,petitioner,vs.TE CO''ISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.

    Godoredo A. )a!os and )u"# (alazar1Al"erto or

    petitioner.Ofce o te (olicitor General and /o!inador /. /a#otor respondent.

    AUTISTA ANGELO,J.:

    $en?amin -asangcay, *ith several others, *as onOctober 1=, 1!4F charged before the %ommission on/lection *ith contempt for having opened three boxesbearing serial numbers l9CF1, l9CFA and l9CFBcontaining o+cial and sample ballots for themunicipalities of the province of #5lan, in violation ofthe instructions of said %ommission embodied in itsresolution promulgated September A, 1!4F, and itsunnumbered resolution date -arch 4, 1!4F, inasmuchas he opened said boxes not the presence of thedivision superintendent of schools of #5lan, theprovincial auditor, and the authoried representatives

    of the Eacionalista (arty, the Liberal (arty and the%itiens (arty, as reuired in the aforesaid resolutions,*hich are punishable under Section 4 of the evised/lection %ode and ule = of the ules of %ourt.-asangcay *as then the provincial treasurer of #5landesignated by the %ommission in its resolution in %ase%/9Eo. AFC, part :: A &b' thereof, to ta5e charge of thereceipt and custody of the o+cial ballots, electionforms and supplies, as *ell as of their distribution,among the di

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    22/268

    :n compliance *ith the summons issued to -asangcayand his co9respondents to appear and sho* cause *hythey should not be punished for contempt on the basisof the aforementioned charge, they all appearedbefore the %ommission on October A1, 1!4F and

    entered a plea of not guilty. Thereupon, evidence *aspresented by both the prosecution and the defense,and on 6ecember 1, 1!4F the %ommission renderedits decision 3nding -asangcay and his co9respondent-olo guilty as charged and sentencing each of them tosu

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    23/268

    &Slade (er5ins v. 6irector of (risons, 4 (hil.,AF1@ >.S. v. Lee Ioc, B (hil., F@ 'n )eSotto,= O.G., A4FC@ 'n )eNelly, (hil., !=='. Theexercise of this po*er has al*ays been regardedas a necessary incident and attribute of courts

    &Slade (er5ins v. 6irector of (risons, '"id.'. :tsexercise by administrative bodies has beeninvariably limited to ma5ing e

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    24/268

    :G.R. Nos. #966#6%. No;/8/( 22, 1990. 'a(ona4o( Petitioner.

    Pato A. Ga*o 4o( LT Co.

    SYLLAUS

    1. %:):L L#2@ %O--OE %#:/S@ %/T:":%#T/ O"(>$L:% %OE)/E:/E%/@ $O#6 O" T#ES(OT#T:OE,G:)/E TI/ (O2/ #E6 6:S%/T:OE TO 6/%// O/">S/ TI/ %#E%/LL#T:OE O" TI/ S#-/ :"S>((OT/6 2:TI /):6/E%/@ OTI/ $#S/S "O $OTS6/%:S:OES. 8 There can be no dispute that the la*

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    25/268

    &Section 1 &n' of the (ublic Service #ct' gives to the$OT &successor of the (ublic Service %ommission'ample po*er and discretion to decree or refuse thecancellation of a certi3cate of public convenienceissued to an operator as long as there is evidence to

    support its action, as held by this %ourt in a long line ofcases, *herein it *as even intimated that in matters ofthis nature so long as the action is ?usti3ed this %ourt*ill not substitute its discretion for that of the $OT &see

    Javier, /t. #l. v. de Leon, /t #l., 1C! (hil. F41@ Santiago:ce (lant and %o. v. Laho, F (hil. AA1@ aymundo

    Transportation %o. v. %edra, !! (hil. !!@ -anila Pello*Taxicab %o., :nc. v. %astelo, 1C (hil. B!=@ 6agupan :ce(lant %o., :nc. v. de Lucero, /t. #l. citing -anila Pello*

    Taxicab %o.@ :nc., /t #l., v. #raullo, B= O.G. A=1@Sambrano v. Eorthern Luon Transportation %o., B4

    O.G. AAF1'. The $OT, in refusing to cancel thecerti3cates of public convenience of $LT$, relied onthese pieces of evidence@ &1' the letter of $LT$ datedSeptember 1, 1!FA@ &A' reports0complaints from thegeneral public@ &B' reports of its 3eldmen@ and &=' itso*n observations acuired thru inspection trips, all of*hich form part of its records. #s 2e have ruledbefore, the $OT is particularly a fact93nding body*hose decisions on uestions regarding certi3cates ofpublic convenience are in;uenced not only by the factsas disclosed by the evidence in the case before it but

    also by the reports of its 3eld agents and inspectorsthat are periodically submitted to it &see La -allorcaand (ampanga $us %o., :nc. v. -ercado, G.. Eo. L91!1AC, Eovember A!, 1!4, 14 S%# B=B'. Li5e*ise,the $OT has the po*er to ta5e into consideration theresult of its o*n observation and investigation of thematter submitted to it for decision, in connection *ithother evidence presented at the hearing of a case&-anila Pello* Taxicab %o., :nc., /t. #l. v. E. Q $.

    Stables %o., :nc., C (hil. 41 citing -anila Pello*Taxicab %o., :nc., /t. #l. v. 6anon, 4 (hil. F4@ -anila/lectric %o. v. $alagtas, 4 (hil. =A!'.

