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ABOUT TIME FOR ARISTOTLE

B S M

Time for Aristotle: Physics IV. B U C. (Oxford UP, . Pp. viii +. Price ..)

Ursula Coopes book on Aristotles treatment of time is excellent. It forms a good

dual to Ben Morisons On Location. Both are published in the same Oxford Aristotleseries, both have an amusing title, and both treat of topics which receive a self-

contained discussion in Aristotles PhysicsIV: Morisons concern is chs , on place;

Coopes is chs , on time.I start with two general thoughts about Coopes book. First, since she is discussinga continuous and fairly short body of text, it would have been helpful had the book

started with a translation (and maybe even a Greek text). Coope provides her owntranslations of much of the text throughout, while acknowledging her debt to Ed-

ward Husseys Clarendon Aristotle translation of Physics IIIIV. But she gives notranslation of the text as a continuous whole. This is a pity. After reading Coopes

introduction, some readers will want to read quickly through Physics IV , inorder, for example, to acquaint themselves with the rough structure of Aristotles

discussion. And it would be helpful to be reading Coopes own translation as a

whole and from the start. Even if a continuous translation were not thoughtnecessary (for there is material in IV which Coope does not discuss), a usefulalternative would have been an indication in the comprehensive Index Locorum (for

example, by use of asterisks) of pages where a translation of a particular portion oftext can be found.

Secondly, while Coope concentrates on a continuous block of Aristotelian text,she has not written a commentary. So she is able to structure her discussion with an

eye on dialectical clarity, without having to follow too slavishly the detailed structureof Aristotles text (she does, of course, follow its general structure). As a result she

can move backwards and forwards over the text in discussing particular issues: for

example, at pp. , in the course of explaining how earlier and later nows are insome ways the same and in some ways different, she cites a , b and

CRITICAL STUDY

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b . To a great extent this is welcome, since Physics IV is not verytightly structured. But the disadvantage is that it is often hard for the reader to see

where and in what order Aristotle himself is making the points which Coope pre-sents, and the difficulty of getting an overview of Aristotles treatment is exacerbated

by the absence of a continuous Coope translation of the four chapters.

.A summary

Time for Aristotle starts with an introduction (pp. ) which lays the necessarygroundwork for what is to follow, for example, concerning Aristotles general

account of continuity and his characterization of change as the actuality of thatwhich potentially is, quasuch (PhysicsIII , a ).

There then follow five parts containing two chapters each. Part I deals with theintroductory material in IV , arguments which suggest that time either does

not exist at all or exists only scarcely (b a ), and arguments on therelation of time and change (a a ), which culminate in the important

preliminary conclusion that time is something of change (a ).Part II examines in detail Aristotles view that important features of time some-

how depend on corresponding features of change, which features in turn depend onfeatures of magnitude (roughly IV , a ).

Part III unpacks the opaque claim that time is a number of change with respectto the before and after (IV , b ; see also IV ,a b and IV ,

a b ).Part IV tackles the idea that there is a single time within which all different

changes have a position. Relevant portions of Aristotles text are IV , b a , and IV ,a b and a . Aristotles writing here is very

dense, and Coope does a fine job in helping the modern reader to engage with theissues Aristotle raises. Her ch. is particularly helpful in clarifying his somewhat

unsuccessful attempts to explain how it is that earlier and later nows are in a way thesame and in a way different, and includes (pp. ) a novel interpretation of one of

the analogies on which Aristotle relies in the course of that explanation, the analogybetween a now and a thing in motion.

Finally, part V looks at two broad consequences of Aristotles treatment of time.First (IV ,b a and IV ,b ), there are some things which are

in time, while there are others which are not (the latter including not only things likeSherlock Holmes, which do not exist at all, but also anything which does exist and

lasts forever, IV , b ). Secondly (IV ,a ), Aristotle sees a complexrelation between time and the soul, summarized at the fiendishly difficult a :

But if nothing else has the nature to count than soul (and in the soul, the intellect), itis impossible for there to be time if there is no soul, except that there could be that,

whatever it is, by being which time is, for example, if it is possible for there to bechange without soul (Coopes translation, p. ).

In what follows I shall concentrate on a few points I found particularly difficult.Parts ofPhysicsIV are opaque even by Aristotles standards, but at every turn

Coopes discussion aided engagement, cast light and stimulated thought. Time forAristotleis an impressive and exciting book, and it would benefit not only specialists


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in ancient philosophy, but also anyone interested in the philosophy of time, since inthis area, as in so many others, Aristotles contributions are of value.

