MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2020ME109Docket: Cum-20-181Argued: August5,2020Decided: August13,2020Panel: GORMAN,JABAR,HUMPHREY,andHORTON,JJ.,andHJELM,A.R.J.

AVANGRIDNETWORKS,INC.,etal.v.

SECRETARYOFSTATEetal.PERCURIAM

[¶1] Avangrid Networks, Inc., the company that owns Central Maine

PowerCompany(CMP)asasubsidiary,andintervenorsMaineStateChamber

of Commerce and Industrial Energy Consumer Group (IECG) appeal from a

judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland County,Warren, J.) dismissing

theircomplaintsforadeclaratoryjudgmentandtoenjointheSecretaryofState

fromplacingacitizen initiativeon theNovember2020ballot. The initiative

proposesa“resolve”thatwouldreverseaMainePublicUtilitiesCommission

order granting CMP’s request for a certificate of public convenience and

necessityfortheNewEnglandCleanEnergyConnectTransmissionProject(the

Project)—“a 145.3-mile transmission line, proposed to run from the

Maine-QuébecborderinBeattieTownshiptoLewiston,thatwilldeliver1,200

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megawatts of electricity from Québec to the New England Control Area.”

NextEraEnergyRes.,LLCv.Me.Pub.Utils.Comm’n,2020ME34,¶1,227A.3d

1117.TheSecretaryofStateandintervenorsMainersforLocalPowerandnine

Mainevoterscross-appeal.1

[¶2] We conclude that the Superior Court erred by dismissing the

declaratory judgment count of the complaint, and we therefore vacate that

portionofthejudgmentandremandthematterfortheSuperiorCourttoenter

a declaratory judgment that the initiative fails to meet the constitutional

requirements for inclusionon theballotbecause it exceeds the scopeof the

people’s legislative powers conferred by article IV, part 3, section 18 of the

Maine Constitution. Because the Secretary of State has expressed his

willingnesstoheedaclearlystateddeclarationfromus,weseenonecessityfor

injunctiverelief.

I.BACKGROUND

[¶3] The citizens’ initiative at issue here is responsive to a decision

issued by the Public Utilities Commission in 2019. Id. ¶ 10. We begin by

1WehavereceivedamicicuriaebriefsfromformerMainelegislatorsMarkN.DionandKennethC.

Fletcher; formerCommissionersof thePublicUtilities CommissionThomasL.Welch,WilliamM.Nugent, and Mark A. Vannoy; Dmitry Bam, professor of law; and Orlando E. Delogu, emeritusprofessoroflaw.

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summarizing the proceedings before the Commission and our review of the

Commission’sdecisiononappeal,afterwhichwefocusonthecitizens’initiative

andthelitigationbeforeustoday.

A. Proceedings Before the Public Utilities Commission and Appeal to theLawCourt

[¶4] Thismatter has its origins in a petition that CMP filedwith the

Commissionin2017seekingacertificateofpublicconvenienceandnecessity

for the Project. Id. ¶ 3; see 35-A M.R.S. § 3132 (2018).2 After holding an

extensivepublichearingandconsideringavoluminousamountofevidence,the

Commission’s hearing examiners issued a report in March 2019 containing

their recommendations. NextEraEnergyRes., LLC, 2020ME34,¶¶6-9,227

A.3d1117. In a lengthywrittenorder issued inMay2019, theCommission

adopted the examiners’ recommendations and findings. Id. ¶ 10. The

Commission concluded that the Project meets the statutory public need

standard and is in the public interest, and it issued the certificate. Id. We

affirmedtheCommission’sdecisioninMarch2020.Id.¶¶1,43.

2Section3132hassincebeenamended.SeeP.L.2019,ch.298,§§7-11(effectiveSept.19,2019)

(codifiedat35-AM.R.S.§3132(2-D), (3), (3-A), (5), (6) (2020));P.L.2019,ch.205,§4(effectiveSept.19,2019)(codifiedat35-AM.R.S.§3132(1-B)(2020)).

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B. Citizens’Initiative

[¶5]AftertheCommissionissueditsdecision,opponentsoftheProject

gatheredsignaturesforacitizens’initiativeproposingtheadoptionofaresolve

directing the Commission to amend its order and issue the opposite

determinations—thattheProjectisnotinthepublicinterestandthatthereis

no public need for the project—and to deny the request for a certificate of

publicconvenienceandnecessity.Theinitiativereads,

Sec.1.Amendorder.Resolved:Thatwithin30daysoftheeffectivedateofthisresolveandpursuanttoitsauthorityundertheMaineRevisedStatutes,Title35-A,section1321,thePublicUtilitiesCommission shall amend “Order Granting Certificate of PublicConvenienceandNecessityandApprovingStipulation,”enteredbythe Public Utilities Commission on May 3, 2019 in Docket No.2017-00232 for the New England Clean Energy Connecttransmission project, referred to in this resolve as “the NECECtransmission project.” The amended order must find that theconstructionand operationof theNECEC transmissionproject arenotinthepublicinterestandthatthereisnotapublicneedfortheNECEC transmission project. There not being a public need, theamended order must deny the request for a certificate of publicconvenienceandnecessityfortheNECECtransmissionproject.

Resolve, To Reject the New England Clean Energy Connect Transmission

Project (emphasis added) (available at the Secretary of State’s website:

https://www.maine.gov/sos/cec/elec/citizens/index.html).3 The initiative’s

3Thesummarytotheinitiativeprovidesasfollows:

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proponents submitted petitions bearingmore than the required number of

signaturesverifiedbytheSecretaryofState.SeeMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,¶18,

cl.2;Reedv.Sec’yofState,2020ME57,¶10,---A.3d---.Inanactionchallenging

thatverification,thecourt(Murphy,J.)enteredajudgmentintheBusinessand

ConsumerDocket affirming theSecretary’sdetermination inApril 2020. Id.

¶¶1,11.WeaffirmedthatjudgmentonappealonMay7,2020.Id.¶¶12-24.

[¶6]Inthemeantime,theSecretarypresentedtheproposedinitiativeto

theLegislatureinacommunicationdatedMarch16,2020.SeeMe.Const.art.

