25c - kesuvos - 54-77b
DESCRIPTION
25c - Kesuvos - 54-77bTRANSCRIPT
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
1
The Soncino Babylonian Talmud
KK EE TT HH UU BB OO TT HH Book III
Folios 54b-77b
CHAPTERS V–VII
T R A N S L A T E D I N T O E N G L I S H W I T H N O T E S
BY R A B B I D R . S A M U E L D A I C H E S B a r r i s t e r a t L a w
AND R E V . D R . I S R A E L W . S L O T K I , M . A . , L i t t . D .
U N D E R T H E E D I T O R S H I P O F
R A B B I D R I . E P S T E I N B.A., Ph.D., D. Lit.
Reformatted by Reuven Brauner, Raanana 5772 www.613etc.com
25c
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
2
Kethuboth 54b
'Four hundred Zuz1 [of the value of this]
wine shall be given to my daughter', and the
price of wine rose. 'The profit', ruled R.
Joseph, 'belongs to the orphans'.2
Relatives of R. Johanan had [the
responsibility of maintaining their] father's
wife who was in the habit of consuming
much3 food. When4 they came to R.
Johanan5 she told them, 'Go and ask your
father that he should assign a plot of land for
her maintenance'.6 When they subsequently
came before Resh Lakish, he said to them,
'[By such an assignment] he has increased all
the more [the allowance for] her
maintenance'.7 'But', they said to him, 'R.
Johanan did not say so?' —
'Go', he told them, 'and give her [proper
maintenance], otherwise8 I shall pull R.
Johanan out of your ears'. R. Johanan, when
they came to him again, said to them, 'What
can I do when one of equal standing9 differs
from me?' R. Abbahu stated: This was
explained to me by R. Johanan: [If the
husband] said,10 'towards maintenance' he
has thereby increased [the allowance for] her
maintenance;11 but if he said,10 'for
maintenance' he has thereby limited the
allowance for her maintenance.12
CHAPTER V
MISHNAH. ALTHOUGH [THE SAGES] HAVE
ENACTED THAT A VIRGIN COLLECTS13
TWO HUNDRED ZUZ14 AND A WIDOW ONE
MANEH,14 IF HE [THE HUSBAND] WISHES TO
ADD, EVEN A HUNDRED MANEH, HE MAY
DO SO. [A WOMAN] WHO WAS WIDOWED
OR DIVORCED, EITHER AFTER
BETROTHAL OR AFTER MARRIAGE, IS
ENTITLED TO COLLECT ALL [THAT IS DUE
TO HER].15 R. ELEAZAR B. AZARIAH RULED:
[ONLY A WOMAN WIDOWED] AFTER HER
MARRIAGE RECEIVES ALL [THAT IS DUE
TO HER], BUT IF AFTER A BETROTHAL, A
VIRGIN RECOVERS ONLY TWO HUNDRED
ZUZ14 AND A WIDOW ONLY ONE MANEH,14
FOR THE MAN PROMISED16 HER [THE
ADDITIONAL JOINTURE] WITH THE SOLE
OBJECT OF MARRYING HER.17 R. JUDAH
RULED: IF [A HUSBAND] WISHES HE MAY
WRITE OUT FOR A VIRGIN13 A DEED FOR
TWO HUNDRED ZUZ AND SHE WRITES [A
QUITTANCE],18 'I HAVE RECEIVED FROM
YOU A MANEH', AND FOR A WIDOW [HE
MAY WRITE OUT A DEED FOR] A MANEH
AND SHE WRITES [A QUITTANCE]. 'I HAVE
RECEIVED FROM YOU FIFTY ZUZ'. R. MEIR
RULED: [THE INTERCOURSE OF] ANY MAN
WHO UNDERTAKES TO GIVE A VIRGIN
LESS THAN TWO HUNDRED ZUZ14 OR A
WIDOW LESS THAN A MANEH14 IS19 AN ACT
OF PROSTITUTION.
GEMARA. [Is not this]20 obvious? — It might
have been presumed that the Rabbis have
fixed a limit in order that the man who has
no means might not be put to shame; hence
we were taught [that there was no limit].
IF HE WISHES TO ADD, etc. It was not
stated, 'If he wishes to write',21 but 'WISHES
TO ADD'.22 This then provides support for [a
ruling which] R. Aibu stated in the name of
R. Jannai. For R. Aibu stated in the name of
R. Jannai: The supplementary provisions23
[that are included] in a Kethubah are subject
to the same regulations as the statutory
Kethubah.24 [In what respect] can this25
matter?26 — In respect of a woman who sells
or surrenders [her Kethubah],27 or one who
rebels,28 one who impairs,29 or claims [her
Kethubah],30 or one who transgresses the
Law;31
1. V. Glos.
2. Since the bequest was not a quantity of wine
but a specified sum of money.
3. Lit., 'spoilt', or 'caused to diminish, (Af. of
[H]).
4. During their father's lifetime. He was on the
point of dying and disposing of his property
(cf. p. 322, n. i).
5. To consult him as to how they could reduce
their liability.
6. So that the liability of the heirs would thereby
be limited to the value of that plot of land
only. Such an assignment, of course, is valid
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
3
only if it was made on one's death bed and is
subject in addition to the woman s consent (V.
Pe'ah, III, 7 and Rashi a.l.). The efficacy of R.
Johanan's advice being dependent on the
consent of the woman explains also why R.
Johanan, despite his regrets for giving advice
to relatives (supra 52b), proceeded to advise
them again (v. Tosaf. a.l. s.v. [H]). In the other
case his advice was effective despite the
woman's wish.
7. His assignment of the land cannot deprive the
widow of her right to proper maintenance,
and can only be regarded as the provision of
an additional source of income from which
she might draw in case the maintenance the
heirs provided was not on a liberal scale.
8. Lit., 'and if not'.
9. Lit., 'who is corresponding to me'.
10. When he assigned a particular plot of land for
his wife's maintenance.
11. 'Towards' implying an addition to what is
already due to her.
12. 'For maintenance' implying 'in return' or
compensation for the maintenance to which
she is entitled.
13. As her statutory Kethubah.
14. V. Glos.
15. Sc. her statutory Kethubah as well as any
additional jointure her husband may have
settled upon her.
16. Lit., 'wrote'.
17. And since he died before marrying her she
can have no claim to it.
18. Though she has received nothing.
19. Lit., 'behold this'.
20. That A HUSBAND MAY ADD, IF HE
WISHES, etc.
21. Which might have implied a mere gift.
22. Sc. to the Kethubah, implying that the
additional jointure assumes the same
designation as the statutory Kethubah itself.
23. Such as additional jointure, maintenance, or
any other of the terms mentioned in the
previous chapter.
24. Infra 104b.
25. The treatment of the additional jointure as the
statutory Kethubah.
26. Lit., 'it goes out (results) from it'.
27. By such an act she sells her additional
jointure as well as her statutory Kethubah
though only 'Kethubah' was mentioned when
the transaction took place.
28. Against her husband, by refusing conjugal
rights or work (v. infra 63a). If, in
consequence, reductions are made from her
Kethubah (v. loc. cit.) her additional jointure,
like her statutory Kethubah, is subject to these
deductions.
29. By admitting that she had already been paid a
part of her Kethubah (infra 87a). In such a
case she cannot recover the balance of the
additional jointure even though that part of
the Kethubah had been left unimpaired. (v.
Tosaf. s.v. [H]).
30. V. supra 54a. As she loses her maintenance by
claiming her statutory Kethubah so she loses it
by claiming only her additional jointures
(Rashi).
31. A woman who transgresses the Mosaic law or
traditional Jewish practice may be divorced
without receiving her Kethubah (infra 72a).
This applies to her additional jointure also.
Kethuboth 55a
in respect of amelioration,1 an oath,2 and the
Sabbatical year,3 in respect of him who
assigned all his property to his sons,4 or the
recovery of payment out of real estate and
from the worst part of it,5 also in respect of
[the law of a widow] while in her father's
house,6 and of the Kethubah for male
children.7
It was stated: The Kethubah for the male
children,8 [the scholars of] Pumbeditha9
ruled, may not be collected from sold or
mortgaged property,10 for we have learned,8
'They shall inherit';11 and the scholars of12
Matha Mehasia13 ruled: It may be collected
from sold or mortgaged property, for we
have learned,8 'They shall take'.14 The law,
however, is that it may not be collected from
sold or mortgaged property, since we have
learned,8 'They shall inherit'.11
Movables15 which are available16 [may be
collected]17 without an oath;18 but if they are
not available,19 [the Kethubah may, the
scholars of] Pumbeditha ruled, [be
collected]20 without an oath18 and the
scholars21 of Matha Mehasia ruled: Only
with an oath. The law [is that they may be
collected] without an oath.
If [her husband] has set aside for her a plot of
land [defining it] by its four boundaries22
[she23 may collect from it] without an oath;24
but if [he only defined it] by one boundary,
[the scholars of] Pumbeditha ruled [that
collection25 may be made from it] without an
oath,24 but the scholars of Matha Mehasia
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
4
ruled: Only with an oath.26 The law,
however, is that collection25 may be effected
without an oath.22 If a man said to witnesses,
'Write out [a deed],27 sign it and give it to a
certain person',28 and they took from him
symbolic possession there is no need29 to
consult him.30 [If, however,] no symbolic
possession was taken, [the scholars of]
Pumbeditha ruled, there is no need29 to
consult him,30 but the scholars of Matha
Mehasia ruled: It is necessary to consult him.
The law is that it is necessary to consult him.
R. ELEAZAR B. AZARIAH, etc. It was
stated: Rab and R. Nathan [differed]. One
maintained that the Halachah was in
agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah and
the other maintained that the Halachah was
not in agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah.
You may conclude that it was R. Nathan who
maintained that the Halachah was in
agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah31 since
R. Nathan was heard [elsewhere] to follow
[the rule of] assumption,32 he33 having stated
that the Halachah was in agreement with R.
Simeon Shezuri in the case of a man
dangerously ill34
1. Of the estate of the husband after his death.
As the statutory Kethubah cannot be
recovered from such amelioration (v. Bek.
5lb) so cannot the additional jointure either.
2. A woman must take an oath in respect of her
additional jointure in all cases where she takes
an oath in respect of her statutory Kethubah
(infra 87a).
3. In which all debts must be released (v. Deut.
XV. iff) but not the obligation of a Kethubah
(v. Git. 48b). The exemption applies to both
the statutory Kethubah and the additional
jointure.
4. And left any fraction of land for his wife.
Thereby she loses her Kethubah (v. B.B. 132a)
and her additional jointure also.
5. These restriction apply to the additional
jointure as well as to the statutory Kethubah
(v. Git. 48b).
6. She may claim her Kethubah within twenty-
five years only (v. infra 104a). This applies
also to her additional jointure. There is no
time limit in the case of a widow who lives in
her late husband's house.
7. The children are entitled to their mother's
additional jointure just as they are entitled to
her statutory Kethubah and to the dowry,
which her father gave to her husband on the
occasion of their marriage, and which also
forms a part of the Kethubah obligations of a
husband.
8. V. Mishnah supra 52b.
9. [H] (lit., 'mouth of Beditha', one of the canals
of the Euphrates), was a Babylonian town
famous as a Jewish centre of learning.
10. Of the widow's late husband.
11. One inherits free assets only.
12. Lit., 'sons of'.
13. [H] is a suburb of Sura in Babylonia.
14. Instead of they shall inherit'. This implies that
the children are entitled to the Kethubah as a
gift made to them by their father at the time
of his marriage with the right to seize his
property wherever it may be found.
15. Pledged by a husband for the Kethubah of his
wife.
16. At the time of the man's death.
17. By the widow who, in other circumstances, is
required to take an oath to the effect that her
late husband had not given her some money
or objects of value as a security for her
Kethubah.
18. Since it is definitely known what objects of
value had been set aside for her Kethubah
there is no reason to suspect that any other
objects or money also had been secretly
deposited with her.
19. If, e.g., they were lost.
20. From the landed property of the deceased,
since all of it is legally pledged for the
Kethubah of one's wife.
21. Lit., 'sons'.
22. As a special security for her Kethubah.
23. When her husband dies.
24. Cf. supra p. 325, n. 14, mutatis mutandis.
25. V. loc. cit. n. 13.
26. As only one of the four boundaries had been
indicated the plot of land cannot be regarded
as a definite security, and the suspicion may
be entertained that her husband may have
given her some private deposit as a security
for her Kethubah (cf. supra p. 325, n. 13).
27. E.g., of a gift of land.
28. Lit., 'to him'.
29. Before the deed is written (Rashi).
30. Whether his instructions were seriously meant
or whether he has not since changed his mind
(cf. Rashi). According to some authorities the
consultation relates to the question of entering
a clause pledging the donor's property (cf.
Tosaf. s.v. [H]).
31. Whose opinion in our Mishnah is based on the
assumption that THE MAN PROMISED …
WITH THE SOLE OBJECT, etc.
32. Wherever a man did not specify his intention
or motive.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
5
33. Cur. edd. read 'R. Nathan'. In Hul. 75b the
reading is 'R. Jonathan', and in Men. 30b 'R.
Johanan'.
34. Who gave instructions for a letter of divorce
to be written for his wife. The document may
be delivered to the woman, even though its
delivery was not mentioned in the
instructions, because it is assumed that the
dying man intended it for this purpose (v. Git.
65b).
Kethuboth 55b
and in that of Terumah1 of the tithe of demai2
produce.3 But does not Rab, however, follow
[the rule of] assumption? Surely it was
stated: As to the gift of a dying man4 [in the
deed of] which was recorded [symbolic]
acquisition, the school of Rab in the name of
Rab reported [that the testator] has [thereby]
made him5 ride on two harnessed horses;6
but Samuel said: I do not know what decision
to give on the matter.
'The school of Rab in the name of Rab
reported [that the testator] has [thereby]
made him ride on two harnessed horses', for
it is like the gift of a man in good health,7 and
it is also like the gift of a dying man.8 'It is
like the gift of a man in good health', in that,
if he recovered, he cannot retract,7 and 'it is
like the gift of a dying man' in that, if he said
that his loan9 [shall be given] to X, his loan
[is to he given] to X.10 'But Samuel said: I do
not know what decision to give on the
matter', since it is possible that he11 decided
not to transfer possession to him12 except
through the deed,13 and no [possession by
means of a] deed [may be acquired] after [the
testator's] death!14
1. V. Glos.
2. V. Glos.
3. V. Dem. IV, 1. In this as in the previous case
the rule of assumption is followed. Cf. p. 326,
n. 10.
4. Who distributed all his estate. V. B.B. Sonc.
ed. p. 658. n. 2. The verbal assignment of a
dying man is valid and requires no deed or
formal acquisition.
5. The recipient.
6. I.e., his claim has a double force: That of the
gift of a dying man and that of legal
acquisition. [H], pl. of [H] 'a harnessed or
galloping horse'.
7. Owing to the symbolic acquisition that took
place.
8. Cf. supra note 3.
9. Lit., 'my loan', a debt which someone owes
him.
10. Although the money was not at that time in
his possession and the gift was not made in the
presence of the three parties concerned (v.
B.B. 144a).
11. By the unnecessary symbolic acquisition. V.
infra n. 12.
12. The donee.
13. Not merely by virtue of the legal validity of his
instructions (v. supra note 3).
14. Hence it was difficult for Samuel to give a
decision on the matter (v. B.B. Sonc. ed. p.
658, n. 11). As Rab, however, definitely ruled
in favor of the donee on the assumption that
the donor 'made him ride on two harnessed
horses', it follows that Rab is guided by the
rule of assumption. How then could it be
implied supra that it was Rab who held that
the Halachah was not in agreement with R.
Eleazar b. Azariah.
Kethuboth 56a
— The fact, however, is that both1 follow [the
rule of] assumption; and he who stated that
the Halachah [was so]2 was well justified,
[while in respect of] him who stated that the
Halachah was not [so],3 [it may be explained
that] here4 also [the ruling is based on] an
assumption, that the man's object5 [it is
assumed] was the formation of a mutual
attachment,6 and such attachment has indeed
been formed.7
R. Hanina8 once sat in the presence of R.
Jannai when he stated: The Halachah is in
agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah. [The
Master] said to him, 'Go Out' read your
Biblical verses outside;9 the Halachah is not
in agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah'.
R. Isaac b. Abdimi stated in the name of our
Master:10 The Halachah is in agreement with
R. Eleazar b. Azariah. R. Nahman stated in
the name of Samuel: The Halachah is in
agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
6
R. Nahman in his own name, however, stated
that the Halachah was not in agreement with
R. Eleazar b. Azariah, while the Nehardeans
stated in the name of R. Nahman that the
Halachah was in agreement with R. Eleazar
b. Azariah. And though R. Nahman uttered a
curse, proclaiming, 'Such and such a fate
shall befall every judge who gives a ruling in
agreement with the opinion of R. Eleazar b.
Azariah', the Halachah is nevertheless in
agreement with R. Eleazar b. Azariah.
And the Halachah in practice is in
accordance with the Opinion of R. Eleazar b.
Azariah.
Rabin enquired: What is the law11 where the
bride only entered the bridal chamber but
there was no intercourse? Is the Kinyan12
effected by the affectionate attachment in the
bridal chamber13 or is the Kinyan effected by
the affectionate attachment of the
intercourse?14 — Come and hear what R.
Joseph learnt: 'Because he assigned15 it to her
only on account of the affectionate
attachment of the first night'. Now, if you
grant that it is the affectionate attachment in
the bridal chamber that effects the Kinyan it
was correct for him to state 'the first night'.
If, however, you contend that it is the
affectionate attachment of the intercourse
that effects the Kinyan, does this [it may be
objected, first] take place on the first night
only and not subsequently? —
What then [do you suggest]? The
[affectionate attachment in the] bridal
chamber? Is the bridal chamber [it may be
retorted] entered16 in the night only and not
in the day time!17 — But according to your
argument does intercourse take place at night
and not in the day time? Surely Raba stated:
If one was in a dark room [intercourse] is
permitted!18 — This is no difficulty. He19
may have taught us that it is proper
conduct20 that intercourse should be at night;
but [if it is maintained that it is the
affectionate attachment in the] bridal
chamber [that effects the Kinyan] the
difficulty arises!21 — [The assumption that
Kinyan is effected in the] bridal chamber also
presents no difficulty. Since, usually, the
bridal chamber is a prelude to22 intercourse
he taught us that it was proper that [it should
be entered] at night.
R. Ashi enquired: What is the law23
where [a
bride] entering the bridal chamber became
menstruous?24 If you should find [some
reason] for saying that it is the affectionate
attachment in the bridal chamber that effects
the Kinyan25 [the question still remains
whether this applies only to] a bridal
chamber that is a prelude26 to intercourse but
not to a bridal chamber that is no prelude to
intercourse,27 or is there perhaps no
difference?28 — This remains unanswered.
R. JUDAH SAID: IF [A HUSBAND]
WISHES HE MAY WRITE OUT FOR A
VIRGIN, etc. Does R. Judah hold the opinion
that a quittance is written?29 Surely we
learned: If a person repaid part of his debt,
R. Judah said, he30 must exchange [the bond
for another].31 R. Jose said: He32 must write
a quittance for him!33 — R. Jeremiah
replied: [Here it is a case] where the
quittance is [written] within.34 Abaye replied:
You may even say [that here it is a case]
where the quittance is not written within.35
There36 it is quite correct37 [to disallow the
use of a quittance, since the debtor] had
undoubtedly repaid him38 and it is possible
that the quittance might be lost and that he38
would produce the bond and thus collect [the
paid portion of the debt] a second time.
Here,39 however, did he indeed give her
anything?40 It is a mere statement that she
addressed to him.41 If, then, he preserved [the
quittance] well and good;42 and if he did not
preserve it, well, it is he himself who is the
cause of his own loss. One can well
understand why Abaye did not give the
explanation as R. Jeremiah, since it was not
stated43 that the quittance was entered
within,44 but why did not R. Jeremiah give
the same explanation as Abaye? — The
quittance here45 is forbidden as a preventive
measure against the [erroneous permitting
of] a quittance elsewhere.46
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
7
The reason [for the husband's exemption47 is
apparently] because she gave him a quittance
in writing.48 If, however, [she had
surrendered a portion of her Kethubah] by
word of mouth only [he would] not [have
been exempt];49 but why? This,45 surely, is a
monetary matter, and R. Judah was heard to
rule that in a monetary matter one's
stipulation50 is valid. For was it not taught: If
a man said to a woman, 'Behold thou art
consecrated unto me51 on condition that thou
shalt have no [claim] upon me [for] food,
raiment or conjugal rights', she is
consecrated,52 but the stipulation is null;53 so
R. Meir. R. Judah, however, said: In respect
of monetary matters his stipulation is
valid?54 —
R. Judah is of the opinion that the Kethubah
is a Rabbinical enactment,55 and the Sages56
have applied to their enactments57 higher
restrictions than to those of the Torah.58 But
what of the case of usufruct59 which is a
Rabbinical law and the Rabbis nevertheless
did not apply any restriction to it;60 for we
learned: R. Judah said, He61 may for all time
eat the fruit of the fruit62 unless he wrote out
for her [the undertaking], 'I have no claim
whatsoever63 upon your estates and their
produce and the produce of their produce for
ever';64
1. Rah and R. Nathan.
2. I.e., that it was in agreement with R. Eleazar
b. Azariah.
3. Cf. preceding note, mutatis mutandis.
4. The statement supra against R. Eleazar b.
Azariah.
5. In promising his bride an additional sum in
her Kethubah.
6. Between him and his bride.
7. Even though no marriage has taken place.
The woman is, therefore, entitled to the full
sum she had been promised. Hence the
statement (which has been ascribed to Rab)
against the ruling of R. Eleazar b. Azariah.
8. Following the reading of Ber. 30b BaH adds
'the Bible teacher'.
9. [I.e., Go teach the Bible to children instead of
venturing into the realms of the Halachah.
Bible instructions were given in a place
'outside' the academy].
10. Rab (v. Rashi) or Rabbi, i.e., R. Judah the
Patriarch (v. Tosaf. a.l. s.v. [H]). According to
Tosaf, the speaker here was the first R. Isaac
b. Abdimi who was a disciple of Rabbi (cf.
Shab. 4ob) and a teacher of Rab (cf. B.B. 87a
and Hul. 110a).
11. According to R. Eleazar b. Azariah's views in
our Mishnah.
12. V. Glos. The legal and final union that may be
regarded as marriage.
13. Huppah v. Glos. And the bride is
consequently entitled to the full amount of the
statutory, and the additional Kethubah.
14. And since this has not taken place the bride
can only claim the statutory minimum.
15. Lit., 'wrote'.
16. Lit., 'there is'.
17. Why then did R. Joseph mention 'night'?
18. In the day time. V. infra 65b, Shab. 86a.
19. R. Joseph. V. supra n. 5.
20. Lit., 'the way of the earth'.
21. V. supra n. 5.
22. Lit., 'stands for'.
23. Is the bride entitled to the additional jointure
of her Kethubah? Cf. supra p. 328, n. 9.
24. The bridegroom dying before intercourse had
taken place. Intercourse with a menstruant is
Pentateuchally forbidden. (Cf. Lev. XVIII,
19).
25. Cf. supra p. 328, n. 10.
26. Lit., 'suitable'.
27. Cf. p. 329, n. 12. The bride would
consequently have no claim upon the
additional sum she was promised.
28. The bride being entitled in either case to the
full amount.
29. By a creditor to whom part of a debt was
repaid; and consequently there is no need to
exchange the bond for one in which the
balance only is entered.
30. The creditor.
31. In which only the balance of the original debt
is entered while the first bond is destroyed.
The debtor cannot be compelled to accept a
quittance which he would have 'to guard from
mice' and the loss of which might involve him
in a claim for the repayment of the full loan. It
is more equitable that the creditor should
change the bond.
32. The creditor.
33. B.B. 170b. Such a course is advantageous to
the creditor, since a bond entitles its holder to
seize any real estate which the debtor has sold
or mortgaged after, but not before the date of
his bond. Were a new bond for the balance to
be written, the creditor would lose his right to
seize any of the debtor's property that was
sold or mortgaged between the date of the
original bond and that of the new one. In the
opinion of R. Jose the rights of the creditor
must not be impaired, while in the opinion of
R Judah equity demands that the debtor be
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
8
not encumbered with the necessity of taking
care of the quittance (cf. supra n. 6). How then
could it be stated here that R. Judah allowed
the writing of a quittance?
34. I.e., is entered on the Kethubah itself, so that
the husband, unlike the debtor spoken of in
B.B., has no need to preserve any document.
35. Cf. supra n. 9.
36. The case of the payment of the part of a debt.
37. For R. Judah.
38. The creditor.
39. In our Mishnah.
40. So MS.M. reading [H].
41. She received no money at all from her
husband.
42. Lit., 'he preserved it'.
43. In our Mishnah.
44. V. supra p. 330, n. 9.
45. The case of the Kethubah.
46. A debt, for instance, where R. Judah does not
allow it (cf. supra p. 330, n. 6).
47. From the payment of the part of the Kethubah
which his wife has surrendered (v. our
Mishnah).
48. Lit., 'she wrote for him'.
49. Since our Mishnah speaks of writing.
50. Even though it deprives a person from a right
to which he is Pentateuchally entitled.
51. The formula of marriage used by the
bridegroom is, 'Behold thou art consecrated
unto me by this ring according to the law of
Moses and Israel'.
52. Becomes his lawful wife.
53. Since it is contrary to the law of the Torah.
Cf. Ex. XXI, 10.
54. B.M 51a, 94a, B.B. 226b
55. Not Pentateuchal.
56. Sc. the Rabbis.
57. In order to prevent laxity.
58. The laws of the Torah, being universally
respected, required no such additional
restrictions.
59. Melog property (v. Glos.) to the fruit of which
a husband is entitled during his lifetime while
the property itself remains the possession of
his wife.
60. A husband being allowed to surrender his
right to the usufruct.
61. A husband who renounced his claim to the
fruit of Melog property.
62. The fruit produced by lands that were
purchased out of the proceeds of the fruit of
the original property.
63. Lit., 'judgment and words'.
64. Infra 83a.
Kethuboth 56b
and it had been established that by 'writing'1
only saying was meant!2 — Abaye replied:
All [married women] have a Kethubah; not
all, however, have fruit. In respect of what is
usual the Rabbis have applied restrictions. In
respect of what is not usual, however, the
Rabbis have made no restrictions.
But what of the case of ass-drivers3 which is
a common occurrence and the Rabbis have
nevertheless applied no restrictions to it; for
we learned: Where ass-drivers entered a
town and one of them declared, 'My
[produce] is new and that of my fellow is old'
or 'Mine is not fit for use4 but that of my
fellow is fit', they are not believed; but R.
Judah said, They are believed!5 — Abaye
replied: To any Rabbinical enactment of an
absolute character6 the Rabbis have applied
further restrictions, but to any Rabbinical
enactment of uncertain origin7 the Rabbis
have added no further restrictions. Raba
replied: They8 relaxed the law in respect of
demai.9
R. MEIR RULED … ANY MAN WHO …
GIVE … LESS, etc. The expression,
'WHO … GIVE … LESS' [implies]10 even [if
the assignment remained a mere]
stipulation.11 Thus it follows that he12 is of
the opinion that the man's stipulation is void
and that the woman receives [her full
Kethubah];13 yet since14 the man had said to
her15 'You will have but a Maneh',16 her
mind is not at ease17 and his intercourse is
regarded as an act of prostitution.18 But,
surely, R. Meir was heard to rule that any
stipulation19 which is contrary to what is
written in the Torah is20 null and void, [from
which it may be inferred,21 may it not, that if
it is] but against a law of the Rabbis it is20
valid?22 — R. Meir holds the view that the
Kethubah is a Pentateuchal institution.
It was taught: R. Meir ruled, If any man
assigns to a virgin23 a sum less than two
hundred Zuz or to a widow less than a Maneh
his marriage is regarded as24 an act of
prostitution. R. Jose ruled: One is permitted
[to contract such a marriage].25 R. Judah
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
9
ruled: If the man wished he may write out for
a virgin a bond for two hundred Zuz while
she writes26 for him, 'I have received from
you a Maneh'; and [he may write a bond] for
a widow for a Maneh while she writes26 for
him, 'I have received from you fifty Zuz'.27
Is R. Jose then of the opinion that 'one is
permitted [to contract such a marriage]'?28
This surely is contrary [to the following:] A
woman's Kethubah may not be made [a
charge on] movable property as a social
measure.29 Said R. Jose: What social measure
is this?30 Their31 price, surely, is not fixed
and they deteriorate in value.32 Now, did not
the first Tanna also say that [a Kethubah]
may not be made [a charge on movable
property]?33 Must he34 not, consequently,
have meant to say: This35 applies only where
he36 accepted no responsibility;37 but where
he accepted responsibility37 [the Kethubah]
may be made [a charge upon them].38
Thereupon came R. Jose to question: Even If
he36 did accept responsibility how [could the
Kethubah be] made [a charge upon them]39
when their price, surely, is not fixed and they
deteriorate in value.40 Now, if there,41 where
the diminution in value [of the movables] is
only a possibility,42 R. Jose provides against
it, would he not even more so [adopt a similar
course] here43 where the diminution [of the
Kethubah] is a certainty? — How now!
There44 she did not know it45 to think of
surrendering her rights;46 but here she was
well aware [of the fact]47 and has definitely
surrendered her rights.
The sister of Rami b. Hama was married to
R. Iwia
1. In R. Judah's statement.
2. Lit., 'what writes? says'. Which proves that,
according to R. Judah no restrictions were
made even in the case of a Rabbinical law.
3. About whose imported produce it is uncertain
whether it has been tithed (v. Glos. s.v.
Demai). Such produce is only Rabbinically
forbidden.
4. I.e., it had not been duly tithed.
5. Demai IV, 7, v. supra p. 131 notes. Which
shows that, according to R. Judah, no
restriction was imposed even on a
Rabbinically forbidden produce. (Cf. supra
note 8).
6. Lit., 'a certainty of their words'.
7. As in the case of Demai where the prohibition
is due to the uncertainty whether or not the
produce had been tithed.
8. The Rabbis, though they applied restriction
even in cases where their prohibition was due
merely to an uncertainty.
9. V. Glos. The uncertainty here is so great, since
most people even among the 'Amme ha-'arez
(v. Glos. s.v. 'Am ha-'arez) do give tithe, that
no restrictions were applied to it.
10. Since the expression used is not 'if the virgin
received less'.
11. While the woman in fact receives the full
amount of her Kethubah.
12. R. Meir.
13. Cf. supra n. 2. Lit., 'and there is to her'.
14. [Lit., 'and since'. The text is not smooth.
MS.M. preserves a better reading 'but since
she had (a full Kethubah) what is the reason
(of R. Meir)?' — Since he said to her, etc.].
15. The virgin who is entitled to two hundred Zuz.
16. One hundred Zuz (v. Glos.).
17. [Lit., 'her mind does not rest, rely upon', i.e.,
she contracted her marriage on the
expectation of a Kethubah of a smaller amount
than the prescribed minimum.]
18. [Since the marriage was not performed in
accordance with the requirements of the law,
it is regarded as an act of prostitution.]
19. Lit., 'whoever makes a stipulation'.
20. Lit., 'his stipulation'.
21. Since he mentions the Torah only.
22. As a Kethubah is an enactment of the Rabbis
(v. R. Judah's view supra 56a), why is the
stipulation void?
23. As her Kethubah.
24. Lit., 'behold this'.
25. The stipulation being valid even if the
woman's surrender of her right was only
verbal.
26. Contrary to the opinion of R. Jose, R. Judah
maintains that a verbal stipulation or
undertaking against a Rabbinical measure is
of no validity.
27. Half a Maneh.
28. I.e., one where the Kethubah amounts to less
than the prescribed minimum.
29. Lit., 'because of making the world right'.
Movable objects may be easily lost and do not
provide a reliable security for the Kethubah.
30. Lit., 'there is in this'.
31. Movable objects.
32. While a Kethubah must always amount to a
legally fixed minimum.
33. Wherein, then, does R. Jose differ from him?
34. The first Tanna.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
10
35. That movable property provides no security
for a Kethubah.
36. The husband.
37. For the loss of the movable property.
38. The possibility of deterioration in value being
disregarded by the first Tanna.
39. Movable objects.
40. R. Jose is consequently of the opinion that it is
not only against loss but also against a
diminution in value that provision must be
made.
41. Where movable objects are assigned as a
security.
42. Lit., 'perhaps they diminish'.
43. Where the husband definitely assigned no
more than half of the legal maximum.
44. V. supra note 14.
45. That the value would be diminished.
46. Lit., 'that she shall forgive' or 'surrender'.
47. That her husband has contracted for a sum
less than her due.
Kethuboth 57a
and her Kethubah1 was lost. When they came
before R. Joseph2 he said to them, Thus said
Rab Judah in the name of Samuel: This3 is
the opinion of R. Meir,4 but the Sages ruled
that a man may live with his wife without a
Kethubah for two or three years.5 Said Abaye
to him:6 But did not R. Nahman state in the
name of Samuel that the Halachah is in
agreement with R. Meir in his preventive
measures?7 — If so, [the other replied] go
and write one8 for her.
When R. Dimi came9 he stated in the name of
R. Simeon b. Pazzi in the name of R. Joshua
b. Levi who had it from Bar Kappara: The
dispute10 refers to the beginning,11 but at the
end11 she cannot, according to the opinion of
all, surrender12 [any portion of her
Kethubah].13 R. Johanan, however stated that
their dispute extended to both cases.14 Said R.
Abbahu: [The following] was explained to me
by R. Johanan: 'I and R. Joshua b. Levi do
not dispute with one another. The
"beginning" of which R. Joshua b. Levi
spoke means15 the beginning of [the meeting
in] the bridal chamber, and by the "end" was
meant15 the termination of the intercourse;16
and when I stated that the dispute extended
to both cases [I meant] the beginning [of the
meeting in] the bridal chamber and the end
of that meeting which is the beginning of the
intercourse.'17
When Rabin came18 he stated in the name of
R. Simeon b. Pazzi in the name of R. Joshua
b. Levi who had it from Bar Kappara. The
dispute refers only to the end, but at the
beginning she may, so is the opinion of all,
renounce19 [any portion of her Kethubah].20
R. Johanan, however, stated that their
dispute extended to both cases. Said R.
Abbahu: This was explained to me by R.
Johanan: 'I and R. Joshua b. Levi do not
dispute with one another. The "end" of
which R. Joshua b. Levi spoke meant the end
of [the meeting in] the bridal chamber, and
by the "beginning" was meant the beginning
of [the meeting in] the bridal chamber; and
when I stated that the dispute extended to
both cases [I meant] the beginning,21 and the
termination of the intercourse.'
Said R. Papa: Had not R. Abbahu stated,
'This was explained to me by R. Johanan: "I
and R. Joshua b. Levi do not dispute with one
another"' I would have submitted that R.
Johanan and R. Joshua b. Levi were in
dispute while R. Dimi and Rabin22 were not
in dispute. The 'end' of which Rabin spoke
might mean23 the end of [the meeting in] the
bridal chamber, and the 'beginning' of which
R. Dimi spoke might mean23 the beginning of
the intercourse.21 What does he24 teach us
thereby?25 — It is this that he teaches us: [It
is preferable to assume]26 that two Amoraim
differ in their own opinions27 rather than that
two Amoraim should differ as to what was
the view of another Amora.28
MISHNAH. A VIRGIN IS ALLOWED TWELVE
MONTHS FROM THE [TIME HER INTENDED]
HUSBAND CLAIMED HER,29 [IN WHICH] TO
PREPARE HER MARRIAGE OUTFIT.30 AND,
AS [SUCH A PERIOD] IS ALLOWED FOR THE
WOMAN, SO IS IT ALLOWED FOR THE MAN
FOR HIS OUTFIT.31 FOR A WIDOW32 THIRTY
DAYS [ARE ALLOWED]. IF THE
RESPECTIVE PERIODS EXPIRED33 AND
THEY WERE NOT MARRIED34 THEY35 ARE
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
11
ENTITLED TO MAINTENANCE OUT OF THE
MAN'S ESTATE36 AND [IF HE IS A PRIEST]
MAY ALSO EAT TERUMAH. R. TARFON
SAID: ALL [THE SUSTENANCE] FOR SUCH A
WOMAN MAY BE GIVEN OF TERUMAH.37 R.
AKIBA SAID: ONE HALF OF
UNCONSECRATED FOOD38 AND ONE HALF
OF TERUMAH.39 A LEVIR40 [WHO IS A
PRIEST] DOES NOT CONFER [UPON HIS
SISTER-IN-LAW]41 THE RIGHT OF EATING
TERUMAH.42 IF SHE43 HAD SPENT SIX
MONTHS44 WITH45 HER HUSBAND AND SIX
MONTHS WITH45 THE LEVIR,46 OR EVEN [IF
SHE SPENT] ALL OF THEM47 WITH HER
HUSBAND LESS ONE DAY WITH45 THE
LEVIR,46 OR ALL OF THEM47 WITH45 THE
LEVIR46 LESS ONE DAY WITH HER
HUSBAND,48 SHE IS NOT PERMITTED TO
EAT TERUMAH.49 THIS50 [WAS THE RULING
ACCORDING TO] AN EARLIER51 MISHNAH.52
THE COURT, HOWEVER, THAT
SUCCEEDED53 RULED:
1. I.e., the written marriage contract. V. Glos.
2. To obtain his ruling on the question whether
she may continue to live with her husband
without the Kethubah.
3. That living with a wife whose Kethubah is less
than the prescribed minimum, and much
more so with one who has no Kethubah at all,
is regarded as mere prostitution, even though
the woman remained legally entitled to collect
the full amount of her Kethubah.
4. Who holds that since the woman is not
absolutely certain that she will obtain the full
amount of her Kethubah (either in the case,
supra, because she believes the man's
stipulation to be valid or, in this case, because
she has no document to prove her claim) it
can only be regarded as an act of prostitution
(v. supra p. 333, n. 8).
5. I.e., for any length of time. V. Tosaf. s.v. [H]
a.l.
6. R. Joseph.
7. The Rabbinical restrictions he added to those
of the Torah.
8. A new marriage contract.
9. From Palestine to Babylon.
10. Between R. Judah and R. Jose on the question
whether a verbal renouncement of the woman
is valid (supra 56b).
11. This is explained infra.
12. By a mere verbal statement.
13. Since she has already acquired it. Only by
means of a written quittance may her rights
then be surrendered.
14. I.e., to the 'beginning' and 'end'.
15. Lit., 'what'.
16. R. Judah and R. Jose dispute only in respect
of the period between the beginning and the
conclusion of the meeting in the bridal
chamber but agree that after intercourse the
man's stipulation is invalid unless the woman
has surrendered her rights in writing. It was,
therefore, quite correct for R. Joshua b. Levi
to state that 'at the end (i.e., of the
intercourse), she cannot, according to the
opinion of all, surrender (i.e., verbally) any
part of her Kethubah'.
17. To which the dispute indeed refers (cf. supra
p. 335, n. 14).
18. From Palestine to Babylon.
19. V. Supra p. 335, nn. 8-10.
20. Since she has not yet legally acquired it.
21. Which corresponds to the termination of the
meeting in the bridal chamber.
22. Whose reports appear contradictory.
23. Lit., 'what'.
24. R. Papa.
25. In view of R. Abbahu's definite statement R.
Papa's remark seems pointless.
26. Unless there is proof to the contrary.
27. It is natural and legitimate for opinions to
differ.
28. In which case one of the two must be
definitely wrong since the view of the Amora
which both of them claim to represent could
not possibly have agreed with what both of
them submit. Had not R. Abbahu's statement
been authoritative, coming as it did from R.
Johanan himself, R. Papa's submission would
have been preferred to his.
29. After their betrothal.
30. Jewels and similar ornaments (v. Rashi).
31. The preparations for the wedding dinner and
the bridal chamber (v. ibid.).
32. Who is presumed to be in the possession of
some trinkets and jewelry from her first
marriage.
33. Lit., 'the time arrived'.
34. Owing to the man's delay (v. supra 2b).
35. The women.
36. Lit., 'they eat of his'.
37. Out of the proceeds of which she may buy
unconsecrated food for consumption during
the days of her Levitical uncleanness.
38. For consumption during her period of
uncleanness.
39. For her use in her clean state.
40. [H], the brother of a deceased childless
husband, whose duty it is to marry the widow.
41. Who became a widow while still betrothed.
42. Prior to their marriage (v. supra n. 12).
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
12
43. As a betrothed virgin.
44. Of the period of twelve months that is granted
to her.
45. Lit., 'in the presence of'.
46. I.e., in awaiting his marriage.
47. The twelve months.
48. [Isaiah Trani preserves a better reading, 'even
if (she spent) all of them with the husband,
less one day, or all of them with the levir].
49. By virtue of her husband whose obligation to
maintain her does not begin until the end of
the twelve months, and even then terminates
with his death.
50. That after THE RESPECTIVE PERIODS
EXPIRED … THEY ARE ENTITLED …
EAT TERUMAH.
51. Lit., 'first'.
52. Cf. Sanh. Sonc. ed. p. 163, n. 7.
53. The authors of the earlier Mishnah.
Kethuboth 57b
A WOMAN1 MAY NOT EAT TERUMAH UNTIL
SHE HAS ENTERED THE BRIDAL
CHAMBER.2
GEMARA. Whence is this3 derived? — R.
Hisda replied: From Scripture which states,
And her brother and her mother said: 'Let
the damsel abide with us Yamim,4 at the least
ten.5 Now, what could be meant by Yamim?
If it be suggested 'two days',6 do people, [it
might be retorted,] speak in such a manner?
[If when] they suggested to him7 two days he
said no, would they then suggest ten days?
Yamim must consequently mean8 a year, for
it is written, Yamim9 shall he have the right
of redemption.10 But might it not be said
[that Yamim means] a month,11 for it is
written, But a month of Yamim?12 —
I will tell you: [The meaning of] an undefined
[expression of] Yamim may well be inferred
from another undefined expression of
Yamim, but no undefined expression of
Yamim may be inferred from one in
connection with which month was specifically
mentioned.
R. Zera stated that a Tanna taught: In the
case of a minor,13 either she herself or her
father is empowered to postpone14 [her
marriage].15 One can well understand why
she is empowered to postpone [the marriage],
but [why also her] father? If she is satisfied,
what matters it to her father? — He might
think this: Now she does not realize [what
marriage implies] but to-morrow16 she will
rebel [against her husband], leave him and
come back to, and fall [a burden] upon me.17
R. Abba b. Levi stated: No arrangements
may be made for marrying a minor while she
is still in her minority. Arrangements18 may,
however, be made while she is a minor for
marrying her when she becomes of age. Is not
this obvious? — It might have been suggested
that [this should not be allowed] as a
precaution against the possibility of her
beginning to feel anxiety at once19 and so
becoming ill. Hence we were taught [that no
such possibility need be considered].
R. Huna stated: If on the day she became
adolescent20 she was betrothed, she is allowed
thirty days21 like a widow.22 An objection was
raised: One who has attained adolescence is
like one who has been claimed [by her
intended husband in marriage]. Does not this
imply, 'Like a Virgin who was claimed'?23 —
No, like a widow who was claimed.
Come and hear: If a woman who is
adolescent had waited for twelve months24
her husband, said R. Eliezer, since he is liable
for her maintenance, may also annul [her
vows]!25 — Read: A woman who is
adolescent26 or one27 who waited twelve
months.28
Come and hear: If a man betrothed a virgin,
whether he29 claimed her and she held back
or whether she claimed him and he29 held
back, she is allowed twelve months30 from the
time of the claim but not from the time of the
betrothal; and one who is adolescent is like
one who has been claimed. How [is this to be
understood]? If she was betrothed on the day
she became adolescent,31 she is allowed
twelve months; while one betrothed [is
sometimes allowed] thirty days.32 Is not this a
refutation against R. Huna? — It is a
refutation.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
13
What [was meant by] 'while one betrothed [is
sometimes allowed] thirty days'? — R. Papa
replied, It is this that was meant: If an
adolescent woman was betrothed after twelve
months of her adolescence have elapsed, she
is allowed30 thirty days like a widow. IF THE
RESPECTIVE PERIODS EXPIRED AND
THEY WERE NOT MARRIED. 'Ulla stated:
The daughter of an Israelite who is betrothed
[to a priest] is, according to Pentateuchal law,
permitted to eat Terumah, for it is written In
Scripture, But if a priest buy any soul, the
purchase of his money,33 and that [woman]
also is the purchase of his money.34 What
then is the reason why [the Rabbis] ruled that
she is not permitted to eat [Terumah]?
Because it might happen that when a cup [of
Terumah] will be offered35 to her in the house
of her father she might give her brother or
sister36 to drink [from it]. If so, [the same
reason should apply] also where THE
RESPECTIVE PERIODS EXPIRED AND
THEY WERE NOT MARRIED! — In that
case37 he appoints for her a special place.38
Now then, no [hired harvest] gleaner39
[working] for an Israelite should be allowed
to eat Terumah, since it is possible that [the
household of the Israelite] would come to eat
with him! If40 they feed him from their own
[victuals], Would they eat of his?41
R. Samuel son of Rab42 Judah explained:43
Owing to a bodily defect44 [that might
subsequently be detected].45 lf so, [should not
the same reason] also [be applicable to a
woman who] had entered the bridal
chamber, but intercourse with whom did not
take place?46 — In that case47 he arranges for
her to be first examined and only then takes
her in.48 Now then, the slave of a priest,49
bought from an Israelite, should not be
allowed to eat Terumah on account of a
bodily defect44 [that might be discovered]!50
— [The law of cancellation of a sale owing to
a subsequent detection of a] bodily defect44
does not apply to slaves. For if the defect is
external [the buyer] has presumably seen it;51
and if it is internal, since [the buyer] requires
[the slave] for work only he does not mind a
private defect.52 Were [the slave] to be found
to have been a thief or
1. Who is not the daughter of a priest.
2. Huppah, v. Glos.
3. Lit., 'whence these words', that A VIRGIN IS
ALLOWED TWELVE MONTHS.
4. [H], E.V., a few days.
5. Gen. XXIV, 55, referring to the period the
relatives of Rebekah wished her to remain
with them after consenting to her marriage
with Isaac.
6. The minimum of the plural.
7. Abraham's servant.
8. Lit., 'but what'.
9. E.V., for a full year.
10. Lev. XXV, 29. As here Yamim means 'a year'
so it does in Gen. XXIV, 55, while [H] means
'ten months'.
11. And [H], 'ten days'.
12. Num. XI, 20. E.V. a full month.
13. Who was claimed by the man who betrothed
her.
14. Lit., 'prevent'.
15. Beyond the period given in our Mishnah; until
she is of age. V. Tosef. Keth. V.
16. After the marriage, when she finds her
connubial duties distasteful.
17. He would then have to provide for her a new
marriage outfit (v. Rashi). It is the privilege of
a minor to leave her husband at any moment
by the mere making of a formal declaration
that she does not like him (v. Glos. s.v. Mi'un).
18. Without legal betrothal.
19. Lit., 'bring in fear from now'.
20. A Bogereth (v. Glos.). Lit., 'she became
adolescent one day'.
21. In which to prepare her marriage outfit.
22. Not the longer period of twelve months. It is
assumed that on approaching adolescence a
woman begins to prepare her marriage outfit,
and the shorter period of one month is
regarded as sufficient for completing it.
23. Who (v. our Mishnah) is allowed a period of
twelve months!
24. From the time she was claimed by the man
who betrothed her.
25. Ned. 70b, 73b. There is no need for her father
to consent to the annulment. (Cf. Num. XXX,
4ff). From here it follows that even one who is
adolescent is not entitled to maintenance until
after the expiry of twelve months, which is an
objection against R. Huna.
26. Who waited thirty days.
27. A Na'arah (v. Glos.).
28. The difference between the two readings is
represented in the original by the addition of
a mere waw.
29. Lit., 'the (intended) husband'.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
14
30. For the preparation of her outfit.
31. Lit., 'she became of age one day'.
32. V. infra for further explanation.
33. Lev. XXII, 11. The conclusion of the verse is
he may eat of it, i.e., of Terumah.
34. The money, or the object of value, which the
man gives to the woman as her token of
betrothal, and whereby she is acquired as his
wife.
35. Rt. [H] lit., 'to mix', sc. wine with water or
spices.
36. Who are Israelites to whom the eating or
drinking of Terumah is forbidden.
37. Lit., 'there', where the priest is legally liable to
maintain her.
38. Away from her father's household; thus
preventing her from giving away his victuals
to her relatives.
39. Who is a priest.
40. Lit., 'now'.
41. Obviously not. Hence the permissibility for
the gleaner to eat his Terumah.
42. Wanting in MS.M.
43. The reason why the daughter of an Israelite
who was betrothed to a priest is not permitted
to eat Terumah before the time her husband
becomes liable to maintain her.
44. [H] 'an implied condition the non-fulfillment
of which annuls the agreement', whence 'a
bodily defect … not stated in the contract'
(Jast.) Cf. [G].
45. In the woman. This might be discovered
before the marriage and, as a result, the
betrothal would be annulled retrospectively.
46. In this case also, should a bodily defect be
discovered before the consummation of the
marriage the betrothal would be annulled
retrospectively. Why then does our Mishnah
permit the eating of Terumah in such a case?
47. Lit., there'.
48. Into the bridal chamber. After entering into
the chamber it may be safely assumed that he
has satisfied himself that she was not suffering
from any bodily defects.
49. Who eats Terumah by virtue of being the slave
of a priest.
50. And that would retrospectively annul the
purchase. The slave would consequently
retain the status of an Israelite's slave to
whom the eating of Terumah was all the time
forbidden.
51. And since he nevertheless consented to the
purchase he must have been content to
overlook it.
52. The sale, therefore, cannot thereby be
annulled.
Kethuboth 58a
a gambler1 the sale is still valid.2 What else is
there?3 [Only that the slave might be found
to have been] an armed robber or one
proscribed by the government;4 but such
characters are generally known.5
Consider! Whether according to the
[explanation of the one] Master6 or
according to that of the other Master7 she8 is
not permitted to eat [Terumah], what then is
the practical difference between them? —
The difference between them [is the case
where her intended husband] accepted [her
defects,9 or where her father] delivered [her
to the intended husband's agents]10 or went11
[with them].10
R. TARFON SAID: ALL [THE
SUSTENANCE] FOR SUCH A WOMAN
MAY BE GIVEN OF TERUMAH, etc. Abaye
stated: The dispute12 applies only to the
daughter of a priest13 who was betrothed to a
priest but with respect to the daughter of an
Israelite14 who was betrothed to a priest all15
agree [that she is supplied with] one half of
unconsecrated food16 and one half of
Terumah.
Abaye further stated: Their dispute12 relates
to one who17 was only betrothed,18 but in
respect of a married woman19 all15 agree
[that she is supplied with] one half of
unconsecrated food20 and one half of
Terumah.20 So it was also taught: R. Tarfon
said, All [the sustenance] for such a woman is
given of Terumah. R. Akiba said, One half of
consecrated food and one half of Terumah —
This21 applies only to the daughter of a priest
who was betrothed to a priest, but with
respect to the daughter of an Israelite who
was betrothed to a priest all22 agree [that she
is supplied with] one half of unconsecrated
food and one half of Terumah. This,21
furthermore, applies only to one who23 was
only betrothed but in respect of a married
woman24 all22 agree [that she is supplied
with] one half of unconsecrated food25 and
one half of Terumah.25
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
15
R. Judah b. Bathyra said, She is supplied
with two thirds26 of Terumah and one third of
unconsecrated food. R. Judah said, All [her
sustenance] is given to her in Terumah27 and
she sells it and purchases unconsecrated food
out of the proceeds.28 R. Simeon b. Gamaliel
said, Wherever Terumah was mentioned29
[the woman] is to be given [a supply equal to]
twice the quantity of unconsecrated
victuals.30 What is the practical difference
between them?31 — The difference between
them [is the question of the woman's]
trouble.32
A LEVIR [WHO IS A PRIEST] DOES NOT
CONFER [UPON HIS SISTER-IN-LAW]
THE RIGHT OF EATING TERUMAH.