    A. :6.@ :6.@ :6.@ -// "#:L>/ TO T/-(O#:LP

    O(/#T/ TI/ T#ES(OT#T:OE L:E/S SIO>L6 EOT$/ # GO>E6 "O TI/ %#E%/LL#T:OE TI//O". 8

    Ta5ing into consideration $LT$s letter datedSeptember 1, 1!FA, it acted in good faith *hen it didnot immediately operate on those lines and notbecause of a design to pre?udice public interest.%erti3cates of public convenience involve investmentof a big amount of capital, both in securing thecerti3cate and in maintaining the operation of the linescovered thereby, and mere failure to operatetemporarily should not be a ground for cancellation,

    especially as *hen, in the case at bar, the suspensionof the service *as directly caused by circumstancesbeyond the operators control &(angasinan

    Transportation %o. v. ".". Ialili, /t #l., !4 (hil. !='.

    B. :6.@ :6.@ :6.@ -#P EOT $/ )#L:6LP /)ON/6 :E TI/#$S/E%/ O" 2:LL">L #E6 %OET>-#%:O>S ):OL#T:OE$P TI/ >T:L:TP O(/#TO@ $OT G>:6/6 $P (>$L:%E/%/SS:TP #E6 %OE)/E:/E%/ #S (:-#P%OES:6/#T:OES. 8 :n absence of sho*ing that thereis *illful and contumacious violation on the part of the

    utility operator, no certi3cate of public conveniencemay be validly revo5ed &-ananal v. #use?o, /t #l.,G.. Eo. L9B1C4, #ugust =, 1!, 1= S%# B'. -oreimportantly, *hat cannot be ignored is that the needsof the public are paramount, as elucidated by the $OTin its order. :n the exercise of its po*er to grant orcancel certi3cates of public convenience, the $OT isguided by public necessity and convenience asprimary considerations &see 6ion v. (ublic Service

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    26/268

    %ommission, /t #l., G.. Eo. L9B=AC, #pril BC, 1!FB,4C S%# 4CC'.

    ! E C I S I O N

    'E!IAL!EA,J.?

    This is a petition for certiorariand0or prohibition *ithprayer for the issuance of a restraining order see5ingto annul the order of public respondent $oard of

    Transportation dated January =, 1!F!.

    The antecedent facts, as culled from the pleadings, are

    as follo*s7chanrob1es virtual 1a* library

    On #ugust 4, 1!F1, the then (ublic Service%ommission granted certi3cates of public convenienceto private respondent $atangas Laguna Tayabas $us%o., :nc. &$LT$' for the operation of t*elve &1A' busunits on the (asay %ity 8 Legaspi %ity line &%ase Eo.FC94F=!'@ six &' bus units on the (asay %ity 8 $ulan,Sorsogon line &%ase Eo. FC94F4C', and ten &1C' busunits on the (asay %ity 8 Sorsogon line &%ase Eo. FC94F41' &pp. 4!9=, ollo'.chanrobles la* library 7 red

    On #pril =, 1!F4, petitioner (antranco South /xpress,:nc. &(#ET#E%O' 3led a complaint against $LT$before public respondent $oard of Transportation&$OT', doc5eted as %ase Eo. F49B19%, charging it *ithabandonment of services on said lines from #ugust,1!F1 to #pril, 1!F4 and praying for the cancellation of$LT$s certi3cates of public convenience &pp. !9FC,ollo'.

    On -arch A=, 1!F, in %ases Eos. FC94F=!, FC94F4Cand FC94F41, (#ET#E%O 3led an urgent petitioncharging $LT$ *ith abandoning said services from-arch, 1!F4 to -arch, 1!F and reiterating its prayer

    for the cancellation of the certi3cates of publicconvenience &pp. FF9F, ollo'.

    $LT$ did not 3le any *ritten ans*er either to thecomplaint in %ase Eo. F49B19% or to the urgent petitionin %ases Eos. FC94F=!, FC94F4C, and FC94F41. ather,in a -otion dated July A, 1!F, $LT$, referring tohearings before the $OT on -arch A=, 1!FF and #pril1B, 1!FF, alleged &pp. 1A91A,ollo'7?gc7chanrobles.com.ph

    DB. #t said hearings, espondent admitted non9operation of the bus services authoried in %ases Eos.FC94F=!,FC94F4C and FC94F41 and thus the need for%omplainant to present evidence in both proceedingsmay be dispensed *ith.

    D=. #t the said hearings, espondent advanceda+rmative defenses on %omplainants >rgent -otionof -arch A=, 1!FF &sic' *hich espondent, in itse?oinder of -ay 4, 1!FF, adopted also as itsa+rmative defenses *ith respect to %ase Eo. F49B19%.

    D$rie;y, these a+rmative defenses are7chanrob1esvirtual 1a* library

    &a' espondent actually registered under (>$denomination all the t*enty eight &A' busesauthoried for operation under the certi3cates soughtto be cancelled nnex R#'@

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    27/268

    &b' The follo*ing supervening factors *hich arebeyond espondents control ho*ever, arose andprevented espondent from operating the lines atissue7chanrob1es virtual 1a* library

    &1' The gasoline crises starting 1!F1@

    &A' The destructive big ;oods in 1!FA and 1!F=@

    &B' The general troubled conditions of peace and orderin 1!F1 and 1!FA leading to the declaration of martialla*@

    &=' Starting 1!FB and on to 1!F=,1!F4 and 1!F thenearly prohibitive cost of units and spare parts &ifavailable at all', the higher costs of operations and

    acute tire shortages particularly in 1!F=@

    &4' #ll these, *hich are of general public 5no*ledgeand 5no*n to the $oard, brought the *hole landtransportation industry in *hat might be termed as inextremis condition causing the ban5ruptcy of manyoperators, big and small@ and

    &' %omplainant (antranco South /xpress, :nc. *as notspared the ill e

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    28/268

    DA. Orders the 3ne of (1C,CCC.CC imposed above to bepaid to this $oard *ithin ten &1C' days from receipt byit of a copy of this Order and declares the consolidatedcomplaints 3led in the above9entitled cases closed and

    terminated.