IV,pt.3,§18,cl.2;Sen.Jour.(129thLegis.Mar.17,2020)(reportingS.C.1058);

HouseJour.Supp.No.10(129thLegis.Mar.17,2020)(reportingH.P.1548).

The Legislature, however, adjourned sine die the next day as a result of the

COVID-19pandemicanddidnotenacttheproposal.SeeSen.Jour.(129thLegis.

Mar. 17, 2020) (reporting S.C. 1059, 1060); House Jour. Supp. No. 4 (129th

Legis.Mar.17,2020)(reportingH.C.384,385).

ThisinitiatedbilldirectsthePublicUtilitiesCommissiontoamend“OrderGranting

CertificateofPublicConvenienceandNecessityandApprovingStipulation,”enteredbythePublicUtilitiesCommissiononMay3,2019fortheNewEnglandCleanEnergyConnecttransmissionproject. TheamendedordermustfindthattheconstructionandoperationoftheNECECtransmissionprojectarenotinthepublicinterestandthatthereisnotapublicneedfortheNECECtransmissionproject.Therenotbeingapublic need, the amended ordermust deny the request for a certificate of publicconvenienceandnecessityfortheNECECtransmissionproject.

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C. ThePresentLitigation

[¶7]OnMay12,2020,daysafterweaffirmedtheSecretary’sverification

ofthepetitionsignatures,Avangridfiledtheverifiedcomplaintthat initiated

the present litigation. The complaint, naming the Secretary of State as the

defendant,sought

• Adeclaratoryjudgmentthattheinitiative

o Exceedsthescopeoflegislativepowersreservedtothepeople,seeMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§18;

o Usurpsthepoweroftheexecutiveandjudicialbranches,seeMe.Const.art.III,§2;and

o Isillegalasaspeciallawthatsinglesoutonecorporationtoexemptfromthegenerallyapplicablelaw;and

• InjunctivereliefpreventingtheSecretaryfromincludingtheinitiativeontheNovember3,2020,ballot.

Avangrid simultaneouslymoved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the

initiative from appearing on the ballot. The court grantedmotions filed by

MaineStateChamberofCommerceandIECGtointervene,andeachentityfiled

acomplaintjoininginAvangrid’srequestsfordeclaratoryandinjunctiverelief.

ThecourtalsograntedmotionstointervenefiledbyNextEraEnergyResources,

LLC;MainersforLocalPower;andnineMainevoters.

[¶8] Mainers for Local Power and the nine Maine voters moved to

dismiss the complaint on several grounds, including that (1) the requested

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relief is barred because the Maine Constitution requires the Secretary to

include the initiativeon theballot, seeMe.Const. art. IV, pt. 3, §18; (2) the

claimswerenotripebeforetheelection;and(3)theinitiativeisconstitutional

becauseutilitiesregulationisalegislativefunction.

[¶9]Afterconductingcommendablyexpeditedproceedings,includinga

hearing,theSuperiorCourtissuedajudgmentonJune29,2020,concludingthat

the initiative’sconstitutionalitywasnotsubject to judicial reviewbefore the

election and dismissing Avangrid’s complaint in which the Chamber of

CommerceandIECGhadjoined.Avangrid,theChamberofCommerce,andIECG

appealed from the judgment, and the Secretary of State, Mainers for Local

Power, and the nine Maine voters filed cross-appeals, all of which are now

beforeus.

II.DISCUSSION

A. PositionsoftheParties

[¶10] The issuebeforeus is narrow—whether the proposed citizens’

initiativefallswithinthescopeofthecitizens’constitutionalpowertolegislate,

createdinsection18ofarticleIV,part3oftheMaineConstitution.Thiscase

cannot—andthereforedoesnot—prospectivelyaddresstheconstitutionality

or legality of the initiative itself as an independent issue. Any such

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determinationnecessarilycouldbemadeonlyiftheissuebecameripe,which

wouldbeafteraninitiativeisenacted.SeeWagnerv.Sec’yofState,663A.2d

564,567(Me.1995).Furtherbutimportantly,itgoeswithoutsayingthatour

analysisandconclusionsareentirelydivorcedfromthemeritsoftheinitiative

becausethemeritsoftheinitiativehavenothingtodowithwhetheritshould

appearontheballot.

[¶11] Avangrid, the Chamber of Commerce, and IECG argue that we

should review the constitutional proprietyof submitting themeasure to the

electorsatall.Theyarguethattheinitiativefallsoutsidethescopeoflegislative

powerconferredonthepeopleofMainethroughthedirectinitiativeprovisions

oftheMaineConstitutionbecausetheinitiativeusurpsexecutiveandjudicial

functions.

[¶12] The Secretary of State agrees with Avangrid that the initiative

exceedsthecitizens’legislativepowerbutargues,asitdidinthetrialcourt,that

Avangridhasnotsatisfiedeveryelementnecessarytoobtaininjunctiverelief.

MainersforLocalPower,thenineMainevoters,andNextEracontendthatthe

dismissalofthecomplaintwasproper.MainersforLocalPowerandthenine

Maine voters additionally argue that the substance of the proposed resolve

comportswithMaine’sConstitutionbecausetheLegislaturemerelydelegated

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legislative power to the Commission, and the Legislature remains free to

interposeitselfinproceedingswheretheCommissionhasacted.4

4MainersforLocalPowerandthenineMainevotersalsoarguethatAvangrid’scomplaintwas

untimelybecause itwasnot filed in time to satisfy the100-day limitprescribed in the followingconstitutionalprovision:

TheLegislaturemayenact lawsnot inconsistentwith theConstitution toestablishprocedures fordeterminationof the validity ofwrittenpetitions. Such laws shallincludeprovision for judicialreviewofanydetermination,tobecompletedwithin100daysfromthedateoffilingofawrittenpetitionintheofficeoftheSecretaryofState.

Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§22;see21-AM.R.S.§§901(7),905(2020). Weareunpersuadedbythistemporal argument because it is not the Secretary’s determination of “the validity of writtenpetitions”thatisatissuehere,andthereforethe100-daylimitonthecompletionofjudicialreviewofthatdecisiondoesnotapply.NeithertheMaineConstitutionnortheadoptedstatutesgoverninginitiativessuggestthattheSecretaryofStatewouldhavethepower,whendeterminingthe“validityofwrittenpetitions”pursuanttoarticleIV,part3,section22and21-AM.R.S.§905,todecidewhetherthesubjectmatterofapetitionexceedsthelegislativepowerconferredonMainecitizens.Rather,thestatutesfocustheSecretary’sattentiononthepetitioner’scompliancewiththerequirementsofa“writtenpetition”assetforthintheMaineConstitutionandthestatutes.SeeMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§§18,20,22;21-AM.R.S.§§901-905(2020). A“writtenpetition”isspecificallydefinedinMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§20:

“[W]rittenpetition”meansoneormorepetitionswrittenorprinted,orpartlywrittenandpartlyprinted,withtheoriginalsignaturesofthepetitioners,or,asauthorizedbylaw,thealternativesignaturesofpersonswithphysicaldisabilitiesthatpreventthemfrom signing their own names, attached, verified as to the authenticity of thesignaturesbytheoathofthecirculatorthatallofthesignaturestothepetitionweremade in the presence of the circulator and that to the best of the circulator’sknowledgeandbeliefeachsignature isthesignatureof thepersonwhosename itpurportstobe,andaccompaniedbythecertificateoftheofficialauthorizedbylawtomaintainthevotinglistortocertifysignaturesonpetitionsforvotersonthevotinglistofthecity,townorplantationinwhichthepetitionersresidethattheirnamesappearonthevotinglistofthecity,townorplantationoftheofficialasqualifiedtovoteforGovernor....

TheelectionstatutesconferalimitedgatekeeperfunctionupontheSecretaryofStatetoreviewtheformofanapplicationfordirectinitiativepetitionsandtorejectanapplicationthatdoesnotmeettheformalrequirementsforproposedlegislation.See21-AM.R.S.§901(requiringthosepursuingadirectinitiativeto“submitawrittenapplicationtotheDepartmentoftheSecretaryofStateonaformdesignedbytheSecretaryofState”topresentthe“proposedlaw”totheSecretary).ThestatutelimitstheSecretary’sreviewofanapplication tomattersof form. See id.§§901(3-A),905(1);seealsoWymanv.Sec’yofState,625A.2d307,311(Me.1993)(statingthattheSecretaryofState’s“refusaltofurnishthepetitionformbasedonthecontentoftheproposedlegislationimpermissiblyviolated

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B. StandardofReviewandRulesofConstructionforInterpretingtheMaineConstitution’sDirectInitiativeProvisions

[¶13] This appeal requires us to construe the Maine Constitution to

determinewhethertheinitiativeshouldbedeclaredinvalidandtheSecretary

ofStateshouldbeenjoinedfromsubmittingtheinitiativetoMainevoters.We

reviewthelegalissuespresentedonappealdenovo.SeeMcGeev.Sec’yofState,

2006ME50,¶5,896A.2d933(constitutionalinterpretation);Johnsonv.Crane,

2017ME113,¶9,163A.3d832(ripeness).

[¶14] To interpret the Maine Constitution, we “look primarily to the

languageused.”Voorheesv.SagadahocCounty.,2006ME79,¶6,900A.2d733

(quotationmarksomitted).Weconstrueconstitutionalprovisionsbyusingthe

same principles of construction that we apply in cases of statutory

interpretation.Id.Thus,wewill“applytheplainlanguageoftheconstitutional

provisionifthelanguageisunambiguous,”and“[i]ftheprovisionisambiguous,

we [will] determine the meaning by examining the purpose and history

surroundingtheprovision.”Id.

Wyman’srightsprotectedbythefirstamendment”(emphasisadded)).BythetermsoftheMaineConstitution,the100-daylimitonjudicialreviewpertainstothisdeterminationonly.SeeMe.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§22.Thecourts,however,havetheauthority“todeclarerights,statusandotherlegalrelationswhether or not further relief is or could be claimed,” and there is no constitutional orstatutory limitationon that authority that constrainsour action in thismatter. 14M.R.S. §5953(2020).

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[¶15]Inpertinentpart,theconstitutionalprovisionregarding“[d]irect

initiativeoflegislation”providesthat“electorsmayproposetotheLegislature

foritsconsiderationanybill,resolveorresolution,includingbillstoamendor

repealemergencylegislationbutnotanamendmentoftheStateConstitution,

bywrittenpetitionaddressedtotheLegislatureortoeitherbranchthereof.”

Me.Const.art. IV,pt.3,§18,cl.1. Wehaveheld,“Thebroadpurposeofthe

directinitiativeistheencouragementofparticipatorydemocracy.Bysection

18thepeople,assovereign,haveretakenuntothemselveslegislativepower,

and that constitutional provision must be liberally construed to facilitate,

rather than to handicap, the people’s exercise of their sovereign power to

legislate....[S]ection18cannotbesaidmerelytopermitthedirectinitiativeof

legislationuponcertainconditions.Rather,itreservestothepeopletheright

to legislate by direct initiative if the constitutional conditions are satisfied.”

McGee,2006ME50,¶25,896A.2d933(quotationmarksomitted).Withthese

standards inmind,we now considerwhether pre-election judicial review is

properinthiscase.

C. RipenessandPre-ElectionJudicialReview

[¶16]Achallengetotheconstitutionalityofthesubstanceofaproposed

citizen initiative is ordinarily not ripe for judicial consideration before an

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electionbecause“[j]usticiabilityrequiresthattherebearealandsubstantial

controversybaseduponanexistingsetoffacts,notuponastateoffactsthat

mayormaynotariseinthefuture.”Lockmanv.Sec’yofState,684A.2d415,

420(Me.1996)(quotationmarksomitted).Wewillnotopineon“thefuture

effect,enforceability,andconstitutionalityof[an]initiativeifenacted”because

“theinitiativemayneverbecomeeffective.”Wagner,663A.2dat567.Thereis

no“concrete,certain,orimmediatelegalproblem”insuchcircumstances.Id.

