R.T.E.A.N & ORS v. AJEWOLE & ORS

CITATION: (2016) LPELR-41271(CA)

In the Court of AppealIn the Kaduna Judicial Division

Holden at Kaduna

ON MONDAY, 29TH FEBRUARY, 2016Suit No: CA/K/287/2009

Before Their Lordships:

HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU Justice, Court of AppealOLUDOTUN ADEBOLA ADEFOPE-OKOJIE Justice, Court of AppealAMINA AUDI WAMBAI Justice, Court of Appeal

BetweenROAD TRANSPORT EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATION OFNIGERIACHIEF ABUBAKAR SADIQ (STATE CHAIRMAN FCTABUJA)CHIEF M. O. AJAYI (NATIONAL PATRON)CHID F. O. U. NWOGU (NATIONAL INTERNALAUDITOR)MAZI AMOBI OYEMUWA (FIRST ASST NATIONALSECRETARY GENERAL)

- Appellant(s)

AndMR. OLUFEMI AJEWOLEMR. MOSES OGUNFAYOREV. O. L. EDEMAALHAJI SHEHU MUSA ISHEWELEMAGISU AKINPELU

- Respondent(s)

RATIO DECIDENDI

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1. APPEAL - ISSUE(S) FOR DETERMINATION: Whether issue(s) for determination must relate tothe grounds of appeal filed"It is elementary that to be relevant in an appeal, issues for determination and arguments thereonmust relate to and challenge the ratio of the decision appealed against - Eyigebe Vs Iyayi (2013)11 NWLR (Pt 1365) 407 and Tukur Vs Interglobal Procurement Engineering Services Ltd (2014) 17NWLR (pt 1437) 575."Per ABIRU, J.C.A. (P. 17, Paras. B-D) - read in context

2. APPEAL - FRESH POINT(S) ON APPEAL: Whether fresh point can be raised at the Court ofAppeal"It is settled law that a Respondent's Notice of Contention is not an opportunity to raise freshissues which had not come up for consideration before the lower Court - Uhumwangho Vs Okojie(1989) 12 SCNJ 84, Nabisco Inc Vs Allied Biscuits Co. Ltd (1998) 7 SCNJ 235, Delta StateGovernment Vs Okon (2002) 2 NWLR (pt 712) 665, Touton S A Vs Grimaldi Compagnia Di NavigaZioni SPA (2010) LPELR-5033(CA). The Respondents' motion dated the 30th of August, 2007 andthe issues canvassed therein did not come up for hearing before the lower Court and did notconstitute part of the issue raised suo motu by the lower Court. The issues raised in the motioncannot thus be raised in this appeal and cannot form the basis for this Court affirming or varyingthe decision of the lower Court on the issue raised by that Court suo motu. The Notice ofContention is an attempt by the Respondents to argue their motion on notice filed before thelower Court and dated 30th of August, 2007 before this Court directly. They cannot be allowed todo so. This is an appellate Court and its jurisdiction is confined to reviewing the decision of a lowerCourt in order to find out whether, on proper consideration of the facts placed before it and theapplicable law, the lower Court arrived at the right decision. In the absence of such a decision of alower Court, there cannot be anything for this Court to deliberate on - Dagaci of Dere & Ors VsDagaci of Ebwa & Ors (2006) 7 NWLR (pt 979) 382, Abdullahi Vs State (2013) 11 NWLR (pt 1366)435, Yaro Vs National Salaries, wages and Income Commission (2013) 12 NWLR (pt.1367) 173."PerABIRU, J.C.A. (Pp. 8-9, Paras. D-F) - read in context

3. COURT - JURISDICTION: What determines jurisdiction of Court to entertain a cause/matter"It is settled law that it is the case of the plaintiff as endorsed on the writ of summons andelaborated in the statement of claim or any other originating process that determines thejurisdiction of the Court - Elelu-Habeeb Vs Attorney General, Federation (2012) 13 NWLR (pt 1318)423, Merill Guaranty Savings & Loans Ltd Vs WorldGate Building Society Ltd (2013) 1 NWLR (Pt1336) 581, Uwazurike Vs Nwachukwu (2013) 3 NWLR (pt 1342) 503, Ahmed Vs Ahmed (2013) 15NWLR (pt.1377) 274."Per ABIRU, J.C.A. (P. 43, Paras. B-D) - read in context

4. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE - RULES OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE: Duty of Courtsto give effect to the intention of legislature when interpreting statutes"... It is not the duty of the Court to ascribe meaning to the clear, plain and unambiguousprovisions of a Statute in order to give them a slant which accords with the Court's own view -lzedonmwen Vs Union Bank of Nigeria Plc (2012) 6 NWLR (Pt 1295) 1. This is particularly more sowhere the Statute in question seeks to restrict access of citizens to Court, as in this case, becausethe wordings of such a Statute must be interpreted strictly and must not be stretched beyond itsordinary meaning unless the need for such stretched interpretation is expressly stipulated in theStatute."Per ABIRU, J.C.A. (P. 41, Paras. B-E) - read in context

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5. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE - RULES OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE: Duty of Courtsto give effect to the intention of legislature when interpreting statutes"Reading through the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act, it is clear that their essence isto compel parties to go through the conciliation and arbitration process provided for in theprovisions before they can access the National Industrial Court for adjudication of their disputes.Now, it is an established principle of interpretation that where the right of access of a person toCourt is either taken away or restricted by any Statute, the language of any such Statute orprovision will not be extended beyond its obvious meaning unless clear words are used to justifysuch extension. This is mainly because it is the practice of the Court to guard its jurisdictionjealously. Thus, while interpreting any outer or restrictive clause in a Statute the Courts usuallyscrutinize every aspect of such provision with a view to ensuring that everything done under suchStatute is done strictly in compliance with the provisions of the Statute. Where the Court finds thatthere is a failure to strictly comply with what the Statute provides for, such an act purported to bedone under the Statute would be ultra vires and would be declared null and void as such actionwould be regarded not to have been carried out under the said provisions of the Statute - InakojuVs Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (pt 1025) 423, Maikyo Vs Itodo (2007) 7 NWLR (pt 1034) 443, Olaleye-Ote Vs Babalola (2012) 6 NWLR (pt 1297) 574. Applying this principle of interpretation to theprovisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act it is clear that they apply only what is referred to asa "trade dispute", and not to any other type of dispute. This Court notes that Section 2 of theTrade Disputes Act states that "no person shall commence an action, the subject matter of a tradedispute or any other inter or intra union dispute in a Court of law.Per ABIRU, J.C.A. (Pp. 28-32,Paras. A-B) - read in context