    D"ailure of respondent0applicant to comply *ith any ofthe foregoing reuirements shall be consideredsu+cient cause for this $oard to *ithdra* theauthority herein granted.

    DSO O6//6.Dcrala* virtua1a* library

    :t rationalied the non9cancellation of $LT$scerti3cates of public convenience, as follo*s &pp. 1A

    #91BB, ollo'7chanrobles virtual la*library

    DObviously, cancellation of a certi3cate of publicconvenience is a penalty of the severest degree. :tsconseuences are su

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    29/268

    DThis leads us into discussing *hat the public need isin the areas covered by the certi3cates of publicconvenience in uestion.

    DThe $oard, in its desire to be responsive to public

    need, has al*ays 5ept itself informed of actual andlatest transportation conditions in the provinces,including the $icol region. Thru reports0complaintsfrom the general public, from reports of its 3eldmen,and from its o*n personal observations acuired thruinspection trips, this $oard is a*are that buses *hichare operating are very much less than *hat has beenauthoried. This *as o+cially con3rmed in a meetingof provincial and -etro9-anila bus operators held in-alacaang (alace on June A1, 1!F, presided over byIis /xcellency, (resident "erdinand /. -arcos himself.

    D:n $icol region, for instance, in the past four years&1!F=, 1!F4, 1!F and 1!FF' (S/: &(#ET#E%O'registered and operated less than 4C of itsauthoried units7chanrob1es virtual 1a* library

    Pear #uthoried >nits egistered

    1!F= = 14! units

    1!F4 &not available' 1A units

    1!F =4B AAF units

    1!FF == AA1 units

    and among the lines not so operated or only partiallyoperated, either through expiration of certi3cates,petitioned suspension of operation or for sheer lac5 ofunits are long distance lines from -anila to the

    provinces of Mueon, %amarines Eorte, %amarines Sur,#lbay and Sorsogon aside from lines serving inter9provincial and local needs in Mueon province and the*hole $icol egion. #mong them are the follo*inglines *hich are concurrert in *hole or in portions of the

    lines (asay %ity 8 Legaspi %ity, (asay 8 Sorsogon and(asay 8 $ulan, all the said lines reuiring theoperation of some t*o hundred t*enty seven &AAF'buses7?gc7chanrobles.com.ph

    Dx x x

    DThe non9operation by (S/: &(#ET#E%O' of thesemore than t*o hundred &ACC' buses clearly reuiresthe entry or operation of an eual number of buses.#ny prohibition against an e

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    30/268

    designed to tap the rich natural resources of theregion.Dcrala* virtua1a* library

    Ience, the present petition.

    On January 14, 1!F!, 2e issued a temporaryrestraining order en?oining the $OT from enforcing its

    January =, 1!F! order &pp. 1=F91=, ollo'.chanroblesvirtual la*library

    :n this petition, (#ET#E%O imputes grave abuse ofdiscretion, acting *ithout or in excess of ?urisdiction onthe part of the $OT *hen it issued the uestionedorder, as indicated by several circumstance that itenumerated. #mong these, only the follo*ing deservediscussion7chanrob1es virtual 1a* library

    1' refusal to cancel the certi3cates of publicconvenience of $LT$ despite its abandonment and0ornon9operation on the sub?ect lines since #ugust 4,1!F1 up to the present@

    A' using as basis for its uestioned order $LT$s letterdated September A, 1!FA &*herein it ?usti3ed its non9operation on account of un3nished portions of theroad' *hich is not part of the records of the case@ and

    B' resorting to extraneous facts not supported bycompetent evidence as basis for its conclusion that thedemand of public need *ould be more paramount thanthe need to penalie $LT$.

    "or its part, $LT$ contends that7chanrob1es virtual1a* library

    1' the cancellation or non9cancellation of its

    certi3cates of public convenience is addressed to thesound discretion of the $OT@

    A' its letter dated September 1, 1!FA &erroneouslyreferred to as the letter dated September A, 1!FA'

    forms part of the $OTs records@ and

    B' the $OT acted correctly in the exercise of its sounddiscretion and *ithin its ?urisdiction *hen it found thatthe demand of public need *ould be paramount thanthe need to penalie it &$LT$'.

    There can be no dispute that the la* &Section 1 &n' ofthe (ublic Service #ct' gives to the $OT &successor ofthe (ublic Service ommission' U ample po*er anddiscretion to decree or refuse the cancellation of a

    certi3cate of public convenience issued to an operatoras long as there is evidence to support its action, asheld by this %ourt in a long line of cases, *herein it*as even intimated that in matters of this nature solong as the action is ?usti3ed this %ourt *ill notsubstitute its discretion for that of the $OT &see Javier,/t. #l. v. de Leon, /t #l., 1C! (hil. F41@ Santiago :ce(lant and %o. v. Laho, F (hil. AA1@ aymundo

    Transportation %o. v. %edra, !! (hil. !!@ -anila Pello*Taxicab %o., :nc. v. %astelo, 1C (hil. B!=@ 6agupan :ce(lant %o., :nc. v. de Lucero, /t. #l. citing -anila Pello*