“[T]o express a view as to the future effect and application of proposed

legislationwould involve [us] at least indirectly in the legislativeprocess, in

violationoftheseparationofpowersmandatedbyArticleIII,Section2,ofthe

MaineConstitution.”Id.(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶17]Similarly,JusticesoftheSupremeJudicialCourthaveopinedthat

aninitiativeproposingabillthatissubstantivelyunconstitutionalisnotsubject

topre-electionchallengeandmustbesubmittedtotheelectorsbecauseofthe

constitutionaldirectivethatan initiative“shallbesubmittedtotheelectors.”

Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§18,cl.2;seeOpinionoftheJustices,673A.2d693,697,

698 (Me. 1996); Opinion of the Justices, 623 A.2d 1258, 1264 (Me. 1993)

(answerofGlassmanandClifford,JJ.);butseeOpinionoftheJustices,623A.2d

at1261-63(answerofWathen,C.J.,andRoberts,Collins,Rudman,andDana,JJ.)

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(reaching the question before the Legislature decidedwhether to enact the

proposalorsendittothevotersandopiningthataninitiativefellwithinthe

citizens’ legislativepower);seealsoWagner,663A.2dat566n.3 (“Since the

Legislaturehasnotenactedtheinitiativewithoutchange,itmustbereferredto

theelectors.”);Wymanv.Sec’yofState,625A.2d307,310(Me.1993)(same).

[¶18]Incontrast,courtsareauthorizedbytheMaineConstitutionand

state statutes to determine whether the proposed initiative satisfies the

proceduralprerequisitesforadirectinitiative.Forexample,wehavereviewed

whether the Secretary of State erred in failing to invalidate certain petition

signaturesfortheinitiativenowbeforeus,Reed,2020ME57,¶1,---A.3d---,

andwhethertheSecretaryofStatewasrequiredtoreceivepetitionsinvoking

apeople’svetoreferendumonabillenactedasanemergencymeasurein1951,

Morrisv.Goss,147Me.89,90,83A.2d556(1951)(construingMe.Const.art.IV,

pt.3,§16).5

5Notably,inbothMorrisv.Goss,147Me.89,90,83A.2d556(1951),andthemorerecentcaseof

Friends of Congress Square Park v. City of Portland, 2014 ME 63, ¶¶ 1, 91 A.3d 601, we wereconsideringwhethergovernmentactorsimproperlydeniedballotaccessforacitizens’initiative—decisions thatwere ripe for reviewbecauseof a live controversy calling for adecisionwith realconsequences. In Friends of Congress Square Park, we affirmed the Superior Court’s judgmentorderingtheCityofPortlandtoplaceacitizens’ initiativeon theballotbecause itwaswithinthescopeoftheinitiativepowersetforthintheCityCode.Id.¶¶1,19.

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[¶19]Atissuehereiswhether,aswithissuesregardingtheadequacyof

compliancewiththepetitionprocess,courtsmayproperlydecide,pre-election,

whether a proposed initiative must be excluded from the ballot because it

exceedsthescopeofthecitizens’ legislativepower. Althoughwehavenever

expresslydecided the issue,manyotherstatecourtshavereachedquestions

pre-election about whether an initiative exceeds the people’s legislative

authority.See,e.g.,AFLv.Eu,686P.2d609,614-15(Cal.1984);CityofIdaho

Springsv.Blackwell,731P.2d1250,1253(Colo.1987);Garvinv.NinthJud.Dist.

Ct.,59P.3d1180,1190-91(Nev.2002);TownofHiltonHeadIslandv.Coal.of

Expressway Opponents, 415 S.E.2d 801, 805 (S.C. 1992); Philadelphia II v.

Gregoire, 911 P.2d 389, 394 (Wash. 1996). Such pre-election review is

authorized because a court is not called upon to review the substantive

constitutionalityofproposedlegislationbutratheriscalledupontodetermine

whetherlegislationhasbeenproposedatall.SeeJamesD.GordonIII&DavidB.

Magleby,Pre-ElectionJudicialReviewofInitiativesandReferendums,64Notre

Dame L. Rev. 298, 302-03 (1989) (distinguishing among pre-election

argumentsthat“themeasure, ifpassed,wouldbesubstantivelyinvalid”;that

the proponents failed “to meet the procedural requirements to qualify the

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measure foranelection”; and that “theballotmeasuredoesnot fallwithina

propersubjectmatterfordirectlegislation”).6

[¶20]UnlikethecasesinwhichMaineJusticeshavedeclinedtoconduct

pre-election review of direct initiatives on the ground that the substantive

constitutionalityofproposedlegislationwasnotripeforreview,seeOpinionof

the Justices, 673 A.2d at 697, 698;Opinion of the Justices, 623 A.2d at 1264

(answerofGlassmanandClifford,JJ.),thiscasepresentsthequestionwhether

the subject matter of the initiative is even eligible to proceed as a direct

initiative.

[¶21]InWagnerv.SecretaryofState,wereviewedthesubjectmatterof

adirectinitiativetodeterminewhetheritwaswithinthescopeofthepeople’s

right to initiate legislation and, after confirming that it was, we declined to

reviewthesubstantiveconstitutionalityoftheproposedlaw.663A.2dat567.

InWagner, opponents of an initiative proposing the enactment of a statute

assertedthattheinitiativewasoutsidethescopeofarticleIV,part3,section18

because itproposedaconstitutionalamendmentrather than legislation,and

6Thestatesthathavedeclinedtoreachconstitutionalissuespre-electionhave,ingeneral,done

so either because additional facts may become relevant or because the issues pertained to thesubstantive constitutionality of the proposed legislation, as opposed to the constitutionalprerequisitesforacitizens’initiativetobesubmittedtothevotersinthefirstplace.See,e.g.,Stewartv.AdvancedGamingTechs.,Inc.,723N.W.2d65,77(Neb.2006);Carterv.LehiCity,269P.3d141,164(Utah2012).

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alsobecausetheproposedstatutewouldbesubstantivelyunconstitutional if

enacted.Id.at566-67.Weaddressed,onitsmerits,thequestionofwhether

the initiative proposed a constitutional amendment, holding that “[t]he

SuperiorCourtspecificallyaddressed,andcorrectlyrejected,theargumentthat

theinitiativewasadisguisedconstitutionalamendment.”Id.at567.Basedon

thatconclusion,wesaid,“Theproposedinitiativelegislationdoesnotpresent

uswithasubjectmatterbeyondtheelectorate’sgrantofauthority.”Id.Having

decided that the subjectmatterof the initiativewaswithin the scopeof the

people’s rightof initiative,wedeclined, on ripeness grounds, to address the

substantiveconstitutionalityoftheproposedstatute.Id.at567-68.