.Magnitude, change and time

A central feature of Aristotles account of time is that there is some sort of depend-

ence of time on change, and of change on magnitude:

Since the changing thing changes from something to something and all magnitude

is continuous, the change follows the magnitude. For through the magnitudes being

continuous the change too is continuous, but through the change the time. For the

amount of time that has passed is always thought to be as much as the amount of

change. Therefore, the before and after is first of all in place. And there it is in

position. But since the before and after is in magnitude, it is necessary that also the

before and after is in change, by analogy with the things there. But the before and

after is also in time, through the following always of the one upon the other of them(IV , a ; Coopes translation, p. ).

This raises many issues. Coope makes a good case for takingmagnitude() to

mean spatial path, while change () incorporates all types of change (seepp. for her attempt to reconcile these two interpretations). What sort of

dependence does Aristotle have in mind when he talks of change followingmagni-tude? According to Coope, what is at issue is explanatory dependence (p. : it is the

continuity of the magnitude which explains the continuity of the change and notviceversa). What does this come to? Coope first (pp. ) introduces a symmetrical

relation, making possibleand ensuring: since change is continuous, time both can beandisguaranteed to becontinuous (and likewise mutatis mutandisfor change and magnitude).

But, as Coope notes (p. fn. ), what Aristotle has in mind is asymmetrical depend-ence. So there are two questions:

. Why say that certain features of change depend on corresponding features

of magnitude, rather than vice versa?

. Why say that certain features of time depend on corresponding features of

change, rather than vice versa?

Aristotle is not very explicit about his reasons here. Coope offers interesting specula-

tions on each question. But her answers pull in opposite directions. On question ()she makes two points (p. ):

a. Because there can be a spatial magnitude over which no change is going on,

while there cannot be a change which does not have a spatial magnitude as itspath

b. Because a single spatial magnitude can be the path for lots of different changes,while a single change can occupy only one spatial path.

(a) suggests a does-not-requirecriterion (features of change depend on those of magni-

tude because magnitudes do not require changes, while changes do requiremagnitudes); (b) suggests a onemany criterion (features of change depend on

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features of magnitude because one magnitude can be associated with many changes,while one change cannot be associated with many magnitudes).

These criteria are consistent with each other as applied to (), changemagnitude,but they give entirely the wrong answers when applied to (), timechange. Aristotle

says that features of time depend on those of change. But does-not-requirefails to givethat verdict, since it is not the case that changes do not require times in which to

occur while times do require changes to occur in them. Nor does onemany give theexpected answer: it is not the case that one change can go with many times while

one time cannot go with many changes. Quite the opposite: a single period of time,just like a single spatial magnitude, can be associated with many changes, while a

single change cannot be associated with many periods of time, any more than it canwith many spatial paths.

Coope does indeed say something quite different about () as contrasted with ().She refers back (pp. ) to Aristotles reasons for saying that time is something of

change (rather than change being something of time). Her account of those reasonsappeals to the privileged ontological status Aristotle typically accords individual

substances (p. : changes are more closely related to individual substances thantime is). But Coopes explication of this closer relation renders the conflict between

() and () even more severe. Changes are more closely associated with substancesthan are times, because a single change is the change of just one substance (this

motion is the motion of thischariot), whereas a single period of time can be associ-ated with lots of different changes in lots of different substances (the motion of this

chariot and the walking of that man occur in the very same time). But this sits ill

with the onemany criterion behind (b).There is an important underlying issue here. Aristotles treatment of time isshaped by his general ontological preferences. Time, for Aristotle, should not be

something ontologically primary. He hopes to give time its proper status by viewingit as a way of ordering changes, while changes are to be understood (in some way) as

the actualization of potentialities possessed by substances, which are ontologicallyprivileged. It is natural to assume that what goes for time goes for place too. And

certainly, for Aristotle, places are not ontologically primary they are the locationsof substances (PhysicsIV , a : the limit of the surrounding body, at which it is

contact with that which is surrounded). But it seems that changes are more closely

related to individual substances than are either times or places (different changescan occur at the same time, although in different places, just as different changes canoccur in the same place at different times and maybe even at the same time). So it

is hard to understand why Aristotle should choose to make features of magnitudeexplanatorily basic (features of magnitude being more basic than change, while

features of time are less basic than change).1

It may be that Coope does not worry that no single set of criteria decides ques-

tions () and (), and that there is no single notion of explanatory dependence inwhich features of time depend on those of change and features of change depend on


1 Coope says explicitly that she takes Aristotle to be using magnitude and place inter-

changeably in his discussion of time. He typically says magnitude (), but we haveplace () at IV , a .

