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22 Days in May: The Birth of the Lib DemConservative Coalition by David Laws review

This account of the coalition's formation will appeal most to political trainspotters

Jonathan Powell, The Observer, Sunday 5 December 2010

This book describes the negotiations between 7 and 11 May on the formation of Britain's first coalition

government since the Second World War and David Laws's all too brief career as a cabinet minister,

which ended with his resignation on the 29th of the month. The negotiations may have seemed

important to the participants at the time, but Ten Days That Shook the World John Reed's firsthand

account of the Russian revolution they were not. This book will appeal more to political trainspotterslike me than to the average reader, replete as it is with verbatim accounts of meetings and full

supporting documents.

It is hard not to warm to Laws himself, his self-deprecating comments and his wide-eyed wonder at

everything in government from kissing the Queen's hand to his special sealed box for top secret

intelligence. The sense ofAlice in Wonderland is compounded by a misprint when he describes two

Lib Dem officials "wondering nonchalantly through the corridor" of Number 10.

His account of the first coalition cabinet meeting is almost more of a parody than Private Eye's New

Coalition Academy: "I watched David Cameron chair the meeting crisply, concisely, and with a clear

command of all the topics being discussed. I concluded that he was not only rather enjoying being

prime minister, but appeared to be rather good at it. Nick Clegg also made some important

contributions."

The trouble with writing an instant book like this when you want to go back into government is that

you have to be unrelentingly nice about pretty much everyone. And yet, if it is to have value, you need

to have some candour about your friends as well as your enemies. The only two people who come

across as anything other than thoroughly decent in the whole saga are Gordon Brown and Ed Balls;

Laws, who clearly can't stand either, describes them as belonging to the thuggish tendency ofpolitics.

He even blames Labour for not getting rid of Brown as leader before the 2010 election so that it could

have a prospect of winning enough seats to form a coalition with the Lib Dems. I found myself

warming to his theme.

The importance of the book lies in his detailed description on the coalition negotiations. It is likely that

absolute majorities will be hard to come by in future and that these will not be the last coalition

negotiations in Britain. The Lib Dem talks with the Tories moved remarkably quickly and smoothly,

certainly far faster than equivalent negotiations elsewhere in Europe, and they gave both party leaders

the opportunity to jettison their party's most ludicrous policies, to their evident relief.

A few fascinating details pop out, like the advice from the Treasury that tax rises as well as spending

cuts will be necessary before the next election and the casual way the two parties stumbled into the

55% threshold for ending five-year, fixed-term parliaments. Laws also tells us that he and Nick Clegg

were always dubious about the pledge on tuition fees.

Laws's central thesis is that the Lib Dems did not enter the negotiations with their minds already made

up. By his account, what stopped an alliance with Labour was the rudeness of Ed Balls and the

indifference of Ed Miliband and Harriet Harman and their failure to make enough concessions to theLib Dems. They had expected a charm offensive from Labour and all they got was a negotiating team

that was, with the exception of Peter Mandelson and Andrew Adonis, charmless and offensive.

Laws seems almost too anxious to prove that he and Nick Clegg were not crypto-Tories set from the

outset on an alliance with David Cameron. And yet, when you read the book, there are little clues all

the way through that there is something to the charge. The most unconvincing part is Laws's

description of why he became a Lib Dem: it was not for any reasons of ideology but just because he

felt comfortable in the party. He says that the coalition could only happen because Clegg was the first

Lib Dem leader to be truly equidistant between the parties, by which he means open to the

Conservatives. And he reveals that George Osborne suddenly popped up in his office in 2001

proposing that he defect to the Tories. Instead of reacting with anger, he seems to have been mildly

pleased with a cold call more reminiscent of the Soviet-era KGB than modern politics.

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His thesis is not therefore terribly convincing even on the evidence of his own account of events. In

fact, a Lib-Lab coalition was never realistic. The numbers just weren't there in Parliament. The

electorate would not have stood for propping up Gordon Brown in government for another six months

after he had been defeated. And a large part of the Labour party would not have accepted such a

coalition of the losers. The Lib Dems' negotiating team clearly did not think such a coalition was

realistic, but used the theoretical threat of it skilfully as a negotiating lever to squeeze their main

demand a referendum on AV out of Cameron.

Laws refers a number of times to the possibility of forming a Lib-Lab coalition in 1997, bringingtogether the progressive forces in British politics, which he says didn't happen because of the size of

Tony Blair's majority. That is wrong. The reason it didn't happen was because Gordon Brown and

other Labour leaders were at the time opposed to such an alliance and to any concessions on AV. It is

paradoxical, therefore, that in 2010 the Labour party ran on an explicit promise of AV and then,

according to this account, Gordon Brown virtually begged Nick Clegg to form a coalition after the

election.

One thing that leaps out of the book is the bifurcated nature of the Lib Dems. The party is, in fact, two

parties made up of both old-fashioned liberal conservatives like Laws and Clegg and social democrats

like Paddy Ashdown and Charles Kennedy. That sort of division is easy to manage in opposition but

much more difficult in government. If they survive the test, as I expect them to do, they will still facethe problem that always faces the junior party in German coalition governments when they get to the

next election: how to differentiate yourself from the larger partner while still claiming credit for what

the government has achieved.

Anyone hoping for a candid account of Laws's resignation from government will be disappointed. He

covers the event in less than half a page and tells us even less than we already know. He is clearly a

very private man but also clearly decent and extremely able. I hope he does get back into government

as we know he will since David Cameron has said he wants him back as soon as possible and that

he enjoys it as much as he did the first time.

David Laws's account of the coalition negotiations is interesting and valuable for future generations

but it is, as he himself says, one sided. For a more balanced view, the book I am dying to read is an

account of the period by Andrew Adonis, the one person who had been a Lib Dem and yet was at the

centre of the Labour negotiating team. Only then will we get a clear view of what it was all about.

Unfortunately, we may have to wait for some time.

Jonathan Powell's The New Machiavelli: How to Wield Power in the Modern World is published by

Bodley Head

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The making of the coalitionIAN BIRRELL

SATURDAY, 4TH DECEMBER 2010

David Cameron was despondent on the evening of 10 May.

David Cameron was despondent on the evening of 10 May. Although the election result was pretty

much as he had predicted privately, he feared that his big, open and comprehensive offer of coalitionwith the Liberal Democrats was about to be rejected in favour of a deal with Labour. When we talked

that night he feared another spell in opposition, and he ended by suggesting I went into the office the

next day since he would have time on his hands.

But as we spoke, the Lib Dem negotiating team was reporting back to Nick Clegg on another

disastrous set of discussions with Labour, ensuring that long-held hopes of the so-called progressive

alliance were shrivelling by the hour. Even Vince Cable accepted the reality of the situation. So the

next day passed in feverish activity as the coalition agreement was sealed, and that evening Mr

Cameron and his hastily summoned wife were clapped out of his office on their way to the Palace.

After 13 years, the Conservatives were back in Downing Street in the most unlikely circumstances.

The excitement of those febrile five days is captured in these two fine accounts of the birth of thecoalition. Both read almost like thrillers, such were the twists and turns as sleep-deprived men and

women played a game of poker with the highest stakes imaginable. Unlike many books by politicians,

they are stuffed with nuggets of genuine revelation, although some of the biggest questions remain

unsolved.

Since David Laws was one of the central figures, 22 Days in May is inevitably the more absorbing,

despite a slightly bland writing style and failure adequately to explain his sudden downfall. The book

is designed to set in stone the Lib Dem case that there was no alternative to joining the Conservatives

in full-blown coalition. Laws calls it the Sherlock Holmes strategy after a late-night discussion with

the hyper- active Paddy Ashdown, who refers to a story in which the great detective eliminates all

available options until there is only one possible solution. Whatever remains, however improbable,must be the truth.

This is precisely what happens. The three other options were tested, then eliminated. Firstly, the idea

of staying in opposition, then supporting a minority Conservative government, and finally a Coalition

of the losers with Labour and the smaller parties. To their credit the Lib Dems took the right decision,

endorsing the electorates verdict, despite the potentially devastating ramifications and the hostility of

previous leaders. Laws recalls how at one meeting he sat down next to Menzies Campbell, who was so

angry he would not talk to him.

The account by Tory MP Rob Wilson is a more probing work, examining mysteries such as the

sidelining of Vince Cable a wise move since, in the first meeting of the negotiating teams, George

Osborne asked if it was possible to discuss deficit reduction without his presence and theunresolved issue of precisely when Cameron and Clegg agreed to a referendum on electoral reform.