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6. INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE - RULES OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE: Duty of Courtsto give effect to the intention of legislature when interpreting statutes"It is trite that in interpreting a Statute, the duty of a Court is to discover the intention of thelawmaker and in so doing it must consider the words used in order to discover their ordinarymeaning, and then give use their ordinary meaning as they relate to the subject matter - MerillGuaranty Savings & Loans Ltd Vs Worldgate Building Society Ltd (2013) 1 NWLR (pt 1336) 581,Gbagbarigha vs Toruemi (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt 1350) 289, Commissioner for Education, Imo State VsAmadi (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt 1370) 133. And in doing so, a Court must not give an interpretationthat would defeat the intention and purpose of the lawmakers, and it should adopt a holisticapproach and interpret the provisions dealing with a subject matter together to get the trueintention of the lawmakers and should adapt a holistic approach and interpret the provisionsdealing with a subject matter together to get the true intention of the law maker and should aimat giving a Statute a purposeful interpretation - Abia State University, Uturu Vs Otosi (2011) 1NWLR (pt.1229) 605, Ayodele Vs State (2011) 6 NWLR (pt.1243) 309, National Union of RoadTransport Workers Vs Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt 1307)170, Attorney General, Federation Vs Attorney General, Lagos State (2013) 16 NWLR (pt 1380)249. A Statute must be read as a whole, and not parts in isolation, and that the different parts ofthe Statute must be interpreted in the light of the whole Statute and an effort must be made toachieve harmony amongst its different parts - Amalgamated Trustees Ltd Vs Associated DiscountHouse Ltd (2007) 15 NWLR (Pt 1056) 118, Nigerian Army Vs Aminu- Kano (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt 1188)429, Abubakar Vs Nasumu (No. 2) (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt 1330) 523.Applying these principles to the interpretation of Section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act2006 vis-a-vis the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act, this Court must say that it isunable to agree with the Counsel to the Appellants that the provisions of Part 1 of the TradeDisputes Act do not come within the contemplation of the Act of the National Assembly referred toin Section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act. If the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade DisputesAct were not contemplated, theNational Industrial Court Act would either have repealed them, as it did of Part II of the TradeDisputes Act or it would have limited their scope of operation. Having not done either and havingsaid in its Section 53(2) that the surviving provisions of the Trade Disputes Act must beinterpreted in a manner to bring them in conformity with the provisions of the National IndustrialCourt Act 2006, it means that the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act must be read intothe provisions of Section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act as one of the Acts of the NationalAssembly contemplated or envisaged. To hold otherwise will be to suggest that though theLegislature chose to preserve the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act by not repealing itin the National Industrial Court Act, it did not intend for the provisions to be of any use as it "may"pass another law on the conciliation and arbitration of trade disputes which will then beoperational under Section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act. It is trite that there is alwaysthere is a presumption against the legislature intending what is unreasonable and inconvenient inthe interpretation of Statute. Thus, it is trite that common sense must be applied in construingStatutes and the construction agreeable to justice and reason must be adopted - Ibrahim VsSheriff (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt 892) 43, Elabanjo vs Dawodu (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt 1001) 76, Sobamowovs Elemuren (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt 1097) 12. In Attorney General, Nasarawa State Vs AttorneyGeneral, Plateau State (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt 1309) 419, the Supreme Court stated that noreasonable Court or Tribunal will impute any absurd or unjust consequences to a Statute or implyin a Statute consequences that will lead to absurdity or injustice. The position of the law in thisrespect is well set out in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12 Edition by Langan, 1976 atpage 199 thus: "In determining either the general object of the legislature, or the meaning of itslanguage in any particular passage, It is obvious that the intention which appears to be most inaccord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles should, in all cases of doubtfulsignificance, be presumed to be the true one. An intention to produce an unreasonable result isnot to be imputed to a Statute if there is some other construction available.Per ABIRU, J.C.A. (Pp.22-26, Paras. A-C) - read in context

7. LABOUR LAW - TRADE DISPUTE: Meaning of trade dispute; factors which must co-exist for acause of action to be considered a trade dispute"... These provisions are contained in Part 1 of the Act which is headed "Procedure for settlingtrade disputes" and Section 1 states that Per ABIRU, J.C.A. (Pp. 26-28, Paras. F-A) - read in context

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8. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - ADDRESS OF COUNSEL: Whether the address of counsel isbinding on Court"This however does not mean that this Court must accept the arguments of the Counsel to theAppellants as gospel truth and automatically enter judgment in favour of the Appellants. This isbecause the address of Counsel is not binding on the Court. The Court must still assess thearguments - Oruboko Vs Oruene (1996) 7 NWLR (pt 462) 555, Ogbu Vs The State (2007) All FWLR(Pt 361) 1651., Eya Vs Olopade (2011) 11 NWLR (pt 1259) 505 and Independent National ElectoralCommission Vs Nyako (2011) 12 NWLR (pt 1262) 439. In Edonkumoh Vs Mutu (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt620) 633, Ibiyeye, JCA stated at 652 E-F thus: Per ABIRU, J.C.A. (Pp. 17-18, Paras. E-E) - read incontext

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HABEEB ADEWALE OLUMUYIWA ABIRU, J.C.A.

(Delivering the Leading Judgment): This appeal is

against the decision of the National Industrial Court sitting

in Kano contained in a Ruling delivered on the 18th of May,

2009 in Suit No NIC/7/2007. The Appellants, as plaintiffs,

commenced the action in the lower Court against the

Respondents, as defendants, and they, by an amended

originating summons dated the 18th of May, 2007 and filed

on the 21st of May, 2007, posed the following questions for

resolution by the lower Court:

i. Whether the defendants, in view of the trade dispute

declared by the 4th and 5th Plaintiffs for themselves and on

behalf of South East and South South Zones of RTEAN

through a notice to that effect dated the 23rd of June 2005,

in compliance with the stipulation of the Union's

Constitution in Article 6c, can proceed to purport to plan,

organize, convene or hold a National Delegates Conference

at Abeokuta Ogun State of Nigeria on the 27th and 28th of

February, 2007 without first resolving the dispute, having

regard to the weight of the issues involved in the trade

dispute.

ii. Whether the defendants can purport to organize a

National

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Delegates conference of RTEAN at Abeokuta Ogun State on

the 27th and 28th of February, 2007 despite the

Notification of Trade Dispute (intra) given to the Honorable

Minister of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity

Abuja in accordance with the Trade Disputes Act Cap 432

Laws of the Federation 1990 on the 19th of July 2005

through a letter signed by the 5th Defendant and the

requisite Form TD/3 dated 19th of July, 2005.

iii. Whether in view of the letter of the Honorable Minister

of Labour dated the 17th of August, 2005 with reference

No ML-HB/7663/1/12 signed by Mrs. Eghobamien inviting

the defendants to a meeting for the resolution of the Trade

Dispute, which has not yet been concluded, and the further

letter of the Honorable Minister of Labour and Productivity

signed by Mr. Chris Ahata dated the 25th of July, 2006 with

reference No ML.IB/56/111/176 denying the defendants of

approval to hold a National Delegates Conference, can the

defendants still disregard same and hold a National

Delegates Conference.

iv. Whether in view of Section 36 (1) of the Constitution of

the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 and Article 13(i) (a)

Article 15,

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Section 10(b) Article 15 and Section 12(b) Article 19(a) of

the Constitution of RTEAN of September 2003, the

defendants can legitimately hold a National Delegates

Conference.

v. Whether in view of the appeal pending in the Court of

Appeal, Lagos Judicial Division in Appeal No CA/L/108/03

filed by Chief Ogunyade challenging the purported election

of the defendants, the defendants can still proceed to

organize a National Delegates Conference.

vi. And if questions (i) to (iv) are answered in the

affirmative, whether the 4th and 5th plaintiffs are not

entitled to be heard on their grievances, and if they are so

entitled to be heard, whether the Court cannot declare the

purported holding or convening of the National Delegates

Conference of RTEAN at Abeokuta Ogun State on the 27th

and 28th of February 2007 as illegal and void and of no

effect whatsoever.

Consequent on the resolution of the above questions, the

Appellants prayed for the following orders:

i. A declaration that the purported holding of the National

Delegates Conference of the RTEAN by the defendants at

Abeokuta Ogun State on the 27th and 28th of February,

2007 without the resolution

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of the issues raised in the plaintiffs Notice of Trade Dispute

is unlawful, illegal, null and void and of no effect

whatsoever.

ii. An order of the Court directing the defendants and all

parties concerned in the intra union dispute of RTEAN to

resolve all major intra union disputes by involving all zones

of the Union before holding a united and an all embracing

National Delegates Conference.