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those of magnitude. For she starts her interpretation (pp. ) of Aristotles accountof the before and after in magnitude, change and place like this:

The central claim of this interpretation is that the way in which the before and after

in place is related to the before and after in change is quite different from the way inwhich the before and after in change is related to the before and after in time.

Aristotle holds not only that the continuity of time is derived from that of change,which is derived from that of magnitude, but also that temporal order (before and

after) is derived from the order of stages in a change, which is derived from spatialorder. This is very puzzling. Many philosophers are apt to think that order (or direc-

tion, if this comes to the same thing) is one of the most significant features of time,and to think, for example, that temporal order sustains striking modal differences

between past and future. In contrast, though, it is not clear even what a before/afterorder isin the case of place; and so it is surprising to find Aristotle saying it is there

first of all (, a ) and by position (, a ). Further, while it iseasier to recognize a before/after ordering in the stages of a change, it is hard to

avoid seeing this as a temporal ordering of earlier and later stages; but if thatwere so, it would undermine any attempt to derive a temporal before/after from a

before/after in change.Coopes constructive interpretation of Aristotles position here is intriguing. At

Metaphysics , a , Aristotle explains the important notion of before/after(priority/posteriority) in nature and substance: a is before b in nature and sub-

stance ifacan exist without b while b cannot exist without a. In this light, for the

before/after in place, bare claims about spatial order make little sense. If I am askedwhether Birmingham is before or after Sheffield, I have no idea what to say. Irequire reference to an origin (is Birmingham before or after Sheffield in relation to

London?). And I require reference to a path(travelling north on the M, rather thansouth and round the globe?). Thus specified, the question has a clear answer:

Birmingham is before Sheffield in relation to London and travelling north on theM. That is to say that a path LondonSheffield has a path LondonBirmingham as

a part; and therefore that the LondonBirmingham part can exist without theLondonSheffield whole, while the LondonSheffield whole cannot exist without

the LondonBirmingham part (pp. , ). LondonBirmingham is before

LondonSheffield in nature and substance.Coope then uses this asymmetry that LondonBirmingham can exist with-out LondonSheffield, but not vice versa in order to generate a non-temporal

asymmetry in the stages of a change. But there is a point to raise even before movingon to the application to change. Quite what does it mean to say, in the case of

places/magnitudes, that LondonBirmingham can exist without LondonSheffield,but not vice versa? It is clear enough that I can travel(north on the M) from London

to Birmingham without travelling from London to Sheffield, but not vice versa. Butthis would be to understand a before/after relation in place in terms of a

before/after in a change (i.e., a journey), which would get things the wrong way

round. Rather, what Coope has in mind is that we can think of LondonBirmingham as standing to LondonSheffield as a line segment stands to a whole

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line. Thinking of it thus is intended to connect withMetaphysics, a and

, although it would remain hard to understand the further claims Aristotlemakes in the surrounding text, that LondonBirmingham is posterior in sub-

stance to LondonSheffield in actuality (a ); and that LondonSheffield is

priorto LondonBirmingham in respect of generation (a ; I think Coope

ducks this issue at p. fn. ). If we do think of matters thus, however, it seems we

are considering not placesfrom which and to which substances move, nor extended

spatial regionsacross which they pass, but rather the abstracted magnitudes of those

bits of the world. For we are being asked to consider a line actually divided into

two line segments so that the whole no longer exists, rather than the LondonBirmingham chunk of the cosmos existing without the LondonSheffield chunk.2

Perhaps it is unproblematic that these paths-with-an-origin are abstracted magni-

tudes. Indeed, perhaps it is to be expected, for that will be why they have two di-

mensions rather than three, and why there is no answer to questions such as Wheredoes Liverpool stand on the LondonBirminghamSheffield path?. But the danger

then is that it again becomes unclear why the before/after order of these abstracted

magnitudes should be privileged. For, as noted earlier, these abstract lengths and

distances, just like periods of time, seem to be less closely related to the ontologicallyprivileged individual substances than are the individual changes, the before/after

structure of which is claimed by Aristotle to be derivative.