    Taxicab %o.@ :nc., /t #l., v. #raullo, B= O.G. A=1@Sambrano v. Eorthern Luon Transportation %o., B4O.G. AAF1'. The $OT, in refusing to cancel thecerti3cates of public convenience of $LT$, relied onthese pieces of evidence@ &1' the letter of $LT$ datedSeptember 1, 1!FA@ &A' reports0complaints from thegeneral public@ &B' reports of its 3eldmen@ and &=' itso*n observations acuired thru inspection trips, all of*hich form part of its records. #s 2e have ruled

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    31/268

    before, the $OT is particularly a fact93nding body*hose decisions on uestions regarding certi3cates ofpublic convenience are in;uenced not only by the factsas disclosed by the evidence in the case before it butalso by the reports of its 3eld agents and inspectors

    that are periodically submitted to it &see La -allorcaand (ampanga $us %o., :nc. v. -ercado, G.. Eo. L91!1AC, Eovember A!, 1!4, 14 S%# B=B'. Li5e*ise,the $OT has the po*er to ta5e into consideration theresult of its o*n observation and investigation of thematter submitted to it for decision, in connection *ithother evidence presented at the hearing of a case&-anila Pello* Taxicab %o., :nc., /t. #l. v. E. Q $.Stables %o., :nc., C (hil. 41 citing -anila Pello*

    Taxicab %o., :nc., /t. #l. v. 6anon, 4 (hil. F4@ -anila/lectric %o. v. $alagtas, 4 (hil. =A!'.

    Ta5ing into consideration $LT$s letter datedSeptember 1, 1!FA, it acted in good faith *hen it didnot immediately operate on those lines and notbecause of a design to pre?udice public interest.%erti3cates of public convenience involve investmentof a big amount of capital, both in securing thecerti3cate and in maintaining the operation of the linescovered thereby, and mere failure to operatetemporarily should not be a ground for cancellation,especially as *hen, in the case at bar, the suspension

    of the service *as directly caused by circumstancesbeyond the operators control &(angasinan

    Transportation %o. v. ".". Ialili, /t #l., !4 (hil. !='. :nthe absence of sho*ing that there is *illful andcontumacious violation on the part of the utilityoperator, no certi3cate of public convenience may bevalidly revo5ed &-ananal v. #use?o, /t #l., G.. Eo. L9B1C4, #ugust =, 1!, 1= S%# B'. -oreimportantly, *hat cannot be ignored is that the needs

    of the public are paramount, as elucidated by the $OTin its order. :n the exercise of its po*er to grant orcancel certi3cates of public convenience, the $OT isguided by public necessity and convenience asprimary considerations &see 6ion v. (ublic Service

    %ommission, /t #l., G.. Eo. L9B=AC, #pril BC, 1!FB,4C S%# 4CC'.chanrobles la*library 7 rednad

    #pparently, (#ET#E%Os purpose in instituting theproceedings for cancellation of $LT$s certi3cates ofpublic convenience is to remove it &$LT$' as acompetitor in the business in *hich they are bothengaged &see (angasinan Transportation %o. v. ".".Ialili, /t #l., supra', *hich is detestable. /xperiencehas demonstrated that healthy competition al*aysredounds to the bene3t of the commuters and the

    development of transportation as a *hole.

    #%%O6:EGLP, the petition is hereby 6:S-:SS/6. Theorder of the $oard of Transportation dated January =,1!F! is #"":-/6. The temporary restraining orderissued on January 14, 1!F! is L:"T/6.

    SO O6//6.

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    32/268

    G.R. No. L1%%%& No;/8/( 30, 1962

    IN RE CONTE'PT PROCEE!INGS AGAINST

    AR'AN!O RA'OS, ESUS L. CAR'ELO, n *s

    )a7a)t as C*a(8an o4 t*/ P(o/ Co88tt//,

    O@)/ o4 t*/ 'ao( o4 'ana,petitioner9appellant,

    vs.

    AR'AN!O RA'OS, respondent9appellee.

    it# *iscal er!ogenes oncepcion, Jr. or petitioner1

    appellant.

    Ar!ando )a!os or and in is own "eal as

    respondent1appellee.

    REGALA,J.:

    On "ebruary B, 1!C, the -ayor of -anila issued an

    executive order creating a committee Dto investigate

    the anomalies involving the license inspectors and

    other personnel of the License :nspection 6ivision of

    the O+ce of the %ity Treasurer and of the License and

    (ermits 6ivision of this O+ce &of the -ayor'.D Ie

    named -r. Jesus L. %armelo as chairman of said

    committee.

    :t appears that the committee issued subpoenas to

    #rmando amos, a private citien *or5ing as a

    boo55eeper in the %asa de #lba, reuiring him to

    appear before it on June B, , !, 14 and 1 and #ugust

    = and 11, 1!C, in connection *ith an administrative

    case against %risanta /stanislao but that amos, on

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    33/268

    *hom the subpoenas *ere duly served, refused to

    appear.

    %laiming that amos refusal tended Dto impede,

    obstruct, or degrade the administrative proceedings,D

    petitioner 3led in the %ourt of "irst :nstance of -anila a

    petition to declare #rmando amos in contempt. #fter

    hearing, during *hich petitioner *as reuired to sho*

    apri!a aciecase, the trial court dismissed the

    petition. The lo*er court held that there is no la*

    empo*ering committees created by municipal mayors

    to issue subpoenas and demand that *itnesses testify

    under oath. :t also held that to compel amos to testify

    *ould be to violate his right against self9incrimination.