The amended originating summons as supported by an

affidavit of facts and to which was attached exhibits. Upon

being served with the processes, the Respondents filed a

memorandum of appearance as well as a motion on notice

dated the 30th of August, 2007. The motion prayed for:

i. An order striking out the suit for incompetence as the

Plaintiffs had no locus standi to institute this action.

ii. An order striking out this suit for fraud and deceit.

iii. An order striking out this suit for this Honorable Court

lacks requisite jurisdiction.

The motion was supported by an affidavit with exhibits

attached.

In the course of the proceedings on the 26th of September

2008, the lower Court expressed doubt as to its

competence to hear and determine

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the subject matter of the suit and it consequently raised the

issue suo motu and directed the parties to address it on its

jurisdictional competence to hear and determine the

subject matter of the suit. Counsel to the parties filed their

written addresses, but whilst the written address of the

Appellants, as plaintiffs, limited its scope to the issue raised

by the lower Court, the written address of the Respondents,

as defendants, strayed beyond the issue. In addition to

addressing on the issue raised suo motu by the lower

Court, Counsel to the Respondents also addressed on the

propriety of the reliefs sought on the amended originating

summons, fraudulent misrepresentation, locus standi,

wrong description of case and abuse of process. These

were arguments on the issues contained in the

Respondents' application of 30th of August 2007. In its

Ruling, the lower Court ignored the arguments of the

Counsel to the Respondents on issues outside the singular

issue it raised suo motu. In resolving the issue of its

jurisdictional competence to entertain the subject matter of

the case of the Appellants, the lower Court held that it did

not possess original jurisdiction to

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entertain the claims of the Appellants and it struck out the

suit for want of jurisdiction. The Appellants were

dissatisfied with the Ruling and they caused their Counsel

to file a notice of appeal against it. The notice of appeal is

dated 12th of June, 2009, but was filed on the 15th of June,

2009 and it contained six grounds of appeal.

In arguing his appeal before this Court, Counsel to the

Appellants filed a brief of arguments dated the 8th of

February, 2010 on the 12th of April, 2013. Counsel to the

Respondents responded by a brief of arguments dated the

20th of March, 2014 and filed on the 24th of March, 2014.

Counsel to the Appellants filed a reply brief of arguments

dated the 24th of April, 2014 on the 2nd of May, 2014.

Counsel to the Respondents additionally filed an amended

Notice of Contention praying that the Ruling of the lower

Court be upheld on other grounds other than that relied

upon by the lower Court and it was dated the 20th of

March, 2014. The Respondents' brief on the notice of

contention was dated the 20th of March, 2014 and it was

filed on the 24th of March, 2014. Counsel to the Appellants

filed a brief of arguments dated the 24th of

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April, 2014 in response on the 2nd of May, 2014. Counsel

to the Respondents filed a reply brief of arguments dated

the 3rd of November 2014. At the hearing of the appeal,

Counsel to the parties adopted and relied on the arguments

contained in their respective briefs of arguments on both

the appeal and on the amended Notice of Contention as

their oral submissions.

By the amended Notice of Contention, the Respondents

intended to contend that this Court should affirm the

decision of the lower Court on different grounds and these

were listed as (i) improper to pray for an injunctive relief

for an action that has already been concluded; (ii)

amending pleadings and reliefs sought in the original

processes contrary to the prayers granted by the lower

Court; (iii) deceitfully including the names of dead persons

and other persons without their consent which is fraudulent

misrepresentation; (iv) lack of locus standi; (v) claim of the

Appellant had to do with election/electoral matters -

Delegates Conference which is not a labour matter per se,

and (vi) abuse of process. These were the issues raised by

the Respondents in their motion dated the 30th of August,

2007.

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This motion was not taken by the lower Court.

The issue that the lower Court raised suo motu and on

which it directed the parties to address it was whether it

had jurisdictional competence to hear and determine the

subject matter of the claims of the Appellants. It is correct

that in addressing the lower Court on the issue raised,

Counsel to the Respondents digressed into arguing the

issues raised in their motion dated the 30th of August,

2007, and which are the issues raised in the Notice of

Contention, and the lower Court rightly, in the view of this

Court, discountenanced the digressing arguments and

focused only on those that were related to the issue it

raised suo motu.

It is settled law that a Respondent's Notice of Contention is

not an opportunity to raise fresh issues which had not come

up for considerat ion before the lower Court -

Uhumwangho Vs Okojie (1989) 12 SCNJ 84, Nabisco

Inc Vs Allied Biscuits Co. Ltd (1998) 7 SCNJ 235,

Delta State Government Vs Okon (2002) 2 NWLR (pt

712) 665, Touton S A Vs Grimaldi Compagnia Di

Naviga Zioni SPA (2010) LPELR-5033(CA). The

Respondents' motion dated the 30th of August, 2007 and

the issues canvassed

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therein did not come up for hearing before the lower Court

and did not constitute part of the issue raised suo motu by

the lower Court. The issues raised in the motion cannot

thus be raised in this appeal and cannot form the basis for

this Court affirming or varying the decision of the lower

Court on the issue raised by that Court suo motu. The

Notice of Contention is an attempt by the Respondents to

argue their motion on notice filed before the lower Court

and dated 30th of August, 2007 before this Court directly.

They cannot be allowed to do so. This is an appellate Court

and its jurisdiction is confined to reviewing the decision of

a lower Court in order to find out whether, on proper

consideration of the facts placed before it and the

applicable law, the lower Court arrived at the right

decision. In the absence of such a decision of a lower Court,

there cannot be anything for this Court to deliberate on -

Dagaci of Dere & Ors Vs Dagaci of Ebwa & Ors (2006)

7 NWLR (pt 979) 382, Abdullahi Vs State (2013) 11

NWLR (pt 1366) 435, Yaro Vs National Salaries,

wages and Income Commission (2013) 12 NWLR

(pt.1367) 173.

The amended Notice of Contention and

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the issues raised therein are inappropriate in this appeal

and they are hereby struck out along with the briefs of

arguments filed thereon by the Counsel to the parties.

In its deliberations on the issue it raised suo motu, i.e. the

jurisdictional competence of the Court to entertain the

subject matter of the claims of the Appellant, the lower

Court stated in its Ruling thus:

"... We totally agree that the cause of action disclosed

are intra union dispute which by the provisions of

Section 54(1) of NICA 2006 is described as dispute

within a trade union or an employers association. At

this juncture the question is having seen the claim of

the claimants are of the view that their claims fall

square ly wi th in the purv iew of Sect ions

7(1)(a)(i), 7(1)(c)(iv) and 7(1)(c)(v) of the NICA 2006.

While we agree that Section 7 of the NICA 2006

generally defines the jurisdiction of this Court, we

must quickly point out that Section 7(1)(a) in

particular must be read in conjunction with the

provisions of Subsection (3) of the same Section 7.

For the avoidance of doubt the said Section 7(1)(a)(i)

of NICA provides as follows:

7. (1) The Court shall have and

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exercise exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes and

matter.

(a) relating to-

...(i) labour, including trade unions and industrial

relations…”

While Section 7(3) of the NICA provides thus:

Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act

or any other enactment or law, the National Assembly

may by an Act prescribe that any matter under

Subsection(1)(a) of this Section may go through the

process of conciliation or arbitration before such

matter is heard by the Court.

This Court has held in a number of cases that the

effect of the provisions of Section 7(3) of the NICA

2006 is that the original jurisdiction of this Court in

relation to trade dispute cannot be accessed without

first going through the processes of dispute

resolution outlined in the provisions of Part 1 of the

Trade Dispute Act Cap T8 Laws of the Federation of

Nigeria (LFN) 2004...