The picture that emerges from both books is of two parties that were prepared for coalition and

conducted negotiations with the seriousness they demanded, while the third was in disarray. We

would not be establishing a new government, we would be chaining ourselves to a decaying corpse,

concluded Laws after one meeting. There can be little doubt that Labour threw away their slim chance

of staying in government with a display of muddle and inflexibility.

So Gordon Brown alienates Clegg with his battering-ram style of diplomacy, then in desperation

seemingly offers him half of all government posts and total control over European policy. Harriet

Harman insults Chris Huhne by being unaware of his portfolio. And while the two peers Adonis

and Mandelson valiantly struggle to hold the coalition talks together, the two Eds Balls andMiliband appear detached and even subversive, focused instead on their imminent leadership battle.

There was a remarkable fluidity to politics during those tense days. Parties ditched key policies left,

right and centre just days after fighting for them in an election although even the Tories were

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surprised by the speed with which the Lib Dems changed tack on the economy. One moment the

coalition agreement proposed four-year fixed terms of government, then it was five years; such is the

ease with which our constitution is changed. And Laws himself was clearly lined up to oversee

transport, presumably with Philip Hammond as Chief Secretary to the Treasury, until he lobbied

successfully to work alongside Osborne.

As a first draft of those dramatic days, these accounts offer a fascinating glimpse into events that will

shape the nations history, when a new generation of Liberals in two parties united in pursuit of power.

Nothing unfolds as you expect, one of the key players tells Wilson, a statement that remains just astrue for the coalition today as it did in May.

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Pretty soon people will be asking 'who the hell is running this country?': David Laws gives the first

account of the five days that changed Britain...

By David Laws

Last updated at 6:49 PM on 20th November 2010

Liberal Democrat MP David Laws was at the heart of talks with the Conservatives and Labour as a

Coalition Government deal was thrashed out against the clock in May.Here, in an extract from his compelling new book, based on transcripts from all key meetings, is the

first eyewitness account of the power struggles, drama and despair of those crucial hours...

Friday, May 7

The day after the General Election, the MPs asked by Nick Clegg to be part of a negotiating team to

deal with a hung Parliament met at party headquarters at Cowley Street. We were ensuring that party

communications were rather more effective than they were in the hung Parliament of 1974, when

Edward Heath's office tried to contact Liberal Party leader Jeremy Thorpe on Election night, only tobe told: 'He's not available right now. He's leading a candlelight procession through the streets of

Barnstaple.'

There was myself, Danny Alexander, Chris Huhne and Andrew Stunell. Danny was Nick's chief ofstaff. Chris was our Home Affairs spokesman. Andrew is an expert on green issues, political reform

and campaigning.

I have seen transcripts of some of the discussions that followed, but not all were formally recorded. I

have put into quotation marks some of the words used by the key players, but only where I have been

able to rely on the written transcripts, or my own notes, or indeed my clear recollections. Where these

sources are not available, I have sought to summarise the conversations that took place.

Nick arrived at around 10.40am and made an announcement to the Press. Behind him, a large number

of party staff had gathered under instructions to look happy, upbeat and positive.

Nick said he would hold to his Election campaign commitment to talk first to the party with the largest

number of seats - the Conservatives.Inside, in the 'war room', he told us: 'Gordon Brown has already been in contact with Vince Cable, and

he is talking about forming an anti-Tory "rainbow coalition". I'm not sure that the numbers really work

for that - do they?'

The general view was that they didn't, but Chris said: 'It's vital to strengthen our bargaining position

by making the rainbow coalition a real possibility. If we can do this, we might even persuade David

Cameron to accept a referendum on voting reform.'

It was agreed that Nick would speak to Cameron after a planned 2.30pm statement by the

Conservative leader. Saturday would start with meetings of the Lib Dem Shadow Cabinet and the

parliamentary party. The federal executive of the party would also meet in the afternoon.My view was that we needed to get on with negotiations as soon as possible but I did not relish the

prospect of trying to get a quick decision out of the Lib Dem Party. Lib Dems love consultation.

Cameron's afternoon statement signalled his openness to 'a new politics' and the possibility of a full

coalition. But was it a bluff? At around 4pm, he and Nick spoke on the telephone.

'I just want to say that I believe that you and I can get on,' Cameron said. 'I believe that this is do-able,

and for the good of the country we need a decent government that delivers stability.'

Nick replied: 'I am very happy to explore the scope for agreement further but there are some key

issues that will be very difficult for both sides to agree on.'

'I understand,' said Cameron. 'I am not one of the "old guard" - I favour doing things differently. We

are ready to start talking to you on a formal basis. I will throw in my top four people. My negotiating

team will consist of William Hague, George Osborne and Oliver Letwin, as well as Ed Llewellyn.

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'We really need to start the talks this evening. Pretty soon people are going to say, "Who the hell is

running this country?" We must try to conclude things by Monday morning, for when the markets

open. Can we aim for that? That would be pretty powerful.'

Nick replied: 'I'm happy to start this evening. But I have a meeting of my parliamentary party

tomorrow morning and we cannot decide anything until I have consulted people. You should also

know that I have been contacted by the other side.'

Cameron responded: 'Well, I just wanted to reassure you that Gordon hasn't been in contact with us! I

think it would be ridiculous if Gordon Brown stayed in Downing Street, after losing 100 seats. Let'spress ahead.'

The conversation, which lasted 12 minutes, closed with agreement for the two leaders to meet over the

weekend, and for the negotiators to meet within a few hours.

Brown's call came through an hour later. The discussion started well enough.

'Hi, Nick. Well, history never quite repeats itself in quite the same way, does it? Well done, this was a

triumph for you. You got your message across. You presented yourself very well,' said Brown, with

one of his charmless and double-edged comments.

Nick replied: 'That's nice of you to say so, but I don't seem to have delivered the seats we wanted.'

Brown continued in measured tones: 'Now, you know the Civil Service will be available to offer their

support to us?'Nick explained that the Conservative and Lib Dem teams would meet that evening.

'Look, Nick,' said Brown, 'whatever the Conservatives are offering on policy, I am sure we could

match them immediately. I have already prepared a note on our policies, another note on the policy

differences between us and a third note on the constitutional process moving forward.

'I want you to understand my commitment to the political reform process. I would not want you to

undervalue my commitment on this but I do think a referendum would be needed.'

By this stage there was no holding Brown back.

'Look, Nick, on tax, spending and the economy, there are not big ideological differences between us.

We both want to help the low-paid on tax, the issue is how. We can look at property taxes, but that

will take a bit of time on the revaluation.

'Turning to civil liberties. ID cards and "28 days" (the current maximum pre-charge detention period

for terror suspects), I think we can thrash it out.

'Nick, the recent political scandals have really changed my view on political reform. Now, perhaps I

could also go through all the other issues that came up during the recent campaign as well if...'

A desperate-sounding Nick swiftly interrupted: 'No! No! Don't. Please don't! I think I know where you

are heading. I just need to say that there is a chronology to this. I have to start with the Conservatives,

I gave that pledge...'

Brown interrupted: 'But I am worried about the constitutional precedent here...anyway, I am not going

to argue.'

Nick said: 'How could our parties overcome the accusations about two parties which came second and

third forming a government, and could we actually form a stable government?'Brown plunged in: 'Yes, I have thought about all this. Nick, people want change, and two parties

working together would mean change. Also, we have together over 50 per cent of the vote. The

Conservatives received about 36 per cent. And, yes, we can command support in the Commons. We

can form an understanding with all the Northern Ireland-parties, based on the economic needs of

Northern Ireland.

'Nick, I could prove to you that this would work. I understand you have said you will talk to David

Cameron first, but can you also talk to us on policy today?'

Nick replied: 'I have said I will talk to the Tories first. Let's see tomorrow how those talks go.'

Brown started to press more insistently: 'It would surely be worthwhile to have parallel discussions?'

Nick said: 'Gordon, I know how you feel, but I don't want to trip up over my own shoelaces on this.

Who are you thinking of on your team anyway?'

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'Peter Mandelson. Andrew Adonis and Ed Miliband. With Alistair (Darling) or Ed Balls, depending on

the issues.