It is invariably the case that when something about Aristotles position is

puzzling, Coope recognizes the fact and has something to say. On the question of

why order in change is explanatorily dependent on spatial order, see pp. . She

makes two points:

(i) It is reasonable for Aristotle to make the before/after in place prior to the

before/after in change because he is already committed to the priority of placeover change as regards their continuity

(ii) It is easier to make sense of actually dividing a magnitude than of actuallyinterrupting a change; actual division of a magnitude takes me from a whole

which exists to a part which exists; but if I do in fact interrupt a change, whatIinterrupt is not an actually occurrent change but something which wouldhave

existed had I not interrupted it.

However, as regards (i), I have already noted some problems in Aristotles idea thatthe continuity of place is prior to, while that of time is posterior to, the continuity of

change. And as regards (ii), the point about actual division is far more plausible as

regards abstracted magnitudes than as regards chunks of the world; and it remains

puzzling why we should privilege these magnitudes over changes, which are, after

all, more robustly connected than the former are with the ontologically basic indi-vidual substances.

Suppose, however, that we let pass any problems about the basic status of the

before/after ordering in magnitude. Coopes appeal to theMetaphysics notion of

priority in substance as ontological independence is nevertheless valuable, because it


2 See fn. above on Coope on Aristotles use ofmagnitudeandplace.

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suggests a way to explicate a prima facienon-temporal before/after order in change;and if that change-order is genuinely non-temporal, then Aristotle could derive

temporal order from it without circularity (one time is before another so long as achange-stage at the first time is non-temporally before a change-stage at the second).

The idea is as follows. Suppose I am asked to interrupta change, for example, ajourney from London to Sheffield, or a reading ofAnna Karenina. Starting at London,

going north on the M to Birmingham, and stopping, is (or could be) an interruptedjourney from London to Sheffield; but starting at Birmingham and going to

Sheffield is not (and could not be). So too starting at p. , continuing to p. , andstopping, is an interrupted reading ofAnna Karenina, while opening the book at p.

and then reading to the end is not. The crucial point on which this turns is notabout the temporal order of change-stages, but rather about what makes a change

the change that it is. A change is a transition between a point-from-which and apoint-to-which (my rebarbative terms are intended to avoid the temporal con-

notations ofstarting- andfinishing-points). The crux of Coopes interpretation (p. ) isthat there is a non-temporalasymmetry between the from-which and the to-which of a

change:

The difference between the beginning and the end of the change is this. A changing

thing can be going to a point C, even though it in fact never gets there. But a

changing thing cannot be coming from a point A if it has never been there.

This sounds highly plausible. But of course it would not help Aristotle if it owed its

plausibility to some covert temporal content. For example, Aristotle would get

nowhere if this was his thought: if something isgoing to C then its being at C is futureand the future is contingent, while if it is coming from A then its being at A ispastandthe past is necessary. Naturally Coope is well aware of this, and her favoured way

(p. ) of bringing out the putatively non-temporal asymmetry is (as in my examplesabove) by reference to interruption:

... the change-parts that might be left over when the change is interrupted all share a

common boundary. It is this fact that makes it possible to define the start of a change

without presupposing temporal order.

However, one might suspect that interruption is a covertly temporal term (and suited

for its purpose for precisely that reason).Interruption can be compared and contrasted with a couple of other notions. First,with interference.3 A pollutant might interfere with the development of the eye without

STEPHEN MAKIN

3 Coope tends to use interruption and interference interchangeably, but this does not seemreasonable. See, e.g., p. : A crucial step in our account of the before and after in changewas the claim that it is possible for a part of a change to occur although, because of interference,the complete change does not. This claim presupposes that interruptinga change is, in a certainsense, analogous to destroying a line (my italics). Or p. : When we interfere with an on-going change, what is left is part of the interrupted change. I suspect Coope adds on-goingin this second remark because her claim would be far less plausible without it. Is it really thecase that any interference with the natural development of a human embryo interrupts a pro-

cess which starts with the fertilization of an egg by a sperm? What the use of on-going does isto import the idea that the change is already under way (i.e., that it has already started).