In view of this therefore, it is our view that the

Claimants claim in this suit which is rooted in an

intra union dispute has prematurely come before this

Court. The parties would have to first exhaust the

processes of conciliation and arbitration as provided

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for under the Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act before

they could come before this Court on appeal, if

necessary.”

This is the reasoning of the lower Court that the Appellants

have a grievance with and their Counsel formulated two

issues for determination in this appeal. These were:

i. Whether once the claim of a party is based on intra Union

dispute it cannot be filed before the National Industrial

Court without first going through the process of

conciliation and arbitration, before the claim can be filed at

the National Industrial Court as an appeal.

ii. Whether in view of the claims in the Originating

Summons and the reliefs sought therein, the provisions of

Part 1 of the Trade Dispute Act apply as a mandatory

precondition and inhibition on the Appellants from directly

invoking the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court as

is enshrined in Section 7 of the National Industrial Court

Act, 2006 due to the provisions of Section 7 (3) of the Act.

Counsel to the Appellants argued the two issues for

determination together and he reproduced the questions

posed by the Appellants on their originating summons

before the lower Court and

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the reliefs sought therein, but in stating the reliefs, Counsel

referred to those contained in the original originating

summons and not those contained in the amended

originating summons. Counsel reproduced the above

quoted portion of the Ruling of the lower Court, and more,

and the provisions of Section 7 (3) of the National

Industrial Court Act of 2006, which he said formed the

basis for the reasoning of the lower Court, and stated that

the lower Court misapplied and misinterpreted the

provisions of the Section. Counsel referred to the canon of

interpretation that says that where words in a Statute are

plain and unambiguous, it is the duty of the Court to give

effect to them and he cited the case of AG Federation Vs

Abubakar (2007) 10 NWLR (pt 1041) 1 thereon and

stated that instead of giving the words used in Section 7 (3)

of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 their plain

meaning, the lower Court imported the words "Trade

Dispute" into them and brought into play the Trade Dispute

Act Cap T8, LFN 2004 to which the Section made no

reference and thus breached the rule that says that Courts

must refrain from interpretation of Statutes that would

translate

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into making legislations and he again referred to the case

of AG Federation Vs Abubakar supra. Counsel stated that

by interpreting Section 7 (3) of the National Industrial

Court Act 2006 as meaning that the jurisdiction of the

Court cannot be accessed without complying with the

Trade Dispute Act, the lower Court imposed a mandatory

condition to be satisfied by a plaintiff before he can access

the National Industrial Court and that this amounted to

making legislation because Section 7 (3) did not impose

such condition and it used the word "may" which is

permissive and not mandatory, and not the word "shall".

Counsel stated further that Section 7 (3) of the National

Industrial Court Act 2006 provides for the likelihood of the

National Assembly to make a law in future which may

provide the option to a party to first refer his claims that

fall under the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court

in Sections 7(1) and (2) for conciliation and arbitration

before bringing the matter before the Court or to choose to

file his grievances directly before the Court without going

through the process of conciliation and arbitration under

the law to be made by the

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National Assembly. Counsel stated that the provisions of

Section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act could not

have been making reference to the Trade Dispute Act, a

law that was already in existence at the time the National

Industrial Court Act was made and that Section 53 of the

National Industrial Court Act expressly repealed Part II of

the Trade Dispute Act and stated that other provisions of

the Trade Dispute Act shall be construed with such

modifications as may be necessary to them in conformity

with the provisions of the National Industrial Court Act and

that Section 7 (3) would have specifically mentioned the

Trade Dispute Act, if that was its intendment. Counsel

stated that the provisions of Section 7 (3) of the National

Industrial Court Act were futuristic and they cannot be

given retrospective application and he referred to the cases

of Ogunlesi Vs Attorney General (Federation) and

Mogele Vs Alewe, both reported in Digest of Supreme

Court case 1956 -1984 on pages 821 and 822 respectively.

Counsel stated that the Trade Dispute Act covers claims

relating to trade disputes alone and that these must be

trade disputes founded on a collective

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agreement and he referred to the definition of trade

dispute in Section 1 of the Trade Dispute Act and stated

that it does not include intra union disputes and that the

lower Court having found that the claims of the Appellants

were rooted in an intra union dispute, and which was not

dependent on a collective agreement, the conciliation and

arbitration process referred to in the Trade Dispute Act

were not applicable. Counsel also stated that entire

provision of Part 1 of the Trade Dispute Act deals with

"procedure" rather than substantive jurisdiction as

conferred by Section 7(1), (2) and (3) of the National

Industrial Court Act 2006 and that rules of procedure

cannot override the provision of a substantive law which

specifically confers jurisdiction on the National Industrial

Court. Counsel concluded his arguments by using this

Court to resolve the two issues for determination in favour

of the Appellants and to allow the appeal.

In his response, Counsel to the Respondents formulated

one issue for determination and it was whether the lower

Court was not correct when it held that it had no

jurisdiction to entertain the claims of the Appellant. In

arguing

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this issue, however, Counsel made no reference to the

deliberations in or the reasons given by the lower Court for

coming to its decision in the Ruling appealed against.

Rather Counsel chose to argue the issues raised in the

Respondents' amended Notice of Contention. Issues which

this Court had found as arising from the contents of a

motion which was not heard or considered by the lower

Court and which this Court had struck as being

inappropriately raised in this appeal. It is elementary that

to be relevant in an appeal, issues for determination and

arguments thereon must relate to and challenge the ratio of

the decision appealed against - Eyigebe Vs Iyayi (2013)

11 NWLR (Pt 1365) 407 and Tukur Vs Interglobal

Procurement Engineering Services Ltd (2014) 17

NWLR (pt 1437) 575. The brief of arguments of the

Respondents does not add value to the issues in this appeal

and will be discountenanced.

This however does not mean that this Court must accept

the arguments of the Counsel to the Appellants as gospel

truth and automatically enter judgment in favour of the

Appellants. This is because the address of Counsel is not

binding on the Court. The Court must still

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assess the arguments - Oruboko Vs Oruene (1996) 7

NWLR (pt 462) 555, Ogbu Vs The State (2007) All

FWLR (Pt 361) 1651., Eya Vs Olopade (2011) 11

NWLR (pt 1259) 505 and Independent National

Electoral Commission Vs Nyako (2011) 12 NWLR (pt

1262) 439. In Edonkumoh Vs Mutu (1999) 9 NWLR

(Pt 620) 633, Ibiyeye, JCA stated at 652 E-F thus:

“It is pertinent to point out that the learned counsel

for the first respondent did not proffer any response

to this issue in his brief of argument. It follows

therefore that he has little to urge on it. The fact that

there is want of response by the first respondent is no

license to accede to the arguments and submissions

of learned counsel for both the appellant and the

second to fourth respondents. Those submissions will

still be meticulously considered and opined upon

accordingly.”

The excerpt of the core reasoning of the lower Court in

holding that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the claims of

the Appellants has been reproduced above. What is evident

from the reasoning is that the lower Court accepted that it

had substantive jurisdiction to hear and determine the

claims of the Appellants under Section

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7(1)(a) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, but it

declined the exercise of that jurisdiction on the ground of

failure of the Appellants to comply with a condition

precedent for coming to Court; failure to exhaust the

conciliation and arbitration procedure provided for in the

Trade Disputes Act, Cap T8, Laws of Federation 2004. The

lower Court predicted its reasoning on the provision of

Section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006.

Section 7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006

reads:

“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act

or any other enactment in law, the National Assembly

may by an Act prescribe that any matter under

Subsection (1)(a) of this Section may go through the

process of conciliation or arbitration before such

matter is heard by the Court.”