[¶22] Wagner illustrates that the courts’ limited involvement in the

direct initiativeprocesscan, inadditiontoproceduralmatters,extendtothe

questionofwhetheradirectinitiativeiswithinthepeople’sconstitutionalright

to initiate legislation. Plainly, a proposal that is outside the scope of the

people’srighttoinitiatelegislationcannot,asaconstitutionalmatter,proceed

totheelectorateasadirectinitiative.Seeid.at567.Wethereforeconcludethat

thequestionofwhetherthesubjectmatterofthisdirectinitiativeiswithinthe

scopeofthepeople’srighttoinitiatelegislationisripeforjudicialreview.See

Gordon&Maglebyat314(“Proceduralandsubjectmatterrequirementscould

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be viewed as jurisdictional limitations; government officials do not have

jurisdictiontoconductanelectiononameasureiftheserequirementshavenot

beenmet, and this issue is immediately justiciable.”). We now turn to that

constitutionalissue.

D. Constitutionality of Submitting the Subject Matter of the ProposedInitiativetotheVoters

[¶23] We begin by outlining the separation of powers in the Maine

Constitution and then turn our focus to the constitutional provisions

authorizingadirectinitiativeoflegislationtodeterminewhetheraninitiative

requiringthePublicUtilitiesCommissiontoalteradecisiononacertificateof

publicconvenienceandnecessityiswithinthescopeofthecitizens’initiative

power.

1. ConstitutionalSeparationofPowers

[¶24] The Maine Constitution establishes three separate branches of

government:

Section 1. Powers distributed. The powers of thisgovernment shall be divided into 3 distinct departments, thelegislative,executiveandjudicial. Section 2. To be kept separate. No person or persons,belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any of thepowers properly belonging to either of the others, except in thecaseshereinexpresslydirectedorpermitted.

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Me.Const.art.III. AswestatednotlongafterMainehadbecomeastate,the

more that the “independence of each department, within its constitutional

limits,canbepreserved,thenearerthesystemwillapproachtheperfectionof

civilgovernment,andthesecurityofcivil liberty.” Lewisv.Webb,3Me.326,

329(1825).Thequestionatissuehereiswhethertheinitiativeproposesan

actthatisnotlegislativeandisthereforenotwithinthepeople’srighttoinitiate

legislation. We thus turn to the scope of that right as defined in the

constitutionalprovisionsauthorizingthedirectinitiativeoflegislation.

2. LegislativeNatureofaDirectInitiativeProposingaResolve

[¶25]Aswenoteabove,theconstitutionalprovisionregarding“[d]irect

initiativeoflegislation”statesthat“electorsmayproposetotheLegislaturefor

its consideration any bill, resolve or resolution, including bills to amend or

repealemergencylegislationbutnotanamendmentoftheStateConstitution,

bywrittenpetitionaddressedtotheLegislatureortoeitherbranchthereof.”

Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§18,cl.1(emphasisadded).Theterms“bill,”“resolve,”

and“resolution”arenotdefinedintheMaineConstitution.Butcf.Me.Const.

art.IV,pt.3,§20(definingothertermssuchas“electors,”“people,”and“written

petition”).

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[¶26] Our previous cases indicate that a “resolve,” like a “bill” or

“resolution,”isalegislativeact.Wehaveexplicitlyandrepeatedlydescribeda

resolve as “having the force of law.” Moulton v. Scully, 111 Me. 428, 448,

89A.944(1914);seealsoLockman,684A.2dat419(construingMe.Const.art.

IV,pt.3,§16);Dayv.Bishop,71Me.132,133(1880).Wehavealsointerpreted

thelanguage,“everybillorresolutionhavingtheforceoflaw,”toreferto“what

iscommonlyknownaslegislativeactsandresolves,whicharepassedbyboth

branches, are usually signed by the governor and are embodied in the

Legislative Acts and Resolves, as printed and published.” 111 Me. at 448,

89A.944 (emphasis added) (quotationmarks omitted). In stating that it is

withinthepoweroftheLegislaturetoadoptaresolve“withoutanypurposeor

intention to abrogate, annul or repeal any existing general law,” we

acknowledgedthataresolveisnonethelesslegislativeaction.CityofBangorv.

InhabitantsofEtna,140Me.85,89-91,34A.2d205(1943).Thus,section18,

although not explicitly using the term “legislation,” requires that a citizens’

initiativeconstitutelegislativeaction.SeealsoLeagueofWomenVotersv.Sec’y

ofState,683A.2d769,771(Me.1996)(statingthat“[w]henthepeopleenact

legislation by popular vote,” they engage in the “exercise of their sovereign

powertolegislate”).

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[¶27]Thisconstructionofsection18isconsistentwithareadingofthe

provisioninthecontextofpart3ofarticleIVoftheMaineConstitution,entitled

“Legislative Power,” and, importantly, the title of section 18 itself, “Direct

initiative of legislation,” Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18 (emphasis added).

Legislative power is, at its core, the “full power to make and establish all

reasonablelawsandregulationsforthedefenseandbenefitofthepeopleofthis

State, not repugnant to this Constitution, nor to that of the United States.”

Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§1;seeLeagueofWomenVoters,683A.2dat771(“The

exercise of initiative power by the people is simply a popular means of

exercisingtheplenarylegislativepower‘tomakeandestablishallreasonable

lawsandregulationsforthedefenseandbenefitofthepeopleofthisState....’

Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§1.”(emphasisadded)).7Thus,thecitizens’powerof

directinitiative“appliesonlytolegislation,tothemakingoflaws,whetheritbe

apublicact,aprivateactoraresolvehavingtheforceoflaw.”Moulton,111Me.

at448,89A.944.