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this implying that the development starts as it should: maybe it is precisely the initialstages which the pollutant causes to go wrong. Or secondly, interruption can be com-

pared with incomplete occurrence. If things go wrong, Candy may manage only anincomplete London marathon: maybe she overslept, missed the start, joined the race

late and ran only the second half. If someone interrupts Candys philosophy examthen he allows her to start but prevents her continuing, and she turns in an in-

complete script. But if someone prevents her turning up on time and she starts halfway through, would we not say exactly the same thing, that her exam was incom-

plete? By contrast, it seems the upshot of Coopes view would be that we cannot saythat Candy turns in an incomplete exam, and stranger still that what she actually

does is turn in a complete sub-exam. The problem, then, is that if Coopes claimsare plausible only about interruption (rather than, for example, interferenceor incomplete

performance), and if the reason for this is that interruption has some covert temporalcontent (you can interfere with a process before it starts, but you cannot interrupt

a process until it is already under way), then the before/after order in change willnot be genuinely non-temporal, and Aristotle will not after all be able to derive a

temporal before/after from an order of change-stages without circularity.

.Numbers and measures

Aristotles general project, of deriving features of times (continuity, before/after

order) from corresponding features of changes, gives rise to a problem. To put itsimply, there are many changes in the world, but only one time order. How is

Aristotle to guarantee that there is a single (inclusive) temporal dimension within

which all the different changes have a position, and which inherits itsfeatures fromtheir features? What is there that is common to the variety of changes (which are

variously rooted in different potentialities of different substances) apart from the fact

that they all stand in a single set of temporal relations? And if it is only theirtemporal relations which connect them together, then it is hard to see how the

structure of that single temporal dimension can be derived from theirstructure.Aristotle is well aware of this. Indeed he appeals to the fact that there is a single

time for all changes in arguing that time cannot be identical to change:

The movement and change of each thing is only in the changing thing itself or

wherever the moving or the changing thing itself happens to be. But time is similarly

both everywhere and with everything (IV , b ; Coopes translation, p. ).

How does Aristotle approach the issue? The first step is to explain how it is that time

stands to any individual change. Here are some extracts from PhysicsIV :

But time, too, we become acquainted with when we mark offchange, marking it off

by the before and after, and we say that time has passed when we get a perception of

the before and after in change.... whenever [we do perceive] the before and after,

then we speak of time. For that is what time is: a number of change in respect of the

before and after.... It is the now that measures time, considered as the before and

after.... Just as the moving thing and the motion go together, so too do the number ofthe moving thing and the number of the motion. Time is the number of the motion,


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and the now is, as the moving thing is, like a unit of number (a , a

b , b , a ; Husseys translation).

Aristotles characterization of time is puzzling: a number of change with respect to

the before and after (Coopes translation, p. ). What does this mean? There is atempting (and fairly common) interpretation according to which Aristotle is sayingsomething which looks (relatively) straightforward: that time is what it is that

measureschange (the quantity of change, as it were). However Aristotle says that timeand change measure each other(IV , b : not only do we measure change bytime but also time by change, because they are defined by one another. The timedefines the change, being its number, and the change the time; Coopes translation,

p. ). Further, Aristotles characterization of time as a number of changefollows im-mediately (and seems to be intended to follow uncontroversially) on his claim thatwe are aware of the passage of time by being aware of the occurrence of changes;

and there is nothing in the latter claim to suggest that Aristotle has in mind aware-ness of the special sort of regular repeated changes that would be needed as the unitsfor clock measurement of time. When we register any alteration we say that time haspassed, even if we are unable to say how much, or to measure the passage byreference to a regular unit.

So Coope offers a different interpretation, according to which Aristotle is notusingnumbersimply to mean measure(see pp. for her criticism of the alternative).But now there is a problem: how can something continuous (such as time) becounted or numbered? The answer lies in Aristotles refinement of the claim: time is

a number which is counted rather than with which we count (b ). We count with

discrete pluralities (e.g., the numerals , , , ... , or intermediaries, such as onemark after another on a page). By contrast, though, we can in an extended sensecount continuous wholes. That is to say, we can order them in the same sort of

linear order as that in which numbers stand. And this, according to Coope, is thecore of the matter. What we count in counting time are nows. To count a now is tomark it off to register it, as it were. Sometimes the reason to mark off items in aseries is not to find out how many there are, but to fix an order or direction.

In countingnows, though, the order is all-important. It does not matter how many nows

we count; what is important is that we count a series of nows in a certain definite order

(an order that reflects the different before and after orders within changes) (p. ).

It is important to appreciate how strong Coopes claim is. She is not saying merelythat while we in fact count how many nows there are, what is important is not thatthere are this number of them but that they are in a certain order. It is relativelyuncontroversial that there can be counting procedures like this (if I write down a

name every time a runner passes the finishing line, in order to produce a ranking forthe race, then in fact I count the number of runners, although what matters is notthat there were that many people competing but that they finished in that order).Coope is envisaging something stronger, a case in which it does not even matter

whether we count allthe Fs, so long as the Fs we do count are put in a certain order.