What is the reason? — The All-Merciful said,
The purchase of his money33 while she is the
purchase of his brother.34
IF SHE HAD SPENT SIX MONTHS WITH
HER HUSBAND. Now that you stated [that
even if she spent the full twelve months less
one day] WITH THE HUSBAND [she is] not
[permitted to eat Terumah] is there any need
[to mention also] WITH THE LEVIR?35 —
This is a case36 [of anti-climax:]
'This, and there is no need to say that'.37
THIS [WAS THE RULING ACCORDING
TO] AN EARLIER MISHNAH, etc. What is
the reason?38 — 'Ulla, or some say R. Samuel
b. Judah, replied: Owing to a bodily defect
[that might subsequently be detected].39
According to 'Ulla40 one can well understand
[the respective rulings of the earlier,41 and
the later rulings],42 the former41 being due to
the possibility that a cup [of Terumah] might
be offered43 to her in the house of her
father,44 and the latter to [the possibility of]
the detection of a bodily defect.45
1. So Tosaf. s.v. [H], and cf. [G], 'gambler'; [G];
'a crafty person' (contra Rashi's
interpretation, 'kidnapper').
2. Lit., 'he reached him'. Slaves being known to
possess such characters a buyer of a slave is
presumed to have accepted the inevitable.
3. That might be given as a reason for the
cancellation of the sale.
4. Sentenced to death.
5. Lit., 'they have a voice', and the buyer must
have known the circumstances before he
bought him and must have consented to have
him despite his unsavory character.
6. 'Ulla.
7. R. Samuel.
8. The daughter of an Israelite who was
betrothed to a priest.
9. Once he consented to overlook them he cannot
again advance them as a reason for the
annulment of the betrothal. In such a case R.
Samuel's explanation is not applicable while
that of 'Ulla is.
10. Cf. supra 48b. As she does not any longer live
with her father's family 'Ulla's reason does
not apply while that of R. Samuel does.
11. Himself or his agents.
12. That of R. Tarfon and R. Akiba.
13. Who is familiar with the restrictions of
Terumah and would, therefore, abstain from
eating it during the days of her Levitical
uncleanness when consecrated food is
forbidden to her.
14. Who may be ignorant of the restrictions
appertaining to Terumah.
15. Even R. Tarfon.
16. For consumption during the days of her
uncleanness.
17. Being the daughter of a priest.
18. Her father with whom she lives during the
period of her betrothal might well be relied
upon that, as a priest, he would duly supervise
her observance of the laws of Terumah and
would, during her uncleanness, himself, or
through her brothers, sell her Terumah and
purchase for her with the proceeds
unconsecrated food.
19. Who does not live with her husband (cf. infra
64b).
20. Being alone she might not be able to arrange
for the sale of her Terumah during her
uncleanness, and might consequently be apt to
consume the consecrated food forbidden to
her.
21. The difference of opinion.
22. V. p. 342, n. 10.
23. Being the daughter of a priest.
24. V. p. 342. n. 14.
25. V. p. 342, n. 15.
26. Lit., 'portions'.
27. But, unlike R. Tarfon who allows only as
much Terumah as if it were unconsecrated
victuals, R. Judah allows a larger quantity of
Terumah (which is cheaper) so that its
proceeds should suffice for the purchase of the
required quantity of ordinary food.
28. Lit., 'money'.
29. In the subject under discussion.
30. Tosef. Keth. V. ab. init.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
16
31. R. Judah and R. Simeon b. Gamaliel.
32. In the selling of her Terumah. It is difficult to
sell Terumah (the buyers of which, being
priests only, are naturally few) and it must be
offered at a very low price. To save the
woman trouble R. Gamaliel allows her
Terumah double the quantity of
unconsecrated victuals so that by reducing the
price of the former by a half she would easily
dispose of it and be able to acquire with the
proceeds her required ordinary victuals. R.
Judah, however, makes no provision for
saving her trouble, and allows her only a
slight margin of Terumah above that of
ordinary food estimated at the current prices.
33. Lev. XXII, 11, v. also supra p. 340, n. 5; only
such may eat Terumah.
34. She does not become his own wife before he
acquired her through the levirate marriage.
35. I.e., OR ALL OF THEM WITH THE LEVIR
LESS ONE DAY WITH HER HUSBAND,
etc. If when one day only of the twelve months
was not spent with the husband she does not
acquire the privilege of eating Terumah, how
much less would such a privilege be acquired
when all the period less one day was not spent
with the husband!
36. Lit., 'he taught'.
37. Lit., 'this, and he need not tell this'.
38. Of the later Beth Din.
39. V. supra p. 341, nn. 3-4.
40. Who (supra 75b) gave as the reason for the
ruling of the earlier Mishnah that the woman
might allow her relatives to drink of her cup
of Terumah.
41. Forbidding Terumah during the first twelve
months also permitting it after the expiration
of that period.
42. Which extends the prohibition until the entry
into the bridal chamber.
43. V. supra p. 340, n. 6.
44. And she might allow her relatives to drink
from it (v. supra note 6). As this would not
happen after the twelve months when the
intended husband, becoming liable for her
maintenance and desirous of preventing her
from giving away his victuals to her relatives
in her father's house, provides for her an
abode of her own, the woman was permitted
to eat Terumah.
45. V. supra p. 341, n. 3. Hence the extension of
the prohibition until the entry into the bridal
chamber.
Kethuboth 58b
According to R. Samuel b. Judah, however,
the earlier [ruling of the] Mishnah is due to
[the possible detection of] a bodily defect and
the later is also due to [the possible detection
of] a bodily defect, what then is [the reason
for] their difference? — [The principle
underlying] the difference is the [efficacy of
an] examination by outsiders. One Master1 is
of the opinion that an examination by others2
is regarded as effective,3 while the other
Master4 holds the opinion that an
examination by others is not regarded as
effective.5
MISHNAH. IF A MAN CONSECRATED HIS
WIFE'S HANDIWORK,6 SHE MAY
NEVERTHELESS CONTINUE TO WORK AND
TO CONSUME [THE PROCEEDS HERSELF].7
[IF, HOWEVER, HE CONSECRATED] THE
SURPLUS8 [ONLY]. R. MEIR RULED: IT IS
DULY CONSECRATED.9 R. JOHANAN HA-
SANDELAR RULED: IT REMAINS
UNCONSECRATED.9
GEMARA. R. Huna stated in the name of
Rab:10 A woman is entitled to say to her
husband, 'I do not wish either to be
maintained by you or to work for you'. He
holds the opinion that when the Rabbis
regulated [the relations of husband and wife]
her maintenance was fundamental11 while
[the assignment of the proceeds of] her
handiwork [to her husband] was due [only to
their desire for preventing] ill-feeling.12 If,
therefore, she said, 'I do not wish either to be
maintained by you or to work for you', she is
entitled to do so.13
An objection was raised: Maintenance [for a
wife] was provided in return for her
handiwork!14 — Read: Her handiwork was
assigned [to her husband] in return for her
maintenance.
May it be suggested that [our Mishnah]
provides support for his15 view? [It stated,]
IF A MAN CONSECRATED HIS WIFE'S
HANDIWORK SHE MAY
NEVERTHELESS CONTINUE TO WORK
AND TO CONSUME [THE PROCEEDS
HERSELF]. Does not [this refer to a wife for
whom her husband is able16 to] provide
maintenance?17 — No; [it is a case where the
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
17
husband is unable to] provide her
maintenance. If, however, [her husband is
unable to] provide her maintenance, what
need was there to state [such an obvious
case]?18 Even according to him who holds
that a master has the right to say to his slave,
'Work for me but I will not maintain you,'19
such a rule applies only to a Canaanite slave
concerning whom Scripture has not written
'with thee', but not to a Hebrew slave
concerning whom it is written in Scripture.
With thee,20 how much less then [would this
apply to] his wife?21 — It22 was necessary [as
an introduction to] the final clause: [IF,
HOWEVER, HE CONSECRATED] THE
SURPLUS [ONLY]. R. MEIR RULED: IT IS
DULY CONSECRATED.23 R. JOHANAN
HA-SANDELAR RULED: IT REMAINS
UNCONSECRATED.
Now [R. Huna's ruling] is in disagreement
with that of Resh Lakish. For Resh Lakish
stated: You must not assume that R. Meir's
reason24 is because he is of the opinion that a
man may consecrate that which has not yet
come into existence25 but this is R. Meir's
reason: Since [a husband] has the right to
compel her to work, his consecration is
regarded as if he had said to her, 'May your
hands26 be consecrated to Him who created
them'. But, surely, he27 did not use such an
expression!28 —
Since R. Meir was heard to state that a man
does not utter his words to no purpose,29 [the
expression the husband used here]30 may be
regarded as if he had actually said to her,
'May your hands be consecrated to Him who
created them'. But is R. Meir of the opinion
that a man cannot consecrate anything that is
not yet in existence? Surely it was taught: If a
man said to a woman, 'Be thou betrothed
unto me after I shall have become a
proselyte' or 'After thou shalt have become a
proselyte'. 'After I shall have been set free',
'After thou shalt have been set free', 'After
thy husband will have died', 'After thy sister
will have died', or 'After thy brother-in-law
shall have submitted to Halizah31 from thee',
she, R. Meir ruled, is legally betrothed!32 —
From that [Baraitha] the inference33 may
indeed be drawn;34 from this, [our Mishnah],
however, it cannot be inferred.35
[IF, HOWEVER, HE CONSECRATED]
THE SURPLUS [ONLY]. R. MEIR RULED:
IT IS DULY CONSECRATED. When does it
become consecrated? — Both Rab and
Samuel stated: The surplus becomes
consecrated only after [the wife's] death.36 R.
Adda b. Ahabah stated: The surplus is
consecrated while she is still alive.37 [In
considering this statement] R. Papa argued:
In what circumstances?38 If it be suggested:
Where [the husband] allows her
maintenance39 and also allows her40 a silver
Ma'ah41 for her other requirements,42 what
[it may be retorted] is the reason of those
who stated that it 'becomes consecrated only
after [the wife's] death'?43 If, however, it is a
case where [the husband] does not allow her
maintenance and does not allow her a silver
Ma'ah for her other requirements, what [it
may be objected] is the reason of him who
stated that 'it is consecrated while she is still
alive'? — This is a case indeed44 where he
does allow her maintenance; but does not
allow her a silver Ma'ah for her other
requirements. Rab and Samuel are of the
opinion that [the Rabbis] have ordained
1. The author of the earlier Mishnah.
2. Lit., 'outside'. Which the man would naturally
arrange at the expiry of the twelve months
when he becomes liable for her maintenance.
3. I.e., after such an examination a man can no
longer refuse to marry the woman on the
ground of the subsequent detection in her of
some bodily defect. Hence his ruling (v. supra
p. 344. n. 7).
4. I.e., the authorities of the latter ruling.
5. And the man may cancel the engagement.
Hence the prohibition to eat Terumah until
the entry into the bridal chamber when the
man himself has the opportunity of
ascertaining the condition of her body.
6. Which partly belongs to him (v. infra 64b).
7. The reason is given infra.
8. Of the proceeds in excess of the sum required
for her maintenance.
9. The reason is given infra.
10. The Hebrew equivalent of the last five words
is wanting in the corresponding passage in
B.K. 8b.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
18
11. Since a woman cannot always earn sufficient
for her maintenance.
12. Between husband and wife.
13. As the Rabbinical enactment aimed at the
benefit of the woman only, she may well
decline that favor if she is so minded.
14. Which belongs to her husband (supra 47b).
This implies that the assignment of a wife's
handiwork to her husband was the original
provision.
15. R. Huna's.
16. And, indeed, also desires to do so. Cf. Rashi
and Tosaf. s.v. [H].
17. And since he is nevertheless precluded from
consecrating her handiwork it follows, as R.
Huna ruled, that a wife is entitled to refuse
maintenance and to retain her right over her
work.
18. That he has no right to consecrate her
handiwork which does not belong to him!
19. B.K. 87b, supra 43a, Git. 12a.
20. Deut. XV, 16.
21. What need then was there to state the
obvious?
22. The first clause which is indeed self-evident.
23. Though he does not maintain her.
24. For giving a husband the right of consecrating
his wife's handiwork.
25. Such as the woman's work before she has
performed it.
26. Which, of course, were in existence at the time
of the consecration. Thus it has been shown
that according to Resh Lakish it is the opinion
of R. Meir that a husband has the right to
compel his wife to work.
27. The husband.
28. He did not say 'Your hands', but 'Your
handiwork'.
29. V. 'Ar. 5a.
30. Since it would serve no purpose at all in the
form he used it.
31. V. Glos
32. When the respective conditions are fulfilled,
though at the time of the betrothal they were
still unfulfilled (Yeb. 92b, 93b, B.M. 16b). This
then shows that a man can legally dispose
even of that which is not yet in existence.
33. V. n. 7 final clause.
34. Lit., 'yes'.
35. Since the reason may well be the one given
supra by Resh Lakish.
36. When her husband inherits her estate.
37. As soon as it is produced.
38. Could the two opposing views be justified.
39. Whereby he acquires the right to her
earnings.
40. Every week.
41. V. Glos.
42. Whereby he acquires the right to the surplus
of her earnings in excess of the sum required
for her maintenance, cf. infra 64b.
43. Since the husband is entitled to both her
earnings and the surplus the consecration
should take effect even while she is alive.
44. Lit., 'for ever'; 'always'.
Kethuboth 59a
maintenance [for a wife] in return for her
handiwork,1 and a silver Ma'ah2 in return
for the surplus;3 and since the husband does
not give her the silver Ma'ah, the surplus
remains hers.4 R. Adda b. Ahabah, however,
is of the opinion that maintenance was
ordained in return for the surplus,3 and the
silver Ma'ah in return for her handiwork;
and since [the husband] supplies her
maintenance, the surplus is his. On what
principle do they5 differ? — The Masters
hold that the usual6 is for the usual,7 and the
Master holds that the fixed [sum]8 is for the
fixed [quantity].9
An objection was raised: Maintenance [for a
wife] was provided in return for her
handiwork!10 — Read: In return for the
surplus of her handiwork.
Come and hear: If he does not give her a
silver Ma'ah for her other requirements, her
handiwork belongs to her!11 — Read: The
surplus of her handiwork belongs to her. But,
surely, in connection with this statement it
was taught: What [is the quantity of work
that] she12 must do for him?13 The weight of
five Sela's14 of warp in Judea [etc.]!15 — It is
this that was meant: What is the quantity of
work [that she must do] in order that we
might determine how much is her surplus?
The weight of five Sela's of warp in Judea
which is ten Sela's16 in Galilee.
Samuel stated: The Halachah is in agreement
with R. Johanan ha-Sandelar.17 But could
Samuel have made such a statement? Have
we not learned: [If a woman said to her
husband],18 if I do aught for your mouth',19
he20 need not annul her vow.21 R. Akiba,
however, said: He20 must annul it, since she
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
19
might do more work than is due to him.22 R.
Johanan b. Nuri said: He20 must annul her
vow23 since he might happen to divorce her24
and she would [owing to her vow] be
forbidden to return25 to him.26 And Samuel
stated: The Halachah is in agreement with R.
Johanan b. Nuri?27 —
When Samuel stated, 'The Halachah is in
agreement with R. Johanan b. Nuri' [he
referred only] to the surplus.28 Then let him29
specifically state, 'The Halachah is in
agreement with R. Johanan b. Nuri in respect
of the surplus', or else 'The Halachah is not
in agreement with the first Tanna',30 or else,
'The Halachah is in agreement with R.
Akiba!31 —
But, replied R. Joseph, you speak of
Konamoth?32 Konamoth are different. For,
as a man may33 forbid to himself the fruit of
his fellow34 so may he also consecrate35 that
which is not yet in existence.36 Said Abaye to
him:37 It is quite logical that a man should be
entitled to forbid the use of the fruit of his
fellows to himself,38 since he may also forbid
his own fruit39 to his fellow;40 should he,
however, have the right to forbid something
that is not yet in existence,41 seeing that no
man has the right42 to forbid the fruit of his
fellow to his fellow?43 —
But, replied R. Huna son of R. Joshua, [that44
is a case] where the woman said, 'My hands
shall be consecrated to Him who created
them', [such consecration being valid] since
her hands are in existence.45 But even if she
had said so, could she consecrate them? Are
they not mortgaged to him?46 — [This is a
case] where she said,47 'When I shall have
been divorced'.48 But is there a consecration
that could not take effect now49 and would
nevertheless become effective later?50 — And
why not? retorted R. Elai. Were a man to say
to his friend, 'This field that I am selling you
shall be consecrated as soon as I shall have
re-purchased it from you', would it not51
become consecrated?52
R. Jeremiah demurred: What a comparison?
There53 [the seller] has the right to consecrate
[his field];54 here,55 however, [the woman]
has no power to divorce herself!56 This55 is
rather similar57 to the case of a man who said
to another, 'This field which I have sold to
you shall become consecrated after I shall
have re-purchased it from you', where it does
not become consecrated.58 R. Papa
demurred: Are the two cases at all similar?
There59 both the field itself and its produce
are in the possession of the buyer, but here60
the wife's person is in her own possession.
This60 is rather similar61 to the case of a man
who said to another,
1. Which belongs to the husband.
2. Every week.
3. V. supra p. 347. n. 14.
4. And cannot consequently be consecrated by
him until after her death when he inherits it.
5. Rab and Samuel on the one hand and R. Adda
b. Ahabah on the other.
6. Maintenance.
7. The proceeds of the woman's handiwork. A
surplus, however, in excess of the sum
required for her maintenance, is unusual.
8. The silver Ma'ah.
9. A wife's handiwork the quantity of which is
prescribed (v. infra 64b).
10. Supra 47b, 58b. An objection against R. Adda
b. Ahabah.
11. Infra 64b; which proves that the Ma'ah is in
return for her handiwork not for the surplus.
An objection against Rab and Samuel,
12. A wife.
13. Her husband.
14. V, Glos. s.v. Sela'.
15. Infra 64b. This 'handiwork', not the surplus.
How then could the insertion of 'surplus' be
justified?
16. The Galilean Sela' being equal to half that of
Judea.
17. In our Mishnah.
18. [H], (Konam) one of the expressions of a vow.
V. Glos.
19. I.e., that her husband shall be forbidden to eat
anything prepared by her or purchased from
the proceeds of her work.
20. The husband who is empowered to annul his
wife's vows. V. Num. XXX, 7f.
21. As a wife's work belongs to her husband she
has no right to dispose of it by vow or in any
other way. Her vow is, therefore, null and
void and requires no invalidation.
22. More than the quantity to which he is entitled
(v. infra 64b). Any work in excess of that
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
20
quantity remains at the disposal of the wife
who is entitled to forbid it to her husband by a
vow. Hence the necessity for annulment.
23. Not only on account of the surplus as stated
by R. Akiba.
24. When he loses all claim to her work, and her
vow becomes effective.
25. He would not be able to remarry her because
her vow would prevent her from performing
for him any of the services which a wife must
do for her husband. [R. Johanan b. Nuri is of
the opinion that the surplus belongs to the
husband and the woman has thus no right to
forbid it to him by vow.]
26. V. Ned. 85a and infra 66a and 70a.
27. According to whom the woman's vow
becomes valid after her divorce though at the
time the vow was made the work she will do
afterwards has not yet come into existence.
From this it follows that a person may
similarly consecrate anything that is not yet in
existence. How, then, could Samuel who
adopts this view as the Halachah also state
that the Halachah is in agreement with R.
Johanan ha-Sandelar according to whom a
thing which is not yet in existence cannot be
consecrated? [For this can be the only reason
for R. Johanan ha-Sandelar's view in the
Mishnah according to Samuel who explained
the reference in the Mishnah to be to the
surplus after the wife's death (v. supra p. 347)
which R. Johanan ha-Sandelar will regard as
unconsecrated because, at the time when the
husband consecrated his wife's handiwork, it
was not yet in existence (Rashi).
28. And not to all her work which has not yet
come into existence. This answer could be
easily refuted, since the same objection that
has been raised against the 'handiwork' may
equally be raised against the 'surplus' which
also was not in existence when the vow was
made. This had been waived, however, in view
of the more general objection that follows
(Rashi). [Tosaf: Samuel's statement that the
Halachah is like R. Johanan b. Nuri is limited
to his view that the surplus belongs to the
husband v. supra p. 349. n. 14].
29. Samuel.
30. From which it would be inferred that
annulment of the vow is necessary only on
account of the surplus.
31. Who specifically mentioned the surplus. Since
none of these expressions was used it is
obvious that Samuel could not have referred
to the surplus only.
32. Plural of Konam, a general term for vows
which are usually introduced by Konam.
33. In making a vow.
34. Though he could not consecrate such fruit to
the Sanctuary.
35. I.e., prohibit to himself by a vow.
36. I.e., seeing that he can, by means of a vow,
prohibit to himself a thing which is not in his
possession, he can also prohibit a thing which
is not yet in existence. Hence the validity of
the vow. In our Mishnah, however, where the
subject is ordinary consecration to the
sanctuary, Halachah is indeed in agreement
with R. Johanan ha-Sandelar that the
consecration is invalid.
37. R. Joseph. 'To him' is wanting in MS.M.
38. By a vow.
39. To any particular person, by means of a vow,
or to everybody by a general consecration to
the Sanctuary.
40. He may forbid his fellow's fruit to himself as
the master of his own body; and he may
forbid his fruit to his fellow as the owner of
his fruit.
41. The woman's work. Neither her work (which
has not yet been done) nor her right to it
(which she will regain only after divorce) is
yet in existence.
42. Even by a vow.
43. Certainly not. As a person has no right to do
the latter, he being neither master of his
fellow's body nor owner of his fruit, so he
should not be entitled to do the former (v.
supra note 1.)
44. R. Johanan b. Nuri's ruling which Samuel
adopted as the Halachah.
45. Whereas our Mishnah deals with the case
where she consecrated her handiwork, and
this is not yet in existence.
46. Her husband. How then could she consecrate
that which is not hers?
47. The consecration shall take effect.
48. At that time she is again independent of her
husband.
49. As in the case under discussion where the
woman while living with her husband is
ineligible to dispose of her work.
50. Obviously not. How then could the Halachah
be in agreement with R. Johanan b. Nuri?
51. When it is re-purchased.
52. It certainly would. Similarly in the case of a
woman's work after she is divorced.
53. The case of the field one is about to sell.
54. Since at the time of the consecration it is still
to his possession. Hence also the effectiveness
of his present consecration after he had re-
purchased that field.
55. In the case of the consecration of a wife's
work while she is still with her husband.
56. How then could she have the power to
consecrate her work even for the future?
57. Lit., 'this is not equal but',
58. Because at the time of the consecration it was
no longer in his possession.
59. The case of the sold field,
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
21
60. V. supra p. 351, n. 15.
61. V. p. 351, n. 17.
Kethuboth 59b
'This field which I have mortgaged to you
shall be consecrated after I have redeemed
it,' where it is consecrated. R. Shisha son of
R. Idi demurred: Are these cases similar?
There it1 is in his2 power to redeem it; but
here she has no power to divorce herself. This
is rather similar to the case of a man who
said to his fellow, 'This field which I have
mortgaged to you for ten years3 shall be
consecrated when I shall have redeemed it',
where it becomes consecrated. R. Ashi
demurred: Are these cases similar? There4
he2 has the power to redeem it at least after
ten years, but here she has never the power to
divorce herself!5 —
But, replied R. Ashi, you speak of Konamoth!
Konamoth are different [from ordinary
vows] since they effect the consecration of the
body6 itself;7 and [the reason here8 is the
same] as that of Raba, for Raba stated:
Consecration,9 leavened food10 and
manumission11 cancel a mortgage.12 They13
should then14 become consecrated
forthwith!15 — The Rabbis have imparted
force to a husband's rights16 [over his wife] so
that they13 shall not become consecrated
forthwith.17
MISHNAH. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE
KINDS OF WORK WHICH A WOMAN MUST
PERFORM FOR HER HUSBAND: GRINDING
CORN, BAKING BREAD, WASHING
CLOTHES, COOKING, SUCKLING HER
CHILD, MAKING READY HIS BED AND
WORKING IN WOOL. IF SHE BROUGHT HIM
ONE BONDWOMAN18 SHE NEED NOT DO
ANY GRINDING OR BAKING OR WASHING.
[IF SHE BROUGHT] TWO BONDWOMEN,19
SHE NEED NOT EVEN COOK OR SUCKLE
HER CHILD. IF THREE, SHE NEED NEITHER
MAKE READY HIS BED NOR WORK IN
WOOL. IF FOUR, SHE MAY LOUNGE20 IN AN
EASY CHAIR.21 R. ELIEZER SAID: EVEN IF
SHE BROUGHT HIM22 A HUNDRED
BONDWOMEN HE MAY23 COMPEL HER TO
WORK IN WOOL; FOR IDLENESS LEADS TO
UNCHASTITY. R. SIMEON B. GAMALIEL
SAID: EVEN24 IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE
UNDER A VOW TO DO ANY WORK HE MUST
DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER KETHUBAH25
TO HER FOR IDLENESS LEADS TO IDIOCY.26
GEMARA. GRINDING CORN! How could
you imagine this?27 — Read: Attending to28
the grinding.29 And if you prefer I might say:
With a hand mill.
Our Mishnah30 does not agree with the view
of R. Hiyya. For R. Hiyya taught: A wife
[should be taken] mainly for the sake31 of her
beauty; mainly for the sake32 of children.33
And R. Hiyya further taught: A wife is
mainly for the wearing32 of a woman's finery.
And R. Hiyya further taught: He who wishes
his wife to look graceful34 should clothe her
in linen garments. He who wishes his
daughter to have a bright complexion,35 let
him, on the approach of her maturity, feed
her with young fowls and give her milk to
drink.
SUCKLING HER CHILD. Must it be
assumed that our Mishnah36 does not agree
with the View of Beth Shammai? For was it
not taught: If a woman vowed not to sickle
her child she must, said Beth Shammai, pull
the breast out of its mouth,37 and Beth Hillel
said: [Her husband] may compel her to
suckle it.38 If she was divorced he cannot
compel her; but if [the child] knows her39
[her husband] pays her the fee and may
compel her to suckle it in order [to avert]
danger?40 — It may be said to be in
agreement even with the view of Beth
Shammai, but here41 we are dealing with
such a case, for instance, where the woman
made a vow and her husband confirmed it;
Beth Shammai being of the opinion that he
has thereby put his finger between her
teeth,42 while Beth Hillel hold that it is she
that has put her finger between her teeth.43
Then44 let them45 express their disagreement
as regards a Kethubah generally.46
Furthermore, it was taught:47 Beth Shammai
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
22
said: She need not suckle [her child]!48 —
But, clearly, our Mishnah is not in agreement
with the view of Beth Shammai.
'If [the child] knows her'.
1. The mortgaged field.
2. The man who consecrated the field.
3. During which period he has no power to
redeem it, as a wife has no power to divorce
herself.
4. The ten years' mortgage.
5. The two cases, therefore, cannot be compared.
6. Of the animal or object consecrated.
7. In relation to the man concerned; and unlike
other consecrations to the Temple Treasury,
can never be redeemed.
8. For the validity of the consecration of the
wife's work.
9. Of a pledged animal for the altar.
10. Which is pledged to a non-Israelite but kept in
the possession of an Israelite when the time
for its destruction on the Passover Eve
arrives. No leaven or leavened food though
pledged to a non-Jew may be kept in Jewish
possession from the mid-day of Passover Eve
until the conclusion of the Passover festival,
11. Of a mortgaged slave,
12. Similarly here, the consecration cancels the
husband's claim upon the body or work of his
wife. Hence the validity of her consecration.
13. The wife's hands.
14. V. supra n. 15.
15. Why then has it been stated that the
consecration becomes effective only after her
divorce.
16. [H] lit., 'the subjection or pledging to the
husband'.
17. His rights, as long as she lives with him, are
not merely those of a creditor to whom an
object has been mortgaged or pledged but the
fuller rights of a buyer. For further notes on
the whole of this passage, v. Ned. Sonc. ed. pp.
265ff.
18. Or a sum that would purchase one.
19. Or their value. V. supra n. 1.
20. Lit., 'sit'.
21. I.e., she need not perform even minor services
for him. She is under no obligation to leave
her chair to bring him any object even from
the same house (cf. Rashi). [H], cf. [G], 'an
easy chair', 'soft seat'.
22. Her husband.
23. Or, according to another interpretation,
'should'.
24. I.e., precautions must be taken against
idleness not only in the case mentioned by R.
Eliezer but also in the following where the
husband himself forbade the work.
25. Thus enabling her to engage in work again.
26. [H], 'stupefaction', 'dullness'.
27. A woman, surely, could not be expected to
turn the sails or the wheels of a mill.
28. Lit., 'causing'.
29. She performs the accompanying services only.
30. Which imposes duties of work upon a wife.
31. Lit., 'a woman is not but'.
32. V. p. 353, n. 14.
33. Not as a bondwoman for her husband. R.
Hiyya agrees, however, that a wife is expected
to work in wool in return for the maintenance
her husband allows her. His only objection is
to menial work such as the grinding of corn
which has an injurious effect upon her
womanly grace. V. Tosaf. s.v. [H].
34. Lit., 'to nurse', 'to make pliant', 'to make
graceful'.
35. Lit., 'that he may make white'.
36. Which imposes upon a wife the duty of
suckling her children.
37. I.e., her vow is valid, because she is under no
obligation to suckle her child.
38. According to their view it is a mother's duty
to suckle her child and her vow is, therefore,
null and void.
39. And refuses to be nursed by any other woman
(Rashi). [Isaiah Trani: Even if it does not
refuse to be suckled by another woman, its
separation from its mother, whom it has
learnt to recognize, may prove injurious to the
infant].
40. Tosef. Keth. V. Since Beth Shammai maintain
here that a wife is under no obligation to
suckle her children (cf. supra n. 6) out
Mishnah (cf. supra n. 5) obviously cannot be
in agreement with their view.
41. In the cited Baraitha.
42. I.e., it is the husband's fault that the vow
remained valid. He could easily have annulled
it had he wished to do so. (V. Num. XXX, 7ff).
43. She should not have vowed (cf. supra note 7).
44. If, as now suggested, the husband has
confirmed the vow the woman had made.
45. Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel.
46. Where a woman vowed that her husband was
to have no benefits from her. According to
Beth Shammai she would be entitled to her
Kethubah because it is the man's fault that her
vow remained valid (cf. supra p. 354, n. 11),
while according to Beth Hillel she would
receive no Kethubah because the making of
the vow was her fault (cf. p. 354. n. 12).
47. In respect of any woman, even one who made
no vow.
48. How then could it be suggested that our
Mishnah is in agreement with the view of Beth
Shammai?
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
23
Kethuboth 60a
At what age?1 — Raba in the name of R.
Jeremiah b. Abba who had it from Rab
replied: Three months. Samuel, however,
said: Thirty days; while R. Isaac stated in the
name of R. Johanan: Fifty days. R. Shimi b.
Abaye stated: The Halachah is in agreement
with the statement of R. Isaac which was
made in the name of R. Johanan. One can
well understand [the respective views of] Rab
and R. Johanan since they are guided by the
child's keenness of perception.2 According to
Samuel, however, is such [precocity]3 at all
possible? — When Rami b. Ezekiel came4 he
said, 'Pay no regard to those rules which my
brother Judah laid down in the name of
Samuel; for this said Samuel: As soon as [the
child]5 knows her'.6
A [divorced woman] once came to Samuel
[declaring her refusal to suckle her son].
'Go', he said to R. Dimi b. Joseph, 'and test
her case'.7 He went and placed her among a
row of women and, taking hold of her child,
carried him in front of them. When he came
up to her [the child]8 looked at her face with
joy,9 but she turned her eye away from him.
'Lift up your eyes'. he called to her, 'come,
take away your son'. How does a blind child
know [its mother]? R. Ashi said: By the smell
and the taste.10
Our Rabbis taught: A child must be breast
fed for11 twenty-four months. From that age
onwards12 he is to be regarded as one who
sucks an abominable thing; these are the
words of R. Eliezer. R. Joshua said: [He may
be breast fed] even for four or five years. If,
however, he ceased13 after the twenty-four
months and started again14 he is to be
regarded as sucking an abominable thing.15
The Master said, 'From that age onwards he
is to be regarded as one who sucks an
abominable thing'. But I could point out a
contradiction: As it might have been
presumed that human16 milk is forbidden17
since such [prohibition may be deduced from
the following] logical argument: If in the case
of a beast18 in respect of which the law of
contact19 has been relaxed20 [the use of] its
milk has nevertheless been restricted,21 how
much more should the use of his milk be
restricted in the case of a human being in
respect of whom the law of contact has been
restricted;22 hence it was specifically stated,
The camel because it23 cheweth the cud [… it
is unclean unto you],24 only 'it' is unclean;
human milk, however, is not unclean but
clean. As it might also have been presumed
that only [human] milk is excluded25 because
[the use of milk] is not equally [forbidden] in
all cases26 but that [human] blood is not
excluded27 since [the prohibition of eating
blood] is equally applicable in all cases,28
hence it was specifically stated, it,29 only 'it' is
forbidden; human blood, however, is not
forbidden but permitted.30
And [in connection with this teaching] R.
Shesheth has stated: Even [a Rabbinical]
ordinance of abstinence is not applicable to
it!31 — This is no difficulty. The latter32
[refers to milk] that has left [the breast]33
whereas the former34 [refers to milk] which
has not left [the breast]. [This law, however],
is reversed in the case of blood,35 as it was
taught: [Human] blood which [is found] upon
a loaf of bread must be scraped off and [the
bread] may only then be eaten; but that
which is between the teeth36 may be sucked
without any scruple.37
The Master stated, 'R. Joshua said: [He may
be breast fed] even for four or five years'. But
was it not taught that R. Joshua said: Even
when [he carries] his bundle on his
shoulders?38 — Both represent the same
age.39 R. Joseph stated: The Halachah is in
agreement with R. Joshua.
It was taught: R. Marinus said, A man
suffering from an attack on the chest40 may
suck milk41 [from a beast] on the Sabbath.42
What is the reason? — Sucking is an act of
unusual43 unloading44 against which, where
pain45 is involved, no preventive measure has
been enacted by the Rabbis. R. Joseph stated:
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
24
The Halachah is in agreement with R.
Marinus.
It was taught: Nahum the Galatian46 stated,
If rubbish47 was collected48 in a gutter49 it is
permissible to crush it with one's foot
quietly50 on the Sabbath, and one need have
no scruples about the matter. What is the
reason? — Such repair is carried out in an
unusual manner51 against which, when loss is
involved,52 the Rabbis enacted no preventive
measure. R. Joseph stated: The Halachah is
in agreement with the ruling of Nahum the
Galatian.
'If he ceased, however, after the twenty-four
months and started again he is to be regarded
as one who sucks an abominable thing'. And
for how long?53 — R. Judah b. Habiba
replied in the name of Samuel: For three
days. Others read: R. Judah b. Habiba
recited54 before Samuel: 'For three days'.
Our Rabbis taught: A nursing mother whose
husband died within twenty-four months [of
the birth of their child] shall neither be
betrothed nor married again
1. Lit., 'until how much?' i.e., at what age is a
child assumed to know its mother, and to
refuse in consequence to be suckled by
another woman?
2. Lit., 'every one according to his sharpness';
the former fixing it at the age of three months
and the latter at that of fifty days.
3. That a child should know its mother at the age
of thirty days.
4. From Palestine to Babylon, v. infra 111b.
5. Whatever its age.
6. May a mother be compelled to suckle it, even
after she has been divorced. She is only
entitled to a fee from the child's father.
7. To ascertain whether the child knew its
mother.
8. Cur. edd. [H], (fem.). Read with Bomb. ed.
[H] (masc.).
9. Af. of [H], 'to look up with joy' (Jast.). 'to gaze
longingly'.
10. Of the milk.
11. Lit., 'a baby sucks and continues until'.
12. If he is still breast fed.
13. Lit., 'he separated'.
14. Lit., 'and returned'.
15. Cf. Tosef. Nid. II.
16. Lit., 'those who walk on two (legs)'.
17. V. Rashi; lit., 'unclean'.
18. Of the unclean classes enumerated in Lev. XI,
4ff and Deut, XIV, 7ff.
19. By a human being.
20. Contact with a live animal, even of the
unclean classes (v. supra n. 10), does not cause
uncleanness.
21. It is forbidden for human consumption (v.
Bek, 6b).
22. Contact with a menstruant, for instance,
causes uncleanness.
23. Emphasis on 'it' ( [H]) (v. infra n. 20).
24. Lev. XI, 4.
25. Lit., 'I take out', sc. from the prohibition of
consuming it.
26. The milk of a clean beast being permitted.
27. From the restriction of consuming it.
28. Even the blood of a clean beast is forbidden.
29. The second 'it' ([H]) in Lev. IV, 11. Cf. supra
n. 14. According to another interpretation the
exclusion of blood is derived from the
expression [H] (E.V. these) at the beginning of
the verse (Rashi).
30. Cf. Ker. 22a and v. infra n. 6.
31. I.e., human milk is not only Pentateuchally,
but also Rabbinically permitted. How then is
this ruling to be harmonized with the previous
Baraitha cited from Niddah which regards
human milk as an 'abominable thing'?
32. Lit., 'that', the last mentioned Baraitha which
permits the consumption of human milk.
33. And is collected in a utensil.
34. Which, regarding the milk as an 'abominable
thing', forbids it to one older than twenty-four
months.
35. As long as it remains within the body it is
permitted; but as soon as it leaves it is
forbidden as a preventive measure against the
eating of animal blood.
36. I.e., which has not been separated from the
body.
37. Ker. 21b.
38. I.e., even at an age when the child is capable
of carrying small loads he may still be breast
fed. How then is this to be reconciled with the
Baraitha cited from Niddah (V. supra note 5)?
39. Lit., 'one size' or 'limit'.
40. [H] (rt. [H] 'to groan'), one sighing painfully
under an attack angina pectoris. V. Jast.
41. Goat's milk which has a curative effect (v.
Rashi).
42. Though the release of the milk from the
animal's breast resembles the plucking of a
plant from its root, or the unloading of a
burden, which is forbidden on the Sabbath,
43. [H], lit., 'as if by the back of the hand'.
44. [H] (rt. [H] Piel, 'break down', 'detach').
Milking an animal with one's hands is
regarded as direct unloading (or detaching)
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
25
which on the Sabbath is Pentateuchally
forbidden (cf. Shab. 95a); releasing the milk
by sucking is an unusual or indirect unloading
or detaching which is only Rabbinically
forbidden.
45. V. supra p. 357, n. 11.
46. Of Galatia or Gallia in Asia Minor,
47. Lit., 'small pieces of straw',
48. Lit., 'that went up'.
49. And thus prevents the proper flow of the
water.
50. [H] lit., 'privately'.
51. V. supra p. 357. n. 14.
52. Were the gutter to remain choked up the
overflow of the water would cause damage.
53. Must the break last for the child to be
regarded as having ceased to suck.
54. A Baraitha, His statement was not merely the
report of a ruling of Samuel who was but an
Amora.
Kethuboth 60b
until [the completion of the] twenty-four
months;1 so R. Meir. R. Judah however,
permits [remarriage] after eighteen months.2
Said R. Nathan3 b. Joseph: Those4 surely,
are the very words of Beth Shammai and
these5 are the very words of Beth Hillel; for
Beth Shammai ruled: Twenty-four months,6
while Beth Hillel ruled: Eighteen months!6 R.
Simeon b. Gamaliel replied, I will explain:7
According to the view8 [that a child must be
breast fed for] twenty-four months9 [a
nursing mother] is permitted to marry again
after twenty-one months,10 and according to
the view11 [that it is to be breast fed for]
eighteen months12 she may marry again after
fifteen months;13 because a [nursing
mother's] milk deteriorates only three
months after [her conception].14
'Ulla stated: The Halachah is in agreement
with the ruling of R. Judah;15 and Mar 'Ukba
stated: R. Hanina permitted me to marry [a
nursing woman] fifteen months after [the
birth of her child].16
Abaye's metayer once came to Abaye and
asked him: Is it permissible to betroth [a
nursing woman] fifteen months after [her
child's birth]? — The other answered him: In
the first place17 [whenever there is
disagreement] between R. Meir and R. Judah
the Halachah is in agreement with the view of
R. Judah;15 and, furthermore, [in a dispute
between] Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel the
Halachah is in agreement with the view of
Beth Hillel;18 and while 'Ulla said, 'The
Halachah is in agreement with R. Judah',15
Mar 'Ukba stated, 'R. Hanina permitted me
to marry [a nursing woman] fifteen months
after [the birth of her child]', how much
more then [is there no need for you to wait
the longer period] since you only intend
betrothal. When he19 came to R. Joseph20 the
latter told him, 'Both Rab and Samuel ruled
that [a nursing woman] must wait twenty-
four months exclusive of the day on which
her child was born and exclusive of the day
on which she is betrothed'.21 Thereupon he22
ran23 three parasangs24 after him, (some say,
one parasang along sand mounds), but failed
to overtake him.
Said Abaye: The statement made by the
Rabbis that 'Even [a question about the
permissibility of eating] an egg25 with kutha26
a man shall not27 decide28 in a district [which
is under the jurisdiction] of his Master' was
not due [to the view that this might] appear
as an act of irreverence29 but to the reason
that [a disciple] would have no success in
dealing with the matter. For I have in fact
learned the tradition of Rab and Samuel and
yet I did not get the opportunity of applying
it.30
Our Rabbis taught: [If a nursing mother]
gave her child to a wet nurse or weaned him,
or if he died, she is permitted to marry again
forthwith.31 R. Papa and R. Huna son of R.
Joshua intended to give a practical decision
in accordance with this Baraitha, but an aged
woman said to them, 'I have been in such a
position32 and R. Nahman forbade me [to
marry again].33 Surely, this could not have
been so;34 for has not R. Nahman in fact
permitted [such remarriage]35 in the
Exilarch's family?36 — The family of the
Exilarch was different [from ordinary
people] because no nurse would break her
agreement37 with them.38
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
26
Said R. Papi to them:39 Could you not have
inferred it40 from the following? It has been
taught: [A married woman] who was always
anxious41 to spend her time42 at her paternal
home,43 or who has some angry quarrel at
her husband's home,44 or whose husband was
in prison,44 or had gone to a country beyond
the sea,45 or was old or infirm,44 or if she
herself was barren, old,46 incapable of
procreation or a minor,46 or if she miscarried
after the death of her husband, or was in any
other way incapacitated for propagation,
must47 wait three months.48 These are the
words of R. Meir. R. Jose,49 however, permits
betrothal or marriage forthwith.50 And [in
connection with this] R. Nahman stated in the
name of Samuel: The Halachah is in
agreement with R. Meir in respect of his
restrictive measures!51 —
'This', they52 answered him, 'did not occur to
us'. The law is [that if the child] died
[remarriage by his mother] is permitted
[forthwith], but if she has weaned him [her
remarriage] is53 forbidden. Mar son of R.
Ashi ruled: Even if the child died [the
remarriage of the mother] is forbidden, it
being possible that she has killed it so as to be
in a position54 to marry. It once actually
happened that a mother strangled her child.
This incident, however, is no proof.55 That
woman56 was an imbecile, for it is not likely
that [sane] women would strangle their
children.
Our Rabbis taught: If a woman was given a
child to suckle57 she must not suckle together
with it either her own child or the child of
any friend of hers. If she agreed to a small
allowance for board she must nevertheless
eat much.58 Whilst in charge of the child59
she must not eat things which are injurious
for the milk. Now that you said [that she
must] not [suckle] 'her own child' was there
any need [to state] 'nor the child of any
friend of hers'? — It might have been
assumed that only her own child [must not be
suckled] because owing to her affection for it
she might supply it with more [than the other
child] but that the child of a friend of hers
[may well be suckled] because if she had no
surplus [of milk] she would not have given
any at all. Hence we were taught [that even
the child of a friend must not be suckled].
'If she agreed to a small allowance for board
she must nevertheless eat much'.
Wherefrom? — R. Shesheth replied: From
her own.60
'Whilst in charge of the child she must not
eat things which are injurious'. What are
these? — R. Kahana replied: For instance,
cuscuta,61 lichen, small fishes and earth.62
Abaye said: Even pumpkins and quinces. R.
Papa said: Even a palm's heart63 and unripe
dates.64 R. Ashi said: Even kamak65 and fish-
hash. Some of these cause the flow of the milk
to stop while others cause the milk to become
turbid.
A woman who couples in a mill will have
epileptic children. One who couples on the
ground will have children with long necks. [A
woman] who treads66 on the blood67 of an ass
will have scabby68 children. One who eats66
mustard will have intemperate children.69
One who eats66 cress will have blear-eyed
children. One who eats66 fish brine70 will
have children with blinking eyes.71 One who
eats72 clay73 will have ugly children. One who
drinks72 intoxicating liquor will have
ungainly74 children. One who eats72 meat and
drinks wine will have children
1. Were she to marry sooner and happen to
become pregnant, the child would have to be
taken from her breast before the proper time.
2. The shorter period is in his opinion quite
sufficient for the suckling of a child.
3. Var. lec. 'Jonathan' (v. Tosef. Nid. Il).
4. The words of R. Meir.
5. R. Judah's words.
6. As the period during which a child must be
breast fed. What then was the object of the
repetition of the same views?
7. Read [H] (v. She'iltoth, Wayera, III). Cur.
edd. [H] (rt. [H], Hif. 'to over-balance',
'compromise').
8. Lit., 'the words of him who says'.
9. Beth Shammai.
10. Not, as R. Meir ruled, twenty-four.
11. Lit., 'the words of him who says'.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
27
12. Beth Hillel.
13. And not, as R. Judah ruled, eighteen.
14. For three months, at least, after her
remarriage the child's breast feeding need not
be interrupted. The views of Beth Shammai
and Beth Hillel thus differ from those of R.
Meir and R. Judah respectively.
15. That a nursing mother need not wait more
than eighteen months.
16. In agreement with the view of Beth Hillel as
interpreted by R. Simeon b. Gamaliel.
17. Lit., 'one'.
18. Who, according to R. Simeon b. Gamaliel's
interpretation, require a nursing mother to
postpone remarriage for no longer a period
than fifteen months.
19. Abaye, who was a disciple of R. Joseph.
20. To consult him on the question his metayer
addressed to him.
21. Yeb. 43a.
22. Abaye.
23. In an attempt to stop his metayer from acting
on his decision.
24. V. Glos.
25. That was found in a slaughtered fowl (v.
Tosaf. s.v. [H] a.l.). The question of eating a
properly laid egg with milk (v. next note)
could of course never arise.
26. A preserve containing milk.
27. Though the answer is simple and obvious.
28. Lit., 'solve'.
29. Against the Master.
30. When the question was addressed to him.
MS.M. adds; 'because at that time I forgot it'.
31. After her husband's death. She need not wait
until the period for suckling mentioned above
has expired.
32. Lit., 'with me was (such) an event'.
33. Before the expiration of the period prescribed
for the breast feeding of the child.
34. Lit., 'Is it so'?
35. V. supra n. 12.
36. The children having been entrusted to hired
nurses. This actually happened in the case of
his own wife Yaltha (v. She'iltoth, Wayera,
XIII and cf. Golds. a.l.).
37. Lit., 'return', 'retract'.
38. Hence it was safe to allow their widows to
remarry (note 12). In the case of ordinary
people, however, the nurse might well change
her mind at any moment and the child would
consequently have to fall back upon the
nursing of his own mother. Should she then
happen to be in a state of pregnancy the child
would be in danger of starvation.
39. R. Papa and R. Huna.
40. The decision of R. Nahman reported by the
woman,
41. Pass. particip. of [H] 'to pursue', 'be anxious'.
42. Lit., 'to go'.
43. And she was there when her husband died.
44. At the time of his death.
45. And there he died.
46. When her husband's death occurred.
47. Though in all such cases it is obvious that the
woman cannot be pregnant.
48. Before remarriage or betrothal. This is a
precaution against a similar marriage or
betrothal on the part of a normal woman who
might be pregnant.
49. This is also the reading of She'iltoth. The
reading of Tosef. Yeb. VI, 6 and 'Erub. 47a is
'R. Judah'.
50. After the husband's death. Cf. Yeb, and
'Erub. l.c.
51. It is consequently forbidden for any widow to
marry again before the prescribed period of
three months has elapsed even where the
cause of the prohibition, i.e., that of possible
pregnancy, does not apply. Similarly in the
case of a nursing mother remarriage would
obviously be forbidden even where the child
died or is otherwise independent of his
mother's nursing. Why then had R. Papa and
R. Huna to rely solely upon the aged woman's
report?
52. R. Papa and R. Huna.
53. Since it is possible that her action was due to
her desire to marry.
54. Lit., 'and went'.
55. Lit., 'and this is not'.
56. Who strangled her child.
57. Lit., 'behold that they gave her a son to give
(him) suck'.
58. Of her own (v. infra) in order to maintain a
healthy supply of milk.
59. Lit., 'with it'.
60. Cf. supra n. 2.
61. [H], v. Jast., hops (Rashi).
62. Cf. infra p. 363, n. 4.
63. Read [H] (cf. Rashi). Cur. edd. [H] (gourd).
64. Lit., 'palm branch'.
65. [H], 'curdled milk', 'an appetizing sauce made
of milk', (cf. Fleischer to Levy, and Jast.).
66. During her pregnancy.
67. Read [H] (Aruk.). Cur. edd., [H].
68. Or 'bald', reading [H] (cf. Rashi). Var. [H]
'gluttons', 'bibbers'.
69. Or 'gluttons'.
70. Or 'small fish' (Rashi) in brine (Jast.).
71. Aruk (s.v. [H]), 'small eyes'.
72. During her pregnancy.
73. [H], a certain kind of reddish clay was
believed to possess medicinal qualities as an
astringent. Cf. Smith, Dict. Gk. Rom. Ant. s.v.
creta, v. Jast.
74. Lit., 'black'. Cf. Jast.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
28
Kethuboth 61a
of a robust constitution. One who eats eggs
will have children with big eyes. One who
eats fish will have graceful children. One who
eats parsley1 will have beautiful children.
One who eats coriander will have stout2
children. One who eats ethrog3 will have
fragrant children. The daughter of King
Shapur, whose mother had eaten ethrog3
[while she was pregnant] with her, used to be
presented before her father as his principal
perfume.
R. Huna4 related: R. Huna b. Hinena tested
us [with the following question:] If she5 says
that she wishes to suckle her child and he6
says that she shall not suckle it her wish is to
be granted,7 for she would be the sufferer.8
What, [however, is the law] where he says
that she shall suckle the child and she says
that she will not suckle it? Whenever this9 is
not the practice in her family we, of course,
comply with her wish; what, [however, is the
law] where this is the practice in her family
but not in his? Do we follow the practice of
his family or that of hers? And we solved his
problem from this: She10 rises with him11 but
does not go down with him.12 What, said R.