Three questions arise for resolution from the arguments of

Counsel to the Appellants in this appeal and these:

i. Whether the Trade Disputes Act Cap T8, Laws of

Federation 2004 comes within the contemplation of or was

one of the laws envisaged by the provisions of Section 7(3)

of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006.

ii. If (i) is in the

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affirmative, whether the provisions relating to conciliation

and arbitration in the Trade Dispute Act, Cap T8, Laws of

Federation 2004 were applicable to the claims of the

Appellants.

iii. If (i) and (ii) are in the affirmative, whether, in the

circumstances of this case, the provisions of Part 1 of the

Trade Dispute Act, Cap T8, Laws of Federation, 2004 on

conciliation and arbitration provisions procedure were

indeed applicable.

On the first question, the Trade Disputes Act was

promulgated in 1976 and was subsequently amended by

the Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act of 1992 and by the

National Industrial Court Act of 2006. The Trade Dispute

Act predated the National Industrial Court Act of 2006 and

it was one of the existing laws that were deemed to be Acts

of the National assembly by the provisions of Section 315 of

the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.

The Trade Disputes Act had fifty two Sections and was

divided into six parts. Section 53 (1) of the National

Industrial Court Act of 2006 repealed Part II of the Trade

Dispute Act and Sections 53 (2) and 53 (3) read thus:

“(1) “Without prejudice to the provisions of

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Subsection (1) of this Section, the other provisions of

the Trade Disputes not shall be construed with such

modifications as may be necessary to bring it into

conformity with the provisions of this Act.

(2) If any provision of the Trade Disputes Act is

inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, the

Provisions of this Act shall prevail.”

By the above provisions the surviving provisions of the

Trade Disputes Act became harmonized and synergized

with the National Industrial Court Act of 2006 and they, for

all intent and purposes, became part of a continuous whole.

The provisions dealing with conciliation and arbitration of

trade disputes are contained in Part I of the Trade Disputes

Act; it is part of the surviving provisions of the Act. Both

the Trade Disputes Act and the National Industrial Court

Act deal with the same subject the resolution of trade

disputes as well as inter and intra union disputes. Counsel

to the Appellants has argued that the provisions Part 1 of

the Trade Disputes Act were not one of the Acts of the

National Assembly envisaged or contemplated in the

wordings of Section 7 (3) of the National Industrial Court

Act of 2006,

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but another law which is to be subsequently passed.

It is trite that in interpreting a Statute, the duty of a Court

is to discover the intention of the lawmaker and in so doing

it must consider the words used in order to discover their

ordinary meaning, and then give use their ordinary

meaning as they relate to the subject matter - Merill

Guaranty Savings & Loans Ltd Vs Worldgate Building

Society Ltd (2013) 1 NWLR (pt 1336) 581,

Gbagbarigha vs Toruemi (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt 1350)

289, Commissioner for Education, Imo State Vs Amadi

(2013) 13 NWLR (Pt 1370) 133. And in doing so, a Court

must not give an interpretation that would defeat the

intention and purpose of the lawmakers, and it should

adopt a holistic approach and interpret the provisions

dealing with a subject matter together to get the true

intention of the lawmakers and should adapt a holistic

approach and interpret the provisions dealing with a

subject matter together to get the true intention of the law

maker and should aim at giving a Statute a purposeful

interpretation - Abia State University, Uturu Vs Otosi

(2011) 1 NWLR (pt.1229) 605, Ayodele Vs State

(2011) 6 NWLR (pt.1243) 309, National

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Union of Road Transport Workers Vs Road Transport

Employers Association of Nigeria (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt

1307) 170, Attorney General, Federation Vs Attorney

General, Lagos State (2013) 16 NWLR (pt 1380) 249.

A Statute must be read as a whole, and not parts in

isolation, and that the different parts of the Statute must be

interpreted in the light of the whole Statute and an effort

must be made to achieve harmony amongst its different

parts - Amalgamated Trustees Ltd Vs Associated

Discount House Ltd (2007) 15 NWLR (Pt 1056) 118,

Nigerian Army Vs Aminu- Kano (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt

1188) 429, Abubakar Vs Nasumu (No. 2) (2012) 17

NWLR (Pt 1330) 523.

Applying these principles to the interpretation of Section

7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 vis-a-vis the

provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act, this Court

must say that it is unable to agree with the Counsel to the

Appellants that the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade

Disputes Act do not come within the contemplation of the

Act of the National Assembly referred to in Section 7(3) of

the National Industrial Court Act. If the provisions of Part 1

of the Trade Disputes Act were not contemplated, the

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National Industrial Court Act would either have repealed

them, as it did of Part II of the Trade Disputes Act or it

would have limited their scope of operation. Having not

done either and having said in its Section 53(2) that the

surviving provisions of the Trade Disputes Act must be

interpreted in a manner to bring them in conformity with

the provisions of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, it

means that the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes

Act must be read into the provisions of Section 7(3) of the

National Industrial Court Act as one of the Acts of the

National Assembly contemplated or envisaged.

To hold otherwise will be to suggest that though the

Legislature chose to preserve the provisions of Part 1 of the

Trade Disputes Act by not repealing it in the National

Industrial Court Act, it did not intend for the provisions to

be of any use as it "may" pass another law on the

conciliation and arbitration of trade disputes which will

then be operational under Section 7(3) of the National

Industrial Court Act. It is trite that there is always there is

a presumption against the legislature intending what is

unreasonable and inconvenient in the

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interpretation of Statute. Thus, it is trite that common

sense must be applied in construing Statutes and the

construction agreeable to justice and reason must be

adopted - Ibrahim Vs Sheriff (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt 892)

43, Elabanjo vs Dawodu (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt 1001)

76, Sobamowo vs Elemuren (2008) 11 NWLR (Pt

1097) 12. In Attorney General, Nasarawa State Vs

Attorney General, Plateau State (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt

1309) 419, the Supreme Court stated that no reasonable

Court or Tribunal will impute any absurd or unjust

consequences to a Statute or imply in a Statute

consequences that will lead to absurdity or injustice. The

position of the law in this respect is well set out in Maxwell

on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12 Edition by Langan,

1976 at page 199 thus:

"In determining either the general object of the

legislature, or the meaning of its language in any

particular passage, It is obvious that the intention

which appears to be most in accord with convenience,

reason, justice and legal principles should, in all

cases of doubtful significance, be presumed to be the

true one. An intention to produce an unreasonable

result is not to be imputed to a Statute if

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there is some other construction available.”

Thus, where words used in an enactment are open to two

interpretations and one construction will lead to an

absurdity while the other would give effect to what

commonsense shows was obviously intended, the

construction that accords with commonsense must be

applied. Commonsense dictates that the provisions of Part

1 of the Trade Disputes Act must be read into the

provisions of Section 7 (3) of the National Industrial Act,

2006 as one of the Acts of National Assembly referred to.

The first of the three questions that arose from the

submissions of the Counsel to the Appellants is thus

answered in the affirmative.

This takes us to the second question - whether the

provisions relating to conciliation and arbitration in the

Trade Dispute Act, Cap T8, Laws of Federation 2004 were

applicable to the claims of the Appellants. The resolution of

this question must necessarily turn on the interpretation of

the provisions of Trade Dispute Act on conciliation and

arbitration. These provisions are contained in Part 1 of the

Act which is headed "Procedure for settling trade disputes"

and Section 1 states that

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“where a trade dispute exists or is apprehended, the

provisions of this part shall apply in relation to the

dispute.” It proceeds in Section 2 to state that “In this

part, unless the context otherwise requires, ‘dispute’

means the trade dispute in question...” And Section 48

of the Trade Disputes Act defines “trade dispute” to mean

“any dispute between employees and workers or

between workers and workers, which is connected

with the employment or non-employment or the terms

of employment and physical conditions of work of any

person.” In other words for a dispute to be declared a

trade dispute within the meaning of Section 48, the

following ingredients must all be present (i) there must be

a dispute; (ii) the dispute must involve a trade; (iii) the

dispute must be between employers and workers or

between workers and workers; (iv) the dispute must be

connected with the employment or non-employment or the

terms of employment or the physical conditions of work of

any person - National Union of Road Transport

Workers Vs Ogbodo (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt 537) 189,

Attorney General, Oyo State Vs Nigeria

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Labour Congress, Oyo State Chapter (2003) 8 NWLR

(pt 821) 1.