And since it may be more controversial that there are counting procedures like this,it would have been helpful to offer some other examples. (Perhaps this would be

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one: I ask you to count offrocks as we walk through the wilderness because what Iwant to fix is the direction in which we have come, so that we can return, rather

than the precise number of rocks there are it does not matter at all to me whetherthere are rocks which you have missed out.)

If this is the way in which time is a number of change i.e., it is the orderin whichchange occurs then it is natural for Aristotles characterization of time as a

number of change with respect to the before and after to follow on from his claimthat we are aware of time by being aware of change. Being aware that thischange-

stage (e.g., passing through Birmingham) is different from that change-stage (e.g.,passing through Nottingham) is a matter of marking off potential divisions in the

change (my journey could have been interrupted at Birmingham, or it could havebeen interrupted at Nottingham). And in registering those different potential

divisions I thereby mark offa period of time, between thisnow and thatnow.I shall not attempt to do justice to the subtlety and detail of Coopes discussion

of numbering and measuring in part III (which includes welcome constructive en-gagement with material in Metaphysics , one of the driest, most unrewarding and

neglected of Aristotles metaphysical treatises). I shall say something, though, abouthow the time is a number of change doctrine is said to contribute to the project of

showing that time is a single and universal dimension.There is a gain, in numbering changes by marking offstages, in ascending from

changes to time, precisely because time is a single order within which all differ-ent changes have a position. And given that time is a single order within which

changes have a position, we can, as Aristotle says, use time to measure change and

also change to measure time. A regular and repeated change (the movement of theclock hand, or the rising and setting of the sun) measures out a period of time (anhour, a day); and since time is a single continuum, that period of time will also

measure out other changes (Candys running of the mile). But now the problemfacing Aristotles strategy of deriving features of time from those of changes looms

large. On the one hand it seems plausible to say that we are not aware of the passageof time directly, but indirectly through recognition of different change-stages, so that

time will inherit the linear before/after order manifest in any individual change. Onthe other hand, though, the order and structure of time should be independent of

any particular change, so that we can be assured of a single temporal order accom-

modating any individual change there might be. Suppose I mark off two stages inthischange, and two stages in thatchange. There is no reason to think that the twochange-intervals stand in any (non-temporal) before/after relation to each other

(that there is any relation of priority in substance and nature between them). But weare very much inclined to expect that the two change-intervals will stand in some

temporalrelation. How can we be confident of that?

.A single time for all changes

I was not clear, either from the Physicstext or from Coopes discussion in part IV,how far Aristotle thought it necessary to go in answering this question. A running

theme of Coopes book is that while Aristotles discussion of time is not of merelyhistorical and scholarly interest, it is also important to recognize that his concerns


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are sometimes orthogonal to our own. Maybe the current problem is a case in point,as suggested by this deflationary remark by Coope (p. ):

Nows are different by being at one stage of a movement and at another.... However, a

full account of temporal order would also have to explain the relation in which oneand the same now stands to different changes. Aristotles remarks about following tell

us nothing about this. As we have seen, he assumes that when we count a now we

count all the change-stages that are at it. This naturally raises the question: in virtue

of what are these change-stages simultaneous or at the same now? To this, he

appears to have no answer.

To whatdoes Aristotle have no answer? If there is to be a single time for all changes,

then one and the same now will have to stand in some relation to each and everychange namely, it must either count a stage of the change or be before or after a

now which does so. Immediately following this deflationary comment Coope turns

her attention to a peculiar Aristotelian claim at PhysicsIV , b , all simultan-eous time is the same, . (See p. fn. ; it is important

to have Coopes translation here rather than Husseys very different though the

whole time in sum is the same. The revised Oxford Translation agrees with Coope.)

Coope argues that what Aristotle is concerned to establish here is that as regards any

change which is going on at the same time (e.g., this afternoon), a single now (as,e.g., when I shout Now) marks offa potential division in every one of them. This

sounds like the view which according to the deflationary passage cited above,

Aristotle merely assumes(when we count a now we count all the change-stages which

are at it); although Coope then goes on to provide a wonderful exposition of

Aristotles defenceof the claim, based on a difficult comparison between the same-

time of different changes and the same-number of different pluralities (see esp.

pp. ). Still, why should Aristotle think it of any significance either to assume or

to defend the claim that all simultaneous changes are marked off by one and thesame now that there is some onenow which marks all simultaneous changes?