Huna, is the Scriptural proof?13 — For she is
a man's wife,14 [she is to participate] in the
rise of her husband but not in his descent. R.
Eleazar said, [The proof is] from here:
Because she15 was the mother of all living16
she was given [to her husband]17 to live but
not to suffer pain.
IF SHE BROUGHT HIM ONE
BONDWOMAN, etc. Her other duties,
however, she must obviously perform; [but
why?] Let her say to him, 'I brought you a
wife in my place'!18 — Because he might
reply, 'That bondwoman works for me and
for herself, who will work for you!'
[IF SHE BROUGHT] TWO BONDWOMEN,
SHE NEED NOT EVEN COOK OR
SUCKLE, etc. Her other duties, however, she
must obviously perform; [but why]? Let her
say to him, 'I brought you another wife who
will work for me and for her, while the first
one [will work] for you and for herself!' —
Because he might reply, 'Who will do the
work for our guests19 and occasional
visitors!'20
IF THREE, SHE NEED NEITHER MAKE
READY HIS BED. Her other duties,
however, she must perform; [but why]? Let
her say to him, 'I brought you a third one21 to
attend upon our guests and occasional
visitors!' — Because he might reply, 'The
more the number of the household the more
the number of guests and occasional visitors'.
If so,22 [the same plea could also be
advanced] even [when the number of
bondwomen was] four! — [In the case of]
four bondwomen, since their number is
considerable they assist one another.
R. Hana, or some say R. Samuel b. Nahmani,
stated: [SHE BROUGHT] does not mean that
she had actually brought; but: Wherever she
is in a position to bring,23 even though she
has not brought any. A Tanna taught: [A
wife is entitled to the same privileges]
whether she brought [a bondwoman] to him24
or whether she saved up for one out of her
income.
IF FOUR, SHE MAY LOUNGE IN AN
EASY CHAIR. R. Isaac b. Hanania25 stated
in the name of R. Huna: Although it has been
said, SHE MAY LOUNGE IN AN EASY
CHAIR she should26 nevertheless fill27 for
him his cup, make ready his bed and wash his
face, hands and feet.28
R. Isaac b. Hanania29 further30 stated in the
name of R. Huna: All kinds of work which a
wife performs for her husband a menstruant
also may perform for her husband, with the
exception of filling31 his cup, making ready
his bed and washing his face, hands and
feet.32 As to 'the making ready of his bed'
Raba explained that [the prohibition] applies
only in his presence but [if it is done] in his
absence it does not matter.33 With regard to
'the filling of his cup'. Samuel's wife made a
change34 [by serving] him with her left hand.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
29
[The wife of] Abaye placed it35 on the edge36
of the wine cask. Raba's [wife placed it] at the
head-side of his couch, and R. Papa's [wife
put it] on his foot-stool.37
R. Isaac b. Hanania38 further39 stated: All
[foodstuffs] may be held back from the
waiter40 except meat and wine.41 Said R.
Hisda: [This applies only to] fat meat and old
wine. Raba said: Fat meat42 throughout the
year but old wine only in the Tammuz43
season.44
R. Anan b. Tahlifa related: I was once
standing in the presence of Samuel when they
brought him a dish of mushrooms, and, had
he not given me [some of it], I would have
been exposed to danger.45 I, related R. Ashi,
was once standing before R. Kahana when
they brought him slices46 of turnips in
vinegar, and had he not given me some, I
would have been exposed to danger.
R. Papa said: Even a fragrant date [if not
tasted may expose one to danger].45 This is
the rule: Any foodstuff that has a strong
flavor or an acrid taste [will expose a man to
danger45 if he is not allowed to taste of it].
Both Abbuha47 b. Ihi and Minjamin b. Ihi
[showed consideration for their waiter] the
one giving [him a portion] of every kind of
dish48 while the other gave [him a portion]49
of one kind only.50 With the former Elijah51
conversed, with the latter he did not.
[It was related of] two pious men, and others
say of R. Mari and R. Phinehas the sons of R.
Hisda, that one of them52 gave [a share to his
waiter]53 first54 while the other gave him
last.55 With the one who gave [the waiter his
share] first, Elijah56 conversed; with the one,
however, who gave his waiter last, Elijah did
not converse.57
Amemar, Mar Zutra and R. Ashi were once
sitting at the gate of King Yezdegerd58 when
the King's table-steward59 passed them by. R.
Ashi, observing that Mar Zutra
1. [H] = [H], celery, parsley, or other green
vegetables.
2. Or 'fleshy', cf. [H], 'flesh'.
3. [H], a fruit of the citrus family used (a) as one
of the 'four kinds' constituting the ceremonial
wreath on Tabernacles and also (b) as a
preserve.
4. Var. lec. 'Papa' (Asheri and MS.M.).
5. The mother of a child.
6. The father.
7. Lit., '(we) listen to her'.
8. Through the accumulation of the milk in her
breast. Lit., 'the pain is hers'.
9. The breast feeding of a child by its mother.
10. A wife.
11. Her husband.
12. Supra 48a. A wife enjoys the advantages of
her husband but not his disadvantages.
13. For the statement cited.
14. Gen. XX, 3 [H] of the rt. [H] 'to go up', 'rise'.
15. Eve, symbolizing all married women.
16. Gen. III, 20.
17. Adam, mentioned earlier in the verse.
18. [H], abs. [H], lit., 'gap'. As the bondwoman
takes her place she should be exempt
altogether from domestic duties,
19. [H], guests that spend a month or a week.
20. [H] ([H] 'flying'), visitors who pay only a short
visit.
21. Lit., 'another'.
22. If an increase in the number of bondwomen
causes a corresponding increase in that of
guests and visitors.
23. I.e., if she has the means.
24. Her husband.
25. MS.M., 'Hanina'.
26. She is not compelled but is advised (v. Rashi
s.v. [H] a.l.).
27. [H], rt. [H] 'to mix', sc. wine with water or
spices.
28. Such personal services are calculated to nurse
a husband's affections (Rash. l.c.).
29. MS.M. 'Hanina'.
30. Read (v. marg. note, a.l.) [H]. Cur. edd. omit
the Waw,
31. Cf. supra n. 3.
32. In order to prevent undue intimacy between
husband and wife during her period of
Levitical uncleanness.
33. Lit., 'we have nothing in it'.
34. During her 'clean days', after menstruation
and prior to ritual immersion, when marital
relations are still forbidden.
35. V. supra note 10.
36. Lit., mouth'.
37. Cf. Golds. Others: (v. Jast.) 'chair'.
38. MS.M. 'Hanina'.
39. V. supra note 6.
40. Until he has finished serving the meal.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
30
41. Which excite his appetite and any delay in
satisfying it causes him extreme pain.
42. Must not be held back.
43. [H], the fourth month of the Hebrew calendar
corresponding to July-August.
44. When the weather is extremely hot and spicy
wine is tempting.
45. Of faintness due to the extreme pangs of
hunger excited by the flavor of the dish,
46. [H] the 'upper portions'.
47. Bomb. ed., 'Abuth'.
48. As it was served.
49. At the beginning of the meal, of the first dish.
50. Keeping back the others until the conclusion
of the meal.
51. The immortal prophet, the maker of peace
and herald of the Messianic era.
52. Lit., 'master'.
53. Of every dish he served.
54. Before he tasted of it himself.
55. After he himself and his guests had finished
their meal.
56. V. supra note 7.
57. By failing to give the waiter a share as soon as
the various dishes were served he caused him
unnecessary pain of unsatisfied desire and
hunger.
58. Or Yezdjird, one of the Kings of Persia.
59. [H] compound word: 'table' and 'maker'.
Kethuboth 61b
turned pale in the face, took up with his
finger [some food from the dish and] put it to
his mouth. 'You have spoilt the King's meal'
[the table-steward]1 cried. 'Why did you do
such a thing?' he was asked [by the King's
officers].1 'The man who prepared that
dish',2 he3 replied, 'has rendered the King's
food objectionable'. 'Why?' they asked him.
'I noticed', he replied, 'a piece of leprous
swine4 flesh in it'. They examined [the dish]
but did not find [such a thing]. Thereupon he
took hold of his finger and put it on it,5
saying, 'Did you examine this part?' They
examined it and found it [to be as R. Ashi
had said]. 'Why did you rely upon a
miracle?' the Rabbis asked him. 'I saw', he
replied, 'the demon of leprosy hovering over
him'.6
A Roman once said to a woman, 'Will you
marry me?' — 'No,' she replied. Thereupon7
he brought some pomegranates, split them
open and ate them in her presence. She kept
on swallowing all the saliva8 that irritated
her, but he did not give her [any of the fruit]
until [her body] became swollen.9 Ultimately
he said to her, 'If I cure you, will you marry
me?' — 'Yes', she replied. Again7 he brought
some pomegranates, split them and ate them
in her presence. 'Spit out at once, and again
and again',10 he said to her, all saliva that
irritated you'. [She did so] until [the matter]
issued forth from her body in the shape of a
green palm-branch; and she recovered.
AND WORKING IN WOOL. Only IN
WOOL but not in flax. Whose [view then is
represented in] our Mishnah? — It is that of
R. Judah. For it was taught: [Her husband]
may not compel her to wait11 upon his father
or upon his son, or to put straw before his
beast;12 but he may compel her to put straw
before his herd.13 R. Judah said: Nor may he
compel her to work in flax because flax
causes one's mouth to be sore14 and makes
one's lips stiff.15 This refers, however, only to
Roman flax.
R. ELIEZER SAID: EVEN IF SHE
BROUGHT HIM A HUNDRED
BONDWOMEN. R. Malkio stated in the
name of R. Adda b. Ahabah: The Halachah is
in agreement with R. Eliezer. Said R. Hanina
the son of R. Ika: [The rulings concerning] a
spit,16 bondwomen17 and follicles18 [were laid
down by] R. Malkio; [but those concerning] a
forelock,19 wood-ash20 and cheese21 [were laid
down by] R. Malkia. R. Papa, however, said:
[If the statement is made on] a Mishnah or a
Baraitha [the author is] R. Malkia [but if on]
a reported statement22 [the author is] R.
Malkio. And your mnemonic23 is, 'The
Mishnah24 is queen'.25 What is the practical
difference between them?26 — [The
statement on] Bondwomen.27 R. SIMEON B.
GAMALIEL SAID, etc. Is not this the same
view as that of the first Tanna?28 — The
practical difference between them [is the case
of a woman] who plays with little cubs29 or [is
addicted to] checkers.30
MISHNAH. IF A MAN FORBADE HIMSELF BY
VOW TO HAVE INTERCOURSE WITH HIS
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
31
WIFE31 BETH SHAMMAI RULED: [SHE MUST
CONSENT TO THE DEPRIVATION FOR] TWO
WEEKS;32 BETH HILLEL RULED: [ONLY
FOR] ONE WEEK.32 STUDENTS MAY GO
AWAY33 TO STUDY THE TORAH, WITHOUT
THE PERMISSION [OF THEIR WIVES FOR A
PERIOD OF] THIRTY DAYS; LABORERS
[ONLY FOR] ONE WEEK. THE TIMES FOR
CONJUGAL DUTY PRESCRIBED IN THE
TORAH34 ARE: FOR MEN OF
INDEPENDENCE,35 EVERY DAY; FOR
LABORERS, TWICE A WEEK; FOR ASS-
DRIVERS,36 ONCE A WEEK; FOR CAMEL-
DRIVERS,37 ONCE IN THIRTY DAYS; FOR
SAILORS,38 ONCE IN SIX MONTHS. THESE
ARE THE RULINGS OF R. ELIEZER.
GEMARA. What is the reason of Beth
Shammai?39 — They derive their ruling from
[the law relating to] a woman who bears a
female child.40 And Beth Hillel? — They
derive their ruling from [the law relating to]
one who bears a male child.41 Why should not
Beth Hillel also derive their ruling from [the
law relating to] a woman who bears a female
child?42 — If they had derived their ruling
from [the law relating to] a woman who bears
a child they should indeed have ruled thus,
but [the fact is that] Beth Hillel derive their
ruling from [the law of] the menstruant.43 On
what principle do they44 differ? — One45 is of
the opinion that the usual46 [is to be inferred]
from the usual,47 and the other48 is of the
opinion that what a husband has caused49
should be derived from that which he has
caused.50
Rab stated: They44 differ only in the case of
one who specified [the period of abstention]
but where he did not specify the period it is
the opinion of both that he must divorce her
forthwith and give her the Kethubah. Samuel,
however, stated: Even where the period had
not been specified the husband may delay
[his divorce],51 since it might be possible for
him to discover some reason52 for [the
remission of] his vow.53 But surely, they54
once disputed this question; for have we not
learned: If a man forbade his wife by vow to
have any benefit from him he may, for thirty
days, appoint a steward,55 but if for a longer
period he must divorce her and give her the
Kethubah.
And [in connection with this] Rab stated:
This ruling applies only where he specified
[the period] but where he did not specify it he
must divorce her forthwith and give her the
Kethubah, while Samuel stated: Even where
the period had not been specified the
husband may also postpone [his divorce],51
since it might be possible for him, to discover
some grounds52 for [the annulment of his
vow]?56 — [Both disputes are] required. For
if [their views] had been stated in the
former57 only it might have been assumed
that only in that case did Rab maintain his
view, since [the appointment] of a steward is
not possible but that in the second case58
where [the appointment] of a steward is
possible he agrees with Samuel. And If the
second case58 only had been stated it might
have been assumed that only in that case did
Samuel maintain his view59 but that in the
former case60 he agrees with Rab. [Hence
both statements were] necessary.
STUDENTS MAY GO AWAY TO STUDY,
etc. For how long [may they go away] with
the permission [of their wives]? — For as
long as they desire.
1. V. Rashi.
2. Lit., 'thus'.
3. R. Ashi.
4. [H], lit., 'another thing', sc. 'something
unnamable', e.g., swine, leprosy, idolatry and
sodomy.
5. One of the pieces of meat.
6. Mar Zutra (v. Rashi).
7. Lit., 'he went',
8. That welled up in her mouth as a result of the
acrid flavor of the fruit.
9. Lit., 'it became (transparent) like glass' (v.
Rashi).
10. Lit., 'spit (and) eject' (bis).
11. Lit., 'to stand', v. Rashi.
12. Such as a horse or an ass or (according to
another interpretation) 'male beasts' (v. Rashi
and cf. BaH a.l.).
13. Cattle or (according to the second
interpretation in n. 9) 'female beasts'.
14. Or 'swollen', v. next note.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
32
15. Because the spinner must frequently moisten
the thread, with his saliva (v. Jast.). Aliter:
'the flax causes an offensive smell in the
mouth and distends the lips' (cf. Rashi and
Golds.).
16. That has been used for the roasting of meat on
a festival, may at the time be put aside (v.
Bezah 28b).
17. Whom a woman brought to her husband at
her marriage (v. our Mishnah).
18. That these, even without the pubic hairs, are
sufficient indication of pubes (v. Nid. 52a).
19. Belorith [H] (cf. Sanh, Sonc. ed. p. 114, n. 5).
An Israelite trimming the hairs of a heathen
must withdraw his hand at a distance of three
finger's breadth on every side of the forelock
(A.Z. 29a).
20. [H], is forbidden to be spread on a wound
because it gives the appearance of an incised
imprint (v. Mak. 21).
21. Forbidden, if made by a heathen, because it is
smeared over with lard.
22. [H], an opinion or dictum of Rabbis, not
recorded in a Mishnah or Baraitha, reported
by their disciples or colleagues.
23. An aid to the recollection as to which
statements were made by R. Malkia and R.
Malkio respectively.
24. [H], a general term for Mishnah and Baraitha
in contradiction to [H] (v. supra note 7).
25. I.e., more authoritative than a reported
statement. Malkia [H] whose name closely
resembles (queen) [H] (and not Malkio) is to
be associated with the Mishnah and the
Baraitha that are designated queen.
26. R. Hanina and R. Papa.
27. Which is recorded in our Mishnah. According
to R. Papa the comment on it must be that of
R. Malkia (cf. supra note 10) while according
to R. Hanina it is included among the
statements attributed to R. Malkio, v. A.Z.
29a, and Mak. 21a.
28. R. Eliezer. What difference is there for all
practical purposes whether the reason for the
ruling Is unchastity or idiocy?
29. V. Jast. Or 'wooden cubs', counters in a game
(cf. Levy).
30. [H] or [H] nardeshir, the name of a game
played on a board; 'chess' (Rashi). [So named
after its inventor Ardeshir Babekan, v.
Krauss T.A. III, p. 113]. A woman who spends
her time in this manner may be exposed to the
temptation of unchastity but is in no danger of
falling into idiocy.
31. Lit., 'IF A MAN FORBADE BY VOW HIS
WIFE FROM INTERCOURSE'.
32. After this period it is the duty of the husband
either to have his vow disallowed or to release
his wife by divorce.
33. From their homes,
34. Ex. XXI, 10.
35. [H] ([rt. [H]], Piel, 'to walk about'), men who
have no need to pursue an occupation to earn
their living and are able 'to walk about' idly.
36. Who carry produce from the villages to town
and whose occupation requires their absence from their home town during the
whole of the week.
37. Who travel longer distances from their homes.
38. Whose sea voyages take them away for many
months at a time.
39. Who allow TWO WEEKS.
40. Intercourse with whom is forbidden for two
weeks (v. Lev. XII, 5),
41. In whose case the prohibition is restricted to
one week (ibid. 2).
42. The fact that the longer period of two weeks
has Pentateuchal sanction should entitle a
husband to vow abstention for a similar
length of time.
43. The period of whose uncleanness is only seven
days (v. Lev. XV, 19).
44. Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel.
45. Lit., 'Master', sc. Beth Hillel.
46. Such as a quarrel between husband and wife
resulting in a vow of abstention.
47. Menstruation which is a monthly occurrence.
Births are not of such regular occurrence.
48. Beth Shammai.
49. Abstention on account of his vow.
50. Birth. Menstruation is not the result of a
husband's action.
51. For two weeks according to Beth Shammai or
one week according to Beth Hillel.
52. [H], lit., 'a door'; some ground on which to
justify his plea that had he known it he would
never have made that vow; v. Ned, 21.
53. A competent authority, if satisfied with the
reason, may under such conditions disallow a
vow.
54. Rab and Samuel.
55. To supply his wife's needs.
56. Cf. supra n. 11. Why then should Rab and
Samuel unnecessarily repeat the same
arguments?
57. The vow against marital duty.
58. A vow forbidding other benefits.
59. Since the appointment of a steward is feasible.
60. The vow against marital duty.
Kethuboth 62a
What should be the usual periods?1 — Rab
said: One month at the college2 and one
month at home; for it is said in the
Scriptures, In any matter of the courses
which came in and went out month by month
throughout all the months of the year.3 R.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
33
Johanan, however, said: One month at the
college and two months at home; for it is said
in the Scriptures, A month they were in
Lebanon and two months at home.4 Why
does not Rab also derive his opinion from this
text?4 — The building of the holy Temple is
different [from the study of the Torah] since
it could be carried on by others.5 Then why
does not R. Johanan derive his opinion from
the former text?3 — There [the conditions
were] different because every man was in
receipt of relief.6
Rab said:7 A sigh breaks down half of the
human constitution,8 for it is said in
Scripture, Sigh, therefore, thou son of man;
with the breaking of thy loins9 and with
bitterness shalt thou sigh.10 R. Johanan,
however, said: Even all the human
constitution, for it is said in Scripture, And it
shall be when they say unto thee: Wherefore
sighest thou? that thou shalt say: Because of
the tidings, for it cometh; and every heart
shall melt, and all hands shall be slack, and
every spirit shall faint, and all knees shall
drip with water.11 As to R. Johanan, is it not
also written, 'With the breaking of thy loins'?
— [The meaning of] this is that when [the
breaking] begins it does so from the loins.
And as to Rab, is it not also written, 'And
every heart shall melt, and all hands shall be
slack, and every spirit shall be faint'? — The
report of the holy Temple is different since
[the calamity] was very severe.
An Israelite and an idolater were once
walking together on the same road and the
idolater could not keep pace with the
Israelite. Reminding him of the destruction of
the holy Temple [the latter] grew faint and
sighed; but still the idolater was unable to
keep pace with him. 'Do you not say', the
idolater asked him, 'that a sigh breaks half of
the human body'? — 'This applies only', the
other replied, 'to a fresh calamity but not to
this one with which we are familiar. As
people say: A woman who is accustomed to
bereavements is not alarmed [when another
occurs]'.
MEN OF INDEPENDENCE EVERY DAY.
What is meant by tayyalin?12 — Raba
replied: Day students.13 Said Abaye to him:
[These are the men] of whom it is written in
Scripture, It is vain for you14 that ye rise
early, and sit up late, ye that eat of the bread
of toil; so He giveth15 unto those who chase
their sleep away;16 and 'these',17 R. Isaac
explained, 'are the wives of the scholars,18
who chase the sleep from their eyes19 in this
world and achieve thereby the life of the
world to come',20 and yet you Say. Day
students'!21 — [The explanation]. however,
said Abaye, is in agreement [with a
statement] of Rab who said [a man of
independence is one.] for instance, like R.
Samuel b. Shilath22 who eats of his own,
drinks of his own and sleeps in the shadow of
his mansion23 and a king's officer24 never
passes his door.25 When Rabin came26 he
stated: [A man of independence is one]. for
instance, like the pampered men of the
West,27
R. Abbahu28 was once standing in a bath
house, two slaves supporting him, when [the
floor of] the bath house collapsed under
him.29 By chance he was near a column [upon
which] he climbed30 taking up the slaves with
him.31 R. Johanan was once ascending a
staircase, R. Ammi and R. Assi supporting
him, when the staircase collapsed under him.
He himself climbed up and brought them up
with him. Said the Rabbis to him, 'Since
[your strength is] such, why do you require
support?32 — 'Otherwise', he replied. what
[strength] will I reserve for the time of my
old age?'
FOR LABORERS TWICE A WEEK. Was it
not, however, taught: Laborers, once a week?
— R. Jose the son of R. Hanina replied: This
is no difficulty; the former33 [speaks of
laborers] who do their work in their own
town while the latter [speaks of those] who do
their work in another town — So it was also
taught: Laborers [perform their marital
duties] twice a week. This applies only [to
those] who do their work in their own town,
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
34
but for those who do their work in another
town [the time is only] once a week
FOR ASS-DRIVERS ONCE A WEEK.
Rabhah son of R. Hanan34 said to Abaye: Did
the Tanna35 go to all this trouble36 to teach us
[merely the law relating to] the man of
independence37 and the laborer?38 — The
other replied: No;
1. That students should (a) be permitted to be
away from their wives even with their
consent, and (b) remain at home (v. Rashi).
According to one opinion the restrictions
spoken of here apply to laborers only.
Students are allowed greater freedom. (V.
Tosaf. s.v. [H], a.l.).
2. Lit., 'here'.
3. I Chron. XXVII, emphasis on 'month by
month'.
4. I Kings V, 28.
5. Solomon had sufficient men for the work and
required each group for no longer than one
month out of every three. The study of the
Torah demands more time.
6. The stipend allowed by the king. This
allowance enabled a husband to provide a
comfortable living for his wife who, in return,
consented to his absence from home every
alternate month. In the case of students,
however, whose study brings no worldly
reward to their wives, the period of absence
from home should not exceed one month in
every three.
7. The following discussion is introduced here on
account of the difference of opinion between
Rab and R. Johanan on the application of
Scriptural texts, which is characteristic of this
as of the previous discussion.
8. Lit., 'body'.
9. The loins are in the middle of the body.
10. Ezek. XXI, 11.
11. Ibid. 12. The prophet's sigh is accompanied by
shattering effects on all parts of the body.
12. Cf. supra p. 369, n, 5.
13. [H], lit., 'sons of the lesson', i.e., students
domiciled in the college town who are able to
live in their own homes and to attend the
college for lessons only.
14. This admonition is addressed to those who
pursue worldly occupations.
15. Without toiling for it.
16. Ps. CXXVII, 2. E.V., unto his beloved. לידידו is
homiletically treated as coming from the
rt.[H] 'to shake', 'chase away'.
17. 'Those who chase their sleep away'.
18. [H]. V. Glos. s.v. Talmid Hakam.
19. In sitting up all night waiting for the return of
their husbands from the house of study.
20. As a reward for the consideration they show
to their studious husbands. Since the wives of
students who come from other towns would
not be expecting their husbands to return
home every day, the reference must obviously
be to those who live in the college town, i.e.,
the day students, which proves that even these
remain all night at the college.
21. How could men who spend their nights in
study be expected to perform the marital duty
daily?
22. A teacher of children (v. supra 50a) who made
an unostentatious but comfortable living.
23. [H] 'mansion', 'palace', i.e., his own home (cf.
'the Englishman's home is his castle').
24. [H], MS.M. [H] 'a detachment of soldiers',
25. To exact from him service or money. As his
wants were moderate, he had no need to be
under obligation to anyone for his food or
drink and had no need to go fat to seek his
livelihood. A man in such a position might
well be described as a man of independence.
26. From Palestine to Babylon.
27. Palestine, which lay to the west of Babylon
where this statement was made,
28. This is told in illustration of the physical
strength enjoyed by the Palestinians,
29. And the three were in danger of falling into
the pool of water over which the floor was
built,
30. Grasping it with one hand,
31. With his other hand.
32. Lit., 'to support him'.
33. Lit., 'here'. Our Mishnah.
34. MS.M., R. Hanin b. Papa.
35. The author of the first clause of out Mishnah,
which deals with the ease of a vow.
36. Lit., 'fold himself up'.
37. V. supra p. 369. n. 5.
38. Whose times only could be affected by an
abstinence of ONE WEEK (Beth Hillel) or
TWO WEEKS (Beth Shammai). The other
classes of persons enumerated, whose times
are once in thirty days or at longer intervals,
would not thereby be affected.
Kethuboth 62b
to all.1 But was it not stated ONCE IN SIX
MONTHS?2 — One who has bread in his
basket is not like one who has no bread in his
basket.3
Said Rabbah4 son of R. Hanan to Abaye:
What [is the law where] an ass-driver
becomes a camel-driver?5 — The other
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
35
replied: A woman prefers one Kab6 with
frivolity to ten Kab6 with abstinence.7
FOR SAILORS, ONCE IN SIX MONTHS.
THESE ARE THE WORDS OF R.
ELIEZER. R. Beruna8 stated in the name of
Rab:9 The Halachah follows R. Eliezer. R.
Adda b. Ahabah, however, stated in the name
of Rab: This is the view of R. Eliezer only.
but the Sages ruled: Students may go away to
study Torah without the permission [of their
wives even for] two or three years.10
Raba stated: The Rabbis11 relied on R. Adda
b. Ahabah12 and act accordingly at the risk of
[losing] their lives.13 Thus R. Rehumi who
was frequenting [the school] of Raba at
Mahuza14 used to return home on the Eve of
every Day of Atonement. On one occasion15
he was so attracted by his subject [that he
forgot to return home]. His wife was
expecting [him every moment, saying.] 'He is
coming soon,16 he is coming soon'16 As he did
not arrive she became so depressed that tears
began to flow from her eyes. He was [at that
moment] sitting on a roof. The roof collapsed
under him and he was killed.17
How often18 are scholars to perform their
marital duties? — Rab Judah in the name of
Samuel replied: Every Friday night.19 That
bringeth forth its fruit in its season,20 Rab
Judah, and some say R. Huna, or again. as
others say. R. Nahman, stated: This [refers to
the man] who performs his marital duty
every Friday night.21
Judah22 the son of R. Hiyya and son-in-law of
R. Jannai was always spending his time23 in
the school house but every Sabbath eve24 he
came home. Whenever he arrived the people
saw25 a pillar of light moving before him.
Once he was so attracted by his subject of
study [that he forgot to return home]. Not
Seeing26 that Sign. R. Jannai said to those
[around him], 'Lower27 his bed,28 for had
Judah been alive he would not have neglected
the performance of his marital duties'. This
[remark] was like an error that proceedeth
from the ruler,29 for [in consequence]
Judah's30 soul returned to its eternal rest.
Rabbi was engaged in the arrangements for
the marriage of his son into the family of R.
Hiyya,31 but when the Kethubah32 was about
to be written the bride passed away.33 'Is
there, God forbid', said Rabbi, 'any taint [in
the proposed union]?'34 An enquiry was
instituted35 into [the genealogy of the two]
families [and it was discovered that] Rabbi
descended from Shephatiah36 the son of
Abital37 while R. Hiyya descended from
Shimei a brother of David.38
Later39 he40 was engaged in preparations for
the marriage of his son into the family of R.
Jose b. Zimra. It was agreed that he41 should
spend twelve years at the academy.42 When
the girl was led before him41 he said to them,
'Let it43 be six years'. When they made her
pass before him [a second time] he said, 'I
would rather marry [her first] and then
proceed [to the academy]'. He felt abashed44
before his father, but the latter said to him.
'My son, you45 have the mind of your
creator;46 for in Scripture it is written first,
Thou bringest them in and plantest them47
and later it is written, And let them make Me
a sanctuary. that I may dwell among them.48
[After the marriage] he departed and spent
twelve years at the academy. By the time he
returned his wife49 had lost the power of
procreation. 'What shall we do?', said Rabbi.
'Should we order him to divorce her, it would
be said: This poor soul waited in vain! Were
he to marry another woman, it would be
said: The latter is his wife and the other his
mistress.' He prayed for mercy to be
vouchsafed to her, and she recovered.
R. Hanania b. Hakinai was about to go away
to the academy towards the conclusion of R.
Simeon b. Yohai's wedding. 'Wait for me',
the latter said to him, 'until I am able to join
you'.50 He, however, did not wait for him but
went away alone and spent twelve years at
the academy. By the time he returned the
streets of the town were altered and he was
unable to find the way51 to his home. Going
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
36
down to the river bank and sitting down
there he heard a girl being addressed thus:
'Daughter of Hakinai, O, daughter of
Hakinai, fill up your pitcher and let us go!' 'It
is obvious',52 he thought, 'that the girl is
ours', and he followed her. [When they
reached the house] his wife was sitting and
sifting flour. She53 lifted up her eyes and
seeing him, was so overcome with joy54 that
she fainted.55 'O, Lord of the universe', [the
husband] prayed to Him, 'this poor soul; is
this her reward?'56 And so he prayed for
mercy to be vouchsafed to her and she
revived.
R. Hama b. Bisa went away [from home and]
spent twelve years at the house of study.
When he returned he said, 'I will not act as
did b. Hakina'.57 He therefore entered the
[local] house of study and sent word to his
house. Meanwhile his son, R. Oshaia58
entered, sat down before him and addressed
to him a question on [one of the] subjects of
study. [R. Hama]. seeing how well versed he
was in his studies, became very depressed.
'Had I been here,'59 he said, 'l also could have
had such a child'.- [When] he entered his
house his son came in, whereupon [the
father] rose before him, believing that he
wished to ask him some [further] legal
questions. 'What60 father', his wife
chuckled,61 'stands up before a son!' Rami b.
Hama applied to him [the following
Scriptural text:] And a threefold cord is not
quickly broken62 is a reference to R. Oshaia,
son of R. Hania. son of Bisa.63
R. Akiba was a shepherd of Ben Kalba
Sabua.64 The latter's daughter. seeing how
modest and noble [the shepherd] was, said to
him, 'Were I to be betrothed to you. would
you go away to [study at] an academy?' 'Yes',
he replied. She was then secretly betrothed to
him and sent him away. When her father
heard [what she had done] he drove her from
his house and forbade her by a vow to have
any benefit from his estate. [R. Akiba]
departed. and spent twelve years at the
academy. When he returned home he
brought with him twelve thousand disciples.
[While in his home town] he heard an old
man saying to her, 'How long
1. Even in respect of the other classes a vow may
be made for the specified periods only.
2. In the case of sailors. How could these be
affected by an abstention of ONE WEEK or
TWO WEEKS?
3. Proverb (Yoma 18b. Yeb. 32b). The latter
experiences the pangs of hunger much more
than the former who can eat the bread should
he decide to use it up. A sailor's wife may
partially satisfy her desires by the hope that
her husband may at any moment return. A
vow extinguishes all her hope; and she must
not, therefore, be allowed to suffer longer
than the periods indicated.
4. Var. 'Raba' (MS.S. and Asheri).
5. I.e., may an ass-driver become a camel-driver
without the permission of his wife, in view of
the longer absence from home which the new
occupation will involve.
6. V. Glos.
7. Proverb, (Sotah 20a, 21b). A woman prefers a
poor living in the enjoyment of the company
of her husband to a more luxurious one in his
absence. She would, therefore, rather have
her husband for a longer period at home,
though as a result he would be earning less,
than be deprived of his company for longer
periods. though as a result he would be
earning more.
8. Var. lec. 'Mattena' (Alfasi).
9. Var. lec, 'Raba' (Asheri).
10. And the Halachah would be in agreement
with the Sages who ate the majority.
11. I.e., his (Raba's) contemporaries.
12. According to whose statement the Sages
permitted students to leave their homes for
long periods (v. supra n. 3).
13. I.e., they die before their time as a penalty for
the neglect of their wives (v. Rashi).
14. A town on the Tigris, noted for Its commerce
and its large Jewish population.
15. Lit., 'one day'.
16. Lit., 'now',
17. Lit., 'his soul rested', sc, came to its eternal
test.
18. Lit., 'when'.
19. Lit., 'from the eve of Sabbath to the eve of
Sabbath'.
20. Ps. 1, 3.
21. Cf. B.K. 82a.
22. MS.M., 'R. Judah'.
23. Lit., 'was going and sitting'.
24. [H] 'twilight', sc, of the Sabbath eve.
25. Read with MS.M., [H] Cur. edd., [H] … [H]
(sing.) may refer to R. Jannai.
26. Cf. supra p' 375' n. 18,
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
37
27. Lit., 'bend', a mark of mourning for the dead,
28. [H]
29. Cf. Eccl, X, 5'
30. So MS.M., reading [H].
31. He was about to marry R. Hiyya's daughter
(Rashi).
32. V. Glos,
33. Lit., 'the soul of the girl rested'. V. supra p'
375, n. 10.
34. The unexpected death of the bride being due
to providential intervention to prevent an
undesirable union,
35. Lit., 'they sat and looked in',
36. David's son (II Sam, III, 4).
37. One of David's wives (ibid.).
38. As the latter was not a descendent of the
anointed king's family it was not proper for
his daughter to be united in marriage with
one who was.
39. Lit., 'he went'.
40. Rabbi,
41. Rabbi's son.
42. The marriage to be celebrated at the end of
this period.
43. The period of study prior to the marriage.
44. On account of his apparent fickleness,
45. In being influenced by affection to shorten the
courting interval and to hasten the marriage
day.
46. Who also hastened the day of His union with
Israel,
47. Ex, XV, 17, i.e., only after settlement in the
promised land was the sanctuary (the symbol
of the union between God and Israel) to be
built.
48. Ex. XXV, 8, i.e., while still in the wilderness.
(V. p. 376, n. 22).
49. Having been separated from him for more
than ten years (Rashi, cf. Yeb. 34b).
50. At the conclusion of the marriage festivities.
51. Lit., 'did not know (how) to go'.
52. Lit., 'infer from this'.
53. Read with MS.M., [H] Cut. edd., [H] may be
rendered 'he lifted up her eye' i.e., he
attracted her attention. (v. Jast. s.v. [H]).
54. Cf. supra p' 355, n. 12.
55. Lit., 'her spirit fled'.
56. For depriving herself of her husband so many
years for the sake of the Torah.
57. Who entered his house unexpectedly and
thereby neatly caused the death of his wife.
58. Who was unknown to his father.
59. I.e., had he remained at home and attended to
the education of his son.
60. Lit., is 'there'.
61. Lit., 'said'.
62. Eccl. IV, is.
63. Three generations of scholars all living at the
same time, v. B.B. Sonc. ed. p. 237. n. 8.
64. One of the three richest men of Jerusalem at
the time of the Vespasian siege. V. Git. 56a.
Kethuboth 63a
will you lead the life of a living widowhood?'
'If he would listen to me,' she replied. 'he
would spend [in study] another twelve years'.
Said [R. Akiba]: 'It is then with her consent
that I am acting'. and he departed again and
spent another twelve years at the academy.
When he finally returned he brought with
him twenty-four thousand disciples. His wife
heard [of his arrival] and went out to meet
him, when her neighbors said to her, 'Borrow
some respectable clothes and put them on',
but she replied: A righteous man regardeth
the life of his beast.1 On approaching him she
fell upon her face and kissed his feet.
His attendants were about to thrust her aside,
when [R. Akiba] cried to them, 'Leave her
alone, mine and yours are hers'.2 Her father,
on hearing that a great man had come to the
town, said, 'I shall go to him; perchance he
will invalidate my vow',3 When he came to
him [R. Akiba] asked, 'Would you have made
your vow if you had known that he was a
great man?' '[Had he known]' the other
replied. 'even one chapter or even one Single
Halachah [I would not have made the vow]'.
He then said to him, 'I am the man'.4 The
other fell upon his face and kissed his feet
and also gave him half of his wealth.5
The daughter of R. Akiba acted in a similar
way6 towards Ben Azzai. This is indeed an
illustration of the proverb:7 'Ewe follows
ewe; a daughter's acts are like those of her
mother.'
R. Joseph the son of Raba [was] sent [by] his
father to the academy under8 R. Joseph. and
they arranged for him [to stay there for] six
years. Having been there three years and the
eve of the Day of Atonement approaching. he
said, 'I would go and see my family'. When
his father heard [of his premature arrival] he
took up a weapon and went out to meet him.
'You have remembered', he said to him,
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
38
'your mistress!'9 Another version: He said to
him, 'You have remembered your dove!'10
They got involved in a quarrel and neither
the one nor the other ate of the last meal
before the fast.11
MISHNAH. IF A WIFE REBELS12 AGAINST
HER HUSBAND. HER KETHUBAH13 MAY BE
REDUCED BY SEVEN DENARII14 A WEEK.15
R. JUDAH SAID: SEVEN TROPAICS.16 FOR
HOW LONG MAY THE REDUCTION
CONTINUE TO BE MADE? UNTIL [A SUM]
CORRESPONDING TO HER KETHUBAH [HAS
ACCUMULATED].17 R. JOSE SAID:
REDUCTIONS MAY BE MADE
CONTINUALLY UNTIL [SUCH TIME] WHEN,
SHOULD AN INHERITANCE FALL TO HER
FROM ELSEWHERE, [HER HUSBAND] WILL
BE IN A POSITION TO COLLECT FROM HER
THE [FULL AMOUNT DUE]. SIMILARLY, IF A
HUSBAND REBELS AGAINST HIS WIFE, AN
ADDITION OF THREE18 DENARII A WEEK IS
MADE TO HER KETHUBAH. R. JUDAH SAID:
THREE TROPAICS.
GEMARA. REBELS in what [respect]? — R.
Huna replied: [In respect] of conjugal union.
R. Jose the son of R. Hanina replied: [In
respect] of work.
We learned, SIMILARLY, IF A HUSBAND
REBELS AGAINST HIS WIFE. Now
according to him who said, '[In respect] of
conjugal union [this ruling] is quite logical
and intelligible;19 but according to him who
said, '[In respect] of work', is he20 [it may be
objected] under any obligation [at all to
work] for her?21 — Yes,22 [rebellion being
possible] when he declares 'I will neither
sustain nor support [my wife]' — But did not
Rab state: If a man says. 'I will neither
sustain nor support [my wife]', he must
divorce her and give her the Kethubah?23 —
Is it not necessary to consult him [before
ordering him to divorce her]?24
An objection was raised: The same25 [law26 is
applicable to a woman] betrothed27 or
married, even to a menstruant, even to a sick
woman and even to one who was awaiting the
decision of the levir.28 Now,29 according to
him who said, '[In respect] of conjugal union'
it is quite correct to mention the sick,
1. A quotation from Prov. XII, 10.
2. I.e., it is thanks to her suggestion and
encouragement that he and, through him, his
disciples, were able to acquire their
knowledge.
3. Which a competent authority may under
certain conditions do.
4. Lit., 'he'.
5. Lit., money'.
6. As her mother had done towards R. Akiba
7. Lit., 'and this it is that people say'.
8. Lit., 'before'.
9. [H] Lit., 'your harlot'. Var. lec. 'thy mate',
'thy beloved'.
10. [H] This version is obtained by the slight
interchange of a h for a z (cf. Supra n. 8).
11. [H] (rt. [H], 'to separate', sever', 'cease') i.e.,
did not eat the [H], the 'meal which, so to
speak. causes one to cease' the eating of food
until the conclusion of the Day of Atonement
after nightfall on the following day.
12. The term is explained in the Gemara infra.
13. V. Glos.
14. Plural of Dinar. V. Glos.
15. This is regarded as the equivalent of the value
of the seven kinds of work (supra 59b) a
woman is expected to perform for her
husband. (Cf. M.R. Gen. LII).
16. Half a Dinar.
17. Then she may be divorced, and cannot claim
her Kethubah.
18. Corresponding to the three obligations of a
husband, prescribed in Ex. XXI, 10.
19. Since a husband, like a wife, might sometimes
decide to rebel in this respect.
20. A husband.
21. Surely not. How then, in this respect. is
rebellion applicable to him?
22. I.e., his duty to maintain and support his wife
corresponds to her duty to work for him.
23. Infra 77a. presumably at once, while
according to Out Mishnah every week AN
ADDITION … IS MADE TO HER
KETHUBAH.
24. Of course it is; since he may quite possibly be
persuaded to resume his obligations. It is
during this period of negotiation that the
weekly additions are made to the Kethubah.
25. Lit., '(it is) one to me'.
26. Relating to the rebellion of a wife against her
husband.
27. When she declares that she will refuse to
marry.
28. Infra 64a. [H], the widow of a man who died
childless, who must either be taken in
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
39
marriage by her deceased husband's brother
or submit to Halizah (v. Glos.) from him.
29. Cut. edd. insert in parentheses: 'This is
correct according to him who said "(In
respect) of work'; but according to him who
said (In respect) of conjugal union", is a
menstruant capable of conjugal union? — He
can answer you: One who has bread in his
basket is not like one who has none'. Others
say, v, infra p. 382.
Kethuboth 63b
but according to him who said, '[In respect]
of work', is a sick woman [it may be objected]
fit to do work?1 — The fact, however, is
that2 [in respect] of conjugal union all3 agree
that [a wife who refuses] is regarded as a
rebellious woman.4 They3 differ only in
respect of work. One Master is of the opinion
that [for a refusal] of work [a wife] is not to
be regarded as rebellious and the other
Master holds the opinion [that for a refusal]
of work also [a wife] is regarded as
rebellious.
[To turn to] the main text,5 If a wife rebels
against her husband, her Kethubah may be
reduced by seven Dinarii a week. R. Judah
said: Seven tropaics. Our Masters, however,
took a second vote6 [and ordained] that an
announcement regarding her shall be made
on four consecutive Sabbaths and that then
the court shall send her [the following
warning]: 'Be it known to you that even if
your Kethubah is for a hundred Maneh7 you
have forfeited it'.8 The same [law is
applicable to a woman] betrothed or
married, even to a menstruant, even to a sick
woman, and even to one who was awaiting
the decision of the levir.9 Said R. Hiyya b.
Joseph to Samuel: Is a menstruant capable of
conjugal union?10 — The other replied: One
who has bread in his basket is not like one
who has no bread in his basket11
Rami b. Hama stated: The announcement
concerning her12 is made only in the
Synagogues and the houses of study. Said
Raba: This may be proved by a deduction,13
it having been taught, 'Four Sabbaths
consecutively'.14 This is decisive.15
Rami b. Hania further stated: [The warning]
is sent to her16 from the court twice, once
before the announcement and once after the
announcement.
R. Nahman b. R. Hisda stated in his
discourse: The Halachah is in agreement with
our Masters.17 Raba remarked: This is
senseless.18 Said R. Nahman b. Isaac to him,
'Wherein lies19 its senselessness? I, in fact,
told it to him, and it was in the name of a
great man that I told it to him. And who is it?
R. Jose the son of R. Hanina!' Whose view
then is he20 following? — The first of the
undermentioned.21 For it was stated: Raba
said in the name of R. Shesheth, 'The
Halachah is that she16 is to be consulted',22
while R. Huna b. Judah stated in the name of
R. Shesheth, 'The Halachah is that she is not
to be consulted'.23
What is to be understood by 'a rebellious
woman'?24 — Amemar said: [One] who says.
'I like him25 but wish to torment him'.26 If
she said, however, 'He is repulsive to me', no
pressure is to be brought to bear upon her.27
Mar Zutra ruled: Pressure is to be brought to
bear upon her.28 Such a case once occurred,
and Mar Zutra exercised pressure upon the
woman and [as a result of the reconciliation
that ensued] R. Hanina of Sura29 was born
from the re-union. This, however,30 was not
[the right thing to do]. [The successful]
result] was due to the help of providence.31
R. Zebid's daughter-in-law rebelled [against
her husband]32 and took possession of her
silk [cloak].33 Amemar, Mar Zutra and R.
Ashi were sitting together34 and R. Gamda
sat beside them; and in the course of the
session they laid down the law: [If a wife]
rebels she forfeits her worn-out35 clothing
that may still be in existence. Said R. Gamda
to them, 'Is it because R. Zebid is a great man
that you would flatter him? Surely R.
Kahana stated that Raba had only raised this
question36 but had not solved it'. Another
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
40
version:37 In the course of their session they
decided: [If a wife] rebels she does not forfeit
her worn-out clothing38 that may still be in
existence. Said R. Gamda to them,
1. Naturally not. How then could she in this
respect be guilty of rebellion?
2. Lit., 'but'.
3. R. Huna and R. Jose.
4. And the Baraitha cited deals with conjugal
union.
5. Of the quotation, 'the same law, etc.' cited
supra 63a ad fin.
6. Lit., 'they (i.e., their votes) were counted
again'.
7. V. Glos.
8. At the end of the four weeks.
9. Cf. Tosef. Keth. V., and supra notes 1 and 2.
10. Obviously not; she being forbidden to her
husband until the conclusion of the days of
her Levitical uncleanness and the seven
subsequent 'clean days'.
11. Cf. supra p. 374. n. 9 The woman's declared
rebellion and the man's knowledge that even
during her cleanness she will remain
forbidden. aggravate the pain of the
deprivation and entitle him to immediate
redress.
12. A woman who rebelled against her husband
13. From the very text of the ordinance.
14. Emphasis on Sabbaths' days of test when
everybody is free from work and able to
attend Synagogue and the houses of study.
15. Lit., 'Infer from this'.
16. A woman who rebelled against her husband.
17. Whose ruling is recorded in the Baraitha just
cited (v. supra p. 381. n. 12 and text).
18. [H] (cf. [H] 'empty'. uncultivated'). 'a hollow,
senseless statement'. The addition of the [H] is
on the analogy of words like [H] (Levy).
Others derive if from [H] 'cave out' (v. Jast.)
19. Lit., 'what'.
20. Raba who regarded the statement as senseless.
21. Lit., 'like that'
22. With a view to inducing her to resume her
duties, and during the negotiations. contrary
to the view of our Masters, only the weekly
sum mentioned is deducted from her
Kethubah. [On this interpretation which
follows Rashi, Raba decides in accordance
with our Mishnah against our Masters. Tosaf.
explains differently R Nahman, In stating that
the Halachah is with our Masters, meant to
exclude thereby the view of Rami B Hama
regarding the two warnings. He maintained
that the words of our masters had to be taken
as they stand, with no mention of any warning
before the proclamation. This is however
rejected by Raba, who declares, on the
authority of R. Shesheth, the Halachah to be
that a warning is given prior to the
proclamation The warning will, In this case,
be that she will lose the while of her Kethubah
should she still prove recalcitrant after the
proclamation].
23. [On Tosaf. interpretation. (Previous note) the
meaning is she is not warned before but only
after the proclamation, agreeing with R.
Nahman b. R. Hisda].
24. Heb. Moredeth, whose divorce is to be delayed
and deductions are in the meantime to be
made from her Kethubah.
25. Her husband.
26. In this case divorce is delayed in the hope that
the weekly reductions of her Kethubah and the
persuasions used by the court will induce her
to change her attitude.
27. [The husband can, if he wishes, divorce her
forthwith without giving her Kethubah; v.
Rashi and Tosaf. s.v. [H].]
28. V. Supra note 4.
29. Supra was the seat of the famous school of
Rab, in the South of Babylonia.
30. Though the pressure in this case resulted to
the birth of a great man.
31. Lit., 'assistance of heaven'
32. [She said, 'He is repulsive to me' (Rashi) v.
infra p. 384, n. 5].
33. Which she had brought with her when she
married, and which was assessed and entered
to her Kethubah.
34. Lit., 'sat'.
35. V supra n. 11
36. As to the forfeiture of worn-out clothes.
37. Lit., 'there are who say'.
38. V. supra p. 383, n. 21.
Kethuboth 64a
'Is it because R. Zebid is a great man1 that
you turn the law against him? Surely R.
Kahana stated that Raba had only raised the
question but had not solved it'. Now that it
has not been stated what the law is,2 [such
clothing] is not to be taken away from her if
she has already seized them, but if she has
not yet seized them they are not to be given to
her. We also make her wait twelve months, a
[full] year. for her divorce,3 and during these
twelve months she receives no maintenance
from her husband.4
R. Tobi b. Kisna stated in the name of
Samuel: A certificate of rebellion may be
written against a betrothed woman but no
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
41
such certificate may be written against one
who is awaiting the decision of the levir.5 An
objection was raised: The same [law6 is
applicable to a woman] betrothed or
married, even to a menstruant, even to a sick
woman and even to one who was awaiting the
decision of the levir!7 — This is no
contradiction. The one8 refers to the case
where the man claimed her;9 the other10 to
that where she claimed him.11 For R. Tahlifa
b. Abimi stated in the name of Samuel: If he
claimed her9 he is attended to;12 if she
claimed him she is not attended to.13 To what
case did you explain the statement of
Samuel14 as referring? To the one where she
claimed him?15 [But if so] instead of Saying16
'A certificate of rebellion may be written
against a betrothed woman' it should have
been said, 'On behalf of a betrothed
woman'!17 — This is no difficulty. Read, 'On
behalf of a betrothed woman'.18
Wherein does a woman awaiting the decision
of the levir differ [from the man] that no
[certificate of rebellion should be issued on
her behalf]? Obviously because we tell her,
'Go, you are not commanded [to marry]';19
[but. then.] a betrothed woman also should
be told, 'Go, you are not commanded [to
marry]'!19 Again should [it be explained to be
one] where she comes with the plea Saying. 'I
wish to have a staff in my hand and a spade
for my burial',20 [this then should] also apply
to a woman awaiting the decision of the levir
if she comes with such a plea! —
[The proper explanation] then [must be this]:
Both statements21 [refer to the case] where
the man claimed,22 and yet there is no
difficulty. since one23 may refer24 to the
performance of Halizah and the other25 to
that of the levirate marriage. For R. Pedath
stated in the name of R. Johanan: [If the
levir] claimed her for the performance of
Halizah his request is to be attended to,26 but
if he claimed her for the levirate marriage his
request is disregarded.27 Why [is he] not
[attended to when he claims her] for the
levirate marriage? Naturally because we tell
him, 'Go and marry another woman'; [but
then even when he claims her] for the
performance of Halizah could we not also tell
him, 'Go and marry another woman'? Again
should the answer be: [Because] he can plead.