Reading through the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade

Disputes Act, it is clear that their essence is to compel

parties to go through the conciliation and arbitration

process provided for in the provisions before they can

access the National Industrial Court for adjudication of

their disputes. Now, it is an established principle of

interpretation that where the right of access of a person to

Court is either taken away or restricted by any Statute, the

language of any such Statute or provision will not be

extended beyond its obvious meaning unless clear words

are used to justify such extension. This is mainly because it

is the practice of the Court to guard its jurisdiction

jealously. Thus, while interpreting any outer or restrictive

clause in a Statute the Courts usually scrutinize every

aspect of such provision with a view to ensuring that

everything done under such Statute is done strictly in

compliance with the provisions of the Statute. Where the

Court finds that there is a failure to strictly comply with

what the Statute provides for, such an act purported to be

done under the Statute would

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be ultra vires and would be declared null and void as such

action would be regarded not to have been carried out

under the said provisions of the Statute - Inakoju Vs

Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (pt 1025) 423, Maikyo Vs

Itodo (2007) 7 NWLR (pt 1034) 443, Olaleye-Ote Vs

Babalola (2012) 6 NWLR (pt 1297) 574.

Applying this principle of interpretation to the provisions of

Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act it is clear that they apply

only what is referred to as a "trade dispute", and not to any

other type of dispute. This Court notes that Section 2 of the

Trade Disputes Act states that "no person shall

commence an action, the subject matter of a trade

dispute or any other inter or intra union dispute in a

Court of law.” and it proceeded to abate all pending

actions in all Court prior to the commencement of the

Section and it made contravention of the provision a

punishable offence. The Section was added by the Trade

Disputes (Amendment) Act of 1992. Reading this provision

along with the other provisions in Part 1 of Trade Disputes

Act, it is completely incongruous and out of place. Section 1

of the Trade Disputes Act is very clear that the provisions

in Part 1

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relate only to trade disputes, and made no mention of inter

or intra union disputes, and this provision was not amended

even when Section 2 was added to the Act. It is a settled

principle of construction of Statutes that where a Section

names specific things among many other possible

alternatives, the intention is that those not named are not

intended to be included - Udoh Vs Orthopaedic Hospitals

Management Board (1993) 7 SCNJ 244. Also, the

definition of "trade dispute" in Section 48 of the Act was

also not expanded to include inter or intra union disputes.

The law is settled that once a Statute defines a word,

phrase or term, the Court cannot go outside the Statute to

seek a meaning of that word, phrase or term not contained

in the definition in the Statute - Uhunmwangho Vs Okojie

(1989) 5 NWLR pt 122) 471. Kalu Vs Odili (1992) 6

SCNJ 76 and Shettima Vs Goni (2011) 18 NWLR (pt

1279) 413. Thus, any dispute that does not come within

the definition of trade dispute in Section 48 of the Trade

Disputes Act is not amenable to and/or covered by the

provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act.

It is obvious that Section 2 of the Trade Disputes Act, 2004

was

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inserted to remove the jurisdiction hitherto possessed by

the High Court and the Federal High Court over trade

disputes and inter and intra union matters, it was not for

the purpose of making inter and intra union disputes

amenable to settlement procedure in Part 1 of the Trade

Disputes Act - Udoh Vs Orthopaedic Hospitals

Management Board supra, National Union of Road

Transport Workers Vs Ogbodo (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt

537) 189, Ekong Vs Oside (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt 929)

102 and Umoren Vs Akpan (2011) 22 NLLR (pt 62)

264. The sting has been taken out of the Section by the

provisions of Sections 53 (2) and 53 (3) of the National

Industrial Court 2006 which subjected the provisions of the

Trade Dispute Act to the overriding provisions of the

National Industrial Court Act and some of which are

Section 7 which vests exclusive jurisdiction over some

matters in the National Industrial Court and Sections 16 to

19 which grant only the National Industrial Court powers to

make certain orders. Therefore, in the spirit of harmonious

interpretation of Sections of a Statute, an inter or intra

union dispute would only be covered by the provisions of

Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act if

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the nature of the dispute therein comes within the nature of

the disputes said to constitute trade dispute under Section

48 of the Act. Once the complaint of a plaintiff is not a

trade dispute, it cannot be caught by Section 7 (3) of the

National Industrial Court Act, 2006 - First Marine

Engineering Services Ltd Vs National Union of

Petroleum & Natural Gas Workers (2011) 23 NLLR

(Pt 65) 283.

It was not in dispute in the instant case that the dispute

submitted for adjudication by the Appellants before the

lower Court was an intra Union dispute; a dispute within

the Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria. The

lower Court stated in the

Ruling that:

"... We totally agree that the cause of action discloses

an intra union dispute which by the provisions of

Section 54(1) of NICA 2006 is described as “dispute

within a trade union or an employers association.”

It was a dispute between the regional organs of the Road

Transport Employers Association of Nigeria and it had to

do with the holding of a National Delegates Conference of

the Union that took place on the 27th and 28th of February,

2007. The dispute was not between

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employers and workers or between workers and workers,

and it had nothing to do with nor is it connected with the

employment or non-employment, or the terms of

employment and physical conditions of work of any person.

It did not come within the definition of Trade Dispute in

Section 48 of the Trade Disputes Act. The National

Industrial Act 2006 recognized in its Section 54 that there

was a distinction between a trade dispute and an inter or

intra union dispute, and that they are not synonymous and

yet it did not expressly include intra union dispute as one of

the disputes covered Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act.

This Court is not unaware of some decisions of the National

Industrial Court which say that by the provisions of Section

7(3) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, inter and

intra union disputes must first go though the settlement of

disputes procedure contained in Part 1 of the Trade

Disputes Act before they can be brought to the National

Industrial Court by way of an appeal - see for example

Maritime Workers Union of Nigeria Vs Nigerian

Labour Congress (2005) 4 NLLR (Pt 10) 270, the

unreported decision in Suit No NIC/12/2007 - Association

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of Senior Staff of Banks, Insurance and Financial

Institutions (ASSBIFI) Vs Union Bank of Nigeria Plc

delivered on the 24th of January, 2008, Adamu Vs

Jalaludeen (2009) 14 NLLR (Pt 38) 272 and Anthony

Vs Iloduba (2010) 18 NLLR (Pt 50) 229. The reasoning

behind these decisions was explained by Kanyip, PJ in

Asuzu Vs Ajewole (2009) 14 NLLR (Pt 39) 434 at452

to 455 thus:

"... This Court has in a number of cases ruled that in

inter or intra union disputes, even after the

enactment of Section 7 of the NIC Act 2006, the

jurisdiction of this Court is appellate not original. In

the case of Association of Senior Staff of Banks,

Insurance and financial Institutions (ASSBIFI) vs

Union Bank of Nigeria Plc... this Court had cause to

review the authorities and antecedents pertaining to

the issue. The holding of this Court in that case

deserves to be quoted in full. To this Court-

Before the enactment of the NIC Act 2006, this Court

held in several cases that in intra and inter union

disputes, the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain

same was appellate not original... Specifically, the

legality of having to subject intra and inter-union

disputes to the

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procedure set out in Part 1 of the IDA was tested in

the case of National Union of Hotel and Personal

Service Workers v. National Union of Food Beverage

and Tobacco Employees and Anor. The Court, however

held it to be valid and legal. One of the reasons for so

holding was the provision of Section 24 of IDA which

provided that a right of appeal shall be from the IDA

to the NIC in cases of intra union disputes arising

from the organization and running of a trade union as

laid down in the union Constitution or in cases of

inter-union disputes arising from restructuring of

trade unions established under the MIA 1990. The

reasoning was that there could be no right of appeal

from a body unless that body has some jurisdiction to

hear the matter in the first place. And coupled with

the provision of Section 9 A(1) of the IDA, which bars

the commencement of an action in respect of a trade

dispute or any other inter or intra union dispute in a

Court of law, the NIC reasoned that since it is also a

Court of law, it could not assume original jurisdiction

in cases of trade disputes, and inter and intra union

disputes.”