    :t appears that in a statement given to investigators of

    the O+ce of the -ayor, amos admitted having

    misappropriated on several occasions, sums of money

    given to him by the o*ner of %asa de #lba for the

    payment of the latters taxes for 1!491!4! and that

    this fact had not been discovered earlier because

    amos used to entertain employees in the %ity

    Treasurers o+ce at %asa de #lba *here amos *as a

    boo55eeper as stated above. The trial court held that

    to compel amos to con3rm this statement in the

    administrative case against certain employees in the

    O+ce of the %ity Treasurer *ould be to compel him to

    give testimony that could be used against him in a

    criminal case for estafa of *hich the o*ner of %asa de

    #lba *as the o

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    34/268

    Saving the provisions of section one hundred

    and t*o of this #ct, any one *ho, *ithout la*ful

    excuse, fails to appear upon summons issued

    under the authority of the preceding paragraph

    or *ho, appearing before any individual or body

    exercising the po*er therein de3ned, refuses to

    ma5e oath, give testimony, or produce

    documents for inspection, *hen thereunto

    la*fully reuired, shall be sub?ect to discipline

    as in case of contempt of court and upon

    application of the individual or body exercising

    the po*er in uestion shall be dealt *ith by the

    ?udge of 3rst instance having ?urisdiction of the

    case in the manner provided by la*.

    One *ho invo5es this provision of the la* must 3rst

    sho* that he has Dauthority to ta5e testimony or

    evidenceD before he can apply to the courts for the

    punishment of hostile *itnesses. &"rancia v. (ecson, et

    al., F (hil. 1CC.'

    Eo*, *hat authority to ta5e testimony does

    petitioners committee have from *hich the po*er to

    cite *itnesses may be implied, pursuant to section

    4C

    To be sure, there is nothing said in the executive order

    of the -ayor creating the committee about such a

    grant of po*er. #ll that the order gives to this body is

    the po*er to investigate anomalies involving certain

    city employees.

    (etitioner contends that the -ayor of -anila has the

    implied po*er to investigate city o+cials and

    employees appointed by him to the end that the po*er

    expressly vested in him to suspend and remove such

    o+cials of employees &Sec. AA, epublic #ct Eo. =C!'

    may be ?ustly and fairly exercised. 2e agree *ith this

    proposition and 2e held so in the case

    ofPaganlungan v. /e la *uente, = O.G. Eo. 1C, p.

    =BBA. $ut 2e do not agree *ith the petitioner that a

    delegation of such po*er to investigation implies also

    a delegation of the po*er to ta5e testimony or

    evidence of *itnesses *hose appearance may be

    reuire by the compulsory process of subpoena. Thus,

    in denying this po*er to an investigating body in the

    O+ce of the -ayor of -anila, 2e said in *rancia v.Pecson, et al., supra7 D2ere do not thin5 the mayor &of

    -anila' can delegate or confer the po*ers to

    administer oaths, to ta5e testimony, and to issue

    subpoenas.D

    "urthermore, it is doubtful *hether the provisions of

    section 4C of the #dministrative %ode are applicable

    to the %ity of -anila as these pertain to national

    bureaus or o+ces of the government.

    %iting 4C #m. Jur. ==!, petitioner contends that Dthe

    po*er of the investigation committee to issue

    compulsory process to secure the attendance of

    *itnesses undoubtedly exists since only

    complimentary to the po*er of the mayor to

    investigate, suspend and remove city o+cers and

    employees, supra, is the recognied rule that *here

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    35/268

    the statute grants a right, it also confers by implication

    every particular po*er necessary for the exercise

    thereof.D There is no merit in the argument. :n the 3rst

    place, the authority cited spea5s of statutory, grant of

    po*er to a body. Iere, 2e have seen that *hatever

    po*er may be claimed by petitioners committee may

    only be traced to the po*er of the -ayor to investigate

    as implied from his po*er to suspend or remove

    certain city employees. There is no statutory grant of

    po*er to investigate to petitioners committee.

    :n the second place, even granting that the -ayor has

    the implied po*er to reuire the appearance of

    *itnesses before him, the rule, as noted earlier, is that

    the -ayor can not delegate this po*er to a body li5ethe committee of the petitioner. &"rancia v. (ecson, et

    al., supra.'

    Lastly, 4C #m. Jur. Sec. =A, p. =4C itself admits an

    exception to the rule invo5ed by the petitioner. Thus, it

    is stated that D*here the liberty and property of

    persons are sought to be brought *ithin the operation

    of a po*er claimed to be impliedly granted by an act

    because necessary to its due execution, the case must

    be clearly seen to be *ithin those intended to be

    reached.D Iere, no less than the liberty of #rmando

    amos is involved in the claim of the committee to the

    right to cite *itnesses.

    2e hold, therefore, that petitioners committee has no

    po*er to cite *itnesses to appear before it and to as5

    for their punishment in case of refusal. This conclusion

    ma5es it unnecessary for >s to pass upon the other

    error assigned by petitioner as having been allegedly

    committed by the trial court.

    2I//"O/, the decision of the %ourt of "irst :nstance

    of -anila is hereby a+rmed, *ithout pronouncement

    as to costs.

    Padilla, Bautista Angelo, La"rador, oncepcion, )e#es,

    J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, /izon and -aalintal,

    JJ.,concur.

    Bengzon, .J.,too5 no part.