'As she is bound to me28 no other wife will be
given me'. Here also29 [could he not plead]
'As she is bound to me no other wife will be
given to me'? —
[The proper explanation] then [is this]: Both
statements30 [deal with one] who claimed her
for the levirate marriage. but there is really
no difficulty. one31 being32 in agreement with
the earlier Mishnah while the other is32 in
agreement with the latter Mishnah. For we
have learned: The commandment of the
levirate marriage must take precedence over
that of Halizah.33 [This was the case] in
earlier days when [levirs] had the intention of
observing the commandment — Now,
however, when their intention is not the
fulfillment of the commandment, it has been
ruled that the commandment of Halizah
takes precedence over that of the levirate
marriage.34
FOR HOW LONG MAY THE REDUCTION
CONTINUE TO BE MADE?, etc. What [is
meant by] TROPAICS? R. Shesheth replied:
[one tropaic is] an istira. And how much is an
istira? — Half a Zuz.35 So it was also taught:
R. Judah said: Three tropaics which [amount
to] nine Ma'ah35 [the reduction being at the
rate of] one Ma'ah and a half per day.36
R. Hiyya b. Joseph asked Of Samuel: In what
respect is he37 different [from his wife] that
he is allowed [a reduction] for the Sabbath,38
and in what respect is she different [from
him] that she is not allowed [an addition] for
the Sabbath?39 — In her case,40 since it is a
reduction that is made, [the seventh tropaic
the husband gains] does not have the
appearance of Sabbath pay. In his case,
however,41 since it is additions that are made,
1. And would humbly accept the ruling.
2. Lit., 'neither thus nor thus'.
3. To afford her an opportunity of changing her
attitude.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
42
4. [Rashi and Adreth among others restrict this
procedure to a rebellion out of repulsion, a
case illustrated in their view by the daughter-
in-law of R. Zebid (v. Supra p. 383, n. 10).
Where the rebellion was out of malice she
loses her Kethubah and dowry completely
after the warning at the end of four weeks.
Maim., on the other hand, applies it to
rebellion out of malice. In the case of rebellion
out of repulsion, she is granted a divorce
immediately because 'she is not a captive to
her husband that she should be forced to have
intercourse with him', and though she forfeits
her Kethubah, she loses none of her dowry (v.
Maim. Yad. Ishuth XIV, 8, and commentaries
a.l.). In his view the case of R. Zebid's
daughter-in-law was one of rebellion out of
malice].
5. Shomereth Yabam, v. Glos,
6. Of. 'a rebellious 'woman'.
7. Supra 63a, notes.
8. The Baraitha cited (v. supr n. 8).
9. And she refused him.
10. Samuel's ruling reported by R. Tobi.
11. And he refused to marry her.
12. And he is awarded a certificate of rebellion
against her.
13. She is not entitled to a certificate of rebellion
against him, which should enable her to
obtain the weekly additions to her Kethubah
(v. our Mishnah). The reason is given infa.
Thus it has been shown that there is a legal
difference between the case where he makes
the claim and between the case where she
makes the claim.
14. V. p. 384, n. 11.
15. V. p. 384, n. 12.
16. Lit., 'that'.
17. Against her husband.
18. The emendation involving only the slight
change of [H] to [H].
19. A woman is under no obligation to propagate
the race (v. Yeb. 65b).
20. I.e., a son who will provide for her while she is
alive and arrange for her burial when she
dies.
21. Lit., 'these and these', the statement reported
in the name of Samuel as well as the other
cited from 63a Supra.
22. And she refused him.
23. The Baraitha cited (v. supra p. 384, n. 8).
24. Lit., 'here'.
25. Samuel's ruling reported by R. Tobi.
26. V. supra p. 384, n. 13.
27. The reason is given anon in the latter
Mishnah cited.
28. By the marital bond which only Halizah can
sever.
29. When he claims her for levitate marriage.
30. V. supra p. 385. n. 8.
31. V. supra p. 385. n. 10.
32. Lit., 'here'.
33. A woman who refused the levir's claim was,
therefore, guilty of rebellion, and a certificate
against her was issued to the levit.
34. No certificate of rebellion may, therefore, be
issued against a woman who refuses such a
marriage.
35. V. Glos.
36. The week consisting of six working days.
37. The husband.
38. Seven tropaics corresponding to all the days
of the week including the Sabbath day.
39. The nine Ma'ah at the rate of one and a half
per day corresponding to six days only (cf.
supra n. 9).
40. I.e., when the woman rebels.
41. When the man rebels against his wife.
Kethuboth 64b
[another addition for the seventh day] would
have the appearance of Sabbath pay. R.
Hiyya b. Joseph [further] asked of Samuel:
What [is the reason for the distinction]
between a man who rebels [against his wife]
and a woman who rebels [against her
husband]?1 — The other replied. 'Go and
learn it from the market of the harlots; who
hires whom?'2 Another explanation: [The
manifestation of] his passions is external;
hers is internal.
MISHNAH. IF A MAN3 MAINTAINS HIS WIFE
THROUGH A TRUSTEE, HE MUST GIVE HER
[EVERY WEEK] NOT LESS THAN TWO
KABS4 OF WHEAT OR FOUR KABS OF
BARLEY. SAID R. JOSE: ONLY R. ISHMAEL
WHO LIVED NEAR EDOM5 GRANTED HER A
SUPPLY OF BARLEY.6 HE MUST ALSO GIVE
HER HALF A KAB OF PULSE AND HALF A
LOG4 OF OIL; AND A KAB OF DRIED FIGS
OR A MANEH4 OF PRESSED FIGS,7 AND IF
HE HAS NO [SUCH FRUIT] HE MUST SUPPLY
HER WITH A CORRESPONDING QUANTITY
OF OTHER8 FRUIT. HE MUST ALSO
PROVIDE HER WITH A BED, A MATTRESS9
AND10 A RUSH MAT. HE MUST ALSO GIVE
HER [ONCE A YEAR] A CAP FOR HER HEAD
AND A GIRDLE FOR HER LOINS; SHOES [HE
MUST GIVE HER] EACH MAJOR
FESTIVAL;11 AND CLOTHING [OF THE
VALUE] OF FIFTY ZUZ EVERY YEAR. SHE IS
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
43
NOT TO BE GIVEN NEW [CLOTHES]12 IN
THE SUMMER OR WORN-OUT CLOTHES IN
THE WINTER, BUT MUST BE GIVEN THE
CLOTHING [OF THE VALUE] OF FIFTY ZUZ
DURING THE WINTER, AND SHE CLOTHES
HERSELF WITH THEM WHEN THEY ARE
WORN-OUT DURING THE SUMMER; AND
THE WORN-OUT CLOTHES REMAIN HER
PROPERTY.13 HE MUST ALSO GIVE HER
[EVERY WEEK] A SILVER MA'AH FOR HER
[OTHER] REQUIREMENTS14 AND SHE IS TO
EAT WITH HIM ON THE NIGHT OF EVERY
SABBATH.15 IF HE DOES NOT GIVE HER A
SILVER MA'AH FOR HER OTHER
REQUIREMENTS, HER HANDIWORK
BELONGS TO HER.16 AND WHAT [IS THE
QUANTITY OF WORK THAT] SHE MUST DO
FOR HIM?17 THE WEIGHT OF FIVE SELA'S
OF WARP IN JUDAEA, WHICH AMOUNTS TO
TEN SELA'S IN GALILEE,18 OR THE WEIGHT
OF TEN SELA'S OF WOOF19 IN JUDAEA,
WHICH AMOUNTS TO TWENTY SELA'S IN
GALILEE.18 IF SHE WAS NURSING [HER
CHILD] HER HANDIWORK IS REDUCED AND
HER MAINTENANCE IS INCREASED. ALL
THIS APPLIES TO THE POOREST IN ISRAEL,
BUT IN THE CASE OF A MEMBER OF THE
BETTER CLASSES20 ALL IS FIXED
ACCORDING TO THE DIGNITY OF HIS
POSITION.
GEMARA. Whose [view is represented in]
our Mishnah?21 [It seems to be] neither that
of R. Johanan b. Beroka nor that of R.
Simeon. For we learned: And what must be
its22 size? Food for two meals for each, [the
quantity being] the food one eats on
weekdays and not On the Sabbath; so R.
Meir. R. Judah said: As on the Sabbath and
not as on weekdays. And both intended to
give the lenient ruling.23 R. Johanan b.
Beroka said:24 A loaf that is purchased for a
dupondiom25 [when the cost of wheat is at the
rate of] four Se'ah25 for a Sela'.25
R. Simeon said:26 Two thirds of a loaf, three
of which are made from a Kab.27 Half of this
[loaf is the size prescribed] for a leprous
house,28 and half of its half29 renders one's
body30 unfit;31 and half of the half of its half
to be susceptible to Levitical uncleanness,32
Now, whose [view is that expressed in our
Mishnah]?33 If [it be suggested that it is that
of] R. Johanan b. Beroka [the prescribed
TWO KABS would only] be [sufficient for]
eight [meals].34 and if [the suggestion is that it
is that of] R. Simeon [the TWO KABS would]
be [sufficient even for] eighteen [meals].35 —
[Our Mishnah may] in fact [represent the
view of] R. Johanan b. Beroka but, as R.
Hisda said elsewhere,36 'Deduct a third of
them for the [profit of the] shopkeeper',37 so
here38 also take a third39 and add to them.40
But [do not the meals] still amount only to
twelve?41 — She eats with him on Friday
nights — 42
This is satisfactory according to
him who explained43 [TO EAT In our
Mishnah as] actual eating. What, however,
can be said according to him who explained
'eating' [to mean] intercourse? Furthermore,
[would not her total number of meals still] be
only thirteen?44 — The proper answer is
really this:45 As R. Hisda said elsewhere,46
'Deduct a half for the [profit of the]
shopkeeper.47 so here48 also take a half49 and
add to them.50 (Does not a contradiction arise
between the two statements of R. Hisda?51 —
There is no contradiction. One statement
refers52 to a place where [the sellers of the
wheat] supply also wood53 while the other
refers52 to a place where they do not supply
the wood.)54 If so55 [the number of meals] is
sixteen.56 With whose [view then would our
Mishnah agree]? With R. Hidka who ruled:
A man must eat on the Sabbath four meals?57
— It may be said to represent even the view
of the Rabbis, for one meal is to be reserved
for guests and occasional visitors.58 Now that
you have arrived at this position [our
Mishnah] may be said to represent even the
view of R. Simeon,59 for according to the
Rabbis60 three meals should be deducted61
for guests and occasional visitors62 and
according to R. Hidka63 two Only are to be
deducted for guests and occasional visitors.64
SAID R. JOSE: ONLY … GRANTED A
SUPPLY OF BARLEY, etc. Do they eat
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
44
barley at Edom only and throughout the
world none IS eaten? — It is this that he
meant: ONLY R. ISHMAEL WHO LIVED
NEAR EDOM GRANTED A SUPPLY OF
BARLEY equal to twice the quantity of
wheat, because the Idumean barley was of an
inferior quality.
THE MAN MUST ALSO GIVE HER HALF
A KAB OF PULSE. Wine, however, is not
mentioned. This provides support for a view
of R. Eleazar. For R. Eleazar stated:
1. I.e., why does the former lose only half a
tropaic a day while the latter loses a full
tropaic each day?
2. The man naturally hires the woman; which
shows that the male feels the deprivation mote
than the female, His compensation. therefore,
must be proportionately higher.
3. A husband who does not live with his wife.
4. V. Glos.
5. In the South of Palestine.
6. This is explained in the Gemara infta.
7. [H], a cake of pressed figs. The latter is sold
by weight; the former by measure,
8. Lit., 'from another place'.
9. [H], a mat of bark or reeds,
10. The separate edd. of the Mishnah read, 'And
if he has no mattress he gives her a rush mat'.
11. I.e., Passover, Pentecost and Tabernacles.
12. Which provide more warmth than outworn
clothes.
13. Even after her husband had provided her
with the new outfit. This is further discussed
in the Gemara infra.
14. Smaller expenses.
15. I.e., Friday nights, the prescribed time for
marital intercourse.
16. This is explained supra 59a as referring to the
surplus.
17. Where he supplies her with the prescribed
allowances.
18. The Galilean Sela' being equal in weight to
half of the Judean Sela'.
19. It is twice as difficult to web the warp than the
woof. Hence a larger Output is required of the
latter than of the former.
20. [H] lit., 'honored', respected'.
21. Which prescribed for a wife a minimum of
TWO KABS.
22. The loaf of bread required for an 'Erub
Tehumin. (v. Glos.).
23. I.e., to reduce the prescribed minimum of the
'Erub. R. Meir used to consume at a weekday
meal less bread than at a Sabbath meal at
which the richness of the additional Sabbath
dishes tempted him to eat more bread. R.
Judah, however, consumed on Sabbath, when
several satisfying courses ate served, less
bread than he would on weekdays owing to
the smaller number of courses.
24. In determining the quantity of bread required
for two meals.
25. V. Glos.
26. V. p. 388, n. 12.
27. Of wheat.
28. If a person remained in such a house (v. Lev.
XIV, 33ff) for a length of time during which
the quantity of bread mentioned can be
consumed his clothes become unclean and
require ritual washing (cf. Neg. XIII, 9).
29. If it consists of Levitically unclean food.
30. Of the person who ate it,
31. To eat Terumah before he performs ritual
immersion, v. 'Er. 82b.
32. [This latter passage does not occur in the
Mishnah 'Er. but is introduced in the Gemara
on 83a as a teaching by a Tanna].
33. Where a wife is allowed a minimum of TWO
KABS of wheat for the week. Since she must
have at least two meals a day, the two Kabs
should provide fourteen (seven times two)
meals, besides an additional one or two
(respectively. according to the Rabbis or to R.
Hidka, infra) for the Sabbath day.
34. According to R. Johanan b. Beroka a loaf that
contains food for two meals (v. supra p. 388. n.
12) is one 'that is purchased for a dupondium
when the cost of wheat is at the rate of four
Se'ah for a Sela', Each Sela' = four Dinarii,
each Dinar = six Ma'ahs and each Ma'ah =
two dupondia. Consequently a Sela' = (4 X 6 X
2) forty eight dupondta. a Se'ah = six Kabs =
twelve half-Kabs. Consequently four Se'ahs (4
X 12) forty-eight half-Kabs. For a
dupondium, therefore, half a Kab of wheat is
obtained; and since this quantity supplies two
meals each quarter of a Kab provides one
meal. The TWO KABS consequently provide
only eight meals.
35. R. Simeon's minimum is 'two thirds of a loaf,
three of which ate made of a Kab'. If two
thirds represent two meals (v. supra p. 388, n.
12) each third represents one meal. If three
loaves are made from one Kab, each Kab
represents (3 X 3) nine meals. The TWO
KABS, therefore, represent (6 X 9) = eighteen
meals. Now since according to our Mishnah a
wife must be allowed fourteen meals plus one
additional meal or two for the Sabbath (v.
supra note 9) neither the view of R. Johanan
b. Beroka nor that of R. Simeon can be
represented by it.
36. V. 'Er. 82b.
37. Though the shopkeeper buys at the rate of
four Se'ahs for a Sela' = half a Kab for a
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
45
dupondium (v. supra p. 389. n. 10) he sells at a
higher price, leaving for himself a profit of
one third of the purchase price. For each
dupondium, therefore, he sells only two thirds
of half a Kab. One third of half a Kab or one
sixth of a Kab thus provides one meal. Two
Kabs therefore, would produce (2 x 6) = twelve
meals.
38. In our Mishnah.
39. The shopkeeper's profit which the husband
saves by the supply of wheat instead of shop
baked loaves.
40. To the presumed number of eight. Four is a
third of twelve which is the number of meals
two Kabs provide.
41. Cf. supra p. 389. n. 13 ad fin. As, however, she
requires fourteen plus one or plus two meals
for the week (v. supra p. 389. n. 9) she is still
short of three or four meals.
42. Lit., 'the nights of the Sabbath'. Friday night
belongs to the Sabbath, the day always
beginning with the sunset of the previous day.
43. Infra 65b.
44. The twelve mentioned (v. supra p. 389. n. 13
ad fin.) plus the one she has on Friday night.
She is thus still short of a meal or meals (v.
supra p. 389. n. 9) for the Sabbath day.
45. Lit., 'but'.
46. V. 'Er. 82b.
47. Cf. supra p. 389, n. 13 mutatis mutandis.
48. In our Mishnah.
49. V. supra note 1.
50. Cf. supra note 2 mutatis mutandis. The
woman thus obtains her full number of meals.
51. Lit., 'a difficulty of R. Hisda against R. Hisda'.
52. Lit., 'that'.
53. For the baking of the bread. In such a case the
shopkeeper deducts only a third for his profit.
54. And the shopkeeper sells at a profit equal to
half of his purchase price to compensate
himself for the cost of the wood.
55. That a half is to be added.
56. Each half Kab producing four, instead of the
presumed two meals, the two Kabs would
produce (4 X 4 ) sixteen meals.
57. Shab. 117a. As R. Hidka is in the minority,
would an anonymous Mishnah which usually
represents the Halachah agree with the
opinion of an individual against that of a
majority?
58. Cf. supra p. 364. nn. 5-6. This leaves the
woman with fifteen meals, twelve for the six
weekdays and three for the Sabbath.
59. According to whom the TWO KABS would
provide eighteen meals.
60. Who maintain that only three meals are
prescribed for the Sabbath.
61. From the eighteen.
62. Cf. supra note 1.
63. Whose view is that for the Sabbath four meals
are prescribed.
64. Leaving for the woman four Sabbath meals
plus twelve for the week days.
Kethuboth 65a
No allowance for wine is made for a woman.1
And should you point out the Scriptural text,
I will go after my lovers, that give me my
bread and my water, my wool and my flax.
mine oil and my drink,2 [it may be replied
that the reference is to] things which a
woman desires.3 And what are they?
Jewelry.
R. Judah of Kefar Nabirya4 (others say: of
Kefar Napor5 Hayil) made the following
exposition: Whence is it derived that no
allowance for wines is made for a woman? —
[From Scripture in] which it is said, So
Hannah rose up after she had eaten6 in
Shiloh, and after drinking.7 only 'he had
drunk' but she did not drink. Now, then,
would you also [interpret:] 'She had eaten'8
that he6 did not eat? — What we say is [that
the deduction may be made] because the text
has deliberately been changed. For consider:
It was dealing with her, why did it change
[the form]?9 Consequently it may be deduced
that it was 'he who drank' and that she did
not drink.
An objection was raised: If [a woman] is
accustomed [to drink] she is given [an
allowance of drink]! — Where she is
accustomed to drink the case is different. For
R. Hinena b. Kahana stated in the name of
Samuel, 'If she was accustomed [to drink] she
is given an allowance of one cup; if she was
not accustomed [to it] she is given an
allowance of two cups'. What does he
mean?—
Abaye replied: It is this that he means: If she
was in the habit [of drinking] two cups in the
presence of her husband she is given one cup
in his absence; if she is used [to drink] in the
presence of her husband only one cup, she is
given none at all in his absence. And if you
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
46
prefer I might say: If she is used [to drink]
she is allowed some wine for her puddings10
only. For R. Abbahu stated in the name of R.
Johanan: It happened that when the Sages
granted the daughter-in-law of Nakdimon11
b. Gorion a weekly12 allowance of two Se'ahs
of wine for her puddings she13 said to them,
'May you grant such allowances to your
daughters'. A Tanna taught: She was a
woman awaiting the decision of the levir.14
Hence they did not reply Amen after her.15
A Tanna taught: One cup16 is becoming to a
woman; two are degrading. [and if she has]
three she solicits publicly.17 [but if she has]
four she solicits even an ass in the street and
cares not. Raba said: This was taught only [in
respect of a woman] whose husband is not
with her; but if her husband is with her [the
objection to her drinks] does not arise.18 But,
Surely. [there is the case of] Hannah whose
husband was with her!19 — With a guest20 it
is different,21 for R. Huna stated Whence is it
inferred that a guest is forbidden marital
union? [From Scripture in] which it is said,
And they rose up in the morning early and
worshipped before the Lord, and returned,
and came to their house to Ramah; and
Elkanah knew Hannah his wife; and the
Lord remembered her,22 only23 then24 but not
before.
Homa, Abaye's wife, came to Raba25 and
asked him, 'Grant me an allowance of board',
and he granted her the allowance. 'Grant me
[she again demanded] an allowance of wine'.
'I know', he said to her, 'that Nahmani26 did
not drink wine'. 'By the life of the Master [I
swear]'. she replied. 'that he gave me to
drink27 from horns28 like this'.29 As she was
showing it to him her arm was uncovered and
a light shone30 upon the court. Raba rose,
went home and solicited R. Hisda's
daughter.31 'Who has been to-day at the
court?' enquired R. Hisda's daughter. 'Homa
the wife of Abaye'. he replied. Thereupon she
followed her, striking her with the straps32 of
a chest33 until she chased her out of all
Mahuza.34 'You have', she said to her,
'already killed three [men].35 and now you
come to kill another [man]!'
The wife of R. Joseph the son of Raba came
before R. Nehemiah the son of R. Joseph and
said to him, 'Grant me an allowance of
board', and he granted her. 'Grant me also
an allowance of wine' [she demanded], and he
granted her. 'I know', he said to her, 'that the
people of Mahuza drink wine'. The wife of R.
Joseph the son of R. Menashya of Dewil36
came before R. Joseph and said to him,
'Grant me an allowance of board', and he
granted her. 'Grant me', she said, 'an
allowance of wine', and he granted her.
'Grant me', she said again. 'an allowance of
silks'. 'Why silks?' he asked. 'For your sake',
she replied. 'and for the sake of your friend
and for the sake of your associates'.37
HE MUST ALSO PROVIDE HER WITH A
BED, A MATTRESS, etc. Why38 should he
give her A MATTRESS AND A RUSH
MAT?39 — R. Papa replied: [This is done
only] in a place where it is the practice to
girth the bed with ropes.40 which would
hurt41 her.
Our Rabbis taught: She42 is not given43 a
cushion and a bolster. In the name of R.
Nathan it was stated: She is given a cushion
and a bolster. How is this to be understood?
If it is a case where she is used to it,44 what [it
may be objected] is the reason of the first
Tanna?45 And if it is a case where she is not
used to it,44 what [it may be asked] is the
reason of R. Nathan?46 — [The statement
was] necessary only in the case where it47 was
his habit but not her habit.48 The first
Tanna49 is of the opinion that [her husband]
may say to her, 'When I go away50 I take
them and when I return I bring them back
with me',51 while R. Nathan holds the opinion
that she can tell him, 'It might sometimes
happen [that you will return] at twilight52
when you will be unable to bring them53 and
so you will take mine54 and make me sleep on
the ground'.55
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
47
HE MUST ALSO GIVE HER [ONCE A
YEAR] A CAP. Said R. Papa to Abaye:
1. Alcoholic drinks might lead her to unchastity
(v. Rashi).
2. Hos. II, 7. And my drink, [H], presumably
including wine.
3. [H] (cf. supra n. 9) being derived from the rt.
[H] 'to long'. 'desire'.
4. MS.M., [H]. [Neburja. identified with en-
Nebraten in upper Galilee].
5. [H] MS.M. [H]; marg., [H].
6. [H]. This is taken as perfect 3rd pers. fem;
according to the accentuation of M.T. it is the
inf. estr. with fem. termination.
7. I Sam. I, 9. E.V., They had drunk. M.T. [H],
Inf. is taken as the equivalent of [H] (3rd
masc. sing.), 'he (Elkanah) had drunk'.
8. The word [H] (ibid.) instead of [H], [H] or [H]
9. From the finite to the infinite.
10. [H] (v. Jast.). Others, 'as an ingredient or
seasoning of a dish' (v. Rashi and Golds.).
11. Or 'Nicodemon', 'Nicodemus', one of the three
wealthiest men in Jerusalem in the days of the
siege by Vespasian and Titus (v. Git. 58a).
12. Lit., 'from the eve of the Sabbath to the eve of
the Sabbath'.
13. In her annoyance at what she considered to be
too small an allowance.
14. Shomereth Yabam. V. Glos.
15. They did not wish their daughters ever to be
placed in the position of a widow who is,
moreover, subject to the decision of the levir.
16. Of wine.
17. Lit., 'with the mouth'.
18. Lit., 'we have not (anything) against it'.
19. And she nevertheless, as stated supra.
abstained from drink.
20. [H] (Cf. Gr. [G]). 'stranger', 'lodger', 'guest'.
21. Hannah at the time was not in her own home
but at Shiloh.
22. I Sam. I, 19.
23. Lit., 'yes'.
24. When they had come to their own home.
25. After Abaye's death (cf. Yeb. 64b).
26. Lit., 'my comforter', a name by which Abaye
was often referred to, v. Git. Sonc. ed. p. 140,
n. 6.
27. [H], MS.M. Cur. edd., [H] 'gave him to drink'.
28. Plural of [H], 'a drinking horn' (v. Jast.) or
'deep cups' (cf. Rashi and Levy).
29. Pointing to her arm.
30. Lit., 'fell'.
31. His own wife.
32. Pl. of [H] (rt. [H], 'to peel') 'peeled or
scrapped leather', 'a leather strap' (v. Jast.);
'a key' (Rashi).
33. [H] Aruk, [H], 'silk'; [H] 'with a silken strap'.
Rashi: 'With the key of a chest'.
34. V. supra p. 319. n. 9.
35. Homa had already thrice married and each of
her husbands had died (v. Yeb. 64b).
36. [Perhaps Debeile in the neighborhood of Hille
(near Sura). There is also a Dabil in Armenia,
v. Funk, Monuments Talmudica, p. 291].
37. To enable her to keep up her social standing
in the company of her deceased husband's
friends and associates.
38. Since beds were usually furnished with a skin
girth (v. Rashi).
39. Which are much less comfortable for lying on
than a skin girth. R. Tam (Tosaf. s.v. [H] a.l.)
deletes MATTRESS since on account of its
softness it is useful even where the bed is
furnished with a skin spread.
40. Instead of the skin girth.
41. [H] (Af. of [H]) lit., 'which produce a
roughness' (v. Jast.). According to Rashi [H]
is to be taken in the sense of 'age'. The ropes
cause her pain and 'age her' prematurely.
42. The wife spoken of to Our Mishnah.
43. By her husband.
44. To sleep on a cushion and a bolster.
45. Who ruled that she is not to be allowed these
comforts.
46. Why should her husband be expected to
provide for her more comforts than she
habitually requires.
47. V. p. 394. n. 10.
48. [Yet on the principle that 'she rises with him'
supra 61a, she is entitled to them when she is
with him (Rashi)].
49. V. p. 394. n. 11.
50. From you.
51. Since she is not in the habit of using them she
does not require them in his absence.
52. On Sabbath eve.
53. The carrying of objects is forbidden on the
Sabbath, the prohibition beginning at twilight
on the Friday evening.
54. The other bed clothes that he had given her or
that she herself had purchased. (V. however,
next note).
55. Hence R. Nathan's ruling that a husband
must in all cases provide his wife with cushion
and bolster. [Var. lec. (v. Tosaf.) omit 'so you
will take mine'. On that reading the woman
will argue that she would be made to sleep on
the ground, even in his presence, when she is
entitled to all the comfort to which he is
accustomed, v. supra note 2].
Kethuboth 65b
This Tanna1 [expects a person to be]
'stripped naked and to wear shoes'!2 'The
Tanna,' the other replied. 'was dealing3 with
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
48
a mountainous region where one cannot
possibly manage with less than three pairs of
shoes [a year].4 and indirectly he informed us
that these should be given to her on the
occasion of a major festival so that she might
derive joy from them.
AND CLOTHING [OF THE VALUE] OF
FIFTY ZUZ. Abaye said: Fifty small Zuz.5
Whence is this deduced? — From the
statement:6 ALL THIS APPLIES TO THE
POOREST IN ISRAEL, BUT IN THE CASE
OF A MEMBER OF THE BETTER
CLASSES ALL IS FIXED ACCORDING
TO THE DIGNITY OF HIS POSITION.
Now, should one imagine [that the reference
is to] fifty real Zuz,7 whence [it could be
objected] would a poor man obtain fifty Zuz?
Consequently it must be concluded [that the
meaning is] fifty small Zuz.
SHE IS NOT TO BE GIVEN NEW, etc. Our
Rabbis taught: Any surplus of food8 belongs
to the husband, while any Surplus of worn
out clothes belongs to the woman. [You said:]
'Any surplus of worn out clothes belongs to
the woman'; of what use are they to her? —
Rehaba replied: For putting on during the
days of her menstruation so that she may not
[by the constant wearing9 of the same
clothes] become repulsive to her husband.
Abaye stated: We have a tradition that the
surplus of the worn out clothes of a widow10
belongs to her husband's heirs. For the
reason in the former case11 is that she shall
not become repulsive to her husband12 but in
this case13 let her be ever so repulsive.
HE MUST ALSO GIVE HER [EVERY
WEEK] A SILVER MA'AH, etc. What [is
meant by] SHE IS TO EAT? — R. Nahman
replied: Actual eating. R. Ashi replied:
Intercourse. We have learned: SHE IS TO
EAT WITH HIM ON THE NIGHT OF
EVERY SABBATH. Now, according to him14
who said, '[actual] eating' it is quite correct
to use the expression SHE IS TO EAT.
According to him,15 however, who said,
'intercourse', why [it may be asked] was the
expression SHE IS TO EAT used?16 — It is a
euphemism.17 as it is written in Scripture.
She18 eateth, and wipeth her mouth, and
saith: 'I have done no wickedness'.19
An objection was raised: R. Simeon b.
Gamaliel said, 'She is to eat with him on the
night of the Sabbath and on the Sabbath
[day]'. Now, according to him20 who said,
'[actual] eating', it is correct to state, 'and on
the Sabbath [day]'.21 According to him,22
however, who said, 'intercourse', is there any
intercourse on the Sabbath day? Did not R.
Huna state, The Israelites are holy and do not
have intercourse in the day-time'?23 — But,
Surely, Raba stated: It is permitted in a dark
room.24
IF SHE WAS NURSING [HER CHILD]. R.
'Ulla the Great made at the Prince's25 door
the following exposition: Although it was
said:26 'A man is under no obligation to
maintain his sons and daughters when they
are minors', he must maintain them while
they are very young.27 How long?28 — Until
the age of six; in accordance [with the view
of] R. Assi, for R. Assi stated: A child of the
age of six is exempt29 by the 'erub30 of his
mother. Whence [is this31 derived]? — From
the Statement: IF SHE WAS NURSING
[HER CHILD] HER HANDIWORK IS
REDUCED AND HER MAINTENANCE IS
INCREASED. What can be the reason?32
Surely because he33 must eat together with
her. But is it not possible [that the reason32 is]
because she34 ailing? — If that were the case
it should have been stated, 'If she was ailing',
why then [was it stated]. IF SHE WAS
NURSING?35 But is it not possible that it was
this that we were taught:36 That nursing
mothers are commonly ailing?37
It was stated: What is the addition38 that he
makes for her?39 R. Joshua b. Levi said: She
is given an additional allowance for wine,
because wine is beneficial for lactation.
CHAPTER VI
MISHNAH. A WIFE'S FIND AND HER
HANDIWORK BELONG TO HER HUSBAND.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
49
AND [OF] HER INHERITANCE40 HE HAS THE
USUFRUCT DURING HER LIFETIME.41 [ANY
COMPENSATION FOR] AN INDIGNITY OR
BLEMISH [THAT MAY HAVE BEEN
INFLICTED UPON] HER BELONGS TO HER.
R. JUDAH B. BATHYRA RULED: WHEN IN
PRIVACY42 SHE RECEIVES TWO-THIRDS
[OF THE COMPENSATION] WHILE HE43
RECEIVES ONE-THIRD, BUT WHEN IN
PUBLIC44 HE RECEIVES TWO-THIRDS45 AND
SHE RECEIVES ONE-THIRD. HIS SHARE IS
TO BE GIVEN TO HIM FORTHWITH, BUT
WITH HERS LAND IS TO BE BOUGHT AND
HE43 ENJOYS THE USUFRUCT.46
GEMARA. What does he47 teach us? This
surely was already learnt: A father has
authority over his daughter in respect of her
betrothal [whether it was effected] by money,
by deed or by intercourse; he is entitled to
anything she finds and to her handiwork; [he
has the right] of invalidating her vows, and
he receives her letter of divorce; but he has
no usufruct during her lifetime. When she
marries, the husband surpasses him [in his
rights] in that he has usufruct during her
lifetime!48 — He49 regarded this50 as
necessary [on account of the law relating to]
INDIGNITY OR BLEMISH [THAT MAY
HAVE BEEN INFLICTED UPON] HER,
[which is the subject of] a dispute between R.
Judah b. Bathyra and the Rabbis.51
A tanna recited in the presence of Raba: A
wife's find belongs to herself; but R. Akiba
ruled: [It belongs] to her husband. The
other52 said to him: Now that [in respect of
the] surplus53
1. Who imposes upon a husband the duty of
giving his wife shoes three times a year and
clothing only once a year.
2. Proverb. By the time the woman will receive
her second or third pair of shoes her clothes
will be worn to tatters and yet she would be
wearing new shoes; a toilet more ludicrous
than one uniformly shabby and worn out.
3. Lit., 'stands'.
4. Though clothes may conveniently last for the
same period.
5. Provincial Zuz (Rashi). A provincial, or
country Zuz was equal in value to an eighth of
the town, Or Tyrian Zuz.
6. Lit., 'since it was taught'.
7. I.e., of the Tyrian standard (cf. p. 395, n. 14).
8. I.e., if the woman did not consume all her
allowance of food prescribed in our Mishnah.
9. During her clean and unclean periods.
10. Whose allowance for clothes is made by her
deceased husband's heirs.
11. Lit., 'there'.
12. Lit., 'in his presence'.
13. Lit., 'here'.
14. R. Nahman.
15. R. Ashi.
16. Cf. BaH. a.l.
17. [H], lit., 'a perfect or appropriate expression'.
MS.M. adds, [H], 'he took up (used)'.
18. The adulterous woman.
19. Prov. XXX, 20.
20. R. Nahman.
21. Since one has to eat in the day time also.
22. R. Ashi.
23. Shab. 86a, Nid. 17a.
24. V. Ibid.
25. The Exilarch.
26. Lit., 'that they (sc. the Rabbis) said'.
27. Lit., 'the small of the small'.
28. Must he maintain them.
29. [H], i.e., he does not require one specially
prepared for himself (v. Golds.). Rashi takes
[H] in the literal sense, 'he goes out'. i.e.,
should his father place an 'Erub in one
direction and his mother to the opposite
direction he would be allowed to move only in
the direction his mother had chosen. In any
case it follows that a child of the age of six is
entirely attached to and dependent upon his
mother and, consequently, just as a man must
provide for his wife so must he provide for the
child who is entirely dependent upon her.
30. V. Glos.
31. That a father is at all liable to maintain his
young children,
32. For the increase of the maintenance.
33. The child.
34. During lactation.
35. The conclusion, therefore, must be that she
was not ailing.
36. By the use of the expression. NURSING, and
not 'ailing'.
37. As this is quite possible no positive proof is
available that it is a father's legal duty to
maintain his young children.
38. For the Increase of the maintenance.
39. So BaH. Cur. edd. omit.
40. Which she inherited from a relative (Rashi's
first interpretation supported by R. Tam.,
Tosaf. s.v. [H] a.l.).
41. The capital, however, remains hers.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
50
42. I.e., if the indignity was imposed in the
absence of onlookers or the blemish inflicted
upon a concealed part of her body.
43. Her husband.
44. I.e., if people witnessed the indignity or if the
blemish was inflicted on a part of the body
that is exposed.
45. Since he not only shares her indignity and
degradation but, in addition, must also put up
with a woman who has become disfigured. V.
Rashi.
46. As is the case with all property that comes
into a wife's possession after her marriage.
The capital remains hers and after his death
or on divorce she recovers also the right of
usufruct.
47. The author of our Mishnah.
48. V. supra 46b, notes, from which it follows that
a husband is entitled to all his wife's
possessions enumerated in our Mishnah. Why
then were the same rulings repeated here?
49. The author of our Mishnah.
50. Our Mishnah.
51. And could not have been inferred from the
statement quoted.
52. Raba.
53. Of a woman's work above the amount
required for her maintenance.
Kethuboth 66a
which is her handiwork1 R. Akiba ruled [that
it belongs] to herself, how much more so her
find? For we learned: [If a woman said to her
husband,] 'Konam, if I do aught for your
mouth', he need not invalidate her vow;2 R.
Akiba, however, said: He must invalidate it,
since she might do more work than is due to
him!3 — Reverse then: A wife's find belongs
to her husband, but R. Akiba ruled [that it
belonged] to herself. But surely, when Rabin
came4 he stated in the name of R. Johanan:
In respect of a surplus5 obtained through no
undue exertion all6 agree that [it belongs to
the] husband, and they only differ in respect
of a surplus5 obtained through undue
exertion; the first Tanna being of the opinion
[that even this belongs] to her husband while
R. Akiba maintains [that it belongs] to
herself!7 — R. Papa replied: A find is like a
surplus gained through undue exertion,8
[concerning which there is] a difference of
opinion between R. Akiba and the Rabbis.
R. Papa raised the question: What is the law
where she performed for him two [kinds of
work] simultaneously?9 Rabina raised the
question: What is the ruling where she did
three or four [kinds of work]10
simultaneously? — These must remain
undecided.11
[ANY COMPENSATION FOR] INDIGNITY
OR BLEMISH [THAT MAY HAVE BEEN
INFLICTED UPON] HER. Raba son of R.
Hanan demurred:12 Now then,13 if a man
insulted his fellow's mare would he also have
to pay him [compensation for the] indignity?
But is a horse then susceptible to insult?14 —
This, however, [is the objection:] If a man
spat on his fellow's garment would he15 also
have to pay him [compensation for this]
indignity? And should you say that [the
ruling] is really so,16 surely [it can be
retorted] we have learned: If a man spat so
that the spittle fell upon another person, or
uncovered the head of a woman, or removed
a cloak from a person he must pay four
hundred Zuz;17 and R. Papa explained: This
has been taught [to apply] only [where it
touched] him18 but if it touched his garment
only [the offender] is exempt!19 — [An insult]
to his garment involves no indignity to him,
[but an insult to] his wife does involve an
indignity to him.20
Said Rabina to R. Ashi: Now then,21 If a man
insulted a poor man of a good family where
all the members of the family are involved in
the indignity, must he also pay [compensation
for] indignity to all the members of the
family?22 — The other replied: There23 it is
not their own persons [that are insulted].
Here, however, one's wife is [like] one's own
body.
MISHNAH. IF A MAN UNDERTOOK TO GIVE
A FIXED SUM OF MONEY TO HIS SON-IN-
LAW AND HIS SON-IN-LAW DIED,24 HE25
MAY, THE SAGES RULED, SAY26 'I WAS
WILLING TO GIVE [THE MENTIONED SUM]
TO YOUR BROTHER BUT I AM UNWILLING
TO GIVE IT TO YOU'.27 IF A WOMAN
UNDERTOOK TO BRING HER HUSBAND28
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
51
ONE THOUSAND DENARII HE MUST ASSIGN
TO HER29 A CORRESPONDING SUM OF
FIFTEEN MANEH.30 AS A CORRESPONDING
SUM FOR APPRAISED GOODS,31 HOWEVER,
HE ASSIGNS29 ONE FIFTH LESS.32 [IF A
HUSBAND IS REQUESTED TO ENTER IN HIS
WIFE'S KETHUBAH:] 'GOODS ASSESSED AT
ONE MANEH', AND THESE ARE IN FACT
WORTH A MANEH,33 HE CAN HAVE [A
CLAIM FOR] ONE MANEH ONLY.34
[OTHERWISE,35 IF HE IS REQUESTED TO
ENTER IN THE KETHUBAH:] 'GOODS
ASSESSED AT A MANEH', HIS WIFE MUST
GIVE HIM [GOODS OF THE ASSESSED
VALUE35 OF] THIRTY-ONE SELA'S AND A
DENAR,36 AND IF 'AT FOUR HUNDRED
[ZUZ]', SHE MUST GIVE [HIM GOODS
VALUED35 AT] FIVE HUNDRED [ZUZ.]37
WHATEVER
1. And should belong to her husband. A
husband is entitled to his wife's handiwork (v.
our Mishnah) in, return for the maintenance
he provides for her (v. supra 58b).
2. Since a wife's work, and even its surplus (v.
supra note 6), belongs to her husband, (v.
supra note 7) she has no right to dispose of it
without his consent. Her vow, therefore, is
null and void and no invalidation is required.
3. And of this surplus being her own property,
she may well dispose. (For further notes v.
supra 59a). How then, Raba argued, could the
opinion be entertained that, according to R.
Akiba, a wife's find (to which she has a
greater claim than to the surplus mentioned)
should belong to her husband?
4. From Palestine to Babylon.
5. V. supra note 6.
6. Lit., 'all the world', sc. R. Akiba and the
Rabbis.
7. A find should naturally be regarded as a
'surplus obtained through no undue exertion',
about which there is no difference of opinion.
How then could it be said that the find of a
wife is a point in dispute?
8. Most finds are not easily obtained, and before
one finds anything valuable among the
deposits of the sea, for instance, many hours
and days might have to he spent.
9. Acting as watchman, for instance, and
spinning at the same time.
10. While doing the former (v. supra n. 2) she was
also teaching, for instance. a lesson and
hatching eggs. Are such performances
regarded as ordinary. or undue exertion?
11. Teku, v. Glos.
12. Against R. Judah b. Bathyra (v. our
Mishnah).
13. If a man is to receive compensation for an
indignity or injury which he himself has not
sustained.
14. Surely not Raba's objection does not,
consequently, arise.
15. Cf. supra n. 6
16. That he must pay compensation.
17. Cf. B.K. 90a.
18. The body of the offended party.
19. Which proves conclusively that for such an
offence, since it was not committed on one's
person, no compensation is paid. Why then
should a husband receive compensation for
his wife's sufferings which he himself has not
experienced?
20. Read [H] (MS.M.). Cur. edd., read [H], and
the rendering (rather unsatisfactory) would
be as follows: His garment feels no shame but
his wife feels the indignity.
21. If indirect insult also entitles one to
compensation.
22. certainly not. Why then should the husband
receive compensation for indignity to his
wife?
23. The case of indirect insult to the family.
24. Childless; so that his widow should now be
married to, or perform Halizah (v. Glos.) with
his surviving brother (v. Deut. XXV, 5ff) who,
in the case of his marriage with the widow, is
entitled to the deceased brother's estate (v.
Yeb. 40a).
25. The father-in-law.
26. To the surviving brother who by virtue of his
right to the estate of the deceased now claims
also the slim his father-in-law had promised
him.
27. And the brother must, nevertheless, either
submit to Halizah from the widow or marry
her.
28. On marriage.
29. As her Kethubah (v. Glos.)
30. V. Glos. He must, in return for the profits he
will be able to derive from his trading with
her money, add fifty per cent to the amount
his wife brought him. A Maneh = a hundred
Dinarii (or Zuz), and fifteen Maneh = fifteen
hundred Dinarii.
31. I.e., if she brought to him, on marriage, goods
instead of cash. This kind of dowry is
designated Shum (appraisement).
32. Than the appraised value. This refers to an
appraisement made during the wedding
festivities when the tendency is to over-assess
whatever goods the bride brings to her
husband. [According to the T.J. a fifth is
allowed for the wear and tear of the goods,
since her husband is held responsible for
them].
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
52
33. I.e., if the assessment was made prior to the
wedding festivities. (Cf. p. 401, n. 12).
34. He cannot claim twenty-five percent more
than the Maneh as in the case where the
valuation was made during the wedding
festivities (v. supra note 1).
35. I.e., If the valuation was made during the
wedding festivities (cf. supra p. 401, n. 12).
36. V. Glos. A Sela' = four Dinarii, thirty-one
Sela's and one Dinar = (31 X 4 + 1) 125
Dinarii. A Maneh, or a hundred Dinarii, is a
fifth less than one hundred and twenty-five
Dinarii.
37. [This passage is difficult, and the
interpretations of it are many and varied, cf.
e.g., Tosaf. s.v. [H]. The explanation given
follows Rashi. R. Hai Gaon, on the basis of the
T.J. (v. supra p. 401, n. 12) explains: If she
promised to bring him a dowry (Shum) of
property worth a Maneh, which does not wear
out, and is thus always actually worth a
Maneh, she need not add a fifth to it, v.
Shittah Mekubbezeth; v. p. 406, in the case of
a bar of gold].
Kethuboth 66b
A BRIDEGROOM ASSIGNS [TO HIS WIFE IN
HER KETHUBAH] HE ASSIGNS AT ONE
FIFTH LESS [THAN THE APPRAISED
VALUE].
GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: There was no
need to state that where the first1 was a
scholar and the second an 'am ha-'arez [the
father-in-law] can say, 'I WAS WILLING
TO GIVE [THE MENTIONED SUM] TO
YOUR BROTHER BUT I AM UNWILLING
TO GIVE IT TO YOU, but even where the
first was 'am ha-'arez and the second a
scholar he may also say so.
IF A WOMAN UNDERTOOK TO BRING
TO HER HUSBAND ONE THOUSAND
DENARII, etc. Are not these2 the same as the
case in the first clause?3 — He taught [first
concerning a] large assessment4 and then he
taught also about a smaller assessment;5 he
taught about his assessment6 and he also
taught about her assessment.7
MISHNAH. IF A WOMAN UNDERTOOK TO
BRING TO HER HUSBAND8 READY MONEY,
EVERY SELA'9 OF HERS COUNTS10 AS SIX
DENARII.11 THE BRIDEGROOM MUST
UNDERTAKE [TO GIVE HIS WIFE]12 TEN
DENARII FOR HER [PERFUME]13 BASKET IN
RESPECT OF EACH MANEH.14 R. SIMEON B.
GAMALIEL SAID: IN ALL MATTERS THE
LOCAL USAGE SHALL BE FOLLOWED.
GEMARA. This,15 surely, is exactly [the same
ruling as] 'He must assign to her a
corresponding sum of fifteen Maneh'.16 — He
taught first about a major transaction17 and
then taught about a minor transaction.18 And
[both rulings were] necessary. For had that of
the major transaction only been taught it
might have been assumed [that it applied to
this only] because the profit [it brings in] is
large but not to a minor transaction the
profit from which is small; [hence it was]
necessary [to state the latter]. And had we
been informed of that of the minor
transaction only it might have been said [to
apply to this only] because the expenses and
responsibility19 are small but not to a large
transaction where the expenses and
responsibility are great; [hence it was]
necessary [to state the former].
THE BRIDEGROOM MUST UNDERTAKE
[TO GIVE HIS WIFE] TEN DENARII FOR
HER BASKET. What is meant by BASKET?
R. Ashi replied: The perfume basket. R. Ashi
further stated: This ruling applies to
Jerusalem20 only.
R. Ashi enquired: [Is the prescribed perfume
allowance21 made] in respect of each Maneh
valued or each Maneh for which [obligation
has been] accepted?22 [And even]23 if you
could find [some reason] for stating: ['In
respect of each] Maneh for which [obligation
has been] accepted'22 [the question arises: Is
the allowance to be made only on] the first
day or every day? Should you find [some
ground] for deciding: Every day, [the
question still remains whether this applies
only to the] first week or to every week.
Should you find [some authority] for stating:
Every week, [it may be asked whether this
applies only to the] first month or to every
month — And should you find [some
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
53
argument] for saying: Every month, [It may
still be questioned whether this is applicable
only to the] first year or to every year. — All
this remains undecided.24
Rab Judah related in the name of Rab: It
once happened that the daughter of
Nakdimon b. Gorion25 was granted by the
Sages26 an allowance of four hundred gold
coins in respect of her perfume basket for
that particular day, and she27 said to them,
'May you grant such allowances for your own
daughters!' and they answered after her:
Amen.28
Our Rabbis taught: It once happened that R.
Johanan b. Zakkai left Jerusalem riding
upon an ass, while his disciples followed him,
and he saw a girl picking barley grains in the
dung of Arab cattle. As soon as she saw him
she wrapped herself with her hair and stood
before him. 'Master', she said to him, 'feed
me'. 'My daughter', he asked her, 'who are
you?' 'I am', she replied, 'the daughter of
Nakdimon b. Gorion'. 'My daughter', he said
to her, 'what has become29 of the wealth of
your father's house?' 'Master', she answered
him, 'is there not a proverb current in
Jerusalem: "The salt30 of money is
diminution?"'31 (Others read:
Benevolence).32
'And where [the Master asked] is the wealth
of your father-in-law's house?' 'The one', she
replied, 'came and destroyed the other'.33 'Do
you remember, Master', she said to him,
'when you signed my Kethubah?' 'I
remember', he said to his disciples, 'that
when I signed the Kethubah of this
[unfortunate woman], I read therein "A
million gold Dinarii from her father's house"
besides [the amount] from her father-in-law's
house'.34 Thereupon R. Johanan b. Zakkai
wept and said: 'How happy are Israel;35
when they do the will of the Omnipresent no
nation nor any language-speaking group has
any power over them; but when they do not
do the will of the Omnipresent he delivers
them into the hands of a low people, and not
only in the hands of a low people but into the
power of the beasts of a low people'.
Did not Nakdimon b. Gorion, however,
practice charity? Surely it was taught: It was
said of Nakdimon b. Gorion that, when he
walked from his house to the house of study,
woolen clothes were
1. Brother who died.
2. The latter portions of our Mishnah, which
contain various instances of deductions of a
fifth. (So Rashi. For another interpretation v.
Tosaf. s.v. [H]).
3. AS A CORRESPONDING SUM … HE
ASSIGNS ONE FIFTH LESS, which includes
all the other instances.
4. ONE THOUSAND DENARII to which the
ruling AS A CORRESPONDING SUM … HE
ASSIGNS ONE FIFTH LESS refers.
5. GOODS ASSESSED AT A MANEH …
THIRTY-ONE SELA'S AND A DINAR. Both
cases were necessary, since some might
assume that with a larger sum over-estimation
is more likely while others might assume that
over-estimation is more likely to take place in
the case of a smaller sum.
6. WHATEVER A BRIDEGROOM
ASSIGNS … ONE FIFTH LESS, referring to
a valuation made by him, of goods she had
already brought to him before the Kethubah
had been written.
7. IF AT FOUR HUNDRED [ZUZ] SHE MUST
GIVE, etc., the last three words implying that
the Kethubah had already been written and
SHE MUST GIVE the required amount of
goods which is naturally valued by her (or her
relations) to correspond after due deduction
with the amount entered in the Kethubah.
8. On marriage.
9. Which is worth four Dinarii.
10. In respect of the corresponding amount to be
entered in her Kethubah.
11. I.e., fifty percent is added to it as in the case of
ready money mentioned in the previous
Mishnah. The difference between the two
cases will be explained in the Gemara infra.
12. Whether daily, weekly or more rarely has not
been stated.
13. According to the explanation of the Gemara.
14. Which she brings on marriage.
15. The ruling in the first clause of our Mishnah.
16. V. previous Mishnah. In that case he adds
fifty percent, and so he does in this case also.
Why then should the same ruling be recorded
twice?
17. A thousand Dinarii in the previous Mishnah,
supra 66a.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
54
18. EVERY SELA', etc. in the Mishnah of ours.
19. [H] (v. Rashi). Jast., 'management, expenses
and risks of business': [H], 'a small capital the
management of which is easy'.