The reason, according to Coope, is that the claim is required for a crucial (and

natural) assumption concerning overlapping changes, that if two changes overlap,

then there are some parts of each which are exactly simultaneous. For example, if I

am walking to the shop while a bird flies from one tree to the next, then there is

some part of my walk and some part of the birds flight which are exactly simul-taneous. Whether this is plausible or not depends on whether uninterrupted changes

have parts of arbitrary size (since it is arbitrary precisely how my walk shouldoverlap with the birds flight). What is it for an uninterrupted change to have parts?

Dividing a change is interrupting it, so an uninterrupted change will not have actual

parts (pp. ). But we can create potential parts in a change when we mark offa

point at which it couldbe interrupted. So we are guaranteed that two overlapping

changes have exactly simultaneous (potential) parts, so long as one and the same

now marks offa potential division in every change going on at that now. For if this

is the case, then marking offa pair of nows while two changes are overlapping will

mark off two change-parts which are simultaneous, since each is bounded by oneand the same pair of nows.

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Coopes exposition of the connection between

(i) All simultaneous changes are marked offby one and the same now

and

(ii) If two changes overlap then they have parts which are exactly simultaneous

was persuasive. But I was less clear about how (ii) is supposed to connect with the

view that there is a single time for all changes. Coope argues (p. ) that (ii) isrequiredfor that claim:

In fact this assumption [(ii)] is not merely natural. It is an assumption that is pre-

supposed by Aristotles view that time is universal.... Aristotle needs to show how we

can make such arbitrary divisions in changes if he is to defend his assumptions about

the universality of time.

Coopes argument turns on the relation between (ii) and the following claims

(iii) There could be a change with no parts which are exactly simultaneous with the

parts of any other changes(iv) Time is a single ordered series in which all changes are related.

Coope argues that if (ii) is false, (iii) is true, and if (iii) is true, (iv) is false. 4 It follows,then, that Aristotle has a motive for defending (ii), since in doing so he is furthering

the project of establishing (iv). And since (i) entails (ii), then there is a purpose toAristotles peculiar remark that all simultaneous time is the same (IV , b ).

But Coopes argument looks unconvincing. For (iii) would be true quite inde-pendently of whether (ii) were true or false if and only if it is possible for there to be a

lone change(that is, a change which does not overlap any other). For in that case (iii)would be true in virtue of that lone changes having no parts simultaneous with any-

thing else. Nevertheless, even given the truth of (iii), (iv) could still be true, so long asany lone change is either earlier or later than any other change you care to pick.

Therefore the truth of (iii) would not entail the falsity of (iv), in which case estab-lishing the truth of (ii), in order, supposedly, to guarantee that (iii) is not true, would

contribute little to the defence of (iv). Consequently the significance of (i) profferedas necessary for the truth of (ii) is diminished; and one may then as a result be less

confident in Coopes controversial translation ofb , from which (i) arises.What would Aristotle need to establish in order to guarantee (iv), that there is a

single temporal order? He has argued in the earlier part of PhysicsIV that thereare no periods of time which are empty of change (b a ; see Coope,

ch. ). He also argues that there are no first or last times (IV , a b ). So


4 Cf. the summary at p. : If the fact that two changes were both going on at once didnot guarantee that they had parts that were exactly simultaneous, then there could be changesthat stood outside the order of the before and after in time. For in that case there could bea change which had no parts that were exactly simultaneous with the parts of any otherchanges. In counting the parts of such a change, we would not also be counting the parts ofother changes (since there would be no other change-parts that were exactly simultaneous

with those that we were counting). Hence our counting could not produce a single orderedseries within which this change and all others were related.

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if there were a lone change, it would have to be continuous with some precedingand succeeding changes, and therefore any lone change would be bounded by a pair

of nows, each one of which is also the boundary of some other change. Thereforethe existence of a lone change, and the truth of (iii), will not threaten (iv), the

universality of time, so long as the fact that one and the same now is the end of onechange and the start of another entails that the first change is earlier than the

second, and the second change later than the first and it may be that Aristotletakes this to require no great argument, since it comes to pointing out that the now

is a boundary and a link between past and future (IV , a ; IV , a ;IV , a ).