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    36/268

    G.R. No. L292%# No;/8/( 2%, 19%$

    SEC. UIRICO P. EANGELISTA, n *s )a7a)t as

    S/)(/ta( o4 t*/ P(/sd/nta Ag/n) on R/4o(8s

    and Go;/(n8/nt O7/(atons, and t*/

    PRESI!ENTIAL AGENCY ON RE-OR'S AN!

    GOERN'ENT OPERATIONS BPARGO, petitioner,

    vs.

    ON. ILARION U. ARENCIO, as P(/sdng udg/,Cou(t o4 -(st Instan)/ o4 'ana, (an)* ==III,

    and -ERNAN!O 'ANALASTAS, Assstant Ct

    Pu) S/(;)/ O@)/( o4 'ana, and ALL OTER

    CITY O--ICIALS AN! E'PLOYEES SI'ILARLY

    SITUATE!, respondents.

    Ofce o te (olicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, 'st.

    Assistant (olicitor General 3s!eraldo 7!ali and

    (olicitor Bernardo P. Pardo or petitioners.

    Gregorio A. 32ercito and *eli0 . avez or

    respondents.

    'ARTIN,J.:

    This is an original action for certiorariand prohibition

    *ith preliminary in?unction, under ule 4 of the ules

    of %ourt, see5ing to annul and set aside the order of

    respondent Judge, the Ionorable Iilarion J. Jarencio,(residing Judge of the %ourt of "irst :nstance of -anila,

    dated July 1, 1!, in %ivil %ase Eo. FBBC4, entitled

    D"ernando -analastas vs. Sec. amon 6. $agatsing,

    etc.D, *hich reads as follo*s7

    :T :S O6//6 that, upon the 3ling of a

    bond in the amount of (4,CCC.CC, let the

    *rit of preliminary in?unction prayed for

    by the petitioner Vprivate respondentW be

    issued restraining the respondents

    VpetitionersW, their agents,

    representatives, attorneys and0or other

    persons acting in their behalf from further

    issuing subpoenas in connection *ith

    the act18ndinginvestigations to the

    petitioner Vprivate respondentW and from

    instituting contempt proceedings against

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    37/268

    the petitioner Vprivate respondentW under

    Section 4C of the evised #dministrative

    %ode. &Stress supplied'.

    (ursuant to his special po*ers and duties under

    Section = of the evised #dministrative %ode,1the

    (resident of the (hilippines created the (residential

    #gency on eforms and Government Operations

    &(#GO' under /xecutive Order Eo. = of January F,

    1!.2(urposedly, he charged the #gency *ith the

    follo*ing functions and responsibilities73

    b. To investigate all activities involving or

    a

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    38/268

    :T :S O6//6 that, upon the 3ling of a

    bond in the amount of (4,CCC.CC, let the

    *rit of preliminary in?unction prayed for

    by the petitioner Vprivate respondentW be

    issued restraining the respondents

    VpetitionersW, their agents,

    representatives, attorneys and0or other

    persons acting in their behalf from further

    issuing subpoenas in connection *ith

    the act18ndinginvestigations to the

    petitioner Vprivate respondentW and from

    instituting contempt proceedings against

    the petitioner Vprivate respondentW under

    Section 4BC of the evised #dministrative

    %ode. &Stress supplied'.

    $ecause of this, petitioners 4 elevated the matter

    direct to >s *ithout a motion for reconsideration 3rst

    3led on the fundamental submission that the Order is

    a patent nullity.6

    #s unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is *hether

    the #gency, acting thru its o+cials, en?oys the

    authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact9

    3nding investigations.

    :t has been essayed that the life blood of the

    administrative process is the ;o* of fact, the

    gathering, the organiation and the analysis of

    evidence.%:nvestigations are useful for all

    administrative functions, not only for rule ma5ing,

    ad?udication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting,

    for supervising and directing, for determining general

    policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes

    no more speci3c than illuminating obscure areas to

    3nd out *hat if anything should be done.n

    administrative agency may be authoried to ma5e

    investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative

    or ?udicial nature, but also in proceedings *hose sole

    purpose is to obtain information upon *hich future

    action of a legislative or ?udicial nature may be

    ta5en9and may reuire the attendance of *itnesses

    in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. :t may

    conduct general inuiries into evils calling for

    correction, and to report 3ndings to appropriate bodies

    and ma5e recommendations for actions. 10

    2e recognie that in the case before >s, petitioner

    #gency dra*s its subpoena po*er from /xecutive

    Order Eo. =, para. 4 *hich, in an e

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    39/268

    one another *ith the principal aim of meeting the very

    purpose of the creation of the #gency, *hich is to

    forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies

    in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena po*er of

    the #gency is con3ned to mere uasi9?udicial or

    ad?udicatory functions *ould therefore imperil or

    inactiviate the #gency in its investigatory functions

    under

    sub9paragraphs &e' and &h'. -ore than that, the

    enabling authority itself &/xecutive Order Eo. =, para.