20. Where the women here in the habit of
indulging in the use of perfumes.
21. Ten Dinarii in respect of each Maneh (v. our
Mishnah).
22. By the husband in the Kethubah. The latter (v.
previous Mishnah) amount to one fifth less
than the valuation.
23. V. Tosaf. s.v. [H].
24. Teku, v. Glos.
25. Cf. supra 65a (p. 392, n. 6).
26. To whom, when her husband died, she applied
for an order for an allowance out of her
husband's estate.
27. In her discontent with the amount.
28. V. supra p. 392, n. 10 and text.
29. Lit., 'where did it go'.
30. I.e., the preservative, the safeguard.
31. [H], i.e., spending it in the exercise of
charitable and benevolent deeds. As the
members of her family were not charitable
they lost their money.
32. [H] (v. supra n. 3) interchange of [H] with [H].
33. The two were mixed up and when the one was
lost the other disappeared with it.
34. The addition made to her Kethubah by the
bridegroom.
35. Read with MS.M., [H]. Cur. edd., [H], 'happy
are you'.
Kethuboth 67a
spread beneath his feet and the poor followed
behind him and rolled them up!1 — If you
wish I might reply: He did it for his own
glorification2 — And if you prefer I might
reply: He did not act as he should have
done,3 as people say, 'In accordance with the
camel is the burden'.4
It was taught: R. Eleazar the son of R. Zadok
said, 'May I [not] behold the consolation [of
Zion] if I have not seen her5 picking barley
grains among the horses' hoofs at Acco. [On
seeing her plight] I applied to her this
Scriptural text: If thou know not, O thou
fairest among women, go thy way forth by
the footsteps of the flock and feed thy kids;6
read not thy kids7 but thy 'bodies'.8
R. Shaman b. Abba stated in the name of R.
Johanan: If a wife brought to her husband9
[a bar of] gold, it is to be assessed and
[entered in her Kethubah] according to its
actual value.10
An objection was raised: '[Broken pieces of]
gold are like vessels'.11 Does not this imply12
'like silver vessels' which wear out?13 — No,
'like gold vessels' which do not wear out. If
so, [the expression] should have been 'like
vessels [made] thereof'! And, furthermore, it
was taught: [A bar of] gold is like vessels;
gold Dinarii are like ready money.14 R.
Simeon b. Gamaliel said: Where the usage is
not to change them15 they are valued and are
[to be entered in the Kethubah] at the rate of
their actual value.16 Now, to what is R.
Simeon b. Gamaliel referring? If it be
suggested [that he refers] to the final clause,17
the inference [it may be pointed out would
be] that the first Tanna maintains his
opinion18 even when the usage is not to
change them, but, surely, [it may be objected]
they can not be used as currency!19
It must consequently be assumed20 [that he21
referred] to the first clause and that it is this
that was meant: [A bar of] gold is like
vessels; and what [is meant by] vessels? silver
vessels;22 and R. Simeon b. Gamaliel said: It
is like gold Dinarii where the usage is not to
change them!23 — No;24 he21 may still refer to
the final clause but [it is a case where] with
difficulty they can be used as currency; and
the principles on which they differ is this:
One Master25 holds the view that since they
can be used as currency we allow her the
increase26 and the other Master21 is of the
opinion that since they can be used as
currency only with difficulty, she is not to
have the increase.27
If you prefer I might reply: All the
statement28 is that of R. Simeon b. Gamaliel,
but a clause therein is missing, and the
proper reading is as follows: [A bar of] gold
is like vessels,29 gold Dinarii are like ready
money. This is the case only where it is the
usage to change them,30 but where it is the
usage not to change them31 they are to be
valued and entered in the Kethubah at the
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
55
rate of their actual value; so R. Simeon b.
Gamaliel for R. Simeon b. Gamaliel holds the
view that where it is the usage not to change
them they are to be valued and [entered in
the Kethubah] at the rate of their actual
value. But [the difficulty] nevertheless
[remains that the expression] should have
been, 'like vessels [made] thereof'! — This is
indeed a difficulty. And if you prefer I might
reply: We are here28 dealing with a case of
broken pieces of gold.32 R. Ashi said: [We
deal here28 with] gold leaf.33 R. Jannai stated:
The spices of Antioch34 are35 like ready
money.36 R. Samuel b. Nahmani stated in the
name of R. Johanan:37 A woman38 is entitled
to seize Arabian camels in settlement of her
Kethubah.39
R. Papi stated: A woman38 may seize
clothes40 manufactured at Be Mikse41 for her
Kethubah.42
R. Papi further stated: A woman38 may seize
sacks made at Rodya43 and the ropes of
Kamhunya44 for her Kethubah.
Raba stated: At first I said: A woman38 is
entitled to seize money bags45 of Mahuza46
for her Kethubah.42 What was [my] reason?
Because [women] relied upon them.42 When I
observed, however, that they47 took them and
went out with them into the market48 and as
soon as a plot of land came their way they
purchased it with this money I formed the
opinion that they rely49 only upon land.50
MISHNAH. IF A MAN GAVE HIS DAUGHTER
IN MARRIAGE WITHOUT SPECIFYING ANY
CONDITIONS, HE MUST GIVE HER NOT
LESS THAN FIFTY ZUZ. IF THE
[BRIDEGROOM] AGREED TO TAKE HER IN
NAKED HE51 MAY NOT SAY, 'WHEN I HAVE
TAKEN HER INTO MY HOUSE I SHALL
CLOTHE HER WITH CLOTHES OF MY OWN',
BUT HE MUST PROVIDE HER WITH
CLOTHING WHILE SHE IS STILL IN HER
FATHER'S HOUSE. SIMILARLY IF AN
ORPHAN IS GIVEN IN MARRIAGE52 SHE
MUST BE GIVEN NOT LESS THAN FIFTY
ZUZ. IF [CHARITY] FUNDS ARE
AVAILABLE53 SHE IS TO BE FITTED OUT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE DIGNITY OF HER
POSITION.
GEMARA. Abaye stated: By FIFTY ZUZ
small coins54 [were meant]. Whence is this
statement inferred? — From the statement in
the final clause: IF [CHARITY] FUNDS
ARE AVAILABLE SHE IS FITTED OUT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE DIGNITY OF
HER POSITION [concerning which], when it
was asked, 'What was meant by FUNDS'.55
Rehaba explained: Charity funds.56 Now if
we should imagine that by FIFTY ZUZ the
actual57 [coins were meant], how much [it
may be asked] ought we to give her even IF
CHARITY FUNDS ARE AVAILABLE!
Consequently it must be inferred that by
FIFTY ZUZ small coins [were meant].
Our Rabbis taught: If an orphan boy and an
orphan girl applied for maintenance,58 the
girl orphan is to be maintained first and the
boy orphan afterwards,59 because it is not
unusual for a man to go begging60 but it is
unusual for a woman to do so.61 If an orphan
boy and an orphan girl
1. I.e., taking the stuff away with them.
2. Such gifts are not regarded as proper charity.
3. He did not give in accordance with his means.
4. The richer and the greater the man the more
is expected of him.
5. The daughter of Nakdimon b. Gorion.
6. Cant. I., 8.
7. [H].
8. [H], involving the change of [H] for [H].
9. On marriage.
10. No addition of fifty per cent (as in the case of
ready money) and no subtraction of a fifth (as
in the case of goods) are made
11. [H], the term is explained anon.
12. Lit., 'what, not?'
13. And consequently deteriorate in value. How
then could R. Johanan maintain that a bar of
gold is to be entered in the Kethubah for its
full value without reducing the fifth
prescribed for goods?
14. Since they can be used as currency. An
addition of fifty percent in their case must,
therefore, be entered in the Kethubah.
15. In the ordinary course of trade, i.e., where
they are not taken as currency.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
56
16. And no addition (as in the case of cash) is
made. Tosef. Keth. VI.
17. Gold Dinarii, etc.
18. That an addition of fifty percent is to be made
(v. supra n. 12).
19. Lit., 'do not go out'. Why then should they be
treated as ready money?
20. Lit., 'but not'.
21. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel.
22. And a reduction of a fifth is therefore to be
made.
23. Cf. supra p. 406, n. 13. Would then R.
Johanan accept the opinion of R. Simeon b.
Gamaliel against that of the anonymous first
Tanna?
24. R. Simeon b. Gamaliel does not refer to the
first clause.
25. The first Tanna.
26. Of fifty percent, as in the case of regular
currency.
27. In the case of bar gold, however, it is generally
agreed, as R. Johanan ruled, that it is to be
entered into the Kethubah at the rate of its
actual value.
28. The Baraitha cited.
29. I.e., gold wares.
30. Cf. supra p. 406, n. 13 mutatis mutandis.
31. V. supra p. 406, n. 13.
32. Which wear away in use. Such are indeed to
be treated in the same way as silver ware (as
has been suggested supra), their price being
entered in the Kethubah after a deduction of
one fifth had been made. R. Johanan.
however, who rules the entry of their actual
value deals with the case of large bars which
do not perceptibly wear away, and whose full
value must consequently appear in the
Kethubah.
33. [H] var. [H] (v. Rashi). Tosaf., 'gold ore';
Golds., 'gold dust'. Cf. p. 407, n. 14 mutatis
mutandis.
34. Or Antiochene, the capital of Syria on the
Orontes, founded by Seleucus Nicator.
[Antioch was a trading centre for spices (v.
Krauss, T.A., I, p. 690)].
35. In respect of the amount to be entered in a
Kethubah.
36. Fifty percent is to be added to the amount the
wife brings in on marriage. These spices were
so famous that they could always be sold and
thus easily turned into cash.
37. Var. lec., 'Johanan'. (MS.M. and Rosh).
38. A widow who advances the claim for her
Kethubah against her deceased husband's
estate (v. Tosaf. s.v. [H]).
39. Though these are movable objects, they are,
owing to the ready sale they command,
deemed to have been pledged for the
Kethubah. [H], 'settlement', 'endowment' (cf.
Jast.). Rashi's interpretation, 'the profit of a
third', is rejected by Tosaf. l.c. [Frankel
MGWJ, 1861, p. 118 derives the term from the
Gk. [G], the outfit which the bride has to
bring with her].
40. V. Rashi; 'sheets' (Jast.).
41. [A frontier town between Babylon and Arabia
(Obermeyer, p. 334)].
42. Cf. supra n. 6 mutatis mutandis.
43. Not identified.
44. [In the neighborhood of Supra, op. cit. p. 296].
45. I.e., the sums of money which they contain
(Rashi).
46. A famous commercial town (v. supra p. 319, n.
9).
47. Windows or divorced women who seized them
for their Kethubah.
48. So MS.M. Cur. edd., omit the last three
words.
49. As a guarantee for their Kethubah.
50. Hence they should not be allowed to seize
Mahuza bags.
51. Lit., 'the husband'.
52. By the guardians of the poor.
53. Lit., 'there is in the purse'.
54. V. supra 65b.
55. Lit., 'bag'.
56. Lit., 'bag of charity'.
57. I.e., the Tyrian Zuz (v. supra l.c.).
58. Lit., 'who came to be maintained', Out of the
poor funds.
59. If the funds permit.
60. Lit., 'his way is to go about the doors'.
61. Lit., 'to go about'.
Kethuboth 67b
applied for a marriage grant1 the girl orphan
is to be enabled to marry first and the boy
orphan is married afterwards, because the
shame of a woman is greater than that of a
man.2
Our Rabbis taught: If an orphan applied for
assistance to marry,3 a house must be rented
for him, a bed must be prepared for him and
[he must also be supplied with] all
[household] objects [required for] his use,
and then he is given a wife in marriage, for it
is said in Scriptures, Sufficient for his need in
that which he wanteth:4 'sufficient for his
need', refers to the house; 'in that which
wanteth', refers to a bed and a table; 'he'5
refers to a wife, for so it is said in Scripture, I
will make him5 a help meet unto him.6
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
57
Our Rabbis taught: 'Sufficient for his need'
[implies] you are commanded to maintain
him, but you are not commanded to make
him rich; 'in that which he wanteth'
[includes] even a horse to ride upon and a
slave to run before him. It was related about
Hillel the Elder that he bought7 for a certain
poor man who was of a good family a horse
to ride upon and a slave to run before him.
On one occasion he could not find a slave to
run before him, so he himself ran before him
for three miles.
Our Rabbis taught: It once happened that
the people of Upper Galilee bought for a poor
member of a good family of Sepphoris8 a
pound of meat every day.9 'A pound of
meat'! What is the greatness in this? — R.
Huna replied: [It was] a pound of fowl's
meat.10 And if you prefer I might say: [They
purchased] ordinary meat for a pound11 [of
money].12 R. Ashi replied: The place was13 a
small village14 and everyday a beast had to be
spoiled for his sake.15
A certain man once applied to16 R. Nehemiah
[for maintenance]. 'What do your meals
consist of', [the Rabbi] asked him. 'Of fat
meat and old wine', the other replied — 'Will
you consent [the Rabbi asked him] to live17
with me on lentils?' [The other consented,]
lived with him on lentils and died. 'Alas', [the
Rabbi] said, 'for this man whom Nehemiah
has killed.' On the contrary, he should [have
said] 'Alas for Nehemiah who killed this
man'! — [The fact], however, [is that the man
himself was to blame, for] he should not have
cultivated his luxurious habits to such an
extent.
A man once applied to18 Raba [for
maintenance]. 'What do your meals consist
of?' he asked him. 'Of fat chicken and old
wine', the other replied. 'Did you not
consider', [the Rabbi] asked him, 'the burden
of the community?' 'Do I', the other replied,
'eat of theirs? I eat [the food] of the All-
Merciful; for we learned: The eyes of all wait
for Thee, and Thou givest them their food in
due season,19 this, since it is not said, 'in their
season' but 'in his20 season', teaches that the
Holy One, blessed be He, provides for every
individual his food In accordance with his
own habits'.21 Meanwhile there arrived
Raba's sister, who had not seen him for
thirteen years, and brought him a fat chicken
and old wine. 'What a remarkable
incident!'22 [Raba]23 exclaimed; [and then] he
said to him, 'I apologize24 to you, come and
eat'.
Our Rabbis taught: If a man has no means
and does not wish to be maintained [out of
the poor funds] he should be granted [the
sum he requires] as a loan and then it can be
presented to him as a gift; so R. Meir. The
Sages, however, said: It is given to him as a
gift and then it is granted to him as a loan.
('As a gift'? He, surely, refuses to25 take
[gifts]! Raba replied: It is offered to him in
the first instance26 as a gift.)
If he has the means but does not want to
maintain himself, [at his own expense],27 he is
given [what he needs] as a gift, and then he is
made to repay it. (If 'he is made to repay it'
he would, surely, not take again! — R. Papa
replied: [Repayment is claimed] after his
death.) R. Simeon said: If he has the means
and does not want to maintain himself [at his
own expense], no one need feel any concern
about him. If he has no means and does not
wish to be maintained [out of the poor funds]
he is told, 'Bring a pledge and you will
receive [a loan]' in order to raise thereby his
[drooping] spirit.28
Our Rabbis taught: To lend29 refers to a man
who has no means and is unwilling to receive
his maintenance [from the poor funds] to
whom [the allowance] must be given as a loan
and then presented to him as a gift. Thou
shalt lend him30 refers to a man who has the
means and does not wish to maintain himself
[at his own expense] to whom [the allowance]
is given as a gift and repayment is claimed
from his [estate] after his death, so R. Judah.
The Sages, however, said: If he has the means
and does not wish to maintain himself [at his
own expense] no one need feel any concern
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
58
about him. To what, however, is the text
Thou shalt lend him31 to be applied? The
Torah employs ordinary phraseology.32
Mar 'Ukba had a poor man in his
neighborhood into whose door-socket he used
to throw four Zuz every day. Once33 [the poor
man] thought: 'I will go and see who does me
this kindness'. On that day [it happened] that
Mar 'Ukba was late at34 the house of study
and his wife35 was coming home with him. As
soon as [the poor man] saw them moving the
door he went out after them, but they fled
from him and ran into a furnace from which
the fire had just been swept.
Mar 'Ukba's feet were burning and his wife
said to him: Raise your feet and put them on
mine. As he was upset,36 she said to him, 'I
am usually at home37 and my benefactions
are direct'.38 And what [was the reason for]
all that?39 — Because Mar Zutra b. Tobiah
said in the name of Rab (others state: R.
Huna40 b. Bizna said in the name of R.
Simeon the Pious; and others again state: R.
Johanan said in the name of R. Simeon b.
Yohai): Better had a man thrown himself
into a fiery furnace than publicly put his
neighbor to shame. Whence do we derive
this? From [the action of] Tamar; for it is
written in Scripture, When she was brought
forth,41 [she sent to her father-in-law].42
Mar 'Ukba had a poor man in his
neighborhood to whom he regularly sent four
hundred Zuz on the Eve of every Day of
Atonement. On one occasion43 he sent them
through his son who came back and said to
him, 'He does not need [your help]'. 'What
have you seen?' [his father] asked. 'I saw [the
son replied] that they were spraying old wine
before him'.44 'Is he so delicate?' [the father]
said, and, doubling the amount, he sent it
back to him.
When he45 was about to die46 he requested,
'Bring me my charity accounts'. Finding that
seven thousand of Sijan47 [gold] Dinarii were
entered therein he exclaimed, 'The provisions
are scanty and the road is long', and he
forthwith48 distributed half of his wealth. But
how could he do such a thing?49 Has not R.
Elai stated: It was ordained at Usha that if a
man wishes to spend liberally he should not
spend more than a filth?50 — This applies
only during a man's lifetime, since he might
thereby be impoverished51 but after death52
this does not matter.
R. Abba used to bind money in his scarf,53
sling it on his back, and place himself at the
disposal of the poor.54 He cast his eye,
however, sideways [as a precaution] against
rogues.55
R. Hanina had a poor man to whom he
regularly sent four Zuz on the Eve of every
Sabbath. One day he sent that sum through
his wile who came back and told him [that
the man was in] no need of it. 'What [R.
Hanina asked her] did you see?' [She
replied:] I heard that he was asked, 'On what
will you dine;
1. Out of the charity funds. Lit., 'came to be
married'.
2. Tosef. Keth. VI.
3. V. p. 409, n. 12.
4. Deut. XV, 8.
.'lit., 'unto him לו .5
6. Gen. II, 18, referring to a wife. Tosef Keth.
VI.
7. Alfasi: he hired.
8. A town on one of the Upper Galilean
mountains. It was called Sepphoris [H] (v.
Meg. 6a) 'because it was perched on the top of
a mountain like a bird', [H]. At one time it
was the capital of Galilee and is identified
(l.c.) with Kitron (Judges I, 30). V. Klein, S.
[H], 54ff
9. Tosef. Pe'ah. IV.
10. Which was very expensive.
11. [H], [G], is both a weight, the Roman libra,
and a measure of capacity.
12. The meat was so expensive.
13. Lit., 'there'.
14. Where there are no buyers.
15. All the meat that remained after his one
pound had been taken off had to be thrown
away for lack of buyers and consumers.
16. Lit., 'came before'.
17. [H] (rt. [H], Pilp.), lit., 'roll', i.e., 'to put up
with the inconvenience'.
18. Lit., 'came before'.
19. Ps. CXLV, 15. [H] lit., 'in his season'.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
59
20. V. supra n. 3
21. V. Rashi.
22. [H], lit., 'what is that before me?'
23. So Rashi. Ar. reads, [H] ( = [H], 'which I
said') i.e., the applicant remarked, 'This is just
what I have said'. (Cf. Jast.).
24. Lit., 'I humble myself'. Rashi: 'I spoke too
much'. The rt. [H], may bear either meaning.
25. Lit., 'not'.
26. Lit., 'to Open'.
27. And thus leads a life of penury.
28. Lit., 'that his mind shall be elated or cheered'.
By this offer he is made to feel that he is not
treated as a pauper and he consents,
therefore, ultimately to take the sum as a loan
without a pledge.
29. [H], E.V., surely, Deut. XV, 8.
30. [H], ibid.
31. I.e., the repetition of the verb, in the Infinitive
and Imperfect (v. supra nn. 2 and 3), from
which R. Judah derived his ruling.
32. Lit., 'spoke in the language of men', who are
in the habit of repeating their words. Hence
no inference may be drawn from the
repetition in the text cited.
33. Lit., 'one day'.
34. So MS.M., [H] Cur. edd. [H].
35. Who, owing to the late hour, went to meet
him.
36. Lit., 'his mind weakened'. He feared that he
was not providentially protected from the
heat of the furnace because he was not as
worthy of divine protection as his wife.
37. So that the poor had easy access to her.
38. Lit., 'near'. She gave them gifts in kind and
they could forthwith derive benefit from
them. He, however, was not approachable at
all times and the alms he gave to the poor
were not in kind but in money which had first
to be spent before the poor could derive any
benefit from it. His benefits, therefore, were
indirect.
39. Why did they make such an effort to escape
from the attention of the poor man?
40. Var Hana (v. B.M. 59a).
41. To be burned (Gen. XXXVIII, 24).
42. Ibid., 25. She chose to be burned rather than
publicly put her father-in-law to shame. it was
only through Judah's own confession (ibid.
26) after he received her private message (ibid
25) that she was saved.
43. Lit., 'day'.
44. [H] MS.M. Cur. edd., 'to him'.
45. Mar 'Ukba'.
46. Lit., 'when his soul was (about to) come to its
rest'.
47. The name of a Persian town in the district of
Shiraz, v. Fleischer to Levy's Worterbuch I, p.
560.
48. Lit., 'he arose'.
49. Distributing half his wealth.
50. V. supra 50a.
51. Lit., 'go down from his wealth'.
52. I.e., when one is on the point of dying as was
the case with Mar 'Ukba.
53. [H] 'scarf' or 'turban', a cloth placed over, or
wound round the head, hanging down loosely
upon, the arms and shoulders.
54. Who undid the binding and shared the money
among themselves.
55. He would nevertheless spare the poor the
feelings of shame.
Kethuboth 68a
on the silver [colored] cloths1 or on the gold
[colored] ones?'2 'It is in view of such cases'
[R. Hanina] remarked, 'that R. Eleazar said:
Come let us be grateful to the rogues for were
it not for then, we3 would have been sinning
every day, for it is said in Scripture, And he
cry unto to the Lord against thee, and it be
sill unto thee.4 Furthermore, R. Hiyya b. Rab
of Difti5 taught: R. Joshua b. Korha said,
Any one who shuts his eye against charity is
like one who worships idols, for here6 it is
written, Beware that there be not a base7
thought in thy heart, etc. [and thine eye will
be evil against thy poor brother]8 and there9
it is written, Certain base7 fellows are gone
out,10 as there9 [the crime is that of] idolatry,
so here also [the crime is like that of]
idolatry'.11
Our Rabbis taught: If a man pretends to
have a blind eye, a swollen belly or a
shrunken leg,12 he will not pass out from this
world before actually coming into such a
condition. If a man accepts charity and is not
in need of it his end [will be that] he will not
pass out of the world before he comes to such
a condition.
We learned elsewhere: He13 may not be
compelled to sell his house or his articles of
service'.14 May he not indeed?15 Was it not
taught: If he was in the habit of using gold
articles he shall now use copper ones?16 — R.
Zebid replied. This is no difficulty. The one17
refers to the bed and table: the other to cups
and dishes. What difference is there in the
case of the cups and dishes that they are not
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
60
[to be sold]? Obviously because he can say,
'[The inferior quality] is repulsive to me',
[but then, in respect of] a bed and table also,
he might say [the cheaper article] is
unacceptable to me! — Raba the son of
Rabbah replied: [This17 refers] to a silver
strigil.18 R. Papa replied: There is no
difficulty: one19 [refers to a man] before he
came under the obligation of repayment,20
and the other refers to a man21 after he had
come under the obligation of repayment.22
MISHNAH. IF AN ORPHAN WAS GIVEN IN
MARRIAGE BY HER MOTHER OR HER
BROTHERS [EVEN IF] WITH HER
CONSENT23 AND THEY ASSIGNED24 TO HER
A HUNDRED, OR FIFTY ZUZ,25 SHE MAY,
WHEN SHE ATTAINS HER MAJORITY,26
RECOVER FROM THEM THE AMOUNT
THAT WAS DUE TO HER.27 R. JUDAH
RULED: IF A MAN HAD GIVEN HIS FIRST
DAUGHTER IN MARRIAGE, THE SECOND28
MUST RECEIVE AS MUCH AS THE [FATHER]
HAD GIVEN TO THE FIRST. THE SAGES,
HOWEVER, SAID: SOMETIMES A MAN IS
POOR AND BECOMES RICH OR RICH AND
BECOMES POOR.29 THE ESTATE SHOULD
RATHER BE VALUED AND SHE30 BE GIVEN
[THE SHARE THAT IS HER DUE].
GEMARA. Samuel stated: In respect of the
marriage outfit31 the assessment32 is to be
determined by [the disposition of] the
father.33
All objection was raised: 'The daughters are
to be maintained and provided for34 out of
the estate of their father. In what manner? It
is not to be said, "Had her father been alive
he would have given her such and such a
sum" but the estate is valued and she is given
[her due share]'. Does not ['provided for'
refer to] the marriage35 outfit?36 — R.
Nahman b. Isaac replied: No; [it refers to]
her own maintenance.37 But, surely, it was
stated: 'Are to be maintained and provided
for'; does not one [of the expressions]38 refer
to the marriage39 outfit and the other to her
own maintenance?40 — No; the one as well as
the other refers to her own maintenance,40
and yet there is no real difficulty, for one of
the expressions38 refers41 to food and drink
and the other41 to clothing and bedding.
We learned: THE SAGES, HOWEVER,
SAID, SOMETIMES A MAN IS POOR AND
BECOMES RICH OR RICH AND
BECOMES POOR. THE ESTATE SHOULD
RATHER BE VALUED AND SHE BE
GIVEN [THE SHARE THAT IS HER DUE].
Now what is meant by POOR and RICH? If
it be suggested that POOR means poor in
material possessions, and RICH means rich
in such possessions, the inference [should
consequently be] that the first Tanna holds
the opinion that even when a man was rich
and became poor she is given as much as
before; but, surely, [it may be objected] he
has none [to give]. Must it not then [be
concluded that] POOR means poor in mind42
and RICH means rich in mind,43 and yet it
was stated, THE ESTATE SHOULD
RATHER BE VALUED AND SHE BE
GIVEN [THE SHARE THAT IS HER DUE].
from which it clearly follows that we are not
guided by the assumed disposition [of her
father], and this presents an objection against
Samuel!44 He45 holds the same view as R.
Judah.
For we learned, R. JUDAH RULED: IF A
MAN HAD GIVEN HIS FIRST
DAUGHTER IN MARRIAGE, THE
SECOND SHOULD RECEIVE AS MUCH
AS THE [FATHER] HAD GIVEN TO THE
FIRST. [Why], then, [did he not] say, 'The
Halachah is in agreement with R. Judah'?46
— If he had said, 'The Halachah is in
agreement with R. Judah', it might have been
assumed [to apply] only [where her father
had actually] given her47 in marriage, since
[in that case] he has revealed his disposition,
but not [to a case where] he had not given
her47 in marriage,48 hence he45 taught us49
that R. Judah's reason is that we are guided
by our assumption [as to whit was her
father's disposition], there being no
difference whether he had already given
her50 in marriage or whether he had not
given her in marriage; the only object he51
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
61
had52 in mentioning [the case where a father]
gave her50 in marriage was to let you know
the extent of the ruling53 of the Rabbis54 [who
maintain] that although he had already given
her50 in marriage and had thereby revealed
his disposition, we are nevertheless not to be
guided by the assumption [as to what may
have been the father's disposition].
Said Raba to R. Hisda: In our discourse we
stated55 in your name, 'The Halachah is in
agreement with R. Judah. The other replied:
May it be the will [of Providence] that you
may report in your discourses all such
beautiful sayings in my name. But could
Raba, however, have made such a
statement?56 Surely, it was taught: Rabbi
said, A daughter who is maintained by her
brothers is to receive57 a tenth of [her
father's] estate;58 and Raba stated that the
law is in agreement with Rabbi!59 —
This is no difficulty. The former60 [is a case]
where we have formed some opinion about
him;61 the latter62 is one where we have not
formed any opinion about him.63 This
explanation may also be supported by a
process of reasoning. For R. Adda b. Ahaba
stated: It once happened that Rabbi gave
her64 a twelfth of [her father's] estate. Are
not the two statements contradictory?65
Consequently66 it must be inferred that the
one67 [refers to a father of whom] some
opinion had been formed while the other68
[refers to one of whom] we have formed no
opinion. This is conclusive proof.
[To turn to] the main text.69 Rabbi said, A
daughter who is maintained by her brothers
is to receive a tenth of [her father's] estate.
They70 said to Rabbi: According to your
statement, if a man had ten daughters and
one son the sons should receive no share at all
on account of71 the daughters? He replied:
What I mean is this: The first72 [daughter]
receives a tenth of the estate, the second
[receives a tenth] of what [the first] had left,
and the third [gets a tenth] of what [the
second] had left, and then they divide again
[all that they had received] into equal shares.
1. I.e., white linen (Rashi).
2. Silk cloths dyed. (Rashi a.l.; cf. also Rashi on
Ezek. XVI, 16). [H] or [H] may be compared
with [G], cushion', 'pillow' (v. Levy); 'will you
recline at dinner', he was asked, 'on the linen,
or silken pillows?' The noun is also rendered,
'table outfit', the expressions, 'silver' and
'gold' being taker, literally; 'Will you dine
with the silver outfit (i.e., with the outfit used
in connection with silver vessels) or with the
gold outfit?' (Jast.).
3. Who do not always respond to every appeal
for charity.
4. Deut. XV, 9.
5. Dibtha, below the Tigris.
6. In connection with the duty of assisting the
poor.
7. [H]
8. Deut. XV, 9.
9. Concerning idolatry
10. Deut. XIII, 14, the expression base, [H] (v.
supra n. 12), occurring in both cases.
11. It is only thanks to the rogues who claim
charity under false pretences that we have an
excuse for not responding to every appeal.
12. V. Rashi; 'a hump' (Jast.) [H] may be
rendered 'leg', 'foreleg' or 'shoulder'. The rt.
[H] in Piel is to be taken according to Rashi's
interpretation in the sense of 'binding',
'forcing', or 'outraging'. It is taken by Jast. as
denom of [H] 'to make high and arched
shoulders', 'to cause or pretend to be
humpbacked'.
13. One who owns less than two hundred Zuz and
wishes to take a share in the poor man's gifts.
The possessor of two hundred Zuz is
forbidden to participate in the poor man's
gifts.
14. Though the proceeds of such a sale would
raise the man's capital above the two hundred
Zuz limit. Pe'ah VIII, 8.
15. Lit., 'and not?'
16. Which proves that a poor man is expected to
sell his costlier goods before he is allowed to
take alms. Why then was it stated here that he
is not compelled to sell 'his article of service'?
17. The last mentioned Baraitha which orders the
sale of 'articles of service'.
18. There can be no hardship in using instead of
one made of a cheaper metal.
19. The Mishnah from Pe'ah, according to which
one is not compelled to sell his articles of
service.
20. I.e., if he possessed less than two hundred Zuz
and applied for assistance before receiving
any help under false pretences. As there is no
claim against him he is not to be compelled to
sell his articles of service.
21. Who, being in possession of two hundred Zuz,
accepted alms under false pretences.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
62
22. I.e., after it had been discovered that did not
belong to the poor classes and was ordered by
the court to refund all sums he had received
unlawfully. In such a case, if he is unable to
meet the claim otherwise, he is compelled to
sell his costly articles and to content himself
with the use of cheaper ones.
23. And much more so if without her consent.
24. Lit., 'wrote'.
25. As her share in the estate of her deceased
father.
26. Though she had accepted the amount during
her minority V. supra note 1.
27. Viz., a tenth of the estate.
28. Who marries after his death.
29. The amount he gives to his first daughter is,
therefore, no criterion for his second
30. The second daughter.
31. Of an orphan.
32. I.e., the amount to be given to the orphan on
marriage out of her father's estate.
33. She is to receive a bigger or a smaller amount
in accordance with her fathers reputation for
generosity or niggardliness.
34. This is explained anon.
35. Lit., ['the Parnasah of her husband', Parnasah
being a technical term to denote the estate set
aside for the dowry of the orphaned daughter.
Frankel MGWJ 1861, p. 119 connects it with
the [G] cf. supra p. 408. n. 6].
36. A contradiction against the ruling of Samuel.
37. Before marriage, while she is still with her
brothers.
38. 'To be (a) maintained and (b) provided for'.
39. V. p. 416, n. 13.
40. V. p. 416, n. 15.
41. Lit., 'that'.
42. Niggardly; having the mind or disposition of a
poor man.
43. Generous.
44. Who stated that the amount is determined by
what is known of the disposition of her father.
How, it is asked, could Samuel differ from a
Mishnah?
45. Samuel.
46. Which would have been a shorter statement
and would have included the name of its
author also.
47. HIS FIRST DAUGHTER.
48. Since his disposition had not beers revealed.
49. By his specific ruling.
50. HIS FIRST DAUGHTER.
51. The compiler of our Mishnah.
52. Lit., 'and that.'
53. Lit., 'power'.
54. The Sages
55. Or: Shall we state, etc. (cf. Rashi, s.v. [H]
Bezah 28a)
56. That the amount to be given to an orphan on
marriage is determined, as R. Judah ruled, by
the disposition of her father.
57. On marriage.
58. Ned. 39b.
59. I.e., that the amount the daughter is to
receives is a legally, prescribed proportion.
How then could he have said that the
Halachah was in agreement with R. Judah (v
supra note 7)?
60. Lit., that', the statement that the Halachah
follows R. Judah (v. supra note 7 )
61. The orphan's father. Knowing his disposition
it is possible to determine accordingly what
amount his daughter shall be allowed on
marriage.
62. Lit., 'that', the law that the proportion she is
to receive is always a tenth of the estate.
63. If he was unknown to the court and no one is
able to supply reliable information on the
point.
64. An orphan on marriage.
65. According to the former statement Rabbi
allowed only one tenth while according to the
latter he allowed a twelfth.
66. To reconcile the contrary statements.
67. The case where a twelfth had been allowed.
68. Cf. supra p. 418, n. 13.
69. A citation from which has been discussed
supra..
70. The scholars at the college.
71. Lit., 'in the place of'.
72. It is at present assumed, 'the first to marry'.
Kethuboth 68b
But did not each one receive what was hers?1
— It is this that was meant: If all of theme
wish2 to marry at the same time they are to
receive equal shares.3 This provides support
for [the opinion] of R. Mattena; for R.
Mattena has said: If all of them wish to
marry at the same time they are to receive
one tenth. 'One tenth'! Can you imagine
[such a ruling]?4 The meaning must
consequently be that5 they are to receive
their tenths at the same time.6
Our Rabbis taught: The daughters,7 whether
they had attained their adolescence before
they married or whether they married before
they had attained their adolescence, lose their
right to maintenance8 but not to their
allowance for marriage outfit; so Rabbi. R.
Simeon b. Eleazar said: If they also attained
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
63
their adolescence, they lose the right to their
marriage outfit.9 How should they proceed?10
— They hire for themselves husbands11 and
exact their outfit allowance. R. Nahman
stated: Huna told me, The law is in
agreement with Rabbi.
Raba raised an objection against R. Nahman:
IF AN ORPHAN WAS GIVEN IN
MARRIAGE BY HER MOTHER OR HER
BROTHERS [EVEN IF] WITH HER
CONSENT, AND THEY ASSIGNED TO
HER A HUNDRED, OR FIFTY ZUZ, SHE
MAY, WHEN SHE ATTAINS HER
MAJORITY, RECOVER FROM THEM
THE AMOUNT THAT WAS DUE TO HER.
The reason then12 is because she was a
minor;13 had she, however, been older14 her
right15 would have been surrendered!16 —
This is no difficulty; the one17 is a case where
she protested;18 the other,19 where she did
not protest.20 This explanation may also be
supported by a process of reasoning. For
otherwise21 there would arise a contradiction
between two statements of Rabbi.22 For it
was taught, 'Rabbi said, A daughter who is
maintained by her brothers is to receive a
tenth of [her father's] estate', [which implies]
only when23 she is maintained24 but not25
when she is not maintained.26 Must it not in
consequence be concluded that one
[statement deals with one] who protested and
the other [with one] who did not protest. This
proves it.
Rabina said to Raba: R. Adda b. Ahaba told
us in your name, If she attained her
adolescence she need not lodge a protest;27 if
she married she need not lodge a protest;27
but if she attained her adolescence and was
also married it is necessary for her to lodge a
protest.28 But could Raba have made such a
statement? Surely, Raba pointed out an
objection against R. Nahman [from the
Mishnah of] AN ORPHAN, and the other
replied that 'the one is a case where she
protested, the other where she did not
protest'!29 — This is no difficulty. One30 is a
case where she is maintained31 by them;32 the
other,33 where she is not maintained by
them.34
R. Huna stated in the name of Rabbi: [The
right35 to] marriage outfit is not the same as
that36 conferred by a condition in a
Kethubah.37 What is meant by 'is not the
same as that conferred by a condition in a
Kethubah'? Should it be suggested38 that
whereas for the allowance for a marriage
outfit even property pledged39 may be
seized,40 [for the fulfillment of an obligation36
under] the terms of a Kethubah no pledged
property41 may be seized,42 what [new point,
it may be objected,] does this teach us?
Surely it is a daily occurrence [that pledged
property] is seized for marriage outfit but not
for maintenance! [Should it], however, [be
suggested that] whereas for a marriage outfit
movable objects also may be seized, [for the
fulfillment of an obligation under] a
condition in a Kethubah only real estate. but
not movable objects, may be seized, [it may
be objected that,] according to Rabbi, for the
one as well as the other43 [movable objects]
may be seized. For it was taught: Both landed
property and movable property may be
seized for the maintenance of a wile or
daughters;44 so Rabbi! What, then, is meant
by '[The right to] marriage outfit is not the
same as that conferred by a condition in a
Kethubah'? —
As it was taught: If a man45 said that his
daughters must not be maintained out of his
estate he is not to be obeyed.46 [If, however,
he said, that] his daughters shall not receive
their marriage outfit out of his estate he is
obeyed, because [the right to] marriage outfit
is not the same as that conferred by a
condition in a Kethubah.47
1. Of course she did. Each one is entitled to a
tenth of the value of the estate as it stood at
the time she married. Why then should there
be a new division in equal shares, which
would deprive those who married earlier from
what was their due?
2. Lit., 'came'.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
64
3. After each in turn had received a tenth of the
value of the estate as it stood at the moment
her share was allowed to her. Since
subsequently they will all pool their shares it
does not matter which of them is given her
share first. the only object of the allotment of
the successive shares is to determine what
part of the estate is to be left for the son. If
there were three daughters for instance, the
division would proceed as follows: One
daughter would be allowed one tenth of the
estate; the other 1/10 x 9/10; and the third
1/10 x 81/100. The son would, therefore,
receive 1 - (1/10 - 9/100 - 81/1000) = 729/1000,
and each daughter would ultimately get a 271
/ (3 X 1000) of the entire estate.
4. Certainly not. If every daughter is entitled to
a tenth of the estate, several daughters, surely,
should receive more than one tenth.
5. Lit., 'but'.
6. The reading being [H] instead of [H] (one
tenth). Cf. supra n. 9.
7. Of a man who left an estate and is survived by
sons.
8. Because the terms of a Kethubah provide for
the maintenance of daughters only until
adolescence (v. Glos. s.v. Bogereth) or
marriage, whichever is the earlier.
9. The tenth of the estate to which, as stated
supra, a daughter is entitled. In his opinion it
is only one who is a minor, Na'arah (v. Glos.),
that receives such tenth, once she has reached
her adolescence, or married as a Na'arah,
without claiming at the time her full marriage
outfit, she loses her claim to it.
10. If they had not been married early and are
desirous of securing their tenth before losing
it through age.
11. [They hire men to declare that they would
marry them (Strashun)].
12. why she may recover the amount prescribed
for her marriage outfit,
13. At the time she married.
14. Even If she was still a Na'arah at the time of
marriage.
15. To her full claim.
16. And she would not be entitled to the balance
of her marriage outfit. This anonymous
Mishnah then is in agreement with the view of
R. Simeon b. Eleazar. Now, since the
Halachah is usually in agreement with the
anonymous Mishnah how could R. Nahman
maintain that the Halachah is in agreement
with Rabbi?
17. Rabbi's statement that she does not lose her
marriage outfit.
18. When less than her due was assigned to her.
19. Our Mishnah.
20. Hence it is only a minor, who cannot
surrender her rights, that may recover the
balance when she becomes of age. One,
however, who has passed her minority (cf.
supra note 8) may well surrender her right.
Her silence is regarded as consent.
21. Lit., 'for if so', that Rabbi maintains that in all
cases a daughter on attaining adolescence
does not lose the right to her marriage outfit,
22. Lit., 'that of Rabbi against that of Rabbi'.
23. Lit., 'yes'.
24. Is she to receive a tenth of the whole.
25. She is to receive no such allowance.
26. I.e., after she had attained her adolescence,
How then could Rabbi also have stated that a
daughter always (v. supra n. 1) receives her
outfit?
27. Against the full, or partial loss of her
marriage outfit allowance. Even without her
protest she retains he right to the tenth of the
estate that is due to her,
28. Otherwise she loses her claim to the marriage
outfit.
29. Supra. Cf. supra p. 420, notes 11 to 14. From
which it follows that once she passes her
minority, though she did not attain her
adolescence, a daughter loses her full claim to
an outfit allowance if she did not lodge her
protest on marriage. How then could it be said
that according to Raba, 'if she married
(provided it was before attaining her
adolescence) she need not lodge a protest'?
30. Raba's ruling that 'if she married she need
not lodge a protest'.
31. After her marriage.
32. Her brothers. In such a case it is to be
presumed that her silence was not due to her
consent to lose her outfit but to the belief that,
as they continued to maintain her, they would
also give her in due course the full amount of
her outfit allowance.
33. The inference from our Mishnah according to
which one who has passed out of her minority
surrenders on marriage her right to the
balance of her outfit.
34. Hence she loses the right to her outfit unless
she lodged her protest.
35. Of a daughter.
36. Of a daughter's maintenance.
37. Cf. supra 52b.
38. As a point of difference between the two
rights.
39. By the brothers (not by the father).
40. Since it represents a fixed sum (one tenth of
the estate) it had the validity of a debt
incumbent upon the estate.
41. Even if it was only the brothers who pledged it
(v. Git. 48b)
42. As the amount is not a fixed quantity it has
not the same force as a debt.
43. For maintenance as well as for marriage
outfit.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
65
44. And much more so for marriage outfit which
has the validity of a debt of a debt (cf. supra
nn. 6 and 8).
45. On his death bed.
46. Since even a dying man, whose verbal
instructions have the validity of a legal
contract, cannot annul the undertaking to
maintain his daughters which he entered in
the Kethubah.
47. While the latter is obligatory upon the
deceased and upon his heirs, the firmer has to
be provided by the heirs only where the
deceased did not give specific instructions to
the contrary.
Kethuboth 69a
Rah inserted1 [the following enquiry]
between the lines2 [of a communication3 he
sent] to Rabbi: What [is the law] where the
brothers have encumbered [the estate they
inherited from their father]?4 [When the
enquiry reached him] R. Hiyya [who] was
sitting before him asked, '[does he mean:]
They sold it or pledged it?' — 'What
difference call this make?'5 the other
retorted. Whether they sold it [he continued]
or pledged it, [the estate] may he seized [to
meet the obligation] of marriage outfit but
may not be seized for that of maintenance
As to Rab, however, if his enquiry [related to
brothers] who sold [the estate], he should
have written to him, 'sold'; and if his enquiry
[related to brothers] who pledged it, he
should have written to him, 'pledged'! — Rab
wished to ascertain the law concerning both
cases and he thought: If I write to him 'sold'
[I shall get] satisfaction If he were to send [in
reply] that 'the estate may be seized', since
the same ruling would apply with even
greater force to the case where they pledged
[the estate]. If, however, he were to send me
in reply that 'it may not be seized', the
question [in respect of brothers] who pledged
[the estate] would still remain. If, [again]. I
were to write to him, 'pledged' then if he sent
in reply that 'the estate may not be seized'
this ruling would apply with even greater
force [to the case where] they sold it. Should
he, however, send a reply that 'it may be
seized', the question [in respect of brothers]
who sold It would still remain. I will,
therefore, write to him, 'encumbered' which
might mean the one6 as well as the other7
R. Johanan, however, ruled: [An estate]8
may not be seized either [to meet the
obligation of the] one or of the other.9
The question was raised: Did not R. Johanan
hear the ruling of Rabbi, but if he had heard
it he would have accepted it? Or is it possible
that he heard it and did not accept it? —
Come and hear what has been stated: If a
man died and left two daughters and one son,
and the first forestalled [the others] and took
a tenth of the estate while the other did not
manage to collect [her share] before the son
died,10 R. Johanan ruled: The second11 has
surrendered her right.12 Said R. Hanina:
Something that is even more striking than
this has been said, [viz.. that an estate] may
be seized13 [to meet the obligation] of a
marriage outfit though it may not be seized
for that of maintenance, and you nevertheless
state, 'The second has surrendered her
right'?14 Now, if that were the case,15 he16
should have asked him 'who said it?'17
— But is it not possible that he in fact did not
hear it [at first]18 and when he [finally] heard
he accepted it, but there19 [the circumstances
are] different, since the house [of the second
daughter] has now ample provisions?20 Said
R. Yemar to R. Ashi: Now then,21 if she22
found anything at all, so that her house is
amply provided for, would we in such a case
also not give her a tenth of the estate? — The
other replied: I said, A house amply provided
for from the same estate.23
Amemar ruled: A daughter24 has [the legal
status of] an heiress. Said R. Ashi to
Amemar: Should it be desired to settle her
claim25 by means of a money payment such a
settlement cannot be effected for the same
reason?26 — 'Yes', the other replied. 'Should
it be desired [the first asked] to settle her
claim by [giving her] one plot of land, such a
settlement cannot be effected for the same
reason?'26 — 'Yes', the other replied.27 R.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
66
Ashi, however, ruled: A daughter28 has [the
legal status of] a creditor.29 And Amemar
also withdrew his former opinion. For R.
Minyomi son of R. Nihumi stated: I was once
standing before Amemar and a woman who
claimed a tenth of [her deceased father's]
estate appeared before him, and I observed
[that it was his] opinion that if [her brothers]
desired to settle with her by means of a
money payment he would have agreed to the
settlement.30 For he heard the brothers say to
her, 'If we had the money we would settle
with you31 by a cash payment', and he
remained silent and told them nothing to the
contrary.
Now that it has been said that [a daughter in
her claim to her tenth]28 has the legal status
of a creditor [the question arises whether she
is the creditor] of the father or of the
brothers. In what respect can this matter? —
In respect [of allowing her] to collect [her
tenth] either from their medium32 land and
without an oath,33 or of their worst land with
an oath.34 Now what [is the law]? — Come
and hear [of the decision] of Rabina: He
allowed the daughter of R. Ashi to collect
[her tenth] from Mar35 the son of R. Ashi out
Of his medium land, without an oath, but
from the son of R. Sama36 the son of R. Ashi
out of his worst land with an oath.37
R. Nehemiah the son of R. Joseph sent the
following message to Rabbah the son of R.
Huna Zuta38 of Nehardea:39 When this
woman40 presents herself to you, authorize
her to collect a tenth part of [her deceased
father's] estate even from the casing of
handmills.41
R. Ashi stated: When we were at the college
of R. Kahana we authorized the collection [of
a daughter's tenth] from the rent42 of houses
also.
R. Anan sent [this communication] to R.
Huna, '[To] our colleague Huna, greetings.43
When this woman40 presents herself before
you, authorize her to collect a tenth part of
[her father's] estate'. [When the
communication arrived,] R. Shesheth was
sitting before him. 'Go', [R. Huna] said to
him,44 'and convey45 to him46 [the following
message]-and he47 who does not deliver the
message48 to him shall fall under the ban —
"Anan, Anan, [is the collection to be made]
from landed, or from movable property?
And who presides at the meal in a house of
mourning?"'49 R. Shesheth went to R. Anan
and said to him: The Master50 is a teacher,51
and R. Huna is a teacher of the teacher,52 and
he pronounced the ban against anyone who
would not convey53 [his message] to you;54
and had he not pronounced the ban I would
not have said, 'Anan, Anan, [is the collection
to be made] from landed, or movable
property, and who presides at the meal in a
house of mourning?'55 Thereupon, R. Anan
went to Mar 'Ukba and said to him: See,
Master, how R. Huna addressed56 me as
'Anan, Anan';57 and, furthermore, I do not
know what he meant by the message he sent
me on marziha.58 The other said to him: Tell
me now
1. Lit., 'suspended'.
2. [H] perhaps from [H] 'to dig'. 'scratch' hence
a line drawn with a stylus (cf. Rashi and last.).
Aruk renders 'stitches' (cf. [H] 'thread'), and
this is apparently the interpretation adopted
by Tosaf (s.v. [H] a.l.), the meaning being that
'among the documents that were sewn
together one containing the enquiry was
appended'; or, 'among the stitches holding the
documents together the one containing the
enquiry was inserted'.
3. A friendly,' letter (Rashi).
4. May it be seized by the daughter for their
marriage outfit?
5. Lit., 'what goes out (results) from it?'
6. Lit., 'thus'.
7. Sold or pledged. And should there be a
difference in law between the two cases, Rabbi
in his reply would naturally indicate it.
8. Which the brothers sold or pledged. Cf. supra.
9. I.e., maintenance or marriage outfit.
10. And the entire estate fell to the lot of the
daughters.
11. Since she did not collect her tenth while the
son was alive, i.e., before she and her sister
became the sole heirs,
12. A daughter may claim a tenth of the estate
from a son only but not from a daughter
whose rights are equal to hers.
13. Though it has been pledged or sold.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
67
14. To her marriage outfit, even in an estate
which had been neither sold nor pledged. The
first sister, surely, cannot possess a stronger
claim upon the estate than a buyer or a
creditor, V. Git. 51a.
15. That R. Johanan never heard Rabbi's ruling.
16. R. Johanan.
17. Since he did not ask him this it may be
inferred that R. Johanan did hear Rabbi's
ruling but did not accept it. For this reason
also he did not withdraw his ruling in the case
of the two daughters.
18. Rabbi's ruling.
19. The case of the two daughters which was
discussed after he had heard Rabbi's ruling
and accepted it.
20. At first she was entitled to a tenth only and
now she gets a half. In such circumstances she
may well be expected to surrender her claim
to the tenth. Rabbi, however, deals with a case
where the brothers are alive, and the
daughters ate entirely dependent on their
tenths,
21. If the argument of additional provision is
admissible.
22. The second sister.
23. From which she was to receive her tenth.
24. In respect of her right to a tenth of her
father's estate.
25. To the tenth of the estate. Lit., 'to remove
her'.
26. Because she has the status of an heiress, Lit.,
'thus also'.
27. As heiress she has the right to claim a share in
the actual property her father left and in
every portion of it.
28. In respect of her right to a tenth of her
father's estate.
29. Her claim may, therefore, be met by a money
payment or by the allotment of any plot of
land of the value of a tenth of the estate that is
due to her.
30. Lit., 'he would have removed (sc. dismissed)
her',
31. So MS.M. adding [H] after [H].
32. Land is classified as [H] best [H], medium or
[H] worst, and payments are made from these
respective qualities in accordance with the
strength and validity of any particular claim.