7AswithlegislationproposedbytheLegislature,courtswillnotordinarilydeterminewhether

thesubstanceofthelegislationis“repugnantto[theMaine]Constitution”beforethelegislationhasbeenenacted.Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§1;seeGuardianshipofChamberlain,2015ME76,¶35,118A.3d 229 (holding that the standard of proof in a statute passed by the Legislature wasunconstitutional);cf.OpinionoftheJustices,2017ME100,¶¶55,60-68,162A.3d188(opining,onasolemn occasion, that citizen-initiated legislation that had been approved by voters violated theconstitution). Thisdetermination isdistinct fromthequestionofwhether an initiativeproposesactuallegislation.

21

[¶28]JusticesoftheSupremeJudicialCourthaveopined,inresponseto

questionspropoundedbylegislativebodies,thatitisnotwithinthepowerof

theelectorstoinitiate

• Abondissue,seeOpinionoftheJustices,159Me.209,214-15,191A.2d357(1963)(citingMe.Const.art.IX,§14);or

• AdefactoamendmenttotheUnitedStatesConstitutionbypetitioningto initiate legislationdirectingmembersof theState’s congressionaldelegation,thegovernor,andstate legislatorstoapplytotheUnitedStates Congress for a constitutional convention, see Opinion of theJustices,673A.2d693,697(Me.1996)(citingU.S.Const.art.V).

In each instance, the Justices concluded that thesematterswerewithin the

exclusive province of the Legislature and therefore beyond the legislative

powerofthecitizens.

[¶29] Sitting as the LawCourt,we have also addressed the extent of

legislativepower.Fiveyearsaftertheconstitutionalamendmentadoptingthe

initiative process took effect in 1909, see Resolves 1907, ch. 121 (effective

Jan.6, 1909), we declined to delay the effect of the Legislature’s resolve

adopting an address to the Governor to remove the Sheriff of Cumberland

County,holdingthattherewasnoneedtoaffordtheopportunityforapetition

forapeople’sveto,seeMe.Cont.Art.IV,pt.3,§§16,17,becausetheLegislature’s

resolve constituted an exercise of its power of impeachment pursuant to

22

articleIXoftheMaineConstitutionandnotitslawmakingpowerpursuantto

articleIV.Moulton,111Me.at431,447-51,89A.944.

[¶30] Morerecently,welistedcharacteristicsofactsconsideredtobe

legislative in determining whether a municipal citizen initiative had to be

presentedtothevoterspursuanttothatmunicipality’scharter:

[C]ourtsconsideranacttobelegislativeifit:(1)makesnewlaw,rather than executes existing law; (2) proposes a law of generalapplicability, rather than being based on individualized,case-specificconsiderations;(3)relatestosubjectsofapermanentorgeneralcharacter,asopposedtosubjectsthataretemporaryinoperationandeffect;(4)declaresapublicpurposeandprovidesforthe ways and means to accomplish that purpose, rather thanimplementingexistingpolicyordealingwithasmallsegmentofanoverall policy question; (5) requires only general knowledge,rather than specialized training and experience or an intimateknowledgeofthefiscalorotheraffairsofgovernment;(6)doesnotinvolveasubjectmatterinwhichthelegislativebodyhasdelegateddecisionmakingpowerforlocalimplementation;(7)establishesoramends zoning laws; (8) is informed by historical examples oflegislativeacts,suchaslongstandingparallelsinstatutesenactedby legislative bodies, rather than traditionally executive acts; or(9)isanamendmenttoalegislativeact.

FriendsofCong.SquareParkv.CityofPortland,2014ME63,¶13n.7,91A.3d

601(citationsomitted).

[¶31] Todecidewhethertheinitiativeat issuehereisconstitutionally

permissiblebyproposing legislationwithin themeaningofarticle IV,part3,

23

section18oftheMaineConstitution,wenextconsiderthenatureofthepowers

heldandexercisedbythePublicUtilitiesCommission.

3. Legislative and Quasi-Judicial Executive Powers of the PublicUtilitiesCommission

[¶32]TheLegislaturecreatedthePublicUtilitiesCommissionin1913so

that the Commission—constituted of individuals who would have greater

expertise in the field than legislators—would regulate and control public

servicecorporations.SeeP.L.1913,ch.129(approvedMar.27,1913;survived

people’svetoSept.14,1914);Legis.Rec.907(1913);InreSearsportWaterCo.,

118Me.382,392,108A.452(1919);seealsoAuburnWaterDist.v.Pub.Utils.

Comm’n,156Me.222,225,163A.2d743(“Theregulationofpublicutilitieslies

withtheLegislatureandnotwiththeExecutiveorJudiciary.”).TheLegislature

“delegated its entire authority over the [regulation of public utilities] to the

Commission.”NewEnglandTel.&Tel.Co.v.Pub.Utils.Comm’n,470A.2d772,

778 (Me. 1984); see 35-A M.R.S. § 111 (2020) (granting the Commission

rulemaking authority). “The power of the Legislature was not, however,

surrendered,butdelegated.TheCommissionhasnolifeexceptaslifeisgiven

bytheLegislature.”AuburnWaterDist.,156Me.at226,163A.2d743.

[¶33] Although legislative authority has been delegated to the

Commission, the Commission also functions as an executive agencywith its

24

membersappointedbytheGovernor,“subjecttoreviewbythejointstanding

committee of the Legislature having jurisdiction over public utilities and to

confirmation by the Legislature,” to execute its statutory obligations. 35-A

M.R.S.§105(1)(2020).Also,theGovernor—nottheLegislature—designates

onememberasthechair.35-AM.R.S.§106(1)(2020).TheCommissionhasan

administrative adjudicatory role that is traditionally regarded as a

quasi-judicialfunctionofaStateagencyinexecutingthelaw.See35-AM.R.S.

§§104, 1301-1323 (2020); see Forest Ecology Network v. Land Use Regul.

Comm’n,2012ME36,¶45n.11,39A.3d74(“Abasictenetofadministrative

law is that rulemaking is a quasi-legislative act, and that adjudication is a

quasi-judicial act.”); Tinkle, The Maine State Constitution 70 (2d ed. 2013)

(“Ingeneral, the firstbranchenacts laws, the secondapproves andexecutes

them,andthethirdexpoundsandenforcesthem.”(citingExparteDavis,41Me.