    4' 3xes no distinction *hen and in *hat function

    should the subpoena po*er be exercised. Similarly, 2e

    see no reason to depart from the established rule that

    forbids di

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    40/268

    relevant to issues on litigations it does not follo* that

    an administrative agency charged *ith seeing that the

    la*s are enforced may not have and exercise po*ers

    of original inuiry. The administrative agency has the

    po*er of inuisition *hich is not dependent upon a

    case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can

    investigate merely on suspicion that the la* is being

    violated or even ?ust because it *ants assurance that

    it is not. 2hen investigative and accusatory duties are

    delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too

    may ta5e steps to inform itself as to *hether there is

    probable violation of the la*. 21:n sum, it may be

    stated that a subpoena meets the reuirements for

    enforcement if the inuiry is &1' *ithin the authority of

    the agency@ &A' the demand is not too inde3nite@ and&B' the information is reasonably relevant. 22

    There is no doubt that the fact93nding investigations

    being conducted by the #gency upon s*orn

    statements implicating certain public o+cials of the

    %ity Government of -anila in anomalous

    transactions 23fall *ithin the #gencys sphere of

    authority and that the information sought to be elicited

    from respondent "ernando -analastas, of *hich he is

    claimed to be in possession, 2#is reasonably relevant

    to the investigations.

    2e are mindful that the privilege against self9

    incrimination extends in administrative investigations,

    generally, in scope similar to adversary

    proceedings. 2$:n a"al v. $apunan, Jr., 26the %ourt

    ruled that since the administrative charge of

    unexplained *ealth against the respondent therein

    may result in the forfeiture of the property under the

    #nti9Graft and %orrupt (ractices #ct, a proceeding

    criminal or penal in nature, the complainant cannot

    call the respondent to the *itness stand *ithout

    encroaching upon his constitutional privilege against

    self9incrimination. Later, in Pascual, Jr. v. Board o

    -edical 30a!iners, 2%the same approach *as follo*ed

    in the administrative proceedings against a medical

    practitioner that could possibly result in the loss of his

    privilege to practice the medical profession.

    Eevertheless, in the present case, 2e 3nd that

    respondent "ernando -analastas is not facing any

    administrative charge. 2&Ie is merely cited as a

    *itness in connection *ith the fact93ndinginvestigation of anomalies and irregularities in the %ity

    Government of -anila *ith the ob?ect of submitting

    the assembled facts to the (resident of the (hilippines

    or to 3le the corresponding charges. 29Since the only

    purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis

    of future action, any unnecessary extension of the

    privilege *ould thus be un*ise.30#ny*ay, by all

    means, respondent "ernando -analastas may contest

    any attempt in the investigation that tends to

    disregard his privilege against self9incrimination.

    # uestion of constitutional dimension is raised by

    respondents on the inherent po*er of the (resident of

    the (hilippines to issue subpoena. 31-ore tersely

    stated, respondents *ould no* challenge, in a

    collateral *ay, the validity of the basic authority,

    /xecutive Order Eo. =, as amended in part by

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    41/268

    /xecutive Order Eo. . >nfortunately, for reasons of

    public policy, the constitutionality of executive orders,

    *hich are commonly said to have the force and e

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    42/268

    the egister of /ligibles in the O+ce for %entral

    (ersonnel ecords revealed Dthat emolonas name is

    not in the list of passing and failing examinees, and

    that the list of examinees for 6ecember 1C, 1!! does

    not include the name of emolona. "urthermore,

    /xamination Eo. C1A4 as indicated in her report of

    rating belongs to a certain -arlou %. -adelo, *ho too5

    the examination in %agayan de Oro and got a rating of

    4.CC.D4

    6uring the preliminary investigation conducted by

    Jaime G. (asion, 6irector ::, %ivil Service "ield O+ce,

    Lucena %ity, Mueon, only petitioner emolona

    appeared. Ie signed a *ritten statement of

    facts

    regarding the issuance of the uestioned eportof ating of -rs. emolona, *hich is summaried in

    the -emorandumFsubmitted by 6irector (asion as

    follo*s7

    DB.1 That sometime in the 3rst *ee5 of

    September, 1!!C, *hile riding in a Napalaran

    Transit $us from Sta. %ru, Laguna on his *ay to

    San (ablo %ity, he met one #tty. Iad?i Salupadin

    &this is ho* it sounded' *ho happened to be

    sitting beside him@

    B.A That a conversation bro5e out bet*een them

    until he *as able to con3de his problem to #tty.

    Salupadin about his *ife having di+culty in

    acuiring an eligibility@

    B.B That #tty. Salupadin *ho represented

    himself as *or5ing at the $atasan, o

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    43/268

    B. That from 1! to 1!, -r. #merica *as

    able to get six &' chec5s at (A,CC.CC each plus

    bonus of Eery %. emolona@

    B.! That -r. #merica got mad at them. #nd

    *hen he felt that -r. #merica *ould verify the

    authenticity of his *ifes eport of ating, he

    burned the original.D

    "urthermore, emolona admitted that he *as

    responsible in acuiring the alleged fa5e eligibility,

    that his *ife has no 5no*ledge thereof, and that he did

    it because he *anted them to be together. $ased on

    the foregoing, 6irector (asion recommended the 3ling

    of the appropriate administrative action againstemolona but absolved -rs. Eery emolona from any

    liability since it has not been sho*n that she *illfully

    participated in the commission of the o

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    44/268

    exonerated of the charges. #ccordingly, Eery

    emolona is automatically reinstated to her

    former position as Teacher *ith bac5 salaries

    and other bene3ts.D

    On appeal, the %ourt of #ppeals rendered its

    uestioned decision dismissing the petition for revie*

    3led by herein petitioner emolona. Iis motion for

    reconsideration and0or ne* trial *as li5e*ise denied.

    Ience, this petition for revie*.