Cf. e g., Git. 48b.
33. That she had never taken anything from the
estate. This would be the law if she were
regarded as the creditor of the brothers.
34. If she is regarded as the father's creditor. In
the latter case she would be subject to the
restrictions imposed on a creditor who claims
his debt from the debtor's orphans (v. Get.
48b).
35. Who survived his father and from whom his
sister claimed a portion of her tenth.
36. Who predeceased R. Ashi and whose son, on
the death of his grandfather (R. Ashi),
inherited his father's (R. Sama's) share and
was now sued by his aunt to give her the
portion of her tenth that his father as a son of
R. Ashi owed her (Rashi). [Ritba and others:
R. Sama died shortly after R. Ashi, before his
daughter managed to collect her tenth share
in the estate].
37. According to Rabina, then, the daughter was
regarded as the debtor of her brothers (Mar
and R. Sama). From the former, therefore,
who was alive she consequently collected of
the best and without an oath (cf. supra p. 425,
n. 11). From the latter, however, she could
only collect through his son as the creditor of
has father's and was therefore subject to the
restrictions of a creditor who collects from
orphans (cf. supra. note I).
38. Var. lec., 'Zuti' (cf. B.B. 66b)
39. V. supra p. 222, n. 8.
40. The bearer, whose case R. Nehemiah had
investigated.
41. The casing being regarded as landed estate
from which her tenth may be collected.
42. The yield of the houses being legally regarded,
like, the houses themselves, as landed
property (cf. supra n. 8').
43. Lit., 'peace.
44. To R. Shesheth.
45. Lit., 'say'.
46. To R. Anan.
47. I.e., 'If you do not deliver the message, etc.',
the third person being used for euphemism.
48. I.e., using exactly the same words, lit., 'say'.
49. R. Huna was apparently offended by the tone
or wording of R. Anan's communication.
Hence the abusive reply.
50. R. Anan.
51. A complimentary introduction to the
unpleasant message that follows
52. I.e., R. Anan. An excuse for carrying out his
instructions though they were offensive to R.
Anan.
53. Lit., 'say'.
54. Lit., 'to him'.
55. The seat of honor at the meal in a house of
mourning was given to the greatest scholar in
the company
56. Lit., 'sent'.
57. Without the title of 'R.'
58. [H], rendered supra, 'a house of mourning'.
Kethuboth 69b
how the incident actually occurred. 'The
incident', the first replied, 'happened in such
and such a way'. 'A man', the other
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
68
exclaimed, 'who does not know the meaning
of Marziha should [scarcely] presume to
address1 R. Huna as, "our colleague Huna".'
What [is the meaning of] Marziha. —
Mourning; for it is written in Scripture, Thus
saith the Lord: Enter not into the house of
mourning2 , etc.3
R. Abbahu stated: Whence is it deduced that
a mourner sits at the head [of the table]?4
[From Scripture] wherein it is said, I chose
out their way, and sat at the head,5 and dwelt
as a king in the army, as one that
comforteth6 the mourners.7 But does not
yenahem8 mean [one who comforts] others?9
R. Nahman b. Isaac replied: The written
form is YNHM.10 Mar Zutra said: [The
deduction11 is made] from here: We-sar
marzeah Seruhim,12 he who is in bitterness
and distracted13 becomes the chief14 of those
that stretched themselves.15
Raba stated: The law [is that payment may
be exacted] from landed property, but not
from movable property, whether in respect of
maintenance, Kethubah or marriage outfit.16
MISHNAH. IF A MAN DEPOSITED17 A SUM
OF MONEY FOR HIS [UNMARRIED]
DAUGHTER WITH A TRUSTEE,18 AND
[AFTER SHE WAS BETROTHED]19 SHE SAYS,
'I TRUST MY HUSBAND',20 THE TRUSTEE
MUST ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
CONDITION OF HIS TRUST;21 SO R. MEIR. R.
JOSE, HOWEVER, SAID: WERE [THE TRUST]
ACTUALLY22 A FIELD23 AND SHE WISHED
TO SELL IT, WOULD IT NOT BE DEEMED24
SOLD FORTHWITH!25 THIS APPLIES TO ONE
WHO IS OF AGE.26 IN THE CASE OF A
MINOR, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO VALIDITY
AT ALL IN THE ACT OF A MINOR.
GEMARA. Our Rabbis taught: If a man
deposited for his son-in-law with a trustee a
sum of money wherewith to buy a field for
his daughter, and she says, 'Let it be given to
my husband', she is entitled [to have her wish
fulfilled, if it was expressed] after her
marriage27 but if only after her betrothal the
trustee must act according to the conditions
of his trust;28 so R. Meir. R. Jose, however,
said: A woman who is of age has a right [to
obtain her desire] whether [it was expressed]
after her marriage or only after betrothal,
but [in the case of] a minor [whether her wish
was expressed] after marriage or after
betrothal, the trustee must act in accordance
with the conditions of his trust.29 What is the
practical difference between them?30 If it be
suggested that the practical difference
between them is the case of a minor after her
marriage, R. Meir holding the opinion that
[even] she is entitled [to have her wish] and
R. Jose comes to state that even after
marriage [It is only] a woman who is of age
that is entitled to have her wish31 but not a
minor, [in that case] what of32 the final
clause,33 IN THE CASE OF A MINOR,
HOWEVER, THERE IS NO VALIDITY AT
ALL IN THE ACT OF A MINOR. Who [it
might be asked] could have taught this?
If it be suggested [that the author was] R.
Jose, [it could be objected:] This, surely,
could be inferred from the first clause; for,
since R. Jose said, WERE [THE TRUST]
ACTUALLY A FIELD AND SHE WISHED
TO SELL IT, WOULD IT NOT BE
DEEMED SOLD FORTHWITH! [it follows34
that only] one that is of age, who is eligible to
effect a sale, was meant,35 but not a minor
who is ineligible to effect a sale.36
Consequently it must be R. Meir [who was
the author of] it, and a clause is in fact
missing [from our Mishnah], the proper
reading being as follows:37 'THE TRUSTEE
MUST ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE CONDITIONS OF HIS TRUST. This
applies only [to a woman whose desire was
expressed] after her betrothal, but if after her
marriage she is entitled [to have her wish].
THIS [furthermore] APPLIES TO ONE
WHO IS OF AGE. IN THE CASE OF A
MINOR, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO
VALIDITY AT ALL IN THE ACT OF A
MINOR.'38 — [The fact]. however, is that the
practical difference between them is the case
of one who is of age [whose wish was
expressed] after her betrothal.39
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
69
It was stated: Rab Judah said in the name of
Samuel. The Halachah is in agreement with
R. Jose. Raba ion the name of R. Nahman
said, The Halachah is in agreement with R.
Meir. Ilfa40 reclined41 upon a sail mast42
and43 said: 'Should any one come and submit
to me any statement [in the Baraithoth] of R.
Hiyya and R. Oshaia44 which I cannot make
clear to him [with the aid] of our Mishnah I
will drop from the mast45 and drown myself'.
An aged man came and recited to him [the
following Baraitha:]46 If a man47 said, 'Give
my children48 a Shekel a week',49 and they
require a Sela',50 a Sela' is to he given to
them.51 But if he said, 'Give them no more
than a Shekel', only a Shekel is to he given to
them.52 If, however, he gave Instructions that
if these died others53 shall be his heirs in their
stead, only one Shekel [a week] is to be given
to them, irrespective of whether he used the
expression of 'give' or 'give no [more]',54
[Ilfa] said to him: [Do you wish to know]
whose ruling this55 is?
1. Lit., 'sent'.
2. [H], Heb. from Aram. [H]
3. Jer. XVI, 5
4. At the meal in a house of mourning.
5. E V., as chief. [H] may bear both renderings.
6. This is explained by R. Nahman anon.
7. Job. XXIX, 25.
8. [H] Imperf. Piel of [H].
9. How then could the text be said to refer to the
mourner who is himself to be comforted?
10. [H], which may be vocalized as the Pus form
Yenuham, 'one who is comforted'. Though the
text must retain its obvious meaning with the
M.T. vocalization of [H], the possibility of
reading ינחם as ינחם also permits of the
Midrashic exposition (Tosaf. s.v. [H]).
11. That the mourner is to sit at the head of the
table at the meal in a house of mourning.
12. [H], Amos, VI, 7. Midrashically, שר = סר
(chief, I.e., 'sits at the head'), מרזח is divided
into [H] (bitter) and [H] (rt. [H] distracted),
and [H] is taken to refer to the comforters
who stretch themselves on their couches or on
the ground at the feet of the mourner. (Cf.
Golds.). E.V., And the revelry of men that
stretched themselves shall pass away.
13. I.e., the mourner.
14. I.e., sits at the head of the table during the
meal.
15. Before him, sc. those, who came to offer their
condolence.
16. A Geonite provision, [H], empowers also the
seizure of movable property to meet any of
these obligations (cf. Tosaf. supra 51a. s.v.
[H]). [This Takkanah has been ascribed to
Hunai Gaon and dated 787, v. Epstein, L. The
Jewish Marriage, p. 255 and Tykocinski, Die
Gaonaischen Verordnungen, p. 35ff].
17. Lit., 'he who made a third', i.e., appointed a
third person as trustee.
18. Cf. supra n. 12, instructing him to use the
money after his death for the benefit of his
daughter, e.g., to buy for her a field.
19. So Tosaf (s.v. [H]) contrary to Rashi's
'married', v. Gemara infra.
20. 'And desire the money to be given to him',
21. Lit., 'what was put in his hand as a third
party'. The daughter's wish is to be
disregarded and the trustee buys a field with
it.
22. Lit., 'was not but'.
23. Not merely a sum of money with which to buy
one.
24. Lit., 'behold it'.
25. Lit., 'from now', sc. from the moment she
expressed her desire to sell it, and the same
should apply where the trust consisted of a
sum of money. The sum of money must
consequently be at her disposal and she may
gave it to her husband if she desires to do so.
26. The point of this limitation is discussed in the
Gemara infra.
27. The assumption being that the father wished
the trustee to act only until his daughter's
marriage.
28. V. supra p. 428, n. 16.
29. Tosef. Keth. VI. Cf. supra p. 428, n. 16.
30. R. Meir and R. Jose, i.e., does R. Meir in the
Baraitha refer to a minor also or only to one
who is of age?
31. Lit., 'yes'.
32. Lit., 'say'.
33. Of our Mishnah.
34. Since R. Jose gave as the reason for his ruling
the consideration that she could have sold the
field if she wished
35. Lit., 'yes'.
36. The final clause, then, would be superfluous
37. Lit., and thus he taught'.
38. Now, since R. Meir also admits that the act of
a minor has no validity, his statement in the
Baraitha cited that after marriage she is
entitled to have her wish must refer to one
who is of age and not to a minor. What, then,
is the practical difference between R. Meir
and R. Jose?
39. According to R. Meir her wish is to be
ignored; according to R. Jose it is to be
granted. Cf. supra p. 428, n. 14. As to a minor
both agree that bet request is not to be
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
70
granted even if she makes it after her
marriage.
40. Scholar and merchant, a contemporary of R.
Johanan. When the latter was appointed to
the presidency of the college the former was
away from his home town, engaged in the
pursuit of his commercial enterprises. What
follows happened on his return when he was
told that had he devoted more time to his
studies and less to commerce the presidency
would have been offered to him. V. Ta'an.
21a.
41. Lit., suspended himself' (cf. Rashi Git. 32b,
s.v. [H] Pesah. 68b, s.v. [H] ).
42. Or sail-yard. Cf. Rashi. Other renderings:
'Sail, or mast of a boat', 'mast-yard', [H], GR.
[G], (perhaps from rt. [H], 'to espy', hence
'espying place') 'mast' or 'yard' (v. Jast.) [H]
cf. Assyr. Makua, a kind of 'boat', 'mast' or
'sail-yard' (v. Rashi, a.l. and Git. 36a, Rashb.
B.B. 161b); 'a ship' (Aruk). In the parallel
passage. Ta'an 21a, the reading for [H] is [H]
(of a ship).
43. To prove that despite has commercial
undertakings he had not forgotten his studies.
44. These were regarded as the most authoritative
of the Baraitha collections
45. Cf. p 430, n. 9.
46. Demanding Mishnaic authority for its rulings
V. infra note 12.
47. Lying on his death bed, or setting out on a
long journey.
48. Out of the estate he leaves behind.
49. For their maintenance
50. A Sela' two Shekels
51. Their father's mention of the smaller coin. it is
assumed, was not meant to exclude the bigger
one. All that he implied was that his children
should be given no more than their actual
weekly requirements.
52. Though they may be in need of more.
53. Whom he named.
54. Because in this case it is evident that it was his
intention to economize as much as possible on
the weekly maintenance of his children in
order that the heirs he nominated might in
due course receive as large an inheritance as
possible.
55. That, though the children need more than
their father had allowed them, the
instructions of the deceased must be carried
out.
Kethuboth 70a
It is that of R. Meir1 who laid down that it is
a religious obligation to carry out the
instructions of a dying man.2
R. Hisda stated in the name of Mar 'Ukba:
The law is that whether [the dying man] said,
'Give' or 'give no more',3 his children are to
he given all that they require. But have we
not, however, an established principle that
the Halachah is in agreement with R. Meir
who laid down that it is a religious obligation
to carry out the instructions of a dying man?
— This applies to other matters, but in this
case [the father] is quite satisfied [that his
children should be provided with all they
need]; and in limiting their allowance,4 his
object was5 to encourage them.6
We learned elsewhere: With regard to little
children,7 their purchase is a valid purchase
and their sale is a valid sale in the case of
movable objects.8 Rafram explained: This
has been taught in the case only where no
guardian had been appointed,9 but where a
guardian had been appointed neither their
purchase nor their sale has any legal validity.
Whence is this inferred? From the
expression, THERE IS NO VALIDITY AT
ALL IN THE ACT OF A MINOR. But might
not the case where a trustee10 had been
appointed be different?11 — If so,12 it should
have been stated, 'IN THE CASE OF A
MINOR, HOWEVER, a trustee must act in
accordance with the conditions of his trust'
what [then was the purpose of the
expression,] THERE IS NO VALIDITY AT
ALL IN THE ACT OF A MINOR? Hence it
may be inferred [that the same law is
applicable] in all cases.13
CHAPTER VII
MISHNAH. IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY
VOW TO HAVE ANY BENEFIT FROM HIM
HE MAY, [IF THE PROHIBITION IS TO LAST]
NOT MORE14 THAN THIRTY DAYS, APPOINT
A STEWARD,15 BUT IF FOR A LONGER
PERIOD HE MUST DIVORCE HER16 AND
GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH. R. JUDAH
RULED: IF HE WAS AN ISRAELITE17 HE
MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE IF THE
PROHIBITION WAS FOR] ONE MONTH, BUT
MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE
KETHUBAH [IF IT WAS FOR] TWO MONTHS.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
71
IF HE WAS A PRIEST18 HE MAY KEEP HER
[AS HIS WIFE, IF THE PROHIBITION WAS
FOR] TWO MONTHS,19 BUT MUST DIVORCE
HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH [IF IT
WAS FOR] THREE. IF A MAN FORBADE HIS
WIFE BY VOW THAT SHE SHOULD NOT
TASTE A CERTAIN FRUIT20 HE MUST
DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE
KETHUBAH. R. JUDAH RULED: IF HE WAS
AN ISRAELITE17 HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS
WIFE, IF THE VOW WAS FOR] ONE DAY,
[BUT IF FOR] TWO DAYS HE MUST
DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE
KETHUBAH. IF, HOWEVER, HE WAS A
PRIEST18 HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE,
IF THE VOW WAS FOR] TWO DAYS [BUT IF
FOR] THREE HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND
GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH. IF A MAN
FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW THAT SHE
SHOULD NOT MAKE USE OF A CERTAIN
ADORNMENT21 HE MUST DIVORCE HER
AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH. R. JOSE
RULED: [THIS22 APPLIES] TO POOR WOMEN
IF NO TIME LIMIT23 IS GIVEN, AND TO RICH
WOMEN [IF THE TIME LIMIT23 IS] THIRTY
DAYS.
GEMARA. Since, however, he24 is under an
obligation to [maintain] her25 how can he
forbid her by a vow [to have any benefit from
him]? Has he then the power26 to cancel his
obligation? Surely we have learned: [If a
woman said to her husband] 'Konam, if I do
aught for your mouth' he need not annul her
vow;27 from which28 it is evident that, as she
is under an obligation to him,29 she has no
right to cancel her obligation,30 similarly
here, since he is under an obligation to
[maintain] her he should have no right to
cancel his obligation!31 — [This,] however, [is
the right explanation:] As he32 is entitled to
say to her,33 'Deduct [the proceeds of] your
handiwork for your maintenance'34
1. Expressed in our Mishnah by the ruling that
despite the request of the daughter the trustee
must carry out the instructions of her
deceased father.
2. Cf. Git. 14b, 15a and 40a.
3. Cf. supra 69b ad fin.
4. Lit., 'and (as to) that which be said thus'.
5. Lit., 'he came'.
6. To lead a thrifty life and to make an effort to
earn their livelihood.
7. Of the ages of nine and eight' (Rashi. a.l. s.v.
[H].). 'six and seven' (Rashb. B.B. 155b, s.v.
[H]).
8. Transactions in landed estate, however, may
be made by such only as have produced signs
of puberty or have attained the age of twenty,
v. Git. 59a, 65a, B.B. i.e.
9. By a father or the court.
10. With definite instructions as to the use he was
to make of the trust money.
11. From an ordinary guardian who is expected
to use his own discretion in the best interests
of the orphans. In the latter case the orphan's
transaction might be deemed valid because it
is not against their father's instructions and,
being in the interest of the orphans, the
guardian might well be presumed to have
acquiesced.
12. That a distinction is to be drawn between a
trustee with special instructions and an
ordinary guardian.
13. Where there is a guardian, whose charge is
somewhat similar to that of a trustee. Lit.,
'even in the world'.
14. Lit., 'until'.
15. To supply his wife's maintenance.
16. I.e., if the woman demands her freedom.
17. Who, unlike a priest (v. Lev. XXI, 7), may
remarry his divorced wife.
18. Cf. supra n. 4.
19. A priest was allowed more time in order to
afford him a longer period of retracting
before his divorce separates her from him for
ever.
20. He confirmed a vow she had made to that
effect (Rashi). Though he has no right to
forbid his wife the eating or tasting of any
foodstuffs he may, by keeping silent when she
herself makes such a vow, confirm it; v. Num.
XXX, 7ff. Others: He vowed to abstain from
his wife should she taste a certain fruit; v.
Isaiah Trani.
21. Cf. supra n. 7 mutatis mutandis.
22. That in the case of a vow against a wife's
adornments, the husband must DIVORCE
HER AND GIVE HER THE KETHUBAH.
23. To the duration of the vow.
24. A husband.
25. His wife.
26. Lit., 'all (power) as if from him?'
27. Supra 59a and notes.
28. Since no annulment is required.
29. A wife's handiwork belongs to her husband.
30. In consequence of which her vow is null and
void and requires no annulment.
31. And his vow also should, therefore, be null
and void.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
72
32. A husband.
33. His wife.
34. I.e., he would neither maintain her nor expect
her to give him her handiwork (v. supra n. 8).
Kethuboth 70b
he [in making his vow] is regarded1 as having
said to her, 'Deduct [the proceeds of] your
handiwork for your maintenance'.
If, however, one is to adopt the ruling R.
Huna gave in the name of Rab, for R. Huna
stated in the name of Rab: A wife may say to
her husband, 'I would neither be maintained
by, nor work [for you]', why should there be
no need to annul [her vow] when she said
'Konam, if I do aught for your mouth'? Let it
rather be said that as she is entitled to say, 'I
would neither be maintained by nor work
[for you]' she [in making her vow] might be
regarded1 as having said, 'I would neither be
maintained by, nor work [for you]'?2 — [The
fact,] however, [is that] the explanation is not
that 'he is regarded'3 but that he actually
said to her, 'Deduct your handiwork for your
maintenance.' If so,4 what need has she of a
steward?5 — [She needs one] where [the
proceeds of her handiwork] do not suffice.6
If, [however, her handiwork] does not
suffice,7 our original question arises again!8
R. Ashi replied: [This is a case] where [her
handiwork] suffices for major requirements
but does not suffice for minor requirements.
How is one to understand these 'minor
requirements'? If the woman is in the habit
of having them, they are, surely, a part of her
regular requirements,9 and if she is not used
to them10 what need has she for a steward?11
— [The law concerning a steward] is
required only where she was used [to them]
in her father's house but consented to
dispense with them when with her husband.12
In such a case she can say to him, 'Hitherto,
before you forbade me by a vow [to have any
benefit from you], I was willing to put up
with your [mode of living], but now that you
have forbidden me [to enjoy any benefit from
you] I am not able to put up [any longer] with
your [mode of living]'. And wherein lies the
difference [between a vow for more, and one
for] NOT MORE THAN THIRTY DAYS? —
[Within a period of] NOT MORE THAN
THIRTY DAYS people would not become
aware of it, and the matter would be no
degradation to her; but after a longer
period13 people would hear of it, and the
matter would be degrading to her.
If you prefer I might reply: [His vow14 is
valid] only if he vowed while she was merely
betrothed to him.15 But has a betrothed
woman, however, any claim to
maintenance?16 — [Yes], if the time [for the
celebration of the marriage] arrived and she
was17 not married. For we have learned: If
the respective periods expired18 and they
were not married,19 they20 are entitled to
maintenance21 out of the man's estate, and [if
he is a priest] may also eat Terumah.22
Wherein then lies the difference [between a
vow for more, and one for] NOT MORE
THAN THIRTY DAYS? — [During a period
of] NOT MORE THAN THIRTY DAYS an
agent23 performs his mission; for a longer
period no agent performs his mission.
And if you prefer I might reply: [The
husband's vow24 is valid] when he made it
while she was betrothed to him and she was
[afterwards] married. But if she was married
[afterwards] she must obviously have
understood her position and accepted it!25 —
[It is a case] where she pleaded, 'I thought I
shall be able to bear it but now I cannot bear
it'. But granted that such a plea26 is properly
admissible27 in respect of bodily defects;28 is
it admissible, however, in respect of
maintenance?29 — Clearly, then, we can only
explain as we explained at first.
HE MAY, [IF THE PROHIBITION IS TO
LAST] NOT MORE THAN THIRTY DAYS,
APPOINT A STEWARD. Does not the
steward, however, act on his30 behalf?31 — R.
Huna replied: [Our Mishnah refers] to one
who declared, 'Whoever will maintain [my
wife] will not suffer any loss'.32 But, even if be
spoke in such a manner, is not the steward
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
73
acting on his behalf? Have we not learned: If
a man who was thrown into a pit cried that
whosoever should hear his voice should write
a letter of divorce for his wife, [the hearers]33
may lawfully34 write, and deliver [it to his
wife]?35 — How now! there36 the man said,
'should write';37 but did the man here38 say,
'should maintain'? All he said was, 'whoever
will maintain'.39
But surely R. Ammi said: In [the case of] a
fire [breaking] out on the Sabbath]40
permission was given to make the
announcement 'Whosoever shall extinguish it
will suffer no loss'.41 Now what does [the
expression] 'In a fire'42 exclude? Does it not
exclude a case of this kind?43 — No; [it was
meant] to exclude other acts that are
forbidden on the Sabbath.44
Rabbah raised an objection: If a man is
forbidden by a vow to have any benefit from
another man, and he has nothing to eat [the
other] may go to a shopkeeper with whom he
is familiar and say to him, 'So-and-so is
forbidden by a vow to have any benefit from
me, and I do not know what to do for him'.
[The shopkeeper] may then give to the one
and recover the cost from the other.45 Only
such [a suggestion]46 is permitted but not that
of 'whoever will maintain [my wife] will not
suffer any loss'?47 — [The formula,] 'There is
no question' is here implied:48 There is no
question [that a man may announce,]
'whoever will maintain [my wife] will not
suffer any loss', since he is speaking to no one
in particular;49 but even in this case where,
since he is familiar with him50 and goes and
speaks to him directly, [it might have been
thought that his mere suggestion is] the same
as if he had expressly told him,50 'You go and
give him',51 hence we were taught [that this
also is permitted].
[To revert to] the main text.52 If a man is
forbidden by a vow to have any benefit from
another man, and he has nothing to eat, [the
other] may go to a shopkeeper with whom he
is familiar and say to him, 'So-and-so is
forbidden by a vow to have any benefit from
me, and I do not know what to do for him'.
[The shopkeeper] may then give to the one
and recover the cost from the other.53 If his54
house is to be built, his wall to be put up or
his field to be harvested [the other] may go to
laborers with whom he is familiar and say to
them, 'So-and-so is forbidden by a vow to
have any benefit from me, and I do not know
what to do for him'. They may then work for
him and recover55 their wages from the
other. If they were going on the same journey
and the one had with him nothing to eat, [the
other]56 may give [some food] to a third57
person as a gift and the first may take it
[from that person] and eat it.58 If no third
person57 is available, he56 may put the food
upon a stone or a wall, and say, 'Behold this
is free59 for all who desire [to take it]', and
the other60 may take it and eat it.61 R. Jose,
however, forbids this.62 Raba said: What is
R. Jose's reason? — [It is forbidden as] a
preventive measure against
1. Lit., 'is made'.
2. And her vow should be valid. Why then has it
been said that her husband 'need not annul
her vow'?
3. Lit., 'do not say; be is made'.
4. That her handiwork is not taken away from
her.
5. The proceeds of her handiwork could be spent
on her maintenance.
6. To make up the legally prescribed sum (v.
supra 64b).
7. And it is, therefore, still her husband's duty to
maintain her in part.
8. How can he by his vow cancel an obligation
that is incumbent upon him?
9. Lit., 'she is used to them'.
10. Being mere luxuries.
11. The husband, surely, is not expected to
provide for such luxuries.
12. Lit., 'roll' with him', i.e., to put up with his
mode of living.
13. Lit., 'more'.
14. That his wife shall not HAVE ANY BENEFIT
FROM HIM.
15. When he is under no obligation to maintain
her.
16. Certainly not (v. supra n. 13). What need then
was there to state the obvious?
17. Lit., 'they were'. V. n. 2.
18. Lit., 'the time (for the respective marriages
referred to supra 57a) arrived'.
19. Through the man's delay.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
74
20. The women mentioned.
21. In accordance with a Rabbinical ordinance.
22. Mishnah supra 57a. Since in such
circumstances the man is Pentateuchally
under no obligation to maintain his betrothed
his vow forbidding her to have any benefit is
valid; and as he is obliged to maintain her in
accordance with Rabbinic law he must
appoint a steward to look after her
maintenance.
23. The steward appointed (v. our Mishnah).
24. V. supra p. 435, n. 12.
25. What claim then could she advance?
26. Mistaken judgment.
27. Lit., 'that we say so'.
28. Though a woman at first consented to live
with the man who suffered from such defects
she may subsequently plead that she under-
estimated her feeling and that now she cannot
bear them (v. infra 77a). A woman may well
be excused her first error of judgment in such
circumstances.
29. No woman, surely, could plead that she was
not aware that a person could live without
food. As she has once accepted the disability
she should not be entitled to change her mind.
30. The husband's.
31. Lit., 'do his mission'. The answer being in the
affirmative, the question arises why his agent
should be allowed to do on his behalf what he
himself is not allowed to do.
32. He would reimburse him.
33. Though they have received no direct
instructions.
34. Lit., 'behold these'.
35. Git. 66a; as if they had been agents who had
received direct instructions from him.
Similarly the steward spoken of in our
Mishnah should be regarded as the husband's
agent (v. supra p. 436, n. 15).
36. The case of divorce.
37. A definite instruction.
38. In the matter of maintenance.
39. This is not even an indirect instruction but a
mere intimation. Anyone acting on such an
intimation only cannot be regarded as agent.
40. When a Jew is forbidden to do any work
himself or to instruct someone else, even a
Gentile, to do it for him.
41. Shab. 121a.
42. Implying a fire only and not other cases.
43. A person's announcement concerning
compensation for the maintenance of his wife
whom he himself is forbidden to maintain, or
any similar announcements which might lead
someone to perform on behalf of that person
what he himself is forbidden to do.
44. The sanctity of the Sabbath demands greater
restrictions which need not he applied to other
prohibitions such as those of vows for
instance.
45. Ned. 43a. Lit., 'gives to him and comes and
takes from this'.
46. Which is rather vague and non-committal.
47. Which is more explicit and a committal
undertaking. An objection against R. Huna.
48. Lit., 'be (the Tanna of that Mishnah) said'.
49. Lit., 'to the world'.
50. The shopkeeper.
51. And, thereby becoming his virtual agent, be
should, like himself, be forbidden to supply
any provisions.
52. Of the citation from Ned. 43a.
53. V. supra p. 437, n. 14.
54. The man who is forbidden to have benefit
from the other by a vow.
55. Lit., 'and come and take'.
56. Benefit from whom he is forbidden to derive.
57. Lit., 'another'.
58. Cf. infra n. 16.
59. Lit., 'they are ownerless property'.
60. V. supra note 9.
61. MS.M. omits [H] ('and it is permitted') which
seems superfluous here as well as supra. V.
supra n. 13.
62. V. Ned. 43a.
Kethuboth 71a
[a repetition of] the incident of Beth Horon.1
R. JUDAH SAID: IF HE WAS AN
ISRAELITE HE MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS
WIFE, IF THE PROHIBITION WAS FOR]
ONE MONTH, etc. Is not this the same
ruling as that of the first Tanna?2 — Abaye
replied: He3 came to teach us [the law
concerning] a priest's wife.4 Raba replied:
The difference between them is a full month5
and a defective month.6
Rab stated: This7 was taught only in the case
of a man who specified [the period of the
prohibition], but where he did not specify,
he8 must divorce her immediately and give
her the Kethubah. Samuel, however, stated:
Even where the period was not specified [the
husband] need not divorce her, since it is
possible that he might discover some reason9
for [the remission of] his vow.10 But surely
they11 had once been in dispute upon this
principle; for have we not learned, 'If a man
forbade his wife by vow to have intercourse,
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
75
Beth Shammai ruled: [She must consent to
the deprivation for] two weeks; Beth Hillel
ruled: [Only for] one week';12 and Rab
stated, 'They13 differ only in the case of a
man who specified [the period of abstention]
but where he did not specify the period he14
must divorce her forthwith and give her the
Kethubah', and Samuel stated, 'Even where
the period had not been specified the
husband need not divorce her, since it might
be possible for him to discover some reason15
for [the annulment of] his16 vow'?17 —
[Both disputes were] necessary. For if [their
views] had been expressed in the former
case18 it might have been assumed that only
in that case did Rab maintain his view, since
[the appointment] of a steward is not
possible, but that in the latter case19 where
[the appointment] of a steward is possible, he
agrees with Samuel. And if [their views] had
been stated in the latter case19 it might have
been assumed that only in that case did
Samuel maintain his view, since the
appointment of a steward is possible. but that
in the former case18 he agrees with Rab.
[Hence both statements were] necessary.
We learned: IF A MAN FORBADE HIS
WIFE BY VOW THAT SHE SHOULD NOT
TASTE A CERTAIN FRUIT, HE MUST
DIVORCE HER20 AND GIVE HER THE
KETHUBAH. Now according to Rab21 [there
is no contradiction22 since] the latter23 may
apply to a man who did not specify [the
period of the prohibition] and the former23 to
a man who did specify [the period].
According to Samuel,24 however, a
contradiction arises!22 —
Here we are dealing with a case, for instance,
where the woman made the vow and he
confirmed it;25 R. Meir26 holding the opinion
that [the husband]27 had himself put his
finger between her teeth. But does R. Meir
hold the principle, 'He has himself put his
finger between her teeth'? Surely it was
taught: If a woman made the vow of a
nazirite28 and her husband heard of it and
did not annul it, she, said R. Meir and R.
Judah, has thereby put her own finger
between her teeth. Therefore, if the husband
wishes to annul her vow, he may do so. But if
he29 said, 'I do not want a wife who is in the
habit of vowing'. she may be divorced
without [receiving] her Kethubah. R. Jose and
R. Eleazar said: He30 has put his finger
between her teeth. Therefore, if the husband
wishes to annul her vow, he may do so. But if
he31 said, 'I do not want a wife who is in the
habit of vowing', he may divorce her but
must give her the Kethubah!32 —
Reverse [the views]: R. Meir and R. Judah
said: 'He has put'33 and R. Jose and R.
Eleazar said: 'She has put'.34 But is R. Jose of
the opinion that it is she who put?34 Have we
not learned: R. Jose ruled: [THIS35
APPLIES] TO POOR WOMEN IF NO
TIME LIMIT IS GIVEN?36 — Read: R.
Meir and R. Jose said, 'He has put';33 R.
Judah and R. Eleazar said, 'She has put'.34
But does R. Judah uphold the principle of
'She put'?34 Have we not learned: R. JUDAH
RULED: IF HE WAS AN ISRAELITE HE
MAY KEEP HER [AS HIS WIFE, IF THE
VOW WAS FOR] ONE DAY?37 — Read: R.
Meir and R. Judah and R. Jose said, 'He
put'.33 and R. Eleazar said, 'She put'.34 And
should you find [some ground] for insisting
that the names must appear in pairs,38 then
read: R. Meir and R. Eleazar said, 'She
put',39 and R. Judah and R. Jose said, 'He
put';40 and this anonymous Mishnah41 is not
in agreement with R. Meir.
Is R. Jose, however, of the opinion that
[THIS42 APPLIES] TO POOR WOMEN IF
NO TIME LIMIT IS GIVEN; from which43 it
is evident that a husband has the right to
annul43 [such vows]?44 This, surely, is
incongruous [with the following]. These are
the vows45 which a husband may annul:
Vows which involve an affliction of soul46 [as,
for instance, if a woman said, 'I vow not to
enjoy the pleasure of bathing] should I
bathe'47 [or] 'I swear that48 I shall not bathe',
[or again, 'I vow not to make use of
adornments] should I make use of an
adornment',47 [or] 'I swear that48 I shall not
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
76
make use of any adornments'. R. Jose said:
These are not regarded as vows involving an
affliction of soul;49 and the following are
vows that involve an affliction of soul: '[I
swear] that I shall not eat meat' or 'that I
shall not drink wine' or 'that I shall not
adorn myself
1. V. Ned. Sonc. ed. p. 148f and notes.
2. Who also allowed a period of THIRTY DAYS.
3. R. Judah.
4. of which the first Tanna does not speak.
5. Consisting of thirty days.
6. Of twenty-nine days. According to R. Judah
ONE MONTH is allowed irrespective of
whether it is a full or a defective one.
According to the first Tanna THIRTY DAYS
are invariably allowed.
7. That for a period of thirty days a steward may
be appointed.
8. Though his vow might be annulled by a
competent authority by the end of the thirty
days.
9. Lit., 'a door'.
10. V. supra p. 370. nn. 10-11.
11. Rab and Samuel.
12. Supra 61b.
13. Beth Shammai and Beth Hillel.
14. According to the opinion of both.
15. V. supra note 10.
16. V. supra. p. 370, n. 11
17. Why then should Rab and Samuel be in
dispute upon the same principle here also?
18. The prohibition of intercourse.
19. The vow forbidding other benefits.
20. Forthwith.
21. Who draws a distinction between a specified
and an unspecified period.
22. Between this ruling (immediate divorce) and
the earlier Mishnah (allowing a certain period
to pass).
23. Lit., 'here'.
24. Who, contrary to the view of Rab (v. supra n.
4), draws no distinction.
25. Since if she is willing to accept her Kethubah
and leave him, she would not try to obtain the
annulment of her vow. There is no advantage,
therefore, in postponing the divorce. Where,
however, he himself made the vow, the
divorce is delayed in order to afford him an
opportunity of discovering some ground for
the remission of his vow.
26. Who is generally the author of an anonymous
Mishnah.
27. By confirming her vow though he had the
right to annul it.
28. V. Num. VI, 2ff.
29. Having once confirmed the vow.
30. V. supra p. 440, n. 10.
31. Having once confirmed the vow.
32. Which shows that R. Meir's view is that she
and not he has put the finger between the
teeth, where she makes the vow and he
confirms it.
33. His finger between her teeth.
34. Her finger between her teeth.
35. That the husband must divorce her and give
her the Kethubah.
36. This referring (as has been explained supra) to
a vow the woman had made, it follows that
according to R. Jose it is the husband who
puts his finger between her teeth.
37. But if for more than ONE DAY be must
divorce her and give her the Kethubah. This
referring to a vow the woman has made, it
follows that according to R. Judah also it is
the husband who put his finger, etc. (v. supra
n. 7).
38. Lit., 'to say: He taught in pairs'.
39. Her finger between her teeth.
40. V. supra note 3.
41. Which follows the principle that it is the
husband who 'put his finger between her
teeth'.
42. That a husband must divorce his wife and also
give her the Kethubah if he has not annulled a
vow she has made against the use of a certain
adornment.
43. Since the husband is penalized (v. supra n. 13)
for not annulling the vow.
44. I.e., those relating to a woman's adornments.
45. So MS.M. and separate edd. of the Mishnah.
Cur. edd., 'things'.
46. V. Num. XXX, 14.
47. 'Up to a certain time'.
48. Lit., 'if'.
49. Hence they may not be annulled by a
husband. V. Ned. Mishnah 79a; cf. however
next note. [The passage that follows does not
occur in the Mishnah Ned. 79a and the source
of the whole citation is consequently,
according to some commentators, said to be a
Baraitha (v. Shittah Mekubbezeth). Tosaf.
however (s.v. [H]) on the basis of an entirely
different text, omits this passage.]
Kethuboth 71b
with colored garments'!1 — Here2 we are
dealing with matters affecting their intimate
relations.3 This explanation is satisfactory
according to him who maintains that a
husband may annul [vows on] matters
affecting their intimate relations. — What,
however, can be said [in explanation]
according to him who maintains that a
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
77
husband may not annul [such vows]? For it
was stated:4 [As to vows on] matters affecting
their intimate relations, R. Huna ruled: A
husband may annul them; R. Adda b.
Ahabah ruled: A husband may not annul
them, for we do not find that a fox should die
of the dust of his den!5 — The fact, however,
is that we are here2 dealing with a case, for
instance, where she made her marital
intercourse dependent upon her use of
adornments, by saying. 'The enjoyment of
your intercourse shall be forbidden to me
should I ever make use of any adornment.'6
[This explanation] is in agreement with a
ruling of R. Kahana.
For R. Kahana ruled, [If a woman said to her
husband]. 'The enjoyment of my intercourse
[shall be forbidden]7 to you', he may compel
her to such intercourse;8 [if, however, she
vowed,] 'The enjoyment of your intercourse
[shall be forbidden]9 to me'10 he must annul
[her vow]11 because no person is to be fed
with a thing that is forbidden to him.12 But
let her13 not adorn herself and consequently
not be forbidden to him!14 — If so,15 she
would be called, 'The ugly woman'.16 But
then let her adorn herself and be forbidden
[intercourse] either for two weeks, according
to Beth Shammai17 or for one week according
to Beth Hillel!'18 — These19 apply only to a
case where he [the husband] has forbidden
her by a vow [to have intercourse with him],
because [in such circumstances] she thinks
'He may have been angry with me20 and will
later21 calm down'.22 Here, however, since
she has made the vow and he remained
silent,23 she comes to the conclusion: 'Since
he remained silent23 he must indeed hate
me'.24
R. JOSE RULED: [THIS APPLIES] TO
POOR WOMEN IF NO TIME LIMIT IS
GIVEN. What is the TIME LIMIT?25 — Rab
Judah citing Samuel replied: Twelve
months.26 Rabbah b. Bar Hana citing R.
Johanan replied: Ten years.26 R. Hisda citing
Abimi replied: A festival;27 for28 the
daughters of Israel adorn themselves on a
festival.
AND TO RICH WOMEN [IF THE TIME
LIMIT IS] THIRTY DAYS. Why just29
THIRTY DAYS? — Abaye replied:
Because28 a prominent woman enjoys the
scent of her cosmetics for thirty days.30
MISHNAH. IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE31
BY VOW THAT SHE SHALL NOT GO TO HER
FATHER'S HOUSE, AND HE32 LIVES WITH
HER IN THE SAME TOWN, HE MAY KEEP
[HER AS HIS WIFE, IF THE PROHIBITION
WAS FOR] ONE MONTH; BUT IF FOR TWO
MONTHS HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND
GIVE HER ALSO THE KETHUBAH. WHERE
HE, HOWEVER, LIVES IN ANOTHER TOWN,
HE MAY KEEP [HER AS HIS WIFE, IF THE
PROHIBITION WAS FOR] ONE FESTIVAL,33
[BUT IF FOR] THREE34 FESTIVALS, HE MUST
DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER ALSO HER
KETHUBAH. IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE
BY VOW35 THAT SHE SHALL NOT VISIT A
HOUSE OF MOURNING OR A HOUSE OF
FEASTING, HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND
GIVE HER ALSO HER KETHUBAH, BECAUSE
THEREBY HE HAS CLOSED [PEOPLE'S
DOORS] AGAINST HER. IF HE PLEADS,
HOWEVER, [THAT HIS ACTION] WAS DUE
TO SOME OTHER CAUSE36 HE IS
PERMITTED [TO FORBID HER]. IF HE SAID
TO HER: '[THERE SHALL BE NO VOW]
PROVIDED THAT YOU TELL36 SO-AND-SO
WHAT YOU HAVE TOLD ME' OR 'WHAT I
HAVE TOLD YOU' OR 'THAT YOU SHALL
FILL36 AND POUR OUT ON THE RUBBISH
HEAP', HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND GIVE
HER ALSO HER KETHUBAH.
GEMARA. This, surely, is self-contradictory.
You said, HE MAY KEEP [HER AS HIS
WIFE, IF THE PROHIBITION WAS FOR]
ONE FESTIVAL, which implies that if it was
for two festivals he must divorce her and give
her also her Kethubah. But read the
concluding clause, [IF FOR] THREE
FESTIVALS HE MUST DIVORCE HER
AND GIVE HER ALSO HER KETHUBAH,
from which it follows, does it not, that if it
was for two only he may keep [her as his
wife]?37 Abaye replied: The concluding
clause refers to a priest's wife, and it
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
78
represents the view of R. Judah.38 Rabbah b.
'Ulla said: There is no contradiction, for
one39 refers to a woman who was anxious [to
visit her parents home]40 and the other
applies to one who was not anxious.41
Then42 was I in his eyes as one that found
peace,43 R.44 Johanan45 interpreted: like a
bride46 who was found faultless47 in the house
of her father-in-law48 and she is anxious to go
and tell of her success49 at her paternal
home.50
And it shall be at that day, saith the Lord,
that thou shalt call me Ishi,51 and shalt not
call me Ba'ali,52 R. Johanan interpreted: Like
a bride in the house of her father-in-law53
and not like a bride in her paternal home.54
IF A MAN FORBADE HIS WIFE BY VOW,
etc. One can well understand that in respect
[of her prohibition to enter] A HOUSE OF
FEASTING
1. Such vows only may be annulled by a
husband. Now, in view of this ruling of R. Jose
(v. supra n. 5), how could it be said that
according to his opinion a husband may annul
vows against the use of any adornments?
2. In the case of adornments referred to by R.
Jose in our Mishnah.
3. Lit., 'things between him and her' (sc.
husband and wife): a powder, for instance, for
the removal of superfluous hair from
unexposed parts of the body. A woman's
abstention from the use of such kinds of
cosmetics or adornments are regarded as
things affecting their intimate relations and
such vows may well be annulled by a husband,
v. Ned. 79b.
4. Ned. 81a.
5. Proverb: i.e., one is not injured by an element
to which one is accustomed. The husband
being accustomed to his wife, cannot be
harmed by her refusal to look after her body
(as defined n. 8); 'pit' (Rashi) or 'rubble',
'loose ground' (Jast.). Since the intimate
relations of husband and wife are not affected
by such a vow, the husband has no right to
invalidate them. How, then, can he be
penalized in the case of the adornments
spoken of in our Mishnah?
6. The annulment of such a vow is within the
right of a husband.
7. By a vow.
8. Because it is not within her power to make a
vow against a duty that is incumbent upon her
as a married woman.
9. By a vow.
10. Such a vow is within her power to make, since
it relates to her own gratification.
11. Though he is under no obligation to respect it.
12. Cf. supra note 1.
13. If according to R. Jose the only reason why a
husband has the right to annul his wife's vows
in connection with adornments (v. our
Mishnah) is because she has made her marital
intercourse dependent upon them.
14. Why then is a husband entitled to annul such
vows?
15. If she were to dispense with her adornments.
16. An insult which she would not be able to bear,
and in consequence of which she would
resume the use of adornments and thus affect
her marital relationship. Cf. supra note 1.
17. As in the case where a man forbade his wife
by a vow to have intercourse with him (supra
61b).
18. Why then has it been stated that HE MUST
DIVORCE HER AND GIVE HER THE
KETHUBAH forthwith?
19. The respective rulings of Beth Shammai and
Beth Hillel, which allow a certain period
before a divorce can be enforced.
20. When he made his vow.
21. Lit., 'now'.
22. And seek the help of an authority in obtaining
its disallowance.
23. And so confirmed it.
24. She is, therefore, anxious to leave him at once.
Hence the ruling in our Mishnah (cf. p. 443, n.
13).
25. During which a wife must put up with the
deprivation of her adornments, and be unable
to demand a divorce.
26. Only where the prohibition has been extended
to a longer period can the husband be
compelled to divorce his wife and to give her
also her Kethubah.
27. I.e., until the major festival next to the day on
which the vow was made. The major festivals
are Passover, Pentecost and Tabernacles.
28. Lit., 'for so'.
29. Lit., 'what is the difference?'
30. If, therefore, the prohibition imposed upon
her by the vow is for less than that period, she
does not suffer much by the deprivation of her
cosmetics.
31. He confirmed a vow she bad made to that
effect. Though a husband has no right to
impose such a vow upon his wife, be may
confirm it by remaining silent when he hears
that she has imposed such a vow upon herself;
v. Num. XXX, 7ff; or, he vowed to abstain
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
79
from his wife should she go to her father's
house; cf. supra p. 433, n. 7.
32. Her father. [Var. lec. 'IF THEY', v. Rashi].
33. It was customary for daughters to visit their
parents living in another town on the occasion
of each major festival (v. p. 444. n. 7), and it
was laid down that no hardship was involved
if one such visit was omitted.
34. The question of two is discussed infra.
35. V. p. 444, n. 11.
36. This is explained in the Gemara.
37. How then are the two clauses to be
reconciled?
38. In the Mishnah supra 70a.
39. Lit., 'here', the first clause which implies that
if the prohibition is to last for two festivals the
woman must be divorced and is to receive her
Kethubah.
40. [H], pass. particip. Kal of [H], 'to pursue', v.
next note. In the first year of her married life
a woman is anxious, as soon as the first
festival after her marriage approaches, to pay
a visit to her paternal home where she looks
forward to the enjoyment of recounting her
novel experiences in her husband's home. If
she is prevented by a vow from paying the
visit at the first festival she must be given the
opportunity of paying a visit not later than at
the second festival. Hence if the vow is for the
first two festivals, she is entitled to a divorce
and to her Kethubah also.
41. Where she is homesick and always longing to
visit her parents, two festivals are considered
a hardship. If she shows no such signs of
homesickness there is no hardship involved
unless the inhibition is for at least three
festivals (Rashi). Tosaf. s.v. it explains
differently: A woman who failed to visit her
paternal home on the occasion of the first
festival after her marriage is presumed to be
fairly indifferent to such visits, and to be
suffering no undue hardship by postponing
her visit for another two festivals.
42. Var. lec., according to Tosaf. 'for it is written,
l'hen'.
43. Cant. VIII, 10.
44. Var. lec., according to Tosaf. 'and R.', etc.
45. Var. lec 'Jonathan'.
46. Sc. a woman in the first year of her married
life.
47. [H] (lit.. 'whole', 'perfect') is of the same root
as [H] (peace) in the text cited.
48. Where she lives with her husband.
49. Lit., 'her praise'
50. Cf. supra p. 445, n. 8.
51. [H], 'my husband', analogous to [H]
'matrimony', the term implying that the
marital union between the parties is complete.
52. Hosea II, 18. [H] signifies 'my master', or 'my
husband' in the sense that the man is lord
over his wife.
53. I.e., after her marriage when her union with
her husband is complete. (V. supra n. 10).
54. When her future husband is still her Ba'al
(master) and not her Ish (husband). Israel's
relation to God, the prophet assures the
people, will be intimate like that of the first
mentioned bride and not cautious, reserved
and uncertain like that of the latter.
Kethuboth 72a
the reason, HE HAS CLOSED [PEOPLE'S
DOORS] AGAINST HER, is applicable;1
what [point, however,] is there [in the
reason,] HE HAS CLOSED [PEOPLE'S
DOORS] AGAINST HER, in the case of A
HOUSE OF MOURNING? — A Tanna
taught: To-morrow she might die and no
creature would mourn for her.2 Others read:
And no creature would bury her.3
It was taught: R. Meir used to say: What is
meant by the Scriptural text, it is better to go
to the house of mourning than to go to the
house of feasting. for that is the end of all
men, and the living will lay it to his heart,4
what, [I say, is meant by] And the living will
lay it5 to his heart? The matters relating to
death. [Let him realize] that if a man mourns
for other people others will also mourn for
him; if he buries other people others will also
bury him; if he lifts up [his voice to lament]
for others, others will [lift up their voices to
lament] for him; if he escorts others [to the
grave] others will also escort him; if he
carries others [to their last resting place]
others will also carry him.
IF, HOWEVER, HE PLEADS [THAT HIS
ACTION] WAS DUE TO SOME OTHER
CAUSE HE IS PERMITTED. What is meant
by SOME OTHER CAUSE? — Rab Judah
citing Samuel replied: On account of
dissolute men who frequent that place. Said
R. Ashi: This applies only where [the place]
has gained such a reputation; where,
however, it has not gained such reputation it
is not within the power of the husband [to
veto it].6
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
80
IF HE SAID TO HER: '[THERE SHALL BE
NO VOW] PROVIDED THAT YOU TELL
[etc.].' [Why indeed] should she [not] tell it?
— Rab Judah citing Samuel replied: [This
refers to] abusive language.7
OR 'THAT YOU SHALL FILL AND POUR
OUT ON THE RUBBISH HEAP'. [Why
indeed] should she [not] do it? — Rab Judah
citing Samuel replied: [Because the meaning
of his request is] that she shall allow herself
to be filled and then scatter it.8 In a Baraitha
it was taught: [The man's request is] that she
shall fill ten jars of water and empty them on
to the rubbish heap. Now according to [the
explanation] of Samuel one can well see the
reason why HE MUST DIVORCE HER AND
GIVE HER ALSO HER KETHUBAH;
according to the Baraitha, however, [the
difficulty arises] what matters it to her if she
does it?9 — Rabbah b. Bar Hana citing R.
Johanan replied: [She cannot be expected to
do it] because she would appear like an
imbecile.
R. Kahana stated: If a man placed his wife
under a vow that she shall neither borrow
nor lend a winnow, a sieve, a mill or an oven,
he must divorce her and give her also her
Kethubah, because [should she fulfill the vow]
he would give her a bad name among her
neighbors. So it was also taught in a
Baraitha: If a man placed his wife under a
vow that she shall neither borrow nor lend a
winnow, a sieve, a mill or an oven, he must
divorce her and give her also her Kethubah,
because [should she comply with his desire]
he would give her a bad name among her
neighbors. Similarly if she vowed that she
shall neither borrow nor lend a winnow, a
sieve, a mill or an oven, or that she shall not
weave beautiful garments for his children,
she may be divorced without a Kethubah,
because [by acting on her wishes] she gives
him a bad name among his neighbors.