38,53(1856)));seealsoFriendsofCong.SquarePark,2014ME63,¶13n.7,91

A.3d601(statingthefollowingasindiciaoflegislativeactivity:thataproposal

“requires only general knowledge, rather than specialized training and

experience or an intimate knowledge of the fiscal or other affairs of

government”;thatitdoesnotinvolveamatterastowhichthelegislativebody

25

hasdelegateddecision-makingpower;andthatitdoesnotinvolveactsthatare

traditionallyexecutiveacts).

[¶34]Thus,separatefromitsroleinlegislatingthroughrulemakingto

regulatepublicutilities,theCommissionfunctionsinanexecutivecapacityas

anadministrativeagency, includingbyholdingapublichearing—sometimes,

asintheproceedingatissuehere,ahearingsubstantialbothindurationandin

thevolumeofinformationsubmittedtoandconsideredbytheCommission—

andrenderingadecisioninaparticularcasewhenautilityhasappliedfora

certificate of public convenience and necessity. See 35-A M.R.S. §§1304,

3132(2), (6) (2020);8 see also 5 M.R.S. §§9051-9064 (2020) (Maine

AdministrativeProcedureAct);cf.Cent.Me.PowerCo.v.Me.Pub.Utils.Comm’n,

395A.2d414,427(Me.1978)(distinguishingtheCommission’s“substantive

powertoregulate”fromits“lawfulauthoritytoconduct[an]investigation”).By

statute,theCommission’sadjudicatorydecisionsmaythenbeappealeddirectly

totheLawCourt“inthesamemannerasanappealtakenfromajudgmentof

the Superior Court in a civil action.” 35-A M.R.S. § 1320(1) (2020). The

Commission’s adjudicatory decisions therefore are subject to judicial—not

8Although35-AM.R.S.§3132(6)(2018)wasamendedaftertheproceedingsatissuehere,itwas

notchangedinanywaythataffectsourreasoninghere,andwecitethecurrentstatute.SeeP.L.2019,ch.298,§11(effectiveSept.19,2019)(codifiedat35-AM.R.S.§3132(6)(2020)).

26

legislative—review.9Seeid.;NextEraEnergyRes.,LLC,2020ME34,227A.3d

1117.

[¶35]Theinitiativeatissuehereisnotlegislativeinnaturebecauseits

purposeandeffectistodictatetheCommission’sexerciseofitsquasi-judicial

executive-agency function in a particular proceeding. The resolve would

interfere with and vitiate the Commission’s fact-finding and adjudicatory

function—anexecutivepowerconferredontheCommissionbytheLegislature.

See35-AM.R.S.§3132(6).AlthoughtheLegislaturemayproperlyconstrainthe

Commissioninits legislativefunctionsandmayaltertheauthorityconferred

on the Commission, the Legislaturewould exceed its legislative powers if it

were to require the Commission to vacate and reverse a particular

administrative decision the Commission hadmade. See 35-AM.R.S. §1323;

Grubbv.S.D.WarrenCo.,2003ME139,¶11,837A.2d117(“TheLegislature

maynotdisturbadecisionrenderedinapreviousaction,astothepartiesto

thataction;todosowouldviolatethedoctrineofseparationofpowers.”).Thus,

9TheLegislaturehasenactedanarrowexceptiontotheexclusivegrantofreviewtothecourts,

bymeansof a statute allowingautility to apply to theLegislature “to granta right, privilegeorimmunitywhichthecommissionhaspowertogrant”aftertheutilityhasexhausteditsrightswiththeCommission.35-AM.R.S.§1323(2020).Here,CMP,theutility,isnotapplyingtotheLegislatureortothevotersthroughthisinitiative.Becausetheissueisnotbeforeus,wedonotaddresswhethertheLegislature’s reviewofan adjudicatorydecisionof theCommissionpursuant to section1323wouldbeaconstitutionalexerciseoflegislativepower.

27

theactionthatwouldbemandatedbythedirectinitiativewouldbeexecutive

innature,notlegislative.

4. Conclusion

[¶36] Althoughwemust“liberallyconstrue[]”section18“tofacilitate,

rather than to handicap, the people’s exercise of their sovereign power to

legislate,”McGee,2006ME50,¶25,896A.2d933(emphasisadded)(quotation

marksomitted),whatisproposedhereisnotlegislation.Thecitizens’initiative,

althoughlabeleda“resolve,”directstheCommission,inexercisingitsexecutive

adjudicatorypowers,toreverseitsfindingsandreachadifferentoutcomeinan

already-adjudicatedmatterinviolationoftheconstraintsofarticleIV,part3,

section18oftheMaineConstitution.SeeGrubb,2003ME139,¶11,837A.2d

117;FriendsofCong.SquarePark,2014ME63,¶13n.7,91A.3d601.Directing

anagencytoreachfindingsdiametricallyoppositetothoseitreachedbasedon

extensiveadjudicatoryhearingsandavoluminousevidentiaryrecord,affirmed

onappeal,isnot“mak[ing]andestablish[ing]”alaw.Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,

§1.10

10Evenwithrespecttospeciallegislation,theLegislaturemaynotenact“aprivateresolvesingling

outanindividualforuniquetreatment.”MacImageofMe.,LLCv.AndroscogginCounty,2012ME44,¶37,40A.3d975;seealsoBrannv.State,424A.2d699,704(Me.1981)(holdingthatthespeciallegislation clause is “violated by special legislation attempting to exempt one individual fromgenerallyapplicablerequirementsofthelaw”).ThecaseofAuburnWaterDistrictv.PublicUtilitiesCommission,156Me.222,163A.2d743(1960),doesnotundermineourreasoningbecausethere,theLegislature’sexemptionofawaterdistrict fromthegeneralregulatorypowerwas througha

28

[¶37] Although an initiative “shall be submitted to the electors” if

legislationisproposed inaccordancewiththeprocesssetforthintheMaine

Constitution,Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§18,cl.2;seeWagner,663A.2dat566n.3;

Wyman, 625 A.2d at 310, here, no legislation is proposed. Consequently, a

constitutional prerequisite to a citizens’ initiative is not satisfied—a

determinationthatisproperforustomakebecauseitislimitedtothenarrow

questionofwhethertheinitiativeiswithinthecitizens’constitutionalpowerto

enactlegislation.SeeWagner,663A.2dat567.Accordingly,wereachtheissue

pre-electionandconcludethattheconstitutionalprerequisitethataninitiative

proposinga“bill,resolveorresolution”—meaninglegislativeaction—hasnot

beenmet.Me.Const.art.IV,pt.3,§18,cl.1.11

special lawestablishingacharter for thewaterdistrict—a function thatisdistinctly legislative innature. See also Taylor v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2016ME71, ¶ 8, 138A.3d 1214 (“As a legislativeenactment,wefirstexaminetheplainlanguageofthecharteraswewouldanyotherstatute.”).Weheld that theCommissionwasboundby the charterbecause theLegislature retains the right tolegislatetoregulatepublicutilities.AuburnWaterDist.,156Me.at228-29,163A.2d743.Here,incontrast, the initiative targets nonlegislative activities of the Commission, as we have explainedabove.