Section 24, forming part of the Part 11 of

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the IDA has now been repealed by Section 63(1) of

the NIC Act 2006, and the other provisions of the IDA

by Sections 53(2) and (3) and 54(4) are subject to the

overriding provisions of the NIC Act and are to be

read with such modifications as to bring them into

conformity with the provisions of the NIC Act. The

question therefore remains whether under the NIC

Act an intra union dispute falls within the original

jurisdiction of the NIC Section 7(1)(a) of the NIC Act,

in giving jurisdiction to this Court in matters relating

to labour, trade unions, industrial relations and

matters incidental thereto among other matters, can

be said to have given a wide jurisdiction in respect of

the enumerated matters. But Section 7(1)(a) must be

read subject to Section 7(3) which provides as

follows.

“Notwithstanding anything contrary in this Act or any

other enactment or law, the National Assembly may

by an Act prescribe that any matter under Subsection

(1) (a) may go through the process of conciliation or

arbitration before such matter is heard by the Court.”

…this Court in interpreting Section 7 (3) in ASBIFI v

ICDA… had this to say –

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the word ‘notwithstanding’ in Section 7(3) is meant to

qualify the jurisdiction granted the NIC until

conciliation and arbitration, if provided for, have

been done. It is to reinforce this stance of the law

that Section 7(4) of the NIC Act provides that an

appeal shall be from the decision of an arbitral

Tribunal to this Court as of right in matters of

disputes specified in Section 7(1)(a) of the NIC Act...

The impact of this Subsection is that matters within

the purview of Section 7(1)(a) that is, matters in

respect of labour including trade unions and

industrial relations; environmental and conditions of

work, health safety and welfare of labour, matters

incidental thereto, which had to go through the

processes of Part 1 of the IDA will continue to go

through those processes even after the passing of the

NIC Act. In other words, those issues which for

instance, the IAF entertained before the passing of

the NIC Act will continue to be entertained by that

body in the spirit of Section 7(3) of the NIC Act… This

means therefore that, like trade disputes, intra-union

(and by extension, interunion) disputes are

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contemplated under Section 7(1)(a) of the NIC Act for

the purpose of Section 7(3) and so would not come

under the purview of the original jurisdiction of this

Court...”

This Court must say that it is unable to accept the logic in

the above reasoning. It is very obvious that the

interpretations of the provisions of the Trade Disputes Act,

as amended by the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, and

of the provisions of Sections 7(3) and 7(4) of the National

Industrial Court Act were guided by a pre-conceived notion

of what was, and what was desired to continue, instead of

by the clear and unambiguous words of the provisions. As

stated earlier, Section 1 of the Trade Disputes Act stated

that the arbitration and conciliation procedure provided for

in the Act was applicable only to trade disputes. The effect

of Section 2 which brought in and sought to lump trade

disputes together with inter and intra union disputes has be

ameliorated and practically obliterated by the provisions in

Sections 53(2), 53(3) and 54(4) of the National Industrial

Court Act. The Section 24 of the Trade Disputes Act which

suggested specifically that cases of intra-union

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disputes arising from the organization and running of a

trade union as laid down in the union Constitution or in

cases of inter-union disputes arising from restructuring of

trade unions should first go before the Industrial

Arbitration Panel for conciliation and arbitration before

coming to the National Industrial Court was in Part II of the

Trade Disputes Act which was expressly repealed by

Section 53(1) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006,

and it was not reproduced in any Section of the National

Industrial Court Act. The definition of trade dispute was not

extended to cover intra and/or inter union disputes either

in the provision of Section 48 of the Trade Disputes Act or

of Section 54 of the National Industrial Court Act.

The provisions of Sections 7(3) and 7 (4) of the National

Industrial Court Act cannot by any stretch of imagination

be interpreted to extend the meaning and purport of the

provisions of the Trade Dispute Act, as amended, beyond

the scope of the ordinary meanings of the words contained

in the Statute. It is correct that Section 7(3) provides some

possible limitations on the direct exercise of original

jurisdiction by the

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National Industrial Court in matters in which the Court has

exclusive jurisdiction under Section 7(1)(a), but it did not

focus that limitation only on the conciliation and arbitration

procedure contained in the Trade Disputes Act and it

recognizes the power of the National Assembly to

promulgate other laws that may provide for conciliation

and arbitration procedure for other matters not expressly

stated in the Trade Disputes Act. And the provision of

Section 7(a) is generic and it covers matters stated in

Section 7(1)(a) that are presently covered by the Trade

Disputes Act or those which may in future be directed by

law yet to be made to be referred to the Industrial

Arbitration Panel. The intendment of Sections 7(3) and 7(4)

is not circumscribed by the Trade Disputes Act; it is beyond

the Act. A read through the complete reasoning of the

National Industrial Court in Asuzu Vs Ajewole supra shows

the continuous struggle by the Court to extend the meaning

of words of the Trade Dispute Act, as amended, and of the

National Industrial Court Act beyond their ordinary

grammatical meanings to achieve a desired end.

The decisions of the National Industrial Court,

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post the passing of the National Industrial Court Act of

2006, that inter and intra-union matters must undergo the

conciliation and arbitration procedure in Part 1 of the

Trade Dispute Act before they can come before the Court

by way of an appeal were, with respect, predicated on

presumptions, conjectures and what the Court would prefer

to happen, rather than on the clear provisions of the

Statute. It is not the duty of the Court to ascribe meaning

to the clear, plain and unambiguous provisions of a Statute

in order to give them a slant which accords with the Court's

own view - lzedonmwen Vs Union Bank of Nigeria Plc

(2012) 6 NWLR (Pt 1295) 1. This is particularly more so

where the Statute in question seeks to restrict access of

citizens to Court, as in this case, because the wordings of

such a Statute must be interpreted strictly and must not be

stretched beyond its ordinary meaning unless the need for

such stretched interpretation is expressly stipulated in the

Statute.

The provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act were not

applicable to the case of the Appellants before the lower

Court which was on an intra union dispute. The point was

conceded by

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the National Industrial Court in one of its decisions,

Aghwefeada vs Asemota (2011) 22 NLLR (pt 63) 413,

wherein it stated that “a claim that essentially relates to

disputes and/or are on occupation of seats and/or

election of off icials of a trade union is an

organizational dispute for which the NICA 2006 has

rested power in this Court to adjudicate upon.” The

second question in this appeal is thus answered in the

negative.

This resolution of the second question raised in the

arguments of the Counsel to the Appellants ordinarily

determines this appeal. However, in view of the fact that

this Court is not the final Court in the judicial hierarchy, it

is wise that it goes further to look at the third question

raised in the arguments of Counsel to the Appellants, in

case it turns on a further challenge that its findings on the

second question are wrong - Ovunwo Vs Woko (2011) 17

NWLR (Pt.1277) 522, Iwunze Vs Federal Republic of

Nigeria (2013) 1 NWLR (Pt 1334) 119 and University

of Calabar Vs Akintunde (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt 1340) 1.