'I really want to honour the constitutional process here. I have studied history. I know that the future of

our country is a progressive alliance between two progressive political parties. The Election has

provided a moment of opportunity which will not return. We could miss this opportunity for ever. It is

an opportunity . . .'

It sounded like a script that someone else had written. The great Labour tribalist was making a

deathbed conversion to the benefits of co-operation with another party.On and on he went: 'The possibility has eluded us before, Nick, for various historic reasons' - for

example, his own determined opposition.

'You would get electoral reform, it would be a pro-Europe government and we would have a

progressive economic policy. There is a real prize here.'

Nick was frustrated by being lectured: 'Yes, I see the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow but...'

Brown cut in again: 'But I can deliver on this, Nick. I can deliver my party, and a majority in the

Commons and the constitutional change.'

Nick, increasingly exasperated, said: 'Yes, but Gordon, I can't sit down to discuss this at 8am

tomorrow. I have to meet my party. I have to talk to the Conservatives.'

'But Nick,' Brown continued, 'There is a problem all over Europe. We will be hit too if we cannotdeliver a stable government. Look, I am aware that I cannot control events. But I am anxious to meet.'

Nick tried to sum up: 'I will go away and talk to my folk to see when we can discuss all this. Danny

Alexander will fix it with Peter.'

Brown made one last pitch: 'Don't be disappointed by your results, Nick. You have made a huge

impact. The agenda of the future has been set by this election. We need to work closely...'

'Yes, yes, yes, that's very helpful,' Nick said.

After a final exchange of pleasantries Nick put the phone down and groaned, 'That man!'

The call had lasted 23 minutes. The Lib-Lab discussions had not got off to a good start.

At 7.30pm, talks with the Conservatives began at the Cabinet Office. We arrived first and Chris sent

out an early signal of his serious intentions by leafing through a volume containing photographs of the

Government art collection, available to decorate the offices of Ministers.

When the Conservative team arrived, we shook hands with each other. We sat around a conference

table surveying each other with the surprise of people who had known each other for years and

suddenly found themselves at the altar, having never quite seen the possibility.

William Hague started off the meeting by assuring us of the Conservatives' serious intent.

'We sincerely want this to work,' he said, 'and we think each side needs to understand the other's

internal processes.'

I hardly dared say that I had been a Lib Dem for 25 years and was still struggling to understand our

party's internal processes.

Danny explained our procedures, including consultation with our Shadow Cabinet, parliamentary

party, federal executive and perhaps even a special conference. Hague tried not to look too appalled.Oliver Letwin proposed that the Conservatives draft a response to each of our four key issues: a

10,000 personal tax allowance; a properly funded pupil premium (money to fund the education of the

most disadvantaged pupils); deficit reduction; and electoral reform.

We made some progress but voting reform was the sticking point. We decided to let the leaders

discuss it, and agreed to meet on Sunday.

Saturday, May 8

I woke with a sense of impending gloom - a day of 'consultation' within the Lib Dems. During the

negotiations, Hague joked that the Conservative Party is 'like an absolute monarchy, moderated by

regicide'. Well, the Lib Dems can be rather like an absolute democracy, moderated by very little.

I expected a sizeable minority of our party to completely oppose a coalition option. The rest I expected

to be split between those favouring Labour and those favouring the Conservatives.

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However, at the meeting of the Lib Dem Shadow Cabinet, and then the subsequent meeting of the

parliamentary party, there was much more unity than I expected. People seemed very pragmatic.

Danny had agreed with Peter Mandelson that we would meet informally and secretly with Labour's

team that afternoon.

By the time I arrived, Mandelson, Adonis, Balls and Ed Miliband were seated on one side of the table,

with us on the other. Mandelson was setting out Labour's position. I detected a modest degree of

detachment, scepticism even, from him. I guessed that Balls would be willing to deal with the Lib

Dems only if absolutely necessary, and while holding his nose.With Miliband, the closer you looked, the more you realised that he was actually quite a long way to

the Left in the Labour Party.

We talked through some of the key issues. There was one uncomfortable point when Chris raised the

issue of Brown's future.

'We have yet to discuss,' he said, 'how we deal with the Gordon Brown problem.'

Mandelson pretended to look surprised. However, this was not the right environment to discuss such a

sensitive issue.

Danny intervened to say: 'No Chris, that is not a matter that we are discussing,' which put an end to the

conversation. Ed Balls and Ed Miliband grimaced, clearly unhappy with the idea that Brown should

have to step down.The meeting lasted an hour and we made clear that this was more of a 'listening' opportunity.

That night Nick met Cameron at Admiralty House for an hour and 15 minutes. Later, he took another

call from a hyperactive Gordon Brown.

Sunday, May 9

The first substantive talks with the Conservative team started at 11am.

We began by dealing with political reform and reached agreement quickly on some issues, including

fixed-term Parliaments. Voting reform was always going to be the toughest issue and the

Conservatives were now offering what amounted to an all-party inquiry, which would draw up a list of

possible voting systems. This would then be voted on in the Commons. Such a proposal had as much

chance of being approved by Lib Dem MPs as a plan to build 1,000 coal-fired power stations in

South-West England.

Danny suggested a referendum on the most modest form of electoral reform - the Alternative Vote

(AV), which allowed candidates to be ranked in preference order and required MPs to secure 50 per

cent of the vote to be elected - linked to Lib Dem support for the Conservatives' own reform plan,

which was to reduce the number of parliamentary seats and to remove Labour over-representation.

However the Conservatives insisted that the furthest they could go was to consider offering a free vote

in the House of Commons on a referendum on AV.

We moved on to economic policy, concluding at 5.30pm and we agreed to meet again on Monday

morning. We went to brief Nick, who then updated us on discussions with Brown. They had met in the

Foreign Office.

'They are obviously pretty desperate,' Nick said. 'Brown says he will do anything we want to secure acoalition, including standing down as Labour leader. In the meantime, he said I could make all the

announcements on new policy so that the Government has a new "feel" to it!'

When Nick spoke to Brown again at 9.30pm the Labour leader had changed his tune and was now

talking about going 'sometime later in the Parliament'.

Nick told him: 'Please understand that I have no personal animosity, but a Lib-Lab coalition will not

be sellable unless you move on swiftly, in a dignified way.'

The Prime Minister replied: 'Look, if I stay on I can help with the referendum campaign on AV.'

An exasperated Danny Alexander, also present, said: 'But we will never win a referendum with you in

charge!' Brown looked rather taken aback.

'Gordon is just impossible to deal with,' Nick told us.

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We agreed to continue to explore our options with both Labour and the Conservatives, and to report

back to the parliamentary party the next day.

Monday, May 10

At sunrise there was all to play for. By sundown the die was cast.

Paddy Ashdown (Lib Dem leader from 1988 to 1999) had phoned on Sunday afternoon insisting that I

call at his house in Kennington, South London, on the way home, regardless of the time. I arrived at

around 1am.

By now, he was of the view that the Lib - Lab option needed to be our first priority. Paddy had spokento Nick earlier, when Brown was offering a swift resignation. I told Paddy that Brown was now

talking about hanging on for months.

'God, the man is impossible,' said Paddy. 'I'll call Mandelson or Adonis. They have to get Gordon to

see sense.'

Paddy phoned 'switch', the Downing Street switchboard, which can track down senior politicians

anywhere in the world, but neither Mandelson nor Adonis could be reached. 'I'll call Blair,' Paddy said

suddenly.

He called Tony Blair's home, waking Cherie, who told him that Tony was in the Middle East where it

was 3am or 4am. After a couple of calls, a sleepy Blair came on to the phone.

'You won't believe what Gordon is up to,' said Paddy. 'First he promised to stand down as leader, thena few hours later he said he wanted to stay on for up to an extra year.'

I could hear Blair chuckling. He could doubtless see the irony of Brown being pressed for an early exit

date. Blair promised to phone Brown.

Across London, a few hours later, Vince Cable was woken by Brown on the telephone at 6am. Vince

managed to spell out to him that the price of a Lib-Lab deal was likely to be his immediate

resignation.

A morning phone call between Mandelson and Danny Alexander finally confirmed Labour agreement

to the Lib Dem requirement for Brown to announce his resignation.

At talks in Whitehall with the Conservatives, Hague started the meeting by saying that no further

voting reform concessions were possible. The Conservatives were now offering a confidence and

supply agreement (in exchange for an agreement on key policies, the Lib Dems would promise to

support the Government on economic issues and on confidence votes, while remaining on the

Opposition benches) to support a Conservative minority administration. What was being offered was

most of what had been agreed, but without a coalition, without direct Lib Dem involvement in

government, and without a pledge to deliver an AV referendum.