. Life spans

In part V, Coope discusses two consequences of Aristotles treatment of time, his

(striking) views about the things that are and are not in time (ch. ), and his argu-ments concerning the relation between time and the soul (ch. ). I shall concentrate

on a couple of issues arising from the earlier of these discussions.It is not particularly striking to discover that a philosopher holds that some things

are in time and some things are not. But it is extremely striking to discover whatAristotle recognizes as not in time. That this is so is the result of two facts. First, he

holds that all things which are in time are surrounded by time (i.e., have a finiteduration), and therefore that anything which lasts forever is not in time:

So it is manifest that the things that always are, considered as such, are not in time,

for they are not surrounded by time, nor is their being measured by time, and an

indication of this is that they are not acted on at all by time either, which shows thatthey are not in time (IV , b ; Husseys translation).

Secondly, Aristotle counts among the eternal items things which are moving (the

celestial bodies). So what can he mean by the claim that there are some changingbodies which are not in time?

According to Coope, we can best make sense of Aristotles position by adopting arich interpretation of what being in time involves. She argues that items of finite

duration are not the only things which can stand in temporal relations, or be past orpresent or future, or undergo changes (pp. ). If this is correct, then since

Aristotle holds that items of finite duration are the only things which are in time,we may well conclude that there is more to being in time than, for example,

standing in temporal relations. What more is involved is that all and only the thingsthat are in timeget older, and this in two ways. First, their past accumulates as time

passes (my past is longer this year than it was last year); and secondly, they decay (Ibecome ever more decrepit as the years pass). If this is what being in time involves,

then Aristotle will be quite correct to hold that something eternal is not in time even if it is eternally moving in circles. For if something has existed for infinite time

past, then it will not have existed for any longer at the end of next year than it hasnow; and if it were going to decay it would already have done so. It is the idea of

things in time being subject to decay to which Aristotle is adverting when he speaksof things being acted on by time in the passage quoted above.

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Coope renders Aristotles talk of certain things being acted on by time respect-able by reference to the Aristotelian distinction between efficient and formal causes.

Time is not a something which can impart causal force, as it were, or triggerchanges, or push around the stuffthat an animal is made of that is to say, time is

never an efficient cause. But when my dog dies, and you ask me why, and I say Itstime had come or Its time was up, I am giving a perfectly good and compre-

hensible explanation. I am saying that it was not struck down in its youth by diseaseor accident, but that it had completed the life span characteristic of that type of

thing. That is, I am providing a formal cause and saying something about the canineform (the natural life span of a dog is around fifteen years).

Coope is therefore able to suggest a charitable explication of Aristotles views onbeing in time: as she puts it, to be in time is to be something that is, in the sense we

have explained, affected by time (p. ). But she notes the difficulty of applying thisexplanation to non-living things (which is why, presumably, the phrase natural life

span rolls offthe tongue far more easily than natural existencespan). Yet lots of in-animate things presumably are in time Mount Everest and my house, for example.

The problem is that inanimate things do not seem to have a natural determinatetime span characteristic of the type of thing they are, and so it is implausible to

suppose that saying Its time was up could constitute a formal explanation of thecrumbling away of a mountain or the collapse of a house.

This is intriguing, and one wonders whether there is a way of extending Coopestreatment to inanimate entities. There are two sorts of case to consider, stufftypes

and artefacts. As regards the first, there is a pattern of explanation which we could

view as an extended formal cause. Suppose I ask you How is it that my wall neededrebuilding so soon, while yours still remains strong?. You give a perfectly good andcomprehensible explanation in saying What else do you expect? Yours was made of

clay while mine was made of stone. You are not, of course, citing the processeswhich led to my clay walls crumbling while your stone wall resisted the wind and

rain that is, you are not providing efficient causes (although there will be anefficient cause story to tell). What you are doing is pointing out that it is of the

nature of clay to decay or to succumb more rapidly to the natural environment thanwould stone (cf.Metaphysics, a : stone has, while clay lacks, a capacity

to resist being acted on for the worse and so as to be destroyed; see also Metaphysics

, b , where Aristotle talks of water undergoing certain changes, e.g., intovinegar rather than wine, in virtue of a corruption contrary to its nature, ). Further, if it is possible to make some headway along these lines with

the decay of stuffs, then the case of artefacts might be handled by reference to thatfirst case. Perhaps it could be argued that an artefact has a natural life span not qua

artefact but qua artefact made of certain stuff. The questions How long do dogslast? and How long do axes last? are superficially similar; but whereas the first has

a fairly determinate answer, the second immediately invites the response It dependson whether they are made of bronze or iron.

University of Sheffield


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