MISHNAH. THESE ARE TO BE DIVORCED
WITHOUT RECEIVING THEIR KETHUBAH:
A WIFE WHO TRANSGRESSES THE LAW OF
MOSES OR [ONE WHO TRANSGRESSES]
JEWISH PRACTICE. AND WHAT IS
[REGARDED AS A WIFE'S TRANSGRESSION
AGAINST] THE LAW OF MOSES? FEEDING
HER HUSBAND WITH UNTITHED FOOD,10
HAVING INTERCOURSE WITH HIM DURING
THE PERIOD OF HER MENSTRUATION,11
NOT SETTING APART HER DOUGH
OFFERING,12 OR MAKING VOWS AND NOT
FULFILLING THEM.13 AND WHAT [IS
DEEMED TO BE A WIFE'S TRANSGRESSION
AGAINST] JEWISH PRACTICE? GOING OUT
WITH UNCOVERED HEAD,14 SPINNING IN
THE STREET15 OR CONVERSING WITH
EVERY MAN. ABBA SAUL SAID: [SUCH
TRANSGRESSIONS INCLUDE] ALSO THAT
OF A WIFE WHO CURSES HER HUSBAND'S
PARENTS IN HIS PRESENCE. R. TARFON
SAID: ALSO ONE WHO SCREAMS. AND WHO
IS REGARDED A SCREAMER? A WOMAN
WHOSE VOICE CAN BE HEARD BY HER
NEIGHBOURS WHEN SHE SPEAKS INSIDE
HER HOUSE.16
GEMARA. FEEDING HER HUSBAND
WITH UNTITHED FOOD. How are we to
understand this? If the husband knows [the
fact],17 let him abstain; if he does not know
[it],17 how did he discover it? — [This ruling
was] required in the case only where she told
him, 'So-and-so the priest has ritually
prepared for me the pile of grain',18 and he
went and asked him and her statement was
found to be untrue.
HAVING INTERCOURSE WITH HIM
DURING THE PERIOD OF HER
MENSTRUATION. How are we to
understand this? If he was aware of her
[condition] he could have abstained, if he was
not aware [of it]19 he should still rely upon
her, for R. Hinena b. Kahana stated in the
name of Samuel: Whence is it deduced that
the menstruant herself may [be relied upon
to] count [correctly]?20 From the Scriptural
statement, Then she shall number to herself21
seven days,22 'Lah means to herself.'23 — It
was required in the case only where she said
to her husband, 'So-and-so the sage told me
that the blood was clean',24 and when her
husband went and asked him it was found
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
81
that her statement was untrue. If you prefer I
might reply on the lines of a ruling of Rab
Judah who said: If a woman was known25
among her neighbors to be a menstruant her
husband26 is flogged on her account for
[having intercourse with] a menstruant.27
NOT SETTING APART THE DOUGH
OFFERING. How is this to be understood? If
the husband was aware [of the fact] he should
have abstained [from the food]; if he was not
aware [of it at the time] how does he know it
now? — [The ruling is to be understood as]
required in the case only where she said to
him. 'So-and-so the baker28 has ritually
prepared the dough29 for me' and when the
husband went and asked him her statement
was found to be untrue.
OR MAKING VOWS AND NOT
FULFILLING THEM; for the Master stated:
One's children die on account of the sin of
making vows,30 as it is said in Scripture.
Suffer not thy mouth to cause thy flesh to sin,
etc. [wherefore should God be angry at thy
voice, and destroy the work of thine hands];31
and what is the work of a man's hands? You
must say: His sons and his daughters. R.
Nahman32 said, [It33 may be inferred] from
the following: In vain have I smitten your
children;'34 'In vain' implies, on account of
vain utterances.35
It was taught: R. Meir said, Any man who
knows that his wife makes vows and does not
fulfill them should impose vows upon her
again. [You say] 'Should impose vows upon
her [again]'? Whereby would he reform
her?36 — But [say] he should provoke her
again in order that she should make her vow
in his presence37 and he would [thus be able
to] annul it.38 They, however, said to him: No
one can live with a serpent in the same
basket.39
It was taught: R. Judah said. Any husband
who knows that his wife does not [properly]
set apart for him the dough offering should
set it apart again after her. They, however,
said to him: No one can live with a serpent in
the same basket.40 He who taught it41 in
connection with this case42 [would apply it]
with even greater force to the other case;43
he, however, who taught it in connection with
the other case [applies it to that case only]44
but [not to this one,42 because]45 it might
sometimes happen that he would eat.46
AND WHAT [IS DEEMED TO BE A
WIFE'S TRANSGRESSION AGAINST]
JEWISH PRACTICE? GOING OUT WITH
UNCOVERED HEAD. [Is not the prohibition
against going out with] an uncovered head
Pentateuchal;47 for it is written, And he shall
uncover the woman's head,48 and this, it was
taught at the school of R. Ishmael, was a
warning to the daughters of Israel that they
should not go out with uncovered49 head?50
— Pentateuchally
1. By the confirmation of such a vow he deprives
her of social enjoyments and relaxation.
2. As she had not participated in the mourning
for others.
3. [H] v. Tosef. Keth. VII and cf. supra n. 1
mutatis mutandis. Aliter: 'And none will care
for her' (Jast.) [H] (rt. [H] 'to hide', or 'to care
for').
4. Eccl. VII, 2.
5. Emphasis on it.
6. Lit. 'not as if all (the power) is from him'.
7. Lit., 'words of shame'.
8. Euphemism for vigorous exercise after
intercourse in order to prevent conception.
9. Lit., 'let her do it'.
10. V. Num. XVIII, 21ff.
11. V. Lev. XVIII, 19.
12. V. Num. XV, 19ff.
13. V. Deut. XXIII, 22.
14. Aliter: With hair loose or unbound.
15. This is explained in the Gemara.
16. This is explained in the Gemara.
17. When the food is given to him.
18. Sc. be has received his priestly dues. Asheri,
Tur and Shulhan 'Aruk omit 'priest'. Any
person, by setting apart the priestly and
Levitical dues, might ritually prepare the
grain.
19. At the time.
20. The prescribed number of the days of her
uncleanness.
21. [H].
22. Lev. XV, 28.
23. I.e., she may be implicitly trusted to count
correctly. What need was there for the ruling
in our Mishnah?
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
82
24. That it was not menstrual.
25. By her habit or the like.
26. If he had intercourse with her after he had
been duly cautioned.
27. Kid. 80a. Our Mishnah would thus refer to a
case where the neighbors informed the
husband of the facts after the event.
28. Lit., 'kneader'.
29. I.e., he has duly set apart the dough offering.
30. And not fulfilling them nor applying for their
disallowance.
31. Eccl. V, 5.
32. Var., 'R. Nahman b. Isaac' (Shab. 32b).
33. The penalty for the sin of vows.
34. Jer. II, 30.
35. Vows made but not fulfilled.
36. The imposition of an additional vow would
hardly induce her to fulfill her former vows or
change her habits.
37. [H] (Hif. of [H] may bear this meaning, 'he
shall cause her (by his provocation) to vow', as
also the previously assumed meaning, 'he shall
cause her to be under (sc. impose upon her) a
vow'.
38. And so avoid the necessity of divorcing her.
39. Proverb; if it is the woman's habit to make
vows and to break them it is practically
impossible for her husband to be always on
the look out to invalidate them. She would,
despite all vigilance, manage to make vows of
which he would remain ignorant. He is
entitled, therefore, to insist on divorcing her.
40. Cf. p. 450, n. 12 mutatis mutandis.
41. R. Judah's ruling which aims at avoiding a
divorce.
42. The dough offering.
43. Vows. A transgression in connection with
these (which are not common) is much less
likely than in connection with the dough
offering which has to be given from every
dough that is made. If, according to R. Judah,
divorce should be avoided in the latter case
how much more so in the former.
44. Cf. supra n. 4.
45. Owing to the frequency of bread baking.
46. Bread, the dough offering from which had not
been set apart. As one is more likely to
commit a transgression in this case R. Judah
would not seek to avoid a divorce.
47. Why then is it here described as one of mere
Jewish practice?
48. Num. V. 18 (v. A.V.) R.V. and A.J.V. render
'And let the hair of the woman's head go
loose'.
49. Cf. supra n. 9.
50. Why then was this described as traditional
Jewish practice?
Kethuboth 72b
it is quite satisfactory [if her head is covered
by] her work-basket;1 according to
traditional Jewish practice, however, she is
forbidden [to go out uncovered] even with
her basket [on her head].
R. Assi stated in the name of R. Johanan:
With a basket [on her head a woman] is not
guilty of2 [going about with] an uncovered
head. In considering this statement, R. Zera
pointed out this difficulty: Where [is the
woman assumed to be]?3 If it be suggested,
'In the street', [it may be objected that this is
already forbidden by] Jewish practice;4 but
[if she is] in a court-yard3 [the objection may
be made that] if that were so5 you will not
leave our father Abraham a [single] daughter
who could remain with her husband!6 —
Abaye, or it might be said, R. Kahana,
replied: [The statement refers to one who
walks] from one courtyard into another by
way of an alley.7
SPINNING IN THE STREET. Rab Judah
stated in the name of Samuel: [The
prohibition applies only] where she exposed
her arms to the public. R. Hisda stated in the
name of Abimi: [This applies only] where she
spins rose [colored materials, and holds them
up] to her face.8
CONVERSING WITH EVERY MAN. Rab
Judah stated in the name of Samuel: [This
refers only to one] who jests with young men.
Rabbah b. Bar Hana related: I was once
walking behind R. 'Ukba when I observed an
Arab woman who was sitting, casting her
spindle and spinning a rose [colored material
which she held up] to her face.9 When she
saw us she detached the spindle [from the
thread], threw it down and said to me,
'Young man, hand me my10 spindle'.
Referring to her11 R. 'Ukba made a
statement. What was that statement? —
Rabina replied: He spoke of her as a woman
SPINNING IN THE STREET. The Rabbis
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
83
said: He spoke of her as one CONVERSING
WITH EVERY MAN.
ABBA SAUL SAID: [SUCH
TRANSGRESSIONS INCLUDE] ALSO
THAT OF A WIFE WHO CURSES HER
HUSBAND'S PARENTS IN HIS
PRESENCE. Rab Judah said in the name of
Samuel: [This12 includes also] one who curses
his parents in the presence of his offspring;13
and your mnemonic sign14 is, Ephraim and
Manasseh,15 even as Reuben and Simeon,16
shall be mine.17 Rabbah18 explained:19 When
she said20 in the presence of her husband's
son, 'May a lion devour your grandfather'.21
R. TARFON SAID: ALSO ONE WHO
SCREAMS. What is meant by a screamer?
— Rab Judah replied in the name of Samuel:
One who speaks aloud22 on marital matters.
In a Baraitha it was taught: [By screams was
meant a wife] whose voice23 during her
intercourse in one court can be heard in
another court. But should not this, then,24
have been taught in the Mishnah25 among
defects?26 — Clearly we must revert to the
original explanation.27
MISHNAH. IF A MAN BETROTHED A
WOMAN ON CONDITION THAT SHE WAS
NOT SUBJECT TO ANY VOWS AND SHE WAS
FOUND TO BE UNDER A VOW,28 HER
BETROTHAL IS INVALID. IF HE MARRIED
HER29 WITHOUT MAKING ANY
CONDITIONS AND SHE WAS FOUND TO BE
UNDER A VOW,28 SHE MAY BE DIVORCED
WITHOUT RECEIVING HER KETHUBAH. [IF
A WOMAN WAS BETROTHED] ON
CONDITION THAT SHE HAS NO BODILY
DEFECTS, AND SHE WAS FOUND TO HAVE
SUCH DEFECTS, HER BETROTHAL IS
INVALID. IF HE MARRIED HER WITHOUT
MAKING ANY CONDITIONS AND SHE WAS
FOUND TO HAVE BODILY DEFECTS, SHE
MAY BE DIVORCED WITHOUT A
KETHUBAH. ALL DEFECTS WHICH
DISQUALIFY PRIESTS30 DISQUALIFY
WOMEN ALSO.31
GEMARA. We have [in fact] learned [the
same Mishnah] also in [the Tractate]
Kiddushin.32 [But] here33 [the laws]34 were
required [in respect of] Kethuboth,35 and the
laws concerning betrothal36 were stated on
account of those of the Kethubah; there37 the
laws in respect of betrothal were required,
and those concerning Kethuboth34 were stated
on account of those of betrothal.
R. Johanan said in the name of R. Simeon b.
Jehozadak: They38 spoke only of the
following vows. That she would not eat meat,
that she would not drink wine or that she
would not adorn herself with colored
garments. So it was also taught elsewhere:
They spoke of such vows as involve an
affliction of the soul, [namely,] that she would
not eat meat, that she would not drink wine
or that she would not adorn herself with
colored garments.
In dealing with this subject R. Papa raised
this difficulty: What does it39 refer to? If it be
suggested [that it refers] to the first clause40
[it might be retorted that] since the husband
objects [to vows] even other kinds of vows41
Should also be included! — [It refers] only to
the final clause.42 R. Ashi said: It may in fact
refer to the first clause,40 but in respect of the
vows to which people usually take exception43
his objection is valid;44 respect of vows to
which people do not as a rule take exception
his objection has no validity.
It was stated: If a man betrothed a woman on
condition [that she was under no vow] and
married her without attaching any
conditions, it is necessary, Rab ruled, that
she45 shall obtain from him a letter of
divorce; and Samuel ruled: It is not
necessary for her to obtain a letter of divorce
from him.46 Said Abaye:
1. [H] or [H] calathus, 'a woven vase-shaped
basket'.
2. Lit., 'there is not in her'.
3. When her head is covered by her basket only.
4. Spoken of in our Mishnah. What need then
was there for R. Johanan's statement?
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
84
5. That otherwise the law of 'uncovered head'
applies also in a court-yard.
6. Since all married women go about in their
court-yards with uncovered heads.
7. Into which the two courts open out. An alley,
since fewer people frequent it, would not have
been included in the restrictions spoken of in
our Mishnah in respect of a public street, yet
it is not considered sufficiently private to
allow the woman to go about there with
'uncovered head'. Hence the necessity for the
specific ruling of R. Johanan.
8. That it might reflect the rose color. [H] 'rose'.
(V. Tosaf s.v. [H]). Aliter: 'Spins with a rose in
her hair', reading [H] 'and a rose' (Maim.).
Aliter: 'Spins with the thread lowered in front
of her face' (euphemism), reading [H] rt. [H],
'to flatten', 'lower' (Rashi). Var. lec. [H] (rt.
[H]) 'to go down', 'descend' (cf. Jast. and
Golds.).
9. Cf. supra n. 4.
10. Reading [H] (Aruch). Cur. edd., [H].
11. Lit., 'on her' or 'it'.
12. The expression [H] … [H] WHO CURSES. …
IN HIS PRESENCE.
13. MS.M. [H] Cur. edd. [H].
14. To aid in the recollection that one's offspring
is like oneself.
15. Jacob's grandchildren.
16. His own children.
17. Gen. XLVIII, 5.
18. Var., 'Raba'.
19. The cursing of which Samuel spoke.
20. [V. Tosaf. s.v. [H] cur. edd. add 'to him'].
21. V. Rashi, and Tosaf. loc. cit.
22. Lit., 'makes her voice heard'.
23. Her screams of pain caused by the copulation.
24. Since her screaming is due to a bodily defect.
25. Infra 77a.
26. Of course it should. Such a case in our
Mishnah is out of place.
27. That given in the name of Samuel.
28. Lit., and vows were found upon her'.
29. Lit., 'he took her, in (his house)'. It will be
explained infra whether this does or does not
refer to the preceding case.
30. From the Temple service (cf. Lev. XXI, 17ff).
31. From marriage. If such a woman married she
may be divorced without a Kethubah.
32. In Kid. 50a.
33. Since our tractate is dealing with the laws of
Kethubah.
34. DIVORCED WITHOUT A KETHUBAH
(bis).
35. Plural of Kethubah.
36. HER BETROTHAL IS INVALID.
37. In the tractate of Kid. 50a.
38. The Rabbis in our Mishnah.
39. The definition of vows given in the name of R.
Simeon b. Jehozadak.
40. Where the husband explicitly expressed his
objection to betroth a woman who was under
a vow.
41. Lit., 'all words', 'things'.
42. Where the husband had made no conditions.
43. Such as those mentioned in R. Simeon b.
Jehozadak's definition.
44. And the betrothal, therefore, is invalid.
45. If it was found that she was under a vow, and
the man consequently refuses to live with her.
46. Cf. Yeb. 110a.
Kethuboth 73a
It must not be suggested that Rab's reason1 is
that, because the man has married her
without attaching any conditions, he has
entirely dispensed with his former
condition.2 Rab's reason rather is that no
man treats his intercourse as a mere act of
prostitution.3
Surely they4 once disputed on such a
principle.5 For it was stated: Where [an
orphan] minor6 who did not7 exercise her
right of Mi'un8 and who, when she came of
age, left9 [her husband]10 and married
[another man], Rab ruled: She requires no
letter of divorce from her second husband,11
and Samuel ruled: She requires a letter of
divorce from her second husband!12 — [Both
disputes were] necessary. For if the latter13
only had been stated, it might have been
assumed that Rab adhered to his opinion14 in
that case only because no condition was
attached [to the betrothal],15 but that in the
former case,16 where a condition was
attached [to the betrothal],17 he agrees with
Samuel.18 And if the former case16 only had
been stated, it might have been assumed that
in that case only19 did Samuel maintain his
view20 but that in the latter13 he agrees with
Rab.21 [Hence both were] required.
We have learned: IF HE MARRIED HER
WITHOUT MAKING ANY CONDITION
AND SHE WAS FOUND TO BE UNDER A
VOW, SHE MAY BE DIVORCED
WITHOUT RECEIVING HER KETHUBAH
[which22 implies that] it is only her Kethubah
that she cannot claim but that she
nevertheless requires a letter of divorce. Now
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
85
does not this23 refer to one who has betrothed
a woman on condition [that she was under no
vow]24 and married her without making any
condition?25 This then26 represents an
objection against Samuel!27
1. For regarding the marriage as valid.
2. And consequently he must not only divorce
her but must give her her Kethubah also.
3. The consummation of the marriage was,
therefore, a legal act necessitating a divorce
for its annulment. In respect of the monetary
obligation, however, the man still adheres to
his original condition which she did not fulfill,
and be cannot consequently be expected to
give her also her Kethubah.
4. Rab and Samuel.
5. I.e., whether intercourse after a conditional
betrothal (the case spoken of supra 72b), or a
legally imperfect marriage or betrothal (the
case cited infra from Yeb. 109b) has the force
of a valid and proper marriage to require the
divorce for its annulment.
6. Who was given in marriage by her mother or
brothers.
7. While she was still in her minority.
8. V. Glos.
9. Lit., 'stood up'.
10. With whom she had intercourse after she had
come of age.
11. Because, according to Rab, her second
marriage was null and void owing to the
Kinyan (v. Glos.) effected by the intercourse of
the first husband when she came of age. (V.
supra n. 12). Being well aware that the
original marriage which took place during the
woman's minority had no legal force, the man
is presumed to have intended his intercourse
after she had attained her majority to effect
the required legal Kinyan of marriage.
12. Yeb. 109b; because any act of intercourse on
the part of the first husband, even after the
woman had attained her majority, was
carried out in reliance on the original
betrothal which, having taken place while she
was a minor, had no validity. Her betrothal to
the second is, therefore, valid and must be
annulled by a proper divorce. Though it may
be added, Samuel admits that she is
prohibited to the second husband, having
regard to the fact that she did not exercise her
right until she reached her majority (v. Nid.
52a). This prohibition is nevertheless only
Rabbinical and consequently has no bearing
on the question of the divorce, the purpose of
which is to sever a union which is
Pentateuchally binding. According to Rab,
however, (v. supra p. 455, n. 13) the
prohibition of the woman to her second
husband is not merely Rabbinical but is, in
fact, Pentateuchal. Why then should Rab and
Samuel dispute on the same principle twice?
13. Lit., 'that', the dispute in the case of the
minor, cited from Yeb. 109b.
14. That the intercourse of the first husband is
regarded as a Kinyan.
15. And the husband may, therefore, be
presumed to be anxious to give to the union all
the necessary validity of a proper marriage
(cf. supra p. 455, n. 13).
16. That stated supra 72b.
17. And the husband naturally believes that the
woman, since she consented to the marriage,
was in a position to fulfill it.
18. That, as it never occurred to the husband (v.
supra n. 5) that his original betrothal was in
any way invalid, and as he did not, therefore,
betroth her by subsequent cohabitation, no
divorce is required.
19. Since a condition was attached to the original
betrothal.
20. That the marriage, owing to its dependence on
the original condition, is invalid.
21. That, since no conditions were made, the
intercourse of the first husband after her
attaining majority has the validity of a
Kinyan, and no divorce from the second is
required.
22. Since the Kethubah was excluded and not the
letter of divorce.
23. The second clause of our Mishnah.
24. I.e., the case spoken of in the first and
previous clause, the second clause of the
Mishnah being dependent on the first.
25. Which is the case in dispute between Rab and
Samuel.
26. The answer being apparently in the
affirmative, and the implication being that a
divorce is required.
27. Who ruled (supra 72b ad. fin.) that no divorce
is necessary.
Kethuboth 73b
— No; [this1 refers to one who] betrothed her
without attaching a condition and also
married her without attaching a condition.2
If, however, one betrothed a woman on a
certain condition and subsequently married
her without attaching a condition would she,
[according to our Mishnah], indeed3 require
no divorce?4 If so, then, instead of stating, IF
A MAN BETROTHED A WOMAN ON THE
CONDITION THAT SHE WAS NOT
SUBJECT TO ANY VOWS AND SHE WAS
FOUND TO BE UNDER A VOW, HER
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
86
BETROTHAL IS INVALID,5 it should
rather have been stated: If a man married a
woman without attaching a condition and she
was found to be under a vow, her betrothal is
invalid, and [it would be evident, would it
not, that this6 applies] even more so to the
former?7 —
It is really this reading that was meant:8 IF A
MAN BETROTHED A WOMAN ON THE
CONDITION THAT SHE WAS NOT
SUBJECT TO ANY VOWS, and then he
married her without making any conditions,
AND SHE WAS FOUND TO BE UNDER A
VOW, HER BETROTHAL IS INVALID; if,
however, he betrothed her without making
any conditions and also MARRIED HER
WITHOUT MAKING ANY CONDITIONS,
SHE MAY BE DIVORCED WITHOUT
RECEIVING HER KETHUBAH; it is only
her Kethubah that she cannot claim but it is
necessary for her to obtain a divorce. But
why has she no claim to her Kethubah?
Because, [apparently], he9 could plead, 'I do
not want a wife that is in the habit of making
vows',10 but if that is the case there should be
no need for her to obtain a divorce
either!11 —
Rabbah replied: It is only according to
Rabbinical law that she requires a divorce.
So also said R. Hisda: It is only in accordance
with the Rabbinical law that she requires a
divorce. Raba replied: The Tanna12 was
really in doubt.13 [Hence he adopted] the
lenient view in monetary matters14 and the
stricter one15 in the case of prohibitions.16
Rabbah stated: They17 differ only in the case
of an error18 [affecting] two women,19 but
where an error [affects] one woman20 all
agree21 that she requires no divorce from
him.22 Said Abaye:23 But our Mishnah,
surely, is one which [has been assumed24 to
refer to] an error [affecting] one woman but
was nevertheless adduced as an objection!25
If, however, such a statement was made at all
it must have been made in this form: Rabbah
stated: They26 differ only in the case of an
error [affecting] a woman [who is in a
position] similar [to that of one of] two
women,27 but in the case of an error
[affecting] merely one woman28 all agree29
that she requires no divorce from him.30
Abaye raised an objection against him:31 If a
man betrothed a woman in error32 or [with
something worth] less than a Perutah,33 and,
similarly, if a minor betrothed a woman, even
if any [of them] has subsequently sent
presents34 [to the woman], her betrothal is
invalid,35 because he has sent these gifts on
account of the original betrothal.36 If,
however, they37 had intercourse they have
thereby effected legal Kinyan. R. Simeon b.
Judah in the name of R. Ishmael said: Even if
they had intercourse they effect no Kinyan.38
Now here, surely, it is an error [affecting]
only one woman and they39 nevertheless
differ. Would you not [admit that by 'error'
is meant] an error in respect of vows?40 —
No; [what was meant is] an error in respect
of that which was worth less than a Perutah.41
— But was not 'less than a Perutah' explicitly
mentioned: 'If a man betrothed a woman in
error or [with something worth] less than a
Perutah'?42 — [The latter part is] really an
explanation [of the former:] What is meant
by 'If a man betrothed a woman in error'? If,
for instance, he betrothed her with
'something worth less than 'a Perutah'.
On what principle do they43 differ?44 — One
Master45 holds the view that everyone is
aware that with less than the value of a
Perutah no betrothal can be effected, and
consequently any man having intercourse
[after such an invalid act] determines [to do
so] for the purpose of betrothal. The other
Master,46 however, holds the view that not
everyone is aware that with less than the
value of a Perutah no betrothal can be
effected, and when a man has intercourse
[after such an act47 he does so] in reliance on
his first betrothal.48
He raised [another] objection against him:49
[If a man said to a woman,] 'I am having
intercourse with you on the condition that my
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
87
father will consent',50 she is betrothed to him
even if his father did not consent. R. Simeon
b. Judah, however, stated in the name of R.
Simeon, If his father consented she is
betrothed but if his father did not consent she
is not betrothed.51 Now here, surely, it is a
case similar to that of an error affecting one
woman52 and they53 nevertheless differ!54 —
They differ in this case55 on the following
points.56 One Master57 holds the opinion that
[the expression] 'On the condition that my
father consents' implies, 'On condition that
my father will remain silent', and [the
betrothal is valid] because, surely, his father
remained silent. And the other Master58
holds the opinion [that the meaning of the
expression is] that his father will say, 'yes',
and [the betrothal is invalid] because his
father in fact did not say, 'yes'.
He raised [a further] objection against him.59
The Sages agree with R. Eliezer60 in respect
of a minor whom her father had given in
marriage and who was divorced,61 [in
consequence of which] she is regarded as an
'orphan' in her father's lifetime,62 and who
was then remarried,63 that she must perform
Halizah64 but may not65 contract the levirate
marriage because her divorce was a perfectly
legal divorce,66 but her remarriage was not a
perfectly legal remarriage.67 This,68 however,
applies only where he69 divorced her while
she was a minor70 and remarried her while
she was still a minor;71 but if he72 divorced
her while she was a minor73 and remarried
her while she was still a minor and she
became of age while she was still with him,
and then he died,74 she must either perform
Halizah or contract the levirate marriage.75
1. The second clause of our Mishnah.
2. I.e., the second clause of our Mishnah is not
dependent on the first one.
3. Lit., 'thus'.
4. This would seem to follow from the
interpretation of our Mishnah just advanced
on behalf of Samuel.
5. A form of expression which, omitting all
reference to marriage, might imply that if she
was subsequently married unconditionally a
divorce is required.
6. That the betrothal is invalid and that
consequently no divorce is required.
7. The case enunciated in the present form of
our Mishnah where the betrothal was not
followed by marriage.
8. Lit., 'thus also he said'.
9. Should he be ordered to pay the Kethubah.
10. And her betrothal is, therefore, invalid as if
the man had advanced such a plea at the
actual time of the betrothal.
11. Cf. p. 457, n. 10. Rab's view that 'no man
treats his intercourse as a mere act of
prostitution' (supra 73a) cannot be advanced
here in reply, since Samuel, whose views are
the subject of the present discussion, does not
admit it.
12. Of our Mishnah.
13. As to 'whether the presumption that, as a
rule, one does not want to live with a wife who
is in the habit of making vows is sufficient
reason for regarding the betrothal of such a
woman as null and void.
14. I.e., the Kethubah. As the woman's claim to it
is of a doubtful nature, her husband who is
the possessor of the money cannot be made to
pay it.
15. That a divorce is necessary if she wishes to
remarry.
16. It is forbidden to live with another man's wife.
17. Rab and Samuel, supra 72b, ad fin.
18. I.e., the man believed that the woman was
under no vow while in fact she was.
19. The first of whom a man betrothed on the
condition that she was under no vow and the
second of whom he afterwards married
without making any condition and
subsequently found that she was under a vow.
Samuel regards the non-conditional marriage
of the second as invalid because the man is
presumed to have married her on the same
condition as that on which he betrothed the
first. Rab, however, maintains that it is quite
possible that the man was so attracted by the
second woman that he was willing to dispense
with his terms.
20. Whom the man betrothed on a certain
condition and afterwards married without
making any condition.
21. Even Rab.
22. Since the man has made it clear at the
betrothal that he objected to live with her if
she were encumbered with any vows.
23. Rashal deletes 'to him', which appears in
brackets in cur. edd.
24. Supra 73a ad fin.
25. Against Samuel (l.c.); which shows, contrary
to Rabbah's assumption, that even in the case
of a mistake in respect of one woman, some
authorities maintain that a divorce is
required.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
88
26. Rab and Samuel, supra 72b ad fin.
27. One, for instance, who was betrothed on a
certain condition, was then divorced and
subsequently married with no condition. In
such a case Rab maintains that a divorce is
required as in the case of the second woman
where two women were involved (cf. supra p.
458, n. 9), while Samuel maintains that no
divorce is required because the man's
condition at the betrothal is regarded as a
permanent declaration that he would not live
with a woman who was in the habit of making
vows and, since this condition renders the
marriage null and void, no divorce is required
to annul such a marriage.
28. I.e., one whose marriage had followed her
betrothal, and no divorce had intervened, so
that the man may well be presumed to have
consummated marriage on the same terms as
those he laid down at the betrothal.
29. Even Rab.
30. In raising the objection against Samuel supra
our Mishnah was assumed to deal with 'a
woman who was in a position similar to that
of two women' (cf. supra n. 1).
31. Rabbah.
32. This, at present, is presumed to mean that the
woman was under a vow and the man was at
the time unaware of it.
33. V. Glos.
34. Sablonoth; v. Kid. Sonc. ed. p. 254, n. 4.
35. Although the presents, if specifically given as
a token of betrothal, would effect a valid
Kinyan of betrothal.
36. And since that betrothal is invalid the gifts
cannot effect the necessary Kinyan.
37. Any of those mentioned whose betrothal is
invalid.
38. Tosef. Kid. IV.
39. R. Ishmael and the first Tanna.
40. Cf. supra note 6. This proves that one
authority at least (viz. the first Tanna)
regards a non-conditional marriage as valid
though it followed a conditional betrothal.
How then could Rabbah maintain, according
to the second version, that in such a case all
agree that, as the marriage is invalid, no
divorce is required.
41. The man, at the time of betrothal, having been
under the erroneous impression that Kinyan
may be effected by such an insignificant sum.
Since this law is generally known it may well
be presumed that subsequent intercourse was
intended as Kinyan. In the case of an error in
respect of vows, however, subsequent
intercourse cannot alter the invalidity of the
betrothal since during the performance of the
latter act the man may still have been under
the impression that his wife was not restricted
by any vow. The general opinion, therefore, is,
Rabbah may well maintain, that no divorce is
in this case required.
42. Is it likely that the same law should be
repeated in the same context?
43. R. Ishmael and the first Tanna.
44. On the previous assumption (that the 'error'
referred to the conditional betrothal of a
woman who was under a vow) the principles
underlying this dispute might be those upheld
supra by Rab and Samuel respectively. On the
present assumption, however, (that be 'error'
refers to a betrothal attempted with less than
a Perutah) the difficulty arises (cf. supra note
1) 'on what principles do they differ?' sc. how
could R. Ishmael maintain his view that 'even
if they had cohabited they effect no Kinyan'?
45. The first Tanna.
46. R. Ishmael.
47. Which be believes to be a valid betrothal.
48. Which was in fact invalid and in consequence
of which the cohabitation constitutes no
Kinyan.
49. Rabbah.
50. To the union.
51. Git. 25b.
52. Since in both cases a condition was attached
to the betrothal, merely one woman is
involved, and no divorce intervened between
betrothal and intercourse.
53. R. Simeon and the first Tanna.
54. R. Simeon maintaining that the intercourse is
a valid Kinyan, and a divorce is consequently
required. How then (cf. supra p. 459, n. 14
mutatis mutandis) could Rabbah assert that
in such a case all agree that no divorce is
necessary?
55. Lit., 'there'.
56. Not on the principle underlying Rabbah's
assertion.
57. The first Tanna.
58. R. Simeon.
59. Rabbah.
60. The reading in the parallel passage, Yeb.
109a, is 'Eleazar'.
61. Her father having received the letter of
divorce on her behalf.
62. Like an orphan, she has no father to give her
away in marriage, because though alive be has
lost his right to do so after he has given her in
marriage once.
63. Lit., 'he (the first husband from whom she
was divorced) married her again'. While she
was still in her minority when her actions
have no legal validity.
64. V. Glos.
65. If her husband died childless and was
survived by a brother.
66. And as the divorcee of his brother she is
forbidden to the levir under the penalty of
Kareth (v. Glos.).
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
89
67. Cf. supra n. 13.
68. That the Sages admit that the minor in
question may not contract the levirate
marriage.
69. Her first husband.
70. The validity of the divorce being due to the
fact that her father has accepted the letter of
divorce on her behalf.
71. When neither she nor her father (cf. supra p.
461, n. 12) had the right to contract the
marriage; and her husband died while she
was still in her minority so that no intercourse
at all had taken place when she came of age.
72. Her first husband.
73. V. p. 461, n. 20.
74. So that it was possible for intercourse to take
place when she was already in her majority.
75. Because the act of intercourse after she had
come of age constituted a legal Kinyan of
marriage, and she became thereby the legally
married wife of the deceased.
Kethuboth 74a
In the name of R. Eliezer,1 however, it was
stated: She2 must perform Halizah but may
not contract the levirate marriage.3 Now,
here,4 surely, it is a case similar to that of an
error5 affecting merely one woman and they6
nevertheless differ!7 — In that case8 also [it
may be said that]9 they6 differ on the
following principles.10 One Master11
maintains that everyone is aware that there is
no validity in the betrothal of a minor and,
consequently, any man having intercourse
[after such an invalid act] determines that his
intercourse shall serve the purpose of a
betrothal.12 The other Master,13 however,
maintains that not everyone is aware that
there is no validity in the betrothal of a
minor, and when a man has intercourse
[after such an act14 he does so] in reliance on
his original betrothal.15
[So]16 it was also stated: R. Aha b. Jacob
stated in the name of R. Johanan. If a man
betrothed a woman on a certain condition
and then had intercourse with her, she,17 it is
the opinion of all, requires no letter of
divorce from him.
R. Aha the son of R. Ika, his18 sister's son19
raised an objection against him: A Halizah
under a false pretext20 is valid; and what is 'a
Halizah under a false pretext'? Resh Lakish
explained: Where a levir is told, 'Submit to
her Halizah and you will thereby wed her'.
Said R. Johanan to him:21 I am in the habit of
repeating [a Baraitha,] 'Whether he22 had the
intention23 [of performing the commandment
of Halizah] and she had no such intention, or
whether she had such intention and he had
not, her Halizah is invalid, it being
necessary24 that both shall [at the same time]
have such intention', and you say that her
Halizah is valid?25 But, said R. Johanan, [this
is the meaning:]26 When a levir is told,
'Submit to her Halizah on the condition that
she gives you two hundred Zuz'.27 Thus28 it
clearly follows that as soon as a man has
performed an act29 he has thereby dispensed
with his condition, [why then should it not be
said] here also that as soon as the man has
intercourse he has thereby dispensed with his
condition?30 —
The other replied: Young hopeful,31 do you
speak sensibly?32 Consider: Whence do we
derive [the law of the validity of] any
condition? [Obviously] from the condition in
respect of the sons of Gad and the sons of
Reuben;33 [hence it is only] a condition that
may be carried out through an agent, as was
the case there,34 that is regarded as a valid
condition; but one which cannot be carried
out through an agent,35 as was the case there,
is not regarded as a valid condition.36 But is
not intercourse37 an act which cannot be
performed through an agent as was the case
there34 and yet a condition in connection with
it is valid?38 — The reason39 there is because
the various forms of betrothal40 were
compared to one another.41
R. 'Ulla b. Abba in the name of 'Ulla in the
name of R. Eleazar stated: If a man
betrothed a woman by a loan42 and then had
intercourse with her, or on a certain
condition43 and then had intercourse with
her, or with less than the value of a Perutah44
and then had intercourse with her, she,45 it is
the opinion of all, requires from him a letter
of divorce.46
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
90
R. Joseph b. Abba, in the name of R.
Menahem in the name of R. Ammi stated: If
a man betrothed a woman with something
worth less than a Perutah and then had
intercourse with her, she45 requires a letter of
divorce from him.46 It is only in this case47
that no one could be mistaken,48 but in the
case of the others49 a man may be mistaken.50
R. Kahana stated in the name of 'Ulla: If a
man betrothed a woman on a certain
condition43 and then had intercourse with
her, she45 requires a divorce from him.46
Such a case once occurred and the Sages
could find no legal ground51 for releasing the
woman without a letter of divorce. [This is
meant] to exclude [the ruling] of the
following Tanna. For Rab Judah stated in the
name of Samuel in the name of R. Ishmael:
And she be not seized52 [only then53 is she]
forbidden;54 if, however, she was seized55 she
is permitted.54 There is, however, another
[kind of woman] who is permitted54 even
though she was not seized.56 And who is she?
A woman whose betrothal was a mistaken
one57 and who may, even if her son sits riding
on her shoulder,
1. V. supra p. 461, n. 10.
2. Whom the first husband remarried 'while she
was still a minor and she came of age while
she was with him, and then be died' (cf. Rashi,
second version, s.v. [H] a.l.). Aliter: Even if
she was remarried after she came of age, or
was divorced and remarried after she came of
age, R. Eliezer's reason being that preventive
measures were necessary against the
possibility of erroneously allowing one who
was an 'orphan in the lifetime of her father' to
contract levirate marriage. If the former
interpretation is adopted the author of the
Baraitha here cited would be in disagreement
with the one in Yeb. 109a (v. Rashi l.c.); if the
latter interpretation is adopted, the reading of
cur. edd. infra is to be emended (v. infra note
14).
3. V. Yeb. 109a where this passage occurs with
some slight variations.
4. Where remarriage took place 'while she was
still a minor and she came of age while she
was with him'.
5. The error of believing the betrothal of the
minor to be valid.
6. The Sages and R. Eliezer.
7. The Sages maintaining that levirate marriage
may be contracted; which proves that the
intercourse that took place when she was of
age is regarded as a valid Kinyan. As the same
principle applies also to the case of error in
respect of a woman under a vow (supra) an
objection arises against Rabbah (cf. supra p.
459, n. 14).
8. Lit., 'there'.
9. If the second interpretation (supra note 7) is
adopted the reading is to be emended to:
Every one knows that the betrothal of a minor
is invalid, but where one betrothed a woman
on a certain condition and then had
intercourse he does so in reliance on this
condition (v. Rashi).
10. Not on the one underlying the case of which
Rabbah spoke.
11. The view expressed by the Sages.
12. Hence the validity of the marriage and the
permissibility of a levirate marriage.
13. R. Eliezer.
14. Which be believes to be a valid betrothal.
15. Which in fact was invalid. Hence the
invalidity of the marriage, etc. (cf. supra note
1).
16. In agreement with Rabbah who stated (supra
73b) that 'in the case of an error affecting
merely one woman all agree that she requires
no divorce from him'.
17. If the condition has not been fulfilled.
18. R. Aba b. Jacob's.
19. MS.M. reads 'son of the sister of Resh
Lakish'.
20. [H] (rt. [H], Hof'al.) lit., 'misled'.
21. Resh Lakish. Cur. edd. omit 'to him' which is
the reading of MS.M.
22. The levir.
23. When be submitted to Halizah.
24. Lit., 'until'.
25. If the levir, according to the interpretation of
Resh Lakish, performed the Halizah in order
to effect thereby a Kinyan of marriage, he
obviously did not intend to perform the
commandment of Halizah the very purpose of
which is not the union of the woman with, but
her separation from, the levir. And, since
there was no intention to perform the
commandment, how could such a Halizah be
valid?
26. Of 'a Halizah under a false pretext'.
27. V. Glos. Even if the promised sum was not
paid to the levir the Halizah is nevertheless
valid. Tosef. Yeb. XII, Yeb. 106a.
28. Since the non-fulfillment of the condition does
not invalidate the Halizah.
29. [Without emphasizing at the time that he does
so in reliance on the condition (v. Tosaf.).]
30. And the woman should, therefore, become his
lawful wife. How then could R. Aha b. Jacob
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
91
maintain in the name of R. Johanan that a
betrothal, on a certain condition that has not
been fulfilled, is invalid and no divorce is
required even if intercourse followed the
betrothal?
31. Lit., 'son of the school house'.
32. Lit., 'beautiful'.
33. V. Num. XXXII, 29, 30 and Kid. 61a.
34. Moses instructed Joshua to act, so to speak, as
his agent in carrying out the condition he had
made (v. Num. XXXII, 28ff).
35. Halizah, for instance. The levir cannot
instruct an agent to submit to Halizah on his
behalf when the sum promised shall have been
handed to him.
36. As the condition is null and void the act of
Halizah remains valid despite the unfulfilled
condition. Where, however, the condition was
valid, as in the case of the betrothal spoken of
by R. Aha b. Jacob, the non-fulfillment of the
condition renders the betrothal null and void
and no subsequent intercourse can be
regarded as an annulment of the condition
and confirmation of the betrothal.
37. When it was intended as a Kinyan of
marriage.
38. As was stated in the passage quoted from Git.
25b (supra 73b).
39. For the validity of the condition.
40. [H] (rt. [H]) lit., 'beings'. 'becomings'. [H] is
the rt. of [H] (Deut. XXIV, 2), and she
becometh … wife. A woman may become a
man's wife either by receiving from him (a)
money (or its equivalent in kind) or (b) a deed
or (c) by cohabitation (Kid. 2a).
41. As a condition in connection with (a) and (b)
(which may be performed through an agent)
is valid, so also is one in connection with (c).
42. Which she owed him. Such betrothal is invalid
because loaned money may be spent, while a
betrothal cannot be valid unless money or its
equivalent (v. p, 464, n. 15) was actually given
to the woman at the time of the betrothal (v.
Kid. 6b).
43. Which was not fulfilled.
44. V. Glos. The minimum sum for a betrothal to
be valid is a Perutah.
45. If the union is to be dissolved.
46. Because a man, it is assumed, would not allow
his intercourse to deteriorate into a mere act
of prostitution.
47. Betrothal with less than a Perutah.
48. That the betrothal was valid. Knowing his act
to be invalid be determines to effect the
Kinyan of the marriage through his
subsequent intercourse. Hence the necessity
for a divorce to dissolve it.
49. Betrothal by a loan or on a certain condition,
spoken of supra in the name of R. Eleazar.
50. He might be under the impression that a loan
may effect a valid betrothal or that the
condition he had made had been fulfilled. As
his intercourse would consequently be based
on his erroneous presumption of the validity
of the betrothal the union would have no
validity and, contrary to the view expressed in
the name of R. Eleazar (v. supra n. 8), no
divorce to dissolve it would be required.
51. Lit., 'there was no power'.
52. Num. V, 13, E.V., neither she be taken in the
act.
53. Only if she was 'not seized', i.e., she did not
act under compulsion but willingly (cf. Yeb.
56b).
54. To her husband.
55. I.e., if she acted under compulsion.
56. Cf. supra n. 1.
57. I.e., when a condition that was attached to it
remained unfulfilled. In such a case the
woman may leave her husband without a
letter of divorce and is free to marry any
other man.
Kethuboth 74b
make a declaration of refusal1 [against her
husband] and go away.2
Our Rabbis taught: If she3 went to a Sage
[after her betrothal] and he disallowed her
vow her betrothal is valid. [If one4 went] to a
physician who cured her, her betrothal is
invalid. What is the difference between the
act of the Sage and that of the physician?5 —
A Sage annuls6 the vow retrospectively7
while a physician effects the cure only from
that moment onwards.8 But was it not,
however, taught, [that if she9 went] to a Sage
and he disallowed her vow or to a physician
and he cured her, her betrothal is
invalid?10 —
Rabbah11 replied: There is no contradiction.
The former12 represents the view of R. Meir;
the latter13 represents that of R. Eleazar.
'The former represents the view of R. Meir',
who holds that a man does not mind14 his
wife's being exposed to the publicity15 of a
court of law.16 'The latter represents that of
R. Eleazar' who holds that no man wants his
wife to be exposed to the publicity17 of a court
of law.18 What is the source19 [of these
statements]?20 —
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
92
[The following] where we learned: If a man
divorced his wife on account of a vow [she
had made] he may not remarry her,21 nor
may he remarry his wife [if he divorced her]
on account of a had name.22 R. Judah ruled:
In the case of a vow that was made in the
presence of many people23 he may not
remarry her,24 but if it was not made in the
presence of many people he may remarry
her.25 R. Meir ruled: In the case of a vow [the
disallowance of which] necessitates the
investigation of a Sage26 her husband may
not remarry her,27 but if it does not require
the investigation of a Sage28 he may remarry
her.29
R. Eleazar said:30 The prohibition against
[remarriage where the disallowance of the
vow] required [the investigation of a Sage]31
was ordained only on account [of a vow]
which requires [no such investigation].32
(What is R. Judah's reason?33 Because it is
written in Scripture,
1. I.e., she requires no formal letter of divorce.
2. V. supra 51b. The practical ruling of the
Sages, as reported by R. Kahana in the name
of 'Ulla, shows that the ruling of R. Ishmael
was not adopted.
3. The woman who was under a vow at the time
of her betrothal.
4. The woman who was afflicted with a bodily
defect at the time of her betrothal.
5. I.e., why is the betrothal valid in the case of
the former and not in that of the latter?
6. Lit., 'uproots'.
7. So that the woman, at the time of her
betrothal, was virtually under no vow. Hence
the validity of the betrothal.
8. Since the woman at the time of the betrothal
was still suffering from her affliction the
betrothal was effected under a false
assumption and is therefore invalid.
9. V. supra note 8.
10. How is this statement to be reconciled with
the previous one according to which
disallowance of a vow by a Sage renders the
preceding betrothal valid?
11. V. Marg. glos. Cur. edd. [H], 'Raba'.
12. The ruling that the betrothal is valid if a Sage
disallowed the vow.
13. That even where a Sage had disallowed the
vow the betrothal is invalid.
14. Lit., 'Is willing'.
15. [H], lit., 'that she shall be disgraced'.
16. By applying in person to the Sage for the
disallowance of her vow. It is assumed,
therefore, that a man has no objection to
betrothing a woman who is under a vow, since
she may subsequently apply to a Sage for a
disallowance.
17. V. p. 466, D. 20.
18. Consequently, if he had known that she was
under a vow he would not have betrothed her.
Hence the invalidity of the betrothal.
19. Lit., 'it'.
20. Attributed to R. Meir and R. Eleazar
respectively.
21. Because, according to one opinion (v. Git.
45b), it is possible that after the woman had
obtained from a Sage the disallowance of her
vow and had married another man, her first
husband might regret his action in divorcing
her and, advancing the plea that he would not
have divorced her had he known that her vow
could be disallowed, might impair thereby the
validity of her second marriage. By the
enactment that 'he may not re-marry her' a
husband is naturally induced to institute all
the necessary enquiries and to consider very
carefully his course before he decides upon
divorce, and should he nevertheless divorce
her and then plead that he was unaware that
her vow could be disallowed, his plea might
well be disregarded. According to another
opinion (Git. l.c.) the prohibition to marry a
woman in the circumstances mentioned is a
penalty, and a warning to women to abstain
from making vows.
22. Immoral conduct. For the reason cf. supra
note 6 mutatis mutandis. As a vow may be
disallowed so may a bad name turn out to be
unfounded, and the first husband might then
try to impair the validity of the second
marriage. According to the second opinion (v.
supra note 6 ad fin.) the prohibition is a
penalty for, and a warning against, lax
morality and ill-reputed associations.
23. Lit., 'of which many knew', cf. infra 75a ab
init.
24. Since such a vow can never be disallowed (v.
infra p. 468, n. 6 and text). R. Judah adopts
the second reason (supra note 6).
25. Because, since the disallowance of such a vow
is permitted, no penalty has been imposed
upon the woman.
26. I.e., if it is of the class of vows which a
husband is not entitled to invalidate.
27. R. Meir, maintaining that a husband does not
mind his wife's being exposed to the publicity
of a court of law forbids remarriage on
account of the first reason supra p. 467, n. 6,
since the first husband might plead that if he
had known that the vow could be disallowed
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
93
by a Sage he would not have consented to give
a divorce.
28. I.e., if the vow was of a class the invalidation
of which is within the husband's rights.
29. Because in this case the husband cannot
advance the plea that the divorce was due to a
misunderstanding (cf. supra p. 467, n. 6 and
note 12).
30. Cur. edd. insert in parentheses, 'Whether it
requires or whether it does not require he
may not remarry her' (cf. the reading in Git.
45b, Rashal and Asheri).
31. V. p. 467, n. 11.
32. V. supra note 1. Since in the latter case the
husband might plead that he was not aware
that he had the right to disallow the vow. In
the former case, however, no such plea can be
advanced because no man would consent that
his wife should be exposed to the publicity of a
court of law. V. Git. 45b.
33. For ruling that a vow that was made in public
(v. supra p. 467, nn. 8 and 9) may not be
disallowed.
Kethuboth 75a
And the children of Israel smote them not,
because the princes of the congregation had
sworn unto them.1 And what is considered
'many'? R. Nahman b. Isaac said: Three
[men]; [for the expression of] 'days'2 implies
two [days] and 'many'2 three. R. Isaac
replied: Ten; [for the term] congregation3
was applied to them.)4 [Now] 'R. Meir ruled:
In the case of a vow [the disallowance of
which] necessitates the investigation of a Sage
he may not remarry her' [and] 'R. Eleazar
said: The prohibition [against remarriage
where the disallowance of the vow] required
[the investigation of a Sage] was ordained
only on account [of a vow] which required
[no such investigation]'.5 on what principles
do they6 differ? — R. Meir holds the view
that 'a man does not mind his wife's being
exposed to the publicity of a court of law' and
R. Eleazar holds the view that 'no man wants
his wife to be exposed to the publicity of a
court of law'.7
Raba replied:8 Here9 we are dealing with the
case of a woman from a noted family in
which case the man10 could say,11 'I have no
wish to be forbidden to marry her
relatives'.12 If so,13 [consider] the final clause
where it is stated, 'But if he14 went15 to a Sage
who disallowed his vow or to a physician who
cured him, his betrothal of the woman is
valid', [why, it may be asked, was it not]
stated, 'the betrothal is invalid' and16
explained,17 'Here we are dealing with the
case of a man from a noted family concerning
whom the woman18 might plead. 'I have no
wish to be forbidden to marry his
relatives'?19 — A woman is satisfied with any
sort [of husband] as Resh Lakish said. For
Resh Lakish stated: 'It is preferable to live in
grief20 than to dwell in widowhood'.21 Abaye
said: With a husband [of the size of an] ant
her seat is placed among the great.22 R. Papa
said: Though her husband be a carder23 she
calls him to the threshold and sits down [at
his side].24 R. Ashi said: Even if her husband
is only a cabbage-head25 she requires no
lentils26 for her pot.27
A Tanna taught: But all such women28 play
the harlot and attribute the consequences29 to
their husbands.