The Lib Dem parliamentary party met at around 1.30pm. There was a strong view that both the

country and the Lib Dems would be better off with a coalition.

Half-way through the meeting we learned that the Conservative whips were asking their own MPs

whether they would be willing to accept a referendum on AV as the price of a coalition with the Lib

Dems. They were thawing on voting reform. By the end of the meeting it was decided that we would

pursue a full coalition option.We would enter talks with Labour if Brown announced he was standing down. In addition, Nick

would tell Cameron that we were interested only in a full coalition, and only on the condition that

Conservative MPs would back a referendum on AV.

At 5.05pm Brown announced that he would resign, opening up the real possibility of the 'progressive

alliance' dreamed of for so long by so many in our party.

Our talks with Labour now moved to 'formal' status and we met their team at Portcullis House that

evening. They were late and while we waited, rumours - later confirmed - reached us that the

Conservatives were to make a new offer to us to hold a whipped vote in the Commons on an AV

referendum, in return for a full coalition.

Eventually, Mandelson, Adonis, Balls and Miliband arrived, joined on this occasion by Deputy Leader

Harriet Harman. It was interesting to watch the body language of the Labour team. Mandelson was

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engaged and serious, Adonis was committed and professional, but between these and the other three

there was a gulf of attitude and enthusiasm. We appeared to be negotiating with two separate Labour

teams. One wanted a deal, the other didn't.

Balls was already rumoured to be committed to taking Labour into Opposition. He stared into the

distance as Mandelson talked, occasionally wincing at comments. Miliband, who had often stopped

me to talk about the importance of keeping the door open to Lib-Lab co-operation, now gave the

impression of being at best indifferent to the success of the talks.

Harman said little but wore a smile that was simultaneously pained, patronising and sceptical.When talking to Chris Huhne about ID cards she said: 'Look, Alan Johnson really needs to talk this

through with whoever the Lib Dem Home Affairs spokesman is.'

'That would be Chris,' Danny retorted.

Labour had brought with them a new policy paper that seemed to indicate tougher action on deficit

reduction than the party had previously planned. However, Balls stuck to the line that the deficit could

not be reduced any faster than outlined in existing plans.

I started a discussion about some of our other proposals - the 10,000 personal allowance, the pupil

premium and the restoration of the pension earnings link.

Tuesday, May 11

'We have all these expensive Lib Dem pledges,' said Balls, 'but how do we fund them, and cut thedeficit?'

I said: 'Look, Ed, as you know we are proposing that the higher personal allowance is funded by

progressive tax reforms of the type I would have thought Labour would support - higher capital gains

tax, a new mansion tax and reform of pensions taxation.'

Mandelson frowned: 'Surely the rich have suffered enough?'

Andrew Adonis chipped in: ' Perhaps Vince and Alistair can meet tomorrow?'

Danny pointed out, as we had already done several times, that we were able to negotiate on these

issues, and we assumed the Labour team was empowered to do so.

I suggested establishing a commission to review the affordability of public sector pensions.

Mandelson and Adonis looked sympathetic but Balls, Miliband and Harman recoiled in horror.

If they were to negotiate an agreement with us, the Labour team first needed to agree among

themselves. The Conservatives had treated us as another Opposition party on an equal footing. The

Labour team, certainly the Eds and Harriet, treated us to policy lectures.

Danny asked: 'Can we rely on Labour MPs supporting an AV referendum?'

'That is what is guaranteed in our manifesto,' said Mandelson.

Then Balls intervened: 'The Chief Whip thinks it could be difficult to get the AV referendum through.

Many of our colleagues are opposed to it. It cannot be guaranteed.'

It was a deadly intervention and, I felt, a calculated wrecking device. If a hotchpotch deal with Labour

and various other parties could not deliver on our policy prospectus, on economic stability or even on

the most modest form of electoral reform legislation, what on the earth was the point of it?

The talks broke up with Mandelson suggesting further discussions the next morning.I believe Balls, Miliband and Harman achieved what they set out to deliver: the planting of significant

doubts in our mind about the likelihood of a Lib-Lab coalition.

It was clear that if we went into coalition with Labour, we would not be establishing a new

government, we would be chaining ourselves to a decaying corpse.

'God, this is going to make life very tough indeed,' said Nick later when we briefed him.

'I have just had Paddy Ashdown, Ming [Sir Menzies] Campbell and Charles Kennedy all talking to me

separately and all wanting us to support the possibility of a deal with Labour.

'I am going to have to insist that you meet the Labour team tomorrow morning.'

The four of us groaned, in a 'do we really have to?' sort of way.

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After briefing the parliamentary party, I gave a statement to the Press waiting in Westminster Hall but

stuck by the usual line about the importance of any agreement delivering 'economic stability and a

credible deficit reduction plan'. My soundbites were beginning to bore even me.

Make your mind up time. Our first meeting was with Labour. Before we left, we received a message

that Brown was now asking all Labour Cabinet Ministers to contact their Lib Dem opposite numbers

to discuss agreement on policy issues.

'This is absolutely barmy,' said Danny. We paged senior colleagues to warn them not to get involved.

The next call was more extraordinary still. It was from Vince Cable who told us that Alistair Darling'sgovernment car was on the way to collect him to take him to the Treasury for talks with the

Chancellor.

Danny asked that a message be sent immediately to Vince, saying that he should send Darling's car

back to the Treasury.

We arrived at Portcullis House and the Labour team trooped in. We expected that the truculent trio -

Balls, Miliband and Harman - would be on better behaviour.

Someone suggested that we needed some refreshments, and Miliband stumped up the money for teas

and pastries. It was about the first financial concession that Labour had made to us.

Mandelson began the talks. 'I think we can leave the economic issues to one side,' he said, 'for Vince

and Alistair to sort out during their meeting at the Treasury.'Danny interrupted: 'Vince has cancelled the meeting. There must be only one set of negotiations. We

will get in a muddle if we start having bilaterals all over the place.'

We later discovered that although Vince had sent the car back, he had decided to go by rail instead to

see Darling. He thought the objection was to the ministerial car, not to the meeting.

Vince was determined to find out where the Chancellor stood. But when he met Darling, they both

agreed that there was not much they could do and, after a brief discussion, the meeting came to an end.

We had agreed that Andrew should explain that we had been disappointed by yesterday's negotiation

and expected a more positive approach. He did this, with the air of a disappointed deputy head teacher,

ticking off a group of sixth-formers. The Labour team did their best to look hurt.

The discussions began. Danny received a text message. It was from Mandelson, on the other side of

the table. It read: 'We need to get a more positive atmosphere if these talks are to be worthwhile.'

Labour did make some concessions - agreeing to reform of the House of Commons, to axe the third

Heathrow runway and the National Identity Register - but there was little movement on anything

else. When I raised public sector pensions reform, Miliband looked horrified.

'Oh no,' he said. 'We cannot go further than our existing agreements with the unions.'

'That sounds like a line from your Labour leadership campaign!' joked Danny. Miliband tried to look

mystified.

We finished the meeting with a promise to stay in touch, but neither side can have considered that

enough progress had been made. Other than Brown, Mandelson and Adonis, it was not clear to us

which other senior Labour politicians actually wanted to stay in office.

Early in the day, Paddy Ashdown had again telephoned Blair, urging him to secure David Miliband'spublic backing for a coalition. But this was snubbed by Miliband, who wanted to lie low. Darling was

also said to be opposed to a coalition.

Nevertheless, at around 1.15pm, Brown met Nick and urged him to think again.

'It was quite embarrassing actually,' Nick reported to us later. 'I was very uncomfortable. He was

passionate about the whole thing, and seemed to be pleading with me.

'We need to move on with the talks with the Conservatives. We must get on with all this, because

there has to be an agreement today. And as soon as I tell Brown that a deal with Labour is off, he may

just go to the Palace and resign.'

If Brown resigned, the Queen would be obliged to send for Cameron to ask him to form a government.

The pressure was on to deliver as quickly as possible.

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At 2pm, talks with the Conservatives resumed. While we talked, Nick had discussions with Cameron

and more chats with an increasingly frustrated Brown. Everyone wanted Brown to hang on until a deal

had been agreed. Britain was not supposed to be left without a government.

The Civil Service, the Palace, the Lib Dems and the Conservatives all wanted Gordon Brown to

remain in place so that the handover of power happened seamlessly. It just about worked.

As the afternoon ticked by, there was give and take on both sides. Our tables were covered in drafts

and redrafts of the coalition agreement.

Then, at around 7.15pm, Gordon Brown emerged into Downing Street.We broke off the talks and switched on a television. As the final drafts of our agreed text were coming

off the Cabinet Office printers, we watched Brown make a brief, dignified and emotional statement.

Then the former Prime Minister and his wife Sarah opened the door to Downing Street to collect their

two young boys.

Whether friend or foe, it is always an emotional moment for those of us who care about politics when

a Prime Minister leaves office. I felt sad rather than elated, but tried not to show it.

George Osborne reached out and slapped me on the back in friendly alliance and celebration.

Who wants to be George Osborne's axeman? I DO! After all I am one of Britain's leading Lib

DUMS...

A mocking note from Labour, rows over a ministerial Jag - and a dramatic fall from

grace...concluding David Laws' compelling Coalition diaries

By David Laws

Last updated at 1:44 AM on 23rd November 2010

Last week Lib Dem MP David Laws exclusively revealed how his party rejected desperate pleas from

Gordon Brown and reached a Coalition deal with the Conservatives. Now, in the second extract from

his new book, he tells how the Lib Dems reacted to the agreement - and describes the 'toughest time'

of his life as he resigned from his Treasury post after just two weeks...

Tuesday, May 11

The Grand Committee Room, off Westminster Hall, was packed with Liberal Democrat MPs, peers,

and senior staff and the mood was one of elation.

My fears that a Lib Dem-Conservative coalition might split the party seemed unfounded. Nick Clegg

came in to a standing ovation. He said he was recommending acceptance of the deal negotiated with

the Conservatives earlier that day.

Copies of the agreement were circulated and afterwards there was discussion, and then there was a

very unusual outbreak of demands that the discussion be cut short and cries of 'Let's vote now'.

In 16 years of Lib Dem meetings, I cannot ever remember such suggestions being made. Paddy

Ashdown, one of the most loved and respected members of the party, spoke. Nick looked down

nervously from the platform. Paddy said that he found it difficult to support an arrangement that

would mean abandoning his great dream of a realignment with the Left. He said that his inclinationwas to throw in his involvement in politics and go back to his garden and his grandchildren.

It threatened to be a huge blow to the Coalition. But then he went on: ' However, after telling Nick my

decision earlier today, I took the time to actually read the document that you have negotiated. I have to

say that it is magnificent. Amazing. F*** it. How can I stay out of this fight? You know that I cannot

resist a battle, not least in the company of my friends.'

There was huge relief and then applause. All Lib Dem MPs and Lords, and all members of the federal

executive bar one, voted to accept the agreement. We had formed the Coalition.

Wednesday, May 12

The portfolio I wanted was that of Chief Secretary to the Treasury. 'Who wants to be George

Osborne's axeman?' one Lib Dem MP was quoted, anonymously, as saying to a newspaper. But who

wants to be in a coalition and have no influence?

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I had no idea what Nick's view of this would be but I hoped that this was what the missed call from

him of the previous evening had been about. I called him. He was still at home at around 8am, getting

his children ready for school.

'I don't like to be presumptuous,' I said, 'and it may be that I am not actually going to be in the Cabinet,

but if I am I really think we need someone at the Treasury.'

Nick mentioned the Department for Transport. I pointed out that the Treasury is the engine room of

any government and that there was a real risk that if we were excluded from it, it would be more

difficult to deliver on our priorities and on the Coalition pledges. Nick said that he would be talking toDavid Cameron, but in the meantime had to sort out the top priority - getting his children to school.

In my office, I waited for that call all MPs hope for when governments are being formed.

Eventually I had a pager message: 'Please call Downing Street.'

One of David Cameron's private secretaries told me: 'The Prime Minister would like to see you

sometime in the next half-hour or so. Do you think you could be available?'

In a calm voice, which sought to strike a balance between over-enthusiasm and nonchalance, I said:

'Yes, of course. Just let me know when.'

'The PM is just speaking to the French President, then he'll talk to you.' This seemed only reasonable

I waited about an hour, checking my phone to ensure that Downing Street had not somehow been put

through automatically to the answerphone. Eventually the same young lady called and said: 'ThePrime Minister will see you in about a half an hour.'

I strolled up Downing Street in as relaxed but businesslike way as I could manage. I have always

thought that new members of the Cabinet look insufferably smug as they make their way up Downing

Street and are feted by the camera crews, so I got out my pager and read through old messages as I

walked to No 10.

The door opened and I was escorted inside. Behind the entrance the doorman had taped an aide-

memoire to the side window so he could recognise some of the lesser-known members of the new

Government. This appeared to have been cut out of a newspaper. I was one of six members of my

party who appeared under the uninspiring headline: Britain's Leading Lib Dums.

A young lady greeted me. 'The Prime Minister is just speaking to the President of France,' she said,

'and then he will speak to you.' This seemed only reasonable.

After a brief wait I was escorted to the Cabinet Room. The Prime Minister was sitting in his chair. He

welcomed me and I sat down opposite him. A photographer dashed around us to record the great event

for posterity.

As I had expected, and hoped, the Prime Minister asked me to become Chief Secretary to the

Treasury. I thanked him for the opportunity. The meeting was over in a couple of minutes.

The plan was for me to head straight over to the Treasury building to meet my new boss, George

Osborne. Even though it was only a short walk, a black ministerial Jaguar was awaiting me outside.

Once again, as the doors of Downing Street opened I did my best to look serious and unemotional, as

befits a new Chief Secretary with a tough job to do. It was all going to plan until, as I got in the door

of the waiting Jaguar, one of the Press photographers shouted out: 'For God's sake smile, youmiserable b******!' He then caught me in shot smiling, as I looked back over my shoulder.

The Jaguar dropped me off at the Treasury. George and I shook hands, and made brief statements to

the Press saying how much we looked forward to working with each other.

And thus was born what was termed, for its all too brief existence, the Treasury team of 'Osborne and

Little', a reference to our respective heights and to George's family firm. This was a moment of huge

satisfaction for me.

When I was first becoming involved in politics in the mid-Nineties, Tatler magazine had tipped me as

one of the Lib Dems 'to watch for' in 20 years' time.

I was Lib Dem prospective parliamentary candidate in Folkestone and Hythe at the time and I bought

up every local copy of the magazine I could find (two).

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When I left my job as a well-paid managing director in the City of London to join the Lib Dems in

1994, we had not many more than 20 MPs, and little or no influence in Parliament. It seemed to many

an eccentric decision.

Indeed, when I applied to become an economics researcher for the party on 14,000 per year, the party

hierarchy found it difficult to believe my story, and assumed that I must be a Conservative spy! My

story had to be 'checked out' before I was allowed to take up even this lowly position.

And now here I was, coming to the Treasury to be the first Liberal Treasury Minister in almost 80

years. Later, I took some early decisions to cut public spending.I had already discovered that I was to have a chauffeur-driven black Jaguar at my beck and call. I

could not imagine being the public-spending 'axeman' while travelling around in a chauffeurdriven

Jaguar.

I enquired how much this had cost my predecessor's budget and was told that it was more than

110,000 per year. I told Chris, my private secretary, that this luxury had to go.

Thursday, May 13

I ploughed through various papers at my desk, and after a while Chris came in with a sealed letter,

which he said I might want to see.

It had been left by my predecessor, Liam Byrne MP. It said simply: 'Dear Chief Secretary, I'm afraid

there is no money. Kind regards - and good luck! Liam.'My initial reaction was to laugh. But I then felt that perhaps the joke was in rather poor taste.

The first Cabinet meeting was that morning and the only decision-making item on the agenda was the

proposal to cut five per cent from ministerial pay and to accept a pay freeze for the rest of the

Parliament.

That afternoon, the new Cabinet was due to see Her Majesty the Queen at Buckingham Palace, to

receive seals of office and to be sworn into the Privy Council.

My office suggested that I should use my chauffeur-driven Jaguar to get to Buckingham Palace.

'Oh, I thought I had cancelled that,' I said.

'Well, sort of,' said Chris. 'But the Government car service has told us we must give something like

three months' notice, so we have the car for the time being anyway.'

Feeling a little guilty at the indulgence, I clambered into the back of the ministerial Jaguar, and we set

off down The Mall. My driver made no reference to my decision to axe the car, but soon moved on to

selling me the virtues of the Government car service. It seemed that there was no problem in my

ministerial life that could not be resolved if only I had access to this service.

I had spent much of the weekend in the Treasury discussing the announcement to be made today on

the introduction of the Office for Budget Responsibility, which removed from politicians the power to

fix the economic growth forecasts in the Budget.

George Osborne made the OBR announcement in the conference room downstairs on the first floor of

the Treasury. George also revealed that the 6billion of 'in-year' cuts in spending in 2010-11 would be

unveiled in just one week.

In the question-and-answer session for journalists that followed, I then inadvertently gave the mediathe headline that they would be looking for, when I made reference to Liam Byrne's letter to me.

I was later to discover that Liam did not much appreciate this exercise in open government, but I was

too busy to worry about his nose being put a little out of joint. I now had 6billion of cuts to find, and

less than a week to do it in.

We were to send out a letter to each department (except overseas aid, health and defence) telling them

how much we wanted them to cut from their budgets. Some departments might 'settle' with us at the

suggested figures. Others could arrange to have their Secretaries of State to meet me.

In a meeting with Treasury civil servants I threw in a few ideas of my own. Why should civil servants

continue to take first-class travel, I asked, when MPs were now more or less banned from doing so?

One civil servant said: 'But Chief Secretary, the revenue from firstclass ticket sales goes to the train-

operating companies, under their contracts. So if there were fewer first-class ticket sales, and the

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revenue fell, it might simply mean greater subsidy payments to the train operators to make up the

difference. That would therefore save the Exchequer little or nothing. It could turn out not to be a real

economy at all, Chief Secretary.'

It was an ingenious defence, worthy of Sir Humphrey Appleby, but not one I was prepared to accept.

Yet I found that this savings proposal somehow always seemed to fall off the list of agreed cuts.

With George away there was another meeting that I had to attend - that of the new National Security

Council. This was chaired by the Prime Minister and included senior Cabinet Ministers, the heads ofthe security services and the top brass from our Armed Forces.

A large pile of briefing papers awaited me in a sealed box, which had to be opened with a special key.

The papers were then to be returned to the box by me. The material was 'Top Secret Classified'. Some

of the papers made even more frightening reading than those on the proposed cuts. All my papers

indicated the Treasury 'lines to take'.

They basically all came to the same thing.

Whatever country we were looking at, whatever issue, whether it was the Middle East or the handling

of the fallout from the volcanic ash cloud disrupting air travel, the Treasury line was always: 'We don't

believe that any extra money can or should be spent on this.'

Wednesday, May 19 --Sunday, May 23The next three days were spent trying to secure the agreement of various departments to their

settlements.

By 11pm on Friday we had agreed all the figures. On Sunday evening I drafted my speech for

Monday's Press conference.

Tuesday, May 25

The reaction to yesterday's statement on the 6.25billion of spending cuts seemed to be generally

favourable. I spoke at a meeting of Treasury officials from the spending directorate, joking that my

eyes were set on a date in July when I would no longer be the shortest serving Chief Secretary.

I noted that Thomas Boardman, Chief Secretary in 1974, had served for barely two months. It was a

joke I would soon come to regret.

Wednesday, May 26

The Chancellor was tied up in meetings so this was my first appearance at the Dispatch Box.

I took an hour of questions and rather enjoyed it. I returned to my office feeling satisfied with my first

performance as a Treasury Minister.

Thursday, May 27

I was pleasantly surprised by the favourable coverage of my performance.

However, The Guardian claimed I 'made Lizzie Borden [the American spinster tried and acquitted in

1893 for the axe murders of her father and stepmother] look like Pollyanna'. The Times reported a

Conservative MP as saying: 'He's the biggest Tory in the Cabinet.'

I left my office in the Treasury late on Thursday evening. I was not to know it, but I had worked my

last day as a Treasury Minister.Friday, May 28

In the morning I returned to my Yeovil constituency office. I was contacted at around 11am by The

Daily Telegraph about my private life, my sexuality and my parliamentary expenses.

It was undoubtedly the toughest time of my life, made all the more testing by having to discuss in a

few short hours and over a telephone line an issue that I had kept private from my family and closest

friends.

I felt I could not remain Chief Secretary. After a stressful 36 hours, I resigned from the Cabinet on

Saturday evening. This was my decision alone, and one I would have taken more swiftly without the

support and representations of senior political friends and colleagues.

Danny Alexander was appointed as my successor. He made a magnificent start as Chief Secretary, so

the work of the Treasury has gone on smoothly without me.

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We all discover some time in life that none of us is indispensable.

David Laws 22 Days In May by David Laws is published by Biteback, priced 9.99. To order your

copy at the special price of 8.99 with free p&p, please call The Review Bookstore on 0845 155 0713

or visit www.MailLife.co.uk/books.

Nick Clegg 'propped up' Gordon Brown to seal Tory deal: Insider account reveals Lib Dems never

wanted Coalition with Labour

By Simon Walters

Last updated at 10:23 AM on 14th November 2010Buckingham Palace helped David Cameron and Nick Clegg keep Gordon Brown in Downing Street in

the days after he lost the Election to make it easier for the Coalition to take power, a former Cabinet

Minister claims tonight.

The Palace, together with the Conservative and Liberal Democrat leaders, made Mr Brown believe he

still had a chance of clinging to power even though they knew he didnt because it was feared he

might resign too quickly and leave Britain without a Government.

The ploy to prop up Mr Brown gave Mr Cameron and Mr Clegg vital extra hours to seal their political

alliance and avoided plunging the Queen into a constitutional crisis, with no Prime Minister.

The disclosure comes in a new book by former Chief Secretary to the Treasury David Laws, based on

secret notes of the dramatic talks between the three parties after the Election failed to produce anoverall winner.

Mr Laws, a senior Liberal Democrat who was present throughout the discussions, gives the first blow-

by-blow insiders account of the high-octane and often acrimonious exchanges between the party

leaders and rival negotiating teams.

His book, 22 Days In May, exclusively serialised in The Mail on Sunday from today, reveals how:

The Lib Dems never really wanted to do a deal with Mr Brown and be chained to the Labour

Governments decaying corpse.

Ed Miliband was reduced to the role of tea boy in the talks and revealed that he could not

upset the unions.

Peter Mandelson responded to Mr Lawss support for a mansion tax on 2 million-plus housesby protesting: Surely the rich have suffered enough?

When the Coalition talks stalled, panicking David Cameron exclaimed: People will soon be

asking who the hell is running the country.

After being harangued by impossible Mr Brown, Mr Clegg cried out: That man! and

fellow Lib Dem Danny Alexander called the former Prime Minister absolutely barmy.

Ed Balls, Ed Miliband and Harriet Harman deliberately sabotaged any prospect of a Lib-Lab

pact.

The book, which makes extensive use of a near-verbatim record of the talks kept by long-serving Lib

Dem aide Alison Suttie, marks Mr Lawss return to the political limelight following his shock

resignation from the Cabinet just weeks into the Coalition.

He was forced to step down when it emerged that the secretly gay MP had claimed 40,000 in second-

home expenses for renting a room from his partner, James Lundie, a lobbyist.

As long as Mr Laws is not censured too severely when the results of an official inquiry are published,

he is widely expected to return to the Cabinet within months. Mr Cameron has called him a very

effective politician.

In his book, Mr Laws gives a vivid description of the scene as desperate Mr Brown begged Mr Clegg

to let Labour stay in power, not realising that exasperated Mr Clegg had already decided to do a deal

with Mr Cameron.

Brown urged Nick to think again, writes Mr Laws. It was quite embarrassing actually, Nickreported to us later. I was very uncomfortable. He seemed to be pleading with me.

It was at this point that Mr Brown was led to think falsely that Labour still had a chance of

hanging on, so he did not go to the Palace and resign.

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Everyone wanted Brown to hang on until a deal had been agreed. Britain was not supposed to be left

without a Government, Mr Laws writes. Nor was it just Cameron and Clegg who pulled the wool

over Mr Browns eyes: the Palace and Cabinet Secretary Sir Gus ODonnell were involved too.

The Civil Service, the Palace, the Lib Dems and the Conservatives all wanted Brown to remain in

place so that the handover of power happened seamlessly. It just about worked.

The Queens linkman to the negotiations was her private secretary Christopher Geidt, who was

monitoring the progress of the Tory-Lib Dem talks in the Cabinet Office.

Mr Geidt, a former Foreign Office mandarin, was briefed to observe proceedings and keep the Queeninformed.

He was to protect her by advising her to appoint a new Prime Minister only when a decision was

clear and uncontroversial.

By mid-afternoon on the Tuesday, when Mr Brown realised that the Lib Dems were heading for a deal

with the Tories, he was impatient to resign but Mr Geidt told him that, constitutionally, he had to

hold off until a formal pact had been confirmed.

When Mr Brown finally went to the Queen later that day to resign, Mr Geidt was waiting to meet him.

Even from the very start of the negotiations, Mr Clegg was irritated by the way Mr Brown went on

and on at him.

As the former Prime Minister listed Labour policies, Mr Clegg interrupted him: No! No! Dont.Please dont! I know where you are heading. I have to start with the Conservatives, I gave that

pledge.

Mr Clegg made it clear to Mr Brown that a Lib-Lab deal was unlikely. How could our parties

overcome the accusations about two parties which came second and third forming a government, and

could we actually form a stable government? I dont want to trip up over my own shoelaces on this,

he said.

After another bout of hectoring by Mr Brown, Nick put the phone down and groaned, That man! Mr Laws derides Mr Browns claim that he could work with the Lib Dems. It sounded like a script

that someone else had written. The great Labour tribalist was making a deathbed conversion to the

benefits of co-operation with another party.

By contrast, Mr Clegg and Mr Cameron hit it off straight away. Mr Laws says of the talks with the

Tories: We sat around a conference table surveying each other with the surprise of people who had

known each other for years and suddenly found themselves at the altar, having never quite seen the

possibility.

On top of the difficulty of dealing with Mr Brown, Mr Laws says the Labour negotiating team was

split into two separate teams one wanted a deal, the other didnt. Lord Mandelson was sceptical

though amenable and Lord Adonis was keen. But there was a gulf of enthusiasm between them and

Ed Miliband, Ed Balls and Harriet Harman.

Mr Laws says Mr Balls killed off any chance of Labour backing voting reforms, calling it a

calculated wrecking device. He writes: It was clear that if we went into coalition with Labour, we

would not be establishing a new government, we would be chaining ourselves to a decaying corpse.

The Conservatives had treated us as another Opposition party on an equal footing. The Labour team,

certainly the Eds and Harriet, treated us to policy lectures.

Ed Miliband was reduced to tea boy during the talks. Someone suggested we needed refreshments,

and Miliband stumped up the money for teas and pastries. It was about the first financial concession

that Labour had made to us, Mr Laws writes.More embarrassingly, Mr Laws reveals how the talks highlighted Mr Milibands close links with the

unions, whose votes got him elected as Labour leader. When I raised public sector pensions reform,

Miliband looked horrified. Oh no, he said. We cannot go further than our existing agreements with

the unions.The disclosures by Mr Laws follow separate damaging claims that Mr Clegg secretly planned to drop

his pledge to scrap university tuition fees months before polling day.

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libdemvoice.org/in-government-for-all-the-right-reasons-the-david-laws-interview-22174.html

In Government for all the right reasons: the David Laws interview

ByHelen Duffett| Published 23rd November 2010 - 4:41 pm

Yesterday I interviewed David Laws, on the day his book22 Days in May was published. I asked him

about the book, his views on the Coalition Government, as well as about the focus of his current work,

plus his thoughts on the Ireland bailout.

In the introduction to the book, David Laws writes that its purpose is to inform those who are

interested in this important period of British politics, and to make sure that an accurate account is leftof what really happened in May 2010, before memories fade, myths grow and evidence is lost.

Why have you published this book now? You said you wanted to get matters on the record, but

why not write it now and publish it in ten years? Thats the way memoirs used to work, so why

so keen to publish after only six months? Isnt history better judged from a distance?

I think its important for us now that people in the country understand how we made the decisions we

made in May 2010, and what factors were uppermost in our minds. And also that we nail some of the

misrepresentations that have come out from some of the others involved in the talks, particularly on

the Labour side, where people have attempted to claim that we went into the negotiations with some

sort of preconception about what type of deal we wanted. And actually what the book shows is that if

we went in with any preconceptions at all, it was that a coalition with Labour would be considerablyeasier to deliver if the electoral maths enabled it, than a coalition with the Conservative party.

So I think that the book demonstrates that we went in without some sort of pre-agenda of who we

would and who we wouldnt deal with, and its very clear that we were putting the policies in our

manifesto and what was right for the country as the key determinants of what we were going to do

once we had discovered there was a hung Parliament.

Firstly its important to get down a historic record, given that this was a very important period in

British politics, and having got the time to do it imposed on me in some ways, I have that opportunity.

And I think its also important for where we are now in politics, given how controversial the coalition

has been with some people that people should understand the decision-making process, and should

understand why we did what we did in May.

With cuts on the way, is this an expectation-management exercise, then?

I dont think its expectation-management, but I think its fact-management in the sense that some

people in the Labour party have claimed that we werent serious about the option of negotiating with

Labour and I think that what this makes clear is that we did engage in a very serious way over that,

and actually if there are any problems in terms of trying to get an agreement or make an agreement

with Labour viable, it was really because of the lack of willingness of the Labour party rather than the

Lib Dems to engage seriously in a negotiation; their lack of preparedness, the fact that their

negotiating team was almost certainly split in their attitudes towards us. And the fact that on the main

economic tack, the economic policy issues, that they didnt make any of the concessions that would

have been necessary in order to make coalition a viable option for us.

So the book performs two functions: it can inform the general public about the Lib Dems and

Tories intentions, but it can also rebut the things that Labour are saying about us

Thats right.

Was it your idea to write the book, or were you getting offers from publishers and newspapers?

No, it was entirely my idea, and I thought from the very earliest time, even while I was still in

Government that it was important for us to get our version of this factually on the record. I clearly

wouldnt have had the opportunity to do that if I had been in Government, given how long it takes to

do something like this. And I thought about it when I left the Government.

I originally decided that it probably wasnt the right time, and then, in July when I thought about it

again, people said Yes, this would be useful from the party, and useful to make sure that the public

record of all these events is correct. And so I just used the time that I had, particularly in August, to

get the account down.

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The coalition negotiations were gruelling. Wouldnt you have rather had a break before diving

in? Many, including the media, were pushing for a quick resolution: what was it like being

caught up in the pace of all of that?

I think we were always conscious that there would be a lot of pressure for a quick resolution.

Werent you exhausted after the General Election?

I wasnt, no, because a) the pressures on most MPs are nothing like those on the party leaders they

must have been pretty exhausted, but for the rest of us its not the same scale of pressure. And b)

undoubtedly there is a bit of an adrenaline rush when you suddenly find yourself pitched intosomething which is about forming a government and deciding upon which policies should and

shouldnt be implemented.

So I didnt really find it all that tiring, and I thought that it was inevitable that there would be pressure

to do things quickly. I thought that it would be a mistake to drag our heels and insist on doing things

very slowly. And while you cant create a government and sort out a policy agreement overnight, I

always thought that if we failed to deliver one by about the Wednesday after the Thursday General

Election, then we would begin to face a lot of criticism. And it would be inevitable that we as the third

party, and the party with the greater democratic accountability, would be more likely to bear the

burden of criticism from the other two parties.

For stalling, perhaps?

Yeah, it was more likely, I thought that we would be the ones blamed for not having a Government,

and for any market instability that could follow. And obviously there was a lot of market nervousness

and instability around that time, because of what was happening in Greece, Portugal and Spain, so I

think we did have to do things quite quickly and not everybody on our negotiating team, as I report in

the book, took that view. There were some others who took a different view and thought that we

needed to take our time but I dont think we had that option.

In future, when people get used to the process of coalition-forming it may be that there isnt the same

degree of pressure, but on this occasion, I think it was important to do it quite quickly. And I dont

think that much was sacrificed by doing it in the timescale we did.

You talk about people getting used to the process of coalition-forming I was interested to read

your article in the Telegraph: The Coalition must aim higher than merely balancing the books. I

was dissecting it a bit; you keep on dropping in references to judging results over the next ten

years: you said that a couple of times, and also talking about stretching out the era of austerity

throughout the entire decade, I wondered: is that a hint? Are you hoping for or expecting a

second term of coalition?

No, I think thats highly uncertain, but I think that its inevitable that the parties will go into the next

election fighting as independent parties with candidates in every seat. But my point in the article was

firstly that we are doing the process of eliminating the deficit over a reasonably long period. People

are saying its all rushed, but the fact is were taking five years to do it.

Its hardly a rushed process, and Im not sure that it would help the country or economic confidence if

we were stretching out this process of austerity for 7, 8, 9, 10 years. I mean people want to see somekind of light at the end of the tunnel.

So its not with the General Election in mind..?

The reason I refer to 10 years on education and welfare reform was they just are very big pieces of

work and if you expect to see some big impact on welfare reform and education, you are not going to

see it just in one Parliament. I mean some of the welfare reform stuff wont start until the end of the

Parliament because of the cost of delivering, so that all this can only be judged over time and years.

Who knows? In the five to ten year period, who will be running the country is highly uncertain and it

could either be a coalition or it could be one party.

I know that overnight change can take five, ten years, and more. But I especially saw your

article today as putting a Liberal Democrat stamp on what could have been just Conservative

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policies. Do you think the input on social policies is distinctly Liberal Democrat? Or do you

think that actually the Conservatives are just as keen on the social side?

I think there clearly has been a strong strain of commitment to the social recovery, broken society

element of policy in Conservative thinking, but its then translating that into the decisions that are

made, and the hard commitments.

Later on in the Parliament there will be some choices to make when the deficit is brought back under

control, about how were going to invest some of the proceeds of growth that there then are that dont

need to go to deficit reduction. All Im trying to signal is that we then have to be ready to take actionto make sure that there is enough money going into education, welfare reform, and the NHS, to make

sure that those services are improved.

Do you think that therell be conflict further down the line if the Tories want to reduce the size

of the State, will we be clawing things back for our agenda, or do you think theres a will

there ..?

I think there is the intention, at least the scope for making sure that the Coalition delivers on those

priorities jointly, but well have to cross that bridge when it comes, not least because at the moment

everybody is focusing simply on the process of deficit reduction and therefore in a sense its almost

easier to get both parties to agree on the big strategy.

The big strategy is deficit reduction, but we dont want to lose sight over the Parliament of the factthat were not just in politics to reduce the deficit and to restore good economic management, but that

we also want the education system to be improved and to see real social mobility in the country. We

want the health system to get better and more responsive to consumers. We want a decent pension

system and a welfare system that actually assists those people who want to get back into employment.

All those are very strong areas where there are Liberal Democrat commitments and where the policies

may be slightly different from those of the Conservative Party.

After the unhappy events in May, are you still fully invested in politics? Do you hope to be more

than a backbench MP in the future?

I leave the speculation for another day, really. Ive had a difficult year, and Im just focusing on the

job Im doing as a backbench MP, which I am really enjoying, Ive got plenty of time to focus on lots

of policy issues that Im concerned about, and can lobby my colleagues about .

When you see the work theyre doing, arent you dying to get more involved?

My colleagues are doing a damn good job, so I cant say that Im sitting there thinking, Goodness

me, they should have done this, that and the other.

The big judgments that Nick and Danny and the others are making, I think, are the right judgments. So

that is a lot easier than it would be if I somehow felt that things were all going wrong.

Like all Lib Dem MPs Ive got the opportunity to talk to Nick and others and communicate with them

and theyre doing a good job of listening to the party.

What do you think of giving all 7bn were saving this year to Ireland, to bail them out?

Well, were not going to give it to them, were going to potentially advance a loan.

At the moment because the coalition has restored confidence in our economic prospects, were havingno problems at all raising finance. Our interest rates are incredibly low, even though we have a large

deficit, we cant afford to take that for granted, but it does mean that were in a stronger position than

we might otherwise be. And I think that the biggest threat to our economy at the moment is not the

difficult position that were having to deal with within the UK there are problems and pressures

there but that I think is gradually going to work itself out over time. The biggest threat would be if

the world economy and the European economy in particular the people were trading with, took a big

downturn again, and so stopping the financial chaos and contagion from spreading, I think is

incredibly important.

Do you think well have to bail out anyone else, in that case?

I dont think so, but I think what we learnt from 2008 and 2009 is that if you dont act quickly to

protect big organisations banks, countries when these things happen, you can pay a very big price

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down the line. And so this time I think we are being proactive in not allowing countries like Ireland

and the banking system to go down the pan.

Weve got, as you know, a huge economic network of interests with Ireland and the Irish banks, and if

that was allowed to topple over I think it would be extremely bad for our economy and it would then

lead to people saying, Well whats the next target we can go for? And that then would be the type of

environment where we would risk the economic recovery that were now seeing. Its just essential that

that doesnt happen.

So, however frustrating it is, at a time when were having to borrow a lot of money, were also havingto help other countries. I think it is terribly important that we dont allow any major country or bank to

topple over.

The meme is that were overly sympathetic [to Ireland] and that charity should begin at home.

Is that just a tabloid construct?

Yeah, and probably more over things like overseas development, whereas over Ireland, its not as if

the Irish have been crying out for the money for the best part of the last couple of weeks theyve

been resisting taking these loans from the EU and the IMF.

So I think people can see that whats been done is not just in the Irish interest but its actually been

done by all these countries because we think its in the European interest, including Britain.

Sometimes you get what you want;

Sometimes you get what you need;

Sometimes you get what you get:

What are you overall thoughts on the way the Liberal Democrats entered a coalition with the

Conservatives?

The book shows that there was no great plot to go with one party or the other, that we were genuinely

making a decision as a party on what was best for the country and what was most likely to advance the

prospects of getting the policies that we stood on in the election manifesto into government, and

obviously a lot of people will criticise us for the decisions that we made.

The honest truth is that we didnt have a great deal of choice. A coalition with the Conservatives not

only offered us the best prospect of delivering many of the Lib Dem policies that we regarded as

important, but it was probably the only prospect of having a stable government that could deliver for

Britain and the British economy.

Had we not been willing to go into coalition with the Conservatives I suspect that there would have

been a lot of economic instability. There would have been higher interest rates, there would have been

more speculation about the UK. And ultimately there would have had to be a second General Election,

which I think would have resulted in us doing quite badly if we were seen to be to blame for there

being no Government, which I think there probably would have been.

We would then have had an outright Conservative majority with no Lib Dem voice in it. Which I think

most people in the country would regard as definitely an inferior option to the one that weve got.

So this is the government that weve now formed for all the right reasons, and weve got to be active

in making it as successful as possible and ensuring that it delivers as much Liberal policy as possible.And if you were going to choose your moment to go into government, not having been in for 70 years,

you wouldnt choose a borrowing requirement of 150bn. But we cant choose our time. These are the

circumstances thrown into our lap and we can only do our best for the country and the party with the

hand that weve been dealt.

People are giving us some credit for having established a coalition which does seem to be able to

make decisions, which is so far viewed by many people as quite successful . The opinion polling

seems to suggest that people do believe that Lib Dem involvement has made a difference to the nature

of the Coalition in the things were doing.

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How Osborne's small, select team helped Cameron do the unthinkable

Extracts from Tory ex-whip Rob Wilson's bookFive Days to Power, The Journey To Coalition

Britain, which gives vivid account of five dramatic days of coalition talks

Nicholas Watt

guardian.co.uk, Friday 12 November 2010 21.30 GMT

Britain's first peacetime coalition in 70 years, which celebrates its six-month anniversary today,

was formed after five dramatic days of negotiations in May. Rob Wilson, a Tory whip at the

time who has spoken to all sides about the talks with the Liberal Democrats, has written a vividaccount of the discussions.

In this edited extract Wilson describes how George Osborne persuaded David Cameron two

weeks before the election on 6 May to do the unthinkable and make discreet preparations for a

hung parliament. The extract ends with Cameron's offer of a "big, open and comprehensive

offer" to the Liberal Democrats on the afternoon of Friday 7 May.

Cameron agreed to let a small but high-powered team, consisting of Osborne himself, Oliver Letwin,

Ed Llewellyn and William Hague, work through all the likely scenarios, and to consider the responses

that each might trigger.

It was done covertly, with Osborne selecting a team that would have needed to know what had been

agreed with Cameron: Letwin, because he was head of policy, Llewellyn as Cameron's representativeon the group and Hague as de facto deputy leader and an ex-leader well aware of all the sensitivities

involved and a wise head to boot.

Planning for a hung parliament therefore began ha