In resolving the third question, this Court will assume that

the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act were

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applicable to the claims of the Appellants.

The third question is whether, in the circumstances of this

case, the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Dispute Act, Cap

T8, Laws of Federation, 2004 on conciliation and

arbitration provisions procedure were applicable.

It is settled law that it is the case of the plaintiff as

endorsed on the writ of summons and elaborated in the

statement of claim or any other originating process that

determines the jurisdiction of the Court - Elelu-Habeeb Vs

Attorney General, Federation (2012) 13 NWLR (pt

1318) 423, Merill Guaranty Savings & Loans Ltd Vs

WorldGate Building Society Ltd (2013) 1 NWLR (Pt

1336) 581, Uwazurike Vs Nwachukwu (2013) 3 NWLR

(pt 1342) 503, Ahmed Vs Ahmed (2013) 15 NWLR

(pt.1377) 274.

The case of the Appellants in the affidavit in support of the

originating summons was that on the 23rd of June 2005,

after more than three years of lack of action over the

complaints of the members South East and South-South

Zones against the Respondents over several issues, the

fourth and fifth Appellants issued a notice of declaration of

trade dispute on behalf of members of the two zones and

served same on

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the Secretary of the Road Employers Transport Association

of Nigeria and that the notice was given for twenty-one

days in l ine with the provisions of the amended

Constitution of the Union of September 2003. It was their

case that they thereafter, on the 19th of July, 2005, gave

information on the declaration of a trade dispute against

the Respondents to the Honorable Minister of Employment,

Labour and Productivity and that on the same day the late

National Vice President of the Association, Etubon Eyo

Honesty, duly complied with the provisions of the Trade

Dispute Act by completing Form TD/3 and submitting same

to the Honorable Minister of Employment, Labour and

Productivity. It was their case that upon the receipt of their

notification of trade dispute, the Honorable Minister of

Employment, Labour and Productivity by a letter dated the

17th of August, 2005 invited both the Appellants and the

Respondents to a meeting at the Conference Room of the

Honorable Minister to be held on the 30th of August, 2005.

It was the case of the Appellants that at the meeting of the

30th of August, 2005 the issues contained in the

notification of a trade dispute were not

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resolved and the meeting deadlocked and the Ministry

promised to call another meeting, but it was yet to do so till

date. It was their case that before the meeting of the 30th

of August, 2005, the Honorable Minister of Employment,

Labour and Productivity wrote a letter dated the 25th of

July, 2005 refusing to approve the request of the

Respondents to convene a National Delegates Conference

of the Road Employers Transport Association in view of the

intra union crisis engulfing the Association. It was their

case that in the course of investigating the first complaint

of the Appellants on the notification of trade dispute with

respect to the Nigerian Security and Minting Company Plc,

the Honorable Minister by a letter dated the 14th of July,

2006 confirmed the crisis existing in the Association. It was

their case that up till now, the intra union crisis and

internal disputes within the Association have not been

resolved, including the very fundamental issues raised by

the Appellants which were very basic to the existence or

proper running of a union. It was their case that this was

the state of affairs when the Respondents proceeded to

purport to hold a National

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Delegates Conference of the Association in Abeokuta on the

27th and 28th of February, 2007 and that the holding of the

Conference without first resolving the crisis existing within

the Union has further deepened the crisis as only a faction

of the Association held the Conference without carrying a

substantial number of members, especially those of South

East and South-South Zones, along.

It was on the basis of these facts that the Appellants

approached the lower Court and posed the questions

contained on the originating summons and sought the two

prayers thereon; to wit

i. A declaration that the purported holding of the National

Delegates Conference of the RTEAN by the defendants at

Abeokuta Ogun State on the 27th and 28th of February,

2007 without the resolution of the issues raised in the

plaintiffs Notice of Trade Dispute is unlawful, illegal, null

and void and of no effect whatsoever.

ii. An order of the Court directing the defendants and all

parties concerned in the intra union dispute of RTEAN to

resolve all major intra union disputes by involving all zones

of the Union before holding a united and an all embracing

National Delegates

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Conference.

Can it be said in the circumstances that the case of the

Appellants was brought before the lower Court

prematurely, without they having first exhausted the

settlement procedure contained in Part 1 of the Trade

Disputes Act? The simple answer is, No. Firstly, the facts as

contained in the affidavit show that the Appellants did

make an attempt to have the dispute mediated or arbitrated

over a number of years between the parties and later

through the office of Honorable Minister for Labour and

Productivity. The facts show that the mediation or

arbitration was still ongoing and that the Honorable

Minister refused to approve the request of the Respondent

to convene and hold a National Delegates Conference

without the resolution of the dispute. The Appellants

alleged that Respondents defied the ongoing mediation and

the directive of the Honorable Minister and proceeded to

convene and hold a National Delegates Conference in

Abeokuta on the 27th and 28th of February, 2007. This was

what prompted the Appellants to approach the lower Court

and, as it is obvious from their claims, they did not pray the

lower Court to resolve the dispute between them, but to

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nullify the convening and holding of the National Delegates

Conference and to direct the parties to go and resolve all

pending intra union disputes between them before holding

an all embracing National Delegates Conference. This was

a matter for the lower Court to deal with directly, quickly

and positively and not a matter for the Industrial

Arbitration Panel.

Secondly, the prayers sought by the Appellants were a

declaratory relief and an order in the nature of a

mandamus and by the provisions of Sections 17 (1) and 19

(b) of the National Industrial Court Act, only the National

Industrial Court could grant the orders, the Industrial

Arbitration Panel was not so empowered. The position is

that in such instances, sending such matters to go through

the conciliation and arbitration process is a complete waste

of time and that it is a matter that the National Industrial

Court should take in its original jurisdiction - Ugwu Vs

Ogboso (2010) 21 NLLR (Pt 58) 164 and Aghwefeada

Vs Asemota (2011) 22 NLLR (Pt 63) 413.

The case of the Appellants was thus not one suited for

conciliation and arbitration. The third question arising from

the arguments of Counsel to

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the Appellants is also answered in the negative.

In conclusion, this Court finds merit in this appeal and it is

hereby allowed. The decision of the National Industrial

Court in Suit No NIC/7/2007 contained in the Ruling

delivered by Honorable Justices M. B. Dadda, M. N. Esowe,

A. Ibrahim and O. A. Shogbola on the 18th of May, 2009 is

hereby set aside. The case is remitted to the National

Industrial Court sitting in Kano for further proceedings and

the hearing of the matter in its original jurisdiction. The

parties shall bear their respective costs of this appeal.

These shall be the orders of this Court.

OLUDOTUN ADEBOLA ADEFOPE-OKOJIE, J.C.A.: My

learned brother Habeeb Adewale O. Abiru JCA has

extensively dealt with the issues in controversy in this

appeal. I am in agreement with His Lordship's reasons and

conclusions and find merit in this appeal.

I also allow the appeal with the costs awarded and set aside

the Ruling of the lower Court. In concurrence with the lead

Judgment, this case is remitted to the National Industrial

Court sitting in Kano for hearing on its merits.

AMINA AUDI WAMBAI, J.C.A.: I have read in advance

the lead

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Judgment delivered by my learned brother HABEEB A. O.

ABIRU, JCA. He has comprehensively dealt with all the

issues in the appeal. I adopt his reasoning and conclusion

as mine. I also allow the appeal and set aside the Ruling of

the Lower Court. I abide the consequential orders therein.

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