ALL DEFECTS WHICH DISQUALIFY, etc.
A Tanna taught: To these30 were added31
[excessive] perspiration, a mole and offensive
breath.32 Do these, then, not cause a
disqualification in respect of priests? Surely
we have learned,33 'The old, the sick and the
filthy'34 and we have also learned, 'These
defects whether permanent or transitory,
render human beings35 unfit [for the Temple
service]!36 — R. Jose b. Hanina replied: This
is no contradiction. The former refers to
perspiration that can be removed;37 the
latter, to perspiration that cannot be
removed.38
R. Ashi said [in reply]: You are pointing out
a contradiction between 'perspiration' and
'one who is filthy' [which in fact are not alike,
for] there, in the case of priests,39 it is
possible to remove the perspiration40 by the
aid of sour wine, and it is also possible [to
remove] an offensive breath by holding
pepper in one's mouth and thus performing
the Temple service, but in the case of a wife41
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
94
[such devices are for all practical purposes]
impossible.42
What kind of a mole is here meant? If one
overgrown with hair, it would cause
disqualification in both cases; if one with no
hair, [then, again], if it is a large one it causes
disqualification in both cases43 and if it is a
small one it causes no disqualification in
either; for it was taught: A mole which is
overgrown with hair is regarded as a bodily
defect; if with no hair it is only deemed to be
a bodily defect when large but when small it
is no defect; and what is meant by large? R.
Simeon b. Gamaliel explained: The size of an
Italian issar!44 — R. Jose the son of R.
Hanina said: One which is situated on her
forehead.45 [If it was on] her forehead he46
must have seen it and acquiesced!47 — R.
Papa replied: It is one that was situated
under her bonnet and is sometimes exposed
and sometimes not.
R. Hisda said: I heard the following
statement from a great man (And who is he?
R. Shila). If a dog bit her48 and the spot of the
bite turned into a scar [such a scar] is
considered a bodily defect.
R. Hisda further stated: A harsh voice in a
woman is a bodily defect; since it is said in
Scripture, For sweet is thy voice, and thy
countenance is comely.49
R. Nathan of Bira learnt: [The space] of one
handbreadth between a woman's breasts.50
R. Aha the son of Raba intended to explain in
the presence of R. Ashi [that this statement
meant that '[the space of] a handbreadth' is
to [a woman's] advantage,51 but R. Ashi said
to him: This52 was taught in connection with
bodily defects. And what space [is deemed
normal]? Abaye replied: [A space of] three
fingers.
It was taught: R. Nathan said, It is a bodily
defect if a woman's breasts are bigger than
those of others. By how much? — R.
Meyasha the grandson of R. Joshua b. Levi
replied in the name of R. Joshua b. Levi: By
one handbreadth. Is such a deformity,
however, possible?53 — Yes; for Rabbah b.
Bar Hana related, I saw an Arab woman who
flung her breasts over her back and nursed
her child.
But54 of Zion it shall be said: 'This man and
that55 was born in her; and the Most High
Himself doth establish her;56 R. Meyasha,
grandson of R. Joshua b. Levi, explained:
Both57 he who was born therein and he who
looks forward to seeing it.58
Said Abaye: And one of them59 is as good as
two of us.60 Said Raba: When one of us,
however, goes up there61 he is as good as two
of them. For [you have the case of] R.
Jeremiah who, while here,62 did not
understand what the Rabbis were saying, but
when he went up there he was able to refer to
us as 'The stupid Babylonians'.63
MISHNAH. IF SHE64 WAS AFFLICTED WITH
BODILY DEFECTS WHILE SHE WAS STILL
IN HER FATHER'S HOUSE,65 HER FATHER66
MUST PRODUCE PROOF THAT THESE
DEFECTS AROSE AFTER SHE HAD BEEN
BETROTHED AND [THAT, CONSEQUENTLY,
IT WAS THE] HUSBAND'S FIELD THAT WAS
INUNDATED.67 IF SHE CAME UNDER THE
AUTHORITY OF HER HUSBAND,68 THE
HUSBAND69 MUST PRODUCE PROOF THAT
THESE DEFECTS WERE UPON HER BEFORE
SHE HAD BEEN BETROTHED AND [THAT
CONSEQUENTLY] HIS BARGAIN WAS MADE
IN ERROR. THIS IS THE RULING OF R.
MEIR. THE SAGES, HOWEVER, RULED:
THIS70 APPLIES ONLY TO CONCEALED
BODILY DEFECTS;
1. Josh. IX, 28; the oath could not be annulled
because it was taken in public.
2. Referring to Lev. XV, 25. Cf. Nid. 73a.
3. [H] (Josh. ibid.).
4. And a congregation consists of not less than
ten men.
5. Cf. supra p. 467, nn. 11ff.
6. R. Meir and R. Eleazar. Cf. supra p. 466, nn.
29ff.
7. The source of the statements (v. supra p. 467,
n. 5) has thus been shown. For further notes
on the passage v. Git. (Sonc. ed.) pp. 200ff.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
95
8. In explanation of the contradiction pointed
out supra 74b.
9. The second Baraitha which rules that the
betrothal is invalid even if a Sage has
disallowed the vow.
10. Even according to R. Meir who maintains that
a husband does not mind his wife's
appearance before a court of law one may still
be objecting to live with a wife who is
restricted by a vow.
11. In his desire to avoid a divorce and to obtain
the retrospective annulment of his betrothal
(v. following note).
12. Her mother and sister who are forbidden to
marry the man who divorced her. He may
insist that he wishes to retain the privilege of
marrying these women members of a noted
family though he objected to the particular
one who restricted herself by a vow. By
obtaining the annulment of the betrothal he
does not place his wife under the category of a
divorcee and he retains, in consequence, the
right of marrying her relatives. Hence the
ruling (even according to R. Meir) that the
betrothal is invalid.
13. If Raba's explanation is to be accepted.
14. A man who betrothed a woman on the
condition that he was under no vow or that he
suffered no bodily defects.
15. After the betrothal
16. In order to reconcile the two clauses.
17. On the lines followed by Raba in the first
clause.
18. Cf. supra n. 3 mutatis mutandis.
19. Cf. mutatis mutandis, supra nn. 4 and 5.
20. Or 'together', 'as husband and wife'. V.
following note.
21. Yeb. 118b. This is a woman's maxim. She
prefers a married life of unhappiness and
misery to a happy and prosperous life in
solitude. [H] (adv.) 'with a load of grief', 'in
trouble' (Jast.) Aliter: (Cf. supra n. 13) us in
'two bodies' (Rashi); 'two persons' (Levy).
22. A woman's opinion of a married life (v. Yeb.
l.c.) [H] pl. of [H], 'a free woman'.
23. [H], 'flax-beater' (Rashi), a watchman of
vegetables' (Aruch.), i.e., of a poor and
humble occupation.
24. To show her friends that she is a married
woman. She is proud to be in the company of
a husband however humble his occupation
and social status.
25. [H], i.e., 'dull', 'ugly' (v. Jast.): 'of a tainted
family' (Rashi).
26. I.e., even a cheap vegetable.
27. A woman is content to dispense even with the
cheapest enjoyments for the sake of a married
life.
28. Who marry the unlovely types enumerated.
29. Lit., 'and hang on'.
30. The defects that disqualify priests (v. Bek.
43a).
31. In the case of women (v. our Mishnah).
32. Lit., 'smell of the mouth'.
33. In respect of defects that render animals unfit
for the altar (Bek. 41a).
34. Under which term, it is at present assumed,
excessive perspiration and offensive breath
are included.
35. Sc. priests.
36. Bek. 43a. How then could it be said supra that
excessive perspiration and offensive breath
are not included among those that disqualify a
priest?
37. By the application of water (v. Tosaf. s.v. כאן).
Aliter: That may be cured (v. Tosaf. loc. cit.).
38. Cf. supra n. 14 mutatis mutandis.
39. Who were not described as 'filthy', but as
suffering from excessive perspiration or
offensive breath. R. Ashi, contrary to the
previous assumption (v. supra note 11), draws
a distinction between 'filthy' which implies a
chronic state of the body and the two others
which are only minor defects.
40. Even if water could not remove it.
41. With whom a husband is constantly in
contact.
42. Hence the ruling that even such minor defects
render a betrothal invalid.
43. Lit., 'here and here', in the case of a priest and
in that of a wife.
44. V. Glos. The question then arises: What kind
of a mole was meant in the Baraitha supra
where it is mentioned among the three defects
of a wife that do not disqualify a priest.
45. And is small in size and without hair.
46. The man who betrothed her.
47. How then could a mole in such circumstances
be regarded as a defect that causes the
invalidity of the betrothal?
48. Any woman.
49. Cant. II, 14.
50. This is explained anon.
51. But if it was bigger or smaller it is to be
regarded as a defect.
52. R. Nathan's statement.
53. Lit., 'is there such a kind'.
54. The following paragraph, though irrelevant to
the subject under discussion, is inserted here
because of its author, R. Meyasha, who is also
the author of the previous statement.
55. [H], lit., 'man and man'.
56. Ps. LXXXVII, 5.
57. The inference is derived from the repetition of
man (v. supra n. 3).
58. Will be acclaimed as a son of Zion.
59. The man of Zion, i.e., the Palestinians (Rashi).
60. Babylonians.
61. To Palestine.
62. In Babylon.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
96
63. Cf. Men. 42a.
64. A betrothed woman.
65. I.e., before she married and went to live with
her husband.
66. If his daughter is to be entitled to her
Kethubah from the man who betrothed her
and refused to marry her on account of her
defects.
67. Metaph. It is the husband's misfortune that
the woman who had no such defects prior to
her betrothal is now afflicted with them.
68. I.e., if the defects were discovered after the
marriage.
69. Should be, on account of her defects, desire to
divorce her and to deny her the Kethubah.
70. The validity of a husband's plea that HIS
BARGAIN WAS MADE IN ERROR.
Kethuboth 75b
BUT IN RESPECT OF DEFECTS THAT ARE
EXPOSED HE1 CANNOT ADVANCE ANY
VALID PLEA.2 AND IF THERE WAS A BATH-
HOUSE IN THE TOWN HE CANNOT
ADVANCE ANY VALID PLEA2 EVEN
AGAINST CONCEALED BODILY DEFECTS,
BECAUSE HE [IS ASSUMED TO HAVE HAD
HER] EXAMINED BY HIS WOMEN
RELATIVES.3
GEMARA. The reason then4 is because the
father produced proof, but if he produced no
proof,5 the husband is believed.6 Whose
[view consequently is here7 expressed]?
[Obviously] that of R. Joshua who stated,
'Our life is not dependent on her statement'.8
Now read the final clause: IF SHE CAME
UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE
HUSBAND, THE HUSBAND MUST
PRODUCE PROOF, the reason then9 is
because the husband produced proof, but if
he produced no proof,10 the father is
believed,11 a ruling which expresses the view
of R. Gamaliel who stated that the woman is
believed!12 — R. Eleazar replied: The
contradiction13 [is evident]; he who taught
the one did not teach the other.14
Raba said: It must not be assumed that R.
Joshua15 is never guided by the principle of
the presumptive soundness of the body, for
the fact is16 that R. Joshua is not guided by
that principle only where it is opposed by the
principle of possession.17 Where, however,
the principle of possession is not applicable
R. Joshua is guided by that of the soundness
of the body; for it was taught: If the bright
spot18 preceded the white hair, he19 is
unclean; if the reverse, he is clean. [If the
order is in] doubt, he is unclean; but R.
Joshua said: It darkened.20 What is meant by
'It darkened'? Rabbah replied: [It is as
though the spot] darkened21 [and, therefore,]
he is clean.22
Raba explained:23 The first clause [is a case
of] 'Here24 they25 were found and here they
must have arisen'26 and so is the final clause:
Here27 they28 were found and here they must
have arisen.29 Abaye raised an objection
against him:30 IF SHE CAME UNDER THE
AUTHORITY OF THE HUSBAND, THE
HUSBAND MUST PRODUCE PROOF
THAT THESE DEFECTS WERE UPON
HER BEFORE SHE HAD BEEN
BETROTHED31 AND [THAT,
CONSEQUENTLY,] HIS BARGAIN WAS
MADE IN ERROR; [Thus only if she had the
defects] BEFORE SHE HAD BEEN
BETROTHED [is the husband's plea]
accepted,32 [but if they were seen upon her]
only after she had been betrothed33 [his plea
would] not [be accepted]. But why? Let it be
said,34 'Here they were found and here they
must have arisen'!35 —
The other30 replied: [The principle36 cannot
be applied if the defects were discovered]
after she had been betrothed because it may
be taken for granted that no man drinks out
of a cup37 unless he has first examined it; and
this man38 must consequently have seen [the
defects] and acquiesced.39 If so,40 [the same
principle should apply] also to one [who had
defects] prior to her betrothal. [Since,]
however, [it is not applied], the presumption
must be that no man is reconciled to bodily
defects, [why then is it not presumed] here41
also that no man is reconciled to bodily
defects? —
This, however, is the explanation: [The
principle36 cannot be applied to defects
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
97
discovered] after she had been betrothed
because two [principles] are [opposed to it:]
The presumptive soundness of the woman's
body42 and the presumption that no man
drinks out of a cup unless he has first
examined it and that this man must,
consequently, have seen [the defects] and
acquiesced. What possible objection can you
raise?43 Is it the presumption that no man is
reconciled to bodily defects? [But this] is only
1. Since he was in a position to see them.
2. That he was not aware of these defects.
3. He must have known, therefore, of the defects,
and acquiesced.
4. Why in the first clause of our Mishnah the
woman who was divorced after a betrothal is
entitled to her Kethubah.
5. So that it is unknown when the defects first
arose.
6. If he pleads that the woman was afflicted with
the defects prior to her betrothal; and he, as
the possessor of the money, is consequently
exempt from paying the Kethubah as is the
law in respect of all monetary claims where
the possessor cannot be deprived of his money
without legal proof of the claim advanced
against him.
7. In the implication that the law is to be decided
in favor of the husband who is the possessor of
the money and not in favor of the woman
who, since she was born without bodily
defects, has the claim of presumptive
soundness of body.
8. I.e., we do not rely on the woman's assertion,
supra 12b, where the time she had been
outraged is a matter of dispute between her
and her husband. Though the woman has in
her favor the claim of the presumptive
chastity of her body she, nevertheless, cannot
obtain her Kethubah because of her husband's
stronger claim as the possessor of the amount
of the Kethubah.
9. Why the woman does not receive her
Kethubah.
10. So that it is unknown when the defects first
arose.
11. Cf. supra note 7 mutatis mutandis; the
woman's presumptive soundness of body
being regarded as a superior claim to that of
the husband possessor of the amount of the
Kethubah.
12. Supra 12b. Cf. supra p. 473, n. 9 mutatis
mutandis and p. 473, n. 12. A contradiction
thus arises between the first and the second
clause of our Mishnah.
13. [H]. Aliter: (rt. [H], 'to break') Divide or sever
(the two clauses). R. Han. (v. Tosaf. s.v. [H],).
regards[H], as an imprecation.
14. The first clause represents the view of R.
Joshua who maintains the same view in the
case spoken of in the second clause, while the
second clause expresses the view of R.
Gamaliel who maintains it in the case of the
first clause also, neither of them drawing a
distinction between a woman who was still in
her father's house and one who was already
under the authority of her husband.
15. Cf. supra p. 473, nn 7-8.
16. Lit., 'but'.
17. Lit., 'presumptive possession of the money'.
18. In leprosy. V. Lev. XIII, 2-4.
19. The man afflicted.
20. Neg. IV, 11.
21. Cf. Lev. XIII, 6: If the plague be dim (or
dark) … then the priest shall pronounce him
clean.
22. Thus it has been shown that R. Joshua, since
be ruled that a doubtful case of leprosy is
clean, is guided by the principle of the
presumptive soundness of the human body
wherever it is not opposed by the principle of
possession.
23. The apparent contradiction between the first
and the second clause of our Mishnah (cf.
supra note 1).
24. In the FATHER'S HOUSE.
25. The BODILY DEFECTS of the woman.
26. And it is owing to this principle only that the
onus of producing proof was thrown upon the
father. Otherwise, he would have been
believed without proof, in agreement with the
view of R. Gamaliel, which is the adopted
Halachah (v. supra 12b), because his claim is
supported by the principle of his daughter's
presumptive soundness of body.
27. In the husband's house.
28. The BODILY DEFECTS of the woman.
29. The two clauses of our Mishnah thus present
no contradiction, both expressing the view of
R. Gamaliel (cf. supra p. 474, n. 15).
30. Raba.
31. [H]. The reading in our Mishnah is [H] a
change of tense and form that does not
materially affect the meaning of the phrase.
32. Lit., 'yes'.
33. Although she was still in her father's house.
34. If Raba's explanation is correct.
35. Since this principle, however, is not adopted
in the final clause, how could Raba's
explanation be upheld?
36. 'Here they were found, etc.'
37. Euphemism.
38. Since he had married the woman.
39. Hence the inadmissibility of the principle,
'Here they were found, etc.'.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
98
40. If the principle of the 'presumptive
examination of the cup' is the determining
factor in favor of the woman.
41. In the final clause where the proof established
the existence of the defects after betrothal
while the woman was still in her father's
house.
42. Lit. 'place the body upon its strength'.
43. Against deciding, on the basis of the two
principles, in favor of the woman.
Kethuboth 76a
one principle1 against two principles,2 and
one against two cannot be upheld.3 [But
where the defects were discovered] before
betrothal, the principle of the presumptive
soundness of her body cannot be applied,4
and all that remains is5 the presumption that
no man drinks out of a cup unless he has first
examined it and that this man must
consequently have seen [the defects] and
acquiesced, [but to this it can be retorted:]
On the contrary, the presumption is that no
man is reconciled to bodily defects, and
consequently the money is to remain in the
possession of its holder.6
R. Ashi explained:7 The [claim in the] first
clause8 [is analogous to the claim] 'You owe
my father a Maneh',9 but that in the final
clause10 [is analogous to the claim] 'You owe
me a Maneh'.11
R. Aha the son of R. Awya raised an
objection against R. Ashi: R. Meir12 admits
that in respect of bodily defects13 likely to
have come14 with her from her father's house
it is the father who must produce the proof.15
But why?16 Is [not this17 analogous to the
claim,] 'You owe me a Maneh'?18 — Here15
we are dealing with the case of a woman who
had a superfluous limb.19 [But if] she had a
superfluous limb20 what proof could be
brought?21 — Proof that the man has seen
it22 and acquiesced.
Rab Judah stated in the name of Samuel: If a
man exchanged a cow for [another man's]
ass, and the owner of the ass pulled23 the
cow24 but the owner of the cow did not
manage to pull25 the ass before the ass died, it
is for the owner of the ass to produce proof
that his ass was alive at the time the cow was
pulled.26 And the Tanna [of our Mishnah
who taught about] a bride27 supports this
ruling. Which [ruling concerning the]
bride?28 If it be suggested:
1. In favor of the man. The principle of
possession is of no consequence here because
it is completely disregarded when opposed by
that of the presumptive soundness of the
body.
2. Which are in favor of the woman.
3. Hence the ruling in her favor.
4. Since proof was adduced that she was afflicted
with the defects prior to her betrothal.
5. Lit. 'what is there?' in favor of the woman's
claim.
6. In the absence of the presumption of the
soundness of body (cf. supra n. 5) the principle
of possession is a determining factor (cf. supra
note 2), and thus, being added to that of a
man's irreconcilableness to bodily defects, two
principles in favor of the man are opposed to
one in favor of the woman. Hence the ruling
in favor of the man.
7. The apparent contradiction between the first
and second clause of our Mishnah (cf. supra p.
474, n. 1).
8. Since the Kethubah of a betrothed woman, as
a Na'arah (v. Glos.), unlike that of a married
one, belongs to her father and not to herself.
9. Where the presumptive soundness of the
claimant's daughter's body, not being that of
the claimant herself, cannot override the
principle of possession which is in favor of the
husband. Hence the necessity for the father to
produce the proof.
10. Dealing with a married woman.
11. In which case (cf. supra note 9 mutatis
mutandis), the presumptive soundness of the
body of the woman who is herself the claimant
is sufficient to establish her claim. Hence it is
for the husband to produce the necessary
proof. Thus it is possible to assume that both
the clauses of our Mishnah under discussion
represent the view of R. Gamaliel who ruled
that the presumptive soundness of body
overrides the principle of possession.
12. Though he stated in our Mishnah that if the
defects were discovered after the woman
CAME UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HER
HUSBAND it is the latter that MUST
PRODUCE PROOF.
13. The reference is at present assumed to be to
any kind of defect.
14. Lit., 'that are likely to come'.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
99
15. Tosef. Keth. VII.
16. Should the father have to produce the proof.
17. According to R. Ashi's explanation.
18. The woman being married and the Kethubah
belonging to her, the presumptive soundness
of her body should be sufficient to establish
her claim.
19. Not, as has been presumed by R. Aha, with
one who was afflicted with any defect. A
superfluous limb does not grow after
betrothal. Being a congenital defect, the
principle of the presumptive soundness of the
body cannot be applied.
20. Which is obviously congenital.
21. In support of her claim to her Kethubah.
22. Prior to betrothal or marriage.
23. Pulling, Meshikah (v. Glos.) is one of the
forms of acquiring legal possession.
24. While the ass still remained on his premises.
25. To take it to his premises.
26. If such proof is produced the former owner of
the cow must bear the loss, because the legal
acquisition by one of the parties of one of two
objects exchanged places upon the other party
the responsibility for any accident that might
happen to the other object even though he did
not himself formally acquire it (v. Kid. 28a).
27. Concerning whose defects a similar doubt
exists. In the case of the exchanged animals it
is uncertain whether the ass died before or
after the acquisition of the cow; in the case of
the bride it is uncertain whether she had her
defects before or after her betrothal.
28. Provides the support.
Kethuboth 76b
The one concerning a bride IN HER
FATHER'S HOUSE,1 are the two cases [it
may be objected] alike? There it is the
father2 who produces the proof and receives3
[the Kethubah from the husband]4 while here
it is the owner of the ass5 who produces the
proof and retains [the cow],6 — R. Abba
replied: [The ruling concerning a] bride in
her father-in-law's house.7 But [the two
cases] are still unlike, for there it is the
husband who produces the proof8 and
thereby impairs the presumptive right of the
father,9 while here it is the owner of the ass
who produces the proof10 and thereby
confirms his presumptive right!11 —
R. Nahman b. Isaac replied: [The support is
derived from the case of the] bride IN HER
FATHER'S HOUSE in respect of her token
of betrothal.12 And, furthermore, it need not
be said [that this13 applies only] in
accordance with him who holds [that a token
of] betrothal is not unreturnable14 but [it
holds good] even according to him who
maintains [that a token of] betrothal is
unreturnable, since his ruling relates only to
certain betrothal, but [not] to doubtful
betrothal [where the father may retain the
token] only15 if he produces proof but not
otherwise.16
An objection was raised: If a needle was
found in the thick walls of the second
stomach [of a ritually killed beast, and it
protrudes only] from one of its sides,17 the
beast is fit [for human consumption,18 but if
it protruded] from both sides, the beast is
unfit for human consumption.19 If a drop of
blood was found on [the needle] it is certain
that [the wound was inflicted] before the
ritual killing;20 if no drop of blood was found
on it, it is certain that [the wound was made]
after the killing.21 If the top22 of the wound
was covered with a crust, it is certain that
[the wounding occurred] three days prior to
the killing;23 if the top22 of the wound was not
covered with a crust,24 it is for the claimant
to produce the proof.25 Now if the butcher26
had already paid the price he27 would have to
produce the required proof and so obtain the
refund [of his money]; but why? Let the
owner of the beast rather produce the proof
and retain [the purchase money]!28 —
[This is a case] where the butcher26 has not
yet paid the price.29 But how can such an
absolute assertion30 be made?31 — [This]
however, [will dispose of the difficulty:] For
when Rami b. Ezekiel came he said, 'Pay no
regard to those rules which my brother
Judah laid down in the name of Samuel; for
thus said Samuel: He in whose domain the
doubt first arose32 must produce the proof;
and the Tanna [of our Mishnah who taught
about] the bride33 provides support for this
ruling.34
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
100
An objection was raised: If a needle was
found in the thick walls of the second
stomach, etc.35 Now,36 if the butcher26 has not
yet paid the purchase price it would be the
owner of the beast36 who would have to
produce the proof and so obtain [its price]
from [the butcher]; but why? [Has not] the
doubt arisen [when the beast was already] in
the possession of the butcher?37 — [This is a
case] where the butcher has already paid the
price.38 But how can such a categorical
statement39 be made?40 — It is the usual
practice that so long as one man does not pay
the price the other does not give his beast.
THE SAGES, HOWEVER, RULED: THIS
APPLIES ONLY TO CONCEALED
BODILY DEFECTS. R. Nahman stated:
1. In the first clause; the assumption being that,
in agreement with R. Eleazar (supra 75b), it
represents the view of R. Joshua, and that the
father must produce the proof even where the
defects were discovered after marriage and
the doubt did not arise until after the bride
had come under the authority of her husband.
(Cf. Rashi, a.l. and infra s.v. [H], ad fin.).
Similarly in the case of the exchange of the
animals the owner of the ass must produce
proof though the doubt occurred after his
Meshikah of the cow had transferred the ass
to the responsibility of the other party.
2. The claimant.
3. Lit., 'brings out'.
4. Which is the usual rule: The claimant
produces the proof and receives his due.
5. The defendant.
6. Contrary to the usual rule (v. supra n. 4). How
then could it be asserted that the latter is
supported by the former?
7. I.e., the second clause of our Mishnah
provides the support; the assumption being
with R. Eleazar (supra 75b), that it represents
the view of R. Gamaliel and that the husband
must produce the proof even where the
defects were discovered prior to marriage,
while the bride was still in her parental home,
and her Kethubah still belonged to her father.
(Cf. Rashi a.l. and infra s.v. [H] ad fin.). The
support is adduced thus: If in this case where
the doubt first arose while the bride was still
under her father's authority (i.e., in the
claimant's possession) it is the husband, who
is the defendant, that must produce the proof,
how much more so in the case of the exchange
of the animals where the doubt arose In the
house of the defendant (the owner of the ass)
that the latter must produce the proof.
8. That she had the defects prior to her
betrothal.
9. The presumption of the woman's soundness of
body.
10. That the ass was alive at the time the cow was
acquired by him.
11. The presumption that the ass that was alive
prior to the acquisition of the cow was also
alive during the time the cow was acquired.
How then could a case in which the proof
rightly serves the purpose of impairing a
presumptive right be taken as support to one
in which the proof is adduced to confirm a
presumptive right?
12. In the first clause of our Mishnah where the
proof must be produced by the father (cf.
supra p. 478, n. 1 mutatis mutandis) though it
serves also the purpose of enabling him to
retain the money, or object of value, that was
given as the token of the betrothal of the
bride. Similarly in the case of the exchange of
the animals, the owner of the ass produces the
proof and retains the cow.
13. That proof is required to enable the father to
retain the token of betrothal.
14. Lit., 'given for sinking', i.e., that it is not
returned under any conditions whatsoever (v.
B.B. 145a). Since it is 'not unreturnable', it is
not in the father's full possession and he might
well he expected to have to produce the proof.
15. Lit., 'yes'.
16. Lit., 'if not, not'.
17. The inner side of the stomach. Owing to the
thickness of its folds it is quite possible that
the needle merely pricked, but did not pierce
through the stomach wall.
18. Since the wound caused by the needle was not
fatal.
19. Trefa (v. Glos.). A perforation of the stomach
is a fatal wound which renders the afflicted
animal unfit for human consumption even if it
was ritually killed before it could die of the
wound.
20. And the beast is, therefore, unfit for human
consumption (cf. supra n. 8).
21. When it could not affect the life of the beast
which, in consequence, remains fit for
consumption.
22. Lit., 'mouth'.
23. And should a butcher buy the beast within the
three days it is a bargain made in error which
he may cancel and claim the refunding of his
purchase money.
24. And the vendor pleads that the wound was
made after the sale when the beast was in the
possession of the buyer, while the buyer insists
that it was made prior to the sale when it was
still in the vendor's possession.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
101
25. Hul. 50b.
26. Sc. the buyer.
27. Being the claimant.
28. As in the case spoken of by Samuel (supra
76a), where the owner of the ass produces the
proof and retains the cow. Since, however, the
law here is not so, an objection arises against
Samuel's ruling.
29. So that the vendor is the claimant. Hence it is
for the butcher, who is the defendant, to
produce the proof and thus retain his money.
30. That the butcher always buys on credit and
that he is, therefore, always the defendant.
31. A butcher, surely, does not always buy on
credit and our Baraitha does not mention
buyer at all but claimant, irrespective of
whether he happens to be the buyer or the
vendor.
32. I.e., the owner of the cow, since the doubt first
arose after the owner of the ass had acquired
the cow and thereby transferred the
responsibility for the ass to the former owner
of the cow.
33. That if the doubt concerning the first
appearance of her defects arose while she was
in her paternal home her father must produce
the proof, and that if it arose when she was
already under the authority of her husband it
is the husband who must produce the proof.
34. Samuel, according to the present explanation,
would hold the same opinion as Raba who
stated (supra 75b) that the first as well as the
second clause of our Mishnah represents the
view of one Tanna, viz. that of R. Joshua.
35. Supra, cited from Hul. 50b.
36. Since it has been laid down that the claimant
must produce the proof.
37. Of course it has, since the needle could not
have been found before the beast had been
killed. Now if Rami b. Ezekiel's report in the
name of Samuel is to be regarded as
authentic, the butcher should have been the
party to produce the proof.
38. And it is the butcher in fact from whom the
proof is expected.
39. That the butcher invariably buys for cash and
that he is therefore always the claimant.
40. Does not a butcher sometimes take on credit?
Kethuboth 77a
Epilepsy1 is regarded as [one of the]
concealed bodily defects.2 This, however,
applies only to attacks which occur at regular
periods,3 but if they are irregular [epilepsy is
regarded] as [one of the] exposed bodily
defects.4
MISHNAH. A MAN IN WHOM BODILY
DEFECTS HAVE ARISEN CANNOT BE
COMPELLED TO DIVORCE [HIS WIFE]. R.
SIMEON B. GAMALIEL SAID: THIS APPLIES
ONLY TO MINOR DEFECTS, BUT IN
RESPECT OF MAJOR DEFECTS5 HE CAN BE
COMPELLED TO DIVORCE HER.
GEMARA. Rab Judah recited: 'HAVE
ARISEN';6 Hiyya b. Rab recited: 'Were'.7
He who recited 'HAVE ARISEN' [holds that
the ruling applies] with even more force
[where the defects] 'were',7 since [in the
latter case the woman] was aware of the facts
and acquiesced. He, however, who recited
'Were' [holds that the ruling does] not [apply
where the defects] 'have arisen'.8
We learned: R. SIMEON B. GAMALIEL
SAID: THIS APPLIES ONLY TO MINOR
DEFECTS BUT IN RESPECT OF MAJOR
DEFECTS HE CAN BE COMPELLED TO
DIVORCE HER. Now, according to him who
reads, 'HAVE ARISEN9 it is quite proper to
make a distinction between major defects and
minor defects.10 According to him, however,
who reads, 'were', what [it may be asked] is
the difference between major defects and
minor ones? Was she not in fact aware [of
their existence] and acquiesced?11 — She
may have thought that she would be able to
tolerate them but now she finds that she is
unable to tolerate them.12
These,13 R. Simeon b. Gamaliel explained,
are major defects: If, for instance, his eye was
blinded, his hand was cut off or his leg was
broken.
It was stated: R. Abba b. Jacob said in the
name of R. Johanan: The Halachah is in
agreement with R. Simeon b. Gamaliel. Raba
said in the name of R. Nahman: The
Halachah is in agreement with the Sages. But
could R. Johanan, however, have made such
a statement?14 Surely Rabbah b. Bar Hana
stated in the name of R. Johanan: Wherever
R. Simeon b. Gamaliel taught in our
Mishnah, the Halachah is in agreement with
his ruling except [in the cases of]
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
102
'guarantor',15 'Zidon'16 and the 'latter
proof'!17 — There is a dispute of Amoraim as
to what was R. Johanan's view.18
MISHNAH. THE FOLLOWING ARE
COMPELLED TO DIVORCE [THEIR WIVES]:
A MAN WHO IS AFFLICTED WITH BOILS,
OR HAS A POLYPUS,19 OR GATHERS
[OBJECTIONABLE MATTER]20 OR IS A
COPPERSMITH20 OR A TANNER,20
WHETHER THEY WERE [IN SUCH
CONDITIONS OR POSITIONS] BEFORE THEY
MARRIED OR WHETHER THEY AROSE
AFTER THEY HAD MARRIED. AND
CONCERNING ALL THESE R. MEIR SAID:
ALTHOUGH THE MAN MADE A CONDITION
WITH HER [THAT SHE ACQUIESCES IN HIS
DEFECTS] SHE MAY NEVERTHELESS
PLEAD, 'I THOUGHT I COULD ENDURE
HIM,21 BUT NOW I CANNOT ENDURE HIM.'21
THE SAGES, HOWEVER, SAID: SHE MUST
ENDURE [ANY SUCH PERSON] DESPITE HER
WISHES, THE ONLY EXCEPTION BEING A
MAN AFFLICTED WITH BOILS, BECAUSE
SHE [BY HER INTERCOURSE] WILL
ENERVATE HIM. IT ONCE HAPPENED AT
ZIDON THAT THERE DIED22 A TANNER
WHO HAD A BROTHER23 WHO WAS ALSO A
TANNER. THE SAGES RULED: SHE24 MAY
SAY, 'I WAS ABLE TO ENDURE21 YOUR
BROTHER BUT I CANNOT ENDURE YOU'.
GEMARA. What [is meant by one] WHO
HAS A POLYPUS? — Rab Judah replied in
the name of Samuel: [One who suffers from
an offensive] nasal smell. In a Baraitha it was
taught: [One suffering from] offensive
breath.25 R. Assi learnt in the reverse order26
and supplied the mnemonic, 'Samuel did not
cease [studying] all our chapter [with] his
mouth'.27
WHO GATHERS. What [is meant by one]
WHO GATHERS? — Rab Judah replied:
One who gathers dogs' excrements.28
An objection was raised: 'One who gathers'
means a tanner!29 — But even according to
your own view,30 would not a contra diction
arise from our Mishnah [which specifies] OR
GATHERS OR IS A COPPERSMITH OR A
TANNER?31 — One may well explain why
our Mishnah31 presents no contradiction32
because the latter33 refers to a great tanner34
whilst the former35 refers to a small tanner;36
but according to Rab Judah the contradiction
remains?37 — [The definition]38 is [a matter
in dispute between] Tannaim. For it was
taught: 'One who gathers' means a 'tanner';
and others say: It means 'one who gathers
dogs' excrements'.39
OR IS A COPPERSMITH OR A TANNER.
What is meant by A COPPERSMITH? — R.
Ashi40 replied: A kettle-smith.41 Rabbah b.
Bar Hana explained: One who digs copper
from the mine.42 It was taught in agreement
with Rabbah b. Bar Hana: What is meant by
a coppersmith? One who digs copper from
the mine.42
Rab stated: If a husband says, 'I will neither
maintain nor support [my wife]', he must
divorce her and give her also her Kethubah.
R. Eleazar went and told this reported
statement to Samuel [who] exclaimed, 'Make
Eleazar eat barley;43 rather than compel him
to divorce her let him be compelled to
maintain her'. And Rab?44 — No one can live
with a serpent in the same basket.45 When R.
Zera went up46 he found R. Benjamin b.
Japheth sitting [at the college] and reporting
this47 in the name of R. Johanan.48 'For this
statement', he said to him, 'Eleazar was told
in Babylon to eat barley'.
Rab Judah stated in the name of R. Assi:49
We do not compel divorce except [in the case
of] those who are tainted.50 When I
mentioned this in the presence of Samuel he
remarked, 'As, for instance, a widow [who
was married] to a High Priest, a divorced
woman or a Haluzah51 to a common priest, a
bastard or a Nethinah51 to an Israelite, or the
daughter of an Israelite to a Nathin51 or a
bastard; but if a man married a woman and
lived with her ten years and she bore no child
he cannot be compelled [to divorce her]'. R.
Tahlifa b. Abimi, however, stated in the name
of Samuel: Even the man who married a
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
103
woman and lived with her ten years and she
bore no child may be compelled [to divorce
her].52
We learned, THE FOLLOWING ARE
COMPELLED TO DIVORCE [THEIR
WIVES]: A MAN WHO IS AFFLICTED
WITH BOILS OR HAS A POLYPUS. This53
is quite justified according to R. Assi, since
only Rabbinically forbidden cases were
enumerated whilst those which are
Pentateuchally forbidden were omitted.54
According to R. Tahlifa b. Abimi55 however,
our Mishnah should also have stated: If a
man married a woman and lived with her for
ten years and she bore no child he may be
compelled [to divorce her].56 — R. Nahman
replied: This is no difficulty. For in the latter
case57 [compulsion is exercised] by words; in
the former58 cases, by whips.59
R. Abba demurred: A servant will not be
corrected by words!60 — The fact, however,
explained R. Abba, is that in all these cases61
[compulsion is exercised] by means of whips
one who is epileptic'. [H] in Nif. 'to be' ,נכפה .1
overtaken by a demon'.
2. Because a woman may conceal her epilepsy by
remaining indoors when the attack comes on.
3. In such a case she can avoid appearing in
public when she feels the approach of the
attack.
4. V. Our Mishnah.
5. The nature of these is explained in the
Gemara.
6. I.e., that the husband's defects spoken of in
our Mishnah arose after he married the
woman.
7. Cf. supra n. 10, i.e., the man was afflicted with
the defects before his marriage.
8. Cf. supra p. 481, n. 10. In this case the woman
might well plead that had she known that the
man would later develop bodily defects she
would never have consented to marry him.
9. V. supra p. 481, n. 10.
10. Since it is reasonable to expect a woman to
object to the former but not to the latter.
11. Of course she was, the defects having arisen
prior to her marriage.
12. Hence her right to claim a divorce.
13. This paragraph appears in old edd. and Alfasi
(cf. BaH a.l.) as a Mishnah.
14. Which implies that only in this particular case
is the Halachah in agreement with R. Simeon
b. Gamaliel.
15. V. B.B. 174a.
16. V. Git. 74a.
17. V. Sanh. 31a.
18. Rabbah b. Bar Hana maintaining that a
general rule had been laid down whilst R.
Abba b. Jacob disputes this.
19. Cf. [G] and v. Gemara infra.
20. This is explained in the Gemara.
21. Lit., 'to receive', 'accept'.
22. Without leaving any issue.
23. It is the duty of the surviving brother to
contract the levirate marriage with the widow
(v. Deut. XXV, 5ff).
24. The widow.
25. Lit., 'smell of the mouth'.
26. Attributing to Samuel the definition given in
the Baraitha and vice versa.
27. Mouth in association with the name of Samuel
suggesting that it was Samuel who interpreted
POLYPUS as offensive breath from the
mouth (cf. supra note 7).
28. Used for tanning.
29. Tosef. Keth. VII, which is contradictory to the
definition given here by Rab Judah.
30. That 'one who gathers' means a tanner.
31. Which shows that 'tanner' and 'one who
gathers' are two distinct occupations.
32. Against the Baraitha which defines 'one who
gathers' as a 'tanner'.
33. Lit., 'here', the term TANNER specifically
mentioned.
34. Who does not himself gather the excrements.
35. 'One WHO GATHERS'.
36. Who must himself gather the excrements
needed for his work.
37. Cf. supra p. 483, n. 11.
38. Of 'one who GATHERS'.
39. Rab Judah, in differing from the Baraitha,
adopted this latter definition.
40. Var. lec. Rab (Aruch.).
41. [H], pl. of [H]j, 'smith';דודי, pl. of [H] (Bib.
Heb. דוד), 'pot', 'kettle'.
42. Lit., 'cuts … from its root', sc. source'.
43. Like an animal, since he, by being so
credulous as to accept an absurd statement,
displayed no higher intelligence.
44. Why does he order divorce rather than
maintenance?
45. Metaph. Divorce is, therefore, preferable.
46. From Babylon to Palestine.
47. Rab's ruling supra.
48. I.e., that R. Johanan also was of the same
opinion as Rab.
49. Var. lec., Rab (Asheri), R. Ashi (Alfasi).
50. I.e., those who are disqualified to their
husbands as priests or from marrying into the
congregation of Israel. [Var. lec., 'We compel
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
104
in the case of tainted (women)'. A man who
married a woman disqualified to him is
compelled to put her away (v. Shittah
Mekubbezeth). According to our text it might
be suggested that Samuel's dictum is
restricted to cases where the defect resides in
the woman and does not exclude the cases of
blemishes dealt with in our Mishnah, where
the defect is in the man].
51. V. Glos.
52. Because propagation of the species is one of
the 613 commandments.
53. The omission from this list in our Mishnah of
the tainted persons enumerated by Samuel.
54. As these are obvious.
55. Who, unlike R. Assi, included the man, whose
wife had no child after living for ten years
with him, among those who are compelled to
divorce their wives.
56. Since compulsion in this case is only a
Rabbinical ordinance.
57. Lit., 'that', the man whose wife had no child
for ten years (v. supra n. 6).
58. Those enumerated in our Mishnah.
59. As the compulsion in the latter case is merely
in the nature of persuasion it could not be
included among the others.
60. Prov. XXIX, 19. How then would a man who
refuses to carry out a decision of a court of
law be moved by mere persuasion?
61. The man whose wife had no child as well as
those enumerated in our Mishnah. Lit., 'that
and that'.
Kethuboth 77b
but in the former, if she said, 'I wish to be
with him', she is allowed [to live with him]
whilst in the latter,1 even if she said, 'I wish
to be with him', she is not allowed [to
continue to live with him].2 But behold [the
case of the man who was] afflicted with boils
with whom the woman is not allowed to live
even if she said, 'I wish to be with him', for
we learned: THE ONLY EXCEPTION
BEING A MAN AFFLICTED WITH BOILS
BECAUSE SHE [BY HER INTERCOURSE]
WILL ENERVATE HIM, and this case was
nevertheless enumerated!3 — There,4 if she
were to say. 'I will live with him under [the
supervision of] witnesses',5 she would be
allowed [to remain with him] but here,6 even
if she were to say, 'I will live with him under
[the supervision of] witnesses,' she would not
be allowed to do so.
It was taught: R. Jose related, An old man of
the inhabitants of Jerusalem told me, 'There
are twenty-four [kinds of] skin disease,7 and
in respect of all these the Sages said,
"Intercourse is injurious", but most of all is
this the case with those afflicted with
ra'athan'.8 What is the cause of it? — As it
was taught: If a man had intercourse
immediately after being bled, he will have
feeble9 children; if intercourse took place
after the man and the woman10 had been bled
they will have children afflicted with
Ra'athan. R. Papa stated: This11 has been
said only in the case where nothing was
tasted [after the bleeding] but if something
was tasted there can be no harm.12
What are the13 symptoms? — His eyes tear,
his nostrils run, spittle flows from his mouth
and flies swarm about him. What is the
cure?13 — Abaye said: Pila,14 ladanum,15 the
rind of a nut tree, the shavings of a dressed
hide,16 melilot17 and the calyx18 of a red date-
tree. These must be boiled together and
carried into a house of marble,19 and if no
marble house is available they may be
carried into a house [the walls of which are of
the thickness] of seven bricks and a half.20
Three hundred cups [of the mixture] must
then be poured upon his21 head until his
cranium is softened, and then his brain is cut
open. Four leaves of myrtle must be brought
and each foot22 [in turn] lifted up and one
[leaf] placed [beneath it].23 It24 is then
grasped with a pair of tweezers and burned;
for otherwise it would return to him.21
R. Johanan issued the announcement:
Beware of the flies of the man afflicted with
ra'athan.25
R. Zera never sat [with such a sufferer] in the
same draught. R. Eleazar never entered his
tent. R. Ammi and R. Assi never ate any of
the eggs coming from the alley in which he
lived. R. Joshua b. Levi, however, attached
himself to these [sufferers] and studied the
Torah; for he said, A lovely hind and a
graceful doe,26 if [the Torah] bestows grace
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
105
upon those who study it, would it not also
protect them?
When he27 was about to die the Angel of
Death was instructed, 'Go and carry out his
wish'. When he came and showed himself to
him the latter said, 'Show me my place [in
Paradise]'. — 'Very well', he replied. 'Give
me your knife', the other demanded, '[since,
otherwise], you may frighten me on the way'.
He gave it to him. On arriving there he lifted
him up and showed him [his place]. The
latter jumped and dropped on the other side
[of the wall].28 He seized him by the corner of
his cloak; but the other exclaimed, 'I swear
that I will not go back'. Thereupon the Holy
One, blessed be He, said, 'If he ever had an
oath of his annulled29 he must return;30 but if
not, he need not return'. 'Return to me my
knife', he said to him; but the other would
not return it to him. A Bath Kol31 went forth
and said to him, 'Return the thing to him, for
it is required for the mortals'.32
Elijah33 heralded him34 proclaiming. 'Make
room for the son of Levi, make room for the
son of Levi'. As he34 proceeded on his way he
found R. Simeon b. Yohai sitting on thirteen
stools35 of gold. 'Are you', the latter asked
him, 'the son of Levi?' — 'Yes', he replied.
'Has a rainbow [the latter asked again] ever
appeared in your lifetime?' — 'Yes', he
replied. 'If that is so [the other said] you are
not the son of Levi'.36 The fact, however, is37
that there was no such thing [in his lifetime],
but he38 thought, 'I must take no credit for
myself'.
R. Hanina b. Papa was his39 friend, and when
he was about to die the Angel of Death was
commanded, 'Go and carry out any wish of
his'. He went to his house and revealed
himself to him. 'Allow me', the latter said to
him, 'thirty days in which to revise my
studies', for it was said,40 'Happy is he who
comes here in full possession of his learning'.
He left him, and after thirty days he
appeared to him again. 'Show me', the latter
said to him 'my place [in Paradise]'. 'Very
well', he replied. 'Give me your knife', the
other said to him, [since otherwise], you may
frighten me on the way'. 'Do you wish to treat
me as your friend41 has done?' he asked.
'Bring', the other replied, 'the Scroll of the
Law and see if anything that is written
therein has not been observed by me'. 'Have
you attached yourself', he asked 'to the
sufferers of Ra'athan and engaged thus in the
study of the Torah?'42 Nevertheless when his
soul passed to its eternal rest, a pillar of fire
formed a partition between him and the
world; and we have it as a tradition that such
a partition by a pillar of fire is made only for
a person who is unique in his generation43 or
[one] of the two [outstanding men] in his
generation. R. Alexandri approached him
and said, 'Do it for the honor of the Sages',
but he disregarded him. 'Do it [he said] for
the honor of your father's house', but he
again disregarded him. 'Do it [he finally
requested] for your own honor's sake' [and
the pillar of fire] departed.
Abaye remarked: [The purpose of the pillar
of fire was] to keep away44 anyone who had
failed to observe even a single letter45 [of the
Torah]. Said R. Adda b. Mattena to him:
[This then would also] exclude the Master,
since he has no battlement to his roof.46 The
fact, however, was47 that he did have one, but
the wind had thrown it down at that moment.
R. Hanina said: Why are there no sufferers
from Ra'athan in Babylon? — Because they
eat beet48 and drink beer containing
cuscuta49 of the hizme50 shrub.
R. Johanan stated: Why are there no lepers
in Babylon? — Because they eat beet,48 drink
beer, and bathe in the waters of the
Euphrates.
1. Lit., 'here'. V. supra p. 485, n. 9.
2. V. supra p. 485, n. 3.
3. An objection against R. Abba's explanation.
4. In the case just cited.
5. Sc. only to attend on him, while refraining
from intercourse.
6. The case of the man whose wife had no child
for ten years after their marriage.
7. Lit., 'stricken with boils'.
KESUVOS – 54b-77b
106
8. Tosef. Keth. VII, ad fin. [H] (cf. [H]
'trembling'), one of the skin diseases causing
nervous trembling and extreme debility of the
body (v. Jast.). Aliter: A person having an
insect in his brain (cf. Rashi).
9. Or 'nervous'. [H] 'to unnerve'.
10. Lit., 'both of them'.
11. The warning against intercourse after being
bled.
12. Lit., 'we have nothing against it'.
13. Lit., 'his', of the man suffering from Ra'athan.
14. A fragrant plant (v. Jast.). Aliter: polion
(Rashi). Aliter: Penny royal (cf. Golds. 'Polei').
15. Or 'labdanum', [G], a soft black or dark
brown resinous exudation from the Cistus or
rock rose.
16. These fall off when the hide is being
smoothed.
17. Sweet scented clover.
18. [H] (cf. [H], half-ripe date), the calyx of the
date when it is in its early unripe condition.
19. To shut out all draughts.
20. [H] is of the size of half a brick, the size of the
brick being three handbreadths.
21. The sufferer from Ra'athan.
22. Of the insect (cf. Rashi's interpretation, supra
p. 486, n. 9).
23. Thus preventing the insect from burying its
feet in the brain when lifted out.
24. The insect.
25. Which are infectious.
26. Prov. V, 19, a reference to the Torah.
27. R. Joshua b. Levi.
28. Of Paradise.
29. [H] (rt. [H] 'to ask' in Ithpa'el) 'to ask a
competent authority for absolution from an
oath or a vow'.
30. His present oath can also be annulled.
31. V. Glos.
32. Lit., 'creatures'
33. Elijah, the prophet who went up by a
whirlwind into heaven (II Kings II, 11).
34. R. Joshua b. Levi.
35. [H] (v. Levy and Jast.). A more acceptable
rendering might be: Sitting at thirteen tables
of fine gold (cf. [H] 'a table').
36. I.e., the saintly man concerning whom Elijah
made his proclamation. The rainbow being a
token of the covenant (Gen. IX, 12) that,
though the people deserved destruction, the
waters shall no more become a flood to
destroy all flesh (ibid. 15), should not appear
in the lifetime of a saint whose merit alone is
sufficient to save the world from destruction
(v. Rashi).
37. Lit., 'and this is not (so)'.
38. R. Joshua b. Levi.
39. The pronoun refers to the Angel of Death
(Rashi) or to R. Joshua b. Levi (according to a
MS.).
40. In the world to come (cf. B.B. 10b).
41. Cf. p. 488, nn. 11 and 12.
42. Sc. he was not even as pious and staunch in
his faith as R. Joshua b. Levi to trust in the
power of the Torah to protect him from all
evil. If the latter, despite his extreme piety, did
not hesitate to outwit the Angel of Death, how
much more likely was he to do so.
43. Head and shoulders above them in learning
and piety.
44. From attending on the deceased.
45. 'Even … letter' is deleted by Rashal. [On this
reading render: 'Who has failed to observe
(the Torah as he did)', v. Rashi].
46. Which is a contravention of Deut. XXII, 8.
47. Lit., 'and this is not (so)'.
48. Aliter: Tomatoes.
49. Instead of the usual hops.
50. Prob. Spira Regia (Jast.); [G] is also suggested
as a probable derivation.