    (etitioner submits that the %ourt of #ppeals erred7

    D1. in denying petitioners motion for ne* trial@

    A. in holding that petitioner is liable for

    dishonesty@ and

    B. in sustaining the dismissal of the petitioner

    for an o

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    45/268

    Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph &A',

    Section 1A of the $ill of ights applies only to

    admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to

    those made in an administrative investigation.1A

    2hile investigations conducted by an administrative

    body may at times be a5in to a criminal proceeding,

    the fact remains that under existing la*s, a party in an

    administrative inuiry may or may not be assisted by

    counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and

    of the respondents capacity to represent himself, and

    no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being

    investigated *ith counsel. :n an administrative

    proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging

    the services of counsel or not. This is clear from theprovisions of Section BA, #rticle ):: of epublic #ct Eo.

    AAC &other*ise 5no*n as the %ivil Service #ct' and

    Section B!, paragraph A, ule H:) &on discipline' of the

    Omnibus ules :mplementing $oo5 ) of /xecutive

    Order Eo. A!A &other*ise 5no*n as the #dministrative

    %ode of 1!F'. Thus, the right to counsel is not al*ays

    imperative in administrative investigations because

    such inuiries are conducted merely to determine

    *hether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure

    against erring public o+cers and employees, *ith the

    purpose of maintaining the dignity of government

    service. #s such, the hearing conducted by the

    investigating authority is not part of a criminal

    prosecution.1B

    :n the case at bar, emolona *as not accused of any

    crime in the investigation conducted by the %S% 3eld

    o+ce. The investigation *as conducted for the

    purpose of ascertaining the facts and *hether there is

    a prima facie evidence su+cient to form a belief that

    an o

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    46/268

    have been dismissed for cause. This proposition is

    untenable.

    :t cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a

    grave o

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    47/268

    motive or bad faith *as ever imputed to 6irector

    (asion *ho conducted the investigation. The

    presumption that o+cial duty has been regularly

    performed remains unrebutted.

    The transmittal of the transcript of stenographic notes

    ta5en during the formal hearing before the %S% is

    entirely a matter of discretion on the part of the %ourt

    of #ppeals. evised #dministrative %ircular Eo. 19!4 of

    this %ourt clearly states that in resolving appeals from

    uasi9?udicial agencies, it is *ithin the discretion of the

    %ourt of #ppeals to have the original records of the

    proceedings under revie* transmitted to it.AC)erily,

    the %ourt of #ppeals decided the merits of the case on

    the bases of the uncontroverted facts and admissionscontained in the pleadings 3led by the parties.

    2e li5e*ise 3nd no merit in the contention of

    emolona that the penalty of dismissal is too harsh

    considering that there *as no damage caused to the

    government since the certi3cate of rating *as never

    used to get an appointment for his *ife, Eery

    emolona. #lthough no pecuniary damage *as

    incurred by the government, there *as still falsi3cation

    of an o+cial document that constitutes gross

    dishonesty *hich cannot be countenanced,

    considering that he *as an accountable o+cer and

    occupied a sensitive position.A1The %ode of %onduct

    and /thical Standards for (ublic O+cials and

    /mployees enunciates the State policy of promoting a

    high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the

    public service.AA

    2I//"O/, the decision appealed from is hereby

    #"":-/6 in toto.

    SO O6//6.

    G.R. No. #3#9 S/7t/8/( 2#, 190&

    TE UNITE! STATES,plainti

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    48/268

    :n the %ourt of "irst :nstance of the city of -anila the

    defendant *as charged *ithin a violation of

    paragraphs FC and B of %ircular Eo. B!F of the :nsular

    %ollector of %ustoms, duly published in the O+cial

    Gaette and approved by the Secretary of "inance and

    Justice.1#fter a demurrer to the complaint of the

    lighter -aude, he *as moving her and directing her

    movement, *hen heavily laden, in the (asig iver, by

    bamboo poles in the hands of the cre*, and *ithout

    steam, sail, or any other external po*er. (aragraph FC

    of %ircular Eo. B!F reads as follo*s7

    Eo heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar

    craft shall be permitted to move in the (asig

    iver *ithout being to*ed by steam or movedby other adeuate po*er.

    (aragraph B reads, in part, as follo*s7

    "or the violation of any part of the foregoing

    regulations, the persons o

  • 7/23/2019 First 25 Cases in Administrative Law (Without Ruperto vs. Torre)

    49/268

    both such 3ne and imprisonment, at the

    discretion of the court@ Provided, That violations

    of la* may be punished either by the method

    prescribed in section seven hereof, or by that

    prescribed in this section or by both.

    >nder this statute, *hich *as not referred to on the

    argument, or in the original briefs, there is no di+culty

    in sustaining the regulation of the %ollector as coming

    *ithin the terms of section 4. Lighterage, mentioned in

    the #ct, is the very business in *hich this vessel *as

    engaged, and *hen heavily laden *ith hemp she *as

    navigating the (asig iver belo* the $ridge of Spain,

    in the city of -anila. This spot is near the mouth of the

    river, the doc5s *hereof are used for the purpose ofta5ing on and discharging freight, and *e entertain no

    doubt that it *as in right sense a part of the harbor,

    *ithout having recourse to the de3nition of paragraph

    of %ustoms #dministrative %ircular Eo. 1B, *hich

    reads as follo*s7

    The limits of a harbor for the purpose of

    licensing vessels as herein prescribed &for the

    lighterage and harbor business' shall be

    considered to include its con;uent navigable

    rivers and la5es, *hich are navigable during any

    season of the year.

    The necessity con3ding to some local authority the

    framing, changing, and enforcing of harbor regulations

    is recognied throughout the *orld, as each region and

    each a harbor reuires peculiar use more minute than

    could be enacted by the central