11 Althoughthe tight timeline for thecurrent litigation isnot ideal,weacknowledge that it isunclearwhetherthequestionwehavedecidedtodaywouldhavebeenripeforadjudicationbeforetheSecretaryactedandhisdecisionwasaffirmedafterjudicialreview.SeeLockmanv.Sec’yofState,684A.2d415,420(Me.1996)(requiring,foramattertoberipe,“thattherebearealandsubstantialcontroversybaseduponanexistingsetoffacts,notuponastateoffactsthatmayormaynotariseinthe future” (quotationmarks omitted));Wagner v. Sec’y of State, 663 A.2d564, 567 (Me. 1995)(“Ripenessconcernsthefitnessoftheissueforjudicialdecisionandthehardshiptothepartiesofwithholdingcourtconsideration.”).Aswehaveobservedinfootnote4above,theSecretary’spowertoreviewawrittenpetitionislimitedtoformalreview.Beforethatreviewhadbeenpursuedtoitsconclusion,however, itwasnotclearthatthemeasurewouldbepresentedtothevotersunlessacourtenteredadeclaratoryjudgmentontheissueweaddresstoday.

29

[¶38]WethereforeremandfortheSuperiorCourttoenteradeclaratory

judgment that the initiative fails tomeet theconstitutional requirements for

inclusionontheballotbecauseitexceedsthescopeofthelegislativepowers

conferredbyarticleIV,part3,section18oftheMaineConstitution.Because,

accordingtotheSecretaryofState,ballotsfortheNovember2020electionneed

beprintedstartingattheendofthismonth,themandateofthisopinionwill

issue five days after the date it is published, with any motion for

reconsiderationtobefiledwithinthattime.SeeM.R.App.P.14(a)(2),(b),(c).

[¶39]Aswehavenoted,inthetrialcourtandindeedduringmuchofhis

oralargumentonthisappeal,theSecretaryofStatehasopposedtheissuance

of injunctivereliefthatwouldenjoinhimfromincludingtheinitiativeonthe

ballot.Ultimately,however,counselfortheSecretarystatedthatifwewereto

concludethattheinitiativeisunconstitutionalandcannotbesubmittedtothe

electorsforpopularvote—whichispreciselyourclearholdingtoday—onhis

own accord, he will not include the initiative on the ballot. Based on the

SecretaryofState’sclarificationofhisposition,weareconfidentthathe“will

complywiththelawonceitisdeclared”andpreventtheinvalidinitiativefrom

beingplacedontheballot.GreatN.Paper,Inc.v.PenobscotNation,2001ME68,

¶64n.21,770A.2d574.Thus,weseenoneedfortheissuanceofinjunctive

30

relief.SeeLittlefieldv.TownofLyman,447A.2d1231,1235(Me.1982)(holding

that injunctive relief against amunicipal planning boardwas “unnecessary”

whenweremandedforthetrialcourttoenteradeclaratoryjudgmentthata

specificversionofanordinanceappliedandtherewas“noevidencesuggesting

anunwillingnessonthepartoftheBoardtoacceptajudicialdeterminationof

thatquestion”).

Theentryis:

Judgmentvacated. Remanded for theSuperiorCourt to enter adeclaratory judgment that theinitiative fails to meet the constitutionalrequirementsforinclusionontheballotbecauseit exceeds the scope of the legislative powersconferredbyarticleIV,part3,section18oftheMaineConstitution. Mandatetoissuefivedaysafterpublicationofthisopinion,withanymotionforreconsiderationtobefiledwithinthattime.

31

JohnJ.Aromando,Esq.(orally),JaredS.desRosiers,Esq.,JoshuaD.Dunlap,Esq.,andSaraA.Murphy,Esq.,PierceAtwoodLLP,Portland,forappellantAvangridNetworks,Inc.GeraldF.Petruccelli,Esq.,andNicoleR.Bissonnette,Esq.,Petruccelli,Martin&Haddow,Portland,forappellantMaineStateChamberofCommerceSigmundD.Schutz,Esq.,AnthonyW.Buxton,Esq.,andRobertB.Borowski,Esq.,PretiFlahertyBeliveau&PachiosLLP,Portland,forappellantIndustrialEnergyConsumerGroupAaronM.Frey,AttorneyGeneral,andPhyllisGardiner,Asst.Atty.Gen.(orally),OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,Augusta,forcross-appellantSecretaryofStateDavid M. Kallin, Esq., Adam R. Cote, Esq., and Elizabeth C. Mooney, Esq.,DrummondWoodsum,Portland,andPaulW.Hughes,Esq.(orally),andAndrewLyons-Berg,Esq.,McDermottWill&EmeryLLP,Washington,D.C., for cross-appellantsMainersforLocalPowerandnineMainevotersChristopherT.Roach,Esq.,RoachRuprechtSanchez&Bischoff,P.C.,Portland,forappelleeNextEraEnergyResources,LLCTimothyC.Woodcock,EatonPeabody,Bangor, foramicicuriaeMarkN.DionandKennethC.FletcherJames L. Costello, Esq., and Rebecca Gray Klotzle, Esq., Curtis Thaxter LLC,Portland, foramicicuriaeformercommissionersoftheMainePublicUtilitiesCommissionDmitryBam,amicuscuriaeproseOrlandoE.Delogu,amicuscuriaeproseCumberlandCountySuperiorCourtdocketnumberCV-2020-206FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY