Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants, vs. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.

Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants. Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for defendant and appellee.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.

The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and, if not, (2) whether it is libelous or not.

The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution:

The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section 15.)

The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress — used in this provision.

Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.1

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.

Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the President, the communication began with the following paragraph:

In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had nevertheless involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly elected members of Congress of engaging in intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address this open letter to focus public attention to certain vital information which, under the present circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our people to expose.1äwphï1.ñët

It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists.

Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second paragraph. The first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to become a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the Department of National Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" — the letter says — are "available to adequately finance a political campaign". It further adds:

It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following: (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of NICA,(2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public information Office, DND. To insure this control, the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS to Europe to study and while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel Llamas. They also sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and while Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners" wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a missing link in the intelligence network. It is, of course, possible that the offices mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. (Emphasis ours.)

Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the heading "other operational technique the following:

(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk on "Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over the military;

(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters — "typed in two (2) typewriters only" — to Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas as the "hero of democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";

(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;

(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an attempt to pack key positions in several branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging to his clique;

(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the impression that they reflect the feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to undermine the administration.

Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had gone no further than the planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future developments".

Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain popular and civilian support.

The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the Armed Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a professional military man; (4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they were handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably, they belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion strength to the various stand-by or training divisions throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano should disqualify themselves from holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup d'etat".

We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this statement is derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.

It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant, knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said communication is false, they could not have possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner, vs. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN DOLORFINO, AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO OBEÑA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.

Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.1 A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening.

In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident," petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784, "People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al."

Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention,2 threw his hat in the political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.3

Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests"4(Omnibus Motion). Among his requests were:

(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate (whether at the Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the Senate is in session, and to attend the regular and plenary sessions of the Senate, committee hearings, committee meetings, consultations, investigations and hearings in aid of legislation, caucuses, staff meetings, etc., which are normally held at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City (usually from Mondays to Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.);

(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a personal desktop computer and the appropriate communications equipment (i.e., a telephone line and internet access) in order that he may be able to work there when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in session. The costs of setting up the said working area and the related equipment and utility costs can be charged against the budget/allocation of the Office of the accused from the Senate;

(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, at reasonable times of the day particularly during working days for purposes of meetings, briefings, consultations and/or coordination, so that the latter may be able to assists (sic) him in the performance and discharge of his duties as a Senator of the Republic;

(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the press or the media regarding the important issues affecting the country and the public while at the Senate or

elsewhere in the performance of his duties as Senator to help shape public policy and in the light of the important role of the Senate in maintaining the system of checks and balance between the three (3) co-equal branches of Government;

(e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his custodians, to be allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and other members of the media who may wish to interview him and/or to get his comments, reactions and/or opinion at his place of confinement at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, particularly when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in session; and

(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of the Senate and related activities scheduled in the morning (9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July 2007 at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City.5

By Order of July 25, 2007,6 the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to three.7The trial court just the same denied the motion by Order of September 18, 2007.8

Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court, and for prohibition andmandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning the Senate staff, resource persons and guests from meeting with him or transacting business with him in his capacity as Senator; and (ii) direct respondents to allow him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and guests and permit him to attend all sessions and official functions of the Senate. Petitioner preliminarily prayed for the maintenance of the status quo ante of having been able hitherto to convene his staff, resource persons and guests9 at the Marine Brig.

Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of Staff, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon (Esperon); Philippine Navy’s Flag Officer-in-Command, Vice Admiral Rogelio Calunsag; Philippine Marines’ Commandant, Major Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino; and Marine Barracks Manila Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo Obeña (Obeña).

Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has, since November 30, 2007, been in the custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Custodial Center following the foiled take-over of the Manila Peninsula Hotel10 the day before or on November 29, 2007.

Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action as against the above-named military officers-respondents. The issues raised in relation to them had ceased to present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination thereof would be without practical value and use. Meanwhile, against those not made parties to the case, petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from this Court.11 Petitioner did not, by way of substitution, implead the police officers currently exercising custodial responsibility over him; and he did not satisfactorily show that they have adopted or continued the assailed actions of the former custodians.12

Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously raised in his Motion for Reconsideration filed with the trial court:

I.

THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A.

UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE WAS ALREADY CONVICTED AT THE TIME HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN THE INSTANT CASE, ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED AND, THEREFORE, STILL ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;

B.

THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS CHARGED WITH TWO (2) COUNTS OF STATUTORY RAPE AND SIX (6) COUNTS OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. HEREIN ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS CHARGED WITH THE

OFFENSE OF "COUP D’ETAT", A CHARGE WHICH IS COMMONLY REGARDED AS A POLITICAL OFFENSE;

C.

THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE ATTEMPTED TO FLEE PRIOR TO BEING ARRESTED. THE ACCUSED/ PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED TO THE AUTHORITIES AND AGREED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS AT OAKWOOD;

II.

GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE MARINE BRIG’S COMMANDING OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO ATTEND THE SENATE SESSIONS;

III.

ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR SOVEREIGN CAPACITY, ELECTED HIM TO THE POSITION OF SENATOR OF THE REPUBLIC PROVIDES THE PROPER LEGAL JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO WORK AND SERVE HIS MANDATE AS A SENATOR;

- AND -

IV.

MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW LIBERAL TREATMENT OF DETENTION PRISONERS WHO ARE HELD WITHOUT BAIL AS IN THE CASE OF FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH "ERAP" ESTRADA AND FORMER ARMM GOV. NUR MISUARI.13

The petition is bereft of merit.

In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioner’s Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.

Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup d’etat which is regarded as a "political offense."

Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.

In sum, petitioner’s first ground posits that there is a world of difference between his case and that of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the motion, and other circumstances which demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos.14

A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.15

It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as

may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusis suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.16 (Underscoring supplied)

The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense,17 or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.18

That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua,19 is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on recognizance was denied.20 The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail21 or imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction,22 justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense23 applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.

As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay,24 it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public.

The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:25

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.26 (Underscoring supplied)

These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the extent that confinement restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical movement. It bears noting that in Jalosjos, which was decided en banc one month after Maceda, the Court recognized that the accused could somehow accomplish legislative results.27

The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.

Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the presumption of innocence during the period material to the resolution of their respective motions. The Court in Jalosjos did not mention that the presumption of innocence no longer operates in favor of the accused pending the review on appeal of the judgment of conviction. The rule stands that until a promulgation of final conviction is made, the constitutional mandate of presumption of innocence prevails.28

In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither denied nor disputed his agreeing to a consensus with the prosecution that media access to him should cease after his proclamation by the Commission on Elections.29

Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention.

Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident,"30 proves that petitioner’s argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real.

Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of bail.31 In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion.32

Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo33 to buttress his plea for leeway because unlike petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who was charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder,34 was able to rebut the strong evidence for the prosecution. Notatu dignum is this Court’s pronouncement therein that "if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury."35 At the time Montano was indicted, when only capital offenses were non-bailable where evidence of guilt is strong,36 the Court noted the obvious reason that "one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to flee."37 Petitioner’s petition for bail having earlier been denied, he cannot rely on Montano to reiterate his requests which are akin to bailing him out.

Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial court’s findings, Esperon did not overrule Obeña’s recommendation to allow him to attend Senate sessions. Petitioner cites the Comment38 of Obeña that he interposed no objection to such request but recommended that he be transported by the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms with adequate Senate security. And petitioner faults the trial court for deeming that Esperon, despite professing non-obstruction to the performance of petitioner’s duties, flatly rejected all his requests, when what Esperon only disallowed was the setting up of a political office inside a military installation owing to AFP’s apolitical nature.39

The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a valid objective that may justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial detention.40 The officer with custodial responsibility over a detainee may undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety and prevent the escape of the detainee.41 Nevertheless, while the comments of the detention officers provide guidance on security concerns, they are not binding on the trial court in the same manner that pleadings are not impositions upon a court.

Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to serve his mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing him from office, depriving the people of proper representation, denying the people’s will, repudiating the people’s choice, and overruling the mandate of the people.

Petitioner’s contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that "a public official can not be removed foradministrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor."42

The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases,43 the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison."44

In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument,45 it is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.46 (Underscoring supplied)

Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention prisoners who have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend "social functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the more serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.

In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention prisoners, petitioner expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form of being placed under Senate custody or house arrest,47 yet he at the same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest to others.

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.48 That this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office49 on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around,50 petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.

Petitioner’s position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests alone, petitioner’s case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves. Jaloslos succinctly expounds:

x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.51

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960

SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner, vs. SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO, BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59,respondents.

Antonio Y. de Pio in his own behalf. F. S. Abeleda, A. b. Fernandez. E. S. Baltao and Tecla San Andres Ziga in their own behalf. C. T. Villareal and R. D. Bagatsing as amici curiae.

BENGZON, J.:

On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.

The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the pertinent portions of which reads as follows:

WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Member of the House of Representatives from the Second District of the province of Cebu, took the floor of this chamber on the one hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A Message to Garcia;

WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from the Second District of Cebu stated the following:.

xxx xxx xxx

The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your unpopular administration the free things they used to get from the government are now for sale at premium prices. They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing. . . . .

WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second District of Cebu, if made maliciously or recklessly and without basis in truth and in fact, would constitute a serious assault upon the dignity and prestige of the Office of 37 3 the President, which is the one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino people, and would expose said office to contempt and disrepute; . . . .

Resolved by the House of Representative, that a special committee of fifteen Members to be appointed by the Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 223, 1960, and for such purpose it is authorized to summon Honorable Sergio Osmeña, jr., to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum to require the attendance of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., fails to do so to require him to show cause why he should not be punished by the House.

The special committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings and recommendations before the adjournment of the present special session of the Congress of the Philippines.

In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged; first, the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.

Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of action and the Court's jurisdiction, the majority decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction. Evidently aware of such circumstance with its implications, and pressed for time in view of the imminent adjournment of the legislative session, the special committee continued to perform its talk, and after giving Congressman Osmeña a chance to defend himself, submitted its reports on July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the House approved on the same day—before closing its session—House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.

Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres Ziga, Fernandez and Balatao)1 filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension, upheld a House Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee—whose members are the sole respondents—had thereby ceased to exist.

There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the serious imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59 and that he refused to produce before the House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to substantiate such imputations. There is also no question that for having made the imputations and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, he was, by resolution of the House, suspended from office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly behaviour.

Resolution No. 175 states in part:

WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by virtue of Resolution No. 59, adopted on July 8, 1960, found Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., guilty of serious disorderly behaviour for making without basis in truth and in fact, scurrilous, malicious, reckless and irresponsible charges against the President of the Philippines in his privilege speech of June 23, 1960; and

WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that they affronted and degraded the dignity of the House of Representative: Now, Therefore, be it

RESOLVED by the House of Representatives. That Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., be, as he hereby is, declared guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and . . .

As previously stated, Osmeña contended in his petition that: (1) the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (20 that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and discipline therefor, the House had lost the power to do so because it had taken up other business before approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes the additional position (4) that the House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its members.

Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any other place" than Congress.

Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense."2 Such immunity has come to this country from the practices of Parliamentary as construed and applied by the Congress of the United States. Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question before us. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. In the United States Congress, Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was censured for using the following language on the floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of the many infamous acts of the infamous Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2,. pp. 798-799). Two other congressmen were censured for employing insulting words during debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a member of Congress was summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate, but invoked his parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-124.)

For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison3, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to this decision amply attest to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a legislator in a foreign country.

And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one year.

Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.

This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against me, he argues, because after my speech, and before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, that such approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent.

Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts or renew its rights to take action which had already lapsed.

The situation might thus be compared to laws4 extending the period of limitation of actions and making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld such laws as against the contention that they impaired vested rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states hold divergent views. At any rate, court are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them."5 And it has been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observancem, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisited number of members have agreed to a particular measure."6

The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:

The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is within the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as security against hasty action. (Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass, 433; Holt vs.Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411; City of Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex parte Mayor, etc., of Albany, 23 Wend. [N. Y.] 277, 280; Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 230. 81 N. e. 977, 124 Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109; City of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696, 65 So. 888; McGraw vs.Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W. 632; Tuell vs. Meacham Contracting Co. 145 Ky. 181, 186, 140 S. W. Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.) [Takenfrom the case of Rutherford vs. City of Nashville, 78 south Western Reporter, p. 584.]

It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, for which Act a resolution of censure was presented, the House approved the resolution, despite the argument that other business had intervened after the objectionable remarks. (2 Hinds' Precedents pp. 799-800.)

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)

SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. — The principle is well established that the courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature since each department is equally independent within the power conferred upon it by the Constitution. . . . .

The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power to example a member, the court will not review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. p. 902.) [Emphasis Ours.].

The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case of Clifford vs. French.7 In 1905, several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined to interfere , explaining in orthodox juristic language:

Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It has been held by high authority that, even in the absence of an express provision conferring the power, every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient. In Hiss. vs. Barlett, 3 Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of Mass. says, in substance, that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is necessary to the to enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state;' 'That it is a power of self-protection, and that the legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and require its exercise. '. . . There is no provision authority courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise by either house of the power to expel a member. These powers are functions of the legislative department and therefore, in the exercise of the power this committed to it, the senate is supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house thereof, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden to do.

We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our opinion emphasize the principles controlling this litigation. Although referring to expulsion, they may as well be applied to other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar: the House has exclusive power; the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.

Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to discovery of impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the interest of comity, we feel bound to state that in a conscientious survey of governing principles and/or episodic illustrations, we found the House of Representatives of the United States taking the position upon at least two occasions, that personal attacks upon the Chief Executive constitute unparliamentary conduct or breach of orders.8 And in several instances, it took action against offenders, even after other business had been considered.9

Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent. In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months because he had assaulted another member of the that Body or certain phrases the latter had uttered in the course of a debate. The Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement, challenging the validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it

nevertheless went on to say the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12 months amounted to removal, and the Jones Law (under which the Senate was then functioning) gave the Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that "each house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel an elective member (sec. 18). Note particularly the word "elective."

The Jones Law, it mist be observed, empowered the Governor General to appoint "without consent of the Senate and without restriction as to residence senators . . . who will, in his opinion, best represent the Twelfth District." Alejandrino was one appointive Senator.

It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that "suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy." But that remark should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then the affected party and who was by the same Jones Law charged with the duty to represent the Twelfth District and maybe the view of the Government of the United States or of the Governor-General, who had appointed him.

It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those power which were granted to it by the Jones Law10; whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers and preprogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In other words, in the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the power it then exercised—the power of suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we find, the Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension11 which the Constitution did not impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended a Senator for 12 months in 1949.

The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212 .)

In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be more weightly in the matter of suspension than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.12

Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. the petition intended to prevent the Special Committee from acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction had been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported to the House, and the latter approved the suspension order. The House had closed it session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having become moot or academic.13 Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings to include all members of the House as respondents, ask for reinstatement and thereby to present a justiciable cause. Most probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction, as in Vera vs. Avelino14 and Alejandrino vs. Qeuaon.15

At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important questions of political law, the Court thought it proper to express at this time its conclusions on such issues as were deemed relevant and decisive.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-34022 March 24, 1972

MANUEL MARTINEZ Y FESTIN petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JESUS P. MORFE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, and THE CITY WARDEN OF MANILA, respondents.

G.R. Nos. L-34046-7 March 24, 1972

FERNANDO BAUTISTA, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCISCO MA. CHANCO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Second Judicial District, Branch III, et al., respondents.

Estanislao A. Fernandez, Amelito Mutuc, Reynaldo Villar, Alberto K. Jamir Anacleto Badoy, Jr., Emmanuel Santos, Sedfrey Ordoñez, Antonio Tupaz, Arturo Pacificador, Dominador F. Carillo, Antonio Borromeo, Augusto Cesar Espiritu, Dandy K. Tupaz and Eugene A. Tan for petitioner Manuel Martinez Y Festin.

Remulla, Perez and Estrella, Fernando P. Cabato and Gaudencio N. Floresca for petitioner Fernando Bautista Sr.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo P. Pardo, Assistant Solicitor General Rosalio A. de Leon and Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza for respondents Judges.

Kaulayao V. Faylona, Manuel Imbong, Jacobo Gonzales, Fernando P. Camaya, Jose Tablizo, Romeo Kahayon and Tomas P. Matic, Jr. for respondents Pulido and Tamayo.

FERNANDO, J.:p

The question raised in these certiorari proceedings, one to which no authoritative answer has been yielded by past decisions, is the scope to be accorded the constitutional immunity of senators and representatives from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress and in going to and returning from the same except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace. 1 Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin 2 and Fernando Bautista, Sr.,3 as delegate of the present Constitutional Convention would invoke what they consider to be the protection of the above constitutional provision, if considered in connection with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code penalizing a public officer or employee who shall, during the sessions of Congress, "arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under [such] Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor." 4 For under the Constitutional Convention Act, 5 delegates are entitled to the parliamentary immunities of a senator or a representative. 6 Both petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions, the information filed against petitioner Manuel Martinez y Festin for falsification of a public document and two informations against petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr. for violation of the Revised Election Code. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent Judges in the above proceedings, 7 would dispute such a contention on the ground that the constitutional provision does not cover any criminal prosecution being merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference being that insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal Code would expand such an immunity, it would be unconstitutional or at the very least inoperative. A careful study of the above constitutional provision, in the light of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, adopting the then well-settled principle under American law and of the purposes to be served by such an immunity, persuade us that the stand taken by the Solicitor General is correct. Thesecertiorari proceedings cannot prosper.

The facts in both petitions for certiorari are not in dispute. Petitioner Martinez y Festin 8 alleged that on June 10,

1971, an information against him for falsification a public document was filed. Its basis was his stating under oath in his certificate of candidacy for delegate to that Constitutional Convention that he was born on June 20, 1945, when in

truth and in fact he knew that he was born on June 20, 1946. There was on July 9, 1971, a special appearance on his part questioning the power of respondent Judge to issue a warrant of arrest and seeking that the information be quashed. On the same day, there was an order from the lower court suspending the release of the warrant of arrest until it could act on such motion to quash. Then came on July 22, 1971 an omnibus motion from him, with previous leave of court, to quash the information, to quash the warrant of arrest, or to hold in abeyance further proceeding in the case. It was not favorably acted on. On August 21, 1971, respondent Judge rendered an order denying the petitioner omnibus motion to quash. In his belief that the information and the warrant of arrest in this case are null and void, the petitioner did not post the required bond. He was arrested by the City Sheriff in the afternoon of September 6, 1971. At the time of the filing of the petition he was confined at the City Jail in the custody of respondent City Warden of Manila. He was on his way to attend the plenary session of the Constitutional Convention. Such arrest was against his will and over his protest. He was arraigned on September 9, 1971. There was at such a time a motion by petitioner to reconsider the court's order of August 21, 1971. It was denied in open court. On the very same day, he filed the petition for certiorari and habeas corpus, but having been released thereafter on bail on September 11, 1971, the petition is now in the nature solely of a certiorari proceeding. 9

As for petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr., 10 it was alleged that he is a duly elected and proclaimed delegate to the

1971 Constitutional Convention. He took his oath of office and assumed the functions of such office on June 1, 1971. He has continued since then to perform the duties and discharge the responsibilities of a delegate. Two criminal complaints, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 146(57) and 148(58), were directly filed with the Court of First lnstance of Baguio and Benguet by a certain Moises Maspil, a defeated delegate-aspirant who placed 15th in the order of votes garnered against the petitioner, and his co-accused for alleged violation of Section 51 of the Revised Penal Code in that they gave and distributed free of charge food, drinks and cigarettes at two public meetings, one held in Sablan and the other in Tuba, both towns being in Province of Benguet. Respondent Presiding Judge conducted the preliminary investigation of said criminal complaints. Thereafter on August 7, 1971, he issued an order for the filing of the corresponding informations. Before a warrant of arrest in said criminal cases could be issued, petitioner in a motion of August 14, 1971 invoked the privilege of immunity from arrest and search, pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6132, otherwise known as the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, in relation to Sec. 15, Article VI of the Constitution and Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent Judge, on the very same day, issued an order, holding in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest and setting the hearing of said Motion on August 23, 1971. As scheduled on August 23, 1971, there was a hearing on such motion. Petitioner however did not prevail notwithstanding his vigorous insistence on his claim for immunity, a warrant of arrest being ordered on the same day. On September 11, 1971, there was a motion to quash such order of arrest filed by petitioner. He was unsuccessful, respondent Judge, in an order of said date, ordering his immediate arrest. His petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed with this Court on September 15, 1971. 11

What is thus sought by petitioners Martinez y Festin and Bautista, Sr. is that the respective warrants of arrest issued against them be quashed on the claim that by virtue of the parliamentary immunity they enjoy as delegates, ultimately traceable to Section 15 of Article VI of the Constitution as construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code, they are immune from arrest. In the case of petitioner Martinez y Festin, he is proceeded against for falsification of a public document punishable by prision mayor. 12 As for petitioner Bautista, Sr., the penalty that could be imposed for each of the Revised Election Code offense, of which he is charged, is not higher thanprision mayor. 13

The respondents in the above petitions were required to answer by resolutions of this Court issued on September 10 and September 20, 1971, respectively. An answer on behalf of respondent Judge Jesus P. Morfe in the case of petitioner Martinez y Festin was filed on September 20, 1971 with an answer in intervention filed by respondent Executive Sheriff of Manila and the Chief of Warrant Division likewise filed on the same date. His petition was duly heard on September 14, 1971, Delegate Estanislao A. Fernandez vehemently pressing his claim to immunity. Thereafter on October 29, 1971, a memorandum, comprehensive in scope and persuasive in its analysis of the constitutional question presented, was filed on behalf of respondent Judge Morfe by Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, two Assistants Solicitors General Bernardo P. Pardo and Rosalio A. de Leon as well as Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza. A memorandum on behalf of President Diosdado Macapagal of the Constitutional Convention, who was given permission to submit such a pleading, was submitted on March 8, 1972 by the Committee on Legal Affairs of the Constitutional Convention. 14

As for the petitions of Bautista, Sr., the answer on behalf of respondent Judge was filed on September 29, 1971. When the matter was heard on October 14, 1971, he appeared through counsel, Delegate Juanito R. Remulla, while respondent Judge was represented by Assistant Solicitor General Rosalio A. de Leon and Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza. With the submission, on October 30, 1971, of an able memorandum on behalf of respondent judge, again, by the same counsel from the Office of the Solicitor General as well as a carefully-prepared memorandum of petitioner Bautista, Sr., on December 1, 1971, the matter was deemed submitted for adjudication.

As noted at the outset, certiorari does not lie to quash the warrants of arrest issued against petitioner Martinez y Festin as well as petitioner Bautista, Sr. Their reliance on the constitutional provision which for them should be

supplemented by what was provided for in the Revised Penal Code is futile. There is no justification then for granting their respective pleas.

No other conclusion is allowable consistently with the plain and explicit command of the Constitution. As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI, the immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace. Treason exists when the accused levies war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort. 15 A felony is act or omission punishable by law. 16 Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. It is a well-settled principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained and any breach thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution. Certainly then from the explicit language of the Constitution, even without its controlling interpretation as shown by the debates of the Constitutional Convention to be hereinafter discussed, petitioners cannot justify their claim to immunity. Nor does Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code come to their rescue. Such a provision that took effect in 1932 could not survive after the Constitution became operative on November 15, 1935. As will be shown, the repugnancy between such an expansion of the congressional immunity and the plain command of the Constitution is too great to be overcome, even on the assumption that the penalty to which a public officer will be subjected in the event that he did arrest one entitled thereto for an offense punishable by less than reclusion temporal suffices to widen its scope. This is so considering not only the history of such a Constitutional grant of immunity but also its basic purpose and objective.

1. Even if the provision granting the legislative immunity of freedom from arrest were clothed in language less clear, its history precludes any other interpretation. As submitted to the Constitutional Convention of 1934, the draft proposal was worded as follows: "The Members of the National Assembly shall in all cases except treason, open disturbance of public order, or other offense punishable by death or imprisonment of not less than six years, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the National Assembly, and in going to and returning from the same." On December 4, 1934, upon its being considered by the Convention, an amendment was proposed by Delegate Aldeguer so that it would read: "The Members of the National Assembly shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the National Assembly, and in going and returning from the same." What was sought by him was to retain the provision of the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, with phraseology identical to that found in the American Constitution.

He defended his proposal thus: "My amendment is not new. It is the same phrase granting parliamentary immunity to the members of the Parliament of England. It is the same phrase granting parliamentary immunity to members of Congress. It is the same phrase granting parliamentary immunity to members of the various state legislators of the Union. Now, in reading the draft proposed by the Sub-Committee of Seven, I found out that it is a broad rule. Mr. President, the question is not whether we should grant privilege of immunity to the members of the National Assembly ... " 17 He was interrupted by a point of order raised, but he was allowed to continue. He went on: "As I was saying, Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Convention, the draft gives to the member of the National Assembly more privileges than what the nature of the office demands. My question is that if the members of the Congress of the United States, if the members of the Parliament, if the members of the various State Legislatures were able to perform their functions as members of law-making bodies with the privileges and immunities granted by the phrase "breach of peace." I wonder why the members of the future National Assembly cannot perform their duties with the same limitations and with the same privileges. Mr. President and members the Convention, the history of parliamentary immunity shows that it was never intended to exempt members of the National Assembly from criminal arrest. When American sovereignty was implanted into these Islands, a new theory of government was implanted too. This theory of government places every man equal before the eyes of the law. The grant of certain privileges to any set of persons means the abrogation of this principle of equality before the eyes of the law. Another reason, Mr. President and Members of the Convention, is this: The State Legislature is the agent of the State. The power or the right of the Legislature to claim privileges is based on the right of self-preservation. The right of the State to claim privileges is due to the fact that it has the right to carry its function without obstacle. But we must also remember that any Legislature is but the agent of the State. The State is the principal. Any crime committed, whether such crime is committed by a colorum or by a gangster, endangers the State. Giving more privileges to an agent, which is the Legislature, at the expense of the principal, which is the State, is not a sound policy. So that, Mr. President, and Members of the Convention, believing that under the phrase "breach of peace", our future members of the Assembly can very well perform the duties incumbent upon them. I submit my amendment for the consideration of this Convention." 18

Delegate Manuel Roxas on behalf of the sub-committee of seven did not object. As a matter of fact, he was for such amendment. He considered it "well-founded" and was for such immunity complying "with the wording of the [Philippine Autonomy Act] in this particular." 19 The Convention readily approved the amendment by acclamation.

It does not admit of doubt therefore that the immunity from arrest is granted by the Constitution was understood in the same sense it has in American law, there being a similar provision in the American Constitution. 20 Its

authoritative interpretation in the United States was supplied by the Williamson case, a 1908 decision. 21

According to the then Justice, later Chief Justice, White who penned the opinion, "the term "treason, felony and breach of the peace," as used in the constitutional provision relied upon, excepts from the operation of the privilege all criminal offenses, ... " 22 He traced its historical background thus: "A brief consideration of the subject of

parliamentary privilege in England will, we think, show the source whence the expression "treason felony, and breach of the peace" was drawn, and leave no doubt that the words were used in England for the very purpose of excluding all crimes from the operation of the parliamentary privilege, and therefore to leave that privilege to apply only to prosecutions of a civil nature."23 Story's treatise on the Constitution was likewise cited, his view on the matter being quite emphatic: "Now, as all crimes are offenses against the peace, the phrase "breach of the peace" would seem to extend to all indictable offenses, as well those which are in fact attended with force and violence, as those which are only constructive breaches of the peace of the government, inasmuch as they violate its good order." 24

As far as American constitutional law is concerned, both Burdick 25 and Willoughby 26 could use practically identical

appraising such immunity, the former stating that it "is not now of great importance" and the latter affirming that it "is of little importance as arrest of the person is now almost never authorized except for crimes which fall within the classes exempt from the priviledge." The state of the American law on this point is aptly summarizedby Cooley: "By common parliamentary law, the members of the legislature are privileged from arrest on civil process during the session of that body, and for a reasonable time before and after, to enable them to go to and return from the same." 27 A prosecution for a criminal offense, is thus excluded from this grant of immunity. So it should be Philippine law, if deference were to be paid to what was explicitly agreed upon in the Constitutional Convention.

2. Would it make a difference however in the availability of the writs of certiorari sought by petitioners considering that Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code would impose upon any public officer or employee who shall, while the Congress is in regular or special session, arrest or charge any member thereof except in case such member has committed a crime punishable by penalty higher than prision mayor? 28 The assumption here

indulged is that the effect of the above in the Revised Penal Code was to expand the grant of parliamentary immunity under the Philippine Autonomy Act, although its literal language does not go that far. It is to be remembered, however, that it took effect on January 1, 1932 before the enforcement of the present Constitution in 1935. Considering that both under the then organic law, the Philippine Autonomy Act and equally so under the present Constitution, such a more generous treatment accorded legislators exempting them from arrest even if warranted under a penal law, the question as to whether it did survive becomes unavoidable. It is our opinion that the answer must be in the negative.

The Constitution is equally explicit on the following point: "All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and all references in such laws to the government or officials of the Philippines shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution." 29 In People v. Linsangan 30 decided in December, 1935, barely a month after the Constitution took effect, the continued applicability of Section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code that would allow the prosecution of a person who remains delinquent in the payment of cedula tax, 31 this Court, in its opinion thru the pen of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Abad Santos, after setting forth that the Constitution prohibits the imprisonment for debt on non-payment of poll tax, 32 held: "It seems too clear to require demonstration that section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code is inconsistent with section 1, clause 12, of Article III of the Constitution in that, while the former authorizes imprisonment for non-payment of the poll or cedula tax, the latter forbids it. It follows that upon the inauguration of the Government of the Commonwealth, said section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code became inoperative, and no judgment of conviction can be based thereon." 33

So it was in De los Santos v. Mallare. 34 Again under the provision of the Revised Administrative Code the President could remove at pleasure any of the appointive officials under the Charter of the City of Baguio. 35 Relying on such a provision, the then President Quirino removed petitioner De los Santos who was appointed City Engineer Baguio of on July 16, 1946, and chose in his place respondent Gil R. Mallare. The Revised Administrative Code was a legislation that dates back to 1917, 36eighteen years before the Constitution prohibited any officer or employee in the civil service being removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law. 37 Again this Court, in the light of aforecited provision in an opinion of Justice Tuason, held: "So, unlike legislation that is passed in defiance of the Constitution, assertive and menacing, the questioned part of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code does not need a positive declaration of nullity by the court to put it out of the way. To all intents and purposes, it is non-existent, outlawed and eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself by express mandate before the petitioner was appointed." 38 In the language of the constitutional provision then that portion of Article 145 penalizing a public official or employee who shall while the Congress is in regular or special session arrest or search any member thereof except in case he has committed a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor is declared inoperative.

The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities,

bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would main independent. It is trite to say that in each and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and habeas corpus by Delegate Manuel Martinez by Festin in L-34022 and the petitions for certiorari and prohibition by Delegate Fernando Bautista, Sr. in L-34046 and L-34047 are hereby dismissed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.

R E S O L U T I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts[1] is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

The issue raised is one of first impression.

Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In answering the query, we are called upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in the context of penal law.

The accused-appellant’s "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that –

1. Accused-appellant’s reelection being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest – not even the police power of the State.

2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without representation.

3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandate entrusted to him by the people.

4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be heard.

5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the U.S. Congress.

6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-equal branch of government to respect its mandate.

7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.

8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.

The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However,

inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.

We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department:

Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; xxx.

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.

The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:

Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same.

For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:

xxx but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved to the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.

The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.

The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress’ function to attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that–

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

Accused-appellant’s reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos[2], which states, inter alia, that –

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.

will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others.

A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,[3] it is the injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.[4]

The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement.

It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant’s arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the State’s penal system.

Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:

a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at the Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to expel/suspend him from the House of Representatives;

b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City;

c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical Center, Makati City;

d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this case, accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane and private vehicle.

He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises, to wit:

a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use his own vehicle and driver in going to and from the project area and his place of confinement.

b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati City.

c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart condition.

There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.

What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:[5]

The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.

The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.

We remain unpersuaded.

No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated at Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate as a member of the House of Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison authorities at the National Pentientiary to perform these acts.

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.

The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws." [6] This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.[7] The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of individuals.[8]

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.[9]

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.[10]

Imprisonment is the restraint of a man’s personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion.[11]

More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of one’s liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused.[12] The term refers to the restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place to place, or of his free action according to his own pleasure and will.[13] Imprisonment is the detention of another against his will depriving him of his power of locomotion[14] and it "[is] something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier."[15]

It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individual’s status in society.[16] Prison officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain rights.[17]

Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant’s claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police power of the State.

WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.